MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SHERMAN ADAMS
THE WHITE HOUSE


In accordance with your memorandum of June 13, 1955, I am submitting the enclosed statement setting forth the views of the Department of State on the recommendations of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities.

HERBERT HOOVER, JR.

Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

Department of State
Views on Subject Report.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Appendix I) Regarding the National Security Agency and Regarding Communications and Electronics

In accordance with the memorandum of June 13 from the Assistant to the President, it was requested that the coordinated views of the interested departments and agencies with respect to the subject Appendix of the Hoover Commission Task Force Report be submitted within 60 days.

The views of interested departments and agencies have been obtained by thorough discussion of the two parts of the Appendix in the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and in the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB). The agreed comments of the two Boards on the two parts are enclosed herewith, together with the covering memoranda from the Acting Executive Secretary of USCIB, and from the Chairman of USCSB.

In his special first indorsement of Part 1 of the Appendix, the Chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities especially emphasized the importance of Recommendation 2 of Part 1, which calls for a "much greater and continuing effort" to produce high level material. You will note, in connection with USCIB's comment on this recommendation that it is reported that steps are being taken to obtain the services of the most highly qualified scientific and technical experts for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the feasibility of solving the problem concerned. Until this investigation has been completed and the steps referred to in USCIB's comments on Recommendation 2 have been taken, the Board feels that it should defer comment on the expansion of the NSA effort recommended by the Report.

Enclosures:
1. Comments by USCIB and USCSB
2. Memo fr Aog Ex Sec, USCIB
3. Memo fr Chairman, USCSB

Allen W. Dulles

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

NLE Date 2/8/55

PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 11849, Sec. 13, 40 FR 46177

NLE DATE 2/8/55
Dear Colonel Goodpastor:

Reference Bulletin No. 56-2 of the Bureau of the Budget, dated July 13, 1955, Chairman Steidle of this Agency has directed that I submit a statement on the subject matter of that bulletin.

This Agency has reviewed the following report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government:

Intelligence Activities

The nature of our Agency is such that the above report has insufficient effect on our operations to warrant comment thereon.

Sincerely yours,

Robert J. Freehling
General Counsel

Colonel Andrew J. Goodpastor, Jr.
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
July 26, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STRAUSS

Governor Adams asked me to tell you that it will be entirely satisfactory for you to
take the extra time for preparing your views
regarding the Hoover Commission Task Force
Report on Intelligence Activities, which you
requested in your memorandum of July 19 to
him.

A. J. Goodpastor
Colonel, G-2, U S Army
Staff Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR: Governor Sherman Adams
The Assistant to the President


On June 13th you transmitted to me portions of the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities and asked that a review be made of it so that the views of the Commission with respect to it could be submitted within 60 days. Since so large a portion of my staff is directly connected with preparation for the Atomic Conference in Geneva and since I will probably be away from Washington for the first two weeks of August, this is to request that you allow me a two-week time extension. I would try to have our views before you by August 26th. Will this be satisfactory?

Lewis L. Strauss
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION 
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ANDREW J. GOGOLASTOR 
Staff Secretary 
The White House 

Subject: Hoover Commission Report

In connection with the classified report on communications intelligence prepared by the Hoover Commission, it is our conclusion that the report is correct in its statements of fact and that, in principle, the conclusions and recommendations are sound.

As you may know, the Science Advisory Committee, at the direction of the National Security Council, made a very thorough investigation of all phases of our readiness including communications, and its conclusions in general parallel the findings of the Hoover Commission. Action recommendations on the Science Advisory Committee report will be made to the National Security Council probably within the next two weeks, and it would be my suggestion that the Hoover Commission classified report be held and reviewed with the President after he has heard the finding of the Science Advisory Committee.

The organizational recommendations in the Science Advisory Committee report are somewhat more far-reaching than those suggested in the Hoover Commission report and, if adopted, would probably satisfy the recommendations of the Hoover Commission report.

We do have two minor items in connection with the Hoover Commission Report that might warrant further attention. They are as follows:

1. Is Fort Meade a suitable dispersal location for the National Security Agency taking into account communications vulnerability together with today's weapon sizes?

2. We would urge that the Director of the National Security Agency be made a member or at least an observer on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Due to the long lead time required to implement actions taken by the Committee, a better programming job could be done.

I will be glad to discuss this matter further with you if you so desire.

Arthur S. Flemming 
Director
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The Assistant to the President

July 6, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Please feel free to go ahead with the production of extra copies of the reports referred to in your memorandum to me (TS 103808) of 1 July. This memorandum constitutes authorization as requested in your memorandum.

S. A.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Governor Sherman Adams, The White House

SUBJECT: Consideration of Appendix I of the Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force by USCIB and USCSB

1. In your memorandum of June 13, you request that the views of USCIB and USCSB on Appendix I of the Hoover Commission Task Force be supplied to your office within 60 days. Analysis of the Report indicates that it will be necessary to reproduce the Report to a limited extent in order to make it possible for the two Boards concerned to consider it.

2. It is understood that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Agency, as well as the CIA, have already received copies of the Report. Accordingly, authorization is requested to make six additional copies for the other members of USCIB, as follows: State, FBI, Air Force, Navy, Army and the Office of the Executive Secretary of USCIB.

3. In addition to the above, in order to arrange for consideration of the pertinent sections of the Appendix by the USCSB, authorization is requested to reproduce 11 copies of these sections. These would be issued to NSA, CIA, OSD, Army, Navy, Air Force, FBI, State, Treasury, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Office of the Executive Secretary of the USCSB. The appropriate sections would be Section III of Part 1 (pp. 19--24), with Recommendations 4 and 5, and Section VII of Part 2 (pp. 16--20), with Conclusion 11 and Recommendations 8, 9 and 10 and the special recommendation.

ALLEN J. DULLES
Director

DECLASSIFIED

Authority mRN 4-2 #18
July 5, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR

GOVERNOR ADAMS:

Re: Report of the Hoover Commission
Task Force on Intelligence Activities
(Federal Bureau of Investigation)

I have your memorandum on the above subject, dated
June 13, 1955. These excerpts from the classified report of the
Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities have been
carefully reviewed. I am enclosing a memorandum to me from the
Director of the FBI, dated June 28, 1955, on this subject and have
no further comments to add.

CC - Mr. Hoover

Attachment
July 5, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. W. H. Godel
Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense

With reference to your letter of 1 July,
your request to take the action described
therein has been approved.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army
Staff Secretary
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL A. J. GOODPASTER

THE WHITE HOUSE

In accordance with the arrangements we made over the telephone with respect to the Hoover Commission Report on intelligence, this memorandum will introduce Mr. Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, who is cleared to receive State Department documents of all classifications. His area of the State Department is responsible for intelligence liaison with CIA. He has "Q" clearance and is fully cleared and indoctrinated under USCIB Directive No. 5.

Robert G. Barnes
Deputy Director
Executive Secretariat
MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Andrew J. Goodpasture, The White House


1. In pursuance of our telephone conversation today, this is to inform you that the Director of Central Intelligence has authorized the reproduction of Appendix I of the Hoover Commission Task Force Report in order to make possible its consideration by USCIB and USCSB.

2. Reproduction will take place under the following conditions:

   a. Six additional copies of Appendix I, both parts, will be made for those members of USCIB which have not already been supplied with a copy. These are: State, FBI, Air Force, Navy, Army and the Office of the Executive Secretary of USCIB.

   b. In connection with consideration of the pertinent sections of the Appendix by USCSB, eleven copies will be reproduced of Section III of Part 1 (pp 19-24), with Recommendations 4 and 5, and Section VIII of Part 2 (pp 16-20), with Conclusion 11 and Recommendations 8, 9 and 10 and the special recommendation. These will be issued to NSA, CIA, OSD, Army, Navy, Air Force, FBI, State, Treasury, AEC and the Office of the Executive Secretary of USCSB.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE:

EDMUND H. KELLOGG

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

N.E. Date 4/11/61
Washington, June 29—Action by the Congress and the President to set up a "watch-dog" system to check the operations and expenditures of Intelligence agencies of the Government is recommended by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.

In a report to the Congress today on Intelligence Activities of the Government, the Hoover Commission finds that such an arrangement is needed not only to review the efficiency and effectiveness of the Intelligence effort, but also to reassure the people and inspire greater confidence in the trustworthiness of this phase of Federal operations.

The Commission's recommendation involves the creation of two committees which might collaborate on important matters in this field. One would be a joint Congressional committee on Foreign Intelligence, and the other would be a compact group of trustworthy private citizens to be named by the President and to serve on a part-time basis.

The Intelligence Task Force, headed by General Mark W. Clark, now president of the Citadel in Charleston, S.C., in a report to the Commission proposed the establishment of a "watch-dog" group for the same purposes, but in a different form. The task force urged the creation of a single small permanent commission by Act of Congress for the Intelligence surveillance job, to be modeled after the Hoover Commission and to include Members of both Houses of Congress as well as distinguished private citizens.

The other proposals of the task force, involving both administrative and legislative action and including broad recommendations for an internal
Recommendation No. 1 of the task force report explained that the CIA should be revamped internally "to produce greater emphasis on certain of its basic statutory functions."

Details and supporting factual matter relating to this recommendation were contained in a separate, highly classified report which was submitted by the task force to Mr. Hoover and presented by him directly to President Eisenhower. Much of this data could not be incorporated in the public report for security reasons.

Both of the task force reports, based on exhaustive surveys in this country and first-hand studies abroad, emphasized that the major aim should be greater concentration on the collection of information about technological and military developments and plans of "our primary target"—the Soviet bloc—and called for greater boldness and freedom of action for our Intelligence forces to overcome the present deficiencies in this country's knowledge of Communist plans.

In a discussion of the State Department's responsibilities and the effect of foreign policies and diplomacy on Intelligence operations, the report said:

"The task force has recognized the incompatibility in method between the practice of diplomacy and more direct and active operations incident to the collection of Intelligence and the conduct of cold war.

"While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts between them must be resolved, usually on a high level, and always in the national interest. It must be realized that diplomacy is not an end in itself; that, while national ends must be served and unjustifiable risks avoided, the collection of
intelligence is a vital element in our national welfare and existence. Instances have come to the attention of the task force where too conservative an attitude has prevailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely action in this field."

The task force expressed the view that the legislation, and organizational set-up for Intelligence purposes are soundly conceived, but that administrative flaws have developed and it proposes remedies.

"Failure to produce certain elements of intelligence has been due in part to the restrictive effects of some of our national attitudes and policies toward the collection of Intelligence so necessary for effective resistance to Soviet aggression," the report added. "Also, among some of those responsible for implementation of our foreign policy by diplomacy and negotiation, there seems to exist an abhorrence to anything that might lead to diplomatic or even protocol complications.

"This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at times has stifled initiative and action in the collection of intelligence. Some of these efforts, if permitted to proceed properly, might have brought direct and immediate results and made positive contributions to the national welfare that would have justified the attendant political risks and possible inconsequential diplomatic embarrassment.

"Security measures adopted by the Communists have been provocingly conceived and boldly employed. They have been quite effective in comparison with our security measures, which have permitted the collection of vital secrets in this country with relative ease.

"The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through concentration on the prime target we much exert every
conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities."

All elements of the Intelligence field were surveyed by the task force, but major attention was paid to the CIA because of the special autonomous character of that agency and because "it is charged with the overall responsibility for coordinating the output of all the intelligence forces."

The recommendations included provisions for lifting the prestige of the Intelligence forces, developing career incentives, providing greater flexibility of recruitment of "the best qualified individuals," and relieving the shortage of trained personnel.

They also embraced suggestions for strengthening security surveys of Intelligence workers and employees of industrial plants engaged in "sensitive" work.

In the matter of personnel security checks, the task force had this to say: "The methods used for selection of personnel were reassuring in the light of suspicions which have been voiced that subversive and Communist elements were readily infiltrating into these sensitive jobs. Our investigations indicated that the Intelligence leadership in all branches is alert to its responsibility and is functioning under strict rules to prevent any such infiltration.

"One flaw in the present system, however, seems to be the absence of a general plan for periodic review of the security status of every person after employment in Intelligence activities, to guard against the possibility that some employee who was completely dependable and honorable when starting
work might have changed character, fallen from grace, or succumbed to alien blandishments or some personal weakness such as strong drink or sexual perversion."

To minimize this hazard, the task force recommended that measures be instituted in all agencies for rechecking the security status of all personnel engaged in Intelligence, at periodic intervals not to exceed five years in any individual case. The Federal Bureau of Investigation makes such a periodic check of all its personnel.

The investigations of the task force with respect to industrial personnel security indicated "a serious weakness" arising from the fact that an individual who has been declared to be a security risk although removed from work of a classified nature, might still be retained on some other work in the same plant, be in daily contact with workers engaged in sensitive production and enjoy freedom of movement within the plant.

"The military departments are aware of the situation," the task force said, "and have recommended legislation to correct this deficiency. The task force commends such a proposal and feels that this loophole in our security barriers should be closed promptly. . .

"Although detailed study of the policies, functions and procedures of the departments and agencies collecting and handling Intelligence data, as outlined to us by the Commission, did not primarily entail the investigation of the security angle of every individual engaged in Intelligence, we recognized the fact that the character of personnel affects these Intelligence functions, and we faced squarely the issue of individual cases under suspicion or brought to our attention from various sources. A number of names came to us with supposedly derogatory information or merely with derogatory implications."
When any such information or any name was brought to our attention from any source concerning individuals employed in the Intelligence field, or even if not so employed, every case except those obviously without merit was referred to the FBI, or where appropriate, to the responsible agency, or to both, with a request for a report.

"Up to the time this report was prepared, some replies to our inquiry developed information to the effect that the records contained no adequate basis for suspicion of the individuals as security risks. Some replies indicated that the individuals were under investigation and that the investigations were continuing. One of the individuals is on leave without pay, pending completion of an investigation now in process, and appropriate disposition."

The report by General Clark's group said its investigations showed that the "sensitive and vital work of the Intelligence community is being led by a group which is sincere and dedicated to the service of the nation," and that it felt the American people "can and should give their full confidence and support to the Intelligence program, and contribute in every possible way to the vital work."

"We found the Director of Central Intelligence," it continued, "to be industrious, objective, selfless, enthusiastic and imaginative. We are convinced, however, that in his enthusiasm he has taken upon himself too many burdensome duties and responsibilities on the operational side of CIA's activities."

The report suggested that the Director of CIA employ an executive director, or "chief of staff," so that he might be "relieved of the chore of many day-to-day administrative and operational problems, and thus be able to give more time to the broad, overall direction of the agency and the coordination of the entire Intelligence effort."
The task force expressed concern over the "possibility of the growth of license and abuses of power where disclosure of costs, organization, personnel and functions are precluded by law," as is the case with CIA. Although the investigation showed no indication of such abuses, as a matter of future insurance it recommended that its proposed "watch-dog" commission including distinguished public-spirited citizens as members, be empowered by law to ask for and receive, under adequate safeguards against "leaks," any information from any source it might need for its own use.

Within the Armed Services Committee, it explained, there is a liaison channel between the Congress and CIA which "serves a worthy purpose" but which cannot include private citizens and does not encompass the wide scope of service and continuity which the investigators consider essential for this task. It found the same defect in more than a score of bills introduced in this session of the Congress to provide for review of CIA's work.

In a discussion of the evolution and growth of our Intelligence program, giving the public a clearer conception of the significance of the operations in modern times, the task force report says:

"For self-preservation, the defenders of a free world need complete, prompt and continuing information on the plans and potentialities of those who would enslave it. Nations and people who value liberty and a sovereign national existence in a free world now look to the United States for leadership and inspiration in their struggle to safeguard these inherent rights.

"In the historic family of nations, this country ranks as a comparative newcomer. In the early days of the Republic—not so long ago as the world measures time—our people felt comfortably distant from the hotbeds of foreign intrigue and conflict."
Transportation and communication facilities in the days of clipper ships and the pony express were so limited and so slow that they fostered a serene assurance of isolation and geographical protection against possible aggressors. . . Our early philosophy of peace still prevails, but within our generation, and for our own protection, organized Intelligence has been forced upon us by the rapidly shrinking world of electronics, nuclear weapons and planes which travel at supersonic speed.

"The United States emerged from World War II as the political leader in free-world affairs and the outstanding military power. The advent of atomic bombs, together with the development of advanced methods for their delivery, intensified the need for adequate and timely intelligence so that we might fulfill our responsibilities in international affairs and insure our own survival.

"Effective Intelligence has become increasingly necessary for our protection against the propaganda, infiltration, and aggressiveness of the Communist leaders. By trial and error, study and skill, we have made progress; but we must not labor under any complacent delusions. There is still much to be done by our Intelligence community to bring its achievements up to an acceptable level."

The task force report cites "the tremendous importance to our country of the Intelligence effort and the unpublicized and selfless duties performed," and says that these services "demand that the prestige of this function, and of the personnel involved, be recognized through the use of adequate career incentives and benefits to encourage full development of talent within the Intelligence community."

To that end the task force recommends that the Executive Pay Bill of 1949 be amended to increase the annual salary of the Director of Central Intelligence
to the equivalent of that of the Deputy Secretary of Defense ($20,000); to bring the pay of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence up to $17,500, the same as that of most under secretaries of the Executive Branch; and to provide operating directors of areas of responsibility in Intelligence with proportionate salaries.

The recommendation further would provide that the chiefs of the various Intelligence units of the military services be elevated in the organizational structure to the level of Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army and Air Force, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy.

Under this plan also the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 would be amended to provide additional medical and hospital benefits and services for dependents of CIA employees when stationed overseas, similar to the benefits authorized for dependents of the members of the Foreign Service; and statutory leave benefits, or accumulation of leave, for employees of CIA overseas, as now applied to members of the Foreign Service.

The task force calls attention to important contributions which might be made to the Intelligence effort by retired civilians with long business experience in the foreign field, and suggests that "this resource should be exploited fully." It points also to the valuable reservoir of retired military personnel with foreign experience which might be utilized.

One major advantage in the exploitation of these trained groups, according to the task force, would be the speed with which they could be fitted into the Intelligence picture. Certain outmoded restrictions now are placed on the full use of this pool of talent.

To remedy this situation, the recommendation is made that the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 be amended to authorize the employment by the
CIA of retired military personnel of the Armed Services "without an arbitrary limitation on the number of such employees." The limit now is fifteen. Such personnel would be authorized to accept either their military retirement pay plus any difference between their retirement pay and the proper pay of the office they would hold in CIA, or the proper pay of the office, but not both.

The recommendation further proposes that the Department of Defense make extensive use of Schedule A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive appointments) in the employment by the military services of civilian Intelligence analysts and other specialists "in order to provide the necessary flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel and to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between Zone of Interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service. Such appointments would take in retired citizens with wide previous business experience in the foreign field.

"Lack of adequate linguistic preparation often has proved to be a serious handicap to our representatives abroad," the task force further reports. "This became painfully apparent during the Korean War. The ability to write and speak the language fluently, and to interpret foreign words and idioms accurately always helps an American to get around in a alien land, to win the confidence of its people, and to understand them."

To meet the present deficiency, the task force recommends that a "comprehensive, coordinated program be developed to extend linguistic training among American citizens serving the Intelligence effort; and that the Department of Defense expand and promote language training by offering credit toward Reserve commissions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reserve personnel for completion of selected language courses."

As an added means of insuring adequate supervision over certain specialized phases of Intelligence activities, the task force also urges that prompt
steps be taken "to introduce highly selective methods of choosing members of the coordinating committee on atomic energy Intelligence, not only to get the benefit of service by the most competent individuals, but also to assure long tenure in this important assignment."

On the ground that efficient and economical handling of Intelligence information demands modern quarters for the personnel and records, General Clark's group recommends that the Congress appropriate "as soon as possible" funds to construct adequate headquarters facilities for the CIA in or near Washington, D. C. It points out that after eight years of operation, the agency still lacks such facilities.

The CIA is known to have its headquarters records and workers scattered about in more than thirty buildings here, some of them outmoded "temporaries" dating back to World War I: A bill now before the Congress calls for the erection of a central CIA structure estimated to cost about $50,000,000, with not more than $6,000,000 additional for an appropriate site and site improvements.

Officials of the agency have estimated that about $2,920,000 could be saved annually if all of its offices, records and headquarters personnel could be brought under one roof.

The savings would include $853,000 now spent for twenty-four-hour guard service in all buildings and for extra guards necessary in protecting information and records, orders and other material which must be shuttled about daily from one office to another; $607,000 in loss of time now required for officials and employees to get from building to building; $133,500 now being paid for some rented quarters; $80,000 for receptionists required at each set of offices; $36,800 for shuttle service between offices; $32,800 in telephone mileage charges and $25,000 for PX services; $69,900 for couriers and
messengers; $50,000 for building servicing; and more than $1,000,000 to pay for alterations and improvements to old buildings to keep them in suitable shape and for heavy expense in moving and switching offices.

These expense items now are said to come to $3,800,000 a year, and could be cut to $880,000 a year in a single headquarters building, according to CIA estimates.

The task force finds fault with the present system of gathering and assaying foreign scientific progress, and proposes new methods for handling this work.

"Our Government and its Intelligence forces are not fully exploiting the possibilities of valuable military and technological data potentially available in scientific reports and technical publications issued in foreign countries," the report comments. "The State Department now is charged with this duty. Under this arrangement, we lack adequate collection facilities and staff experts to evaluate the material."

To correct this situation, it recommends that the responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific Intelligence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA, "with authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad."

Serving with General Clark on the Intelligence Task Force were Admiral Richard L. Conolly (retired), of Brooklyn, now president of Long Island University; Ernest F. Hollings, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina; Henry Kearns, manufacturer and executive, of La Verne, Calif.; Captain "Eddie" Rickenbacker, of New York, chairman of the board of Eastern Air Lines; and Donald S. Russell, president of the University of South Carolina. The staff director was Major General James G. Christiansen (retired).
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GOODPASTER

SUBJECT: Reproduction of the Report of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities

Permission is requested to reproduce approximately six copies of the main body of the subject report and of Appendix I. These additional copies are urgently needed in order to enable the numerous elements of the Department of Defense involved in intelligence activities to make their contributions to the Department of Defense comments due to the White House.

This office will undertake to insure that the additional copies are accounted for and destroyed after they have served this immediate purpose, and will inform you as soon as this has been done.

W. H. GODDELL
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON 14 Dec 56

MIC - lend Wright's copy for access to security

1 - Make pertinent copy extracts of Top Sec

2 - Inform agencies

3 - Do not provide agency comments
Document removed by the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

For further information, see entry / of the pink WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) at the front of this folder.
Rpt Recommendations  

Action - send to agencies concerned for consideration and report

Exec. Sp. Coun. on Communities

"Leads" warranting investigation

Action - Have investigations made where agencies concerned believe this to be indicated, and report submitted.

Brownell

A. Dulles
The Honorable Herbert Hoover,
Chairman, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government,
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

In my letter of submission of the Task Force Reports on Intelligence Activities of our Government, dated May 20, 1955, I indicated that the classified report was so assembled as to facilitate the distribution of certain sections to the various departments and agencies to which they apply.

You will recall that a number of recommendations which my Task Force made are of particular interest to and within the authority of the heads of various departments to adopt. The distribution recommended in the attached table is designed to place in the hands of the heads of the departments and agencies affected so much of the report as pertains to their areas of responsibility.

In addition to the single copy transmitted with my letter of May 20, 1955, a sufficient number of copies of the report have been reproduced to accomplish the distribution proposed herein. I suggest that these additional copies be placed at the disposal of the President, or his designated representative.

Sincerely,

Mark W. Clark
Mark W. Clark, Chairman,
Task Force on Intelligence Activities

Enclosure:
Table of Distribution
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. DILLON ANDERSON

In connection with the review your staff has been making of Department and Agency responses concerning the report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, there are attached CIA comments on those recommendations of Chapter IV of the report which relate to matters of interest or concern to that Agency. Also attached is a copy of Chapter IV itself, together with Department of Defense comments thereon.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army
Staff Secretary
July 10, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. DILLON ANDERSON

In connection with the review your staff has been making of Department and Agency responses concerning the report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, there are attached CIA comments on those recommendations of Chapter IV of the report which relate to matters of interest or concern to that Agency. Also attached is a copy of Chapter IV itself, together with Department of Defense comments thereon.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army
Staff Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. JAMES LAY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

In connection with the review you have been making of Department and Agency responses concerning the Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, there are attached: a) a copy of Governor Adams' memorandum to Dr. Flemming regarding the "Special Recommendation" in Appendix I, Part 2 of that report, and b) Dr. Flemming's response to Governor Adams', enclosing copies of memoranda to Secretary Wilson, and from Secretary Wilson and Mr. Allen Dulles.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army
Staff Secretary
The Assistant to the President

March 2, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE ARTHUR FLEMMING

SUBJECT: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Appendix I, Part 2)

Reference is made to your memorandum to Colonel Goodpaster dated July 6, 1955 wherein you set forth general comments relative to the "Special Recommendation" of the subject report which suggests: "That the President set up a special commission composed of technically qualified civil and military communications and electronics representatives, to survey and produce recommendations as to ways and means to insure the more effective utilisation of all communications and electronics resources of the United States in the national interests in case of war or national emergency."

On the basis of further analysis, it now appears desirable that more detailed views on this "Special Recommendation" be provided by the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Accordingly, it is requested that you obtain the views of the latter agencies with respect thereto and provide them to this office together with your own views concerning the substance of the Special Recommendation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10 Jan

Dr. Reed
Mr. Mills
Mr. Blacy
Mr. Perry

Cleared by all types of int. activities

I indicated we would plan to bring them in when reports start coming in.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Main Report)

Enclosed is one copy of Chapter IV of the main report on the subject and one copy of the Defense Department comments thereon.

Although Chapter IV of the subject report is concerned primarily with the Department of Defense, it is noted that certain of the recommendations of that Chapter, of which the following are noted, also relate to matters of interest or concern to the Central Intelligence Agency:

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<td>3</td>
<td>137</td>
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<td>4</td>
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It is requested that you examine the above-listed recommendations along the lines of your earlier review of other segments of the Report (as outlined in my memorandum to you dated June 13, 1955) and that you furnish your views thereon at your earliest convenience.

The enclosed material should be returned to this office at the time you furnish your views thereon.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Main Report)

Enclosed is one copy of Chapter IV of the main report on the subject and one copy of the Defense Department comments thereon.

Although Chapter IV of the subject report is concerned primarily with the Department of Defense, it is noted that certain of the recommendations of that Chapter, of which the following are noted, also relate to matters of interest or concern to the Central Intelligence Agency:

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It is requested that you examine the above-listed recommendations along the lines of your earlier review of other segments of the Report (as outlined in my memorandum to you dated June 13, 1955) and that you furnish your views thereon at your earliest convenience.

The enclosed material should be returned to this office at the time you furnish your views thereon.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Main Report)

Enclosed is one copy of Chapter IV of the main report on the subject and one copy of the Defense Department comments thereon.

Although Chapter IV of the subject report is concerned primarily with the Department of Defense, it is noted that the following recommendations of that Chapter also relate to matters of interest or concern to the Central Intelligence Agency:

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It is requested that you examine the above-listed recommendations along the lines of your review of other segments of the Report (as outlined in my memorandum to you dated June 13, 1955) and that you furnish your views thereon at your earliest convenience.

The enclosed material should be returned to this office at the time you finish your views thereon.

Sherman Adams
Assistant to the President
The Honorable Sherman Adams  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Governor Adams:

Reference is made to my letter dated 15 June 1955 concerning certain allegations against employees of this Agency which your office received from the Hoover Commission and which you turned over to this Agency on 2 June 1955.

I wish to inform you that the cases of have been considered by senior officials in the Central Intelligence Agency and I have approved their findings that these employees should be retained in their employment under the provisions of Executive Order 10450.

The case of is still under investigation by the FBI and, upon completion of investigation, will be fully adjudicated under Executive Order 10450. is no longer an employee and although he has re-applied, his acceptance will depend upon a favorable determination of his case. I will advise you separately at that time.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

27 Feb 52

Godell — Monday

re giving CIA 
the Defense comments.

27 Feb — He concurs.
February 15, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ANDERSON

SUBJECT: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities

In response to your request there follows a list of the recommendations of the subject report which Coyne has flagged as being of particular interest from the standpoint of the White House or the NSC. The list is keyed to Coyne's 1/20/56 memorandum (copy attached) which analyzes the entire report and agency comments thereon.

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Attention is directed to the fact that some of the attachments require Special Handling in line with COMINT regulations.

/s/ E. G.

S. Everett Gleason
Acting Executive Secretary

Coyne/MMC

DECLASSIFIED

Attachments Authority \( MR \, 79-3^{1/2} \)

By [Signature] Date 12/18/51
February 17, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GOODPASTER:

Per conversation.

J. Patrick Coyne

Attachment

Colonel A. J. Goodpaster
Staff Secretary.
The White House

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Memorandum for: Colonel A. J. Goodpaster
Staff Secretary
The White House

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force
on Intelligence Activities

On December 15, 1955, at the President's direction, you referred the following documents to me for further action and recommendations as appropriate: (1) the subject Report, and (2) departmental and agency comments upon applicable sections of the subject Report.

To facilitate consideration of the material which you referred to me, a member of the NSC Staff has prepared the enclosed memorandum and analysis dated January 20, 1956. When you have reviewed the attachments I suggest that we jointly consider the next step which should be taken with respect to the subject Report, with particular reference to those recommendations of the Report which suggest action by the White House and the National Security Council.

I want to specifically call your attention to those segments of the enclosed memorandum entitled "Additional Action Required" and "Observations." Because they were prepared by the aforementioned NSC staff representative merely in an effort to point up particularly relevant areas of the subject, and because they were included merely for our guidance, it is requested that they not be further disseminated by you.

It is my understanding that representatives of the Budget Bureau have reviewed the subject report and their written observations thereon are expected to be received momentarily.

Until we have had an opportunity to review this matter jointly, I do not contemplate taking any further action with respect to the subject. The Report, however, will be retained by us and, pursuant to the recent approval granted by you, will be made available to appropriate representatives of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

Enclosure
CHAPTER I - Brief History of U. S. Foreign Intelligence Activities
(Pages 1-12).

This Chapter contains no recommendations.

CHAPTER II - The Central Intelligence Agency (Pages 13-75).

Recommendation 1 (page 72): That "covert intelligence" and "cold war" functions of the current DD/P be assigned to separate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility shall be administratively and logistically self-supporting. (A minority of the Task Force members did not concur in this recommendation, believing that "covert intelligence" and "cold war" operations should be under the staff and operating control of a single operating Deputy Director - as at present.)

Agency Comment: CIA opposes the recommendation on the grounds that:
(1) "the experience of CIA during the period of separate operation prior to 1952 proved the operational disadvantages of attempting to conduct, on a secure and efficient basis, two world-wide clandestine organizations, each compartmented from the other"; and (2) organization of separate supporting elements for each of the clandestine services would be duplicative, costly and ineffective.

Additional Action Required: Presidential decision as to whether the Task Force (majority) recommendation or the contrary views of CIA should be adopted.

Observation: CIA's view should be adopted since the majority proposal of the Task Force has been tried previously and found less satisfactory than present organizational arrangements which combine the covert and cold war functions of CIA. (The CIA view is consistent with that of the Doolittle Committee whose survey of CIA's clandestine services was much more extensive than that made by the Task Force.)

Recommendation 2 (page 73): That CIA be reorganized with a Director, a Deputy Director, an Executive Director, a general Secretariat, necessary staff sections and offices of the administrative and logistic services and an operating Deputy Director of Intelligence with seven operating offices thereunder, including an Office of Basic Intelligence.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs in the creation of, and has established, an Office of Basic Intelligence. CIA notes that the balance of this recommendation consists of suggesting that the names of four of the offices under the Deputy Director.
Director of Intelligence be changed. CIA will change the name of one of
these offices shortly, but believes that little will be accomplished in
effecting the other name changes suggested.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 3 (page 73): That CIA re-establish the Office of Executive
Director to relieve the DCI of the necessity of having to devote a large
part of his time to the solution of many daily administrative and minor
operational problems.

Agency Comment: CIA is opposed on the grounds that the interposition of
another command echelon would not necessarily accomplish the intended
objective. CIA is giving this recommendation further study, however.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or the NSC.

Observation: This recommendation does not involve any major policy con-
siderations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended should be
left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 4 (page 73): That the status of the three major operating Deputy
Directors be changed from Civil Service appointees (now Grade GS-18)
to Public Law Presidential appointees, at an annual salary of $16,000.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs in the recommended pay increases but thinks
it unwise that the Operating Deputy Directors require Senatorial approval,
particularly where an individual's background and competence in clandestine
operations would have to be reviewed. CIA has received no indication of
any Senatorial desire to review CIA appointments, other than the appointments
of the DCI and his Deputy.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or NSC. CIA is taking
action through appropriate channels in an effort to obtain the pay increases
recommended.

Recommendation 5 (page 73): That the "cold war" operating deputy director be
designated as CIA's representative on the Operations Coordinating Board
to free the DCI to devote a greater share of his time to the Agency's
intelligence functions.

Agency Comment: CIA is opposed. It notes that the DCI is required to
personally attend OCB meetings by virtue of a Presidential Directive,
and that his participation in OCB meetings is not unduly burdensome.
CIA notes further that the Deputy Director/Plans is closely associated
with OCB activity in that CIA members of OCB working groups are drawn from
CIA's clandestine services.
**Additional Action Required:** Presidential decision as to whether the Task Force recommendation should be adopted.

**Observation:** Because the benefits derived from DCI's participation in OCB meetings outweigh the burdens occasioned by such participation, the Task Force recommendation should be rejected. If this observation is concurred in advice should be communicated to CIA as to the President's reaffirmation of the directive which provides for DCI's membership on the OCB.

**Recommendation 6 (page 73):** That a comprehensive internal management survey of the Agency be conducted by CIA within a year following the reorganization of CIA, as recommended by the Task Force.

**Agency Comment:** CIA presently has in progress three concurrent programs of an internal management nature.

**Additional Action Required:** None, at this time.

**Recommendation 7 (page 74):** That all NSC, IAC, and DCI Intelligence Directives be reviewed by the IAC and others concerned, with a view to establishing clearer areas of responsibility and to allocating intelligence tasks in accord with each agency's capability, interest, and paramount national responsibilities.

**Agency Comment:** The DCI will recommend the establishment of an IAC Subcommittee to review all such Intelligence Directives, as necessary, to clarify areas of responsibility or reallocate tasks.

**Additional Action Required:** Action at appropriate levels (IAC, DCI, NSC) to be taken on the basis of the review of Intelligence Directives being initiated by CIA.

**Recommendation 8 (page 74):**

**Additional Action Required:** None by the White House or the NSC.
Recommendation 9 (page 7k): That the Scientific Estimates Committee be abolished and in lieu thereof there be established under the IAC a Scientific Intelligence Committee with appropriate subcommittees to insure community-wide coordination.

Agency Comment: CIA is in general agreement with this recommendation. The substance thereof is under active consideration in the IAC.

Additional Action Required: None, other than the normal actions which will flow from IAC consideration of the recommendation.

Recommendation 10 (page 7k): That the effectiveness of CIA's security program be re-evaluated to establish a system assuring personnel security rechecks on a minimum five year basis.

Agency Comment: CIA reports that the recommended program has been in effect as of March 26, 1955 and, in addition, that there is a continuing review made of the security of its employees, including automatic rechecks in the case of personnel actions, such as transfers, promotions, appointments to special activities, etc.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 11 (page 7k): That Congress be requested to appropriate funds to construct adequate CIA housing facilities in or near Washington.

Agency Comment: CIA reports this has been done.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 12 (page 7k): That the CIA Act of 1949 be amended to authorize employment of "any" (instead of 15 now authorized) retired officers or warrant officers of the Armed Services; and to authorize overseas personnel additional dependent medical benefits and employee leave accumulations equivalent to those authorized for Foreign Service personnel.

Agency Comment: CIA would welcome an increase in the number of retired officers of the Armed Services authorized to be employed by the Agency. It believes that the authorized number should be between twenty-five and fifty. CIA concurs in granting additional Foreign Service benefits for dependents as well as leave benefits and leave accumulations for CIA employees.

(Current inquiry of CIA reflects the Agency has prepared draft legislation - now being processed by the Budget Bureau - designed to authorize employment of as many as forty retired officers of the Armed Services, as well as draft legislation
designed to carry into effect the Task Force recommendations concerning CIA personnel, their leave accumulations, and additional medical benefits for dependents of CIA employees stationed abroad.)

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 13 (page 75): That legislation be sought to increase the annual salary of the DCI to $20,000; to increase the compensation of the Deputy DCI to $17,500; and to authorize the appointment of an Executive Director of CIA at an annual salary of $16,000.

Agency Comment: The recommended increases in the salaries of the DCI and the Deputy DCI have been included in proposed amendments to the Executive Pay Bill of 1949. CIA, as indicated in Recommendation 3 above, opposes establishing the office of Executive Director, but is giving further study to the Task Force recommendation on this point.

Additional Action Required: None.

CHAPTER III - The Department of State (Pages 76-88).

Recommendation 1 (page 87): That the personnel strength of the Intelligence Area be maintained at a level consistent with functional responsibilities and work load.

Agency Comment: State concurs. An increase of ten persons for the present fiscal year has been authorized for the Intelligence Area. State is budgeting a substantial increase for its intelligence function in fiscal year 1957.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 2 (page 88): That NSCID No. 10 be revised to place responsibility for collection of information in the basic sciences in CIA.

Agency Comment: State reports that while it is not possible to comment favorably or unfavorably on this recommendation at this time, meetings on the subject are being held with CIA and every effort will be made to develop a satisfactory solution.

Additional Action Required: Action is dependent upon the outcome of the State-CIA meetings mentioned above and on the IAC review of all Intelligence Directives (to which reference is made in Chapter II, Recommendation 7).
Recommendation 3 (page 88): That State finalize its plans for the periodic review of all personnel coming within the provisions of Executive Order 10450.

Agency Comment: State has given substantial thought to the matter and agrees that a program for periodic review should be carefully considered. Through its normal channels State will pursue the matter with interested agencies, such as Justice and the Civil Service Commission.

Additional Action Required: None, beyond that indicated in State's comment.

Recommendation 4 (page 88): [Blank]

Recommendation 5 (page 88): [Blank]

CHAPTER IV - The Department of Defense (Pages 89-205).

A. Office of Special Operations (Pages 89-94)

Recommendation 1 (page 94): That DOD Directive 5105.7 be examined with a view to clarifying and eliminating any ambiguities which would lead to a misinterpretation of the functions and misapplication of the authority of OSO; and that the relationships of OSO with the intelligence organization of the JCS and the military departments be spelled out more specifically to reduce possibilities of friction and misunderstanding.

Agency Comment: DOD does not consider that the Directive is ambiguous. However, DOD will give continuing attention to the operations of OSO under the Directive.
Additional Action Required: None, beyond that referred to in DOD's comment.

B. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Pages 94-99)

This Section contains no recommendations.

C. Department of the Army (Pages 99-137)

Recommendation 1 (page 137): That the Army Attache System be manned to permit full exploitation of its collection potential and that present personnel ceilings imposed by DOD be lifted in order to achieve greater flexibility and permit more extensive prior training of assigned personnel.

Agency Comment: DOD agrees with the concept calling for maximum exploitation of the intelligence potential of the Attache System. It does not agree that present personnel ceilings are seriously inhibitive. DOD reports that its ceilings on Attache strength (in the three services) are flexible; that DOD now has underway a program for consolidating and simplifying the Attache functions of the services; and that it is studying ways of improving selection and training of Attaches.

Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to lifting personnel ceilings in the Attache System.

Recommendation 2 (page 137): That the (Army) Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, be elevated to the level of Deputy Chief of Staff.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It notes that the top staff of the Army was recently reorganized following a balanced consideration of all its aspects and it concludes that it would be premature to reorganize now as recommended, particularly since legislation would be necessary to achieve the Task Force's recommendation.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or the NSC.

Observation: This recommendation does not involve any major policy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 3 (page 137):
Recommendation 5 (page 137): That consideration be given to more extensive use of "Schedule A" in the employment of civilian analysts and other intelligence specialists in the Department of the Army, in order to achieve necessary flexibility.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs in general and has initiated a thorough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its study of the problem.
Recommendation 6 (page 137): That the Army aggressively attack the linguist problem by developing and using outside sources for training in colleges and universities through the method of (for example) its comprehensive ROTC and Reserve programs.

Agency Comment: DOD reports that considerable use is now being made of civilian facilities for the purpose indicated, but that the problem involves quality rather than quantity and is most acute in the case of rare languages. The recommendation concerning ROTC language training requires further study.

Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its further study.

Recommendation 7 (page 137): That measures be instituted for the periodic security rechecking of personnel assigned in sensitive areas at intervals not to exceed 5 years.

Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security practices essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The general subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underlying objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required: Apart from the review referred to by DOD, no additional action is required.

D. Department of the Navy (Pages 138-156)

Recommendation 1 (page 156): That the Navy put its counterintelligence program on a wider base so as to bring its worldwide protection up to an adequate level.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs but believes that the actual method of expansion should be further investigated.

Additional Action Required: Further investigation as suggested by DOD, followed by action consistent with its investigative findings and with the objective of establishing an adequate counterintelligence program in the Navy.

Recommendation 2 (page 156): That the Navy provide for periodic review of the security status of intelligence personnel who come within the provisions of Executive Order 10450.

Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security practices essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The general subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underlying objective of the recommendation is adequately served.
Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 3 (page 156): That the Navy expand its intelligence collection effort.

Agency Comment: See DOD's comment on Recommendation 1 of the Task Force Report on the Department of the Army, (page 7, above).

Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to lifting personnel ceilings in the Attache System.

Recommendation 4 (page 156): That the Navy continue and expand its efforts to improve intelligence consciousness at all ranks and levels of the Department.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. Instruction on the mission and role of intelligence is included in the regional training schools, intelligence centers, and in the curricula of line schools at all levels.

Additional Action Required: None.

E. Department of the Air Force (Pages 156-179)

Recommendation 1 (page 178): That the position of Director of Intelligence, Air Force, be raised to that of a Deputy Chief of Staff.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It notes that the Task Force made a similar recommendation (which DOD opposes) with respect to the Director of Intelligence, Army, but that it made no recommendation respecting the position of the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or the NSC.

Observation: This recommendation does not involve any major policy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 2 (page 178): That a limited number of civilian personnel spaces for Air Force Intelligence be exempt from certain Civil Service requirements.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs in general and has initiated a thorough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its study of the problem.
Recommendation 3 (page 178): That a board or commission be established to make an equitable and coordinated allocation among the member agencies of personnel spaces exempt from certain Civil Service requirements.

Agency Comment: DOD has initiated a thorough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required: None, pending the completion of DOD's study.

Recommendation 4 (page 178): That the Air Attache System be maintained at a level which will insure an adequate collection capability and that Air Attache qualifications be commensurate with the collection potential of the station.

Agency Comment: See DOD's comment on Recommendation 1 of the Task Force's Report on the Department of the Army (page 7, above).

Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to the Attache System, its adequacy, personnel strength, training, qualifications, etc.

Recommendation 5 (page 179): That an Intelligence Research Center be established under CIA to guide the total intelligence research program.

Agency Comment: DOD notes that each service intelligence agency and CIA conduct research programs and it agrees that a common research service would be desirable. However, it believes that the effort to establish such a center "should be under the DCI acting for the IAC and not under the CIA."

Additional Action Required: Joint consideration of this recommendation by the IAC agencies.

Observation: It would appear desirable that CIA be apprised of, and be afforded an opportunity to comment on, this recommendation. This is particularly so if the "additional action" indicated above is not taken (if such action is taken, CIA will automatically have such an opportunity by virtue of its identification with the IAC).

Recommendation 6 (page 179): That a board be established to supervise declassification of security information.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It believes such a procedure would be cumbersome, and is of the view that its present practices in this area are adequate.

Additional Action Required: None, because ultimate responsibility for such matters is lodged in the head of the Department concerned.
Recommendation 7 (page 179): That a periodic examination be made of Air Force intelligence publications to assure justification for both the publication and distribution thereof.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs; the recommended action is now being implemented.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 8 (page 179): That mechanical and electronic devices to analyze, classify, file, and produce intelligence information be put into use at the earliest possible moment.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. It believes that automation in intelligence production has undoubted value and it notes that considerable investigation has been conducted along the lines indicated in this recommendation.

Additional Action Required: Implementation of the recommendation by DOD.

Recommendation 9 (page 179): That all possible resources be used to exploit technological means for intelligence collection.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, advising that the recommendation is currently receiving attention.

Additional Action Required: None (assuming the attention being afforded this matter by DOD results in the implementation of this recommendation).

Recommendation 10 (page 179): That the use of "overflights" to secure vital information receive constant consideration.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that the constant support of other U. S. Government agencies is required if full results are to be achieved. (DOD observes that upon resolution of some of the details involved in this recommendation, it may be advisable to seek NSC action thereon.)

Additional Action Required: Presidential and/or NSC consideration following receipt of DOD's recommendation on the subject.

Recommendation 11 (page 179): That the Air Force develop adequate procedures for the periodic security review of personnel occupying sensitive positions.

Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security practices essentially fulfill the objective of this recommendation. The general subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underlying objective of the recommendation is adequately served.
Additional Action Required: Apart from the review referred to by DOD, no additional action is required.

F. Covert Operations - Department of Defense (Pages 179-205)
Recommendation 5 (page 205): That the National Security Council review present assets and direct the necessary action to assure adequate preparation for evasion and escape and support of guerrilla warfare.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. To facilitate the review recommended DOD suggests that CIA and DOD report the pertinent facts to the NSC with recommendation for necessary action. To that end DOD will initiate a proposal looking to the preparation of an appropriate report.

Additional Action Required: None, pending preparation of the referenced report.

Recommendation 6 (page 205):
Reconzinderation 2 (page 220): That the responsibility of AEC for intelligence be defined in an NSC Intelligence Directive and that an NSC Intelligence Directive set forth the responsibility, authority, functions, and composition of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee.

Agency Comment: AEC agrees. It is of the belief that this two-fold recommendation may be accomplished by one NSC Intelligence Directive; that such a Directive should also establish the responsibilities of the other IAC agencies for atomic energy intelligence "in order that ambiguities of present directives ... be clarified."

CIA advises that AEC's intelligence responsibilities are now under discussion between CIA and AEC, and that at the appropriate time an intelligence directive thereon will be proposed to the NSC.
DOD concurs in this two-fold recommendation. It favors an NSCID for the purpose of defining AEC's intelligence responsibility; but it believes that since the JAEC is a subcommittee of the IAC, a DCID (rather than an NSCID) will suffice to carry out the latter part of the recommendation.

Additional Action Required: None, pending completion of IAC's processing of the directives envisaged by this recommendation.

Recommendation 3 (page 220): That the AEC define the responsibility and functions of its Division of Intelligence.

Agency Comment: AEC reports that its Division of Intelligence has received the informal concurrence of the other intelligence agencies as to its national intelligence responsibilities. Following Commission consideration thereof, the intelligence agencies will be formally notified of same.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 4 (page 220): That each of the member agencies of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee insure that it is represented on that Committee by the best qualified individual available concerning the matter under discussion, and that changes in representation be made as infrequently as practicable.

Agency Comment: AEC concurs. AEC reports that every effort has been and will continue to be made to comply with this recommendation.

CIA reports that it has pressed for the assignment of the best qualified personnel to the Committee, and it notes that the record of the Committee in the matter of continuity and length of tenure is a very favorable one.

DOD concurs in this recommendation noting that it will continue to make every effort to insure the fulfillment thereof.

State reports that it has been following the practice recommended by the Task Force.

Additional Action Required: None.
DOD concurs in this recommendation.

State concurs. In order that the National Intelligence Estimates may reflect the full extent of available intelligence in this field, State recommends specific courses of action which appear appropriate for IAC consideration.

Additional Action Required: Consideration by the IAC.

CHAPTER VI – The Federal Bureau of Investigation (Pages 221-226).

This Chapter contains no recommendations.

CHAPTER VII – Intelligence Production (Pages 227-244).

Recommendation 1 (page 234): That an agreed glossary of intelligence terms be produced and reviewed periodically.

Agency Comment: DOD agrees and suggests that an IAC Subcommittee be appointed to produce it.

State has no particular difficulty in this area, but it will be pleased to assist IAC in implementing the recommendation.

CIA reports that it has compiled a glossary of intelligence terms and that action will be taken through the IAC to secure acceptance thereof as the authoritative dictionary of intelligence nomenclature.

Additional Action Required: Completion of the project by the IAC.
CHAPTER VIII - Functional Intelligence (Pages 245-254)
Recommendation 2 (page 254): That the State Department's programs for integration and expansion of the Foreign Service and for acceleration of language and area training be pursued vigorously.

Agency Comment: State reports that this matter is the subject of vigorous action at all levels of the Department on a continuous and top priority basis.

CHAPTER IX - Personnel (Pages 255-274).

Recommendation 1 (page 273): That DOD give consideration to the exploitation of the ROTC and reserve intelligence programs for language training purposes by offering credit toward reserve commissions and drill credits respectively, for the completion of selected language courses.

Agency Comment: DOD notes that considerable use is now being made of civilian facilities for the purpose indicated in this recommendation; that the problem involves quality rather than quantity; that the recommendations concerning ROTC language training require thorough study; and that it would be unwise to give blanket accreditation for language work regardless of the type of service for which the trainee is destined.

Additional Action Required: Completion of DOD's study and consideration of the recommendation.

Recommendation 2 (page 273): That DOD conduct periodic surveys of service personnel procedures to insure that adequate consideration is being given to the requirements of the intelligence agencies for their share of the best qualified military personnel.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. DOD believes its current practices are adequate. It agrees that the highest practicable standards should be applied in the selection of attache personnel.

Additional Action Required: None, assuming DOD's current practices are in fact adequate.

Recommendation 3 (page 273): That DOD require that the Military Services study the problem of improving the prestige of the civilian analyst vis-à-vis his military colleagues.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that in practical terms there is no easy solution to this problem. DOD reports much has been done on the problem and that it will keep same under review.

Recommendation 4 (page 273): That DOD facilitate the employment as intelligence specialists of qualified retired military personnel by initiating action toward amending the laws concerning federal employment of retired military personnel, with a view to removing the present ceiling on the Federal pay of such individuals.
Agency Comment: DOD believes present laws on this subject are too restricted; on the other hand it is fearful lest statutory amendments be such as to permit retired officers with intelligence experience to automatically find employment as civilian intelligence analysts. DOD reports that the CSC has developed a proposal to relax existing legislative requirements along the general lines of this recommendation.

Additional Action Required: Executive Branch processing of CSC's legislative proposal and submission thereof for Congressional consideration.

Recommendation 5 (page 273): That DOD give consideration to more extensive use of "Schedule A" in the employment of civilian analysts and other intelligence specialists, in order to provide necessary flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel by the military services, and to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between the Zone of Interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service.

Agency Comment: DOD agrees that greater flexibility in hiring and in the ability to shift civilian personnel between the Zone of the Interior and foreign stations is essential. It believes a degree of relaxation of Civil Service regulations is desirable to deal with these problems. DOD has initiated a thorough study of the matter.

Additional Action Required: Appropriate action by DOD following completion of its study of the problem.

Recommendation 6 (page 273): That DOD, in the consideration of future economies, give proper weight to the importance of intelligence in peace time, so as to avoid serious reductions-in-force in our centers of intelligence production.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that the purpose of this recommendation can be further served by applying such reductions-in-force as do occur to overhead positions rather than to basic productive elements.

Recommendation 7 (page 274): That DOD take prompt action to insure that proper consideration in personnel planning is given to the impact of the time lag involved in our present clearance requirements for filling sensitive positions.

Agency Comment: DOD believes this recommendation requires further study.

Additional Action Required: Further study and appropriate action by DOD.

CHAPTER X - Security (Pages 275-283).

Recommendation 1 (page 273): That any individual employed in an intelligence organization "about whom sufficient doubt concerning his security has been raised should be removed from employment pending final determination of his case."
Agency Comment: DOD considers that its current security practices and procedures essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. However, it reports that the general subject will be reviewed in order to insure that those objectives are adequately served.

CIA reports that it is carrying out the intent of this recommendation in that it adheres carefully to Executive Order 10450 which provides for the suspension of Federal employees when a reasonable doubt exists as to their security status. State reports that "this recommendation requires no implementation in the Department of State" .... since State's regulations do not preclude employee suspensions in such circumstances.

Additional Action Required: Strict adherence to Executive Order 10450 by the agencies concerned - such adherence will accomplish the objective of this recommendation.

Observation: State has missed the point of this recommendation. All agencies now have the authority to suspend employees under the circumstances indicated in the recommendation. The point the Task Force appears to be making is that some of the agencies fail to suspend when there is sufficient cause and it is the Task Force's view that in the intelligence organizations of our government in particular, such suspension should occur pending final determination of the employee's case.

Recommendation 2 (page 283): That the "findings and proposed disposition of those cases which were reported as still in process at the time the survey by this Task Force was concluded should be reported to the President."

Agency Comment: DOD did not comment on this point.

CIA noted that under normal reporting procedures as established by Executive Order 10450, information is furnished to the Civil Service Commission or the FBI on such cases, and that thereafter the status of such cases is available to the President, through the executive agencies he has designated, to report on the implementation of Executive Order 10450.

State advises that detailed reports concerning the very small percentage of such employees in its Intelligence Area have been made available to the Civil Service Commission, and that CSC makes a composite report periodically on such cases in all government agencies.

Observation: CIA and State seem to have missed the point of this recommendation. (DOD did not comment upon it at all.) If the recommendation is deemed to have validity, the White House may wish to request that the heads of the intelligence agencies concerned report the findings and disposition of alleged security risk cases (in their intelligence areas) in process at the time the Task Force concluded its survey.

- 22 -
CHAPTER XI - Counterintelligence (Pages 284-292).

Recommendation 1 (page 292): That the Navy give due consideration to the requirement for additional competent and trained counterintelligence personnel in order to provide adequate security for its personnel and facilities.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs in principle, but believes that the actual method of expansion should be investigated.

Additional Action Required: Further investigation as suggested by DOD, followed by action consistent with its investigative findings and with the objective of providing adequate security for naval personnel and facilities. (See Recommendation 1, Chapter IV, D, page 10, above.)
CHAPTER XII - Maps and Libraries (Pages 293-305).

Recommendation 1 (page 305): That the IAC consider the adoption of a single index system based on the Intelligence Subject Code now in use by CIA.

Agency Comment: CIA and DOD concur. CIA reports that this recommendation is currently under study in a special subcommittee of the IAC. The subcommittee is expected to report to the IAC within the next few weeks.

CHAPTER XIII - Coordination in Overseas Areas (Pages 306-309).

Recommendation 1 (page 309): That senior military commanders in the field be given greater flexibility in their use of information on a need-to-know basis, giving due regard to the protection of its source.

Agency Comment: DOD considers that "current practices in the DOD are satisfactory within the regulations imposed by other agencies."

CHAPTER XIV - Development of New Equipment and Techniques (Pages 310-311).

Recommendation 1 (page 311): That the IAC take positive action to insure that a definite and concerted effort is made to develop new techniques, methods and equipment for the collection and production of intelligence and insure that a free exchange of information concerning such projects is accomplished within the intelligence community.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, stating that continuing efforts are being devoted to fulfillment of this recommendation. DOD observes that in all cases full effectiveness can be achieved only with a frank and free interchange of information.

State concurs, noting that it has initiated a number of steps in social science, psychological and research areas, all of which are designed to further the objective of this recommendation.
CHAPTER XV - "Watch-Dog" Commission (Pages 312-317):

Recommendation 1 (page 317): That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed of members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence, be established by Act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organization, functions, policies, and results of the Government agencies handling foreign intelligence operations; and to report, under adequate security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress, and to the President, annually and at such other times as may be necessary or advisable. The proposed "watch-dog" commission should be empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needs for its own use. It would be patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission). Appointments by the President of persons from private life to the proposed commission should be made from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the nation.

Agency Comment: CIA does not concur in this recommendation. CIA believes, with the Hoover Commission itself, that "while mixed Congressional and citizens committees for temporary service are useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties." CIA points out that it now reports to the Armed Service Committees of the Senate and House, and to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. As a consequence CIA does not consider that a Joint Congressional Committee would add any essential helpful element. CIA does concur, however, in the appointment (as recommended by the Hoover Commission, but not by its Task Force) by the President of a committee of experienced private citizens to examine and report periodically on the work of the Government's foreign intelligence activities.

DDD believes that the permanent, bipartisan commission recommended by the Task Force would afford improved protection for, as well as efficiency in, foreign intelligence operations.

Additional Action Required: None, in view of the establishment on January 13, 1956 by the President of a Board of Consultants to review periodically the foreign intelligence activities of the Government.

CHAPTER XVI - Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations (Pages 318-348).

This Chapter is merely repetitious of information appearing earlier in the Report. Conclusions and recommendations are restated in verbatim fashion in some instances; in other instances they are paraphrased and combined with still other opinions and recommendations contained in the body of the report. This Chapter does not appear to contain any new information. It merely restates, repeats, and re-emphasizes certain of the points previously made.
Appendix I

Part 1 - The National Security Agency (Pages 1-58)

Recommendation 1: (page 46) That NSC direct USCIB to establish COMINT requirements in the light of COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to require minimum interpretation of what is required and of its degree of importance. USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, should determine the best way of producing same. If USCIB fails after a reasonable length of time to provide more adequate guidance to the Director, NSA, the latter should be made a member of the IAC.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers the first part of this recommendation to be in hand in that a revised COMINT requirements list, prepared with NSA participation, has been approved by a Working Committee within USCIB and will soon be presented for USCIB approval. With respect to the second part of the recommendation, USCIB does not believe that NSA membership on the IAC should be related to the development of or failure to develop USCIB directives or requirements.

DOD concurs, but is doubtful that the problem to which the latter part of the recommendation is addressed will be solved by making the Director, NSA, a member of the IAC. DOD is presently crystallizing its views on the general subject of intelligence and on the ultimate organization of the top structure of U.S. intelligence. DOD proposes to discuss the matter with State and CIA and hopes in due course, together with those agencies, to arrive at an agreed proposal for submission.

Additional Action Required: As to COMINT requirements - none. As to NSA's membership on the IAC - defer decision pending a determination as to whether USCIB's revised COMINT requirements constitute sufficient guidance for NSA. (In the interim consideration should be given to granting observership status on the IAC to the Director, NSA.)

Recommendation 2: (page 46) That the Director, NSA, be given clear cut directives which will enable him to make much greater and continuing effort to produce high level communications intelligence. This is of such great importance that monetary considerations should be waived and an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once. (It is noted that in forwarding Appendix I, Part 1, the Task Force indicated that "the importance of the adoption of Recommendation 2 is especially emphasized - this is believed to be of the utmost importance to the intelligence effort."
Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in the implication that guidance or lack thereof has adversely affected the production of high level communications intelligence. USCIB notes that "emphasis upon the guidance factor has tended to obscure the real, and critical, weakness which does exist, namely.

As to the proposed initiation of efforts in this field along the lines of the Manhattan Project, USCIB states that it is not now in a position to determine the nature and scope of the increased effort which might be applied. 

USCIB believes it will be in a better position to decide this matter as a result of NSA's plan for implementing the new COMINT objectives list.

... problem referred to above. USCIB is convinced that maximum assistance would be provided to NSA in the solution of its major problem by the...

Based thereon, the Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT (Sec/State and Sec/Def) has agreed that an optimum, if not indeed a prerequisite, step toward... to that end, the Special Committee has authorized marshalling of all relevant resources of the intelligence agencies.

Additional Action Required: Reconsideration by NSC's Special Committee for COMINT of the recommended expansion of NSA's efforts.

Observation: Such reconsideration should be deferred pending completion of the study and related steps referred to by USCIB and summarized above.

Recommendation 3 (page 49): That ELINT and COMINT be integrated to the extent of placing ELINT under NSA for analysis of the product and guidance and coordination in the collection and dissemination of ELINT. The authority of operational commanders over the integral ELINT resources, however, should not be abridged.

USCIB or the combined board which is recommended in this report to replace it should exercise only policy control over ELINT matters.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes this recommendation has been overtaken by the issuance of NSCID No. 17 and by the DOD Directive on ELINT dated July 13, 1955. USCIB believes no further action should be taken on this recommendation until these recent directives have been implemented and tried.

Additional Action Required: Following a reasonable trial period the reference Directives should be re-examined in the light of this recommendation.

Observation: The USCIB response is unclear. By inference it appears that ELINT has not been placed under NSA, as recommended by the Task Force.

Recommendation 4 (page 50): That the military services and NSA continue to strive for a higher degree of cryptographic security; that the problem of communications security be restudied by USCSB (or the combined board as recommended in this report) with a view to reducing to the lowest practicable level the quantity of information released through telecommunications; and that NSC 168 be re-examined to ascertain if the Director, NSA, has sufficient authority to carry...
out his COMSEC responsibilities.

Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the need for a higher degree of communications security and feels that efforts to attain this end should continue; however, it does not consider that the recommendation falls within the purview of USCIB.

USCSB reports that, at all times, the military services and NSA keep the problem of cryptographic security under thorough review. USCSB concurs in the recommended review of NSG 168, but notes that in essence this review is already underway pursuant to the provisions of NSG 168 itself.

Recommendation 5 (page 51): That a single board with appropriate technical subcommittees have policy guidance over communications intelligence and communications security. If the recommendation to place the evaluation and analysis of ELINT under NSA is adopted, then policy guidance for ELINT as well as COMINT and COMSEC should be exercised by the proposed single board.

Agency Comment: USCIB is not now willing to recommend establishment of a single board "because the basic functions and organizational arrangements within a number of the interested agencies are sufficiently divergent to justify the continued separate existence of USCIB and USCSB." USCSB opposes the recommendation because of the difficulties of implementation which would result from the establishment of a single board, as proposed.

Recommendation 6 (page 51): That DOD study the organizational structure and proper positioning within its respective services of the three cryptologic agencies - AFSS, ASA, and NSG - with a view toward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthening their personnel assignment policies and logistic support.

Agency Comment: USCIB endorses the aim of this recommendation but considers it a problem internal to DOD. DOD believes that one means of achieving the objective of this recommendation is to constitute the service cryptologic agencies as major commands. The Air Force Cryptologic Agency (AFSS) has been so constituted for about seven years. The Army Cryptologic Agency (ASA) was designated as a major command following the submission of the Task Force Report. The Navy Cryptologic activity (NSG) is not so constituted at present; DOD will in the near future ask the Secretary of the Navy to review his cryptologic organization to determine whether it might be re-established on a basis paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force.

Recommendation 7 (page 52): That the military services give greater attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular or "career" reserve officers to the maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field stations, and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service officers. Rotation and replacement procedures should be improved. The feasibility of using civilian... should be tested. It is also recommended that Congress enact legislation...
to authorize NSA to employ especially qualified retired military personnel with no restriction on the number so employed. Such legislation should also permit Sec. Def. to recall active officers to duty with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized strength of NSA, but not of the respective military services.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD reports that full consideration of these proposals is currently in progress within DOD.

Recommendation 8 (page 54): That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number of "super grades" and positions under Public Law 313 to NSA; to the possibility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges extended to civilians overseas.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD also concurs and is taking the steps it deems appropriate in an effort to accomplish the objectives of this recommendation.

Recommendation 9 (page 55): That USCIB or its successor board clarify the objectives and functions of intelligence liaison detachments with NSA, establish uniform procedures to be followed for such detachments in their relationship with NSA, and specify maximum numbers of personnel to be assigned for liaison duties after examining the extent of interest of each agency concerned. Intelligence personnel assigned to liaison duty with NSA should be required to attend an indoctrination course conducted by NSA.

Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in this recommendation. It agrees that mutual familiarization with the requirements, capabilities and operations of both NSA and consumer agencies is desirable; it feels, however, that because the necessary functions of intelligence liaison detachments vary continuously with the missions of the consumer agencies and the character of COIN production activities, the arrangements called for by this recommendation cannot successfully be rendered uniform.

Additional Action Required: Decision as to whether the view of the Task Force or the view of USCIB should be adopted.

Observation: USCIB's view is most sound. The Task Force recommendation should be rejected.

Recommendation 10 (page 56): That NSA and the three cryptologic services give greater emphasis to, and continue to develop mutual cooperation.

APPENDIX I
Agency Comment: USCIB concurs. Greater emphasis has been given this matter and USCIB considers the arrangements which have been undertaken in this regard to be satisfactory.

Recommendation 11 (page 56): That more thorough periodic re-investigations of personnel be made. Particular effort should be concentrated on persons occupying the more sensitive positions.

Agency Comment: USCIB has established a special committee to investigate the matter, and USCIB is prepared to act on whatever recommendations are made by that committee.

Observation: See "Observation" Section of Chapter X, Recommendation 3.

Recommendation 12 (page 57): That the Director, NSA, be given authority to inspect the service cryptologic schools and make appropriate recommendations for improvement where COMINT is affected.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs.
Recommendation 1 (page 37): That an Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee (ICES) to the Combined Intelligence Board (this assumes that USCIB and USCSB have been combined into a single board, as proposed elsewhere in the report) be established to review and produce recommendations to the Combined Intelligence Board with respect to all communications and electronics proposals from intelligence activities which call for facilities, equipments, or additional personnel which cannot be obtained from existing resources; and to supply technical advice to the Board on such matters as it might request.

Agency Comment: USCIB does not agree. It believes that the spirit of this recommendation is being accomplished by expert communications and electronics advice provided from within the agencies concerned with the subject.

Additional Action Required: None, assuming the USCIB comment on this recommendation is accurate.

Recommendation 2 (page 38): That more effective use be made within DOD of the high potential value and know-how available in the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deal with communications and electronics problems related to the broad intelligence field. Responsibility should be placed on that group for reviewing and commenting on communications and electronics requirements that the NSA considers necessary to meet the intelligence objectives, and the demands being placed by NSA on the special communications and electronics groups in the military services under NSA operational control; and for submitting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on ways and means to insure maximum coordination and effectiveness in the over-all communications and electronics effort in support of intelligence.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers that existing procedures for reviewing and commenting on NSA requirements are satisfactory.

Recommendation 3 (page 38): That more effective technical advice be injected into USCIB deliberations to permit development of more appropriate statements of the intelligence objectives to be accomplished by communications or electronics means.
Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the spirit of this recommendation and believes that it is now being carried into effect.

Recommendation 4 (page 38): That the present basic policy for the provision of point-to-point communications services to intelligence community activities from existing governmental or civil communications services be continued. That any attempt to set up separate, duplicate, or paralleling point-to-point communications facilities be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee recommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in the first sentence of the recommendation. It agrees with the second sentence to the extent of believing that no separate facilities should be established for intelligence use without full consideration by appropriate authority.

Recommendation 5 (page 39): That a basic policy of utilizing existing facilities, services, and equipment to the maximum degree be applied wherever it is determined to be technically feasible in the COMINT, ELINT, and CONSEC operations (this applies particularly to certain aspects of the technical training phases, operational procedures, and logistics); that exceptions to this policy be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee recommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers that the spirit of this recommendation is now being carried out. It does not agree that the additional review (called for in the last sentence) is either necessary or desirable.

Recommendation 6 (page 39): That any arrangements with respect to centralized control of ELINT give adequate consideration to the immediate and vital interest of the military in this field and the need to keep electronic countermeasures (ECM) - a tactical weapon - clearly under military operational control.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes that this recommendation has been overtaken by the issuance of NSCID 17 and the related Department of Defense Directive of July 13, 1955.

Recommendation 7 (page 39): That all planning and operation of communications and electronics efforts in support of intelligence activities include full consideration of the following to meet national emergency conditions:

a. Day-to-day operation and training be based on realism in light of the situation and facilities expected to be available in time of war or national emergency. This applies in a special manner to planning operations to be effective in case of heavy jamming operations.

APPENDIX I
b. Key intelligence installations, served by costly, hard-to-replace electronics equipment and associated records be located outside established target areas. That these installations have integrated plans for national emergency or disaster operations. That all agencies involved in planning new, alternate, or emergency locations for Federal agencies expedite action to assist NSA in its current efforts to obtain a suitable site.

c. Pending accomplishment of b, that effective interim disaster plans be developed promptly for each key intelligence installation to include as a minimum (1) alternate site, (2) installed and tested minimum equipment with necessary basic records at the alternate site, and (3) adequate knowledge of disaster plans by key personnel.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-a and considers that it is now being carried out. USCIB agrees in principle with Recommendation 7-b but notes that the great extension of target areas by fallout hazards would require relocation at such great distances that reduction in operational efficiency would be unacceptable and the agency concerned would be unable to retain or attract key personnel. USCIB reports that plans for the location of alternate NSA sites are now being developed by DOD. USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-c and reports that it is being carried into effect except for:

Recommendation 8 (page 40): That the present basic communications (cryptographic) security plan, providing for centralized control with effective decentralization of operations, be continued; that each agency and service maintain effective inspection and vigorous training programs to reduce to the minimum cryptographic operational security violations.

Agency Comment: USCSB concurs, noting that the Communications Security Plan referred to represents, in reality, a number of communications security arrangements each of which is considered satisfactory.

Recommendation 9 (page 40): That NSC determine ways and means to control more effectively release of valuable intelligence to potential enemies via clear text messages being transmitted over government and civil communication networks.

Agency Comment: USCSB considers that the policy responsibility for control of governmental clear text messages falls within its charter. It reports that it has long recognized this problem and is working toward its solution. It does not believe that the problem is one for NSC consideration. USCSB considers that the policy responsibility for control of nongovernmental clear text messages over civil communications network is outside its purview.

Additional Action Required: Referral of the nongovernmental aspects of the subject to Commerce for consideration in the light of its NSC-assigned responsibilities relating to the safeguarding of unclassified strategic information.
Recommendation 10 (page 40): That the general tendency within the communications intelligence and the communications security agencies to overemphasize the special security facets of their operations with respect to basic communications and electronics features be examined objectively and comprehensively by competent, technically qualified authority to insure that such overemphasis is not producing unnecessary duplication of facilities and operations in peacetime which will grow to completely unrealistic figures in wartime, and producing a system which may fail in an emergency because it will require considerable readjustment of basic operational practices at a critical time.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes existing procedures for review of communications requirements are adequate. USCIB does not believe that the security aspects of COMINT are significantly overemphasized. Accordingly, USCIB opposes creation of the special committee called for by this recommendation. USCIB, in essence, concurs in USCIB's view; it believes that no separate examination of the problem is required.

Recommendation 11 (page 41): "SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION": That the President set up a special commission composed of technically qualified civil and military communications and electronics representatives, to survey and produce recommendations as to ways and means to insure the more effective utilization of all communications and electronics resources of the United States in the national interests in case of war or national emergency. (This recommendation was singled out by the Task Force as one worthy of special emphasis and as one believed to be of great importance.)

Agency Comment: ODNI expressed the view (7/6/55) that the Report which was shortly thereafter to be made to the NSC by the Science Advisory Committee would contain organizational recommendations somewhat more far reaching than those suggested in the Task Force Report and, if adopted, would probably satisfy the recommendations of the Task Force Report.

Additional Action Required: DOD, ODNI and CIA views should be obtained on this recommendation, including recommendations as to its implementation. (The ODNI comment of 7/6/55 is not specific enough to assess the validity of the Task Force recommendation.)
Appendix II

The Clandestine Services of the Central Intelligence Agency

Recommendation 1 (page 42): That the "covert intelligence" and "cold war functions" of the Deputy Director/Plans be assigned to separate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility should be administratively and logistically self-supporting.

Agency Comment: CIA does not concur, noting that the recommended system had been tried prior to 1952 and abandoned; that CIA's experience during the period of separate operations proved the operational disadvantages of attempting to conduct on a secure and efficient basis two worldwide clandestine organizations, each compartmented from the other.

Additional Action Required: See Chapter II, Recommendation 1, Page 1, above.

Recommendation 2 (page 42): That the part of CIA's July 15, 1952 Directive appointing area division chiefs as executives of the DCI and providing for their direct dealing with him and senior overseas representatives be rescinded.

Agency Comment: CIA reports this Directive has been reviewed and rescinded.

Recommendation 3 (page 42): That the DCI re-establish the office of Executive Director of that agency.

Agency Comment: CIA is opposed to this recommendation on the ground that the interposition of another command echelon would not necessarily accomplish the intent of the recommendation. Further study, however, is being given the subject.

Observation: Because this is purely of an intra-agency character, it would seem appropriate to defer to DCI's judgment thereon.
Observation: In view of the reasons advanced by CIA, all of which are valid, the Task Force recommendation should not be adopted.

Recommendation 7 (page 143): That the program for training of specialists in covert intelligence collection and for the development of linguists be intensified.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs and has in effect a number of measures the objectives of which coincide with this recommendation. A mandatory quota of five per cent of all clandestine service personnel are in training at all times.
Recommendation 8 (page 43): That submission of individual budgets to the CIA Project Review Committee by the area division chiefs be discontinued and funds for each cold war component be prepared under the supervision of its chief and submitted for the component to the Project Review Committee.

Agency Comment: CIA observes that this recommendation is based on a separation of CIA "cold war" and "covert intelligence functions" with which CIA does not concur. It notes, however, that in relation to its existing organization the programming system of the clandestine services now being put into operation assures a review by the DDP and his staff of the budget recommendations of the area divisions of CIA clandestine services.

Recommendation 9 (page 43): That the number of auditors of the regular CIA audit staff be increased materially.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs. This action is being taken as rapidly as possible in line with an internal organizational survey made by CIA several months ago.

Recommendation 10 (page 43):

Recommendation 11 (page 43): That the NSC render a specific interpretation of the provisions of paragraph h-b, NSC 5412/1 as it affects the several members of the intelligence community.

Agency Comment: CIA notes that the reference paragraph directs that the DCI shall be responsible for "informing through appropriate channels and on a 'need-to-know' basis, agencies of the U.S. government, both at home and abroad, including diplomatic and military representatives, of such operations as will affect them." CIA reports that it has been scrupulously careful to keep other agencies appropriately informed pursuant to the "need-to-know" principle; and that it is trying constantly to remedy and prevent individual instances of failure on the part of its personnel in their efforts to strike the difficult balance between the proper range of interests of another agency and the restrictive principle of "need-to-know." CIA points out that as a standard procedure it provides individual briefings for Ambassadors and other State personnel, Defense Commanders, Chiefs of Military Missions, Attaches, etc.

Recommendation 12 (page 43): That the CIA Act of 1949 be amended to authorize the employment of "any" (instead of fifteen now authorized) retired officers or warrant officers of the armed services.

Agency Comment: See Chapter II, Recommendation 12, Page 1, above.

APPENDIX II
Document removed by the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

For further information, see entry 13 of the pink WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) at the front of this folder.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LAY

SUBJECT: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities

1. You will recall that the President directed referral of the subject report and the agency comments thereon to Mr. D. Anderson for further staff action and recommendations as appropriate. Pursuant to that referral I have examined in their entirety the report and the agency comments thereon.

2. The subject report, totaling 583 pages, consists of:

A. The Main Report (362 pages) which is classified Top Secret.

B. Appendix I, Part 1 (58 pages) (relating to the National Security Agency) which is classified Top Secret. This document contains code word material. It requires special handling. It should be handled via Comint Channels on a Top Secret - U. S. Eyes Only basis.

C. Appendix I, Part 2 (43 pages) (relating to Communications and Electronics in Support of Intelligence Activities) which is classified Top Secret. This document contains code word material. It requires special handling. It should be handled via Comint Channels on a Top Secret - U. S. Eyes Only basis.

D. Appendix II (43 pages) (relating to CIA's Clandestine Services) which is classified Top Secret and requires special handling.

E. The Published Report (76 pages), which is, of course, unclassified.

3. In an effort to facilitate the action directed by the President I have prepared the enclosed memorandum which:

A. Sets forth chronologically each recommendation in the report and its appendices (exclusive of the published report, which merely restates some of the recommendations in the classified report);

B. Sets forth the gist of the agency (agencies, in some instances) comments on each recommendation;

C. Contains, where appropriate, my "Observations" and suggestions as to "Additional Action Required" (in terms of the recommendations in the report and the agency comments thereon). It is emphasized that the subparagraphs entitled "Additional Action Required" and "Observations" are merely the suggestions and views of the writer, prepared only with the thought in mind that they might be helpful in pointing up unresolved problems to be considered by those responsible for taking the further
staff action directed by the President. If the subparagraphs do not serve that purpose, they should i. ignored.

4. The enclosed memorandum is lengthy, because the subject report is lengthy; it contains some duplication, partly because the subject report contains a great amount of duplication, but more particularly, because I have listed separately every recommendation in the report to insure that none is overlooked.

5. It is to be noted that, due to the nature of the distribution made of the report, some of the agencies did not receive sections of the report containing data and recommendations on matters falling within their primary jurisdiction.

6. It is also to be noted that the report was submitted in May 1955; that agency comments thereon were submitted during the late Summer or early Fall of 1955; and that as a consequence, some of the recommendations which are flagged as possibly requiring additional action may have been acted upon during the period between the submission of the agency comments and the referral of the subject to Mr. Anderson for attention.

7. Recommendation: That this memorandum and its enclosures be referred to Mr. Anderson for such further action as he deems appropriate.

J. Patrick Coyne
January 12, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. RALPH REID
BUREAU OF BUDGET

With regard to your memorandum attached, I have now advised Jimmy Lay to let Messrs. Macy, Perry and Hamilton have access to the Hoover Commission Intelligence Activities report.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U.S. Army
Staff Secretary
Honorable Rowland R. Hughes
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hughes:

The Intelligence Activities Report prepared by the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government has been reviewed in accordance with Bureau of the Budget Bulletin No. 55-5.

The only recommendation on which it is appropriate for the Federal Civil Defense Administration to comment is number 5, concerning the rechecking of the security status of all personnel engaged in Intelligence activities. This Agency concurs in this recommendation and plans to institute rechecks of all personnel engaged in such activities at five year intervals.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Val Peterson
Administrator
December 19, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. DILLON ANDERSON

For further staff action and recommendations as appropriate, the President has approved and directed referral to you of the attached Departmental and Agency submissions relating to implementation of the report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities. These were received in response to memoranda to the Departments and Agencies indicating, on behalf of the President, actions desired by him with respect to the report. Copies of these memoranda are attached, together with the full classified report of the Task Force (President's copy) and a schedule showing the distribution given to the various components of the report.

For your information, the follow-up action will delayed until the matter could be taken up with the President following his recovery, since he had earlier indicated that the initial distribution and handling of the report to be only as personally directed by him.

Action with regard to the recommendation for a "watch dog commission" is proceeding separately. Your action should include recommendations for such further action with regard to the special commission on communications and electronic resources as is deemed appropriate.

J. O. Geppert
Colonel, C/E, U.S. Army
Staff Secretary
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ask President

OK to have NSC
staff: Hoover but Curtis
t Dept. replies.

Yes 1 Dec 55
Escape & invasion
while
GP looked at
MIL - not satisfactory

GP which looked at
CIA.
December 13, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. DILLON ANDERSON

For further staff action and follow-up as appropriate, the President has approved and directed referral to you of the attached Departmental and Agency submissions relating to implementation of the report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities. These were received in response to memoranda to the Departments and Agencies indicating, on behalf of the President, actions desired by him with respect to the report. Copies of these memoranda are attached, together with the full classified report of the Task Force (President's copy) and a schedule showing the distribution given to the various components of the report.

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Action with regard to the recommendation for a "watch dog commission" is proceeding separately. Your action should include such further action with regard to the special commission on communications and electronic resources as is deemed appropriate.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army
Staff Secretary
Memo to AEC
from Gov. Adams 6/13/55 Top Secret

Memo to Gov Adams
From Adm Strauss 9/15/55 Top Secret
(2134-1A
cy 1, Series a., 8 pgs

Memo to Atty Gen
from Gov Adams 6/13/55 Top Secret

Memo to Gov Adams
from Atty Gen 7/5/55 Top Secret
cy 1; memo to
atty Gen from the
Director, FBI 6/28/55 Top Secret
(2 pages)

3 memos to
Director, CIA 6/13/55 Top Secret
from Gov Adams

Memo to the
Président from 8/16/55 Top Secret
Director, CIA;
mem to Dir. CIA (Special Handling)
from H. D. Jones
(USCIB) and 11 pg
report

Memo to Dir CIA 8/16/55 Top Secret
from Gen Erskine
Cy 1 and 4 pg rpt

Memo to Ex Sec NSC 10/14/55 Top Secret
fm W P Armstrong
No 1 of 6 and
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### CONTENTS

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<tr>
<th>CHAP.</th>
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<th>CIA</th>
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<td>FBI</td>
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<td>VIII.</td>
<td>FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE</td>
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<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td>255-274</td>
<td></td>
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<td>SECURITY</td>
<td>275-293</td>
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<td>COUNTERINTELLIGENCE</td>
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<td>MAPS &amp; LIBRARIES</td>
<td>293-305</td>
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<td>COORDINATION OVERSEAS</td>
<td>306-309</td>
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<td>DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EQUIP.</td>
<td>310-311</td>
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<td>XV.</td>
<td>WATCH-DOG COMMISSION</td>
<td>312-317</td>
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**APPENDIX I**

Parts 1 and 2

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**APPENDIX II**

2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
July 7, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Mr. Barnes at State called me on 5 July asking that Mr. Fisher Howe be permitted to read the full basic report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities. He did so on 6 July, indicated he did not think it necessary for State to have a copy of the report, although they might wish to read it again (to which I agreed).

He asked that I read Appendix II from the standpoint of seeing whether there are references to the State Department in it which would warrant a State representative reading it. I said I would do so.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army

12 July -
I talked to Mr. Allen Dulles and asked him if he would read Appendix II. He said he would let State know his view. I so advised Mr. Howe.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

On direction of Governor Adams, I visited President Hoover on 27 May 1955. Among other matters discussed, he advised me that General Clark, early in the work of his Task Force on Intelligence Activities, had made certain contacts and undertakings to have an investigation made of certain individuals whose names were given to him, together with certain material relating to them. President Hoover indicated that the investigations were not complete, and that General Clark felt that he was under an obligation to arrange for their completion. President Hoover said he would not be able to carry out this action; his plan was to send the material to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, who would then make a report to the White House. I undertook to consult with Governor Adams, see whether this procedure is suitable, and inform President Hoover's office appropriately.

I thereupon informed Governor Adams of the foregoing, and he indicated that President Hoover could send the material directly to him at the White House. I also advised the President on 31 May in general terms of the action being taken, and called Mr. Tuck of the Hoover Commission the same day and advised him of Governor Adams' decision in the matter. He said he would so inform the Commission.

On 25 May, at Governor Adams' direction, I met with Mr. Brownell, who handed me a memorandum to him from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, explained its contents, and discussed them briefly. He indicated that it would be acceptable to talk to Mr. Allen Dulles about it in general terms -- i.e., that the list was furnished, that an investigation was started and then halted because of a possible requirement to examine CIA records, make interviews, etc. He indicated that Mr. Dulles has asked to be kept in touch with any further action, so as not to have any interference with special operations of CIA.
After studying the material provided by Mr. Brownell, I discussed the matter with Governor Adams and prepared a memorandum for discussion with Mr. Dulles as to further steps to be taken, and indicating the individuals named and the principal allegations made in the material submitted.

On June 2 Governor Adams, Mr. Dulles and I met in Governor Adams' office, and after discussion it was agreed that Mr. Dulles would have a check made of the individuals and allegations indicated in the brief I had prepared, copy of which was furnished him, and would provide a memorandum reporting his findings and giving views in the matter as appropriate.

Later the same day Colonel Dubbelde of the Clark Task Force turned over material which had been developed in the course of the Task Force work, including reports from the departments concerned on individuals and allegations substantially the same as those set forth in the material given to me by Mr. Brownell.

On 15 June Mr. Dulles submitted to Governor Adams, with copies to the Attorney General and to the FBI, a memorandum reporting investigation made on the individuals and allegations provided to him, and relating this to previous actions of a similar kind. In his memorandum he advised that certain CIA employees listed were under investigation within the Agency and their cases are being turned over to the FBI together with investigative results of the CIA for whatever action is appropriate. (The memorandum also indicated that Mr. Dulles is forwarding a copy of it with a request for investigative action where deemed warranted under Executive Order 10450.)

I advised General Persons today of the essentials of the foregoing (pursuant to direction of Governor Adams) for use in connection with any reference to the matter pertaining to his Legislative Liaison activities.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

On direction of Governor Adams, I visited President Hoover this afternoon. He turned over to me the classified report with appendices of his Task Force on Intelligence Activities.

He also made the following points:

a. The Task Force is preparing about ten additional partial copies, each of which contains material pertinent to a particular agency and would be suitable for referring to that agency if the President so desired. Mr. Hoover does not plan to send these reports to anyone but the President. At his request, I undertook to inform Mr. Hollister or Mr. Tuck if it was desired to have these copies transmitted to the President.

b. A considerable amount of highly classified material has been accumulated in the process of the Task Force work. Mr. Hoover has asked the Task Force to draft an order for him to them as to the disposal of this material. When he receives it, he will send it to Governor Adams for comment as to the proposed disposition.

c. General Clark, early in the Task Force work, made certain contacts and undertakings to have an investigation made of certain individuals whose names were given to him, together with certain material relating to them. These investigations are not complete, and he feels that he is under an obligation to arrange for their completion. President Hoover will not be able to carry this out; his
plan is to send the material to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover who would then make a report to the White House. I undertook to consult with Governor Adams and see whether this procedure is suitable.

d. Mr. Hoover indicated that changes recently suggested in the unclassified report had been made. He also said that he thought he would not submit this report to the Congress until after the completion of his Commission's work, and his return from a vacation which he expects to last for about four months.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U.S. Army

31 May

I advised Gov. Adams of the foregoing, with response as indicated. I then advised the President (who asked me to flag the report recommendations).

I called Mr. Tuck (of the Hoover Commission) and advised him of Gov. Adams' decisions as a, b, c. He said he would so inform the Commission.
May 23, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR ADAMS

As action on the Hoover Task Force report on intelligence activities, I suggest that you (or I, if you wish) advise Mr. Hollister generally as follows:

1. On the basis of a reading of the report for security, it is felt that there are several passages to which further consideration should be given -- one of these seems a rather clear-cut and unnecessary disclosure of information potentially valuable to foreign countries, and the rest appear to be of an "optional" character, in which the value to foreign countries of the information disclosed would have to be weighed against its value in terms of informing the American public. The passages referred to are:

   a. On page v, at the top of the page, a preferred version might read: "Two reports are submitted: one, unclassified; the other, classified TOP SECRET, with certain appendices which require special additional clearance." (This is the "clear-cut" case referred to above.)

   b. On page vii, the sentence in the first full paragraph beginning "Our effort to achieve, etc.," which gives an indication of success attained in obtaining a steady and reliable flow of data, might be deleted.

   c. On page ix, in the second paragraph, the sentence beginning "The information we need, etc.," which identifies Communist plans, progress and potential as intelligence targets, might be deleted.

   d. There are several references authoritatively identifying attaches as intelligence-gatherers of major importance. These include the second sentence of the first paragraph on page 7, the second sentence of the second paragraph on page 11, the second full paragraph on page 22, and the second and fifth sentences of the paragraph beginning at


the bottom of page 23. In addition, there is a similar identification of the Foreign Service in the last sentence on page 14.

e. The recommendation concerning the NSA at the bottom of page 41 has the effect of giving emphasis to this agency in an intelligence context and might be deleted.

2. The outline of U. S. top organizations for intelligence is undoubtedly one for which foreign countries would have had to expend a considerable amount of money to obtain -- and would still not have had complete confidence that it was authoritative. Some generalizing might be considered.

3. The reference to the "Under Secretary of Defense" on page 40 might be changed to "Deputy Secretary of Defense."

Goodpaster
TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS

SUBJECT: Study of reports of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government

In accordance with Public Law 108, 83d Congress, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government is currently submitting its reports to the Congress. Reports on Personnel and Civil Service, on Paperwork Management, and on Federal Medical Services have been released, and it is understood that more than a dozen further reports will be issued during the weeks ahead.

It is the desire of the President that each agency make a review of each of the Commission's reports and submit its views to the President through the Bureau of the Budget within thirty days after the release of the particular report. Each such statement should be forwarded in five copies.

These reviews should determine the application to the agency of the Commission's recommendations, including task force recommendations specifically endorsed by the Commission. Each agency statement should indicate the extent to which the recommendations can be put into effect and the manner of carrying them out.

ROWLAND R. HUGHES
Director
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:

The views of the Department of Defense on the Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities (unclassified) are attached. Specific comments are included on each of the recommendations considered applicable to this Department.

As you know, it is my impression that each of the Commission reports receive careful study and evaluation within the Department of Defense. Accordingly, it may be that after further consideration of this report we will have additional comments to make.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

SIGNED

C. E. Wilson

Inclosure

The President

The White House
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS
ON
HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT
ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (UNCLASSIFIED)

October, 1955
COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE GOVERNMENT

The following comments are addressed to the Recommendations of the Task
Force which are applicable to the Department of Defense. Recommendations (a)
and (b) of the Commission itself, and Recommendations Nos. 1, 2, and 7 of the
Task Force, are considered not to be sufficiently applicable to the Department
of Defense to justify comment by it.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

"That the chiefs of the various intelligence units of the military ser-
vice be elevated in the organizational structure to the level of Deputy
Chief of Staff in the Army and the Air Force, and Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations in the Navy."

Non-concur

Comment

The Department of Defense agrees that it is essential that intelligence
be given adequate weight and representation in the staff organization of the
military services if it is to function with optimum efficiency, - but it
considers that this can be assured without the recommended organizational
changes at this time.

Implementation: None at this time.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

"That the Department of Defense make extensive use of Schedule A of the
Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive appointments) in the employment
by the military services of civilian intelligence analysts and other spe-
cialists in order to provide the necessary flexibility in the recruitment
of qualified civilian personnel (to include retired citizens with wide
previous business experience in the foreign field) and to facilitate the
interchange of such personnel between zone of interior competitive service
and the overseas excepted service."

Concur

Comment

Each of the three Services has taken or is developing measures to apply
Schedule A to elements of its civilian intelligence staff. In addition,
the Department of Defense is studying the matter with a view to finding an
optimum balance between desirable flexibility in hiring and rotation of
skilled career personnel on the one hand and providing the fullest
practicable job security and incentive (as a vital morale factor) on
the other.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 5

"That measures be instituted in all agencies for rechecking the security status of all personnel engaged in intelligence activities at periodic intervals not to exceed 5 years in any individual case."

Concur in principle.

Comment

It is considered that the current security practices and the procedures for acting on adverse information essentially fulfill the objectives of these recommendations. Within the objectives, however, it is desirable to leave to each individual service reasonable latitude in the method of implementation. For example, it may in some cases aid the investigation not to alert the individual involved by suspending him. Measures are taken, of course, in such cases to insure that classified information is adequately safeguarded. This general subject is being reviewed in order to insure that the underlying objectives of these recommendations are adequately served.

Implementation: Additional precautions indicated by such review.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6

"That the responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of CIA, with authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad."

Concur in part

Comment

The collection of scientific intelligence is one of the most important intelligence activities of the Government. It is of vital concern to the Department of Defense. The CIA should have coordinating responsibility but it would be unwise and inefficient to give it or any other agency a monopoly in this field, nor does any one agency now have such a monopoly. The Department of Defense considers it inappropriate for the Central Intelligence Agency to have overt attaches stationed abroad.

Implementation: None by Department of Defense.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 8

"That steps be taken to introduce highly selective methods of choosing members of the coordinating committee on atomic energy intelligence, not only to get the benefit of service by the most competent individuals, but also to assure long tenure in this important assignment."
Comment

The salaries the Department of Defense can pay for top-flight talent in this field compare unfavorably with those offered outside the Government, and this makes it difficult to insure long-term continuity.

Implementation: The Department of Defense will use its best efforts to carry out this Recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 9

"That a comprehensive, coordinated program be developed to expand linguistic training among American citizens serving the Intelligence effort; and

"That the Department of Defense expand and promote language training by offering credit toward reserve commissions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reserve personnel for completion of selected language courses."

Concur in principle

Comment

The Department of Defense endorses the importance of a comprehensive program of foreign language and area specialist training for persons serving the national intelligence effort and allied activities. It and its elements have taken various measures during the past years to further such a program. But in the case of ROTC and reserves, the Department of Defense is reluctant to provide for additional language training if such training must be at the expense of training in primary military subjects. Specifically, the Task Force's recommendation would make for wider participation but would, not by itself, produce well-trained linguists.

Implementation: The various existing programs are being studied in the light of this recommendation with a view to achieving an optimum balance between qualitative and quantitative standards.
Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have recently read over the first printed volume of your hearings on "Security - Government Printing Office," and recall that at the time the hearings began, the press published several quotations to the effect that an alleged member of the Communist Party had access to secret data of the Central Intelligence Agency. Subsequently it was developed that this person was a Government Printing Office employee. In addition, the Deputy Public Printer, Mr. Cole, was quoted in the papers as stating to a reporter, in referring to the main GPO plant, that he could not say positively whether they handled CIA material, but that it was his belief that they could or would.

At the time these investigations were being conducted, I had a careful check made of our reproduction facilities and found that no classified CIA material is printed in the main GPO plant. The only CIA work which is handled there is routine unclassified matter such as blank forms. On 12 August Walter Prrozheime, our Legislative Counsel, informed Mr. Carr of your staff of these facts. Mr. Cole informs us that these facts are correct, and in addition that he has submitted a statement of these facts to your Committee.

The press reports mentioned in the first paragraph have received widespread circulation both in the United States and abroad, and have raised some questions as to our security. Under the circumstances, therefore, I would appreciate it if you would include this letter in the printed hearings so that the fact that CIA does not have classified material printed in the main GPO plant is made a matter of record.

It has occurred to me that in the course of your investigations you may possibly run across information concerning this Agency or its personnel. Naturally, I would appreciate it if you would make such information available to me so we can take a thorough look at such matters.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Allen W. Dulles

Allen W. Dulles
Director
7 July 1954

The Honorable Joseph R. McCarthy
Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations
Senate Committee on Government Operations
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Senator McCarthy:

During the closing days of the recently conducted hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee you made several references to alleged Communist infiltration of the Central Intelligence Agency. In reply to a similar charge made earlier in the Committee hearings I denied such infiltration.

In the event that you should have any evidence in support of these allegations, it would be of the utmost importance that I should have an immediate opportunity to investigate them. Accordingly I would appreciate it if you would let me have at the earliest possible moment any unfavorable information you may have bearing upon the loyalty or integrity of any employee of this Agency. Any such information will be immediately investigated and appropriate action taken.

I have noted that you have indicated that you are making available to General Clark your material on this subject. Consequently I am sending him a copy of this letter and asking that he kindly advise me if the information which he may receive from you is of a nature to require any investigation on my part.

I feel that any unfavorable information regarding any CIA employee would require any immediate action and should not necessarily await the report of the Task Force.

Faithfully yours,

(signed)

Allen W. Dulles
Director
15 January 1955

General Mark W. Clark
The Citadel
Charleston, South Carolina

Dear General Clark:

The Press reports today that Senator Joseph R. McCarthy states that he gave to you yesterday information on "alleged communism and corruption" in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Under date of 7 July 1954 I wrote Senator McCarthy as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations referring to his allegations of Communist infiltration of the CIA and requesting that he make available to me any evidence he had in support of these allegations to permit an immediate investigation thereof. A copy of that letter was sent to you on 7 July 1954. I received no reply whatsoever from Senator McCarthy to this letter.

In the event that any of the information which Senator McCarthy now states he has turned over to you contains, as alleged, any indication of Communism or corruption in the CIA, I would investigate the matter immediately and thoroughly. Certainly such investigation should not repeat not await the report or findings of your committee some months hence. Action should be taken now.

Accordingly, I urgently request that you make available to me at the earliest possible moment any information in the material furnished you by Senator McCarthy which would permit an immediate and thorough investigation of the McCarthy charges.

Faithfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles
Director
(Central Intelligence Agency)
Jan 21 1955

The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations
Senate Committee on Government Operations
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I would like to call to your attention certain correspondence with Senator McCarthy as your predecessor as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

During the hearings on security of the Government Printing Office, Senator McCarthy publicly stated that an alleged member of the Communist Party had access to secret data of the Central Intelligence Agency. By letter of 22 October 1953 I pointed out to Senator McCarthy that no CIA classified material is printed in the main GPO plant. Further, it was requested that information concerning this Agency or its personnel developed in the course of investigation be made available to me for thorough inspection. No reply was received to that communication.

During the closing days of the Army hearings, Senator McCarthy made several references to alleged Communist infiltration of the Central Intelligence Agency. On 7 July 1954 I wrote Senator McCarthy and requested that he make available to me at the earliest possible moment any unfavorable information bearing on the loyalty or integrity of any employee of CIA. Although Senator McCarthy had publicly stated that he was "disturbed beyond words" by the alleged success of Communists in penetrating the CIA, there was no reply to this communication.

Copies of the aforementioned letters are attached for your information.

According to press report of 15 January 1955, Senator McCarthy made available to General Mark W. Clark information on "alleged communism and corruption" in the Central Intelligence Agency. As you will note from the attached telegram of 15 January 1955, I advised General Clark that if any of the information which Senator McCarthy had turned over to him contains any "indication of communism or corruption in the CIA, I would investigate the matter immediately and thoroughly."
I would like to renew my request that the Committee kindly make available to me any information it may have in its files or which it may develop in future investigations which might reflect on the CIA or its personnel. I would desire to make a thorough investigation of any such information.

I would welcome an opportunity to discuss with you personally any matters respecting the CIA which you feel might bear on the Committee's work, and I await word from you whether and when you consider such a conversation would be desirable.

Faithfully yours,

(signed)

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Enclosures:
2, as indicated above
March 7, 1955

My dear Mr. Dulles:

Reference is made to your letter of January 21.

After hearing from you, I requested that the files of this Subcommittee contained the material on CIA be reviewed to determine the kind and type of derogatory information contained therein.

Unfortunately, it was found that those files were not in the file office of the Investigating Subcommittee, but were in the possession of the former Chairman, Senator McCarthy. Those files have been returned to the Subcommittee within the past week and I have instructed that they be reviewed. Upon the completion of this study, I shall again be in touch with you.

I regret the delay in answering your letter, but I am sure that you understand there are always certain delays when the Senate reorganizes.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

John L. McClellan
Chairman

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D.C.
Document removed by the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

For further information, see entry 7-8 of the pink WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) at the front of this folder.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 13, 1955

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Federal Bureau of Investigation)

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you the attached portions thereof relating to matters of interest or concern to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The President would like to have a careful review made of the attached report, and to receive any comment deemed appropriate with respect to it within sixty days. Such comment should include any views with respect to the discussion in the report concerning the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO BE RETURNED TO THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you the attached portions thereof relating to matters of interest or concern to the Department of State.

The President would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of your Department, and to submit your views with respect to it within sixty days. These views should include specific comment on each of the recommendations relating to the State Department, and should indicate those recommendations which you consider can and should be adopted (indicating for these the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect); the statement should also indicate any recommendations not considered appropriate for adoption, together with supporting reasons and comment.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12055, Sec. 3-201

By DJH Date 12/15/81
The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you the attached portions thereof relating to matters of interest or concern to the Atomic Energy Commission.

The President would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of the Atomic Energy Commission, and to submit the views of the Commission with respect to it within sixty days. These views should include specific comment on the recommendations relating to the Atomic Energy Commission, indicating the extent to which it is considered these can and should be adopted, together with the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you the attached portions of the main report relating to matters of interest or concern to the Central Intelligence Agency.

The President would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of your Agency, and to submit your views with respect to it within sixty days. These views should include specific comment on each of the recommendations relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, and should indicate those recommendations which you consider can and should be adopted (indicating for these the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect); the statement should also indicate any recommendations not considered appropriate for adoption together with supporting reasons and comment.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.

June 15, 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on
Intelligence Activities (Department of the Air Force)

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Com-
misson Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to
transmit through you the attached portions of the main report relating
to matters of interest or concern to the Department of the Air Force.

The President would like to have a careful review made of the attached
report from the standpoint of the Department of the Air Force and to
receive comments with respect to the report within sixty days. These
comments should include specific remarks concerning each of the
recommendations relating to the Department of the Air Force, and
should indicate those recommendations which it is considered can and
should be adopted (indicating for these the method and timing deemed
appropriate for placing them in effect); the statement should also in-
dicate any recommendations not considered appropriate for adoption,
together with supporting reasons and comment.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission"
and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources
to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and
need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (National Security Agency)

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit through you, as a matter of interest or concern to the Director of the National Security Agency, the attached copy of Appendix I thereof.

For your information, a copy of this Appendix has been transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence with a request that a careful review be undertaken from the standpoint of the USCIB and USCSB, and that coordinated views of interested departments be developed and submitted within sixty days.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.
June 13, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Office of Special Operations)

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you the attached portions of the main report relating to matters of interest or concern to the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense.

The President would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached report and to submit your views with respect to it within sixty days. These views should include specific comment on the recommendations relating to the Office of Special Operations, indicating the extent to which these recommendations are deemed acceptable, and the intended manner of placing them in effect.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Office of Special Operations)

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you, as a matter of possible interest and concern to the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense, the attached copy of Appendix I thereof.

For your information, a copy of this Appendix has been transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence with a request that a careful review be undertaken from the standpoint of the USCIB and USCSB, and that coordinated views of interested departments be developed and submitted within sixty days.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 13, 1955

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Department of the Army)

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit through you the attached portions of the main report relating to matters of interest or concern to the Department of the Army.

The President would like to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of the Department of the Army and to receive comments with respect to the report within sixty days. These comments should include specific remarks concerning each of the recommendations relating to the Department of the Army, and should indicate those recommendations which it is considered can and should be adopted (indicating for these the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect); the statement should also indicate any recommendations not considered appropriate for adoption, together with supporting reasons and comment.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Department of the Navy)

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit through you the attached portions of the main report relating to matters of interest or concern to the Department of the Navy.

The President would like to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of the Department of the Navy and to receive comments with respect to the report within sixty days. These comments should include specific remarks concerning each of the recommendations relating to the Department of the Navy, and should indicate those recommendations which it is considered can and should be adopted (indicating for these the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect); the statement should also indicate any recommendations not considered appropriate for adoption, together with supporting reasons and comment.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

Sherman Adams
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Joint Chiefs of Staff)

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you the attached portions of the main report relating to matters of interest or concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached report and to submit your views with respect to it within sixty days. These views should include specific comment on the discussion in the report concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.
June 13, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Joint Chiefs of Staff)

The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you, as a matter of interest and concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the attached copy of Appendix I thereof.

The President would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached Appendix as it pertains to activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to transmit your views with respect to it within sixty days. These views should include specific comment on each of the recommendations relating to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicating the extent to which it is considered these can and should be adopted, together with the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect.

Task Force recommendations relating to a "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

By Date 2/1/79
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 9, 1955

Subject: Hoover Commission Reports

The last few days I had a chance to talk with leading industrialists, bankers, and insurance people in Hartford, Connecticut, at Brown University, and in New York City. I found an almost universal interest among all shades of opinion in these groups in the Hoover Commission reports and what the administration was planning to do about them. There has apparently been a very thorough job done of stirring up a really active interest among the members of the business community.

You probably noticed (what I have been told) in some of Mr. Hoover’s comments yesterday that he feels that there is considerable overt and covert opposition to the proposals in the various departments. He probably thinks that it is stirred up from the lower ranks. Actually there is strong opposition to some of the proposals by the very top of the departments; for example, Messrs. Flemming and Brownell, as members of the Hoover Commission, have made substantial and, in some cases, rather strong dissents to specific recommendations in the reports. Secretary Humphrey and other Cabinet members have strong opposition to some of the recommendations.

In order to accomplish our objective of obtaining as many positive supporting actions on the large number of recommendations that we can agree on and make sure that we have an excellent record on the points where we disagree, I think it might be helpful if you would mention at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow this situation and ask that the replies that we ask for in connection with circulating the reports to the different governmental departments be signed in all future cases by either the Secretary or the Under Secretary and that where there is any substantial and specific dissent or opposition the letter to the Budget Bureau reporting on these recommendations be signed by the Secretary or the head of the agency.

We shall move ahead as rapidly as we can in pulling together as long a list of items that the administration can support as it is possible to do, although there will be some delay because of "Operation Alert" next week and because we are in the midst of pulling together the 1957 budget ceiling figures.

Director

Electrostatic reproduction made for preservation purposes by the Eisenhower Library for replacement of a deteriorating manuscript item.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
Meeting in Governor Adams' office
11:30 AM, 2 June 1955
Present: Gov. Adams, Mr. Allen Dulles, Colonel Goodpaster

Mr. Dulles will have a check made of the individuals and allegations indicated in the attached memorandum and annexes (copy furnished him) and will provide a memorandum reporting findings and giving views in the matter as appropriate.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CEE, US Army

CC: Mr. Allen Dulles
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2. Infrared investigation of fixed
an administrative/executive
models and mismanagement.

SM (Support of SPD) Take up with C.D.
RG (Weij, Blossom) mantle A.
M.T. (Same plus others) (Perhaps)
MB. (Zekump - wind) work 9th.
To: Colonel Goodpaster

Subject: Enclosed Letter from General Clark

Dear Colonel Goodpaster:

Enclosed is a letter from General Clark which explains a matter mentioned to you.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]
Chairman.
May 25, 1955

Dear John:

Thank you for sending me the document resulting from the work of the Commission’s Task Force on Intelligence Activities.

It has been read for security. As might be expected, nothing deemed to be an unequivocal violation of security has been noted, but there are several passages having possibly adverse security implications to which further consideration might, with profit, be given. Except for one passage where rephrasing is proposed, the suggestion is simply to delete certain sentences or phrases. To facilitate your consideration, the deletions and the suggested rephrasing have been indicated on the copy of the report which you sent me and which I am returning herewith.

Sincerely,

Mr. John B. Hollister
Executive Director
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
Washington, D. C.
Dr. John J. Dubrul, Jr.
213 Prince St.
Alexandria, Va.
Phone Overlook 3-4937
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR ADAMS

As action on the Hoover Task Force report on intelligence activities, I suggest that you (or I, if you wish) advise Mr. Hollister generally as follows:

1. On the basis of a reading of the report for security, it is felt that there are several passages to which further consideration should be given -- one of these seems a rather clear-cut and unnecessary disclosure of information potentially valuable to foreign countries, and the rest appear to be of an "optional" character, in which the value to foreign countries of the information disclosed would have to be weighed against its value in terms of informing the American public. The passages referred to are:

   a. On page v, at the top of the page, a preferred version might read: "Two reports are submitted: one, unclassified; the other, classified TOP SECRET, with certain appendices which require special additional clearance." (This is the "clear-cut" case referred to above.)

   b. On page vii, the sentence in the first full paragraph beginning "Our effort to achieve, etc.," which gives an indication of success attained in obtaining a steady and reliable flow of data, might be deleted.

   c. On page ix, in the second paragraph, the sentence beginning "The information we need, etc." which identifies Communist plans, progress and potential as intelligence targets, might be deleted.

   d. There are several references authoritatively identifying attachés as intelligence-gatherers of major importance. These include the second sentence of the first paragraph on page 7, the second sentence of the second paragraph on page 11, the second full paragraph on page 22, and the second and fifth sentences of the paragraph beginning at
the bottom of page 23. In addition, there is a similar identification of the Foreign Service in the last sentence on page 14. These will be deleted.

e. The recommendation concerning the NSA at the bottom of page 41 has the effect of giving emphasis to this agency in an intelligence context and might be deleted.

2. The outline of U. S. top organizations for intelligence is undoubtedly one for which foreign countries would have had to expend a considerable amount of money to obtain — and would still not have had complete confidence that it was authoritative. Some generalizing might be considered.

3. The reference to the "Under Secretary of Defense" on page 40 might be changed to "Deputy Secretary of Defense."

Goodpaster
May 25, 1935

Mr. John B. Hollister
Executive Director
Commission on Organisation of the
Executive Branch of the Government
Washington, D.C.

Receipt No. 357.
May 21, 1955

Honorable Sherman Adams
The Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sherman:

Following our telephone conversation this morning, I am enclosing you the "Overt" portion of the Report of the Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities. This is the one, you understand, which will be presented to the Commission and when and if approved, will be filed with the Congress and given complete publicity.

While we do not see anything in it which would seem to be a security violation, the Task Force has requested, and we concur in the request, that it be cleared before presentation to the Commission and we feel that in this clearance, it should not be presented either to the Central Intelligence Agency or to the Department of Defense since they are concerned in it.

You have kindly offered to attend to this clearance for us which we hope can be accomplished very quickly in order that we may take it up for Commission action. As you know, our Commission terminates automatically in a few weeks.

Yours very sincerely,

John B. Hollister
Executive Director

Enclosure

P.S. Let me know if you need extra copies of the Report.

J.B.H.
The recommendations discussed below are from Appendix I of the Task Force Report. The Department of Defense comments are supplementary to those submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence for the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB), in which the Department of Defense and the three Services concur.

RECOMMENDATION No. 1

"That the National Security Council direct USCIB to establish COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to require minimum interpretation by the Director, NSA, of what is required and its degree of importance. USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, should determine the best way of producing the end product. If USCIB fails after a reasonable length of time to provide more adequate guidance to the Director, NSA, then the latter should be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur, subject to comment.

2. Comment:

It is doubtful that IAC membership for the Director, NSA, would solve the problem; it would probably raise additional complications.

In this connection, the Department of Defense considers that the present status and membership of the IAC give rise to ambiguity which this particular recommendation would only sharpen. The IAC is unique in being neither a policy nor an operational body, but a mixture of the two. This is the result partly of unforeseen evolution within the IAC, and partly of significant changes which have occurred within the Department of Defense since the IAC was established.

To the extent that the NSC intended the IAC to serve as a policy body, its Defense membership (the three Services and JCS) is at once diffuse and incomplete in that the Service representation is largely at an operating rather than a policy level and the Secretary of Defense is not directly represented, although the JCS representative (Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee) coordinates with the appropriate elements of OSD. On the other hand, to the extent that the IAC serves as a body concerned with the coordination and formulation of intelligence estimates and the coordination of operational intelligence matters, its present formalized structure may not
be entirely necessary. The three Service intelligence chiefs are suitable representation in this context, and although the Chairman, JIC, does not conduct operations, he is the appropriate indirect representative of the Secretary of Defense for these matters. In its dual capacity the IAC works, but in an unnecessarily complicated and probably uneconomical context of differing levels of activity.

The Department of Defense considers that a more desirable ultimate organization of the top structure of U.S. intelligence would involve a single board with policy cognizance over all aspects of intelligence. The Secretary of Defense's representative would be an appropriate civilian official, competent to act for him. Under this board would be several specialist committees to deal with operational matters; one concerned with communications and electronics intelligence and communications security (as recommended by the Clark Task Force); another with intelligence operations; a third with intelligence production; and possibly others. Representation on these committees would be provided by the Service intelligence chiefs and other operators (such as the Director, NSA) when appropriate.

The following main points summarize the views that are crystallizing in the Department of Defense on the general subject of intelligence:

1. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense must assume final responsibility for guidance and control over all aspects of intelligence.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence as the actual executive agent must have adequate and clearly defined coordinative powers under the Secretaries of State and Defense.

3. National intelligence policy is under the cognizance of the National Security Council. However, because of the sensitive nature of important elements of intelligence, intelligence matters might most appropriately be dealt with by a Special Committee of the NSC (which is now the case, to the satisfaction of all concerned, with respect to COMINT and CONSEC matters: the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Attorney General for matters under his cognizance, with the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence, constitute the Special Committee of the NSC).

4. The concept behind USCIB has proved to be the most satisfactory solution so far in one important intelligence area. Appropriately modified, it could usefully be applied to the entire intelligence field.

The changes which this general concept would involve do not require legislation. Internal reorganization within the IAC and probably an executive order to establish the new organization would suffice.

The Department of Defense proposes to discuss this subject further with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Department of State, and hopes in due course together with them to arrive at an agreed proposal for submission.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

"That the Director, NSA, be given clearcut directives which will enable him to make much greater and continuing effort to produce high-level communications intelligence. This is of such great importance that monetary considerations should be waived and an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once."

Department of Defense Position:

With respect to that portion of the Recommendation advocating "an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project": the Department of Defense considers some expansion on the USCIB comments is warranted.

With this objective in mind the Department of Defense has authorized the Director, NSA, to bring the best possible analytical brains from outside NSA to bear on the problem (if they can be found); and USCIB has recommended that this country undertake a maximum effort to:

The Department of Defense considers that as to warrant the full force of the government behind both projects.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 6

"That the Department of Defense carefully study the organizational structure and proper positioning within its respective services of the three cryptologic agencies - AFSS, ASA, and NSG - with a view toward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthening their personal assignment policies and logistical support."

USCIB considered that this recommendation pertains to an internal problem within the Department of Defense, and has accordingly referred it to this Department for comment.

The Department of Defense has long recognized that high professional standards and opportunity for a rewarding career for military and civilian personnel engaged in the communications intelligence effort must be strengthened if we are to deal successfully with the increasingly difficult technical problems confronting that effort. One means of achieving this objective is to constitute the Service cryptologic agencies as major commands. These should be subordinate neither to the intelligence nor to the communications elements within the Services, but should in each case report directly to the chief of staff. Adequate recognition of cryptology as a major operational career field cannot be otherwise achieved.

The Air Force cryptologic agency, the Security Service (AFSS), has been so constituted for approximately seven years. The AFSS is responsible for COMINT production and COMSEC activities, and in addition operated the Air Force's ground-based ELINT stations and its SSO (Special Security Officer) system for the dissemination of COMINT. Largely because of its status as a major command, the AFSS has developed a dynamic and promising program for recruiting, developing and holding on to technically qualified military career personnel.

Until recently the Army cryptologic agency (the Army Security Agency (ASA)) was responsible for COMINT production and for COMSEC. It was subordinate to G-2. On 23 June 1955, the ASA was designated as a major command responsible to the Chief of Staff, with virtually complete cognizance over all Army aspects of COMINT, COMSEC, ELINT and communications electromagnetic countermeasures (ECM). It is anticipated that this action will facilitate development of an energetic Army cryptologic career program paralleling that of the Air Force.

The Navy cryptologic activity, the Navy Security Group (NSG), is not so constituted. It operates at a lower echelon and under divided intelligence and communications cognizance. The NSG does not nominally have a commanding officer; it functions under the Chief of Security Branch who in turn reports to the Director, Naval Communications. The responsibilities of the NSG include COMINT production, COMSEC, and ELINT.
The Secretary of Defense proposes in the near future to ask the Secretary of the Navy to review the placement of the Navy cryptologic organization to determine whether a subordination and structure more closely paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force might not be advantageous.

**RECOMMENDATION NO. 7**

"That the military Services give greater attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular or career reserve officers to the maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field stations, and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service officers. Rotation and replacement procedures should be improved. The feasibility of using:........................................ should be thoroughly tested.

"It is also recommended that the Congress enact legislation to authorize the National Security Agency to employ specially qualified retired military personnel as presently authorized the Central Intelligence Agency and with no restriction on the number so employed. Such legislation should also permit the Secretary of Defense to recall retired officers to active duty with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized strength of NSA but not of the respective military services."

**Department of Defense Position**

The Department of Defense submits the following additional observations in expansion of the USGIB comment on this recommendation. As set forth in its comments on Recommendation No. 6, the Department of Defense believes that the establishment of major cryptologic commands in each of the military services will do much to promote the career possibilities advocated in Recommendation No. 7. Also, with the support of this Department, the Army and NSA are already embarked on a program to develop:........................................ Recently the Secretary of Defense endorsed a Navy proposal to augment the Naval Security Group with civilians.

With respect to the employment by NSA of specially qualified retired military personnel, the Department of Defense supports this proposal for NSA in principle as an element of the Department, but would emphasize that the highest objective standards of professional or technical skill should be applied in hiring such persons, in order to avoid possible abuses which could seriously prejudice career civilian morale.

Full consideration of the application of this proposal is currently in progress among personnel and legislative experts within the Department of Defense.
March 9, 1955

Maj. Gen. J. G. Christiansen
Committee on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government
Room 4850, Gen. Acctg. Ofc. Building
5th and G Streets
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Jim:

Here is a copy of a letter to Senator McCarthy for your information. I will be seeing you on the 22nd.

Sincerely,

Mark W. Clark

MWC/spb
Encl.
This pamphlet was included in the material Sen. Clark gave to me in an envelope, which he said Senator McCarthy gave him.

It was assumed that this was furnished as background information. Our investigation of C-2 was conducted along the lines indicated in scope of survey.
"That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number of 'super grades' and positions under Public Law 313 to NSA; to the possibility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges extended to civilians overseas."

**Department of Defense Position:**

The Department of Defense is supporting the efforts of the Director, NSA, to obtain additional super grades from the Civil Service Commission. Further, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel) is seeking as a priority matter (within existing legislation) to meet the request of the Director, NSA, for further inducements to selected consultants and privileges for civilians employed overseas. The consultant problem is not confined to NSA alone, and the Department prefers to resolve it for NSA as part of an over-all Department of Defense solution. Such additional legislation as may be required to achieve these objectives is also under consideration.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

26 May 55

MIR

don 25 May, at Geo. Adams’
direction, I met with Mr.
Brownell who handed me a
memorandum to him from
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, explained
its contents, and discussed
it briefly.

He indicated that it would
be acceptable to talk to Mr.
Aiken Dulles about it in general
terms - i.e., that list was furnished
that investigation was started, or
then stopped (because of, e.g., to
examine CIA records, make
interviews, etc.). He indicated Mr.
Dulles has asked to be kept in
contact - so as not to have
any interference with special
ages of CIA.
List of names forwarded to Sen. Clark.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECEIPT

June 1, 1955

SECRET

SUBJECT: Case Files of Task Force on Intelligence Activities, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.

1. List of names furnished General Mark W. Clark by Senator Joseph McCarthy.
2. List of names sent by Task Force to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
3. Report by Central Intelligence Agency on names furnished by the Task Force.
4. Report by Department of the Army on names furnished by the Task Force.
5. Report by Department of the Air Force on names furnished by the Task Force.
6. Report by Department of the Navy on names furnished by the Task Force.
7. Report by Department of State on names furnished by the Task Force.
10. Pax et Liberte case furnished General Mark W. Clark by Senator Joseph McCarthy. Central Intelligence Agency's reply and memorandum from Colonel Herman O. Lane, Staff Member of the Task Force.
11. $200,000 allegedly lost by Central Intelligence Agency. This case was furnished General Mark W. Clark by Senator Joseph McCarthy. Central Intelligence Agency's reply.


14. Final Report of the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, pursuant to H.Res. 390 and H.Res. 539 (82nd Congress)

I certify that I have received the above listed documents from Colonel John J. Dubbelde, U.S. Army, Retired, Deputy Staff Director, Task Force on Intelligence Activities, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Washington 25, D.C.

Official Business

Last list sent to Mrs. J. Edgar Hoover.
CIA reply on names
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FILE NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G2-SPS</td>
<td>12 APR 1955</td>
<td>Security Status - 3 pgs, 2 cys</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Dear Mr. Christiansen:

I refer to your letter of March 30, 1955, which requests information on employment and security status of certain individuals.

Records maintained at Headquarters USAF do not indicate that any of the individuals named in your letter of March 30 are now or have been employed in any headquarters activity. As you are aware, the maintenance of civilian personnel records is decentralized to the various field operating agencies.

Therefore, in conformity with the agreement made by Captain Knight of your staff and Colonel Paul H. Crews of our Office of Special Investigations, no effort has been made to check any of the many civilian personnel offices in the field in connection with your request. For this reason, it is not possible to furnish conclusive information as to present or past employment of these individuals in any of the various USAF operating elements not directly administered by Headquarters USAF.

In view of the above, the Department of the Air Force is unable to furnish security information as requested by you.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK AYER, JR.
Special Assistant to the Secretary

Mr. J. G. Christiansen
Staff Director
Task Force on Intelligence Activities
Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government
General Accounting Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.
Merry Christmas 12 names Green Team
Send M:\Carthy
Read More Case
C.I.P. reply
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Dead Man Case

The following is the true story which was apparently the basis for the "Dead Man Case" item.

Mr. Howard Louis JAMISON, Jewish, entered on duty with the Training Office of CIA on 1 October 1951. He was to be a lecturer and his first lecture was to be given on 22 October 1951.

Since his subject was one which required the use of libraries and facilities outside CIA (such as the Library of Congress) he was given twelve days (from 10 October 1951 until 22 October 1951) to do outside research and collect materials to be used in his lectures. This plan and the materials he would collect and the research he would do had all been carefully gone over in Training Division prior to 10 October 1951 when Mr. JAMISON last talked to Training Division officials.

Mr. JAMISON was living at the YMCA in Washington and YMCA officials (and his personal papers) had no data or knowledge of his CIA employment. These were correct security precautions which Mr. JAMISON had taken. YMCA officials only knew (and could only find in his papers) his home address in Springfield, Massachusetts.

On 11 October 1951 Mr. JAMISON died in his room at the YMCA of natural causes (heart failure) and the YMCA immediately notified his family at his home address in Springfield, Massachusetts and they (because of the Jewish custom) immediately took the body home for burial services.

CIA did not know of his death until he failed to show up on 22 October 1951. When he failed to appear on 22 October 1951 for the scheduled lecture the Training Office immediately called the Security Office and they learned all of the above on that date.
There were no security breaches by JAMISON or his family.

Mr. Robert BANNERMAN (Deputy Director of Security, CIA) advises that the case was quite properly handled in every aspect and Training Division was not blamable in any way for actions taken. This is simply a case of an employee having had very few friends in CIA and having been on a task which (for twelve (12) days) allowed him to do independent research in libraries outside CIA and having quietly died while on this outside duty.
$200,000 allegedly

Sen. McCarthy's allegations

CIA answers
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: $200,000 Allegedly Lost by CIA in Germany in 1948-49

This story is not correct. A cursory review of financial and operational records in 1948, 1949, 1950 (and subsequently) for the Division covering Germany has been made; and personnel who were in Germany and/or are in a position to know of any such loss as that indicated have been asked for anything they can recall of a loss of official funds. Among the persons questioned were: 

said he would most certainly have known of any loss of CIA (official) funds and he categorically has stated the story is not true.

In addition to the above, there is the obvious error in date. arrived in Germany in April 1951 and neither of the two (2) others named was in Germany during 1949.

The first OPC representative in Germany was: there are some unresolved questions regarding his finances and some of his accountings but there is no question which should give rise to any story similar to "$200,000.00 being lost by CIA".

who is presently in Washington, states he arrived in Germany in late August 1950. He has never heard of any loss of (or even any questions about) $200,000 and is certain that he would have heard of it if it had occurred in 1949 (prior to his arrival). He states he knows no loss of official funds occurred while he was in

They have, therefore, not been questioned about this allegation.
Reply is due from AF - has not been received 2 June 1955, per Dubbelde.
Air Force Contract No. AF33(038)12909 with Harvard University

Analysis of the Soviet Social System

The Contract Mission: On 1 June, 1950, the Human Resources Research Institute of the Air University Command, entered into a contract with Harvard University whereby its Russian Research Center would undertake to gather information about the life experience of the Soviet people and the institutions which control their behavior by interviewing ex-Soviet citizens, to integrate the interview data with such other sources of data on the Soviet Union as are available and pertinent, and to synthesize the resulting information into a "provisional working model," or analysis, of the Soviet social system. Specifically, the research is intended to:

(1) Describe and analyze the components of the Soviet social system - the people, their key institutions, and the way institutions and people interact;

(2) Indicate the strengths and weaknesses of the system under given conditions;

(3) Develop a series of inter-related statements or propositions about the structure and function of Soviet society as a total system, in order to provide a basis for more accurate predictions as to the probable behavior of the system under specified conditions, especially under conditions of internal stress or external force, and consequently to provide a basis for Air Force policy and planning in regard to the Soviet Union. This predictive device, as described above, is termed the Working Model of the Soviet Social System.

Cost and Current Status of the Project: This contract was initiated 1 June 1950 and terminated 30 June 1954. A no-cost extension was granted to 30 September 1954. The total cost for the contract was $908 thousand.

At the present time the Air Force monitor of this project is the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Air Research and Development Command.

The Project has been divided into four phases each of which were accomplished in approximately one year:

Phase 1. Collection of data. During this period, interviews and questionnaires were completed in Europe and in this country.

Phase 2. Processing. Materials were translated, content examined, topically organized, and tabulation commenced.
Phase 3. Analysis. This phase was concerned with the completion of coding and tabulation, and the preparation of analytical reports on special topics.

Phase 4. Completion of Analysis and Conclusion. All special reports, summary reports and prediction guides are being completed and forwarded to the Air Force monitor. Completion of work in this phase is being accomplished by Harvard University without additional cost to the government.

Results of this contract have been used by various staff offices of the Air Force, by the Army and by CIA through published reports, reference to project files or through briefings presented by Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn, formerly director of the Russian Research Center.
May 5, 1955

General J. G. Christiansen
Staff Director
Task Force on Intelligence Activities
Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government
General Accounting Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Christiansen:

Your letter of April 2 addressed to President Pusey has been referred to me for reply.

I am able to inform you that Professor John K. Fairbank (not Fairbanks) did not participate in the work done by the Russian Research Center of Harvard University under Air Force Contract No. AF 33(038) 12909.

Very truly yours,

McGeorge Bundy
Dean
Dr. Nathan Pusey, President,
Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts

My dear Dr. Pusey:

Under the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, the Task Force of which General Mark W. Clark is chairman, has been engaged for the past few months in a survey of Federal intelligence activities. In the course of this work, a wide variety of information has been made available to the Task Force, some of which is insufficiently complete to permit proper appraisal of its worth.

Of the nature of information mentioned above, is a statement concerning Air Force Contract No. AF 33(038) 12909 with Harvard University. The Task Force has been advised that the Human Resources Research Institute of the Air University Command entered into this contract with Harvard University on June 1, 1950, whereby its Russian Research Center would undertake an analysis of the Soviet social system. It is understood that this contract terminated June 30, 1954.

The additional information needed by the Task Force concerns whether or not Mr. John K. Fairbanks participated in this contractual effort. Your cooperation is requested to the extent of advising whether Mr. Fairbanks was employed by the Russian Research Center during the term of the contract referred to, whether he took part in the work involved in that contract, and the inclusive dates of such participation. A brief statement as to the nature of the work performed by Mr. Fairbanks would be helpful.

In order that this information may be available to the Task Force when it next assembles for deliberation on May 12, 1955, an early reply is requested. Thank you for your assistance in this regard.

Very truly yours,

J. G. Christiansen
Staff Director
Irene Christiansen

Here is a piece that appeared in the March issue of "National Business" published by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The only part of the piece that I note appears on page 459.
WHAT RUSSIA WILL DO NEXT

Kremlin wants to avoid all-out war, Air Force Russian study reveals. The chances of revolt in Soviet Union held slim, although many Russians are fed up with terror tactics of Red regime

By PAUL HENCKE

MALENKOV's resignation as Russia's premier and his replacement by Bulganin will mean little change in Russia's over-all strategy.

This is the opinion to be drawn from a four year study of communist power and weaknesses which the Russian Research Center at Harvard University has just completed for the United States Air Force.

An exclusive interview starting on page 26 summarizes the most important findings of the study. Some of the conclusions are heartening to the cause of freedom. Others seem to justify the darkest of doubts about the future.

Air Force evaluators describe the Harvard material as "the most thoroughgoing and extensive examination of national life in the Soviet Union ever undertaken by western scholars."

Their enthusiasm is warranted. The study—begun in 1950 and completed last Nov. 30—provides our government with an X-ray picture of the many forces at work in Soviet society: of a regime shaken by ideological controversies and conflicting personal ambitions yet unified by communism's historic drive toward world conquest; of a people weary of the burdens thrust on them by totalitarian masters yet mesmerized by communism's promise of a better life; of an economy capable of equipping a mammoth modern war machine yet pathetically inept in its efforts to supply consumer goods to the citizens of the Soviet.

The basic contents of the study are the accounts which Russian people themselves have given of their day-to-day life. Harvard's research teams conducted hundreds of oral interviews with Russian emigres in Europe and America during 1950 and 1951. This information was augmented by thousands of questionnaires filled out by Soviet escapees, special reports written by former factory managers, Communist Party officials and others, and papers prepared expressly for the Project by American experts on the Soviet Union.

In its unprocessed form the Harvard data exceeded 33,000 pages. Specialists working under the supervision of Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn, director of the project for Harvard, integrated this information, and funneled the end-product into the Officer Education Research Laboratory at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Ala.

There two Air Force intelligence specialists, Dr.
Herman J. Sander and Edmund O. Barker have been working the data into final shape. Their work will not be completed until some time this summer.

The study covered many aspects of Soviet life—reaction to German occupation, Soviet policy toward national minorities, the arrest system, attitudes of the man-in-the-street toward the regime, the role of the factory manager, and so on.

The final report was written by Dr. Kluckhohn in cooperation with two staff assistants, Drs. Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer. It bears the wordy title, "Strategic Psychological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System," but amounts, in fact, to a simple summing-up of all that was learned during the four years of exhaustive research. It is in this volume, too, that Harvard's Russian experts predict what Russia's next moves will be.

The scope of the scholarship, which went into this study is illustrated by the special competencies of Drs. Kluckhohn, Inkeles and Bauer: They are, in the order named, an anthropologist, sociologist, and social psychologist. Also included on the project research staff were historians, economists, political scientists, clinical psychologists, students of Soviet literature and other recognized experts on the USSR.

Sixty of the former Soviet citizens interviewed were given clinical psychology tests designed to reveal to the researchers the innermost workings of the Soviet mind.

Special care was taken in all phases of the research to assure unbiased opinion. The interviewees were both men and women, but men predominated. Most were in their middle years. Many of them were carried out of Russia as impressed laborers by the retreating Nazis during World War II. Others left Russia in the immediate postwar era.

Some got out as late as 1950.

No significant differences were noted in the attitudes expressed by those Russians brought out of their homeland by the German Army and those who left later. For this reason the research directors believe that they obtained a portrait of Russian society as it is today, as well as ten or 15 years ago.

The average Soviet citizen, in other words, has been much the same person since about 1940 and probably won't change much in his basic attitudes in the foreseeable future.

The interviewees made up a cross-section of work groups—housewives, students, Red Army and Communist Party officials, farmers, doctors, lawyers—and included members of many disparate national groups—Armenians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Great Russians, Ukrainians, and so forth. Many had been active, loyal supporters of the regime right up to the time they left Russia.

Few could be labeled as "social failures" and their testimony challenged on that basis.

Certain themes recurred often during the four years of fact-finding: agriculture is a very weak cog in the Soviet machine (Harvard's researchers call the peasant-farmers the "angry men" of the Russian populace); many Russians dislike, even detest, the regime yet like and support such communist devices as state ownership of the means of production and the concept of the welfare state; there is little chance that the Party and the regime will be overthrown.

What prompted the Air Force to have this research performed?

The answer is simple. Nations are interrelated social systems of great complexity in the modern world, and the impact of air weapons in any future war will go much beyond the physical damage which can be accomplished.

Since the definition of a target system has expanded and the potentiality of weapons has changed, it has become necessary to consider factors previously ignored. Among the most important of these are the psychological and sociological bases of community and national life.

In the case of the Soviet Union and its 215,000,000 people, this has necessitated turning social science methods to the description and analysis of the basic components of the Soviet system—the people, their key institutions, and the manner in which institutions and people interact.

The report gives the Air Force new analyses of the people and of basic institutions of the Soviet system—and analyses which will have particular value in strategic planning.

Considerations of strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system, loyalties and dislikes of the people, or any other social vulnerabilities, provide a realistic framework within which Russian capabilities can be measured.

Whether at policy levels, in training programs, or in the hands of Air Force research experts, this study brings to each a more penetrating view and understanding of the USSR as it exists today.

To draw out the significant findings of the Air Force-Harvard study, NATION'S BUSINESS interviewed Edmund O. Barker, the Air Force official most familiar with the Harvard material.

Mr. Barker's answers are based solely on the contents of the Harvard Project.

How will Malenkov's resignation affect future moves by the Soviet government?

Changes in leadership were expected by the Project. Barring profound crises (as might occur in agriculture), the outlook is for relative stability and continuation of substantially the present system regardless of "palace revolutions."

Will Malenkov's resignation affect the validity of the Project findings?

No—not at all, because the Project was primarily concerned with basic, largely unchanging, aspects of Soviet life, institutions, and people, rather than with the changing fortunes of leaders at the top involved in the struggle for power. These fundamental elements in Soviet national life are continuing: They weather crises and outlive leaders.
Hundreds of refugees were interviewed to gain picture of Soviet society. Air Force will use the Project’s findings to plan strategy it will use in event of war

It is evident that the changes in leadership (Malenkov’s succeeding Stalin, Beria’s execution, Malenkov’s “resignation,” Bulganin’s accession—and tomorrow possibly Khrushchev) have not significantly changed or improved life for the Soviet masses. To the contrary, as successive leaders promise more and deliver less (that is, failure in consumer goods and agricultural programs), they may be significantly adding to popular discontent.

What forecasts can be made, using the Project findings?

A continuation of the cold war is expected for the next five years at least. All-out war seems unlikely. The struggle for power among the top leaders of Russia will continue. This is almost inevitable in the Soviet state unless a genuine change in the nature of the system occurs. The trend toward managerial bureaucracy may give the “committee” type of dictatorship a greater chance of stability in the USSR than many westerners are likely to predict.

What direction is Soviet over-all policy likely to take in the next five years?

The Soviet regime appears to be clearly committed to stabilization and consolidation both at home and abroad. Industrial productivity is to be heightened, the morale of the population improved, and the present position in Europe is to be maintained but not extended; expansive activities are to be centered in Asia and in “colonial” regions generally.

Two extreme possibilities are completely discarded: breakdown or continuation of the Soviet system’s development without any change.
INSIDE RUSSIA continued

Project spokesman Barker thumbs through final report. Study cost Air Force more than $900,000

Are the Russian people likely to revolt against the regime?

No. There is scant evidence for the view that more than a very tiny part of the population would take appreciable risks to sabotage the regime or to aid western democracy.

What changes did the Project research indicate might occur in the Soviet system?

Changes will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and possibly in one of the following main directions, or some combination of them:

1. Gradual reversion to "Stalinism," especially if a single leader attains unquestioned supremacy.
2. More emphasis on national bureaucracy, that is, greater control by managerial technicians than by Party ideological zealots.
3. Reversion to certain traditional, pre-Soviet patterns with strong development of Russian or Pan-Slavic nationalism and imperialism.
4. Gradual movement in directions likely to change—eventually—the essential nature of the Soviet system and to make possible stable accommodation with the West.

What is the present over-all strategy of the Soviet leaders?

They want to consolidate their internal position and exploit the weakness of the non-Soviet world by propaganda, diplomacy, fifth-column movements, and local rebellion, while waiting for the processes of history to produce Lenin's predicted decay of capitalism. The immediate causes of this policy seem to be a combination of the increased strength of the West, and the accentuation of internal difficulties in the USSR.

What does the present foreign policy of the USSR appear to be?

It is, to a significant degree, two-pronged:

One prong, ironically enough, involves a "containment" of the revived strength of the West by trying to obstruct French ratification of EDC, German rearmament, stirring up old hostilities between Germany and France, dividing the United States and Great Britain on China policy and so on.

Increasing emphasis is placed on "intra-imperialist," conflicts and upon the allegedly disastrous eventual consequences of "internal contradictions" in western economies.

There seems to be a rather definite decision—at least for the immediate future—to let our western system fall to pieces through its own internal dynamics, and with a certain minimum amount of nonmilitary facilitation on the part of the Soviets.

The other prong, of course, is a continued policy of nibbling away at the choicest of the overripe colonial morsels: Indochina is the latest victim, but others in Asia and Africa are presumably on the list.

What does the final report have to say about the Soviet program of "peaceful coexistence"?

The Soviet attitude toward "coexistence" is that it is tolerable as a temporary state of affairs. It is clear that the present leadership intends to cooperate with the free world only to the extent that this will advance the eventual prospect of a completely communist world.

Is the Soviet regime committed at home to a policy of relaxation of internal rules?

SOVIET CITIZENS' VIEWS OF AMERICA

This is how the majority of Soviet citizens view America and the West:

America is the capitalistic West in general, but to a lesser degree is aggressive and bent on world domination. This propaganda point has been established by dissociating the American government from two symbols which Soviet citizens still value: the American people and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Soviet press insists that the U.S. government and its foreign policy do not represent the people.

America is respected for its technology and its material power. The goal of overtaking and surpassing American production was a Soviet slogan from the beginning of the Five-Year Plan.

Capitalism is a decadent socio-economic system which survives only by exploitation of the workers and under the artificial stimulation of ornament production.

The standard of living of the rank-and-file citizen of western countries is lower than it is in the Soviet Union.

Americans are materialistic and lack spiritual values. [These criticisms come overwhelmingly from intellectual émigrés.]

Westerners are soft and can't take it.

All people are not treated alike in America. Certain racial and ethnic groups are discriminated against.
$1,500,000,000
FOR PROPAGANDA

The Importance of propaganda in the USSR is indicated by the budget. In 1950, out of a $70,000,000,000 national income, $1,500,000,000 went to propaganda activities.

The Soviet Union has some 6,000 special local schools, in addition to regional and national schools, for training propagandists. Trainees come from every part of the world to attend these schools.

Soviet propaganda has sought to reverse certain stereotyped propaganda images. Our mental picture of the Bolshevik, who was always a bearded figure sitting on a huge pile of bombs with a hammer in his hand and a sickle in his teeth, has now been picked up by the Soviets for their own use; they have Uncle Sam sitting on an enormous pile of atom and hydrogen bombs with a Coca-Cola bottle in his mouth.

To propagandize Soviet factory workers on the exploitation and enslavement of workers in America, a film was shown concerning a police-striker fight in Detroit. In the fighting, some white and Negro workers were injured and had to be carried on stretchers to waiting ambulances. As the injured were carried past the camera, first, the Soviet factory workers noticed that the American workers wore shoes without holes in the soles. Word quickly went around that the picture was a fake.

Yes. The rulers clearly want better internal morale and various improvements. At the 1954 Supreme Soviet, Malenkov and Khrushchev complained about the standard of labor discipline, the quality of output, and the rate of increase in productivity. The Soviet leaders are indeed facing dilemmas, but we must not be guilty of easy optimism as to the outcome. In the first place, we must remember that a little sop can go a long way in the Soviet system. Expectations are low and there is also still sufficient belief in the reality of “capitalist aggression” to make the people satisfied with small concessions.

What other forecasts are found in the final report concerning the future of the Soviet system?

1. An improvement in the standard of living and a slackening of the tempo of development, accompanied by an easing of rigid administration and intense terror, could effect a substantial and perhaps a profound reorientation of the population toward the regime.
2. As time goes on, the role permitted rational technical bureaucracy in running things within the limits of set policy will increase, and such technical considerations may come to have more effect on the actual direction of policy.
3. Concerning agriculture, the authors of the final report are convinced that the regime will not give up the collective farm system, and this will remain a source of friction, tension, and lowered production.

What does the final report forecast for the future of the USSR?

In short, the best prediction for the short-run is that, at the worst, the present regime may revert to Stalinism, and at best it may become a more popular, or at least less resented, but no less totalitarian government.

In neither case do we anticipate that either the long-range goals or the strategy of Soviet foreign policy will be greatly changed in the next decade, although there may be some modifications of tactics and methods.

What has the Project to say about Soviet society in general, and the emergence of a managerial bureaucracy in particular?

It is certainly true that there has been some crucial crystallization of Soviet society. A new kind of bourgeoisie has become accustomed to relative luxury. Social stratification is more rigid. The decrease in social mobility has lessened a certain kind of vital dynamism which characterized Soviet society for a long period. An entrenched group has strong vested interests in the status quo. There is a conflict between two conceptions: the old ideal of party asceticism, and that of “the rich new life.” However, in spite of some tendency in the direction of managerial bureaucracy, the ideological element in communism weigh against a very rapid bureaucratic dominance in the USSR.

If the factory-manager class emerges as a powerful group in the USSR, would this lead to a “managerial revolution”?

Far from seeking great changes in the industrial system, these key managerial personnel want to maintain it in its present form. They have a considerable stake in its continuance through high salaries, sizable cash bonuses, production rewards, better apartments, and other special privileges attaching to high position. Within the factory system, they seek to reduce interference from the center—that is, Moscow-located ministry chiefs—and to make the system work more smoothly.

Will you explain what is implied in the Project reference to the fact that Soviet people have built-in “mental radar”?

Living in a country where a slip of the tongue may land you in jail,

(Continued on page 48)
THEY BUILD
ATOM’S ROAD
TO PEACE

By PHILIP GUSTAFSON

Dean Ralph A. Sawyer (left) and Prof. Henry J. Gomberg with model of $1,500,000 Phoenix Laboratory

TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND believers in private enterprise have bought themselves a share in the atomic age. These shareholders range from housewives to industrial giants like General Motors and Ford whose contributions run into seven figures. Among them, they have piled up $7,500,000 to help find peacetime applications of nuclear energy and to study its effects on society.

These 25,000 have made cash gifts to Phoenix Project, the pride and joy of the University of Michigan and its students, alumni and friends. Phoenix Project is the only organized non-government operation which attempts to come to grips on a comprehensive scale with the problems atomic energy creates. It lives by the grace of private donations alone; yet in peacetime research it ranks with the country's great nuclear laboratories—Brookhaven, Argonne and Oak Ridge—supported by government funds.

Phoenix is not a foundation, nor an institute. It is simply a project, run by deans and professors who also carry full-time academic schedules. It is kept going by teachers who conduct its research without additional salaries. In five years, Phoenix has grown until it consists of nearly 100 research projects; it permeates practically every division of the university and virtually every department of human knowledge.

Phoenix sprang into being after Hiroshima as a memorial to University of Michigan war dead—a means of turning the destructive potential of the bomb to human benefit. From the idea of one Mich-
What Russia Will Do Next

(Continued from page 29)

or in Siberia, the people have become sensitive observers and evaluators of other persons. Friends, associates, colleagues—all are given a careful appraisal and size-up in order to assess the risk in such contacts and associations. The network of regime informers is reportedly large, and interestingly replenished by petty thieves, prostitutes and criminals who, in exchange for their freedom from jail sentences, must become “neighborhood spies” for the regime.

Additionally, the “block system,” which holds each member of a group responsible for the actions of all the other members of his group, helps to keep the average citizen extremely chary of close contacts with others.

What are the main social and psychological weaknesses of the Soviet system?

The system is vulnerable:

To an increase in the people’s correct knowledge of the outside world.

To situations where the reachable elite, especially the military elite, feel a conflict between patriotism and their loyalty to the regime in power.

To actions by the United States, whether of an economic, military or psychological warfare nature, which are unexpected by the Soviet leadership, and hence disturbing to their confidence that their calculations about us are sound.

To clogging of the decision-making process at higher levels.

To the risk that a purge campaign initiated at the top may become a run-away affair like that of the mid-1930’s.

To exposure of weak links or inconsistencies in its ideological armor.

To substantial increases in the discontent in the Soviet population, and perhaps even more to abrupt alterations in the tightening and relaxing of pressures upon the people.

Do the people get away with anything in the Soviet system?

Yes—to the extent that the regime feels that such actions contribute to the success of programs! Since much of the citizen’s extra-legality is actually necessary to the functioning of the system, no institutions are run completely according to the book, and an unstable balance is worked out between the application and evasion of the means of control.

How does the overage citizen get along in the Soviet system?

The rank-and-file citizen learns to apply complicated techniques of accommodation and evasion to carry on his daily affairs and to maintain himself in reasonably successful or at least untroubled adaptation to the regime.

Do the people resent the Soviet leaders or the Soviet system?

Their hostility is toward the regime—the actual people in power—rather than toward the system.

Even those who are violently anti-Soviet favor state ownership of means of production, and other institutional features which are associated with socialism.

What general features of Soviet life are most intensely resented by the people?

The low standard of living, the excessive pace of everyday life and the threat of arbitrary political repression.

What organizational feature of the Soviet system is most hated?

The collective farm system. The Project interviews contained strikingly little complaint about the factory system other than dislike of harsh labor discipline laws. For example, repeated tardiness means a prison sentence.

Millions of people have been arrested by the secret police at one time or another. How has this affected their attitudes?

Being arrested has little effect on a person’s general social and political attitudes and values. The individual does not generalize his experience to the point of revising his judgment concerning the kind of society in which he lives. Arrest, however, does increase his hostility to the regime.

Furthermore, arrest—whether his own or that of a family member—makes him anxious about his own future, and thereby increases the probability of his leaving the Soviet Union voluntarily if the opportunity arises.

Does discontentment cause the Individual to put less effort into his job?

The degree of dissatisfaction with, or even disaffection from, the system does not necessarily detract from the energy with which a person does the job assigned to him. The disaffected person often does his job well, and in fact may work with a little extra energy, either because he feels he has to prove himself or because he finds comfort in his work. The fact that the Soviet system tends to produce dissatisfaction in its citizens does not in itself mean that it gets less effective work from them.

THE PEOPLE SPEAK

Types of criticism permitted in the Soviet press (mainly in the form of letters to the editor):

The Palace of Culture of the Novo-Tagil Metallurgical Plant has "dressing rooms so small that it is impossible for an actor to put on his make-up."

The Teacher’s Gazette, the official journal of Soviet teaching, published this criticism of Comrade Komarova, a geography teacher in the 254th school in Moscow: "In discussing Rome, the capital of Italy, he never mentioned a word about the reactionary role of the Vatican!"

The Turkmen Iskra of August 20, 1954, published this criticism in its letters to the editor column: "At the Vorovsky rest home (a health-vacation resort for workers), it was announced that the hot shower bath was working. This was a great event for the guests, However, it was impossible to take a bath since the water came up to one’s knees in the shower-room."

48
On what does the stability of the Soviet system rest?

The stability of the Soviet system involves a nice balance between the regime's powers of coercion and the adjustable habits of the Soviet citizenry. The stability of the system and of the people's loyalty depends to a high degree on the citizen's own belief in the stability of that system and on his having no alternative but to adjust.

Are the non-Russian nationalities in the USSR the most dissatisfied?

Not at all. People in the same social group, peasants, workers, employees, intelligentsia, hold essentially the same attitudes and values regardless of nationality. The nationality element is sometimes strong, but more often it is latent and seems to be only a secondary contributing cause to disaffection.

What did the Project find out about the peasantry which constitutes about 55 per cent of the Soviet labor force?

The peasantry is the outstandingly disaffected group in the population. Further, the peasants' hatred of the institutional form of the collective farm is generally shared by all social groups. The collective farm is revealed as the most wholeheartedly opposed of all Soviet economic and social institutions.

How does the regime indoctrinate Soviet youth to be good communists?

Mainly through state-controlled education and also through the ubiquitous communist organizations for youth: the Octobrists for ages 8-11, the Pioneers for ages 10-15, and the Komsonol—Communist Youth League—for ages 15-23.

Are Soviet young people likely to become disaffected as they mature?

No. Although there is a period of crisis, when the individual reaches maturity, in the relationship of youth to the regime, only a small minority actually turn against the system because of disillusionment. In most instances, they are able to reconcile the conflict in their feelings toward the regime. The younger generation is coming to accept as natural many aspects of Soviet life and the Soviet system that the older generation rebelled against.

How aware of the outside world are the Soviet people?

Ignorance and distorted views of the outside world are deeper and more widespread—even among the intelligentsia—than heretofore had been realized.

How does the regime control the radio programs heard by the Soviet people?

In several ways. Some foreign programs are jammed to prevent their being heard. In addition the radio system is almost completely (80 per cent) based on wired speakers. These are speakers wired to a central control station in the city instead of individual tube or aerial sets. The regime has been largely successful in keeping foreign broadcasts from reaching the population and in putting into the communications network its own propaganda.

How classless is Russia's classless society?

Anything but! Soviet society is highly stratified into classes somewhat similar to those in western industrial society. In theory, the class system is open—a person can rise from one class to a higher—and such movement has actually been extensive. However, certain avenues are blocked for those of bourgeois family background and for many others whose close relatives have been proscribed as enemies of the state.

How have the Soviet people fared at the hands of their rulers?

Supported by their belief or claim that they are executing the will of history, the regime has been ruthless in handling people. Little is thought of enormous physical suffering, and even loss of life if, by these means, appropriate goals are felt to be advanced. Only when bad morale is believed to affect production or even to raise the threat of disorders does the regime relax the pressures. This indifference adds to the flexibility of the regime's pursuit of short-term goals.
What features of Soviet leadership receive widespread approval?

The people like the purposefulness, the activism, and the steady looking to the future.

Have the Soviet leaders developed among the elite a considerable proportion of people of an externally disciplined and driving character?

To a certain degree, this has been done. However, even in this group the underlying personality of these people often seems to continue to conform to the traditional Russian characteristics familiar in literary and historical sources:

Violent psychological ups and downs.

Need for warm personal relations and for a firm place in the group.

Unwillingness to compromise.

Passive resistance, only occasionally marked by violent outbursts, to strong and arbitrary authority.

Vitality and spontaneity alternating with melancholy and apathy.

Mixed attitudes toward foreigners.

These are traits which continue to characterize the personality of the rank-and-file Russian.

How do informal advisory mechanisms contribute to the operation of the Soviet system?

These are the many evasive, quasi-legal or illegal actions of Soviet citizens which are most criticized in the official press and generally regarded by western observers as signs of weakness. They include: "scroungers"; "five percenters"; "the Tolka" (a supply expediter); blat (the reciprocation of favors and the use of personal influence to obtain illegal advantages); the "web of mutual support" (collusion between manufacturers and government inspectors); simulation of required output; hoarding supplies; padding estimates; concealing reserves; underreporting output.

These activities are actually advantageous for the system, helping to keep it from bogging down in its own red tape. The research has provided a strong realization of the importance of informal mechanisms in the operation of a society that on the surface appears and pretends to be highly centralized, controlled, and rationalized.

Does the regime tolerate independent clubs, labor unions, fraternal organizations?

No. However, "localism"—which is the tendency for local loyalties to develop and for local interests to be advanced over those of the regime—has a more important status in the Soviet scene than it had been accorded heretofore.

How do the people feel toward their native land?

The depth of their loyalty to the Motherland is an outstanding sentiment in all classes irrespective of religion, political attitudes, and of personality structure. This is coupled with a genuine fear of foreign aggression. These sentiments are strongest in the heartland, but prevail pretty generally.

Does Soviet propaganda demand more than conformity from the people?

Yes. The Soviet propaganda machine does not limit itself, as most other systems of political propaganda have done, to the technique of reiteration, hammering in, to the suppression of complaints and disturbing information. It insists upon positive action from the people. It is true that incessant profession of faith is the prerequisite not only of personal security but also of advancement at school, in work, and in every sphere of life.

To conform, at least outwardly, is necessary for survival.

But the regime wants more than conformity; it wants not so much belief, in the sense in which Christians would use that term, as active support of the Party as the trustworthy custodian of all the fundamental doctrinal questions. The individual can so comply by actively propagating and carrying out the Party program and its concrete demands.

What is the significance of ideology in the Soviet regime?

Enormous stress is put on ideology both as a doctrine and as a practical instrument. The operating ideology of the leadership at any given point in time is kept remarkably consistent. The more formal total theoretical system has, in fact, undergone change through time, but much effort is expended to rationalize these changes and preserve the appearance of continuity and consistency. There is good evidence that communist ideology affects the thinking and the acts of leaders and of other intellectuals who grew up under the Bolshevik regime.

Do the Soviet leaders carry on a constant battle against opposition elements?

Yes. Both because of their addiction to rational planning and because of their conviction that "everyone who is not completely for us is against us," the ruling elite have made great efforts to stamp out growing centers of independent power and communication in the Soviet system. Their success, however, is incomplete.

Is the Soviet terrorization of the people an integral part of the system?

Yes. Terror and forced labor are well known communist instruments of power. They are primarily goal-achieving tools, rather than sadistic methods, as in the Nazi case. The motivation behind their use is dominantly political—that is, eliminating opposition to the regime, through economic utility, as sending prisoners to work the uranium mines—is exploited.

What is the regime's attitude toward the little piece of private land allowed the peasant?

As a sop to the serious resistance to forced collectivization, the Collective Farm Statutes of 1935 allowed each farm household a private plot varying in size from two thirds to one and one fifth acres. The regime has tried to whittle
down these private holdings, partly to free more labor for communal work, partly to increase the peasant's dependence upon the proceeds from the collective farm to which he belongs. The leaders have a still more fundamental distrust of private agriculture because, in Lenin's words:

"Peasant small-scale production breeds capitalism and a bourgeoisie—every day, every hour—by a natural process and on a mass scale."

Collective farms take up 85 per cent of all agricultural land in the USSR, and another nine per cent is organized into state farms.

**Is the agricultural system currently in crisis?**

Yes. According to the Russian leaders themselves, during the period 1940-1953 when the population of the USSR increased by 15,000,000, there was a total decline in grain acreage of 35 per cent of the prewar average.

Food production is the lowest and the average Soviet diet the smallest and poorest since the First Five-Year Plan came into force in 1928.

The numbers of beef and dairy cattle in 1953 were less than the total in 1916.

**What are some of the central and repetitive patterns of behavior of the Soviet regime?**

Overcontrol, overconcentration, and overcommitment. As to overcommitment of resources, the leaders tend to undertake a massive program in such a way that every conceivable resource, including critical reserves, must be totally involved. Alternative policies, however, are more nearly ready for implementation than would appear on the surface.

**Can the Soviet regime completely disregard the wishes and welfare of the people?**

Road building and maintenance nearly stopped in depression and war years, but the search for safer, more durable and economical pavement went right on. The Portland Cement Association has played a major role.

One project consists of roads built more than ten years ago with different cements and concrete mixtures as part of the highway systems of New York, Missouri and South Carolina. Purpose: to test weathering effects in various climates. Already this field experiment has shown conclusively that air-entrained concrete (containing billions of tiny air cells) eliminates damage caused by freeze-thaw cycles and chemicals used to melt snow and ice. Result: a safer, longer-lasting, lower-anual-cost pavement.

Developments like this from PCA's continuing field and laboratory work help make tomorrow's roads a benefit to all Americans, who pay for them with license fees, gas and other taxes on private and commercial vehicles.
RUSSIA continued

No. Since the individual is the most flexible resource of the Soviet system, the regime is necessarily concerned with the morale of the population—not as an objective in itself, but as an unavoidable prerequisite to economic production and military readiness.

How does one get ahead in the USSR?

A citizen's social class and his occupation largely determine both his opportunities for advancement and his attitudes toward the system. Social position is more important than such factors as nationality or previous arrest in affecting his hostility toward, passive acceptance of, or active support of the regime.

Is discontent in the USSR the same as disloyalty?

No. Although there is a great deal of popular dissatisfaction, there is only a relatively small amount of disaffection and disloyalty. Soviet escapes and DP's left little doubt about the extent to which most of them were unhappy about many aspects of their lives in the USSR. But these same interviews indicated that most of the citizens of the USSR feel helpless in the face of the power of the state and desire only to live peacefully—to keep out of trouble, to do nothing that would bring them to the attention of the secret police.

Is there a difference between the psychological make-up of the Soviet leaders and the people?

Psychologically, there continues to be a great gap between the Soviet masses and the elite. The masses remain rather close to the traditional literary picture of Russian character. They are warm-hearted, impulsive, given to mood swings and contradictory in behavior. The goal—and to some extent the attainment—of the elite is the rather puritanical "new Soviet man": disciplined, working steadily and consistently, subordinating personal conduct and motivation to the requirements of Party discipline.

What was the Project mole of the nationalities problem?

Nationality feeling undoubtedly still exists and is of genuine importance in a number of groups within the USSR—Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, the Moslem peoples, and so on. However, while ethnic minorities represent something like half or more of the total population of the Soviet Union, their power is not proportionately great.

Second, the minorities by no means present a united front; on the contrary, they have their own frictions and jealousies.

Third, individuals from the minor nationalities occupy a disproportionately small number of power positions in the total system.

Fourth, the minorities are being rather rapidly Russified.

In general, nationality groups feel the same resentments toward the regime and the same dissatisfactions with the system as other citizens of the USSR, although they may feel them somewhat more intensely.

Do the intelligentsia of the USSR enjoy a favored position?

Yes, even though they are subject to closer surveillance than are rank-and-file citizens. They run greater risks of punishment and more extreme demands are put upon them. Yet they are also the favored beneficiaries of the system.

Which class fares worst of all under the Soviet system?

The peasants.

What can the regime do to enhance its position among the people?

Leaders of the present regime can gain very solid popular support if they supply more consumer goods and better housing, ease up on the terror, make some concessions to the peasant, and somewhat relieve the frantic pace at which all the population has been driven.

What is the present situation of the military clique in the USSR?

The military is a key group. The relative prestige and power of military leaders have notably increased—and is further enhanced by Bulganin's accession to premiership. They have greater capabilities for independent action than any other group in the Soviet Union, save the Communist Party. Military leaders, on the whole, have had little more experience with the West and tend to have a more realistic estimate of its power. They are more trusted by peoples of the Soviet Union than any other power echelon. While virtually all officers above the grade of captain are members of the Party or Komsomol, it is likely that patriotism will prevail over the regime or ideological commitment among most senior officers in a crisis situation.

What is the greatest weakness of the Soviet system?

The fact that the Soviet system violates so many interests of its citizens in achieving state goals that the regime cannot rely on their loyalty.

What is the chance that a revolution will wreck the Soviet system?

There is little likelihood that the Soviet dictatorship will crumble from its own faulty structure within the immediately foreseeable future. Nor do we anticipate an internal revolution other than possibly, a change in the personnel of the ruling clique.

What are the chronic failures of the Soviet system?

The prolonged depression of the standard of living; the unremitting pace of industrialization; the continued unchanged operation of the despised collective farm system; and the ever present threat of terror.

Did this study cover attitudes and conditions in satellite countries?

No, the Harvard Project was confined to the USSR, and in particular, to three aspects of national life in the Soviet Union: the day-to-day life of the people; the structure and functioning of basic Soviet institutions (family, education, industrial system, internal communication system, popular behavior, professional life, etc.); and the interaction of Soviet people and Soviet institutions.

How seriously do the Soviet leaders take communist doctrine?

The communist ruling elite take ideology and indeed philosophy...
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