DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 2/3

DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
(Effective 6 May 1958)

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 7 of NSCID No. 2, for the purpose of assuring effective and secure exploitation of nongovernmental individuals and organizations for foreign intelligence information.

1. The Central Intelligence Agency shall:
   a. Determine the foreign intelligence potential of nongovernmental organizations and individuals, and maintain a central index of such sources in the United States.
   b. Establish procedures to insure that the interests of organizations and individuals contacted will not be jeopardized.
   c. Establish standards and procedures for security clearance of all such contacts.

1 This Directive supersedes DCID No. 7/1 of 10/1/53.
e. Obtain the agreement of responsible policy-making officials of U.S. domestic organizations having a foreign intelligence potential before establishing and maintaining contacts within that organization.

f. Inform the Intelligence Advisory Committee departments and agencies of the prospective departure from, return to or availability within the United States of selected individuals having a high foreign intelligence potential, so that the departments and agencies may furnish requirements or provide specialists for briefing or interrogation.

g. Arrange for direct contact between representatives of other Intelligence Advisory Committee departments and agencies and nongovernmental sources within the United States whenever conditions require such action or upon the request of an Intelligence Advisory Committee department or agency.

h. Disseminate to the Intelligence Advisory Committee departments and agencies all foreign intelligence information obtained through this program.

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2. Further to implement this undertaking, the Intelligence Advisory Committee departments and agencies shall:

a. Assign to duty in the Central Intelligence Agency field offices, if they so desire and within their capabilities, representatives to serve their interests under the direction of the appropriate field office chief. Member departments and agencies may also, at their discretion, establish active working liaison between their field elements and Central Intelligence Agency field offices.

b. Send to the Central Intelligence Agency requirements for foreign intelligence information to be obtained from non-governmental sources within the United States.

c. Transmit to the Central Intelligence Agency for appropriate dissemination full information and reports resulting from approved direct contacts by their representatives with non-governmental sources, unless direct dissemination is authorized, identifying such sources, where possible, for central index purposes.

3. Each Intelligence Advisory Committee department and agency will establish procedures in its Washington, D. C. headquarters for receiving non-governmental visitors and for the receipt of any intelligence information which such visitors may offer. When it is determined that such a non-governmental individual is offering, or has provided, foreign positive intelligence information, that intelligence agency will advise the
Contact Division, Office of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, which will be responsible for the visitor’s exploitation, in accordance with paragraph 7 of NSCID No. 2.

5. Further to implement this undertaking, the departments and agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee shall furnish to the Central Intelligence Agency, to the maximum extent possible, and as appropriate, all foreign intelligence information and source leads which are received as a result of their normal relationship with nongovernmental organizations and individuals.

6. Under the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, a committee composed of representatives of each of the Intelligence Advisory Committee departments and agencies will meet periodically to consider mutual problems and interests in connection with this program.

7. Nothing in this program shall be interpreted to affect the established relationship of the departments and agencies with nongovernmental organizations and individuals in the United States for purposes other than the procurement of foreign intelligence information. Nor shall it affect the normal interchange of documents between libraries of the departments and agencies and other libraries, or the development of academic research information or research projects with individuals or nongovernmental institutions.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence