A SPECIAL HISTORICAL STUDY
OF
THE NSA/CSS ORGANIZATION
AND ITS IMPACT ON USAFSS

FREEDOM THROUGH VIGILANCE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT releasable to
FOREIGN NATIONALS

The information contained
in this document will not
be revealed to foreign
nationals or their represen-
tatives.

1 May 1973

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE
A SPECIAL HISTORICAL STUDY
OF
THE NSA/CSS ORGANIZATION
AND ITS IMPACT ON USAFSS

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794, and 798) the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Prepared by:

BOB W. RUSH
Command Historical Officer

1 May 1973

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE
San Antonio, Texas
Within three months of the Conservative party crisis in Britain...a book by Randolph Churchill on the day-to-day history of the affair had been written and published. To rush in upon an event before its significance has had time to separate from the surrounding circumstances may be enterprising, but is it useful? An embarrassed author may find, when the excitement has died down, that his subject had no significance at all. The recent prevalence of these hot histories on publishers' lists raises the question: Should—or perhaps can—history be written while it is still smoking? (From an article, "Can History Be Served Up Hot," by Barbara W. Tuchman, in the Book Review section of The New York Times, March 8, 1964.)

The man who ventures to write contemporary history must expect to be attacked both for everything he has said and everything he has not said.

--Voltaire.
20 January 1950

Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, DIRAFSA, concudes that the USAFSS plan represents a "reasonable approach to the fulfillment of the mission delegated by JCS 2010/6."
The SCA and NSA representatives had developed the plan on the basis of guidance issued by the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Their basic objective was to specify the authority of the DIRNSA/Chief, CSS to direct and manage all cryptologic matters for the United States in order to (a) improve intelligence support to military operations, (b) save resources through better management, and (c) integrate related DOD military and civilian activities. To do this, they followed two organizational concepts. First, the NSA/CSS would be a unified organization. Second, the CSS, including the subordinate SCAs, would be the field operating arm, with NSA as the planning, processing, analytic, and production arm.
17 March 1953

FDOO

DIRNSA disapproves the USAFSS Close Support Concept.
The CSS was organized along conventional joint staff lines, except that there was no provision for a J-2 (Intelligence). In addition to the Deputy Chief, CSS, there was a Chief of Staff and five assistant chiefs of staff; viz., J-1 (Military Personnel), J-3 (Operations and Readiness), J-4 (Logistics), J-5 (Planning), and J-6 (Communications Operations). While not a part of the joint staff, the Commandant of the National Cryptologic School was given the task of coordinating the cryptologic training system. Personnel of the joint staff elements were to be predominantly military; and, where applicable, they were "dual-hatted" to complementary NSA positions. All other officers were assigned to the CSS only.25
Finally, the mission of the field elements was "to conduct operations in response to tasking and direction from the NSA/CSS." Further, the plan contained detailed annexes on Organization, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting; Personnel Management; Operations and Readiness; Communications; Logistics; Research and Development; Representation and Area Headquarters; Operations Research; System Design; Training; Phasing; and Assets. Some six months after formal establishment of the CSS, the Chief of Staff of the new organization drafted a brief historical resume of developments and progress up to that time, primarily for informational purposes.
Nonetheless, things did not progress as smoothly as this statement seemed to indicate.
Soon after DOD approved the CSS Organization Plan, NSA asked the SCAs to identify their SIGINT professional and pre-professional employees and to furnish names of "volunteers" for transfer to the NSA rolls. 1

NSA announced in June 1972 that it was delaying the civilian integration program because negotiations with the Navy had reached an impasse. The agency made it clear, however, that DIRNSA wanted to proceed with the program as soon as possible. 2
NSA said that to carry out its responsibility of providing guidance and direction to the military departments, the SCAs should accept NSA career development programs for 17 of its career fields. NSA also proposed the establishment of a committee made up of representatives from NSA/CSS and the SCAs to further review and refine implementing directives.

NSA further proposed to DOD that to facilitate accomplishment of an integrated career development program within the cryptologic community, DOD should obtain a common appointing authority (Schedule A) for all three SCAs since the Army and Navy were currently under Schedule A and USAFSS was under Schedule B. Both Schedule A and B appointments were non-competitive. Hiring procedures under Schedule A did not follow competitive procedures since their appointments were of a confidential or policy determining character for which it was not practicable to examine. Schedule B appointments did follow competitive procedures.
Upon approval of the CSG organization plan, DINAUSA requested prompt action in extending the policy for reporting incidents involving CSS facilities and personnel. Consequently, NSA issued a draft directive (USSTD 522), dated 22 May 1972, which attempted to establish a system for reporting incidents which, in effect, would duplicate such reporting already prescribed in JCS PUB 6, 16.
DIRNSA notified USAFSS that he believed it necessary to proceed with plans for the "immediate disestablishment" of the Region.

DIRNSA, but then on 27 July 1972 he again notified all concerned that disestablishment was to proceed "on a most expeditious basis."
On 14 September 1972 NSA/CSS asked the SCAs to provide CSS/J-1 with a monthly summary of current and projected military personnel strength by AFSC for all cryptologic units worldwide. The listing was to include current authorized, assigned, and projected strength by month for 12 months for all USAFSS headquarters and field units by station, AFSC, and pay grade. The purpose for gathering this information was to facilitate adjustment of personnel under the operational control of the CSS and to keep the Chief, CSS informed of their status.
NSA said that the advent of CSS should permit reductions in personnel at HQ USAFS.
NSA/CSS staff officers believed that dual-hatting was essential to the unified organization concept envisioned in the CSS plan. Further, they believed that separate staffs would be too expensive.