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# EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS

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DURING THE

FIRST SESSION OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS,

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
IN SIXTEEN VOLUMES.

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REPORT  
OF  
THE SECRETARY OF WAR,  
IN TWO VOLUMES.

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VOL. II

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## REPORT OF COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE.

OFFICE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE,  
*Washington City, D. C., October 20, 1865.*

SIR: In compliance with the special instructions of the War Department of October 7, addressed to chiefs of bureaus, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Subsistence department during the past year:

The subsistence stores required for distribution to the several armies in the field have during the year been purchased, as was done during the earlier years of the war, in the principal markets of the northern States. The facilities and cost of transportation to the various points where they were required for issue, the relative prices in the different markets, and a due regard to the general commercial interests of the country, have governed this department in apportioning these purchases among the several market centres of the country. New Orleans, gradually resuming a healthy commercial condition, already enables this department—and in further aid of such resumption—to obtain in that market a considerable portion of the supplies required for distribution from that point. Although the present general condition of the southern States is not such as to afford a large amount of supplies for the troops on duty therein, still the officers of this department are able in some parts of those States to enter into contracts for beef cattle and slaughtered beef, as also to some extent to purchase therein other articles. The principal purchasing officers of the Subsistence department have performed their duties with great fidelity to the interests of the country and with much mercantile ability, and also, as I am frequently assured, to the general satisfaction of the commercial men of the country with whom they have transacted the business of this department.

So far as has been practicable, subsistence stores have been obtained by advertising for and receiving sealed proposals for their delivery. During the past six months four hundred and two such advertisements have been received and placed on file in this office.

The principal commissaries immediately responsible for the subsistence of the several armies in the field have performed the important and often difficult duties of receiving, protecting, and distributing the supplies forwarded to them with commendable efficiency and success. They have also, by great energy, been able, to a considerable extent, to subsist the troops upon the resources of the country in which the armies were operating or through which they were passing.

It is believed that during the entire war no campaign, contemplated movement, or expedition has failed on account of the inability of the Subsistence department to meet its proper requirements. It is also believed that the troops, wherever stationed or operating, have, with rare exceptions, been supplied with rations in good and wholesome condition.

While the Subsistence department has furnished a constant, timely, and adequate supply of subsistence for the several large armies occupying widely different fields of operations, as also for the troops at all the separate positions occupied throughout the entire country, it is due to the Quartermaster's department that its vast labors in the transportation of these supplies be recognized as having been performed with a readiness and efficiency worthy of the highest commendation. As a single item indicating the amount of these labors, I instance the fact that during the year 1863 the Quartermaster's department shipped from the port of New York an average of seven thousand packages of subsistence stores per day for every working day of the year, and for the year 1864 six thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven packages per day.

The sudden close of the war, and the consequent immediate muster-out of a large part of the army, unavoidably left on hand in some of the depots an excessive supply of subsistence stores. This excess has been sent to other points, where stores were required, instead of meeting such requirements by further purchases. By this course a considerable part of these supplies have been, or will be, economically disposed of. Surplus and damaged stores are in process of being disposed of by sale. A considerable quantity of hard bread, surplus or too old for issue to troops, remains to be disposed of. A sufficient quantity of this and other surplus articles have been held back from an earlier sale with the view of meeting, in an economical manner, the urgent wants of those people, white and colored, who have, by the events of the war, been reduced to a suffering condition; to whom it has been deemed an act of charity, due from the government, to make limited issues of food.

I have the honor to report that, under your orders of June 29, 1865, directing the discontinuance of the whiskey ration, and the sale of the whiskey on hand, the issue of that article was at once stopped. The sale has already taken place at many points, and will soon be completed.

During the past year, as in the previous years of the war, a very considerable income has been derived from the sale of the hides, tallow, and other parts of beef-cattle not issuable as beef to the troops. The total amount of such sales has not been ascertained. At the Washington and Alexandria depots alone they amount to \$344,468 98½ for the year ending 30th of September, 1865, and to \$1,377,875 93 during the four years ending at that date.

Under the able and judicious management of Brevet Brigadier General William Hoffman, United States army, Commissary General of Prisoners, the prisoners of war, held under his charge at thirty-two forts, prison barracks, camps, and hospitals, have been well and humanely subsisted, having received a sufficient portion and variety of the ration to insure health, leaving in the hands of the several issuing commissaries, as "savings," that portion of the ration not deemed necessary for persons living in entire idleness. The pecuniary value of these "savings" has constituted a prison fund, available, under the instructions of the commissary general of prisoners, for the purchase of articles necessary for the prison barracks and hospitals, and for meeting other necessary expenses of the prisoners. General Hoffman has already, under your instructions, transferred to the Subsistence department a "savings" credit of the amount of \$1,507,359 01, and reports that there remains yet to be transferred an amount not less than \$337,766 98, making a total amount of \$1,845,125 99.

The discharge of volunteer forces, and the consequent reduction of the expenses of this department, will enable it to meet all demands without exhausting the appropriation for the current fiscal year.

The current work of this bureau is, habitually, up to date. The examination of the money and property accounts is nearly as close up to date as it is practicable to have it. It would, however, facilitate the prompt examination of the money and property accounts of the officers of the Subsistence department, if the law permitted the former, as well as the latter, to be sent, by the officers rendering them, direct to this bureau for its administrative action before going to the accounting officers of the treasury. I do not doubt that the Third Auditor is of the same opinion.

Under section 3 of the act of July 4, 1864, authorizing the claims of loyal citizens in States not in rebellion for subsistence actually furnished to the army of the United States, and receipted for by the proper officer receiving the same, or which may have been taken by such officers without giving such receipt, to be submitted to the Commissary General of Subsistence, and making it his duty to cause each claim to be examined, there have been submitted as follows:

Whole number of claims submitted, 1,470.

Number approved for payment . . . . .	50
Number disallowed . . . . .	413
Number awaiting explanations, &c. . . . .	650
Number awaiting examination . . . . .	357
	<hr/>
	1,470
	<hr/> <hr/>

With your approval, it is proposed to ascertain and exhibit, in a tabular form, the total quantity of each article of subsistence stores purchased for use of the army during each year of the war, from 1861 to 1865, inclusive. Such a statement would form an interesting addition to the mercantile statistics of the country.

Under the act of March 3, 1865, for the better organization of the Subsistence department, authorizing, during the continuance of the rebellion, the selection and assignment of commissaries of subsistence of the volunteer and regular service to geographical military divisions, to separate armies in the field, to military departments, to principal subsistence depots, and to the office of the Commissary General of Subsistence as assistants, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel of the Subsistence department, there have been so selected and assigned nine commissaries of subsistence; one from the regular service, and eight from the volunteer service. There have also been selected and assigned, under authority of the same act, to inspection or other special duty, two commissaries of subsistence with the rank of lieutenant colonel; one from the volunteer, and the other from the regular service. Also, to divisions, two commissaries of subsistence with the rank of major; both from the volunteer service.

During the past year two vacancies have occurred in the regular service of the Subsistence department; one by the brief sickness and death, after much zealous and efficient field service, of Major John Kellogg, and the other by resignation of Captain Edward R. Hopkins, a valuable officer. - Both of these vacancies were filled by selections and appointments from the volunteer branch of the Subsistence department.

The Subsistence department, at the commencement of the war, contained but twelve officers of all grades; it had reached this number by small additions, authorized by law, from time to time, as the army was increased and the territory occupied by it extended; the several additions subsequent to the act of April 14, 1818, by which a Commissary General of Subsistence was originally authorized, being as follows: by the act of March 2, 1820, two commissaries; by the act of July 5, 1838, five commissaries; by the act of September 20, 1850, four commissaries. Since the commencement of the rebellion there have been added as follows: by the act of August 3, 1861, twelve commissaries; by the act of February 9, 1863, five commissaries; making a total of twenty-nine officers of all grades. A further increase is not recommended until it shall be made to appear that the present number of officers is inadequate to the service required of the department.

The officers of this department, regulars and volunteers, have, with but few exceptions, performed their duties with signal fidelity and success. Some of them have been held from serving with troops in the field, much against their choice and ambition.

To the able senior Assistant Commissary General of Subsistence, and to the other officers on duty in this bureau, is largely due the credit of the general good condition of the affairs of the Subsistence department which I am enabled to report.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. B. EATON,

*Commissary General Subsistence.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

## REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL.

WAR DEPARTMENT, SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, D. C., October 20, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following statement of finances and general transactions of the Medical department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865:

## RECEIPTS.

Balance in the treasury July 1, 1864.....	\$914, 135 10
Balance in the hands of the disbursing officers.....	324, 061 65
Balance remaining of appropriation for artificial limbs for soldiers and seamen, per act of July 16, 1862, chap. 182, sec. 6....	4, 265 00
Annual appropriation for the year ending June 30, 1865, by act of June 15, 1864, chap. 124, sec. 1.....	8, 930, 640 00
Deficiency appropriation for the current fiscal year, by act of March 2, 1865, chap. 73, sec. 8.....	3, 251, 000 00
Annual appropriation for the year ending June 30, 1866, by act of March 3, 1865, chap. 81, sec. 1, required for disbursement during the present fiscal year, and placed to the credit of the Medical department for that purpose March 22, 1865.....	6, 000, 000 00
Amount drawn from appropriation made by joint resolution of April 29, 1864, to cover expenditures for medical attendance and medicine for hundred-days volunteers.....	300, 000 00
Amount refunded by the Subsistence department for board of sick and wounded soldiers in private hospitals.....	64, 293 40
Amount refunded for medical attendance and supplies furnished prisoners of war.....	140, 506 08
Amount received for subsistence of officers in hospitals.....	286, 281 04
Amount disallowed in account of Eben. Swift, United States army, for June, 1863, and refunded from appropriation for pay of volunteers.....	17, 762 91
Proceeds of sales of condemned and unserviceable hospital property.....	59, 671 41
Proceeds of sales of ice not required for hospital use....	12, 352 25
Value of books and surgical instruments sold to medical officers and private physicians.....	8, 311 30
Received for hospital property sold to the Quartermaster's department.....	7, 003 61
Received for medicines, &c., issued to refugees and freedmen..	554 73
Recovered for hospital property lost or damaged in transportation.....	534 45
Recovered of Acting Assistant Surgeon J. S. Geltner, United States army, for property and moneys illegally disposed of	1, 000 00
Amount received for care of patients belonging to the United States navy.....	283 00
Amount received from all other sources.....	446 20
Total credits for the year.....	20, 323, 102 13
Amount over-expended by disbursing officers.....	166, 578 34
	<hr/> <hr/>
	20, 489, 680 47

## DISBURSEMENTS DURING THE YEAR.

For medical and hospital supplies.....	\$15,204,497 20
For pay of private physicians.....	1,865,821 82
For pay of hospital employés.....	949,462 46
For expenses of purveying depots.....	683,830 33
For care of sick soldiers in private hospitals.....	240,476 11
*For artificial limbs for soldiers and seamen.....	126,538 00
Expenses of hospitals for officers.....	243,876 37
Miscellaneous expenses of the Medical department.....	13,996 94
	<hr/>
	19,328,499 23
Balance in the treasury June 30, 1865.....	1,161,181 24
	<hr/>
	20,489,680 47
	<hr/> <hr/>

The ample provision for sick and wounded existing at the date of my last annual report was increased during the ensuing months until a maximum of (204) two hundred and four general hospitals, with a capacity of (136,894) one hundred and thirty-six thousand eight hundred and ninety-four beds, was reached. Field hospitals, hospital transports and cars, ambulance corps, and the purveying depots, were kept in condition to meet all possible requirements, and General Sherman's army was met at Savannah by four first-class sea-going steamers, thoroughly equipped as hospital transports, with extra stores and supplies for five thousand beds, should it have become necessary to establish large hospitals upon his line of operations.

Upon the receipt of General Orders No. 77, dated War Department, Adjutant General office, April 28, 1865, immediate measures were taken to reduce the expenses of this department. Of the (201) two hundred and one general hospitals open on January 1, 1865, (170) one hundred and seventy have been discontinued. Three of the four sea-going hospital transports have been discharged; the fourth is now constantly engaged in the transfer of sick and wounded from southern ports to the general hospitals in New York harbor. All of the river hospital boats have been turned over to the Quartermaster's department, and but a single hospital train is retained in the southwest.

The vast amount of medicines and hospital supplies becoming surplus through the reduction of the army have been carefully collected at prominent points, and are being disposed of at public auction, most of the articles bringing their full value, and in some instances, their cost price.

Since April, 1861, there have been appointed (547) five hundred and forty-seven surgeons and assistant surgeons of volunteers; mustered into service (2,109) two thousand one hundred and nine volunteer regimental surgeons, and (3,882) three thousand eight hundred and eighty-two volunteer regimental assistant surgeons; employed as acting staff surgeons (75) seventy-five; as acting assistant surgeons (5,532) five thousand five hundred and thirty-two.

As far as returns have been received, during the war (34) thirty-four officers of the medical staff have been killed or died of wounds received in action, (24) twenty-four wounded, and (188) one hundred and eighty-eight have died from disease or accident incurred in the service; (1) one died in a rebel prison, (6) six of yellow fever. A completed record will increase this number.

Two hundred and fourteen (214) surgeons and assistant surgeons of volunteers, reported as supernumerary, have been mustered out.

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\* Furnished during the year—artificial legs 1,388; arms 1,121.

In compliance with the act of Congress, hospital chaplains have been reported for muster-out when the hospitals to which they were attached have been discontinued. Of the two hundred and sixty-five (265) appointed during the war, twenty-nine (29) are still in commission.

The business of this office has been largely increased by the necessity for immediate examination and settlement of the accounts of staff and regimental medical officers mustered out of service, while the number of applications from the Pension bureau for "official evidence of cause of death" now averages one thousand five hundred and fifty (1550) a month, the number received and acted upon in the last fiscal year being over nineteen thousand (19,000); other official inquiries, requiring reference to records and hospital registers, are very numerous.

The returns of sick and wounded show that of white troops one million fifty-seven thousand four hundred and twenty-three (1,057,423) cases have been treated in general hospitals alone from 1861 to July 1, 1865, of which the mortality rate was 8 per cent. In addition to the alphabetical registers of dead, not yet fully completed, the records of the Medical department contain thirty thousand (30,000) special reports of the more important forms of surgical injuries, of disease, and of operations. These reports, with statistical data, and a pathological collection, numbering seven thousand six hundred and thirty (7,630) specimens, furnish a mass of valuable information which is being rapidly arranged and tabulated as a medical and surgical history of the war, for the publication of the first volumes of which an appropriation will be asked.

In this connexion, and as illustrating more in detail the importance of this work, the army medical museum assumes the highest value. By its array of indisputable facts, supported and enriched by full reports, it supplies instruction otherwise unattainable, and preserves for future application the dearly-bought experience of four years of war. Apart from its great usefulness, it is also an honorable record of the skill and services of those medical officers whose contributions constitute its value, and whose incentive to these self-imposed labors has been the desire to elevate their profession. A small appropriation has been asked to continue and extend this collection.

During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865, an army medical board was appointed to meet in Cincinnati, Ohio, on the 18th day of October, 1864, for the examination of candidates for the medical staff of the army, and of assistant surgeons of that corps for promotion. Nine applicants for admission into the medical staff were invited to present themselves before this board. Of this number, two were fully examined and approved; one withdrew before his examinations were concluded; two were rejected as unqualified, and four failed to appear. Six assistant surgeons were examined for promotion and found qualified. Two assistant surgeons were reported for re-examination. Of the approved candidates, two have been appointed assistant surgeons.

Boards have been in session at New York, Washington, D. C., Hilton Head, S. C., New Orleans, La., Memphis, Tenn., Little Rock, Ark., and Cincinnati, Ohio, for the examination of candidates for appointment in the volunteer medical staff. One hundred and fifty-two candidates were invited before these boards, fifty-eight of whom passed satisfactory examinations and were appointed accordingly. The remainder were rejected, failed to appear, or withdrew before examination was completed. These boards were discontinued in June, 1865.

The casualties in this corps since June 30, 1864, are as follows: appointed, 96; promoted, 40; restored, 2; resigned, 32; declined, 1; died, 7; dismissed, 3; discharged, 3; dropped, 1; mustered out, 19; cancelled, 7.

Boards for the examination of candidates for appointment as medical officers to colored troops have been in session permanently at Boston, New York, Washington, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and at such other points from time to time as the necessities of the service demanded.

In nearly all sections of the country the health of the troops has been fully equal to that of the preceding years, though military movements of unprecedented magnitude have been pushed to successful termination without regard to seasons. An epidemic of yellow fever prevailed at Newbern, N. C., in September, October and November, 1864, causing two hundred and seventy-eight (278) deaths among the troops stationed there, of whom five hundred and seventy-one (571) were attacked. The released or exchanged prisoners arriving at Wilmington, N. C., from rebel prisons suffered from an epidemic of typhoid fever, which, however, was arrested by strict attention to hygienic rules and prompt transfer to northern hospitals. With these exceptions no serious epidemics have appeared, and it is interesting to note that quarantine regulations strictly enforced by military authority have proven, during the occupation of southern seaports and cities by our troops, to be an absolute protection against the importation of contagious or infectious diseases. In view of the apprehensions entertained in regard to the Asiatic cholera, now devastating the shores of the Mediterranean, this becomes a significant fact.

For recommendations of measures tending to the greater efficiency of the Medical department, you are respectfully referred to the special report from this office, called for by circular dated War Department, Adjutant General's office, October 7, 1865.

In conclusion, I desire to bear testimony to the ability, courage and zeal manifested throughout the war by the officers of the Medical department under all circumstances and upon all occasions. With hardly an exception they have been actuated by the highest motives of national and professional pride, and the number who have been killed and wounded bears most honorable testimony to their devotion to duty on the field of battle.

To the medical directors of armies in the field and of military geographical departments especial praise is due for the successful execution of their arduous and responsible duties.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. K. BARNES, *Surgeon General,*  
*Brevet Major Gen'l, U. S. Army.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE PAY DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1865.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Paymaster General's Office, Washington, October 31, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit a report of the official transactions of the Pay department of the army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865.

The tabular statements herewith presented exhibit the details from which the following statement in gross is made:

Balance in hands of paymasters and unissued requisitions in treasury at beginning of fiscal year (July 1, 1864).....	\$86,039,808 87
Received from the treasury during the fiscal year (including unissued requisitions in treasury on June 30, 1865).....	337,200,000 00
Received by paymasters from other sources, exclusive of sums transferred among themselves.....	6,815,137 50
	430,054,946 37
Total to be accounted for.....	430,054,946 37

Accounted for as follows :

Disbursements to the regular army.....	\$7,839,225	47
Disbursements to the Military Academy.....	153,099	11
Disbursements to the volunteers.....	300,738,635	95
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Total disbursement.....	308,730,960	53
Amount of unissued requisitions in the treasury on June 30, 1865.....	65,900,000	00
Balance actually in hands of paymasters on June 30, 1866... ..	55,423,985	84
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	430,054,946	37
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This large amount in the hands of paymasters at the end of the fiscal year was an unavoidable necessity from the fact that at that precise period of time the department was everywhere throughout the country under the greatest pressure of payments to mustered-out troops, and money in large sums had to be kept thus distributed.

From the above it will be seen that the sum actually disbursed during the fiscal year and in process of disbursement at the end thereof was \$430,054,946 37.

Since the beginning of the current fiscal year, beside the above sums in the hands of paymasters and the unissued requisitions stated, \$94,000,000 have been disbursed, and distributed for disbursement, making a total expenditure of \$524,054,946 37 during the last fiscal year, and the present one to this date.

Of this large sum more than one-half (\$270,000,000) has been paid to disbanded volunteer troops mustered out of service.

From the early days of June to the present time, this department has made final payment to more than eight hundred thousand officers and men. The number paid cannot be definitely stated for the want of time for full official returns to be received from the many various and distant points of payment throughout the country, especially as these payments are still continuing. Enough, however, is known with certainty to establish the fact that the figures stated are not in excess.

This is an extraordinary exhibit of work performed chiefly within the three months of June, July and August—two hundred and seventy millions of money paid to eight hundred thousand individual men. When the manner of these payments is observed, with a knowledge of the particularity required in each case, the accounts varying in amounts, each to be separately computed in its several items of pay, clothing, bounty, &c., with such stoppages as may be chargeable deducted, the final amount stated and the signature of each officer and man to be appended in duplicate to the receipt rolls, a just appreciation may be formed of the stupendous labor involved. No similar work of like magnitude, regarding its immensity both as to men and money, and the small limit of time in which it has been performed, has, it is believed, any parallel in the history of armies.

The troops for discharge were, under the orders from the Adjutant General's office, transported to their respective State rendezvous as rapidly as the proper officers of the various organizations could despatch the duty of mustering out.

This department engaged to prepare with funds officers at all the sixty different places of designated rendezvous throughout the States, and to make prompt payment in the shortest practicable time, on the arrival of each organization, so as substantially to avert delays, with all their evil consequences at the places of rendezvous. How far this pledge on our part has been redeemed the country can answer. The facts of record in the War Department show no delays of moment occurring in any quarter; none, at least, chargeable to this depart-

ment. The work is mainly accomplished, satisfactorily accomplished, beyond the most sanguine anticipations of those who could understand and properly measure the vastness of the undertaking.

For this result the country is indebted largely to the zeal, intelligence, and sleepless industry of a corps of experienced paymasters who signalized themselves in this the closing act of their military staff service by a faithfulness and devotion which reflects the highest honor upon them as a body, and as individual officers. To them, under the skilful management of their supervising district chiefs, this department owes its success; and I take occasion, as the head of the department, in this public official communication, to render to them the homage of my grateful acknowledgments. The credit is theirs, for without their experience and cordial co-operative efforts, not all the powers of the government combined could have wrought so favorable a solution of a difficult problem.

It becomes my duty also to notice here, in most favorable terms, the valued services of the officers and clerks connected immediately with this office. They appreciated the emergency, and bent themselves to the difficult work, which, for a time, pressed upon the office with almost overwhelming weight. With payments simultaneously progressing at sixty different points, widely separated, with the necessity of keeping each one supplied with funds from day to day, and a necessity also that each should have no more than required for immediate disbursement—drawing from the treasury at the rate of \$20,000,000 per week, and compelled to make close estimate and careful watch of its daily distribution, so that the demand at each given point should be surely supplied, and yet no more than supplied; telegrams and letters continually pouring in, noting the movement and destination of troops, and repeating these notices to the proper points of rendezvous; applications and appeals constantly arriving, requiring immediate answers; new questions arising and referred to this office for instructions, &c.—kept our thoughts, our pens, our press, and the telegraph in constant requisition by day and by night. Mid all this I am happy to bear testimony that every one labored with cheerful alacrity—in some instances, indeed, during the heated season, even beyond their strength. It may be said of these, as I have said of the paymasters in the field, but for their willing efforts, rendered with self-denying devotion, the work could not have been a success.

The unstinted facilities extended, sir, by your authority and orders, in the free use of the military telegraph, the printing press, and all other agencies that could be profitably applied to the end, together with the liberal confidence which you were pleased to repose in this office, leaving to it an almost unrestricted discretion to manage, without hindrance, its own details; your concurrence in, and support of, its acts and orders—these reveal the vital secret of a result so favorable.

I cannot close this branch of my subject without a grateful expression of indebtedness to the officers of the Treasury Department for the courteous and zealous attention with which, during the trying exigency, they always entertained the importunate demands of this office. What often seemed as hopeless impossibilities obstructing the financial path, were, by their fervent efforts, readily dispelled, and thus all our requisitions were met with most satisfactory promptness.

At the date of my last annual report, besides the small number of officers constituting the pay department of the regular army, (and which is without casualty or change since,) there were in the service 409 additional paymasters, contingent appointments under the law of July, 1838. Afterwards, up to March 3, thirty-eight others were appointed and confirmed, making a total of..... 447

Accounted as follows:

Resigned.....	89
Commission declined.....	1

Dismissed.....	4
Appointments cancelled.....	21
Dropped.....	2
Died of disease.....	5
Lost at sea.....	1
Killed by guerillas.....	2
Died while prisoner of war.....	1
Mustered out.....	111
	<hr/>
Total casualties.....	237
	<hr/>
Remaining in service.....	210
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This reduction may still continue, following with even pace, as their services can be spared and their accounts be rendered, the progress of the reduction of the army.

The sudden disbandment of our volunteer hosts, besides their final payment on the ordinary forms of muster-out rolls and other discharge papers, has devolved upon this department an inordinate accumulation of "referred claims" transmitted for adjustment and payment. These have arisen from various causes, but chiefly from the inability of the officers charged with the execution of the muster-out papers to reach a complete history as to pay, clothing, bounty, &c., of large numbers of enlisted men, so as to enable a final settlement at the time of discharge. To all such certificates of discharge are furnished, upon which are indorsed the fact of non-payment, and the holders are directed to forward the same, as the basis of their claim, to the Paymaster General for adjustment.

Such magnitude has this demand attained, that it has been found necessary to organize a special division of paymasters as an attachment of this bureau, to take exclusive cognizance of this class of claims.

This "division of referred claims" is now composed of a chief supervising paymaster of much intelligence, judgment, and experience, with twelve other paymasters, also competent officers of experience, and a corps of sixty-four active clerks. The peculiar labors of this division could not be near so well performed under any other organization, having, as this does, enlightened paymasters to supervise every branch of the work, each being responsible for his own.

Every claim sent to this division requires for its elucidation a careful and laborious search through all the previous rolls on file in this and the Second Auditor's office, besides constant reference to the Adjutant General's office, to trace out through the past records all the facts touching the case, the charges, stoppages, forfeitures, &c., that it may be stated with accuracy the balance due the claimant. This done, vouchers in form covering that balance are filled out and transmitted to the claimant for his signature, which returned to the paymaster, the latter remits a check for the amount. From this it will be seen how tedious is the work of this division, what careful industry it demands, and how inevitable are the delays complained of by impatient claimants.

The clerical force of this bureau is without material change since the date of my last annual report.

For months past, in anticipation of an early permanent reduction of that force, I have refrained from recommending new appointments to fill such vacancies as have occurred by resignations and other casualties.

This course, I apprehend, may continue without injury or material inconvenience to the public service. Such, however, is the sudden accumulation of the business of the bureau, by reason of the present influx, for examination, of rolls and other classes of vouchers, resulting from the recent and continued large payments to disbanded troops already adverted to, that but a very slight reduction in the number of clerks employed will be practicable for some months to come.

I need hardly urge the unqualified conviction, that the compensation allowed by the government to this indispensable class of public agents is quite inadequate in view of the present exorbitant cost of the necessaries of life. The clerks of this bureau, as a body, are highly meritorious and deserving public servants. None, I am sure, better than they, have by faithful industry earned just title to favorable consideration. It becomes my duty, therefore, respectfully, but urgently, to recommend a reasonable increase of the rates of compensation now by law fixed for the clerks employed in this bureau. Especially is this demanded by every consideration of the public interest, of enlightened public economy, for the clerks of the higher grades, and for the chief clerk. I feel sure I have only to present this subject to your attention to insure your influence in the furtherance of a consummation so proper.

In another paper communicated to you, dated the 11th instant, I have had the honor to submit, for your consideration, a plan for the better organization and a permanent increase of the Pay department of the army, to which I respectfully invite your attention in connexion with this report.

The entire of the regular army and the volunteer forces of every description retained in service, and not embraced in orders for muster out, have been paid, or are provided for and in process of payment to the end of the last fiscal year, (to 1st July last.)

Many organizations have been paid to the later date of September 1.

All discharged troops have been paid in full, and all being discharged or under orders for discharge are provided for, and will be paid as fast as they arrive at their respective places of rendezvous.

Paymasters are held in readiness to make another payment to the troops who shall be continued in the service, whenever the needful funds for that purpose may be available.

In conclusion, I beg to present to your attention the following remarkable summary statement of the results in this department during the past four years of war.

The total of money disbursed by the department from July 1, 1861, to the present date, is one thousand and twenty-nine million two hundred and thirty-nine thousand (1,029,239,000) dollars.

Total defalcations in the department for same period, supposing that nothing is made from sureties, (it is believed that more than one-half will be collected from these sources).....	\$541,000
Total expenses for disbursement, including pay and allowances to paymasters and their clerks, mileage and travelling expenses, &c., an average of 350 paymasters and 400 clerks for the term of four years and four months (a large average).....	6,429,600
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Total defalcations and expenses.....	6,970,600
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Thus it is seen that the total of every character of expense to the government arising from the disbursement of the pay to the armies during the period stated is less than seven-tenths of one per cent. of the sum disbursed.

Surely this is a cost most wonderfully cheap for the execution of duties so important and responsible. It is much questioned if there is another instance on record of public disbursement so cheaply performed.

Respectfully submitted:

B. W. BRICE,  
*Paymaster General U. S. A.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

Statement showing the amount in the hands of each of the disbursing officers of the Pay department and unaccounted for on the 1st of July, 1864; the amount remitted to each from the treasury or turned over by other agents during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865; the amount accounted for by accounts and vouchers of expenditures or by transfer or replacement in the treasury, and the balance remaining unaccounted for to be applied to payments in the first quarter of the next fiscal year.

Paymasters.	Balances in hands of paymasters and unaccounted for July 1, 1864.	Remitted from treasury and turned over by other agents, in the year ending June 30, 1865.	Total amounts received and to be accounted for.	Amounts expended in paying regular troops.	Amounts expended in paying volunteers.	Am'ts expended in paying Military Academy.	Amounts turned over to other agents or re-placed in the treasury.	Total am'ts accounted for.	Balances remaining un-expended and to be applied to payments in the next fiscal year.	Am'ts of requisitions included in balances not received by paymasters on June 30, 1865.	Actual balances in hands of paymasters.	
<i>Regulars.</i>												
Benjamin W. Bruce.....	\$2,877,359 18	\$5,505,478 61	\$8,382,837 79	.....	.....	.....	\$8,382,122 10	\$8,382,122 10	\$715 69	.....	\$715 69	
Hiram Leonard.....	729,783 13	3,727,736 66	4,457,519 79	.....	.....	.....	2,871,891 20	2,871,891 20	1,585,628 59	\$1,500,000 00	85,628 59	
Nathan W. Brown.....	4,714,013 45	30,620,082 04	35,334,095 49	\$578 53	\$2,948 93	.....	28,589,520 29	28,589,520 29	6,734,375 20	5,000,000 00	1,734,375 20	
Thomas J. Leslie.....	6,536,365 17	75,504,308 07	82,040,673 24	61,954 04	149,206 76	.....	61,519,227 85	61,730,382 65	20,310,284 59	18,500,000 00	1,810,284 59	
Cary H. Fry.....	79,798 51	503,606 45	583,404 96	257,959 85	256,460 78	.....	62,791 44	577,182 07	6,222 89	.....	6,222 89	
Franklin E. Hunt.....	2,388,927 41	4,472,116 19	6,860,143 60	4,226 72	.....	.....	4,894,390 08	4,898,616 80	1,961,526 80	500,000 00	1,461,526 80	
Samuel Woods.....	6,661 11	482,512 66	489,173 77	38,862 34	375,729 69	.....	60,945 99	475,538 02	13,635 75	.....	13,635 75	
Daniel McClure.....	3,098,526 75	37,589,614 00	40,688,140 75	.....	.....	.....	29,981,567 68	29,981,567 68	10,706,573 07	8,000,000 00	2,706,573 07	
Thomas M. Winston.....	35,488 46	8,873,043 18	8,908,531 64	.....	.....	.....	3,640,140 34	3,640,140 34	5,268,391 30	.....	5,268,391 30	
Augustus H. Seward.....	9,189 21	402,142 22	411,331 43	321,217 65	18,825 03	.....	71,288 75	411,331 43	.....	.....	.....	
Robert A. Kinzie.....	435,107 45	1,506,887 77	1,941,995 22	.....	49,946 22	.....	1,442,000 00	1,442,000 00	499,995 22	400,000 00	99,995 22	
George L. Febinger.....	5,780,826 79	6,521,730 96	12,302,557 75	.....	.....	.....	12,098,865 63	10,148,811 85	153,745 90	.....	153,745 90	
William S. Wallace.....	1,453 64	1,725,000 00	1,736,453 64	1,910 56	342,729 65	.....	1,880,134 24	1,734,774 45	1,679 19	.....	1,679 19	
David Taggart.....	1,042,237 63	9,660,043 17	10,708,280 80	70,592 78	2,405,519 41	.....	7,558,724 76	19,034,836 95	673,443 85	.....	673,443 85	
Adam D. Stewart.....	28,313 07	1,089,414 39	1,117,727 46	806,619 30	153,367 41	.....	4,641 64	1,117,727 46	452,825 16	.....	452,825 16	
Henry C. Pratt.....	2,767 24	2,948,396 68	2,951,163 92	127,935 45	1,054,912 99	.....	1,315,490 32	2,498,338 76	42,060 68	.....	42,060 68	
Simeon Francis.....	16,049 62	273,400 81	289,450 43	24,423 76	193,309 61	.....	29,656 38	247,389 75	.....	.....	.....	
John A. Whitall.....	34,714 85	265,396 38	300,111 23	65,203 92	186,590 83	.....	37,518 58	289,313 33	10,797 90	.....	10,797 90	
Simeon Smith.....	5,308 29	1,104,821 06	1,110,129 35	27,013 20	982,382 79	.....	98,616 13	1,079,012 12	171,117 23	.....	171,117 23	
Charles T. Larned.....	3,379 57	831,478 39	831,857 96	2,755 98	385,417 88	.....	272,492 72	640,665 58	31,191 38	.....	31,191 38	
Edward Wright.....	6,906 98	821,124 32	828,031 30	60,092 44	705,701 92	.....	56,999 12	822,793 48	5,237 82	.....	5,237 82	
John P. Brua.....	427 04	401,925 77	402,352 81	.....	253,633 36	.....	146,728 36	402,352 81	.....	.....	.....	
Rodney Smith.....	.....	909,599 40	909,599 40	8,967 89	672,814 63	.....	51,655 63	733,468 15	176,131 25	.....	176,131 25	
J. B. M. Potter.....	21,211 81	1,640,532 71	1,661,764 52	1,250,936 84	250,211 04	.....	123,572 43	1,624,720 31	37,044 21	.....	37,044 21	
Total.....	27,856,916 36	197,380,411 89	225,237,328 25	3,133,212 34	8,439,738 93	153,099 11	164,668,454 20	176,394,504 58	48,842,823 67	33,900,000 00	14,942,823 67	

Volunteers.	2,501, 811 66	7, 710, 588 75	10, 212, 400 41	34, 914 57	114, 077 74	8, 587, 300 41	1, 625, 100 00	1, 000, 000	625, 100 00
Daniel H. McPhail	1, 432, 051 26	5, 786, 404 85	7, 238, 456 11	34, 914 57	114, 077 74	7, 238, 456 11	1, 625, 100 00	1, 000, 000	625, 100 00
William K. Gibson	296 61	1, 719, 882 25	4, 120, 178 86	1, 484, 260 51	4, 096, 575 90	1, 639, 772 67	60, 406 19	1, 000, 000	60, 406 19
David Taylor	104, 190 09	4, 146, 006 86	4, 156, 611 64	4, 403, 377 21	4, 096, 575 90	4, 096, 575 90	60, 406 19	1, 000, 000	60, 406 19
Dwight Bannister	76, 561 83	30, 360, 971 50	2, 192, 051 65	9, 732 46	877, 730 37	23, 717, 939 84	6, 747, 221 75	5, 000, 000	1, 747, 221 75
Joha H. Kinzie a	5, 911, 582 78	23, 540, 770 38	20, 452, 353 16	25, 505 85	8 03	2, 018, 477 59	123, 574 06	5, 000, 000	1, 123, 574 06
Will Cumbaek	15, 427, 734 44	74, 627, 238 87	90, 054, 973 31	2, 571 24	461, 997 76	29, 432, 345 13	11, 368, 701 23	10, 000, 000	1, 368, 701 23
E. E. Paulding	60, 460 79	3, 579, 927 80	3, 579, 927 80	7, 519 64	1, 100, 139 31	3, 575, 121 56	4, 806 24	10, 000, 000	4, 806 24
Joseph A. Nunes	1, 446, 039 14	1, 506, 499 93	1, 506, 499 93	1, 860, 061 18	389, 518 67	1, 455, 065 85	50, 834 08	10, 000, 000	50, 834 08
Thomas H. Halsey	64, 931 98	1, 278, 225 95	1, 343, 157 93	1, 717 74	508, 027 11	1, 164, 403 95	178, 753 98	10, 000, 000	178, 753 98
Matcolm McDowell b	2, 838 49	2, 343, 589 39	2, 346, 438 42	23, 129 37	554, 802 83	2, 270, 116 66	76, 321 76	10, 000, 000	76, 321 76
William Patten	53, 325 67	1, 680, 960 39	1, 734, 286 06	52, 496 38	1, 226, 045 57	435, 205 94	20, 540 17	10, 000, 000	20, 540 17
Edwin D. Judd	22, 823, 451 07	74, 024, 188 26	74, 024, 188 26	7, 364 18	533, 090 52	62, 612, 882 65	109, 347 07	10, 000, 000	109, 347 07
C. P. E. Johnson	75, 900 57	1, 175, 500 00	1, 251, 500 00	58, 590 53	1, 241, 572 74	1, 251, 234 64	74, 329 38	10, 000, 000	74, 329 38
Thomas S. Allison	67, 180 29	1, 494, 995 56	1, 494, 995 56	1, 822 231 24	1, 613, 928 73	1, 420, 666 18	8, 636 89	10, 000, 000	8, 636 89
William Allen	32, 975 12	1, 755, 050 95	1, 755, 050 95	2, 300 73	442, 969 73	1, 813, 574 35	10, 164 55	10, 000, 000	10, 164 55
John Coon c	13, 155 35	517, 248 50	517, 248 50	1, 040, 512 20	61, 813 49	507, 083 95	55 95	10, 000, 000	55 95
Frederick Robie	28, 856 30	318, 000 00	318, 000 00	14, 448 04	243, 080 10	1, 040, 436 25	44, 608 54	10, 000, 000	44, 608 54
William B. Rochester	144, 421 53	1, 364, 666 31	1, 364, 666 31	49, 591 15	1, 619, 817 01	3, 348, 914 07	43, 728 70	10, 000, 000	43, 728 70
Edwin C. Morse	73, 530 18	4, 603, 530 44	4, 603, 530 44	27, 029 98	1, 767, 520 66	4, 606, 100 21	141, 851 76	10, 000, 000	141, 851 76
Milton J. Stone	38, 587 70	2, 085, 491 27	2, 159, 021 45	5, 975 06	726, 073 54	2, 157, 954 75	1, 066 70	10, 000, 000	1, 066 70
Jonathan Ladd	3, 020, 369 67	8, 705, 136 39	8, 705, 136 39	31, 671 28	276, 102 13	11, 584, 175 97	141, 530 09	10, 000, 000	141, 530 09
Jacob A. Camp	1, 837 72	2, 216, 567 25	2, 255, 154 95	58, 095 95	1, 564, 280 84	1, 954, 805 16	300, 349 79	10, 000, 000	300, 349 79
H. A. Hutchins	62, 266 78	2, 068, 307 46	2, 070, 145 18	13, 017 25	647, 953 03	1, 916, 258 76	153, 886 42	10, 000, 000	153, 886 42
H. P. Reese	7, 576 99	809, 298 45	809, 298 45	17, 473 67	216, 373 12	516, 668 70	72, 056 51	10, 000, 000	72, 056 51
Joseph A. Lawyer	26, 782 36	1, 560, 787 76	1, 560, 787 76	1, 192, 255 14	862, 454 43	1, 560, 787 76	27, 087 94	10, 000, 000	27, 087 94
Roland G. Usher	37, 768 34	746, 034 48	772, 816 84	589, 170 05	577, 614 87	1, 095, 167 20	51, 703 85	10, 000, 000	51, 703 85
Henry L. King	104, 360 62	3, 492, 087 07	3, 529, 855 41	6, 006 45	374, 990 28	3, 232, 000 00	297, 855 41	10, 000, 000	297, 855 41
George Marston	62, 416 45	7, 982, 362 77	8, 044, 779 22	11, 002 12	473, 005 45	3, 525, 784 95	4, 518, 994 27	10, 000, 000	4, 518, 994 27
Robert Smith, (Ill.) d	11, 002 12	2, 037, 017 89	2, 037, 017 89	17, 634 02	495, 541 76	3, 010 69	7, 991 43	10, 000, 000	7, 991 43
Charles S. Jones	7, 576 99	562, 000 00	562, 000 00	10, 412 88	445, 227 41	1, 816, 733 38	193, 030 53	10, 000, 000	193, 030 53
F. W. Crane	26, 782 36	418, 537 03	438, 083 73	309, 611 46	325, 279 93	437, 708 73	5, 348 11	10, 000, 000	5, 348 11
J. H. McBlair	37, 768 34	306, 657 96	309, 611 46	105, 015 40	189, 576 10	309, 611 46	375 00	10, 000, 000	375 00
J. Ledyard Dodge	104, 360 62	120, 008 76	120, 008 76	1, 551 62	151, 277 72	120, 008 76	973, 870 01	10, 000, 000	973, 870 01
L. S. Hapgood	62, 416 45	1, 540, 000 00	1, 540, 000 00	1, 151 55	1, 692, 513 47	886, 067 52	38, 430 38	10, 000, 000	38, 430 38
Alban V. Elliott	11, 002 12	3, 501, 900 80	3, 501, 900 80	11, 422 56	1, 512, 488 91	3, 408, 017 73	384, 574 04	10, 000, 000	384, 574 04
George P. Folsom e	2, 736 02	2, 448, 322 75	2, 448, 322 75	20, 228 51	606, 806 29	2, 064, 217 73	9, 980 50	10, 000, 000	9, 980 50
Anthony Ten Eyck	19, 546 70	535, 049 65	535, 049 65	4, 817 29	446, 442 51	839, 326 74	4, 696, 809 50	10, 000, 000	4, 696, 809 50
N. S. Brinton	2, 953 50	19, 493, 230 92	19, 493, 230 92	1, 356, 439 86	728, 633 82	14, 342, 768 40	25, 012 70	10, 000, 000	25, 012 70
James W. Carpenter f	319, 937 53	1, 356, 439 86	1, 356, 439 86	12, 588 20	876, 320 98	1, 331, 427 16	26, 502 93	10, 000, 000	26, 502 93
H. F. Dixon	4, 547 31	1, 114, 339 63	1, 114, 339 63	1, 117, 933 33	1, 117, 933 33	1, 091, 430 40	26, 502 93	10, 000, 000	26, 502 93
William Richardson g	4, 469 02	3, 501, 900 80	3, 501, 900 80	1, 551 62	151, 277 72	886, 067 52	973, 870 01	10, 000, 000	973, 870 01
James H. Phinney	314, 257 68	19, 493, 230 92	19, 493, 230 92	4, 817 29	446, 442 51	839, 326 74	4, 696, 809 50	10, 000, 000	4, 696, 809 50
C. S. Stevenson	13, 018 00	1, 356, 439 86	1, 356, 439 86	1, 356, 439 86	728, 633 82	14, 342, 768 40	25, 012 70	10, 000, 000	25, 012 70
Samuel A. Safford	3, 593 70	1, 114, 339 63	1, 114, 339 63	1, 117, 933 33	1, 117, 933 33	1, 091, 430 40	26, 502 93	10, 000, 000	26, 502 93
A. W. Hendricks	3, 593 70	1, 114, 339 63	1, 114, 339 63	1, 117, 933 33	1, 117, 933 33	1, 091, 430 40	26, 502 93	10, 000, 000	26, 502 93
Amos Bunney	13, 018 00	1, 356, 439 86	1, 356, 439 86	1, 356, 439 86	728, 633 82	14, 342, 768 40	25, 012 70	10, 000, 000	25, 012 70
Robert L. Wilson	3, 593 70	1, 114, 339 63	1, 114, 339 63	1, 117, 933 33	1, 117, 933 33	1, 091, 430 40	26, 502 93	10, 000, 000	26, 502 93
W. H. Scott	3, 593 70	1, 114, 339 63	1, 114, 339 63	1, 117, 933 33	1, 117, 933 33	1, 091, 430 40	26, 502 93	10, 000, 000	26, 502 93

Statement showing the amount in the hands of each of the disbursing officers of the Pay department, &c.—Continued.

Paymasters.	Balances in hands of paymasters and unaccounted for July 1, 1864.	Remitted from treasury and turned over by other agents in the year ending June 30, 1865.	Total amounts received for.	Amounts expended in paying regular troops.	Amounts expended in paying volunteers.	Am'ts expended in paying Military Academy.	Amounts turned over to other agents or placed in the treasury.	Total am'ts accounted for.	Balances remaining unexpended and to be applied to payments in the next fiscal year.	Am'ts of requisitions included in balances not received by paymasters on June 30, 1865.	Actual balances in hands of paymasters.
J. O. Culver	\$50,937 92	\$1,617,599 54	\$1,668,537 46	\$10,656 74	\$1,127,241 91		\$529,747 63	\$1,667,646 28	\$891 18		\$891 18
George Phelps	79,388 32	1,923,574 72	2,008,963 04	5,873 62	1,946,581 84		55,456 05	2,007,911 51	1,051 53		1,051 53
Charles W. Campbell	2,376 44	1,581,702 20	1,584,078 64	11,452 63	1,077,252 90		391,403 80	1,480,109 33	103,969 31		103,969 31
Charles F. Davies	750,679 60	2,302,377 22	3,053,056 82	1,951 27	515,659 88		2,535,039 10	3,052,650 25	406 57		406 57
Moses F. Webb	6,618 73	1,497,053 11	1,503,671 84	88,738 97	1,357,047 34		52,770 59	1,498,556 90	5,114 94		5,114 94
George A. Mitchell	4,327 62	1,790,984 31	1,791,311 93	4,276 60	890,324 56		891,558 22	1,781,862 78	9,429 15		9,429 15
Henry C. Whitney	149,739 28	1,375,738 55	1,525,537 83	18,163 90	1,536,530 27		1,062,545 26	1,525,537 83	1,257,015 02	\$1,000,000	257,015 02
Robert P. Dodge	16,533 53	3,731,321 38	3,747,854 91	9,094 88	1,489,609 38		571,448 15	2,490,839 89	34,944 49		34,944 49
V. C. Hanna	27 56	2,101,145 82	2,101,173 38	5,171 36	1,489,609 38		104,212 56	2,066,238 89	4,183 58		4,183 58
Morgan L. Martin	71,080 46	720,115 66	791,196 12	9,094 88	673,705 10		1,933 58	362,738 90	32,518 13		32,518 13
Charles J. Sprague	2,011 39	393,245 64	395,257 03	12,838 77	347,976 55		1,933 58	362,738 90	142,299 70		142,299 70
William G. Smith	2,783 68	1,290,710 08	1,293,493 76	1,567 24	271,837 77		875,789 05	1,149,194 06	102,169 97		102,169 97
William G. Terrill		854,046 70	854,046 70	12,001 97	548,424 13		131,450 93	751,876 73	30,416 65		30,416 65
O. S. Witherill	19,309 01	2,318,018 15	2,337,327 16	695 67	1,778,348 90		527,865 94	2,306,910 51	158,198 71		158,198 71
Martin L. Bundy	193,517 49	3,498,241 35	3,691,758 84		1,056,462 65		2,477,097 48	3,533,560 13	22,262 97		22,262 97
J. A. L. Morrell		8,301,970 16	8,301,970 16		415,656 92		7,864,050 27	8,279,717 19	4,045 36		4,045 36
Thomas B. Oakley		1,852,843 35	1,852,843 35	14,083 51	1,525,009 14		309,705 34	1,848,797 99	5,492,492 07	5,000,000	492,492 07
Frank M. Eting	10,146 78	19,177,154 43	19,187,301 21	91,059 10	440,961 86		13,162,788 18	13,694,809 14	241,804 25		241,804 25
William H. Johnston	103,106 24	2,556,691 12	2,659,797 36	37,543 46	872,618 99		1,507,830 66	2,417,993 11	91,164 45		91,164 45
Nicholas Vedder		1,427,676 05	1,427,676 05		938,624 50		397,887 10	1,336,511 60	155,388 13		155,388 13
Oliver Holman	4,451 37	1,534,509 09	1,538,960 46		889,144 25		494,423 08	1,383,572 33	8,866 55		8,866 55
William Tillman	29,702 71	2,767,333 52	2,797,036 23	220,074 45	504,416 22		2,063,679 01	2,788,169 68	16,069 00		16,069 00
William Larned	120,973 01	789,257 67	910,230 68	8,989 91	576,068 48		309,163 29	894,161 68	1,014,618 32		1,014,618 32
Russell Errett	28,172 57	3,305,302 53	3,333,475 10	30,594 12	1,658,863 61		629,369 05	2,318,836 78	16,754 75		16,754 75
Thomas M. Burt	57,736 25	1,092,687 55	1,150,423 80	4,194 81	909,562 60		236,666 39	1,150,423 80	463,107 52		463,107 52
Frank Bridgeman	98,449 52	4,252,365 59	4,350,815 11	15,602 34	1,409,187 30		2,909,270 72	4,334,060 36	463,107 56		463,107 56
Julian O. Mason	195 52	1,955 52	1,955 52		195 52		195 52	195 52			
Henry W. Newell	158,289 76	2,793,815 61	2,952,105 37	15,820 28	1,577,344 71		893,832 82	2,486,997 81	15,542 08		15,542 08
John V. Sullivan	30,000 00	429,846 19	451,846 19	336 25	257,124 33		292,395 61	459,846 19	69 52		69 52
William J. Martin		606,500 00	606,500 00		533,431 22		73,068 78	606,500 00	363,164 79		363,164 79
Robert S. Webb		903,642 09	903,642 09	1,138 31	817,388 88		69,582 82	888,100 01	15,542 08		15,542 08
Alex. B. Williams	5,037 57	110,067 71	115,105 28		89,127 95		25,907 81	115,035 76	69 52		69 52
William M. Wiley	54,363 23	4,755,616 24	4,809,979 47	46,109 62	1,008,478 80		3,392,226 26	4,446,814 68	363,164 79		363,164 79
Alvin Walker	16,245 43	919,562 24	935,807 67	168 46	861,943 47		73,695 74	935,807 67			
W. C. H. Sherman	14,019 14	1,468,977 20	1,482,996 34	10,689 46	1,415,173 11		57,133 77	1,482,996 34			

Luther T. Thustin	184, 612 75	1, 498, 153 21	13, 043 60	595, 213 31	1, 072, 993 25	1, 681, 250 16	1, 515 80
R. P. L. Baber		1, 303, 938 96		1, 097, 050 77	102, 090 15	1, 199, 140 92	104, 798 04
John Allison		348, 017 00	21, 907 69	236, 561 03	91, 117 87	349, 606 59	
Robert Smythe	44, 681 12	2, 097, 364 30	3, 061 75	1, 255, 968 79	806, 271 96	2, 065, 302 50	76, 712 92
James M. Wilson		1, 455, 000 00	10, 196 01	1, 974, 011 22	475, 683 06	1, 449, 694 28	5, 992 76
J. W. Smith	1, 816 19	2, 553, 324 79	54, 294 45	1, 106, 906 35	1, 130, 520 21	2, 247, 622 57	305, 702 41
James Mann		9, 410, 074 44	1, 048 48	1, 030, 537 06	8, 238, 624 78	9, 323, 456 29	86, 618 15
Charles Dodge o	5, 516 77	869, 792 91		651, 044 57	223, 216 63	875, 309 68	
Asa Holt, jr.	18, 549 02	6, 793, 486 39	191, 456 34	3, 718, 323 99	2, 216, 786 92	6, 126, 567 25	685, 468 16
John R. Cravens		1, 051, 278 54	336 00	663, 077 53	312, 409 25	969, 822 78	81, 455 76
Hiram C. Bull	1, 641 51	509, 521 21		463, 280 97	2, 373 16	465, 654 13	43, 867 08
Ellery W. Eddy	17, 133 75	308, 682 90	7, 685 27	267, 523 42	1, 419 67	276, 628 36	32, 054 54
H. K. Lawrence	26, 605 00	26, 605 00				26, 605 00	26, 605 00
S. B. A. Haynes		1, 764, 317 41	3, 023 69	1, 044, 422 98	682, 282 91	1, 729, 729 58	34, 587 83
John S. Cocks	50, 000 00	1, 105, 946 79		1, 108, 773 63	47, 173 16	155, 946 79	81, 455 76
C. M. Terrell	242, 478 60	5, 003, 736 68	5, 746 68	1, 769, 096 00	3, 147, 159 36	4, 922, 002 04	81, 734 64
Joshua H. Watts	140, 406 55	558, 396 27	82, 129 46	4, 406, 020 92	3, 22, 787 94	47, 457 95	47, 457 95
D. Colden Ruggles p		120, 000 00				510, 938 32	120, 000 00
Edward C. Kemble	1, 363 20	846, 877 04	90, 933 19	518, 915 18	238, 391 87	848, 240 24	2, 352 13
William S. Pope	2, 014 30	1, 416, 860 45		1, 016, 804 80	399, 717 82	1, 416, 522 62	2, 352 13
Edmund J. Porter o		1, 409, 302 81		1, 296, 400 04	112, 902 77	409, 302 81	
E. H. C. Hooper	2, 894 56	557, 670 56		496, 549 02	32, 625 85	531, 206 24	29, 358 88
Charles J. F. Allen	844 61	954, 602 50	2, 031 37	866, 623 54	30, 278 99	888, 477 30	66, 125 20
O. M. Dorman		986, 138 27	181 50	874, 996 85	110, 756 36	985, 934 71	203 56
John A. Sabin	2, 448 91	1, 090, 525 92	170 95	1, 021, 392 39	71, 411 49	1, 092, 974 83	
William C. Jones	219, 590 30	1, 965, 920 16		1, 068, 279 32	1, 106, 873 63	2, 175, 153 57	10, 356 89
Samuel C. Staples	3, 250 05	479, 048 23	20, 313 01	288, 100 26	148, 933 11	457, 346 38	24, 951 90
George Pomeroy	7, 819 49	1, 033, 694 26		911, 879 21	72, 425 89	998, 611 37	42, 902 38
T. H. Stanton		1, 299, 183 90		942, 112 49	339, 451 85	1, 293, 702 40	5, 481 50
John M. Austin	6, 311 16	685, 068 56		388, 982 09	70, 862 33	468, 139 32	223, 240 40
Harris G. Rodgers	11, 019 54	991, 947 00	8, 294 90	890, 284 21	87, 792 59	978, 076 80	24, 889 74
James B. Sheridan	106, 121 64	847, 190 04		797, 011 68	64, 778 23	879, 503 46	73, 808 22
Stephen A. Walker		730, 946 37	17, 713 55	392, 728 78	337, 473 45	730, 202 23	744 14
John S. Fillmore g	126, 140 17	426, 468 36	503 51	341, 171 11	3, 424 30	345, 098 92	81, 369 44
Elihu Griffin	895 48	921, 116 96		529, 514 84	391, 178 78	920, 693 62	423 36
A. H. Boyden r		646, 286 64	5, 939 94	118, 178 09	322, 168 61	646, 286 64	
George E. Glenn		1, 526, 004 09		511, 493 22	978, 079 65	1, 489, 572 87	36, 431 22
Jeremiah Fenno		2, 286, 908 17		1, 263, 692 19	963, 026 36	2, 226, 718 55	60, 189 62
Thomas K. Osgood	3, 269 71	1, 028, 224 23	1, 480 67	581, 619 24	445, 060 11	1, 028, 160 02	64 21
Albert H. Hoyt		1, 935, 096 59	48, 069 36	1, 383, 187 52	481, 060 11	1, 912, 919 33	22, 177 26
Henry McFarland		1, 350, 523 13	8, 710 60	1, 301, 613 85	7, 479 73	1, 317, 804 18	32, 718 95
Simon R. Marston	40, 134 58	1, 214, 823 18	38, 728 18	336, 589 78	836, 066 94	1, 211, 384 85	3, 438 33
J. A. Brodhead	85, 799 57	2, 053, 321 27	39, 213 12	1, 414, 284 98	675, 795 34	2, 129, 293 42	9, 827 40
George Browne	59, 530 33	1, 563, 761 68	314, 163 22	811, 664 75	399, 987 23	1, 525, 815 20	37, 946 48
Stephen M. Crosby		1, 692, 235 56	18, 248 95	810, 034 00	798, 645 99	1, 626, 928 94	65, 306 62
William H. Jameson		713, 000 00	705 58	570, 351 26	180, 222 81	751, 279 65	4, 183 02
Joshua Howard o		739 54		717 92	21 62	739 54	
Nicholas Norcross	190, 782 27	1, 414, 445 55		1, 030, 054 53	302, 816 53	1, 332, 871 03	81, 574 49
Daniel E. Bishop s		87, 186 63		76, 161 70	11, 034 93	87, 186 63	
Irving T. Ballard	15, 444 33	2, 108, 201 12	37, 501 68	1, 243, 649 22	819, 925 54	2, 101, 076 44	7, 124 66
Alexander Diven	2, 105 68	792, 060 90	7, 809 94	1, 513, 142 84	271, 108 14	792, 060 90	
James A. Farrish		1, 113, 411 65	1, 347 20	788, 604 70	315, 683 88	1, 105, 635 78	7, 775 87







Chambers Baird.....	1, 400, 610 00	1, 550 75	1, 054, 609 54	380, 211 34	1, 397, 371 63	3, 238 37
John W. Wallace.....	2, 028, 726 21	111 11	1, 715, 616 66	1, 273, 998 44	2, 028, 726 21	3, 238 37
Selden E. Marvin <i>gg</i> .....	495, 743 60		360, 170 43	136, 850 79	497, 021 22	
Nich's St. J. Green <i>hh</i> .....	630, 212 38		544, 056 11	88, 158 10	632, 214 21	
Charles R. Littlefield.....	1, 090, 438 35		743, 984 41	47, 045 26	791, 029 67	304, 169 72
Ethan S. Reynolds <i>m</i> .....	515, 000 00		389, 540 73	125, 459 27	515, 000 00	
Benj. L. Martin <i>ii</i> .....	473, 000 00		389, 831 04	85, 108 96	473, 000 00	
George W. Hank <i>jj</i> .....	712, 375 50		575, 958 78	136, 416 72	712, 375 50	
Wm. H. H. Allen.....	925, 025 00		734, 149 14	60, 337 91	811, 005 41	116, 279 26
David T. Dickson.....	1, 623, 354 59		1, 402, 528 45	218, 966 12	1, 621, 494 72	1, 859 87
Edward Walcott <i>kk</i> .....	352, 750 00		267, 536 60	85, 193 55	352, 750 00	
Peter P. G. Hall.....	1, 307, 800 00		754, 291 95	546, 654 63	1, 300, 946 58	6, 853 59
Geo. A. Putnam <i>ll</i> .....	187, 742 46		47, 780 68	139, 961 78	187, 742 46	
Elias Casper <i>m</i> .....	988, 797 80	7, 852 28	752, 545 35	228, 400 17	988, 797 80	
Joseph Moore, jr.....	189, 890 00	23, 801 68	155, 622 79	10, 465 53	189, 890 00	
George B. Dudley.....	842, 058 55		546, 594 03	200, 434 73	747, 028 76	95, 029 79
George W. Candee.....	1, 003, 251 47		834, 984 17	141, 863 69	976, 847 86	26, 536 70
Zosiah D. Pulsifer.....	2, 205, 599 15	227 62	1, 063, 756 92	736, 640 94	1, 500, 627 47	409, 815 74
Charlesiah Voorhis.....	834, 382 96		791, 078 92	43, 306 04	834, 382 96	
James Whitehill <i>mm</i> .....	805, 274 75		610, 683 47	241, 962 45	852, 645 92	
Thos. P. Haviland.....	5, 979, 000 00	337 15	715, 189 49	5, 174, 494 29	5, 890, 021 29	92, 835 40
John N. Scott.....	1, 168, 188 10	10, 852 43	891, 934 02	261, 595 75	1, 164, 381 94	3, 806 16
John W. King <i>nn</i> .....	400, 000 00		243, 815 24	156, 184 76	400, 000 00	
Mark Hollingshead.....	960, 043 50	7, 928 47	719, 158 14	196, 667 77	925, 754 38	34, 296 12
Joseph Harris.....	695, 000 00		405, 504 01	289, 495 99	695, 000 00	
Warren C. Emmerson.....	1, 435, 784 50	397 00	1, 134, 487 27	172, 745 61	1, 307, 629 88	128, 154 62
Thomas J. Saunders.....	650, 500 00		305, 920 78	94, 079 22	400, 000 00	250, 500 00
Charles Crawford.....	289, 397 05		275, 438 39	7, 661 96	284, 133 43	5, 263 62
Michael S. Guenckel.....	886, 617 93	1, 033 08	674, 572 83	192, 045 10	886, 617 93	
Horace H. Hann.....	1, 192, 000 00	190 59	543, 548 17	469, 120 48	1, 012, 859 24	179, 140 76
Michael G. Hart <i>oo</i> .....	803, 969 67	9, 705 27	731, 849 68	62, 414 72	803, 969 67	
Rufus Haywood.....	1, 127, 500 00		1, 057, 681 38	73, 831 35	1, 131, 512 73	
Samuel V. Holliday.....	1, 579, 187 38		1, 773, 682 12	84, 411 47	857, 943 59	724, 029 66
Stephen Lounsberry <i>ff</i> .....	762, 517 75	2, 331 16	626, 949 54	134, 140 90	763, 421 60	100 19
Allen McKean <i>pp</i> .....	455, 000 00		221, 889 72	233, 110 28	455, 000 00	
Jas. E. McKenny <i>qq</i> .....	688, 812 80	2, 734 19	579, 985 16	108, 028 47	690, 747 82	
James H. Nelson.....	909, 886 49	2, 051 41	637, 747 40	284, 235 11	924, 033 92	8, 383 63
Wm. V. Porter <i>rr</i> .....	29, 565 95	14, 625 35	568, 128 50	73, 042 10	655, 785 95	
William M. Smith <i>ff</i> .....	501, 114 30		456, 725 64	45, 042 88	501, 768 52	
Albert P. Shreve.....	1, 150, 532 31	1, 030 65	684, 130 53	210, 633 70	895, 794 82	254, 737 43
H. W. Snyder.....	1, 508, 522 26	632 01	683, 165 21	532, 939 55	1, 216, 736 77	292, 213 33
Frederick C. Tarr.....	1, 347, 077 52	1, 268 55	1, 108, 099 19	189, 913 07	1, 299, 280 81	48, 073 68
Wm. D. Thompson.....	928, 513 00		844, 682 75	84, 962 62	929, 645 37	4, 842 94
Charles T. Wilson.....	2, 218, 146 83		1, 008, 796 79	1, 57, 841 91	2, 066, 638 70	151, 508 13
John S. Walker.....	1, 207, 116 31	18, 908 71	566, 952 69	617, 234 82	1, 203, 086 22	11, 115 26
P. Edwin Dye.....	620, 934 91	1, 267 10	522, 770 62	73, 074 06	697, 711 78	23, 223 13
Allen A. Craig <i>c</i> .....	675, 901 86	3, 928 18	203, 377 44	468, 506 24	675, 901 86	14, 849 65
Nathan G. King.....	873, 105 94	324 54	726, 331 40	133, 200 35	800, 256 29	
Elphlett Rowell <i>hh</i> .....	872, 900 27	31, 728 40	643, 391 17	229, 320 81	904, 440 38	575, 950 00
Henry B. Hoffman <i>n</i> .....	575, 950 00	33, 240 05	251, 261 25	291, 448 70	575, 950 00	
James Lupton.....	1, 377, 109 39	106, 637 25	1, 026, 698 58	429, 543 79	1, 562, 879 62	1, 488 25
Edw. D. Redington.....	1, 002, 916 04		856, 353 78	147, 586 20	1, 003, 949 98	



William C. Woodson	704, 000 00	704, 000 00	406, 095 45	237, 837 91	703, 933 36	66 64
Elijah T. Cole r	80, 283 00	80, 283 00	50, 590 01	29, 438 74	80, 283 00	66 64
Thomas H. Gardner	635, 030 00	635, 030 00	607, 546 39	17, 920 09	635, 466 48	9, 563 52
Albert G. Salisbury	510, 981 65	510, 981 65	392, 538 27	73, 082 30	475, 945 85	35, 035 80
Wm. B. C. Pearson	830, 049 58	830, 049 58	748, 134 05	48, 369 62	28, 074 34	28, 074 34
Charles C. Jones	919, 027 00	919, 027 00	417, 593 74	69, 813 48	488, 393 85	430, 633 15
James P. Condy	677, 933 00	677, 933 00	344, 801 53	323, 974 89	668, 776 42	9, 156 58
Henry S. Goddard	593, 000 00	593, 000 00	500, 736 43	61, 086 18	561, 822 61	31, 177 39
William K. Patrick	1, 174, 442 95	1, 174, 442 95	1, 054, 405 94	115, 056 96	1, 173, 614 95	828 00
Foster A. Hixson	800, 532 81	800, 532 81	634, 388 88	137, 189 44	796, 700 66	3, 832 15
C. S. Underwood	572, 089 12	572, 089 12	522, 255 53	40, 394 90	562, 650 43	9, 438 69
Israel O. Dowe	522, 307 91	522, 307 91	410, 920 52	24, 778 61	437, 451 32	84, 856 59
George M. Adams <i>lth</i>	489, 511 21	489, 511 21	305, 975 59	183, 535 62	489, 511 21	215, 605 68
Joel A. Fithian	888, 000 00	888, 000 00	584, 084 41	80, 562 11	672, 394 32	3, 028 58
William T. Asson	687, 848 90	687, 848 90	517, 368 21	166, 793 08	684, 820 32	35, 281 33
Henry G. Nims	4, 122, 018 75	4, 122, 018 75	486, 560 35	3, 581, 483 39	4, 086, 737 42	56, 337 30
William H. Stuart	1, 089, 896 74	1, 089, 896 74	783, 418 88	250, 140 56	1, 033, 559 44	1, 466 10
Albert McKinney	1, 234, 504 78	1, 234, 504 78	714, 125 03	518, 913 65	1, 233, 038 68	2, 762 60
Joseph D. Atwell	1, 224, 525 95	1, 224, 525 95	624, 950 37	599, 370 58	1, 244, 525 95	302, 076 05
William Baily o	591, 643 42	591, 643 42	6, 671 95	21, 171 45	588, 880 82	164, 110 11
Franklin Ames	2, 382, 217 72	2, 382, 217 72	1, 433, 339 76	562, 562 65	2, 020, 141 67	167, 637 65
Joseph B. Young	776, 180 18	776, 180 18	517, 596 63	258, 583 55	776, 180 18	14, 829 88
Nathaniel A. Tucker	1, 205, 366 96	1, 205, 366 96	873, 374 12	166, 649 16	1, 041, 256 85	27, 037 78
Henry L. Williams	3, 052, 691 65	3, 052, 691 65	1, 163, 144 35	1, 636, 146 66	2, 885, 051 00	5, 126 33
Elbert V. Carter	539, 780 23	539, 780 23	418, 429 89	106, 273 21	339, 209 20	30, 835 00
John H. Ellis	306, 246 98	306, 246 98	307, 654 41	31, 554 79	634, 873 67	910, 303 69
Charles O. Benedict	640, 000 00	640, 000 00	573, 600 86	61, 272 81	618, 914 79	463, 416 50
Francis M. Smith	900, 044 82	900, 044 82	784, 593 44	84, 616 38	869, 209 82	95, 081 16
James McInire <i>m</i>	195, 900 99	195, 900 99	110, 517 38	85, 383 61	195, 900 99	41, 654 88
Samuel S. Drew <i>t</i>	141, 000 00	141, 000 00	115, 260 01	25, 739 99	141, 000 00	102, 818 50
Pierre Van Alstyne	1, 965, 755 48	1, 965, 755 48	860, 113 47	192, 018 35	1, 053, 451 79	57, 267 88
William Williams	1, 082, 331 29	1, 082, 331 29	557, 344 58	61, 570 21	618, 914 79	8, 769 46
Robert Hundhausen	693, 032 88	693, 032 88	663, 483 84	28, 340 00	693, 032 88	36, 812 43
Bradley M. Thompson	1, 682, 798 00	1, 682, 798 00	938, 967 95	648, 748 89	1, 567, 716 84	8, 417 25
John J. Ladd	948, 797 54	948, 797 54	439, 316 86	467, 825 80	907, 142 66	99, 330 33
John A. Pitzer	894, 367 44	894, 367 44	703, 325 04	81, 983 51	791, 548 94	26, 079 58
Frank H. Fletcher	531, 010 55	531, 010 55	303, 328 57	227, 392 12	531, 010 55	60, 247 30
John A. G. Barker o	250, 000 00	250, 000 00	164, 179 08	85, 958 57	250, 000 00	8, 885 11
Philo Bundy	440, 005 90	440, 005 90	364, 420 70	202, 684 99	372, 738 02	424 73
Gilbert Wadleigh	1, 480, 149 90	1, 480, 149 90	1, 268, 437 95	70, 270 10	400, 000 00	284 64
Julius M. Jones <i>w</i>	400, 000 00	400, 000 00	339, 729 90	364, 642 94	1, 093, 296 08	239, 950 97
Joseph Powl	1, 150, 108 51	1, 150, 108 51	738, 653 14	150, 272 95	250, 082 75	293, 263 63
Philip Filer	258, 500 00	258, 500 00	99, 632 55	42, 672 65	408, 731 83	8, 417 25
George P. Sanford	408, 731 83	408, 731 83	366, 059 18	49, 605 86	312, 826 10	99, 330 33
George B. Cockhill	412, 156 43	412, 156 43	263, 220 24	9, 430 40	450, 920 42	56, 079 58
David Gribben	477, 000 00	477, 000 00	441, 490 02	37, 882 96	300, 787 50	60, 247 30
Edward Spear, jr	361, 034 80	361, 034 80	262, 904 54	118, 925 04	465, 976 40	8, 885 11
Daniel L. Casez	465, 976 40	465, 976 40	349, 720 75	43, 394 14	173, 114 89	424 73
Lot Chambelein	182, 000 00	182, 000 00	156, 518 21	83, 432 06	239, 950 97	284 64
Abraham Beeler <i>w</i>	240, 375 00	240, 375 00	240, 643 64	52, 619 99	293, 263 63	
D. C. Smith <i>w</i>	293, 157 00	293, 157 00				

Statement showing the amount in the hands of each of the disbursing officers of the Pay department, &c.—Continued.

Paymasters.	Balances in hands of paymasters and unaccounted for July 1, 1864.	Remitted from treasury and turned over by other agents in the year ending June 30, 1865.	Total amounts received and to be accounted for.	Amounts expended in paying regular troops.	Amounts expended in paying volunteers.	Am'ts expended in paying Military Academy.	Amounts turned over to other agents or re-placed in the treasury.	Total am'ts accounted for.	Balances remaining un-expended and to be applied to payments in the next fiscal year.	Am'ts of requisitions included in balances not received by paymasters on June 30, 1865.	Actual balances in hands of paymasters.
J. Trueman <i>xx</i> .....	\$2,292 45	\$6,000 00	\$8,292 45	.....	\$6,156 76	.....	\$2,135 69	\$8,292 45	.....	.....	.....
W. S. Mann <i>yy</i> .....	.....	336,000 00	336,000 00	.....	49,141 61	.....	286,564 07	335,705 68	.....	.....	.....
F. B. Dixon <i>zz</i> .....	.....	67,000 00	67,888 22	.....	29,117 90	.....	38,770 32	67,888 22	.....	.....	.....
W. H. Jones .....	.....	1,712,364 70	1,712,364 70	\$1,186 37	993,189 45	.....	654,268 72	1,648,644 54	63,720 16	.....	63,720 16
Total .....	58,182,892 51	735,514,613 42	793,697,505 93	4,706,013 13	298,897 02	.....	424,211,433 61	721,216,339 76	72,481,162 27	\$32,000,000	40,481,162 17
Grand total .....	86,039,808 87	932,895,025 31	1,018,934,834 18	7,839,225 47	300,738,635 95	\$153,099 11	588,879,887 81	897,610,848 34	341,211,323,985 84	65,900,000	55,423,985 84

B. W. BRICE, Paymaster General, United States Army.

NOTES TO THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

- a* Died June 22, 1865.
- b* Resigned February 25, 1865.
- c* Resigned March 29, 1865.
- d* Resigned April 9, 1865.
- e* Dismissed August 1, 1864.
- f* Resigned June 1, 1865.
- g* Resigned September 30, 1864.
- h* Resigned March 13, 1865.
- i* Resigned April 28, 1865.
- j* Died July 24, 1864.
- k* Resigned August 3, 1864.
- l* Resigned February 8, 1865.
- m* Resigned May 29, 1865.
- n* Resigned April 27, 1865.
- o* Mustered out June 1, 1865.
- p* Died in rebel prison February 10, 1865.
- q* Died December 25, 1864.
- r* Resigned May 27, 1865.
- s* Resigned May 12, 1865.
- t* Resigned March 15, 1865.
- u* Resigned January 9, 1865.
- v* Resigned September 16, 1864.
- w* Resigned May 15, 1865.
- x* Resigned March 9, 1865.
- y* Resigned October 27, 1864.
- z* Resigned December 7, 1864.
- aa* Resigned May 1, 1865.
- bb* Resigned December 23, 1864.
- cc* Resigned February 18, 1865.
- dd* Resigned May 8, 1865.
- ee* Dismissed February 23, 1865.
- ff* Mustered out June 30, 1865.
- gg* Resigned December 27, 1864.
- hh* Resigned May 19, 1865.
- ii* Dismissed February 25, 1865.
- jj* Resigned February 23, 1865.
- kk* Resigned June 9, 1865.
- ll* Resigned May 10, 1865.
- mm* Resigned June 3, 1865.
- nn* Resigned January 17, 1865.
- oo* Resigned May 20, 1865.
- pp* Resigned June 5, 1865.
- qq* Resigned June 8, 1865.
- rr* Resigned March 8, 1865.
- ss* Resigned January 14, 1865.
- tt* Resigned April 25, 1865.
- uu* Mustered out January 9, 1865.
- vv* Killed October 27, 1864.
- ww* Died October 28, 1864.
- xy* Resigned April 27, 1863.
- zz* Discharged September 7, 1864.

## REPORT OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,

*Washington, October 30, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to present the following report upon the several branches of the public service committed to the care of this department, for the year ending on the 30th of June, 1865:

## CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

*Duties of the officers during the year.*—The corps of engineers consisted of eighty-five officers, the Military Academy, its officers and professors, and the battalion of engineer soldiers, of five companies.

Of the eighty-five (85) officers of engineers embraced in the corps, fifty-four (54) were on detached duty commanding army corps, divisions, and other military organizations, on staff duty, and as engineers and assistant engineers with armies operating against the rebels, in command of the pontoon bridge service, and in command of the troops of the engineer battalion; and thirty-one (31) on duty superintending sea-coast defences, lake surveys, lake and sea-coast harbor improvements, Military Academy, and assisting the Chief Engineer in connexion with all these duties.

Every officer of the corps has been on continued and uninterrupted duty during the entire year, and four (4) of its members have died in service.

The loss in officers killed, and who have died in service from wounds and other causes during the rebellion, is fourteen (14.)

Twenty-one (21) of the members of the corps still remain on detached service, performing important duties growing out of the rebellion, which prevent their returning to engineer duty.

The value and estimation in which the military talents and practical knowledge of the officers of the corps are held, have, by contributing to the command of the armies, and for staff service, together with the loss of those who have given their lives to the defence of their country, greatly reduced its numbers and efficiency for the many duties devolving upon it. Many of those of highest rank and experience are still on detached service, and the vacancies from casualties have necessarily been filled by junior members, recent distinguished graduates of the Military Academy.

Although the legal strength of the corps is sufficient to perform the proper functions of its members, the present assignment of its officers renders it impracticable to meet the numerous demands upon the department.

For a comprehensive knowledge of the duties of the engineers, a recurrence to the general objects of the campaign is necessary. (See plans Nos. 1 and 11.)

It will be recollected that, by descending the Shenandoah and crossing the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, the rebel army, in 1864, threatened Washington, Baltimore, Pittsburg, and even Philadelphia, as also intermediate cities. Washington city had become the great depot for immense supplies for all arms of service for months in advance. An extensive ordnance depot, a navy yard, the general hospitals, the archives of the nation, its executive and judiciary, with the public edifices for all national purposes, was the rich prize, to gain possession of which the rebel authorities directed their efforts, as well as to divert our armies from the attack on Richmond. At Antietam and South mountain they had been defeated and driven back into the valley of the Shenandoah. Again they made a powerful effort, and were defeated at Gettysburg, and driven across the Potomac and up the valley. In July, 1864, after the Lieutenant

General had forced the rebel armies, concentrated under Lee, from Todd's tavern, through Spottsylvania and Cool Arbor, into Richmond and Petersburg, they made another effort to divert the Lieutenant General by detaching Early on another expedition down the valley of the Shenandoah and across the Potomac, threatening Baltimore by moving on the Monocacy, where a small body of our troops were repulsed, thus jeopardizing both Baltimore and Washington. The attention of the Lieutenant General was given to these efforts of his adversary to divert him from his main object, the defeat and capture of Lee's army; and, while withdrawing part of the garrison to re-enforce the armies operating against Richmond, he held the command of his rear and Washington by being enabled to transport from before Petersburg as large a force as Lee could detach to operate in the valley and on Washington. Many thousands of wounded and sick occupied the hospitals in Washington, and the troops fit for duty did not suffice to man the armaments of the forts around the city. The engineers had previously constructed a system of detached redoubts and forts around the city, on a circuit of upwards of thirty-five (35) miles. Early, after his success at Monocacy, moved directly upon the defences of Washington, between the Potomac and the Eastern Branch. (See plan No. 1.) Colonel Alexander, of the corps of engineers, was the only officer of the corps whose personal attention could be given to these defences. Colonel Woodruff and Major Kurtz, of the corps of engineers, and assistants of the Chief Engineer, were first ordered to these defences. Subsequently all the officers on the sea-coast, north and east of this city, were detached from their labors of constructing sea-coast batteries, (then threatened by rebel iron-clads building in Europe, as another effort to divert our armies in the field,) and were ordered to the defences of Baltimore and Washington—Major Prime, Captain Robert, and Lieutenant J. A. Smith to the aid of Colonel Brewerton at Baltimore, and Colonel Macomb, Major Blunt, Major Casey, and Captain Tardy to the aid of Colonel Alexander at Washington. The rebel blow was aimed at Washington. The wise foresight of the Secretary of War had caused all the employés of the several bureaus of his department to be organized and drilled as infantry troops. The necessity for the withdrawal of the 6th army corps from Petersburg, and of the 19th from New Orleans, had also been foreseen, and orders sent to them to proceed to this city to meet the blow that was threatened. The Veteran Reserves and convalescents from the hospitals were also ordered to garrison the defences. Requisitions were made upon the governors of States to furnish troops, but with little success. The 6th and 19th corps arrived at the most opportune moment. Early directed his efforts upon Fort Stevens, but finding the garrison re-enforced, and even moving out of the defences to meet him, he suddenly retreated across the Potomac and up the valley of the Shenandoah. The engineers were then ordered to their former stations on the seaboard.

Early was pursued by Sheridan with his cavalry, and the troops that drove him from Washington up the Shenandoah, defeating him and his re-enforcements, and eventually annihilating his army. For this expedition Major Stewart, Captain Gillespie, and Lieutenant Meigs, of the corps of engineers, were assigned. In the death of Lieutenant Meigs, while reconnoitring in the neighborhood of Winchester, the corps lost one of its most meritorious and valued members. Captain Gillespie accompanied Sheridan's expedition to the James river, destroying the rebel communications on that river and all others west and north of Richmond, and finally joined the Lieutenant General before Petersburg.

With the investment of Petersburg commenced a series of laborious and difficult engineering operations by the army of the James and the army of the Potomac. The narratives collated from the reports of Colonel Michler and General Michie give the details of these operations. A reference to plan No. 12 will

explain the extent of the defences about Petersburg and Richmond, and the labors of our engineers about Petersburg and the rebel defences on the north side of the James river.

The rebels after being defeated by the army under Lieutenant General Grant and driven from their intrenchments around Petersburg, extending to the Hatchie, evacuated that city on the 2d April, 1865. The evacuation of Richmond followed on the 3d April, when the rebel army under Lee retreated, and was closely pursued and pressed to Appomattox Court House, where it yielded to the superior prowess and skill of the armies of the United States, on the 9th April, 1865, thus breaking up all semblance of rebel authority, leaving Sherman to end it by the capture of Johnston on the 23d April. A map of this campaign is in progress, awaiting information yet to be collected to perfect it as an historical record of these ever-memorable military operations which resulted in restoring the power and union of a nation.

After the evacuation of Richmond the rebel chief and his advisers, who devised this most unjust and unwarrantable scheme to destroy a nation, sought safety in flight towards Georgia. Their movements had been foreseen, and were provided for by a brilliant campaign of a cavalry force under General James H. Wilson, (captain of the corps of engineers,) who posted his troops with great discrimination and judgment, and succeeded in capturing the leader at Irwinton on the 10th May, 1865.

From Atlanta the grand army of the West, commanded by Sherman, commenced moving for the sea-coast, while Thomas occupied Tennessee and Kentucky. The rebels under Hood on evacuating Atlanta operated on Sherman's previous line of march.

The labors of the engineers at Chattanooga under Colonel Merrill, and the volunteer engineers, had rendered this important position as well as Knoxville impregnable; and Hood retrograded towards the Tennessee river with a force so far superior to Thomas's as to cause the latter to fall back gradually upon Nashville. The labors of the engineers in fortifying Franklin, on the Harpeth river, did not suffice, with a single army corps under Schofield, to hold those intrenchments.

Our army fell back to Nashville, where much labor and the skill of the engineers had previously been bestowed in fortifying it by General Morton, Colonel Merrill, Captains Barlow and Burroughs, and other junior officers of the corps of engineers, together with volunteer engineers. In September, 1864, Major Tower, corps of engineers, (brevet major general of volunteers,) took charge of these defences, and perceiving the great importance of Nashville as a depot of supplies as well as other important strategic advantages, commenced to add to and perfect the fortifications, (see plan No. 4,) on which he continued unremittingly until Hood's advance and investment of the place on the 15th and 16th December, 1864.

During the few days preceding Hood's arrival before Nashville, Thomas had concentrated his several available army corps within the fortifications of Nashville, the plan of which is given on plate No. 4.

The importance of these defences was mainly in enabling Thomas to concentrate his army at a depot well stored with munitions of war, and to hold his enemy, flushed with his successful march from Atlanta, in check until he was ready to take the field.

The accompanying plan of the fortifications (No. 4) by General Tower and annexed extracts from his report explain more fully the successes of this most important advance of Thomas, resulting in the demolition and annihilation of the rebel power in Tennessee.

During the same eventful period the fortifications that had been constructed

by the engineers at Murfreesboro' were successfully held and defended by a part of Thomas's army.

Colonel Merrill, captain engineers, with the volunteer engineers, had during the year given special attention to fortifying all the important points on the railroads in Tennessee and part of Kentucky, while Lieutenant Colonel Simpson, corps of engineers, had fortified Cincinnati, Ohio, Covington and Newport, Frankfort and Louisville, Kentucky, and the lines of the Louisville, Nashville, and Kentucky Central railroads, thus covering Thomas's rear and defending his lines of communication.

Such is a general outline of the labors of the engineers in Tennessee.

The march of the grand army of the West under Sherman (see plan No. 3) did not call for offensive or defensive fortifications.

The labors of the engineers, Captain Poe, (brevet brigadier general U. S. A.,) Captain Reese, (brevet brigadier general U. S. A.,) Lieutenant Stickney, (brevet major U. S. A.,) Lieutenant Ludlow, (brevet major U. S. A.,) and Lieutenant Damrell, were most advantageously bestowed upon the roads and bridges, and reconnoitring the enemy's movements and positions. (See annexed narratives.)

The pontoon trains under charge of these officers were indispensable to the success of the army. They consisted of canvas boats, which proved serviceable for the march of this army from the Tennessee to its final disbandment in Washington city in 1865. The advantages of these light trains, their frequent use during the campaign proving their adaptation to our country, are fully developed in the narrative collated from Poe's and Reese's reports.

In September, 1863, Knoxville was captured by our force, and in November of the same year Chattanooga was occupied by our army. At the latter point Sherman concentrated his supplies, and moved in force against the rebels, driving them through Ringgold, Tunnel Hill, Dalton, Resaca, Allatoona, and Kennesaw, to Atlanta.

At this latter place the rebel army was strongly intrenched. The place was first invested by our army on the north and east, when its strength being fully ascertained, Sherman marched his army to the south, defeating the rebels at Jonesboro' and Lovejoy's, thus investing it on the south and compelling Hood to evacuate this stronghold.

The annexed narrative, collated from the report of Brevet Brigadier General O. M. Poe, U. S. A., captain of engineers, gives the important incidents connected with its capture, and furnishes plans of the rebel defences. (See plan No. 2; see narrative annexed.)

While these movements and successes of the armies under Thomas and Sherman were in progress, General Grant ordered a division of his army under General Terry to co-operate with the navy in the reduction of the defences of the mouth of Cape Fear river in January, 1865.

Captain Comstock, of the corps of engineers, (lieutenant colonel, A. D. C., brevet brigadier general volunteers,) had charge of the engineer operations of this expedition.

Fort Fisher, situated at and commanding the northern entrance of this river, was found to be the key of the position. Plans Nos. 5 and 6 give the details of the defences constructed by our army to cover its landing and its rear while operating on Fort Fisher.

A bombardment by the fleet, resulting in dismounting many of the guns on the land front of the work, as well as cutting the electric wires for exploding a formidable system of mines on the same front, preceded a successful assault by the troops under General Terry.

The accompanying plans Nos. 5 and 6, with extracts from General Comstock's

report, give the details<sup>r</sup> of the rebel fortifications and those thrown up by our troops. (See General Comstock's report annexed.)

Later in the season General Canby concentrated the troops under his command and moved to the attack of the city of Mobile, having the co-operation of the navy. The labors of the engineers under Captain McAlester, (brevet major U. S. A.,) Captain Palfrey, (brevet lieutenant colonel U. S. A.,) Lieutenant Burnham, (brevet major U. S. A.,) and others, were here called into requisition.

Blakely (see plan No. 7) was invested, batteries constructed and opened upon the formidable rebel batteries covered by strong intrenchments, with abatis surrounding their entire position, with its flanks resting on the Blakely river.

Plan No. 7, with extracts from the report of Major McAlester, gives the details of the operations, final assault and construction of the rebel defences on the 8th April, 1865. (See McAlester's report, annexed.)

Spanish Fort was at the same time invested by our army, and the more formidable siege operations of a first and second parallel with approaches and enfilading batteries became necessary, and resulted finally in the capture of the rebel defences by assault, on the 8th and 9th of April, 1865. (See plan No. 8.)

These defences and approaches are given in detail on plans Nos. 7 and 8, which, with extracts from Major McAlester's report, will explain and illustrate this well-designed and skilfully executed siege.

The fall of Blakely and Spanish Fort caused the rebel army under Taylor, Gardner, and Maury, to evacuate Mobile, and retreat to the North.

Plan No. 9 gives the formidable rebel defences of the city of Mobile, surrounding it with three lines of detached forts and connecting intrenchments, with the flanks resting on Mobile river. The skilful labors of the rebel engineers about this city were very extensive and the system exceedingly strong.

The determination of the commanding general to turn these works, by first reducing Blakely and Spanish Fort proved successful, and the character of the works as shown on the plan forcibly illustrates the saving of lives and treasure in not first attempting to reduce these powerful defences.

Plan No. 10 gives the position of the entire and connected system of rebel defences that succumbed to the skill and talent of Canby.

While these important operations were in progress in Tennessee and Alabama, Sherman, with the grand army of the West, and Lieutenant General Grant, with the combined armies of the Potomac and the James, together with the garrison of Washington city, were simultaneously leading the national forces to strike a final blow to rebel power, and enforce the restoration of national authority from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

(See plan No. 3.) Sherman's army reached the sea-coast, by first capturing Fort McAllister, on the 13th December, 1864, by Hazen. The strong rebel intrenchments at Savannah were then invested, and the rebel General Hardee driven from them across the Savannah river. The department has as yet received no plans of Fort McAllister or of the defences of Savannah. The labors of the engineers of Sherman's army (see Poe's narrative) were again bestowed principally in reconnoitring the enemy's positions, and manœuvring the canvas pontoon trains to cross the army over the several rivers between Savannah and the last water-course crossed in pursuit of rebels. The success of these bridge trains is given in the extracts from Generals Poe's and Reese's reports. The city of Charleston fell into our power on the 18th February, 1865, after its evacuation by the rebels in consequence of Sherman's movements in its rear, and cutting off its supplies from the interior, while it was already blockaded by our fleet, and invested by land by our army.

Schofield, after the reduction of the entire defences of Smithville, moved upon Raleigh, and united his forces with those of Sherman. The engineer operations

on this line were in reconnoitring and manœuvring the pontoon bridge trains for the passage of the rivers, under Lieutenant Stickney, (brevet major U. S. A.,) of the corps of engineers. (See Stickney's narrative.) After obstinately contested combats at Averysborough and Bentonville, the rebel power under Johnston was finally overcome and subdued by the capture of his entire command on the 23d April, 1865; after which, by easy marches, the grand army of the West repaired to Washington city.

(See plans Nos. 1, 11, and 12.) The momentous campaign of the armies under the command of the Lieutenant General, with the purpose of capturing Richmond, and overthrowing the rebel authorities holding the semblance of Confederate power in that city, was commenced on the Rapidan in May, 1864. The battles of Todd's Tavern, on the 7th May; of Spottsylvania, on the 14th and 19th, and passage of the North Anna, on the 24th; of Coal Arbor, on the 31st May and 1st June; the march thence and passage of the James river on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, with the investment of Petersburg on the 3d July, 1864, constitute a brilliant series of grand battles and manœuvres that do not come within the scope of engineer reports.

The annexed narrative and information from the report of Colonel Michler, dated October, 1865, give more specifically the labors of the officers of the engineer corps during the progress of this campaign.

#### SEA-COAST AND LAKE DEFENCES.

While most of the officers of the corps of engineers have been actively engaged in the field as heretofore stated, others have given their attention to the important labor of sea-coast defences.

Against predatory expeditions of rebel cruisers and iron-armored vessels, built in foreign ports claiming to be neutral, it was necessary to construct batteries to mount rifle artillery and smooth-bored ordnance of heavier calibres than heretofore used. Colonel Macomb, Major Blunt, Major Casey, of the corps of engineers, were employed in thus fortifying thirteen harbors on the eastern coast. At the same time progress on the permanent sea-coast defences was continued at all the harbors from Maine to Hampton roads, inclusive, at Key West and Tortugas, and at San Francisco; and repairing the permanent works on the Gulf of Mexico that were taken from the rebels, which had been more or less injured by them and by our attacks, to restore them to the Union. On the northern and eastern works, as also on the California coast, the main object has been so to direct the operations as soonest to mount the contemplated armaments, which, at this time, are required to be of such penetrating and crushing power as will in all probability insure the destruction of any iron-armored vessels that can combat them. The introduction of these increased calibres and this power of artillery has made it necessary to renew most of the gun platforms heretofore constructed which were designed for no larger calibre than forty-two pounders. At the present time no smaller gun is prepared for the sea-coast batteries than one-hundred-pounder rifle guns, and ten to fifteen inch rifled and smooth-bored guns.

The further construction of the sea-coast batteries has been retarded by the necessity which now exists of so covering part of our guns and gunners as to render them secure against any advantage that an attacking power in iron-armored ships opposed to them shall possess. So far as we have yet progressed, preparations for guns of large calibre have been perfected, and the guns mounted to throw, collectively, one hundred and forty-seven thousand one hundred and fifty pounds of metal at a single discharge, which is an addition during the year of forty thousand six hundred and fifty-one pounds of metal that can be so thrown against an enemy.

Continuing to increase the armament on our sea-coast in the same ratio, for a reasonable time, will render the harbor defences exceedingly difficult for any maritime power to overcome, and, in combination with other auxiliary means of defence, will carry the cost and time requisite to subdue them beyond the means of foreign powers, provided we hold our works in a perfect condition for both land and sea attacks.

Boards of engineers have been detailed to consider what modifications are necessary at each and every work along our sea-coast to adapt them to resist the powerful armaments that European fleets, singly or combined, may be enabled to bring across the Atlantic, over the bars of our ports and harbors, to attack them.

The details of the operations during the year at the several works on the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, Lake and Pacific coasts, derived mostly from the reports of the superintending engineers, are annexed.

#### PRISON DEPOTS.

The prison depots also called for the labors of engineer officers. Point Lookout, at the mouth of the Potomac, was subject to sudden attack from marauding parties and detached cavalry from armies operating against Baltimore and Washington, which, with the immense body of prisoners, made it necessary to fortify the position against attempts to liberate them, by forts commanding both the interior and exterior. Major Stewart, assisted by Lieutenant Cantwell, and afterwards Colonel Brewerton, constructed these defensive works.

#### THE PRISON DEPOT AT JOHNSON'S ISLAND,

Cleveland harbor, Lake Erie, had to be defended against attempts of the prisoners, and succor by water, from expeditions organized in the friendly and neutral territories of Great Britain in Canada. Major Casey and Captain Tardy were assigned to and performed this service, constructing a water battery at the mouth of the harbor, against a force approaching by water, and temporary field forts on Johnson's island.

#### SURVEYS, MAPS, AND TOPOGRAPHY.

The surveys for the armies in the field, embracing the topography of the country passed over and particular sites occupied, have been referred to in other parts of this report.

The extent of the labors performed by the officers on duty in the bureau has been the engraving, lithographing, photographing and issuing 24,591 sheets for officers in the field and various branches of the service requiring this information, leaving still on hand a few copies of each publication for reference and the calls of the War Department.

The survey of the northwestern lakes has been in progress for several years, to obtain for the commerce of the States whose industry is promoted by that extended interior navigation the safety that a perfect and correct knowledge of the shores and bottom alone can attain. It is being conducted under the direction of Major Reynolds, of the corps of engineers, upon the same scientific principles and with the same care and accuracy that has been bestowed upon the coast survey and other national geodetic surveys. During the year two maps have been prepared from the field-notes published and issued to the

navigators of the lakes. One gives the west end of Lake Superior, and the other the northeastern part of Lake Michigan. Three others have been prepared and are now ready for engraving, giving the Portage river and the bay of L'Anse, on Lake Superior; and a third giving the north end of Green bay.

Twenty-eight hundred and twenty (2,820) sheets of the maps of the lake surveys have been issued for commercial, harbor improvement, and military purposes, during the year, making the whole number of maps called for and issued since these surveys were commenced 27,411 sheets.

Special surveys have also been made during the year, maps issued and forwarded for the use of the department, of Niagara river, Erie, Conneaut, Ashtabula, Grand river, Cleveland, Black river, Sandusky, St. Joseph's, Grand Haven, Chicago, Racine, and Sheboygan.

#### SURVEYS.

The principal labors of the parties engaged in these surveys during the year are comprised in the measurement of  $269\frac{1}{2}$  miles of shore-line,  $164\frac{1}{2}$  square miles of topography, 187 miles of soundings, and 1,200 square miles of off-shore hydrography on 1,586 miles of lines of soundings, the measurement of a base line of 4,173 feet in length, difference of longitude between several distant points by electric observations, and observations by flashing lights; also astronomical observations for the latitude of eight points.

*Recommendation.*—These surveys are called for by numerous parties and individuals, as well as by commercial men, for private as well as for public use. It is indispensable that some rules and system be established to keep the issue of these valuable maps within such limits as will insure the great objects of the survey, the *diffusion* of this information to promote national industry, at the same time to prevent them falling into the hands of persons collecting for *other purposes than the public good*.

I recommend that the department be therefore authorized to issue these maps, after supplying the wants of the government, at the cost of paper and printing, as is now and for years past has been authorized for distributing the Coast Survey maps. This will prevent an improper use, and enable all persons capable of using them to obtain copies.

The estimate for carrying on the work for the next year is \$184,604 42, which exceeds the amount appropriated for last year's operations about \$60,000.

It is proper to say that this increase of estimate does not contemplate any advance in the wages of assistants, but is simply due to the increased cost of materials and supplies.

On our Pacific coast Major Williamson, of the corps of engineers, has explored and reconnoitred parts of northern California and southern Oregon, giving the topography of its roads, and continues observations for barometric correction of altitudes, having also in view an investigation of the formula for determining heights by this instrument. He has traversed and explored the heights of the Nevada range in northern California, said to be 10,000 to 11,000 feet above the level of the sea, and the military roads between the coast and this range of mountains to facilitate the military operations of the commanding general. During the year he also examined the various sites on Admiralty inlet and Pugets sound, that might hereafter become useful for military purposes, and selected such as should be reserved from sale by the land office.

#### PRESERVATION AND REPAIR OF ATLANTIC HARBORS AND SEA-WALLS.

An appropriation was made in 1864 for renewing the construction of the sea-walls in Boston harbor to preserve the head-lands from further destruction

by the ocean waves, and, as a consequence, injury to the harbor for commercial use, while at the same time it preserves important sites that hereafter will be occupied by batteries bearing on the channel leading to the city of Boston. The following narratives of the operations on these islands are drawn from the report of Colonel Graham, the superintending engineer. The same officer was charged with the application of the appropriation of \$100,000 for the preservation and repair of the harbors on the Atlantic. The accompanying summary gives his views on this subject in relation to the Susquehanna river below Havre-de-Grace, dredging the Patapsco river, Portland Harbor breakwater, navigation of the Hudson river below Troy, and Delaware breakwater. Colonel Graham recommends additional appropriations for the Atlantic harbor improvements.

#### REPAIRS OF SEA-WALLS ON DEER AND LOVELL'S ISLANDS, IN BOSTON HARBOR.

*Deer Island sea-wall.*—The walls on this island are three in number, viz: the north wall, middle wall, and south wall; respectively 1,743 feet, 839 feet, and 383 feet in length.

There were six places averaging 60 feet each in length, where the backing and flagstones of the platform had fallen in, and many places where large blocks of stone had been forced out from the body of the walls into the sea.

In September, 1864, a violent storm from the northeast washed away the clay backing from the north wall, to such an extent as to throw the cavities into one of 300 feet in length, besides forcing twelve large stones from different parts of the wall into the sea, and bulging the body of the wall both inward and outward, which weakened it so much, as to make it impossible for it to stand another such shock. No time was lost in taking down the whole of the injured portion and commencing the relaying it from the foundation, in hydraulic cement. Ninety feet lineal were rebuilt in this manner before the close of the working season. Much damage was done during the winter and spring storms.

During the summer to the close of the fiscal year, 50 feet lineal, in addition, were taken down and rebuilt. A small balance only remains on hand for this work; and the estimate of the engineer in charge for its continuance is \$25,359 86.

*Sea-wall on Lovell's island.*—This wall is for the protection of the northern end of the island from abrasion by the action of the sea. It is 803 feet long. The smallness of the appropriation granted for the joint repairs of the walls on this and Deer island rendered it impossible to do more on the former one than to procure the materials for erecting the necessary buildings for carrying on the work.

The estimated cost of repairing the sea-wall on this island is \$43,891 68.

#### SEA-WALLS AT GREAT BREWSTER'S ISLAND, BOSTON HARBOR.

There are two walls, 372 and 340 feet in length respectively, on this island; and additional walls for its protection and to prevent serious injury to the ship channel from the wash of large quantities of soil into it, to the extent of 1,550 feet lineal, are required.

During the winter a large number of tools were made at the blacksmith's shop on Great Brewster's island. Derricks were procured, a well was sunk, and a rail track 800 feet long was graded for drawing stone and other heavy articles, and in addition 1,500 cubic yards of stone and gravel were collected preparatory to commencing operations in the spring, since which time the work has been steadily and satisfactorily progressing.

About \$26,000 of the appropriation has been expended, leaving a balance of \$39,754 42 available for further prosecution of the work.

The engineer in charge estimates that additional funds will be required for the continuance of this work, to the amount of \$111,222 20.

## REPAIRING, ETC., HARBORS ON THE SEA-BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES.

*Dredging channel of Patapsco river from Fort McHenry to the mouth of said river.*—The absence of the dredges necessary to perform this work (they having been loaned to the Quartermaster and Navy departments for military purposes) rendered it impossible to make any progress with the work. The officer in charge has visited and reported upon the existing obstructions, however, and they will be removed at as early a day as practicable.

*Susquehanna river below Havre-de-Grace, Maryland.*—Upon inspection of the channel at this place by the engineer in charge, obstructions to the navigation were found to exist for vessels drawing over six feet of water, but owing to circumstances above cited, (the want of dredges,) no progress was made in their removal.

*Portland Harbor breakwater, Maine.*—The engineer in charge reports that the work of repairs on this breakwater has progressed satisfactorily, and recommends that it should be extended at once 400 feet further out. He estimates for the further prosecution of the repairs the sum of..... \$21,338 35  
For extending the breakwater 400 feet..... 83,772 70

Making a total of..... 105,111 05

*Improvement of the navigation of the Hudson river below Troy, N. Y.*—Owing to the want of dredges, no progress was made in this work during the last year. It will be commenced at the earliest practicable moment.

*The Delaware breakwater.*—A minute survey of this work will be required before repairs can be commenced. The pressing duties of the officer to whom this work was assigned prevented his giving it his attention in time for the commencement of the work. It will receive attention as soon as possible.

In addition to the above-mentioned works, there are others whose repairs should be attended to, but it is evident that the appropriation is utterly inadequate to the purpose.

## REPAIRS AND COMPLETION OF SEA-WALL AT BUFFALO, N. Y.

A special appropriation for this object, of \$37,500, was made in July, 1864, and the work was commenced as soon as possible.

The operations during the year ending June 30, 1865, have consisted in repairing the breaches in the old wall, quarrying stone, and laying the foundations for the proposed extension of the sea-wall.

The total amount expended during the year was \$8,494 92.

## PRESERVATION AND REPAIR OF LAKE HARBORS.

A general appropriation of \$250,000 under this head was made by Congress, approved June 28, 1864, and after due consideration it was distributed among the harbors most essential to the interests of commerce in proportion to their importance.

Owing to the lapse of time since any repairs were made upon harbor improvements, (some fifteen or twenty years,) the works had fallen into decay, and in many instances become entirely dilapidated; and under these circumstances, especially when considering the utter inadequacy of the appropriation, the question of applying it to the most advantage was one of great difficulty.

Some of the most important harbor works had scarcely anything left to “re-

pair or preserve," and in a strict construction of the act would have been cut off from any benefit in the appropriation, while from others much of the old work had to be removed before anything new could be commenced. It will be evident, therefore, that although much has been done generally, the amount of work at particular points must appear small.

The following summary from the reports of the officers in charge will exhibit the state of the works at the close of the year. Should it be the determination of Congress to persevere with the repairs and preservation of these artificial works to improve the navigation of the lake harbors, the department will be prepared to give the sums recommended by the superintending engineers for the different localities.

*Repairs of pier at Oswego harbor, N. Y.*—Major C. E. Blunt, corps of engineers, reports that operations for this object have been carried on during the entire working season. The sinking of new cribs, repair and ballasting of old ones, and replanking the outer surface of the pier, constitute the work done. Similar repairs will continue to be necessary to a greater or less extent from year to year.

The amount expended during the year was \$14,588 17. The sum still available from the appropriation made last year for repairs and preservation of lake harbors will probably be sufficient for the coming year.

*Genesee River harbor, N. Y.*—Captain J. A. Tardy, corps of engineers, reports that preparations for repairing the west pier at this harbor were commenced in the fall of 1864, and during the year ending June 30, 1865, the amount expended was \$11,141 43. By the close of the present working season the balance of the available funds will have been expended.

*Light-house pier, Buffalo, N. Y.*—Captain J. A. Tardy, corps of engineers, reports that nothing was done during the fall, owing to the lateness of the season. Active operations for repairs could not be commenced before July, 1865. This pier is very much out of repair. Piles on the harbor side and at the extremity need replacing. Stone-work is much injured and thrown out of place by the action of the ice.

*Harbor of Chicago, Illinois.*—A special survey with a view to its improvement, as well as to the preservation and repair of existing works at this point, was made during the season. The officer in charge of the work, Colonel T. J. Cram, corps of engineers, however, could not, under the restrictions of the act making the appropriation, apply any portion of it, and the city authorities appropriated \$75,000 to be expended in continuing the dredging of the direct channel through the outer bar of the mouth of the harbor, which they had already opened to some extent, and in extending the north pier 400 feet, under the plan approved by this department and suggested by the officer in charge.

This important harbor presents great engineering difficulties to insure permanency to any system for its improvement that heretofore has been devised. The present system is designed to open a channel across a shoal that the continued effort of nature is forming. While the present method of prolonging jetties, thus extending the river channel across the shoal, has the effect of cutting a new and deep channel across such shoal, such improvement has no effect in preventing, in a limited period, the formation of another shoal across the opening of these piers into what was originally deep water. Nor have they any effect in retarding the causes of such formation. It is by checking the perpetually shifting sands along the shores that we must arrest this perpetual injury to the harbors. No place demands more care and attention to this important subject than Chicago. Most of the other lake harbors are affected in this manner and from similar causes. The attention of the superintending engineers and others interested in this subject, so important to the commerce and trade of the lakes, will be

drawn to some means of rendering the expenditures for these harbors more durable.

*Racine harbor, Wisconsin.*—Colonel Cram reports that the work at this harbor has consisted in levelling back the sand heaps from back of the north pier, in putting in new timbers and filling with stone the shore portion likely to be breached, (north pier,) in repairing and filling with stone sixty feet of same pier further out, in securing outer crib or pier-head in place, and preventing it being overturned, and in replacing broken timbers of the pier-head of south pier.

The additional work contemplated for the remainder of the season will, it is hoped, render the work at this harbor secure for several years to come.

*Milwaukie harbor, Wisconsin.*—Colonel Cram reports that the work accomplished at this harbor was as follows, viz: in replacing iron bands and bolts, repairing the timbers of the south pier-head, and in removing by dredging a lump which had formed in the natural bed in the middle of the channel just at the entrance.

With the additional work yet remaining to be done, the harbor will be in good condition.

*Sheboygan harbor, Wisconsin.*—Colonel Cram reports that sufficient material for the repairs at this harbor could not be accumulated to justify the commencement of the work until April, 1865.

During the summer much of the work has been successfully done, a part of it having to be put under water, and therefore difficult to accomplish. It is contemplated to complete the work during the coming season.

*St. Joseph's harbor, Michigan.*—Colonel Cram reports that the repairs at this point, consisting of closing the breach in the north pier and removing the wood-work and filling it with stone to a level three feet above the water, were successfully accomplished with immediate beneficial results.

This harbor is a very important one, being the only harbor of refuge the United States has ever expended money upon on the east shore of Lake Michigan, and should be fully repaired and improved.

*Erie harbor, Pennsylvania.*—Colonel Cram reports that the repairs of the works at this place were completed, including the strengthening the low place in the peninsula at the head of the bay.

*Grand River harbor, Ohio.*—Colonel Cram reports that the breach in the west pier of 150 feet in length has been completely repaired, leaving an additional 150 feet of the outer damaged and decayed part to be repaired next season. The breach of 90 feet in length in the outer portion of the east pier, and likewise a very considerable portion of the inner part of the old east pier, have also been repaired, and nearly all the material that will be required for the remainder of the repairs authorized has been delivered on the spot. The entrance to the harbor has been very materially improved by what has already been done, and it is probable that a channel of nine feet over the outer bar will be made by next spring.

*Cleveland harbor, Ohio.*—The work at this point has been much abused by corporate authorities and private individuals, in the use of it for their own advantage; and as this abuse is, in spite of remonstrance, daily on the increase, it is highly probable that the piers will in the end be entirely destroyed.

In consequence of the officer in charge (Colonel Cram) not being able to get entire possession of the east pier from the hands of those who are using it for private pecuniary advantage, no repairs have been put upon it.

The west pier and the pier-head have been very thoroughly repaired, and both have been filled with stones, with the exception of a part of the inner sustaining work put in to strengthen and preserve the old west pier. Before the close of the present season, most or all of the filling will be in, and there will remain no more to be done until next winter, when, taking advantage of the ice, about seventy old piles will be pulled up.

Ample depth of water now exists on the bar, which has been attained by the city in large expenditures for dredging.

*Black River harbor, Ohio.*—Colonel Cram reports that during the season the west pier has been repaired, and also all the under-water work of the east pier has been successfully put in. Before the close of the season, it is anticipated that all of the east pier will be completely built up and planked over to a point necessary to stop the sand from running into the harbor.

*Vermillion harbor, Ohio.*—The amount required to repair this harbor being so large, it was not deemed advisable to commence it with the limited means at the disposal of the department.

*Sandusky harbor, Ohio.*—No vestige of the old work could be found upon inspection of this harbor, and as the act making the appropriation did not contemplate new works of improvement, it was not deemed proper to apply any part of the appropriation.

*Repairs of harbor works at Burlington, Vermont, and Plattsburg, New York, Lake Champlain.*—The sums of \$13,000 and \$2,000 respectively were allotted from the appropriation for "repairs and preservation of lake harbors" to these two points, to be expended in repairing the breakwaters, and at the latter place to direct the repairs so as to admit of placing a small harbor light on the north end of the breakwater. After examination on the spot, it was not judged expedient by Major Blunt, the engineer in charge, to commence work before the falling stage of the lake in 1865. Nothing was consequently done before the closing of the fiscal year.

Some dredging was reported as desirable by the engineer in charge near the Plattsburg breakwater. It was not, however, judged expedient to have it done at present.

The outlay of money at Burlington to make the breakwater adequate to the wants of the large and increasing business of the place would be so great, that it is not thought expedient at present to ask for any further appropriation.

#### MILITARY ACADEMY.

During the past year sixty-eight cadets completed their studies and military exercises at the academy, and were commissioned as lieutenants in the army.

This is the most numerous class that has ever graduated at the institution since its organization in 1802.

For many years the number of graduates has not sufficed to fill the annual vacancies in the army.

The number of officers in the several branches of the staff, and of regiments now comprising the regular army, has greatly increased from time to time, while the number of cadets authorized by law has remained unaltered since 1843. The result is that neither the staff corps, nor regiments of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, can be furnished with the numbers to perfect their company organizations, and military science and art cannot be disseminated throughout the country in proportion to the increase of population and national interests to be protected. The total number of cadets now at the academy is 235, and the total number authorized by existing laws is 293. From various incidents to which the appointments are subject, this ratio does not materially alter from year to year.

The average cost of the institution for the last twenty years has been \$160,711 83. The cost during the past academic year was \$201,217. These sums include the pay of cadets, officers, and professors, and all contingencies.

The annual average appropriation for twenty years is \$166,684 63, and for the present year is \$257,505. This excess arises from the increase of the pay of cadets, and for increase cost of forage for artillery and cavalry horses, &c.

*Recommendation.*—To meet the wants of the military service, and to diffuse a knowledge of the science and art of war more extensively throughout our widely extended domain, I recommend at this time an increase in the total number of cadets of two additional appointments from each State and Territory, and the District of Columbia; thus making the number of appointments to be authorized under the law to be one from each congressional district and Territory and the District of Columbia, ten from “at large” annually by the President’s selection, and two in addition from each State and Territory and the District of Columbia.

The difficulties that have been experienced for years past in training the minds and bodies of the young gentlemen sent to the academy to prepare them for usefulness as members of the military profession, arise mainly from the qualifications of the candidates being so exceedingly limited. While at the present time it may not be expedient to increase the standard for admission, I do urgently *recommend* that a selection from at least five candidates to be nominated for each appointment may be authorized by law, when every section of the country would more certainly have its due proportion of graduates entering the army annually. Should this principle be authorized by law, the examination of the candidates could be ordered in several sections of the country, at convenient military posts, and thus save a great annual expense now incurred by partially educating and returning deficient cadets to their distant homes, insure a much greater proportion of members who could master the course of studies, and avoid the numerous and frequent discharges from the academy for inability to acquire the requisite information and proficiency for a graduate of this institution.

## FINANCES.

During the year ending June 30, 1865, the expenditures of the department for fortifications on the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, Pacific coasts, and on the northern lakes, including bridge trains, intrenching tools, and for all other military purposes, amounted to.....	\$5, 174, 335 23
For civil works, as lake harbors, harbors on the Atlantic, survey of the lakes, they amounted to.....	218, 400 00
And for the Military Academy, not including the pay of professors and cadets .....	86, 685 00
	<hr/>
Making a total annual expenditure of.....	5, 479, 420 23
	<hr/> <hr/>

The accounts of the disbursing officers of the department have been regularly forwarded from month to month. These accounts had accumulated in the department during the past four years beyond the means allotted to the financial branch to examine, correct, and forward to the Treasury Department for final settlement.

During the year twelve hundred and three monthly accounts, amounting to \$11,834,308 35, have been thus examined and forwarded to the Auditor for final settlement, and there remain on hand at this time three hundred and ninety-eight monthly accounts to be examined, amounting to \$4,492,964 85. At the rate of progress made during the past year in the examination of these accounts, the work in a short time will be brought up to the months in which they are received from the officers. No defalcation or losses in any way exist in the disbursements and accountability of the officers of the department.

At the present time all property purchased for the armies in the field, either worn or of a perishable character, is being sold, and the avails will be returned to the treasury. The amount of sales to this date is \$34,123 12. The resi-

due of this property is being stored in engineer depots for further use, at the Jefferson Barracks depot, Missouri, and at the Willett's Point depot, New York, under charge of engineer officers and troops of the engineer battalion.

The property of the department in the hands of its agents is accounted for quarterly, and the returns examined in this bureau.

The number of returns examined during the year is.....	220
And remaining to be examined.....	43

Making the number of property returns rendered by officers .....	263
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RICH'D DELAFIELD,  
*General, and Chief Engineer U. S. Army.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

*Narrative collated from the reports of Colonel N. Michler.*

FROM THE RAPIDAN TO PETERSBURG.

Accurate maps and topographical information of the country to be passed over were much needed, and called for the earliest attention of the engineers. (See plan No. 11.) Reconnoissances had been made as far as the different fords of the Rapidan, and the country was so far well known. The movements of the army in November and December, 1863, between the Rapidan and Mine run, had furnished some information that proved of great value. The experience gained during the campaign of the army of the Potomac in May and June 1864, showed that the existing maps sufficed only for general information, and furnished but little suitable for selecting the routes of columns, and were entirely deficient in details required for the manœuvre of troops in the field in the face of an enemy. The country proved to be of the worst and most impracticable character; and although in one of the oldest States of the Union, it was without any geographical information among its archives. It became evident that this information would have to be obtained in anticipation of any forward movement of the army. To accomplish this, Colonel Michler's party was kept occupied day and night preparing maps, much needed, in the absence of reliable guides, for directing the columns, either as they moved on the routes, or manœuvred for position previous to attack. Major Weyss and Captain Paine, of the volunteers, were the assistants of Colonel Michler, who had also seven civil assistants and men detailed from the ranks. The labors of these assistants commenced after crossing the Rapidan, progressed until the army arrived in front of Petersburg, and continued on other fields until October, 1864. Every road within the lines of the army was examined and surveyed, and the work pushed as far to the front and on the flanks as practicable. Their notes were at once photographed in the field, and distributed for use. Revised editions of these photographs were published as fast as any new information was procured. In this way several editions of eleven maps were arranged and issued, comprising surveys covering an area of 730 square miles. Other surveys were made by means of odometers, on the headquarters train, over a distance of 179 miles; and others made with the cavalry expeditions under General Sheridan, over an aggregate distance of 310 miles. These surveys were completed from information obtained from captured maps. Six sheets were thus improved.

On the 9th July, 1864, an order was issued directing the operations of the army against the intrenched position of the enemy defending Petersburg, and

that they be by regular approaches. This required a survey of the topography of the country, and the positions of the lines of both armies. To this map constant reference was made during the siege. Over 1,300 miles of actual surveys were made during the period now referred to. More than 1,200 maps were issued previous to crossing the Rapidan, and over 1,600 photographic sketches between that date and the 30th July, 1864.

A brief synopsis follows of the duties assigned the officers of the corps of engineers in the order of events.

On the 3d May Lieutenant Mackenzie accompanied General Gregg's second cavalry division, remained with this command, after crossing the Rapidan, at Ely's ford during the 4th and 5th May, and was in the action against the enemy's cavalry at Todd's tavern. On the 6th May he returned to the engineer battalion. Lieutenant Howell accompanied the third cavalry division, and continued with General Wilson until the 25th May, accompanying the division from Chancellorsville to Haxall's landing, on the James river, and was present in the engagements along the route thither and back. Colonel Michler crossed the Germania ford with General Meade, and was directed to reconnoitre the ground along the Wilderness creek, and to the right of the position occupied by the 5th corps, across the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike. At the crossroad, between the latter and the plank road at Spotwood's, the enemy's cavalry was encountered. A division of the 6th corps, and Ricketts's, were formed in line parallel to the latter road, and moved forward to the right of the 5th. During the greater part of the 5th and the entire 6th May, Colonel Michler remained with General Sedgwick. On the 6th May he made an examination of his front and took part in the construction of an intrenched line, the right of which was much exposed, several crossroads offering facilities for outflanking the position. A series of determined and bloody assaults on both days opened the campaign, the battle of the Wilderness ending on the evening of the 6th May by a fierce attack about dark by the enemy on the right of the 6th corps. Colonel Michler then guided the 6th corps to a new position, the left still resting on the right of the 5th, the latter having slightly fallen back; the line was reformed, and extended across the Germania plank road, with the right resting near Southerland's, beyond the Quarles mill. The movement of the corps commenced about midnight, and it was established in its new position by daylight.

On the night of the 7th May the army again advanced. Lieutenant Benyaurd, of the corps of engineers, guided the 6th corps along the turnpike to Chancellorsville, thence by the plank road to Piney Branch church, and thence to the intersection of the plank road with the Brock road, near Alsop's, Benyaurd having previously passed over this road with Kilpatrick. He remained with the 6th corps. The other engineer officers accompanied the commanding general on the evening of the 7th May to Todd's tavern, at the intersection of the Brock and Catharpen roads. At this point a severe cavalry fight, under Gregg, occurred during the afternoon. On the 8th May some severe skirmishing commenced between the advance of the 5th corps and the enemy, then falling back from the Wilderness towards Spottsylvania Court House. At day-break Michler reconnoitred the country along the Brock road, and parallel to the Po river, to select a position for the 2d corps, in the event of the enemy attempting to strike our flank. About noon he was ordered to remain with Hancock for duty. During the day he reconnoitred to the west, along the Catharpen road, as far as Corbin's bridge, across the Po. The columns of the enemy were distinctly seen moving southward. Towards evening he made a strong demonstration, and was easily repulsed. On the 9th May the officers of engineers, with part of the engineer battalion, assisted the different corps in strengthening their positions by intrenchments. On the 10th May the engineers bridged the Po river for the passage of the 2d corps. Subsequently Michler guided Gibbon's and Birney's divisions back across the river to a po-

sition in rear and right of the 5th corps. Mackenzie was engaged the same day in reconnoitring in front of the 6th corps, selecting, in company with General Russell, the point of successful attack on the rebels by Upton's brigade. On the 11th May Captain Mendell, corps of engineers, guided the 2d corps forward to the left, preparatory to a general assault along the whole line, driving the enemy. Rain and muddy roads checked the contest. The next day, the 12th May, the two armies fought from early dawn until darkness had for hours fallen over the contending hosts. Fourteen hours' fighting had failed to drive the rebel army from its strong position. During the afternoon of the 12th Major Duane and Colonel Michler reconnoitred the ground between the right of the 6th corps and the old Court House road, to select a line for a division of the 5th corps to hold, to relieve the other divisions of this corps.

On the 13th May, Michler was ordered to examine the line in front of Hancock's corps, including the famous "salient," to ascertain what should be done to strengthen it. In the course of the day he also examined the line of the 6th corps, to the right of the 2d. On the morning of the 14th, Michler was directed, in company with Duane, to cross the Ny, and examine the line taken up by the 5th corps, and endeavor to locate the position of the enemy's works around Spottsylvania Court House, detached portions of which could be seen from one or two commanding points. They had evidently been constructed some time previously, in anticipation of the present move. Soon afterwards Michler reconnoitred, with his assistants, towards the Anderson House, and located certain buildings in Spottsylvania, and other sections of the works around it. In the afternoon he accompanied Upton's command, of the 6th corps, across the Ny, to the left of the 5th corps, occupying a commanding position in front of Meyer's house, from which it was soon driven, but repossessed of it, on the other divisions of the 6th corps coming up. On the 15th, 16th, and 17th, during a suspension of the contest by rain and impassable roads, daily reconnoissances were made of the enemy's position by the engineer officers. On the 18th a general attack was made by our army without any decided success, and on the 19th movements were made to turn the enemy's right flank, the enemy making a similar move on our right. On the evening of the 19th Michler, accompanied by Captain Turnbull, of the corps of engineers, was sent to report to Birney, who was holding the enemy in check on our right flank, to give him information of the nature of the ground. He remained all night, examining his position preparatory to a renewal of the attack by daylight. On the night of the 20th May the army moved by its flank, the 2d corps leading. Lieutenant Mackenzie was ordered to report to General Hancock, and accompany his command, with which he continued until the North Anna was reached, and during the operations on that river, and then returned to general headquarters, having reconnoitred the successive lines taken by that command.

On the 21st May, Michler was sent across the Mattapony to ascertain the existence of any fords above the bridge by which the 6th corps could cross the Po, on the line of march from Anderson's (Smith's) mill. A reconnoissance was also made towards Mud Tavern, on the telegraph road. Information was now gained that the enemy had abandoned Spottsylvania Court House, and was moving south by the telegraph road towards the North Anna, to take up that naturally strong position.

The movement of the army was continued on the 23d of May. The 2d and 5th corps were in the advance. Each forced a passage of the North Anna. On the 24th May the whole army, except two divisions of the 9th corps, effected the passage of that stream. On the morning of the 25th Michler made a reconnoissance of the whole line from Noel's station to the river. A log bridge had been constructed in addition to the one at Quarles's; these, with the Chesterfield and several pontoon bridges, afforded perfect facilities for crossing. The

enemy was now found to be in strong position in front of Hanover Junction. General preparations were made during the day to re-cross the whole army.

On the 26th Michler made an examination of all the bridges and crossings, including the canvas pontoons laid during the day near the railroad bridge. On the evening of the 26th the re-crossing of the river commenced and continued the following day. Lieutenant Howell, of the corps of engineers, guided the 9th corps. On the afternoon of the 27th, Michler and Mackenzie examined the roads leading from Rider's to Taylor's ford and Normand's ferry on the Pamunkey, and also to widow Nelson's ferry, to ascertain whether it would be possible to cross the river at the latter point, and the result proved satisfactory. The crossing of the river at Hanover-town was seized the same day. By the evening of the 28th the troops had all passed over the several pontoon bridges thrown over the stream for this purpose. Apprehensive that the enemy might attack our army in detail while crossing the river, Major Duane and Colonel Michler rode along the whole line to aid in forming it and see that it was continuous. Before dark a strong position had been occupied and many parts of it intrenched, the left resting near the Tolopatomoy, and the right on Crump's creek. Lieutenant Howell, of the corps of engineers, was sent in the morning to examine the country in advance of the position, and was present during the fight that took place with the reconnoitring force.

On the 29th of May a grand reconnoissance in force was ordered in the direction of Hanover Court House and Shady Grove church, and along each of the intermediate roads. Lieutenant Mackenzie accompanied the 5th corps, Lieutenant Howell the 9th, Captain Turnbull the 2d, Captain Mendell one division of the 6th, while Colonel Michler joined another division of the same corps. On the 30th Lieutenant Howell was ordered to join the 5th corps, and Lieutenant Benyaurd the 6th. These officers, with Lieutenant Mackenzie, were constantly engaged during this and the following day in making reconnoissances along the Tolopatomoy and of the different lines taken up as the army changed position.

On the 1st of June Captain Mendell and Lieutenant Benyaurd were ordered to fortify the position of the White House to protect it against any sudden cavalry attack, the depot having been moved from Port Royal to that place. During the day, in company with Lieutenant Gillespie, of the engineers, and several assistants, they examined the country southeast of Old Church tavern to find several parallel roads over which to move the different columns simultaneously. The army was now in position at Cool Arbor. A general attack was made by the enemy along his entire front, which was repulsed. The morning of the 3d of June witnessed a most gallant assault by the army along its entire front. It failed in its object of driving back the enemy across the Chickahominy, both lines of battle being at the time parallel to that stream. Early in the morning Michler was directed to make a reconnoissance along the 2d corp's lines to ascertain its position and strength, and, later in the day, to examine the line of battle of the 18th corps and Birney's division of the 2d corps. Never were two lines of battle more closely arrayed against each other, separated by distances varying from forty to one hundred yards, each awaiting in silent and unwavering determination the fierce attack of the other, but neither willing to take the initiative. Both contending forces had already experienced most deadly repulses. No portion of the body could be exposed at any moment. The unerring shot of the sharpshooter warned all against rising above the hastily constructed intrenchments. All lay close to the ground, it being necessary to crawl on hands and knees to reach the line.

Having carefully examined the position of the works with Captain Farquhar, of the corps of engineers, Colonel Michler reported to the commanding general the impossibility of successfully storming the position of the enemy in front of that corps in consequence of its great strength, and there being no suitable

place in the rear to mass the troops for the attack. Already three desperate attempts had been made to force the position, and each was repulsed with very heavy loss. The army was directed to intrench its line and render it as strong as possible. Major Morton, of the corps of engineers, took charge of the works in front of the 9th corps. Lieutenant Howell, with a company of the engineer battalion, was sent to the 6th corps to construct batteries and covered ways, and Lieutenant R. S. Mackenzie, with a company of the same command, attended to the same duty in front of the 2d corps, where he remained until the 10th of June, when he was transferred to the command of the 2d Connecticut artillery. The two armies remained closely confronting each other from the 4th to the 9th of June, during which period our left had been extended to cover Bottom's bridge. On the 7th of June Captain Turnbull joined General Sheridan's cavalry corps on an expedition towards Gordonsville. He reported again to his commander after an extended and important tour under Sheridan at Petersburg, and then only to remain a short time, being assigned to duty at Baltimore, then threatened by the rebels.

On the 9th June Michler was ordered to select a new line in rear of the intrenched position then occupied by the army, to be held temporarily by two divisions, to enable the troops to retire without being molested and to cover the movement towards the east and along the east bank of the Chickahominy. The ground selected by the engineers lay between Elder's swamp and Allen's mill pond, almost directly in front of Cool Arbor. On the morning of the 10th the construction of the batteries and connecting parapets commenced, Captain Gillespie directing one portion and Lieutenant Benyaurd the other, and work was finished on the following morning. Captain Mendell with Lieutenant Howell made a reconnoissance to Windsor Shades, on the Chickahominy, to ascertain the practicability of crossing the supply train at that point, and reported unfavorably.

On the night of the 12th June the withdrawal of the troops from the hotly contested field so long occupied by them was effected, and the several columns set in motion.

On the 13th, by direction of the commanding general, Colonel Michler proceeded in advance of the army of the Potomac to the James river to reconnoitre the ground from Swynyard's, overlooking Herring creek and Harrison's landing, and thence over Gun's Hills run and Queen's creek towards the mouth of Kellovan's creek. This examination had in view the selection of a line of battle to be taken up to protect the passage of the army over the James river. The line selected covered Swynyard's and Wilcox's landing, the left resting on Herring creek, and crossed the upper part of Wynoke neck or peninsula, at the southern point of which it had been ordered that a pontoon bridge should be thrown. The 2d corps reached the position by dark and commenced to intrench, which work was subsequently suspended. On the morning of the 14th June steamers commenced ferrying the 2d corps across the James from Wilcox's landing to Wind-mill Point. The engineer officers were all engaged endeavoring to find direct roads leading from the Court-house across Queen's creek, down Wynoke neck, but soon discovered it was only fordable on the main road. It was ascertained that approaches were being constructed at the landing under the direction of General Weitzel by the engineers of the army of the James, preparatory to building the pontoon bridge, not sufficient material for completing it having yet been received at the point. Upon Major Duane's arrival General Weitzel turned over the entire charge of the matter to him, and the bridge was thrown under Duane's direction. At daybreak of the 15th June Colonel Michler was ordered to select a short line to be held by the 6th corps to cover the crossing of the remainder of the army and the supply train. In order to leave sufficient space to park the latter, he selected a commanding ridge running westwardly from Tyler's mill, the right to rest on Tyler's creek, impassable below the mill ;

and the left on the James river below the mouth of Queen's creek. The battalion of engineers commenced at 4 p. m. to construct the pontoon bridge at Wynoke landing, and finished it at 11 p. m. It consisted of 101 wooden pontoons. A part of the army having crossed the James, the first attack on Petersburg was made on the evening of this day, when the outer line of the enemy's works was captured by troops that moved by water from the White House. On the 16th June the staff of the commanding general crossed the James on the pontoon bridge. Just before dark an assault was made along the whole line at Petersburg by the troops then in position against the enemy's second position. On the 17th and 18th the attacking columns renewed their desperate efforts against the enemy's front, at times reaching and mounting his parapets and then compelled to retire after desperate fighting and heavy loss. On the right, possession of the ground at Page's, near the Appomattox, was gained and held, the enemy's line at that point being within a few hundred yards of Petersburg.

At this time the reconnoissances and surveys of our lines in front of that city and of its environs commenced. Major Weyss, of the volunteers, had the immediate charge of the principal field party.

The engineer corps was called upon on the 17th to mourn the loss of one of its most accomplished officers. Whilst reconnoitring the position in front of the 9th corps for the purpose of selecting the ground upon which to form a division in line of battle preparatory to the assault on that day, Major Morton exposed himself to the unerring shot of one of the rebel sharpshooters; he was killed instantly, the ball penetrating his left breast. Major Morton had served with the army of the Potomac but a short time, having joined on the banks of the North Anna; he was, immediately on his arrival, assigned to the 9th corps and remained with it until his death, performing excellent service. His great desire to excel in his profession, added to an energetic and impulsive nature, had led him on several previous occasions to expose himself. He laid down on the battle-field a useful, active, and brave life in the cause of his country, and deeply has the army, especially the corps to which he had been so long and ably attached, been called to grieve his sudden death. Captain Harwood, United States engineers, having reported for duty on the 27th, was, a day or two after, temporarily assigned to the 9th corps.

On the 19th and 20th the two opposing armies remained comparatively quiet, each willing to rest after their late exhausting labors. During these four days Lieutenants Howell and Benyaurd were engaged on the right of the line, and Captain Gillespie on the left. During the three following ones (the 21st, 22d, and 23d) the army resumed, after the brief suspension referred to, active operations tending towards outflanking the enemy on his right, severing his lines of communication towards the south and endeavoring to reach the Weldon railroad. The several officers of engineers accompanied these movements. An intrenched line was finally taken up and held, running nearly south from the Appomattox along the front of Petersburg to the Jerusalem plank road, and then almost parallel to that road, with the left refused and again crossing it near the Williams house.

On the 24th, accompanied by Captain Mendell and Lieutenant Howell, Colonel Michler made a reconnoissance of the country between the Avery house and the Blackwater swamp, for the purpose of selecting a line to fall back upon in the event of withdrawing a part of the army for other purposes; the crossings of the swamp were also carefully searched and its character examined in regard to forming an obstacle to passage of artillery and infantry. On the 29th the Appomattox was also examined in reference to the facilities for bridging it. Surveys were daily being made of the different lines taken up, and reconnoissances were extended over the adjacent country.

Lieutenant Howell was temporarily, during the 28th, 29th, and 30th, on duty with the 6th corps, and Lieutenant Benyaurd, for the last few days of June, with the 9th Corps. Captain Gillespie was engaged also at this time with the different corps in examining and rectifying their lines.

During the month of July the officers of engineers were principally occupied in superintending the various operations of their profession—such as the preparation of siege material, the construction of redoubts, batteries, parallels, and boyaux, together with conducting the necessary surveys, and preparing complete plans and maps of the environs of the city and its approaches, incident to offensive movements against the fortified position taken up by the enemy in front of Petersburg. No regular siege was intended, as it would be impossible, with the small army brought before it, to invest it completely; the lineal contour is too great to attempt to cut off all communications with the town, or to prevent re-enforcements from being thrown into it. To take the place some favorable position must be selected at which to assault the works, and burst through and occupy the interior; and, to accomplish this, a preponderance of metal must be brought to bear upon the immediate point of attack to silence the enemy's guns, and to open the way for an attacking column specially chosen for the occasion.

On the 3d of July the major general commanding addressed a communication to the chief of artillery and chief engineer to know "whether any offensive operations from the lines now held by this army are practicable." The commanding general of the ninth corps had authorized Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants, commanding the 48th regiment Pennsylvania volunteers, to drive a gallery for a mine to blow up one of the enemy's batteries in his front; and the above officers were also directed to examine the place and ascertain whether the assault could be advantageously made, should the operation prove successful. The result of their investigation is set forth in the following extract from the reply made on the 6th, in compliance with the instructions received by them: "The enemy's front has been very much strengthened. It consists of a system of redoubts connected by infantry parapets. The ground in front is obstructed by abatis, stakes, and entanglements, rendering an assault impracticable. Regular approaches must, therefore, be resorted to. It is probable the siege will be a very long one, inasmuch as, soon as one line of works is carried, another equally strong will be found behind it, and this will continue until the ridge is attained, which looks into the town." The front of attack decided upon was a salient of the enemy's line on or near the Jerusalem plank road. On the 9th of July orders were issued by the commanding general that "the operations of this army against the intrenched position of the enemy defending Petersburg will be by regular approaches on the fronts opposed to General Burnside's and General Warren's corps;" and on the following day a plan of conducting the siege was submitted. On the 11th the project, being in conformity with his views, was approved and adopted, and it was ordered that the work be commenced at once.

Lieutenant Lydecker, who reported late in June, took an active part in the construction of the works referred to. Captain Farquhar had charge of those in front of the 18th corps. On learning the plan adopted, Colonel Michler directed his principal assistant, Major Weyss, to commence on the 9th a triangulation of the front of Petersburg, and to take the immediate charge of the surveying party; the work was extended from the south of the Jerusalem plank road as far north as City Point. By this triangulation, performed under the fire of the enemy's batteries and sharpshooters, the different spires and certain prominent buildings in Petersburg were accurately located; and, with a copy of the map of that city and the Appomattox river prepared by the Coast Survey, the two were combined, and thereby an exact and connected map of the locality of our siege operations was obtained, covering the ground occupied by both armies. On the 9th the troops of the 6th corps were ordered to Washington city, then threatened by

the rebels; on the following day Colonel Michler was directed to select a line refused from the position occupied by the 6th corps, extending from the redoubt, (now called Fort Prescott, then in course of construction,) on the Jerusalem plank road, towards the Blackwater swamp. Lieutenant Lydecker accompanied Michler during the reconnoissance, and was subsequently directed to trace the line, and place in position the troops ordered to hold it. The site for a new redoubt was chosen between the Norfolk railroad and the swamp, and its construction placed under the direction of Captain Harwood, who had been relieved from duty with the 9th corps the same day. On the 14th, orders were issued to have the old works of the enemy demolished; this had been his advanced position, and the first to be taken by assault; the redoubts and batteries, in fact the whole intrenched line, had been well planned and constructed at a much earlier period in view of the probability of a demonstration being made against Petersburg; the site selected was a most commanding one, the natural lay of the open fields in front forming a perfect glacis. Towards the close of the month everything was in readiness to explode the mine which had been in course of construction in front of the 9th corps. In company with Colonel Spaulding and Lieutenant Benyaurd, Colonel Michler had the great gratification of penetrating the gallery and its lateral branches, and of examining in detail its construction, the mode of ventilation, and the arrangement of the chambers. Lieut. Colonel Pleasants, who kindly offered to accompany the party and explain the nature of his labors, prepared a highly interesting report, giving a succinct account of the manner of driving the gallery and its lateral branches; the nature of the soil encountered; the construction and dimensions of the chambers; the charging and tamping, with other interesting facts connected with the history of the mine from its first inception to its completion. The main gallery was 510.8 feet, and each of the lateral galleries 37.5 feet; radius of crater 25 feet. The work commenced June 25, and finished July 23.

The different engineering operations, which had been pushed forward night and day, were fast progressing towards completion; the several batteries, constructed with the utmost care and in the highest order of professional skill, had received their armaments of guns and mortars, and only waited the moment to play a conspicuous part in whatever steps might be taken, either offensive or defensive. On the 26th the 2d corps received marching orders, and crossed the Appomattox and James to Deep Bottom to co-operate with the army of the James; Lieutenant Howell was directed to accompany the movement, and remained with the command until it returned on the night of the 29th to participate in the arrangements for the grand assault upon the enemy's work. Instructions were issued on that day, by the commanding general, for the guidance of all in the contemplated attack; and, in accordance with these, engineer officers were assigned to duty with each corps.

On the morning of the 30th the mine was exploded, although not at the appointed hour. The result proved it a decided success; for in its crater were swallowed up several guns, a large number of men—an entire regiment—besides destroying a part of the enemy's line. The dimensions of the crater proved to be two hundred feet long and fifty feet wide, the explosion charge being eight thousand pounds. The grand assault was made, and the attacking column reached the enemy's line; it failed, though, to accomplish its purpose. Orders were issued to discontinue operations during the day.

This report does not intend to furnish more than a general outline of the various duties performed by the different officers of the engineer corps who were during the campaign connected with the army of the Potomac. As far as it has been in Col. Michler's power he has endeavored to portray faithfully the extent of their labors; many omissions may have been made in enumerating them, but these may be rectified in a subsequent and more detailed account of that most interesting period.

Colonel Michler states that he has not deemed it proper or right to dwell upon the exact character of the duties performed by the senior engineer, Major James C. Duane, only casually having mentioned them in a few cases where they accompanied each other on different reconnoissances. He hopes that Major Duane's health will soon permit him to prepare an accurate statement of the engineering operations performed by him and under his direction. Until then he hopes what has now been presented will prove acceptable. Believing it would afford Major Duane great pleasure, Col. Michler respectfully requests the favorable attention of the major general commanding to the important services rendered by the officers of both the regular and volunteer engineers. They labored faithfully and earnestly to attend to the respective duties assigned them, and, it is believed, with great credit and honor to themselves and to that arm of the service to which they belong. It is hoped a proper acknowledgment will be made them for the active part taken by them during that most trying period from the crossing of the Rapidan to the assault on Petersburg.— (See plans Nos. 11 and 12.)

Upon the explosion of the mine and failure of the assault the troops engaged were directed on the following day to resume their previous positions to a great extent, some few changes being ordered for the purpose of reducing their fronts and establishing reserves for ulterior movements. The plan of the siege by regular approaches having been abandoned, Colonel Michler was directed at the same time to "make such a disposition of the lines then occupied by the corps as would enable them to be held by a diminished force," and therefore determined to select an interior line, to consist of some few detached enclosed works, subsequently to be connected by lines of infantry parapets. The first line selected was one lying on very commanding ground, and extending from the present Fort Sedgwick to the Rushmore House, immediately opposite Fort Clifton, one of the enemy's works on the Appomattox, at the head of navigation for large sea-going vessels, passing near the Avery, Friends, Dunn, and Jordan houses; this being considered too far to the rear of the then advanced position, and apparently yielding too much ground, for the possession of which such desperate fighting had taken place, he finally chose an intermediate one, and sites for Forts Rice, Mickle, Morton, Haskell, Steadman, and McGilvery were selected, and the intervening batteries and lines located. It had also been decided to enlarge and strengthen the lunette, the site of which is now occupied by Fort Sedgwick. By direction of Lieutenant General Grant the supervision of the line in front of the 18th corps had also been placed under his direction. The construction of these different works was pushed rapidly forward by night, under the immediate charge of Captains Gillespie and Harwood and Lieutenants Howell, Benyaurd, and Lydecker, as much so as the sparsity of officers, the extreme heat of the weather, and the heavy and constant artillery fire of the enemy would permit.

Several officers of the corps of engineers, including Captains Mendell, Turnbull, and Farquhar, had been ordered away from the army on other duty, and some of the lieutenants were absent on sick leave. By the 20th of August the works were so near completion as to be in readiness for the contemplated movement on the Petersburg and Weldon railroad. After the successful advance and holding of that most important thoroughfare, he was directed to select positions for large works on or near that road for the protection of the left flank of the army, and also to connect them by a system of redoubts with Fort Sedgwick. On the 26th of August, in connexion with the disposition of troops then made, orders were given him to "proceed at once to the construction of the redoubts proposed for the left of the line on the Weldon railroad, and of the works at the Burnt Chimney and the Strong house," now designated Forts Dushane, Wadsworth, Howard, and Alex. Hays.

The construction of these works and intermediate batteries, connected by infantry parapets, was immediately commenced, under the more immediate charge

of Lieutenants Howell, Benyaurd, and Lydecker, and was afterwards turned over to Captains Folwell and McDonnell, 50th New York volunteer engineers. Owing to the bad condition of the roads during the late move, the commanding general directed that a line should be selected for a military railroad from the depot at City Point to the intersection of the Weldon railroad, at or near the Yellow Tavern, for the more certain and rapid transportation of supplies. The laying of this road was placed in charge of the construction corps of the chief quartermaster of the armies operating against Richmond. The soil contains a great quantity of sand, and at times becomes almost impassable.

By the 7th of September the interior portions of the works last referred to were well advanced, sufficiently so to be occupied in case of an attack by the enemy, and obstructions, consisting of wire entanglements, abatis, fraises, and slashing generally of the timber along the entire front, had been prepared. Many miles of corduroy roads and bridges had been built by the 50th New York volunteer engineers for the convenience of and more direct communication between the different corps of the army.

During the first few days of September he also selected sites for different works, and traced a line from the bastion work (Fort Dushane,) on the Weldon railroad, to the rear of the camps of the armies operating against Petersburg, its left resting on the Blackwater swamp, near Fort Bross; these were designed to guard against any movement of the enemy on the three large and important thoroughfares, the Jerusalem plank, the Norfolk stage, and Halifax roads. The several redoubts then laid out and commenced were subsequently named Davison, McMahan, Stevenson, Blaisdell, and Kelly.

In his report for the week ending on the 17th of September he reported that along every portion of the line, from the Appomattox river, below Petersburg, to the Weldon railroad, and thence back to the Blackwater swamp, work was progressing rapidly; the length of the line at that time was over sixteen miles, and along it had been constructed, or were in course of construction nineteen forts and redoubts, and forty-one batteries; in addition to the labor on these works, including the obstructions in their front, bomb-proofs, magazines, and drainage in the interior, nearly two thousand yards of roads and one-third of the covered ways had been "corduroyed," and six thousand seven hundred square feet of substantial bridging built; the old intrenched lines were also being levelled. These labors were continued during the following week, the officers and men of the regular battalion of engineers, and of the 50th New York volunteer engineers, having the construction of them. At the same time his attention, under instructions from the commanding general, was directed to the examination of the country in reference to a defensive line from Blackwater swamp, near Prince George Court House, north towards Old Court house, or Bailey's creek, the latter a deep impassable stream, emptying within a few miles of that point into the James river.

This line, in connexion with that already in course of construction, completed the chain of works from the Appomattox, below Petersburg, to the Weldon railroad, and thence back to the James river, adding nine miles to its length, making twenty-five miles in all, the flanks resting on the two rivers, and with them entirely encircling the army of the Potomac. (See plan No. 12.)

The sites of five works were traced, and work commenced upon three of them. At the same time he was directed to confer with Lieutenant Colonel Benham, corps of engineers, (brigadier general volunteers,) in command of the immediate defences of City Point, in regard to a short line extending from the Court House on Bailey's creek, north towards the Appomattox, to cover and protect against any sudden attack of cavalry the depot at that point.

On the 21st a circular from headquarters army of the Potomac directed that "the armaments and garrisons designated for the forts be regarded as permanent, to be moved only when specially directed."

By the 26th the military railroad was completed, opened for travel, and placed in charge of the provost marshal general of the army.

On the 28th, in company with the chief of artillery, he made a general inspection of the whole line, and found the work progressing most satisfactorily. During the evening of the same day orders were issued for certain dispositions and arrangements of the troops to be made, and that the whole army should be in readiness to move before daylight on the following morning. The corps commanders were directed to "hold in view the contingency of the withdrawal of their troops from the rifle-pits connecting the enclosed works, leaving the line from the Appomattox to Fort Davison to be held by the redoubts and enclosed batteries, and the further contingency of withdrawing entirely from the intrenchments."

In consequence of this projected movement, instructions were immediately given to the officers of engineers to suspend all operations on the different field-works in course of construction, and to hold their commands and the pontoon trains in readiness to obey further instructions.

The active operations of the army were successfully advanced some few miles to the left or west of the Weldon railroad during the 29th and 30th of September and 1st and 2d of October, causing a corresponding extension of the lines. On the morning of the latter, after the repulse of the enemy in his final attack, it having been determined to hold on to the position, he was ordered to select a new line to connect the advanced point near the Pegram house with Fort Wadsworth, and locate the necessary intermediate works; the tracing, profiling and construction of them was immediately commenced.

Before daylight on the morning of the 4th, by direction of the commanding general, he made a reconnoissance for the purpose of selecting a line to be refused from the left flank towards the rear, and to be connected with Fort Dushane. The sites of several new redoubts were established, the connecting lines traced, and with large details their construction immediately commenced.

By this extension to the west of the Weldon railroad, eleven additional enclosed works, Keene, Urmston, Cawakey, Fisher, Welch, Gregg, Cummings, Sampson, Emory, Seibert and Clark, and several batteries, were linked with the already formidable cordon that surrounded the army. The length of this portion of the line is nearly seven miles, making a continuous stretch of twenty-three miles of earth-work from the right on the Appomattox to the left on the Black-water swamp. Adding to this the section from the latter to the James river, the line measures more than thirty-two miles, comprising thirty-six forts and fifty batteries. In addition to these, there were eight other enclosed works along the inner line of the defence of City Point.

The incredibly short time in which those to the west of the Jerusalem plank-road were built, surprised the officers of our own army. The sites of the works were only selected on the 2d and 4th of the month; still the weekly report of the 8th states that they were already nearly completed.

To the officers of the corps of engineers then present, under his orders, Harwood, Gillespie, Howell, Benyaurd, Lydecker and Phillips, and to those of the 50th New York volunteer engineers, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel J. Spaulding, and to the men of their respective detachments, must be given the credit for the immense amount of work accomplished.

The works were well constructed and finished, and the infantry parapets are as strong as they could be made to answer a useful purpose. The artificial strength of the line was to a great extent increased by the naturally strong position chosen to resist any attack or assault by the enemy.

On the 4th of the same month, notwithstanding the few officers of the corps that remained on duty, he was compelled to send Lieutenant Phillips to report to General Benham to assist in constructing the line in front of City Point; the latter was about three miles in length, comprising eight small redoubts.

On the 12th, the commanding general directed Colonel Michler to make an examination of that part of the line extending between Forts Hays and Fisher, to ascertain whether said line could be shortened, and to furnish a written report for Lieutenant General Grant's information. As no particular advantage could be gained and a considerable amount of work would be required, he reported unfavorably.

The weekly report, dated October 22, informs the general-in-chief, "that the whole line occupied by the army of the Potomac was entirely constructed and in a defensible condition; some minor details still required attention; additional obstacles, palisades, and fraises in connexion with the abatis and wire entanglements had been rapidly pushed forward every night to strengthen it" In consequence of reports that the enemy were driving galleries at different points to undermine several works, he directed shafts to be sunk within them and listening galleries to be run out as precautionary measures, although no indications were found to exist after a most careful personal examination.

On the 16th, accompanied by Captain Gillespie and Lieutenant Benyaurd, he examined critically the ground between Fort McGilvery and a point opposite Fort Clifton, to ascertain the strength of the enemy's position, and whether any new works were in course of construction, as well as to decide upon the possibility of forcing a passage of the river and severing his communication by rail with Richmond.

On the 20th, by direction of the commanding general, he visited City Point in company with the Medical Director of the army for the purpose of selecting the ground for a general field hospital. An advantageous place was found on the bluff overlooking the James, between the railroad and Bailey's creek. Beside the convenience of locality, it possessed the advantage of retirement and security, as well as that of health. Fine springs burst forth here and there from the banks sufficient to supply every want.

The names of the different works of the line to the west of the Weldon railroad, and of that in front of City Point, were selected from among those of the many distinguished officers who were killed in action during the recent campaigns, nobly fighting their country's battles,—and so given in plan No. 12.

On the morning of the 24th of October two new redoubts were ordered to be thrown up at points he had previously selected—the one between the Norfolk road and the Avery house, the other near the Friends' house—from both of which positions command was had over the main line of works. These were sufficiently far advanced for the movement ordered to commence on the afternoon of the 26th. The latter, in which the greater part of the army participated, continued through the 27th and 28th, extending west across Hatcher's run, and reaching along and south of it as far as the Boynton plank-road, where the latter crosses the stream at Burgess's mill.

During the afternoon of the last day the different commands returned to their old camps. The engineer troops were then engaged along the entire line, in repairing damages, adding obstructions, driving galleries, and in every conceivable way rendering the line as strong as possible.

On the 7th of November he was directed by the major general commanding the army of the Potomac "to furnish General Benham, commanding defences of City Point, with the project of the line of intrenchments from Prince George Court House to Old Court House, and also to indicate what was necessary to be done to connect the right of that line with the rear intrenchments resting on the Blackwater."

In consequence of a contemplated movement, he had been compelled to suspend work upon that section of the defensive line, and its construction was subsequently turned over to the above-named officer.

By the 12th of the same month, the lines being completed, both as regards their external and internal arrangements, the following extract from Special

Orders No. 306, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, of the same date, was issued for the information of all concerned :

“The attention of corps commanders is called to the necessity of preserving in good order the intrenchments front and rear, with the abatis, slashings and other defences. \* \* \* \* \*

“The chief engineer officer will inspect the lines, both front and rear, from time to time, and report to these headquarters any failure to keep the same in good order, or any destruction of the defences.”

From this time forward the engineer troops were principally occupied during the winter in attending to the needed repairs of the forts and batteries, in keeping in order the several corduroy roads, in overhauling and placing in good condition the pontoon trains, in constructing huts for winter quarters, and in building stabling for the large number of animals required for the transportation of the tool and bridge trains.

The temporary quiet of the army was again interrupted for several days. On the 6th of December, by direction of the commanding general, an engineer officer, with a battalion of engineer troops and one hundred and fifty feet of canvas bridging, was directed to accompany the 5th corps during the movement of the latter south along the Weldon railroad, and subsequently all, both regular and volunteer, were called upon to be under arms to take part in the same operation. Orders were issued at the same time that all camps located, as well as huts, corrals, or other structures erected in the vicinity of the lines of defence, either in front or rear, which, in the judgment of the engineer, interfered with the proper defence of the works, should be immediately removed. Preparations were also made to move, if necessary, all surplus property and the sick in hospitals to within the lines of City Point. Arrangements in regard to the further disposition of troops were directed in the event of a general move; those not previously designated for holding the intrenched lines to be formed into a movable column, under the immediate orders of the commanding officer of the 2d corps. All work not necessary for the defence of the position held by the army was suspended. The movement had scarcely commenced when, in consequence of severe storms of rain, accompanied with sleet, the army was finally compelled to return to its old position, some considerable damage having been effected along the line of the railroad.

Comparative quiet again reigned throughout the army, with the exception of the attempt of the enemy's iron-clads to come down the James river on the 24th of January, 1865, until the 4th of February, when a movement of the cavalry was ordered for the following day, to be supported by the 5th and 2d corps.

The cavalry successfully captured a small train of the enemy on the Boydton plank-road, and entered Dinwiddie Court House.

In consequence of the destruction of a bridge over Hatcher's run, the 5th corps was detained for several hours in crossing, and the former, not being supported, fell back. A severe attack was made upon the 2d corps, but was repulsed, and little more was effected on that day. On the following morning (6th) the 5th corps was ordered to pass the stream at the crossing on the Vaughan road and take up position to the left of the 2d, the cavalry protecting its flank.

Some severe fighting took place during the day. Early on the same morning he had been sent to select a line between Fort Sampson and Armstrong's mill, and choose sites for works to hold and command the crossing at the latter place and the one on the Vaughan road. On the 7th orders were issued to intrench the line, but on the following day were so modified as to cause the line to be run direct from Fort Sampson to the Vaughan road crossing. The length of this addition to the intrenched line s nearly four miles, making the front line from the Appomattox to Hatcher's run fifteen miles of continuous earthworks. Heavy storms of rain and sleet again disturbed this movement.

With the exception of the attack on Fort Steadman on the 25th of March, and its temporary occupancy by the enemy, no event of importance occurred until the inauguration of the campaign on the 28th of the same month. The distance from Battery No. 10, adjoining Fort Steadman, to the point of the enemy's line, (Colquit's salient,) immediately opposite, is only six hundred and thirteen feet between the main works, the shortest distance between the two at any point, excepting at Elliott's salient, (the locality of the mine.) The picket-lines of the two armies were only four hundred and thirty-five feet apart, those of the enemy only a few feet in front of his main works; one of the advanced Union pickets was only separated two hundred and five feet from his opposite neighbor, a narrow boyau leading to his pit from the main line. Without the exercise of the most unflinching vigilance on the part of the picket and the garrison, any sudden dash at the first early dawn of the morning might prove momentarily successful; but a position so well flanked by adjacent batteries, and commanded by others in its rear, proved so untenable as to cause the enemy to be most severely punished for his temerity, and to compel him to relinquish the object of an attack for which no reasonable explanation can be made.

Before proceeding further, he calls attention to the topographical department of the army of the Potomac.

Owing to the limited degree of information which could be obtained, either from published maps or inquiries made of the inhabitants—the latter generally being averse and in most cases unable from ignorance to impart it, even in relation to the particular localities in which they lived—his assistants had a laborious although an interesting duty. They have not only been constantly engaged in following up every movement, and in most cases acting as guides to the different columns of troops, thereby obtaining a most reliable knowledge of the country by actual experience, but have been compelled to anticipate the geographical wants of a large army ever in motion by constant and careful researches.

In order to be able to furnish the necessary data upon which to base the different military combinations, and thereby being made responsible to a great extent for the information upon which the commanding general was able to hypothecate a reasonable degree of success in the execution of his plans, the department had necessarily to be ever active and always exact.

The engineer bureau has been furnished from time to time with the many maps supplied the officers of armies operating against Richmond and Petersburg, including those of the campaigns from the Rapidan to the Appomattox; that of the carefully surveyed plan of the lines occupied during the siege of Petersburg; the several sheets representing the country adjacent to the latter city, and also about Richmond, comprising the several lines of the enemy for the defence of the capital; and also copies of those prepared in anticipation, and upon which were based the movements which terminated so successfully and gloriously the last grand campaign of April, 1865.

On the 27th of March certain movements of the several corps of the army of the Potomac were ordered to commence at an early hour of the 29th. On the 28th the instructions of the previous day were somewhat modified, but at the appointed time the several columns were in motion.

A pontoon train accompanied the 5th corps to enable it to cross Hatcher's run, and subsequently remained there for the passage of the general trains. The 2d corps, which had been replaced by a portion of the 24th along the intrenched line heretofore occupied by it, crossed by the bridge on the Vaughan road. The cavalry passed over by a bridge still further down, at Malone's crossing, and moved towards Dinwiddie Court House.

In gaining their position but little opposition was encountered; one division of the 5th had a spirited engagement on the Quaker road, and handsomely repulsed the enemy.

On the 30th, the 2d and 5th corps advanced their lines to beyond the junction of the Quaker and Boydton plank road, driving the enemy into his main works; the two lines were within easy artillery range; the right of the 2d now rested on Hatcher's run, near the Crow house; a division of the 24th corps crossed the run and connected the right of the 2d with the tête de pont on the Vaughan road; *both lines were intrenched.*

During the night previous and throughout the whole of this day the rain poured down in torrents. The roads had become impassable for wagons and artillery and the engineer troops were engaged in corduroying them and in rebuilding bridges over Hatcher's and Gravelly runs.

The wagon-train stuck fast in the mud. The cavalry had to be sent back by divisions to the terminus of the military railroad to replenish their supplies of rations, the wagons not being able to come up to them.

During the night of the 30th the 2d corps extended its front to the left, along the Boydton plank road, resting its flank on Gravelly run. On the morning of the following day an unsuccessful effort was made by the 5th corps to drive the enemy from the White Oak road; subsequently, upon being re-enforced, the attack was renewed, and possession gained of that road.

Towards evening the cavalry had repulsed and held in check, in front of Dinwiddie Court House, a superior force of the enemy. During the night of that day, the 31st, the 5th corps was sent to the assistance of the cavalry. From the commencement of the movement he had accompanied the commanding general over different parts of the field, in readiness to execute such instructions as might be given, and on the 1st of April, by his direction, rode along and inspected the lines from Hatcher's run toward the west. The evening of that day witnessed a most brilliant engagement on the left, in which both the cavalry and the 5th corps participated, the enemy along that immediate front having been completely routed.

This glorious news was communicated throughout the army, and orders were issued that a simultaneous attack should be made at different points along the entire *length of the intrenched line* at four o'clock on the following morning. The grand assault of the 2d of April was made, and the exterior line of the enemy's works penetrated and possession gained of the larger portion of them.

The enemy having been pierced at his centre and divided, one portion was driven within an interior line of works immediately encircling the city, and the other moved off from the White Oak along the Claiborne road, rapidly pursued by a division of the 2d corps. The line of the army extended at noon of that day from the Appomattox, above Petersburg, to the Appomattox below, the two flanks resting on the river.

Colonel Michler was at that time ordered to rectify this line if necessary, and later in the day to select a site for a pontoon bridge across the river, and positions for batteries to command the crossing and protect passage of the army in the event of the retreat of the enemy.

Early on the morning of the 3d it was ascertained that the enemy had evacuated the city of Petersburg, and orders of march were immediately issued to the different corps to follow in pursuit. The roads were found in wretched condition, and a great deal of corduroying and bridging had to be done. About noon on the 5th he was ordered to proceed in advance of the 2d and 6th corps to report to General Sheridan, who had arrived with the cavalry and 5th corps at Jetersville on the previous evening, to consult with him in regard to the position to be taken by the army in anticipation of an expected attack by the enemy, it being reported that his whole force was concentrating at Amelia Court House. His line of retreat towards Danville had been cut off, and it was presumed he would venture a heavy battle to regain it. In company with the general he rode over the line, and by the direction of the general the troops were posted as they arrived; a part of the line of battle had been *previously*

*intrenched*, and work was commenced on other portions; the anticipated fight, however, did not take place.

On the following day (6th) the army of the Potomac was put in motion in three parallel columns towards Amelia Court House to attack the enemy, but the cavalry having early ascertained that he was endeavoring to escape by Decatursville towards Farmville, the direction of the line of march was immediately changed; the 2d moved directly on the former place, and in a short time came upon and commenced a brisk skirmish with the retreating force, and continued to drive him until night closed the operation; the 5th corps was shifted to the right flank and took the road to Pineville.

Colonel Michler was directed to report the change of movement and explain its object to the commanding officer of the 6th corps. His column was counter-marched and thrown from the right to the left flank. After retracing its steps through Jetersville, and passing some two miles beyond the village, it left the main turnpike and followed a road which he had found leading towards the northwest, and by which the troops moving along it were absolutely certain of striking the flank of the retreating army. The entire cavalry force was operating on the same flank.

By night the battle of Sailor's creek was fought, which will long be remembered as one of the most brilliant and successful affairs of the war. It was, in fact, the last desperate engagement between these two armies.

On the 7th of April the pursuit was continued. The enemy having succeeded in crossing the Appomattox at Farmville and High Bridge, he succeeded in destroying all the bridges at the former place, but failed in his efforts to damage the common road bridge at the latter crossing; three spans of the railroad bridge (Richmond and Danville road) were burnt; this structure is two thousand four hundred feet long and one hundred and twenty-five feet high. The enemy made some slight resistance at both these places and also on the Lynchburg plank road, at a point about four miles beyond Farmville.

The naturally very strong position at high bridge was rendered additionally so by several redoubts which had been built there some time previous, for the protection of the bridge against cavalry raids.

On the 8th the 2d and 6th corps followed along the stage-road to Lynchburg, whilst the 5th, 24th and cavalry corps pursued; the one by Hampton Sydney College and Prospect Stations towards Appomattox Court House.

During the day he returned to Farmville to hasten the construction of some additional pontoon bridges, and rejoined the major general commanding on the main road. On the previous evening Lieutenant General Grant had demanded the surrender of General Lee, to avoid the further effusion of blood. No skirmishing had taken place during the day, although the one army was close on the rear of the other.

About noon on the 9th, in consequence of the negotiations in regard to the surrender which were pending and exchanged under flags of truce between the generals commanding the respective armies, the advance of the army of the Potomac, still engaged in pursuit, when within three miles of Appomattox Court House was ordered to halt and await the issue of the proceedings. The other column had, by rapid marching, succeeded in passing around and confronting the head of that of the enemy at the latter place.

The few hours of anxious suspense were happily compensated by the glorious tidings which were soon proclaimed throughout the army, announcing "the surrender of the army of northern Virginia."

On the following day the army commenced a retrograde movement towards Burke's Station, where it remained in camp until ordered to take up its final march towards Washington, D. C.

On the 14th of April Colonel Michler was detached from the staff of the commanding general of the army of the Potomac, and directed, in conformity with instructions from Lieutenant General Grant, to proceed to Petersburg, in

order to examine and direct military surveys of the respective intrenched positions held by the two opposing armies during the siege, and prepare plans of the same, combined with a detailed and accurate topographical map of the adjacent country; also to assume charge of the surveys of the different battle-fields and lines of operations from the James river to Appomattox Court House.

By the 30th of June, the termination of the fiscal year for which this report is called, the field-work had been far advanced, but in consequence of the necessity of continuing during favorable weather the survey of the several hundred square miles through which it extends, little or no office duty was accomplished—only sufficient drawing to answer necessary purposes at the time; and consequently the maps at that time were not sufficiently far advanced, and could not exhibit the large amount and the nature of the work accomplished.

*Narrative colla'ed from reports of Major Mendell.*

PONTOON TRAINS.

The companies of the United States engineer batallion with the army of the Potomac were under the immediate command of Major Mendell, of the corps of engineers, with Captain Turnbull, Lieutenants Mackenzie, Benyaurd, Howell, Cuyler and Heap, whose services, with the men under their command, are given in Major Michler's reports.

The pontoon trains for service in the field, and to accompany the several army corps, were under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Spaulding, of the 50th New York volunteers. The services rendered by this branch of the engineer department were indispensable to the success of the army. Without these transportable bridges, the armies could not have moved through a country intersected with numerous rivers, wide and deep, and oftentimes with rapid currents, as well as ebb and flood tides. The material of this branch of our service is modelled from the French wooden trains and the Russian canvas trains. These trains, particularly that with light canvas boats, have, during this war, for the first time been proved advantageous and efficient and adapted to our country. They have been very generally used by the armies in the west and south, as well as the armies in the east. The officers having charge of these trains and their construction have devised and adopted many useful modifications in the details. Lieutenant Colonel Spaulding has added much to these modified improvements. The accompanying tabular statement from his report will exemplify the use and value of this indispensable branch of the engineer service.

Dates. 1864.	No. of b'dg	L'gth in feet.	Kind of bridge.	Location.	River.	Officer in command of trains.
April 29..	1	180	Canvas .....	Kelly's ford .....	Rappahannock ..	Captain Folwell.
May 4....	2	150	...do.....	Ely's ford .....	Rapidan .....	Do.
Do.....	3	190	Wooden .....	do .....	do .....	Major Brainerd.
Do.....	4	220	...do.....	Germania ford.....	do .....	Captain McDonald.
Do.....	5	220	Canvas .....	do .....	do .....	Captain Van Brocklin.
Do.....	6	160	Wooden .....	Culpepper's ford.....	do .....	Captain Palmer.
May 7....	7	190	...do.....	Ely's ford .....	do .....	Captain McDonald.
May 10...	8	420	...do.....	Fredericksb'g lower cross- ing.....	Rappahannock ..	Major Brainerd.
Do.....	9	50	Canvas .....	.....	Po .....	Captain Van Brocklin.
Do.....	10	50	...do.....	.....	Po .....	Do.
May 18...	11	440	Wooden .....	Fredericksb'g Lacy house	Rappahannock ..	Major Beers.

Dates. 1864.	No. of b'dg	L'ght in feet.	Kind of bridge.	Location.	River.	Officer in command of trains.
May 23...	12	160	Canvas.....	Jericho mills.....	North Anna.....	Captain Van Brocklin.
May 24...	13	100	do.....	Railway bridge.....	do.....	Captain Folwell.
Do.....	14	100	do.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
May 25...	15	100	do.....	Above railroad bridge.....	do.....	Do.
Do.....	16	80	* Wooden.....	Quarles's mills.....	do.....	Major Beers.
May 26...	17	160	do.....	Jericho mills.....	do.....	Do.
Do.....	18	100	do.....	Below railroad bridge.....	do.....	Captain McDonald.
Do.....	19	100	do.....	Above railroad bridge.....	do.....	Do.
May 27...	20	180	Canvas.....	Hanover Town.....	Pamunkey.....	Captain Van Brocklin.
Do.....	21	164	do.....	do.....	do.....	Captain Folwell.
May 28...	22	146	§do.....	Mrs. Nelson's.....	do.....	Do.
Do.....	23	140	Wooden.....	do.....	do.....	Major Beers.
Do.....	24	180	do.....	Hanover Town.....	do.....	Captain Van Brocklin.
Do.....	25	180	do.....	Dunkirk.....	Mattapony.....	Captain Personius.
June 1...	26	188	Canvas.....	do.....	do.....	Captain Van Brocklin.
June 3...	27	160	do.....	New Castle ferry.....	Pamunkey.....	Do.
June 5...	28	150	do.....	do.....	do.....	Captain Folwell.
June 12...	29	100	Wooden.....	Long bridge.....	Chickahominy.....	Major Ford.
Do.....	30	60	† do.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
June 13...	31	60	‡ Canvas.....	Jones's bridge.....	do.....	Lieutenant Folwell.
Do.....	32	40	** do.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
Do.....	33	60	§§ Wooden.....	do.....	do.....	Captain Palmer.
Do.....	34	40	¶ do.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
June 14...	35	240	Wooden and Canvas.....	Cole's ferry.....	do.....	Lt. Col. Spaulding.
June 19...	36	100	Canvas.....	Dunkirk.....	Mattapony.....	Captain Folwell.
June 23...	37	60	do.....	Jones's bridge.....	Chickahominy.....	Do.
Do.....	38	40	do.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
		6,458				

\* Besides pontoon, 220 feet of cribbing. § Or Mrs. Huntley's. || Main channel. † South branch. ‡ Main branch. \*\* South branch. §§ Main channel. ¶ South branch.

From the above statement, it appears that the total number of pontoon bridges built was thirty-eight, and their aggregate length six thousand four hundred and fifty-eight (6,458) feet.

During the whole time covered by this report he believes the pontoon trains have been promptly on time when ordered, the bridges rapidly and skilfully built, and all other engineering operations of the command faithfully performed.


Whatever credit may be awarded to this is mainly due to the energy and skill of the officers in immediate charge of the several works, and to the zealous and faithful co-operation of the men under their command.

*Narrative from the report of Lieutenant P. S. Michie, corps of engineers, brevet brigadier general of volunteers, to General Delafield, Chief Engineer, United States Army, dated 10th October, 1865.*

(See plans Nos. 11 and 12.) The army of the James, consisting of the 10th and 18th army corps, (and subsequently of the 24th and 25th.) commanded by Major General B. F. Butler, occupied a defensive position across the peninsula of Bermuda Hundred on a line six thousand and fifty-eight yards long, its right resting on the James river about one mile below the Howlett house, and its left on the Appomattox river, on the high ground across the creek, from and on the high ground overlooking Port Walthall.

This defensive line, from its position, was unusually strong. With its flanks resting on and protected by two rivers, and its front of attack being diminished to about one-fourth of its length, because of impassable ravines, it was capable of being held by a much inferior force than the enemy were required to keep in its front. But it had also its disadvantages; for the enemy intrenched on a line approaching not nearer than eight hundred yards, with flanks as secure as ours, and a front made unassailable by means of all the obstacles known to field defence, and thus effectually closed to our forces there every avenue to do damage to the railroad and turnpike, which were the lines of communication to the

wings of the rebel army and the avenues to their capital. The position of the two lines is given below in the sketch.



In addition to the line above described there was a strong work thrown up on Spring Hill, on the south side of the Appomattox river, just opposite Point

of Rocks, and also strong works at Wilson's wharf and Fort Powhattan, on the James river, all of which were constructed and garrisoned by detachments from this army.

These latter commanded the channel of the river at very important points, and on their occupation depended the uninterrupted supply of the "armies operating against Richmond."

Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel, United States volunteers, captain United States engineers, was the senior engineer of this army until October, 1864, but in consequence of his illness in August, the duties of his office devolved upon General Michie.

*July.*—No engineering operations of any importance were carried on during this month. Attention was principally directed to strengthening the lines already laid out, in building water batteries for 100-pounder guns for the defence of Trent's Reach, and in general repairs to the line. During this month there was constant picket firing all along the front, constant surprises on part of both forces of the picket lines, and attempts to gain ground towards each other.

A signal tower one hundred and twenty feet high was built at Point of Rocks, from the top of which could be seen the Richmond and Petersburg railroad and turnpike. This gave us the means of obtaining a great deal of information, and must have impressed the enemy with this idea, for they established a casemated battery of three Whitworth rifled field guns for the special purpose of firing at this tower. But one shot of all fired at it struck it, and that only splintered one of the posts without damaging the tower itself.

*August.*—On the 3d of August a pontoon bridge five hundred and sixty feet long was built on the Appomattox river at Broadway landing, for the passage of the 2d army corps.


A second signal tower one hundred and twenty-six feet high, and capable of being made forty feet higher, was built on the right flank of the line, on the high bluff known as "Crow Nest," James river, opposite Aikin's. From the top of this could be seen the Richmond and Petersburg turnpike, and the cross-roads connecting the main roads which ran to Richmond on the north side of the James river. A lookout constantly stationed here gave information of the enemy's movements.

Major General Butler having conceived the idea of cutting a canal across the peninsula known as Dutch Gap, to pass iron-clads and other war vessels through to avoid Trent's Reach and the Howlett battery, and the idea receiving the warm support of the then commander of the navy in the river, a survey of the locality was made by his direction.

From the sketch given below it will be seen that the river widens from four hundred feet at the Howlett house to twenty-seven hundred at Trent's Reach. As a consequence, at the latter place the channel becomes narrower and shallower, and at ordinary high water vessels drawing twelve feet ten inches of water can pass under favorable circumstances, but the channel was effectually blocked by the powerful battery Dantzler at the Howlett house, which had a plunging fire upon the whole channel from Trent's Reach up to within a few hundred yards of the Howlett house. This battery had also embrasures cut to look up the river, to give a fire in rear in case any vessel was successful in passing the heavy fire of its front.

The survey of Dutch Gap showed a centre section line five hundred and twenty-two feet long, from a point in the channel on the south to a point in the channel on the north, fifteen feet deep. The highest point on this centre line was thirty-eight feet and five-tenths above high-water mark, and the lowest four feet, which was at the south mouth. On a line sixty feet from this centre line, on either side, the ground rose to forty-two and eight-tenths feet at the north mouth, and to eleven and four-tenths feet on the south. The difference of water-level was ten and one-tenth inches, taken at extreme low tide,

thus showing the natural fall of the river between these points to be two and thirteen-hundredths inches to the mile. To all appearances the soil offered no insuperable difficulties for excavation, although it was rumored that the James



ver granite, which outcropped a mile above the lower mouth and a mile and a half below, would be met with beneath the upper strata, and cause a complete failure.

The strata met with were as follows, viz: yellow Virginia brick clay for twelve feet; layer of coarse sand and gravel two to four feet; half an inch to two inches bog iron ore; layer of pebbles and large gravel two feet, then hard blue clay, or hard pan, containing a large quantity of sulphuret of iron, or iron pyrites. This latter stratum was never exhausted, and the bottom and sides of the canal were chiselled out of this, presenting as smooth and compact a surface as if built with masonry. In round numbers, there were about forty-eight thousand cubic yards to be excavated—the canal to be sixty feet wide at high water, forty feet wide at bottom, and fifteen feet deep.

It is a question whether this project, one of the simplest in civil engineering, would have been of any advantage other than to bring our navy a few miles further up the river; for after it was commenced, it was well known that other and nearly as powerful batteries lined both banks of the James river, commanding almost impassable obstacles, and ready to do their share in disputing the passage to the rebel capital. And besides, it was an ascertained fact that the river was filled with torpedoes of the most delicate construction, most painful evidence of which we had in the destruction of three of our vessels in reaching the position then occupied. If any advantage could have accrued to us from this canal in a military point of view, it would be a maximum only by keeping it a profound secret.

The excavation being ordered to proceed, ground was broken on the 9th August, and immediately thereafter the enemy began the constant annoyance with their rifle and mortar batteries, which ended only with the suspension of labor on the canal; January 1, 1865. There were thrown in the vicinity of the working parties over twenty thousand shells during the whole period of the work. The canal was excavated mainly by soldiers and partly by dredges. The latter were old and almost worn out, and were worked by civilians, who did not come up to their promises, being driven off and frightened by the enemy's shells. Not more than six thousand to seven thousand cubic yards were removed by the dredges, which were promised to remove four hundred cubic yards every ten hours. They worked from the south mouth two hundred feet up into the canal, where an embankment separated the part on which the soldiers were working from the lower half.

The whole canal, except an embankment at the north mouth to protect against direct firing, was excavated to the required dimensions. The soil was very favorable below high-water mark. It was the "hard pan" of miners, a hard, stiff blue clay, perfectly impervious to, and insoluble in, water. Whatever leakage took place through the strata of sand and gravel was removed by a steam pump.

About the middle of December the mines which had been made in the embankment were nearly completed. This embankment was much larger than was intended to be blown out with powder, for it had been General Michie's endeavor to reduce it far below what would have been almost certain to be removed, but during his absence the water had been let into the excavated part and up to the embankment without orders. It would have required a greater amount of labor and length of time to remove it than we were warranted to use at this period.

It remained then only to do the best to blow out the mass between the water in the river and that in the canal; and the problem became to use an amount of powder large enough to remove the embankment and disturb its foundation so that it would be easy to remove afterwards, and at the same time not so much as to disturb and cave down the walls of the canal in the vicinity. Twelve thousand pounds of powder were divided among five mines—one of four thousand and four of two thousand each—distributed as follows: Three mines were placed at a depth of fifteen feet below high water, one of four thousand being on the centre line of the canal and thirty-five feet from the face of the embank-

ment, and two of two thousand each were placed on the same level, ten feet on each side of the centre line and twenty-five feet from the face. Two remaining were at a depth of twenty-five feet below high-water mark, or ten feet lower than the three first, and twenty feet further out than the central mine, towards the channel on the north side.

Towards the time of charging and tamping the mines the water leaked in very rapidly, and the pumps were kept going night and day. The powder in the four smaller mines was in tin cans holding one hundred and twenty-five pounds each. In the larger mine the powder was in four large rubber bags holding eight hundred pounds, all opening into a water-tight box which contained eight hundred pounds, and in the centre of which was the point of fusion of this mine.

The method of exploding the mines was by means of the Gomez fuze, a quick burning composition said to be instantaneous for distances under 100 feet. This method proved defective, and the results showed conclusively that all of the powder did not burn, and will not when ignited in the centre of large mines. The effect would, in General Michie's opinion, have been several times greater if centres of fusion could have been made for every hundred pounds of powder, which can be done now with an electric apparatus.

In the method used, in the centre of each charge was placed the end of a length of Gomez fuze, cut at different points to allow the flame to ignite the powder in several places. This fuze was then grafted to an equal length in the same level running to the other mine. The three mines in the upper level were joined in the same way, and finally the two lines were grafted together and joined to the end of a piece of slow-match, cut to burn twenty minutes. The grafts had been tried repeatedly before being finally determined on, and had always been successful.

On exploding the mine the embankment was thrown down and a current commenced running through the canal. Excavation by means of discharging cans of powder under water deepened and widened the channel, aided by strong rreshets, so that at high water six and a half feet of water is on the embankment. General Butler having been relieved from the department about this time, work was discontinued by order.

The canal at present is used by the steamer O. S. Pierce and others of that class, which save by this way about five and a half miles of travel. A few days' work to clear up the disturbed mass and to widen and deepen the north mouth would make this the usual travelled route by all vessels navigating the river. The current and tide partly flow through this way, but their action is unimportant in clearing it out, because the debris consists of large lumps of cemented gravel and hard blue clay. The above embraces all the data of interest in this much-talked-of project, and is given complete to avoid referring to it in the account of each months' labor.

*September.*—During this month a line of works was built, and a post established at Harrison's landing. The defensive works consisted of a redoubt of four embrasures, with a stockaded gorge commanded by the gunboats in the river, and infantry breastworks running from the flanks to the river. The length of the whole line is fourteen hundred and twelve yards. A canvas pontoon bridge of twenty-three boats was built on the Appomattox river September 19. The pontoniers who built it, having no experience with these boats, were twelve minutes in building the first, and three minutes in building the last, the average time being seven and a half minutes for each boat. Owing to the river being affected by the tide, the claw balks had to be lashed to the saddle piece, or they would slip up or down, according as the tide was ebb or flow. Often this bridge had to be covered with manure to deaden the sound of travel, when troops crossed. In these cases, the dust of the manure falling in the canvas boats would rot the threads of the canvas, and cause more or less leakage. It

was noticed that some of the canvas coverings would leak as much as six inches of water at night and none the following day. Teams heavily loaded would often sink these boats to within four inches of the gunwale. These were among the most prominent things noticed in the use of these boats in a permanent bridge, a use, however, for which they were never intended.

During the night of September 28, a pontoon bridge, thirteen hundred and twenty feet long, was built on the James river at Aikin's landing. With one hundred pontoniers the bridge was finished in six and a half hours, so quietly as not to disturb the enemy's pickets on the opposite side of the river.

The army began to cross at 3 a. m. September 29, in two columns, one on the bridge above spoken of, and the other on the bridge at Deep Bottom. A successful advance was made; Fort Harrison, the key point of the outer line of Richmond defence carried by assault, and the line of works extending to the Darby-town road occupied by our army. It having been determined to remain in the position thus carried, the rebel works from Fort Harrison to the New Market road were occupied by our troops and their front turned during the night and following day. Shortly afterwards a line was thrown up, with batteries at appropriate intervals, extending from our left flank at Fort Harrison to the James river, where it rested on a large work at a point a little above Cox's landing. This work, called Fort Brady, was on the site on which the rebels had commenced the erection of a powerful rifled battery, to command the mouth of the canal. We armed the work with three one-hundred-pounder Parrott guns, and several four-and-a-half-inch Rodman rifles, constructed a large bomb-proof for the protection of the garrison, and surrounded it by strong lines of abatis. The line from this work to Fort Harrison afforded a secure defence in case of a flank attack on the left, as it subjected the attacking party to a chance of being defeated, cut off and captured, or driven into the river, after leaving their own lines.

*October.*—Efforts were early made to strengthen the right flank by a strong line and redoubts, but the work was stopped by order from the then commander of the 10th army corps. A strong attack on this flank was made by the enemy in force on the 7th of October, which the cavalry who guarded this flank were unable to withstand, and which at one time threatened to be very disastrous to this army.

Terry's division of this corps, with the artillery under Jackson, checked and finally drove back the enemy, and then the work of securing the flank was pushed rapidly along.

About four hundred yards east of the New Market road a strong redoubt fifty yards square was built, and formed a salient from which the whole country within six hundred yards was commanded, and from its right flank an infantry parapet of strong profile, well protected from assault by abatis, ran towards the New Market road, where it rested, about the vicinity of the Four-mile church. From this point to near the mouth of Four-mile creek strong isolated redoubts were built and manned with troops and artillery, so placed as to mutually support each other. Along New Market heights the most salient points were taken and occupied by strong closed works, and in their front, for one thousand and fifteen hundred yards, the woods were "slashed," thus making a continuous abatis in their front to the limit of the range of their artillery; works were also placed to flank the valleys and sides of these hills.

As there was some possibility of moving the greater part of this army to a new field of operations, leaving but a small force behind, a line of interior works, some three thousand four hundred yards long, was built but for such a contingency. The right rested on Four-mile creek, and the left on the marsh below Aiken's landing. The details of construction were the same as generally belong to field defences, the stronger batteries being placed so as to command the

most important roads or the most probable points from which an attack would be made, with infantry parapets four to six feet thick on top joining them.

In front were ditches from eight to twelve feet wide and six feet deep, and in advance of these a line of good abatis. This line was well indicated, the batteries completed and infantry parapet two-thirds finished, the remaining work to be done after the troops occupied the line. Often the greatest difficulty has been in getting an army to take up a proper and exact line of defence at first, each regiment, company, and man digging where they find their spades, without reference to the fitness of things, indicating the necessity of more engineer officers.

As detached works to this line, it was intended to hold those on New Market heights and Camp Holly, which would have given us the command of New Market, Kingsland, and Darbytown roads. The necessity for this line never occurring, it was never occupied by troops.

After the occupation of Fort Harrison and the rebel captured lines, the enemy began the construction of a new line of defence joining their water batteries on the river at Chaffin's farm with Fort Gilmer, and running thence easterly to join on to that portion of the captured line which we could not occupy at the Charles City road, and so on to new bridge on the Chickahominy.

The line that our forces occupied was made as strong as possible, and possessed the advantage of having but a short part exposed to an attack of the enemy, which part was strongly manned and guarded.

On the 27th a movement was made on the Darbytown and Williamsburg roads with no other result than to keep the enemy from sending re-enforcements to the right of their army at Petersburg, which was then being attacked by the army of the Potomac. During this movement General Weitzel's troops fought on the same ground, in advance of Seven Pines, on which the army of the Potomac fought in 1862.

*November.*—Details of both engineers and infantry were constantly employed during this month in repairing the works of defence, and perfecting and completing those alluded to. During this season the roads used by the supply trains from the wharves and bridges became much cut up, and corduroying was commenced. Wharves for the quartermaster, ordnance, commissary, and medical departments were built at suitable places on the river. Frequent rumors arriving at Fort Harrison that the enemy were mining the work, in order to allay the fears of the garrison well-holes were dug on the glacis to serve for listening galleries. As the nearest approach of the rebel works was eight hundred yards, and a valley twenty feet deep had to be crossed before reaching the work, but little attention was paid to these rumors.

While attention was paid to the defensive operations, we also found time to collect, repair, and put in working order three saw-mills, which were located in a splendid forest in the Bermuda woods. By these mills from seven thousand to ten thousand feet of lumber were sawed per day, the greater portion of which was used in the construction of a permanent hospital at Point of Rocks. Sufficient was obtained, however, to stock the engineer depot, build platforms and magazines in all the batteries, wharves and bridges on the river.

Below is a report of the engineer force of the army, and how employed, which may be taken as a fair standard of each day's detail during the period of quiet:

2 officers, 80 men, building redoubts and corduroying roads; 2 officers, 66 men, repairing 10th army corps front; 2 officers, 90 men, repairing 18th army corps front; 1 officer, 30 men, bomb-proof to dredge Dutch Gap and Fort Brady; 1 officer, fifty men, corduroying roads; 2 officers, 30 men, engineer depots at Bermuda and Fortress Monroe; 2 officers, 143 men, various small details, &c.—12 officers, 489 men, 1st New York volunteer engineers. 4 officers, 105 men, on duty at saw-mills, building wharf, pontoon bridges, repairing wagons, &c.

*December.*—This month's labor was a continuation of the last, and the principal roads of supply were ready for winter use quite early in the month. Whatever damages had been done to the defences were repaired. Timber for a permanent pile bridge was prepared in the woods, which bridge was to be built in January. A detachment of engineer troops accompanied the expeditionary force to Fort Fisher.

*January.*—As the enemy frequently opened a heavy mortar fire from in front of his works opposite Fort Harrison, and as the artillery men were unable to stand to their guns during its continuance, it was deemed advisable to make protection to the guns on the front of Fort Harrison. The mortars used by the enemy were Coehorns, placed outside of their works, and behind the line of picket reserves, protected in their front by a strong line of abatis. It was designed to bomb-proof the whole front of the work, and put in casemates enough, constructed somewhat on the Hoxo plan, for the guns on the front. There was a banquette for infantry on top, reached by broad, wide stairs in rear, which gave the infantry good cover, and enabled them to see perfectly every point in advance. The ditch was deepened and widened, and a fraise placed in the scarp to prevent scaling. But four of these casemates were constructed, and two bomb-proofs, a sketch of which is shown on opposite page.




There were also three strong lines of abatis and wire entanglement placed in front of the ditch, making the whole work quite formidable and easy to hold.

In order to save sandbags, which at this time became very expensive, Lieutenant King, engineer corps, designed some loop-holes for riflemen, and for use in the picket lines, which proved admirably well adapted for their purpose, and being prepared at slight cost at the saw-mills, were used on all the works and rifle-pits. They were constructed of boards, and of the form shown in the diagram. They presented a smaller target for the enemy's sharpshooters, and at the same time gave a large field of fire. They were not easily discernible at any distance, and could easily be removed and replaced.


**NOTE.**—The rebel device for the same purpose consisted in placing logs of various lengths, ten to fourteen inches in diameter, hewn on two sides, with notches cut in the lower side once in about six feet, along the interior crest of the parapet, and banking these logs in front with earth. The notches which formed the loop-holes were tapering towards the outside, similar to our own, and where there was much sharpshooting the orifice was still further reduced by a plate of thin boiler iron, eight or ten inches square, with a hole in the centre but little larger than the barrel of a musket. These plates were spiked to the front side of the logs, (covering the notches,) and in some cases were found with fifteen to twenty bullet marks upon them, many of which were so near the edge of the opening that the bullets probably went through, and it is quite likely that all the bullets that struck the plate would have struck the man in the rear of it had ordinary sandbag loop-holes been used.

The engineer may at times find this expedient worthy his attention, observing that the logs near the crest of the parapet are not suitable where artillery can be used against them.

The permanent pile bridge was finished after a little more than two weeks' labor, being thirteen hundred and sixty-eight feet long. It became necessary as a substitute for the pontoon bridge, owing to the great freshets in the river, the floating ice and the drift-wood that came down the river at this time. It was a pile bridge, each pier consisting of three piles driven firmly into the bed of the river and connected by a cap piece, and the piers joined by strong pieces to form bays each fifteen feet wide. An inclined log was attached to each pier to ward off drift and ice. This was securely attached to a pile driven a short distance above and in the prolongation of the pier, which pile was nearly sawed



off. When driven by the pile-drivers sufficiently it was broken off, and the end of the inclined pile thus anchored to the bottom; the other was spiked to the pier, as shown in the sketch below.



The river deepens to sixteen feet about one thousand feet from the north shore, and then to thirty feet for a distance of nearly one hundred and eighty feet, and then decreases rapidly to the shore-line. At the channel a draw of pontoon boats was made one hundred and eighty feet wide. The lumber which was used in the construction of this bridge was obtained from the engineer depot saw-mills.

*February.*—There were additional river batteries on the south side of the James, constructed and armed with 100-pounder guns, as an additional protection against another rebel raid of iron-clads. During this month, and early in March, the engineer force of the army decreased rapidly, owing to the expiration of their term of service.

*March.*—There were at this time less than three hundred effective men for duty, and but a small number of these were engineer soldiers proper. Repairs of the batteries were constantly going on. To obviate the effects of winter weather, platforms were relaid, magazines drained, and their cover renewed and thickened, and generally the lines of the army put in good defensible condition.

The mules belonging to the pontoon train were worked continuously at the saw-mills during the winter, and only relieved when directed by Major General Barnard, the engineer of the combined armies operating against Richmond, to be used in preparing four (4) pontoon trains for active service and marching. New mules were obtained, and every effort made to break them to harness in time. The whole artisan force was put at work to repair and strengthen the wagons and boats. Finally orders were issued to take a train of but fifteen canvas boats, which was ready for the march on the day specified. The engineer force was divided; one part under Brevet Major W. R. King, United States engineers, remained with General Weitzel's forces, and entered the city of Richmond with his command. They began and continued the erection of a defensive line, until the news of Lee's surrender reached the city. They also built a pontoon bridge joining Richmond and Manchester, twenty-four hundred feet long, upon which afterwards the armies of the James, the Potomac, Sherman's army, and Sheridan's cavalry crossed. The engineer force with the moving column consisted of six companies of engineers and one of pontoniers. A tool train of ten wagons moved with the pontoon trains; the latter consisted of thirty-two wagons, carrying forage, spare-chess, and three hundred and eighty feet of bridge material. The weight, drawn by eight mules, was ascertained by weighing a pontoon wagon with its material two weeks after the campaign closed, and was found to be as follows:

Two (2) boats of canvas and box . . . . .	305 pounds.
Transoms . . . . .	470 "
Claw balks . . . . .	1,440 "
Saddle balks . . . . .	244 "
Boat sides . . . . .	224 "
Anchor lines . . . . .	175 "
Anchors . . . . .	310 "
	<hr/>
	3,168 lbs. wagon load.
Wagon . . . . .	1,278 "
	<hr/>
Weight drawn . . . . .	4,446 "
	<hr/> <hr/>

During the march there were rains, which would increase the weight. On the 29th of March the moving column of the army of the James, consisting of Turner's division of West Virginia troops, of the 24th army corps, and Foster's first division of the same corps, commanded by Major General Gibbon, and Birney's division of the 25th army corps, all commanded by Major General Ord, occupied the left of the army of the Potomac, intrenched lines resting on Hatcher's run.

On the 30th an advance was made across the run by Turner's and Foster's division, rebel picket line captured, and a position secured beyond Armstrong's house, with eight hundred yards of the rebel line of works. Turner's division joined the 2d army corps by a bridge built over the run. On Turner's right Foster and Birney made the connexion with the 6th army corps, still in position behind their intrenched lines. Attempts were made during the night to build intrenchments and cover for a battery, but the ground would not stand, being saturated with water from recent heavy rains, and so spongy that it would not bear the weight of a horse.

*April.*—On the morning of the 2d the successful assault being made, and rapidly followed up by an attack on Fort Gregg, which was taken after some desperate fighting the troops occupied a position entirely surrounding Petersburg. During the night everything was got in readiness for a rapid march in the morning. Starting at 5 a. m., and taking the Cox road, our army made a rapid march towards Burkeville—a part of the engineer force moved ahead to repair roads and bridges—the pontoon trains followed headquarters, to be in readiness in case of necessity. Burkeville was reached on the night of the 5th, and occupied during the next day. A small force being sent out to burn the high bridge at Farmville was met by the rebel advance and captured, after desperate fighting. The troops moved in that direction on the 6th, and engaged a portion of the advance of the enemy, while the cavalry headed them off on the Prince Edward Court House road. On the afternoon of the 7th the troops entered Farmville, the enemy burning the bridges at this place and retreating across the river. The pontoon train of our army having been well kept up to the front, notwithstanding its overloaded condition, was fortunately able to be used to pass over the artillery and trains of the sixth and second army corps and enable them to follow in rapid pursuit of the enemy that night. The pontoons were relieved by those of the army of the Potomac before daybreak, and once more in position for a new march.

At daylight on the 8th the 24th army corps moved from Farmville, taking the road running nearly with the south side railroad, and made a forced march of nearly thirty-three (33) miles before midnight, resting for a few hours on the railroad where Sheridan had captured several cars loaded with bacon and corn. At 3½ a. m. on the 9th the infantry moved again, and at 8 a. m. were in action on the extreme left of the army. The leading brigade of Foster's

division of the 24th army corps went into action on the double-quick, and delivered the volley which staggered and drove back the advance of the enemy who had at that moment gained some temporary advantage over the cavalry. The action lasted until 10 a. m., when a truce was granted preliminary to the surrender.

*May.*—During this month a bridge was built at Fredericksburg. Surveys were made, by direction of Major General Barnard, of the detached works surrounding the city, and orders were afterward received to continue the survey of the intrenched lines and country adjacent to Richmond.

*June.*—Brevet Major King was intrusted with the charge of rebuilding a bridge, called Mayo's bridge, connecting Richmond and Manchester. The following is an extract from his report on the completion of the bridge. The plan adopted for the bridge is represented by the accompanying drawing, page 45.

#### DESCRIPTION.

*c f i*, main chords made of four pieces, 4 inches by 12 inches, breaking joints, and forming continuous beams the entire length of the bridge.

*j i*, corbels, 14 inches by 16 inches, resting on wall plates *w w*, and supporting main chords.

*a b g h*, &c., straining beams, 10 inches by 12 inches, oak, supported by posts and struts.

*b c g f*, &c., main suspending rods in pairs, secured at *b* and *g* by wrought-iron plates, and at *c* and *f* by cast-iron connecting plates bolted to the chord.

*c d* and *e f*, lower suspending rods, secured at *c* and *f* to cast-iron connecting plates, and at *d* and *e* to horizontal wrought-iron bars; these bars being connected by three small rods *d e*, *d k*, and *e k*, diagonal iron braces, to prevent vertical undulations.

*k k*, floor girders, 10 inches by 14 inches, supporting 4-inch by 12-inch joists and 3-inch plank.

*d k e k*, oak supports, 6 inches by 10 inches, resting in cast-iron shoes, which are supported by wrought-iron bars *d* and *e*.


Lateral braces (not shown in drawing) connect the floor girders to prevent horizontal swaying, and diagonal braces steady the posts *d k* and *e k*.

#### DIMENSIONS.

Entire length thirteen hundred and ninety-six (1,396) feet; entire width, including side-walks, thirty-one (31) feet; width of carriage-way in clear nineteen and a half (19½) feet; number of bays eighteen (18); width of bays, sixty-nine to seventy-eight (69 to 78) feet; height of piers at low water, twenty (20) feet.

The strains on the different rods were computed as follows: Allowing for a load of forty (40) pounds per square foot of roadway, forty (40) pounds per cubic foot of timber, and sixty thousand (60,000) pounds as the breaking weight of iron per square inch, then the greatest strain on the upper suspension rods will be nearly thirty-two thousand five hundred (32,500) pounds.

	Pounds.
Breaking weight of same.....	90, 000
Lower inclined suspension rod's greatest strain.....	16, 000
Breaking weight.....	46, 500
Lower horizontal suspension rod's greatest strain.....	10, 200
Breaking weight.....	26, 000
The entire amount of wrought-iron used, including bolts, plates, &c., was.....	44, 068
Cast-iron.....	13, 586



Side elevation of one bay. Scale: One inch to sixteen feet.

*Narrative from General Tower's reports of the 1st February and 31st March, 1865, to General Delafield, chief engineer.*

Nashville was first occupied by our army on the 15th and 16th of December, 1864. The officers of the corps of engineers commenced to fortify it at that time, and as its importance increased from time to time, by making it the depot for the armies of the west, the labors of the engineers continued, and were not relaxed to the date of the last effort of the rebels to capture it, and thus endeavor to frustrate Sherman's march through Georgia and the Carolinas to Virginia. To hold it, and check the advance of Hood through Kentucky to the Ohio, called forth all the zeal and talent of the engineers. General Tower had been sent thither in September, 1864, and labored to perfect the incomplete defences. On the advance of the rebel General Hood, and while the army was falling back from Franklin, the necessity for strengthening and completing these defences became more urgent. He then wrote to the assistant adjutant general of Major General Thomas, suggesting that the forces of the quartermaster's department might throw an intrenched line over the high hills in advance of the Lorenz house, should it be thought expedient, (see plan No. 4.) At 12 m. General Thomas visited Fort Morton, and informed him that about five thousand men would report at one o'clock. To his question shall they intrench the Lorenz Hills? he replied, no, *let them construct your interior line* connecting with the forts. The army will hold the hills and intrench them.

He therefore gave Captain Jenney, who was assisting him, directions to run the line of infantry intrenchments from Fort Morton around the Taylor house to Hill 210. Captain Jenney was assisted by Major Powell, of the Tennessee army reserve artillery; Major Dickson, inspector of artillery of the army of the Tennessee, superintended assiduously the construction of the large and important battery on Hill 210. Captain Barlow, of the corps of engineers, took charge of the line from the Cumberland river to the Chattanooga railroad, south side of the city.

A portion of the line from Hill 210 to Hyde Ferry was laid out by Captain Barlow and himself, the rest by Major Willet. During the fifteen days preceding the battles before Nashville, more than seven miles of infantry parapet and rifle-pit intrenchments were thus constructed by the quartermaster and railroad forces. This gave a continuous line (see plan No. 4) in advance of all the hospitals, storehouses, and other structures, except the scattered houses of the suburbs in front of College Hill, and held the elevated positions which looked upon the buildings within range. It is the line indicated in his report of October, 1864. It is just as long a line as that occupied by the army over the hills, but the shortest that would effectually secure the hospitals and other important structures. The line over the hills was the best army line, but deriving no support from Forts Morton, Houston, Gillem, and Hyde Ferry, could not be held by the usual forces occupying Nashville.

It would have required a large number of redoubts of expensive construction, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, to have fortified the line of hills, but such line would hold an enemy well away from the city, covering it effectually. It was his opinion that completing the works already described, and strengthening the principal batteries at intermediate points, would make Nashville secure with its usual garrison, aided by the quartermaster's organized forces. Hill 210 must be strengthened, as it is a key position, and the Taylor House knoll should be supported by a keep. Small block-houses in batteries, like the construction for Battery Donaldson, are a good arrangement when well covered by the parapets. Unfortunately, wood constructions are the most difficult of accomplishment. Embrasures, magazines, and block-house bomb-proofs cause the great delay in making forts and batteries. A great deal, however, has been accom-

plished during the past three months in spite of extremely unfavorable weather, mud, and muddy roads. It has rained more than half the time.

When General Sherman appointed him inspector general of fortifications for his military division, he requested him to look well to the defences of Nashville. He also called his attention to Murfreesboro' and Columbia, the line of defence for the army falling back. Murfreesboro' was known to be well defended. Columbia was the position on Duck river which would have been held by our army had the corps from Missouri arrived a week sooner. As things occurred, Nashville was the threatened point, and he gave his attention to its defences, using all his personal influence to get aid from every source possible. The plans submitted will show works devised by him for the defence of this depot, and alterations in original works. He had to thank the railroad department for much assistance rendered, and especially the quartermaster's department for aid in laborers and material. These laborers were mostly organized as brigades, and turned out as such, and guarded two miles of the interior line during the battles of the 15th and 16th of December, 1864, and in case of an attack on the city would doubtless be an efficient assistance to this garrison.

Captain Barlow understands this position well, and would doubtless do everything in his power to forward its defences. Waiting for plans has delayed this synopsis of engineer operations at Nashville.

He was getting up a plan of the magnificent battles of December 15 and 16, gained by the United States army, commanded by Major General Thomas, over the rebel forces under General Hood. (See plan No. 4.)

Having accompanied the commanding general during these fights, it was his special request that he should direct the survey and drawing of the plan illustrating them.

Captain Barlow, United States engineers, in immediate charge of the defences of Nashville since the middle of December, had much improved his department, and heartily responded to his efforts to push forward the defensive line. Captain Jenney, aide-de-camp on General Sherman's staff, in charge of topographical office there, had voluntarily assisted and had done excellent service superintending at Forts Houston, Gillem, and in the construction of infantry line of intrenchments.

He has sent the map (see plan No. 4) of the battles of Nashville, which shows the dispositions of troops before and during the battles, and which, with the exception of sections, seems clear and complete. By a little attention it will be perceived how admirably the battle was planned. Its execution was in accordance with the plan.

X was the turning point on which the army wheeled as on a pivot. From that point, to the river on the left, the lines were held by new troops under General Steedman, while the three infantry corps, commanded by Generals Wood, Smith, and Schofield, and the cavalry corps under General Wilson, were hurled upon the enemy's centre and left. Our army, thus in position, formed nearly a straight line, of which the left far refused (made up of new troops) held lines supported by works and covered by a brilliant dash of General Steedman with a small force in advance towards the enemy's right. The right was the old fighting army, which, though requiring much time to swing into position, (about 40,000 strong,) necessarily broke the enemy's left, and drove him from his main line.

The second day the rebel general had concentrated his forces; but the moral effect of his first day's fight, his losses, especially in artillery, together with our superiority of cavalry, which dismounted and attacked his left rear, all contributed to his defeat; and the left of his line was broken about four o'clock by a dash of General Smith's corps. The battle is worthy of study.

*Narrative from the report of Brevet Brigadier General O. M. Poe to the Chief Engineer, dated October 8, 1865.*

The operations connected with the march of General Sherman's army, extending over a great portion of the southern States, were of a very rapid character. Such of them as legitimately belonged to the engineer department were so intimately blended with the whole that it is impossible to separate them. In order to explain clearly why bridges were built and roads made in the localities where they were, it will be necessary to give the movements of the army somewhat in detail, when the reasons will generally be evident. The labors of the engineers were directed to facilitate these movements, and always with a distinct idea of their object.

On the 1st of July, 1864, General Poe was on duty as chief engineer with the army commanded by Major General W. T. Sherman, then before Kenesaw mountain. At that time the engineer organization for the army in the field was altogether inadequate. There were within the limits of the military division the following engineer organizations, viz:

First Michigan engineers and mechanics.

First Missouri engineers.

Both these regiments belonged to the army of the Cumberland, and were distributed as follows: the former along the railroads, forming our lines of supply, engaged in building block-houses to defend them against raiding parties of the enemy's cavalry; and the latter along the important line of railroad from Nashville to Johnsonville, on the Tennessee river, engaged in completing that work.

The department of the Ohio was provided with an engineer battalion in 1863, when the movement upon East Tennessee commenced.

The department of the Tennessee was not provided with any regular engineer organization, but was fortunate in having an excellent pioneer organization. In order to equalize the engineer forces in the military division, the major general commanding, at General Poe's suggestion, transferred the first Missouri engineers from the department of the Cumberland to the department of the Tennessee, and it was ordered to join the army in the field.

Two pontoon bridges, having an aggregate length of 1,400 feet, were with the forces in the field, and distributed as follows: 800 feet, in charge of the fifty-eighth Indiana volunteer infantry, commanded by Colonel George P. Buell, were attached to the army of the Cumberland; 600 feet, in charge of Captain Kos-sack, aide-de-camp, and a body of pioneers, were attached to the army of the Tennessee.

Both those bridges were of the kind known as the "canvas bateau bridge." Two more bridges of the same kind, each 600 feet in length, were held in reserve at Nashville.

The staff organization of the engineer department with that army was as follows:

Captain O. M. Poe, United States engineers, chief engineer military division, Mississippi.

Captain C. B. Reese, corps of engineers, chief engineer department and army of the Tennessee.

Captain W. J. Twining, lieutenant of engineers, chief engineer department and army of the Ohio.

Lieutenant H. C. Wharton, corps of engineers, chief engineer, army of the Cumberland.

Until the early part of May the duties of chief engineer army of the Cumberland had been performed by captain W. E. Merrill, corps of engineers, but he, having received authority to organize the regiment of veteran volunteer engineers provided for by act of Congress, had gone to Chattanooga for that purpose.

Early in July the following officers of the corps of engineers reported to General Poe, and were assigned to duty as follows, viz :

- Captain J. W. Barlow, to army of Tennessee.
- First Lieutenant O. H. Ernst, to army of Tennessee.
- First Lieutenant Wm. Ludlow, to army of Cumberland.
- First Lieutenant A. N. Damrell, to army of Ohio.

In the army of the Cumberland, each corps, division, and nearly every brigade was provided with an officer detailed from among the commissioned officers of the infantry regiments, whose duty it was to make such surveys and reconnoissances as might be wanted. The other two armies were not so well provided, but had sufficient organization to do all that was requisite.

The military operations of the previous two months had gradually forced the enemy from his position in Buzzard Roost Gap back to the ground he now held at Kenesaw mountain. During this time the labors of the engineers were confined to reconnoitring, road-making, and bridge-building. Pontoon bridges had been built over the Oostanaula, at Resaca and at Lay's ferry, and two flatboat bridges over the Coosawatchie, also pontoon bridges over the Etowah river, at the cliffs.

The enemy showed little disposition to yield his stronghold at Kenesaw. After the assault of the 27th June it was determined to move towards our right, at the same time advancing that flank—a movement which it was supposed would result in the evacuation by the enemy of all ground north of the Chattanooga, except his bridge-head at the railroad crossing.

Receiving instructions from General Sherman, commanding, General Poe made a personal reconnoissance of the ground upon our right as far as our extreme cavalry outposts, at or near Anderson's mill, on Olley's creek, and immediately upon his return and report the army of the Tennessee was put in motion. No sooner was this movement developed, than the enemy, on the night of the 2d and morning of the 3d July, evacuated his position at Kenesaw and in front of Marietta, and we took possession, the troops moving right on in pursuit. Contrary to expectation and information, we found that the enemy intended to make a stand upon a line from Ruff's Station (Neal Dow) to Ruff's mill, the flanks being refused along Nickajack and Rottenwood creeks. This line had been prepared by militia and contrabands only a few days before its occupation by Johnston's army, and was well built, consisting of good infantry parapets, connecting salients, in which were placed a large number of pieces of field artillery in embrasures. The length of this line was nearly six miles.

On the 4th July our skirmishers drove the enemy's into the works on the main road by a spirited dash, being supported by the divisions of Stanley, of the 4th corps, and Johnson of the 14th corps, and our lines pressed up at all points, but not near enough to silence the artillery. Late in the evening the 16th corps, forming the left of the army of the Tennessee, carried by assault a portion of the rebel line. At daylight on the morning of the 5th July our skirmishers advanced, only to find the enemy gone—a movement rendered necessary upon their part by the success of the 16th corps on the evening previous.

The next line of works was found in front of the railroad bridge, and the several road and pontoon bridges at Pace's, Montgomery's, and Turner's ferries, forming a very extensive *tête de pont*, which consisted of a system of square redoubts in defensive relations, connected by infantry parapets. But few of these redoubts were prepared for artillery, being arranged with a banquettes for infantry fire. The artillery was placed in small intermediate redans. The redoubts partook more of the character of tambours. They were constructed by building double log pens, and filling the space between them with earth. There was nothing in the plan to recommend them to the attention of the engineers.

The left of this line rested upon a large seven-gun redoubt, near the mouth of Nickajack creek, and the right upon another redoubt prepared for eight guns, and situated near the Chattahoochee, about one mile above the railroad bridge. Opposite this point the intrenchments on the south side of the river began, and extended, in a continuous line, nearly to Island creek, being altogether about eight miles.

The railroad bridge at its southern end was protected by three batteries of irregular shape and one redoubt. This line, owing to the care bestowed upon its construction, and the nature of the approaches, was far the strongest we had yet encountered. It had been built for some length of time, and had been located by good engineers. A few days spent in reconnoissances showed us very plainly that it would cost many lives to carry the position by assault, even were an assault to succeed, which was extremely doubtful. It was accordingly deemed best to turn it. An inspection of the country showed that this must be done by the left, since such a movement to the right, owing to the broken character of the country, and the fact that the enemy, expecting us to move that way, had carefully guarded all the crossing places, was almost impossible. Having decided to pass the river by our left, strong demonstrations were made upon our right to confirm the enemy in the impression that the movement was to be made in that direction, and that we would attempt to cross the river at some point below the mouth of Nickajack creek.

The points selected for the crossing were at Roswell factory and Philip's (Isham's) ferry, and the army of the Tennessee, which had been demonstrating upon our right, was suddenly thrown to Roswell, where it crossed the Chattahoochee upon a trestle bridge built by the pioneers of the 16th army corps out of the materials at hand. No opposition was made by the enemy.

The army of the Ohio, which had been on the left, now became the centre, made a rapid movement across the river at Philip's ferry, surprising a small force of the enemy stationed there, and capturing one piece of artillery. While the forces which actually effected the crossing were engaged in constructing some light works to serve as a bridge-head, two canvas pontoon bridges were thrown, upon which the balance of the army of the Ohio crossed.

General Poe remarks here, that whenever it was deemed necessary to use a bridge for a greater length of time than forty-eight hours, the pontoon bridges were *invariably* replaced by wooden trestle bridges constructed from the materials at hand, either by engineer troops or the pioneer force. The object of this was to preserve the canvas covers of the bateaux, even at the expense of considerable labor, since we had the latter in greater abundance than the former.

The canvas bridges at Philip's ferry were replaced by a trestle bridge built by the engineer battalion of the 23d army corps. Another pontoon bridge was thrown, meanwhile, at Powers' ferry, some two miles lower down, upon which the 4th army corps crossed. This corps formed a junction with the army of the Ohio, but the army of the Tennessee was still acting independently.

One division of the 4th corps now swept down the south bank of the river to Pace's ferry, which enabled us to build two pontoon bridges at this point, upon which the 14th and 20th corps crossed.

Two days before this the enemy, under influence of the presence of the 4th and 23d corps on the south side of the river, had crossed his whole force to that side and left us in possession of the strong line on the north side, upon which so much care and labor had been bestowed.

The passage of the Chattahoochee had now been completely effected. Our whole army was on the south side of the river, with a loss of less than a dozen men. But between us and Atlanta, our objective, were still the three serious obstacles of Nancy's creek, Peach Tree creek, and the entire rebel army. We

knew but little about the country, and the inhabitants, always few in number and indisposed to give us information, had all gone further south. Not an able-bodied man was to be found between Marietta and the enemy's line. We could only feel our way cautiously forward, using the greatest diligence in reconnoissances.

The army of the Tennessee, forming the left wing, was directed towards Stone mountain; the army of the Ohio, in the centre, towards Cross Keys and Decatur, and the army of the Cumberland, on the right, *via* Buck Head, towards Atlanta. The left wing and the centre crossed Nancy's creek the same day, (July 18.) The cavalry division of General Garrard, which had been operating on the extreme left, succeeded in reaching the Augusta railroad between Decatur and Stone mountain.

On the next day, July 19, the 23d army corps, after a sharp skirmish, occupied Decatur, where it formed a junction with the army of the Tennessee. The army of the Ohio then withdrew, and, passing to the right, camped for the night on Pea Vine creek. The army of the Cumberland crossed a small force over Peach Tree creek, which maintained its footing.

*July 20.* The army of the Tennessee advanced along the Augusta railroad to within about three and a half miles of Atlanta, where the enemy was found intrenched. The army of the Ohio moved along the road leading from Judge Peyton's to Atlanta, and soon encountered the enemy intrenched. The army of the Cumberland crossed Peach Tree creek at several points, and the left of it, (4th corps,) connecting with the army of the Ohio, met the same obstacle. The 14th corps, on the extreme right, moving on the Howell's Mill road, joined the 20th corps on its left, and this, in turn, joined Newton's division of the 4th corps, which was moving on the Collier's Mill road. There was no communication on the south side of Peach Tree creek, between Newton's and the other divisions of the 4th corps.

This was the status when two rebel corps, moving down the Howell's Mill-road and Collier's Mill road, attacked the 20th corps, together with the left division of the 14th corps and Newton's division. After a severe engagement, lasting until dark, the enemy was repulsed at all points. The result was to firmly establish our position on the south bank of Peach Tree creek, having overcome two of three obstacles already referred to as between us and Atlanta.

*July 21.*—We steadily pressed forward along our whole line, developing the enemy in his intrenchments, extending from a point about a mile south of the Augusta railroad around the north side of the city to the Chattanooga railroad. This line was well built, and capable of a tolerably good defence. It consisted of a system of open batteries for artillery, connected by the usual infantry parapet, with all the accessories of abatis, chevaux-de-frise, &c. But it was evidently not the main line upon which the enemy relied for his final defence.

*July 22.*—The enemy evacuated the line referred to above during the night of the 21st, and we pressed forward on all the roads until the enemy was again found behind intrenchments. Reconnoissances proved that these were finally the main lines of defensive works covering Atlanta. They completely encircled the city at a distance of about one and a half miles from the centre, and consisted of a system of batteries, open to the rear and connected by infantry parapet, with complete abatis in some places in three or four rows, with rows of pointed stakes and long lines of chevaux-de-frise. In many places rows of palisading were planted along the foot of the exterior slope of the infantry parapet, with sufficient opening between the timbers to permit the infantry fire, if carefully delivered, to pass freely through, but not sufficient to permit a person to pass through, and having a height of twelve to fourteen feet.

The ground in front of these palisades (or stockades) was always completely swept by the fire from the adjacent batteries, which enabled a very small force to hold them.

To this line we opposed another extending from a point one and a half miles south of the Augusta railroad around by the north to a point one and a half miles southwest from the three-mile post on the Atlanta and Chattanooga railroad. About noon, while engaged in extending this line to the left and front, the enemy, making a detour to the south and eastward, passed around our left flank, and, completely enveloping it, attacked it both in flank and rear. Fortunately, the 16th corps was en route to meet just such an attack, and was in a position to form, looking to our left rear, its right joining the 17th army corps. The fighting here was of the most desperate character. Meanwhile the enemy pushed one corps from their works right down the Augusta railroad upon our line, where they gained a temporary success, but were finally driven back at all points. Our troops were now put under the cover of the ordinary rifle-trenches, with works of a slightly heavier character for the artillery. Close reconnoissances were made of the enemy's whole line in our front, and it was decided that no attempt at assault should be made upon that part of the enemy's line which we could see. The major general commanding was satisfied that no assault would be made at present, neither did he desire anything like regular siege operations, but instructed that the lines occupied by our troops be of such a character that they could be held against a sortie, and to push them forward at all points where it could be conveniently done; at the same time he would attempt to reach the enemy's line of railroad communication at or near East Point, the junction of the roads from West Point and Macon to Atlanta. It is about six miles southwest from Atlanta. This movement, he hoped, would either result in a general engagement, with chances greatly in our favor, or in the evacuation of Atlanta. He directed General Poe to personally select a line at the Augusta railroad, where our left flank could rest and command that road, while the army of the Tennessee was withdrawn to make the movement indicated.

On the morning of the 24th July, accompanied by Captains C. B. Reese and J. W. Barlow, and Lieutenants Twining and Ernst, of the corps of engineers, General Poe passed over the ground, selected the line, and gave the necessary directions for its construction.

General Sherman having determined to send a cavalry force around each flank of the enemy to operate upon his communications, General Poe was directed to see in person to the construction of a pontoon bridge at Turner's ferry. This was done by ordering the train belonging to the army of the Tennessee from where it was then laid, at the railroad crossing over the Chattahoochee, *via* the old Peach Tree road, to Turner's ferry. After proceeding as far as Proctor's creek, we found that the enemy occupied Turner's ferry. It was then too late to do anything towards fighting for possession of the ferry. Upon a report of the facts to General Sherman, he ordered the cavalry division of General McCook to clear the ground at daybreak next morning, July 26, which was done, the bridge constructed, and communication established between the cavalry forces on the south bank of the river with those on the north bank.

The new line to be occupied by our left flank upon the withdrawal of the army of the Tennessee having been completed by the morning of the 27th July, the movement of that command towards our right flank commenced, and at the same time the movement of the cavalry forces began, that passing around the enemy's left flank being under command of General McCook, and that around his right flank under Generals Stoneman and Garrard, the balance of our army meanwhile pressing forward and gaining ground as rapidly as possible. This was continued on the 28th July, when at about noon a furious attack was made upon the army of the Tennessee, particularly upon the 15th corps, by a force of the enemy which moved from Atlanta out on the Lick

Skillet road. The whole of the 15th corps had been refused along a ridge extending northwestwardly from Ezra church, and nearly parallel with the Lick Skillet road, its left joining the 17th corps, and making nearly a right angle with it near the church. The position was a most admirable one, and the enemy was severely whipped. The rebel army in our front had been under command of Joseph E. Johnston until the 19th July, when the command was transferred to General Hood. Johnston's policy appeared to be a purely defensive one. Hood's was decidedly offensive-defensive, as shown by the fact that three desperate and severe battles were fought within ten days after he assumed command.

The last three days of July were devoted to skirmishing to attain positions as favorable as possible. Meanwhile, under instructions from the major general commanding, General Poe selected a new line to be occupied as a flank by a portion of the army of the Cumberland, in case it was decided to transfer the army of the Ohio to the right flank. The line was constructed under the superintendence of Lieutenant Wharton, United States engineers. It extended from our front line near Walker's house, on the Collier's Mill (Buckhead) road, nearly due north, to the line of rebel works evacuated on the night of the 21st of July.

On the night of the 1st August the army of the Ohio was withdrawn from its position on the left and rapidly moved to the right, near the poor-house, and extending nearly to the north branch of Utoy creek, at Willis's mill, the engineers giving general directions concerning the lines.

The army of the Tennessee swung forward its extreme right about half a mile, turning upon its position at Ezra church as a pivot. The army of the Ohio connected with the right of the army of the Tennessee. This movement developed a part of the enemy's line in front of these two armies, and discovered the same system of batteries, connected by infantry curtains, that we had met before, thus showing that we had not yet found the enemy's left flank, the prime object of all our movements.

A portion of the army of the Ohio was thrown across Utoy creek, and established itself on the south side without much opposition.

*August 4.*—An attack was ordered to be made at 3 p. m. by the army of the Ohio and the 14th corps of the army of the Cumberland, the object being to thrust our forces through the enemy's lines, and effect a lodgement on the railroad between Atlanta and East Point. The attack, however, was not made.

*August 5.*—The Chattahoochee river railroad bridge was completed, and our trains ran up to the three-mile post. By General Sherman's direction Lieutenant Ernst was sent to Marietta to superintend the construction of defences at that place. An attack was ordered for 2 p. m., the object being as given above, but again no attack was made.

*August 6.*—The attack twice before ordered was made, but repulsed. The two corps of the army of the Cumberland, forming the left of our army, kept steadily pushing forward, but without anything like siege approaches. Our sharpshooters had gained such positions as rendered it difficult for the enemy to work his guns.

*August 7.*—The attack made yesterday was renewed and proved successful. It was found that the line of rifle-trenches carried by the assault was not the enemy's main line, but stood nearly perpendicularly to it. The army of the Tennessee moved forward about 400 yards, swinging upon the centre of its right wing as a pivot.

The successive advances, either directly or by swinging upon some part of the line as a pivot, were made in the following manner: by pushing forward, just before daylight, a strong line of skirmishers to the position chosen beforehand, which maintained its ground during the day, each man getting such cover as he could, generally by scooping out a rifle-pit at the foot of a tree, behind a

log or stone, in which they could find shelter. As soon as night made it possible, working parties were thrown out to the skirmish line, and connected by the ordinary rifle-trenches the entire chain of rifle-pits. These lines were continually being strengthened until it was desired to make another advance, when the operation was repeated. In this way our lines were pushed at any point we wished to within two hundred yards of the enemy's, and with slight loss.

*August 8 and 9.*—Was at work everywhere strengthening our lines; commenced the construction of batteries for 4½-inch guns, which had been ordered. These were placed in position as follows: two in front of the 20th army corps near the Chattanooga railroad, and two others in front of the 16th corps. The whole of the army of the Tennessee advanced about  $\frac{3}{8}$  of a mile, in the manner already described, and the lines of the army of the Cumberland were straightened so that the whole line was as far advanced as the salients had been. The army of the Ohio was engaged in intrenching itself in its position south of Utoy creek. August 10, 11, and 12, no advances were made. August 13, it was decided to move all the army except one corps (which was to be thrown back to the Chattahoochee railroad bridge) around Atlanta, upon the railroads running south from East Point, and the pontoon train of the army of the Cumberland was moved from the railroad bridge along the north side of the river to the Sandtown ferry, preparatory to throwing a bridge across the river at that point.

*August 15.*—The line of Proctor's creek was examined for the purpose of selecting a defensive flank to be used when the army of the Cumberland was withdrawn. Two pontoon bridges were laid at Sandtown ferry. A trestle bridge was commenced at Sandtown ferry to replace the pontoon bridges at that point.

*August 17.*—Orders for the movement of the army to the rear of East Point were promulgated. The cavalry command of General Kilpatrick started upon a raid to the southward of Atlanta.

*August 18 and 19.*—The troops kept hard at work to induce the enemy to believe that we contemplated no movement upon his rear of greater importance than a cavalry raid. The entire force of engineer officers hard at work reconnoitring all the roads to our right as far as the enemy's cavalry would permit.

*August 20.*—A force of infantry reached the Atlanta and West Point railroad near Red Oak Station, and tore up a portion of the track. Our batteries were completed along our whole line and we were ready for any emergency.

*August 21 and 22.*—The pioneer force was all kept at work preparing siege materials. The batteries along our whole line kept up a slow but steady fire, both upon the enemy's lines and upon the city of Atlanta. The remarks in this paragraph apply to every day for the last two weeks.

*August 23.*—Under instructions from the Major General commanding, General Poe went to the Chattahoochee railroad bridge and selected a line to be occupied by the corps (20th) which was to be left behind during our movement to the rear of Atlanta, and gave Lieutenant Ludlow full instructions concerning the building of it.

The position held by the 15th army corps during the battle of the 28th July was selected by Captain Reese, as a flank, to be occupied by the army of the Tennessee upon the withdrawal of the army of the Cumberland. General Kilpatrick's cavalry command returned, having passed entirely around Atlanta.

*August 24.*—At work upon the new flank referred to above. Reconnoissances pushed to the right almost as far as Campbellton.

*August 25.*—At midnight the grand movement commenced by the withdrawal of the 4th and 20th corps. The latter marched directly to the railroad bridge, Pace's and Turner's ferries, while the former, passing in rear of the army of the Tennessee bivouacked next night on the Utoy creek. Before the movement began its left had rested on the Decatur road.

*August 26.*—The movement of the army of the Cumberland still going on, and at dark the left wing of the army of the Tennessee was swung to the rear upon its right, and occupied the position previously prepared for it.

*August 27.*—All the army in motion except the army of the Ohio. The army of the Cumberland was placed in position along Camp creek, covering all the roads leading from Mount Gilead church toward East Point and Red Oak. The army of the Tennessee was thrown further to the right, but close enough to keep up communication; it covered all the roads leading towards Fairburn. But little resistance was offered to our advance.

The troops intrenched their position every night. This was made a rule from the time the campaign commenced, and was continued until the close of the war, whenever the proximity of the enemy rendered it prudent. During all the operations of this great army, extending over a year of time and thousands of miles of territory, it was never surprised.

*August 28.*—The army of the Cumberland was thrown forward upon the Atlanta and West Point railroad at Red Oak, and the army of the Tennessee at Shadna church and Fairburn, while the army of the Ohio was thrown into such a position along the road from Mount Gilead church to Red Oak as to cover our left flank. Immediately upon striking the railroad the troops were intrenched, and without the loss of a dozen men we had secure hold upon it, and could proceed to destroy it as leisurely as we pleased.

*August 29.*—The greater part of the army was at work destroying the railroad, which was effectually done for about 12½ miles, every tie being burned and every rail bent. The enemy did not attempt to disturb us.

*August 30.*—The army again in motion, being directed as follows: The army of the Ohio towards Morrow's mill; the army of the Cumberland towards Couch's farm-house, and the army of the Tennessee towards the Renfro (Renfrew?) place. The latter pushed on still further and succeeded in seizing the Flint River bridge and gaining a foothold between the river and Jonesboro'. The enemy was found in force covering the town.

*August 31.*—The army of the Ohio moved towards a point on the Macon railroad two miles south of Rough and Ready Station, and succeeded in reaching it, and making a secure lodgment (intrenched.) The 4th corps was put in position in support. Four more brigades of the army of the Cumberland moved from Couch's due east, until they struck the railroad between the army of the Ohio and Jonesboro', when they also intrenched. About the same time that these forces reached the railroad the enemy attacked the lines of the army of the Tennessee immediately in front of Jonesboro', and tried to carry them by assault. They were repulsed with heavy loss.

*September 1.*—The army of the Cumberland was concentrated, so as to connect from the left of the army of the Tennessee to the railroad about two miles north of Jonesboro', the 4th army corps destroying the railroad as it advanced. The army of the Ohio commenced the destruction of the railroad at Rough and Ready and connected with the break made by the other troops. About 4 p. m. the 14th army corps assaulted and carried the right of the enemy's line, consisting of the usual batteries, connected by infantry parapet. The approach of night alone prevented the capture of the entire rebel force.

We were now squarely upon the rebel lines of supply. The movements of our army had been so rapid that the enemy exhibited the greatest confusion, and shortly after midnight the light of the burning buildings and explosions of ammunition in the direction of Atlanta (distant 20 miles) indicated very plainly that the enemy was evacuating the place, and on the morning of the 2d September the 20th army corps, which had been left behind at the Chattahoochee bridge for the purpose, marched into Atlanta.

In describing these operations it has been necessary to go somewhat into detail, in order that they might be clearly understood, deeming it peculiarly the

province of the engineer to call attention to such brilliant manœuvres as those which enabled us to pass a river too deep to be forded, in the very face of the enemy, with a loss of less than a platoon of men, and those which placed six army corps upon the enemy's lines of communication in opposition to a single corps.

In accomplishing these results the engineer department performed the following special labor, viz :

10 pontoon bridges built across the Chattahoochee river, averaging 350 feet in length, 3,500 feet; 7 trestle bridges, built out of material cut from the bank, across the same stream, of which 5 were double-tracked and two were single, 350 feet long each, 2,450 feet; 50 miles (estimated) of infantry parapet, with a corresponding length of artillery epaulement; 6 bridges over Peach Tree creek, averaging 80 feet long each, 480 feet; 5 bridges over Flint river, averaging 80 feet long each, 400 feet; also many smaller bridges built, and many miles of road repaired.

The topographical branch of the engineer department worked efficiently. Surveys were made of all the routes passed over by infantry columns, together with the lines of parapet built. A map on the scale of 4" = 1 mile, illustrating the siege (so called) of Savannah, has been forwarded to the engineer bureau, in which these surveys are compiled, from the passage of Peach Tree creek, July 19 to the beginning of the movement upon the enemy's lines of communication, August 25, and a general map (photographic copy) illustrating the entire campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta. General Poe forwarded to the bureau a complete set of photographic views illustrating military operations about Atlanta.

From the map department 4,000 copies of campaign maps were issued to the proper officers to facilitate military operations.

General Poe bears testimony to the efficiency of the engineer officers on duty with General Sherman's army. Though all have done well, yet he expresses particular indebtedness to Captain C. B. Reese and Lieutenants Wharton and Twining.

Upon the occupation of the city of Atlanta examinations were made by General Poe, under the orders of the General commanding, with a view to the modification of the defences better adapted for defence by the small force to be left for the purpose. The rebel line was about twelve miles in development; the new line was less than three miles in extent. The entire engineer force was applied to the construction of the works, aided by details from the infantry of the 20th corps. The balance of the army had been put in motion against the enemy which had appeared on our lines of communication. A complete set of photographs, illustrating the defences as far as completed, were forwarded to the engineer bureau, and the works were projected on the map illustrating the siege of Atlanta.

Preparations were there completed for the march to Savannah, perfecting the organization of the engineer department, which now consisted of engineer troops and troops of the line doing engineer duty, 2,775 men; pioneers, 1,800 men; making an aggregate for engineer duty 4,575 men charged with the tools and tool trains as well as the pontoon train; the aggregate length of the train was 1,430 feet. A large number of axes and shovels were in the hands of the troops.

The engineers were charged with the destruction of railroads, depots, steam machinery, &c., &c., in the city of Atlanta, all of which was effectually done without the aid of fire or powder wherever their use might endanger other property. Ties were burnt and rails heated and twisted of all the roads within the limits of the old rebel defences equal to a length of about ten miles of road. With all the vigilance of the engineers, lawless persons succeeded in firing many buildings in the business part of the city.

On the 15th and 16th of November the army corps severally commenced the march towards the sea-coast, and in their progress the Augusta railroad was destroyed as far as the Oconee bridge; the Georgia Central railroad, from within three miles of Macon to the city of Savannah; the Charleston and Savannah railroad, from the Savannah river bridge to Savannah; the Savannah and Gulf railroad as far as the Altamaha, and the branch from Millen destroyed, the branch from Gordon to Eatonton seriously damaged.

On the march fifteen pontoon bridges were built at different localities: two of 80 feet each long, two of 100 feet, three of 200 feet each, two of 250 feet each, four of 300 feet each, and two of 400 feet each—an aggregate of 3,460 feet in length. On the 10th of December the army arrived in front of Savannah, where reconnoissances were pushed forward and along the entire extent of the enemy's front, which was located along a chain of swamps and other natural obstacles, and intrenched in the usual manner, and strengthened by means of sluice gates and dams, thus flooding the entire front of their line. On the 11th it was determined to attack Fort McAllister, a plan of which had been found during the reconnoissances, this being the only obstacle to a free communication with the fleet in Ossabaw sound.

The engineer troops, under the direction of Captain Reese, engineers, rebuilt the "King's bridge," which had been destroyed. One division of infantry crossed and advanced to the vicinity of the fort, formed, assaulted, and carried the work in a gallant style on the evening of the 13th December.

The fort mounted twenty-two guns, generally in barbette. Its land front had a good ditch with a row of stout palisades and well-built glacis with abatis, exterior to which was planted a row of 8-inch shells arranged to explode when trodden upon. The obstructions in the river, piles and torpedoes, were removed from the channel, and steamboats ascended to King's bridge where the depot of supplies was located.

The guns of Fort McAllister, as well as six 30-pounder Parrott's from Hilton Head, were to be placed in position preparatory to an assault on the main lines, when, on the night of December 20, the enemy, crossing the Savannah on a bridge of flatboats, made his escape, abandoning a large number of guns and material of war, and blowing up his iron-clads. As at Atlanta, no regular siege approach was attempted. Reconnoissances led to the belief that assault would have resulted in success.

General Poe with General Reese, under the orders of the general commanding, after careful examination, selected a new line to be intrenched for the defence of such stores and material as might be left there, consisting of a system of large lunettes closed at the gorge, and in defensive relation, with connecting infantry parapets, for a garrison estimated at five thousand men. The location of the new lines was very nearly the same as those of 1814.

A map is in course of preparation which will show the topography of Savannah and vicinity, the work of attack and defence, the new lines constructed during the occupation of the city, and the lines of 1814.

Before leaving Savannah, on the campaign through the Carolinas, by request of General Grover, who was left in command at Savannah, General Poe handed him a paper, of which the following is a copy:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION MISSISSIPPI,  
"Chief Engineer's Office, Savannah, Ga., January 21, 1865.

"GENERAL: In accordance with your request, I have the honor of submitting the following memoranda with reference to the defence of the city of Savannah.

"First. The defence of the city itself. This is accomplished by the line of works now in process of construction, after the plan indicated in my letter to

Major General Sherman, dated December 26, 1864. These works are now ready to receive sixty (60) guns, partly siege and partly field artillery, and, in my opinion, are in a condition which would warrant their defence by the garrison estimated for. Captain Suter, United States engineers, and chief engineer department of the south, has been furnished with a trace of this line, on which the several positions of the guns composing the complete armament are indicated. Captain Suter has also been furnished with those maps captured at this city which relate to the defence. Opposite the city, on the main Carolina shore, two small works should be built, to command the union causeway and the Huger causeway. The above contemplates an attack by a much larger force than the garrison, and, in my opinion, will never be made.

“Secoud. The defence of the approaches. Three main roads lead into the city from inland, viz : The Ogeechee plank road, (Darien road,) the Louisville stage road, the Augusta stage road.” The last two join within  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles of the city. The points where the enemy’s late lines crossed these roads furnish the best defence. When taken in conjunction with the obstacles formed by opening the sluice-gates at high tide, the positions are strong. If the bridge across the Ogeechee at King’s is destroyed, it effectually cuts off direct approach by that road, and it can only be reached by crossing the river above, and getting to it by some of the numerous cross-roads. An enemy would not be likely to do this unless he were in largely superior force, since he would necessarily put himself in a ‘pocket.’

“Third. The defence of the river navigation. This is best accomplished by a force stationed at this city, large enough to go out and fight any enemy that would be likely to approach. In order that our opponents might reach any of the points where they could injure us much, they would be compelled to thrust themselves some miles beyond us, leaving whatever garrison there might be in Savannah on their flank and in rear. They could not interrupt navigation without establishing themselves in enclosed works upon the banks of St. Augustine creek, (we hold Fort Jackson,) and a very short time would suffice for the capture of any enemy having temerity enough to do this.

“With all our great resources of water transportation, I regard it impossible for our enemy to make a successful lodgement on St. Augustine creek.

“I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“O. M. POE, *Capt. Eng., Brevet Col. U. S. A.,*

“*Chief Eng. Mil. Div’n Miss.*”

“Major General GROVER,

“*Com’dg U. S. Forces, Savannah, Ga.*”

For the campaign to Goldsboro’, inaugurated in mid-winter, to be made through a country famous for the extent of its swamps, all of which for five hundred miles distance were to be crossed at right angles at that season of the year when they were flooded with water, and generally regarded as impassable for troops, the engineer department was organized with great care. The pontoon trains were put in perfect order. Every officer and man belonging to the engineer organization was duly impressed with the importance of the part they were to take in the march, where so much was to depend upon prompt and efficient bridge-building and road-making.

The same organization of the department was preserved as that made for the Savannah campaign:

1. Staff: O. M. Poe, captain engineers, brevet colonel United States army, chief engineer military division Mississippi.  
C. B. Reese, captain engineers, brevet colonel United States army, chief engineer department, and army of Tennessee, (right wing.)

Amos Stickney, first lieutenant engineers, brevet captain United States army, assistant to Captain Reese.

William Ludlow, first lieutenant engineers, brevet major United States army, chief engineer army of Georgia, (left wing.)

William Kossak, captain, A. D. C., chief engineer 17th army corps.

Klosterman, captain, &c., chief engineer 15th army corps.

2. Engineer troops and troops of the line on engineer duty :

1st Michigan engineers and mechanics, Colonel J. B. Yates, unassigned.

1st Missouri engineers, Lieutenant Colonel William Tweeddale, (right wing.)

58th Indiana, volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel J. Moore, (left wing.)

3. Pontoniers and pontoon trains :

Right wing, 1st Missouri engineers.

Left wing, 58th Indiana volunteer infantry.

The pontoon trains remained exactly as before specified.

The tool trains remained the same, but the number of tools carried along by brigade wagons was greatly increased, particularly the number of axes.

When the movement actually commenced, a portion of the army marched *via* Sister's ferry. The pontoon train of the left wing accompanied this column; all other engineer troops and trains were transported by water to Beaufort, and moved thence by land. Owing to the season and the nature of the country, the demand for labor of engineer troops was constant.

The heavy rains which fell just as the movement commenced greatly impeded the march of the column, which crossed the Savannah at Sister's ferry. To enable it to progress at all, 700 feet of pontoon bridge were built, and 1,000 feet of trestle bridge; also some miles of corduroying.

The right wing met with similar obstructions, though not so serious. A pontoon bridge was thrown across Whale branch, and fully one-fourth the road thence to Pocotaligo was corduroyed.

On the 1st of February, the movement from Sister's ferry and Pocotaligo commenced, the enemy at that time endeavoring to hold the line of the Salkahatchee. The left wing moved towards Duck Branch post office, and the right wing by the two roads between the Salkahatchee and the Coosawhatchee; the 17th corps being directed on River's bridge, and the 15th corps on Duck Branch cross-roads, with a division thrown out to Anglesey post office. On the night of the 3d of February, the enemy's position at River's bridge was carried by a portion of the 17th army corps.

On the 4th, the 15th army corps reached Banford's (or Beaufert's) bridge, and found it destroyed, the enemy having evacuated his works at this point. Twenty-two bridges, scattered over a mile of swamp, and averaging about 25 feet in length, were rebuilt during the night, and the whole road through the swamp was corduroyed.

The left wing, with the cavalry on its left flank, continued its march direct on Barnwell.

On February 7, the Charleston and Augusta railroad was reached at Midway by the 17th army corps; at Barnberg, by the 15th army corps; at Graham's, by the 20th corps; and at Blackville, by the 14th corps, with the cavalry on its left. The pontoon train of the right wing was pushed forward towards, and all the infantry of the entire army, together with the Michigan engineers, were put at work destroying the railroad. This was effectually done; all wood-work was burnt, every rail was *twisted*, and all water-tanks, engines, and machinery of all kinds destroyed, to include the Edisto bridge and Williston, and partially destroyed, between Williston and Johnson's.

During the night of the 9th a pontoon bridge was thrown at Binnaker's, and the enemy driven away from the position he had taken to dispute the crossing.

Another pontoon bridge was thrown at Holman's, and all our force was across by the evening of the 11th, the left wing crossing at Duncan's and Guignard's bridges.

The right wing moved direct upon Orangeburg. The enemy opposed the crossing of the north fork of Edisto river, but, as usual, he was driven away, and three pontoon bridges built; one on the main Orangeburg road, and the other two at Schilling's bridge.

The 17th corps occupied Orangeburg, and destroyed the railroad thence to and including the Congaree river bridge. The left wing meanwhile was moving towards Columbia by the nearest roads. The right wing now directed its march towards Columbia, and, after some opposition at Thomas's creek and Congaree creek, where the enemy was found well intrenched, arrived at a point opposite the city on the 16th of February.

The bridges over the Saluda, Broad and Congaree rivers were all found to have been burnt. A pontoon bridge was built at the Saluda river bridge, near the factory, and a portion of the 15th corps crossed during the night. The left wing pontoon bridge was built over the Saluda at Zion church,  $9\frac{1}{2}$  miles above Columbia, and some force crossed. On the 17th a pontoon bridge was built just above the ruins of the former bridge over Broad river, three miles above Columbia, and the right wing crossed to the north bank and occupied the city, the greater part of which was burnt during the night. Many reasons are given for this flagrant violation of General Sherman's orders. It was principally due to the fact that the citizens gave liquor to the troops until they were crazily drunk and beyond the control of their officers. The burning cotton, fired by retreating rebels, and the presence of a large number of escaped prisoners, excited the intoxicated soldiers to the first acts of violence, after which they could not be restrained.

On the 18th the left wing crossed the Broad river on a pontoon bridge, thrown at the mouth of Wateree creek, near Freshley's mills, and commenced the destruction of the Greenville and Columbia railroad, from Alston toward Columbia.

On the 19th, by direction of General Sherman, all the railroad shops, depots, city gas-works, &c., in Columbia were destroyed, the Michigan engineers furnishing the working parties.

On the 20th the march was resumed, the 17th army corps, together with the Michigan engineers, at work destroying the Columbia and Charlotte railroad from Columbia northward, while the 15th corps was at work from Columbia towards Kingsville.

The Charlotte railroad was *thoroughly destroyed* from Columbia to White Oak Station, 44 miles. At Winnsboro' the whole army was concentrated, and the left wing assisted in the destruction of the railroad thence to the northward.

From Winnsboro' and White Oak the left wing and the cavalry moved to Rocky Mount, and the right wing to Peay's ferry. A pontoon bridge was thrown over the Catawba (Wateree) at each of these points, and after a great deal of trouble, arising from high water, rapid currents and muddy roads, the army was transferred to the eastern bank of the river. The crossing was begun on the morning of the 23d February, and was completed on the 27th, after one bridge at Rocky Mount had been carried away. It was 700 feet in length, and about 200 feet of it was totally lost. The balance was recovered, and the bridge rebuilt.

By this time the cavalry had passed through Lancaster—the 20th corps was at Hanging Rock—and the right wing was at Tillersville, in the vicinity of which it crossed Lynch's creek, after almost incredible labor in building bridges

and corduroying roads. The remainder of the army crossed at Finilly's and McMann's bridges. The whole army was now moving on Cheraw, and was concentrated there on the 3d March, without any opposition not easily overcome. A large amount of material of war was captured at Cheraw, all of which (except three guns brought on as trophies) was destroyed by the Michigan engineers.

The march was resumed on the 6th March, the 15th, 17th, and 20th corps crossing the Pedee on a pontoon bridge at Cheraw, and the 14th corps and cavalry on another at Sneedsboro'.

The whole army now aimed to concentrate at Fayetteville, N. C., the cavalry passing through Rockingham, and thence *via* the first road north of the Fayetteville and Albemarle plank-road; the 14th corps *via* Love's bridge over Lumber river; the 20th corps *via* McFarland's bridge; the 15th corps *via* Gilchrist's bridge; and the 17th corps *via* Campbell's bridge.

All these bridges had been destroyed by the enemy, and each was replaced either by a pontoon or a trestle bridge.

The concentration at Fayetteville was effected on the 11th March with very little opposition, though the enemy's cavalry was all around us. At Fayetteville it was found that the enemy had greatly enlarged the capacity of the old United States arsenal.

The Michigan engineers were at once set at work to destroy it, to batter down all masonry walls, and to break to pieces all machinery of whatever kind, and to prepare the two large magazines for explosion. The immense machine shops, foundries, timber sheds, &c., were soon reduced to a heap of rubbish, and at a concerted signal, fire was applied to these heaps, and to all wooden buildings and piles of lumber; also to the powder trains leading to the magazines. A couple of hours sufficed to reduce to ashes everything that would burn, and the high wind prevailing at the time scattered these ashes, so that only a few piles of broken bricks remained of that repossessed arsenal. Much of the machinery here destroyed had been brought, at the beginning of the war, from the old arsenal at Harper's Ferry.

On the 13th pontoon bridges were thrown over the Cape Fear river as follows: that of the left wing, just below the ruins of the road bridge, (it having been burned by the enemy,) and that of the right wing, about three miles below, and the army commenced crossing.

On the 15th the bridges were taken up, and the left wing, together with the cavalry, moved out on the Raleigh road. The supply trains of the cavalry and of the left wing, under escort of one division from the 14th corps and one from the 20th, after going some seven or eight miles turned to the eastward, taking the main Goldsboro' road, whither they were ordered. The cavalry and the other four divisions continued on the Raleigh road until the enemy was encountered at Tayler's Hole creek. Early next morning the enemy, consisting of Rhett's brigade of South Carolina heavy artillery, was attacked and quickly dislodged from his intrenchments.

Our troops pressed on in pursuit, and soon encountered the enemy in considerable force, intrenched at the cross-roads south of Averysboro', his lines extending from Cape Fear river to Black river. At this point the peninsula between the two rivers is narrowest. By the time proper dispositions were made to attack, it was dark, and before daylight next morning (March 17,) the enemy was gone, but was closely followed as far as Averysboro' by one division of the 20th corps.

A map illustrating the operations at this point was forwarded to the bureau of engineers with General Poe's letter, dated August 14th, 1865.

The pursuit to Averysboro' developed the fact that the enemy had retreated in the direction of Smithfield, and our march was resumed along the main road hence to Goldsboro'. On the morning of the 19th, the right wing was within

two miles of the left. The enemy having kept at a safe distance from us, and destroyed all bridges leading to the northward, in advance of the head of our column, it was inferred that he did not intend to offer any serious opposition to our march. The right wing was ordered to move from Lee's store direct to Goldsboro', and the left wing aimed to reach the same point *via* Cox's bridge. When near Bentonville, the enemy, moving down the Smithfield road, suddenly attacked the left wing and gained a temporary advantage over its leading division; but the other three divisions, the cavalry and the Michigan engineers, getting into position, repulsed every subsequent attack of the enemy, all of which were of a very desperate character, as the rebel commander well knew that daylight of next morning would bring with it the entire right wing. And such was the case: that part of the army, marching nearly all night, and advancing *via* the same road that the left wing was on, but *from the opposite direction*, reached the enemy's rear, not having been stopped a moment by the opposition of the enemy. The rebel line was of course at once doubled back, and a junction was made between the right and left wings of our forces.

The next day (March 20) the first division 17th army corps succeeded in getting within 200 yards of the bridge over Mill creek, on the Smithfield road, and the 15th corps carried and held the entire line of the enemy's skirmish pits in its front. Again the enemy ran away during the night, and was two miles beyond Mill creek.

On the 14th August General Poe transmitted to the Engineer bureau a map which was intended to illustrate this battle.

The trains meanwhile had never stopped their movement towards Goldsboro', and the troops now following, soon began to pour into that town, already occupied by the troops of General Schofield, and the most wonderful campaign of the war was ended. Two pontoon bridges were built over the Neuse at Cox's, and two more near the County bridge, upon which everything crossed.

Supplies of all kinds were very badly needed, and among the rest the canvas covers of the pontoon boats needed renewal. In the train attached to the light wing this was particularly the case, since many of the covers had been in the water an aggregate of sixty days. Attention is especially directed to this train, because the material had been hauled from Nashville to Goldsboro' upon wagons, and had been in constant use, and yet the train was serviceable. Indeed, all that was required to make it *perfectly* efficient was a new set of canvas covers.

Fully one-eighth of the whole army was without shoes, and nearly as badly off for the other articles of clothing, having now marched through the heart of the enemy's country, over swamps and through forests, nearly if not quite 500 miles, occupying sixty days of time, during which they drew but little more than their sugar and coffee from the government, gathering subsistence for themselves and animals from the enemy's country.

During the march from Atlanta to Savannah the line of march was parallel to the larger water-courses. On this, it led at right angles to them all, and, as expected, the difficulties encountered were greatly increased. The line of march was chosen near the junction between the clay of the upland, with the sand of the lower country, which may be tolerably well defined by tracing a line through the lower "rapids" on each of the streams crossed.

It was hoped and expected that along this line would be found the best roads and the minimum amount of mud and swamps, while at the same time it passed through or in the vicinity of the towns it was considered important to attack.

This supposition was entirely correct. Still the route, at its best, involves an immense amount of bridging of every kind known in active campaigning, besides some four hundred miles of corduroying. The latter was a very simple affair, where there were plenty of fence rails, but in their absence in-

volved the severest labor. It was found that two good fences furnished enough rails to corduroy a strip of road as long as one of them so as to make it passable. General Poe estimates the amount of corduroying on this campaign at fully 100 miles to each army corps, making an aggregate of 400 miles. This is a moderate estimate. This kind of work was rarely done by the cavalry, since their trains moved with the infantry columns.

The right wing built 15 pontoon bridges, having an aggregate length of 3,720 feet. The left wing built about 4,000 feet, thus making a total of 7,720 feet, or nearly  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile. The amount of trestle bridge built was not measured, but it was not so great.

In corduroying, the entire available force of the army was used—engineers, pioneers, and infantry. The pontooning was all done by engineer troops, according to the organization already given, and the building of trestle bridges by engineers and pioneers.

Surveys have been made of the entire line of march of each army corps, as well as the route pursued by the headquarters military division. The latter was as good a survey as could be made with odometer and prismatic compass, and was under charge of Captain H. A. Ulfers, assistant adjutant general volunteers, on engineer duty.

Upon arriving at Goldsboro', attention was devoted to refitting the army for a new campaign. The grand army was reorganized, so that it consisted of three divisions of two army corps each, viz :

The army of the Tennessee, of the 15th and 17th corps, being the right wing; the army of the Ohio, department of North Carolina, of the 10th and 23d corps, being the centre; and the army of Georgia, of the 14th and 20th corps, being the left wing.

The engineer organization to correspond with this, was :

1. Staff: O. M. Poe, captain engineers, brevet colonel United States army, chief engineer, military division, Mississippi; C. B. Reese, captain engineers, brevet colonel United States army, chief engineer, D. and A. T.; W. J. Twining, captain engineers, brevet lieutenant colonel United States army, chief engineer, department of North Carolina; W. Ludlow, 1st lieutenant, engineers, brevet major United States army, assistant to chief engineer, M. D. M.; A. Stickney, 1st lieutenant engineers, brevet captain United States army, assistant to Colonel Reese; A. N. Damvell, 1st lieutenant engineers United States army, assistant to Lieutenant Colonel Twining.

2. Engineer troops and troops of the line on engineer duty: 1st regiment Michigan engineers and mechanics, Colonel J. B. Yates, commanding, unassigned, under direct orders of chief engineer; 1st regiment Missouri engineers, Lieutenant Colonel William Tweeddale, (right wing,) pontoniers; detachment 15th regiment New York volunteer engineers, commanding, (centre,) pontoniers; engineer battalion 23d army corps, (centre,) engineers; 58th regiment Indiana volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel J. Moore, commanding, (left wing,) pontoniers.

3. Pontoon trains: With right wing, 600 feet canvas; with centre, 600 feet canvas; with left wing, 800 feet canvas; total, 2,000.

The organization of pioneers and tool trains was exactly as described heretofore, except that it was extended to the additional force that had joined the army.

On the 10th April the army moved forward upon the road to Raleigh, meeting with feeble resistance. The usual corduroying and bridge-building commenced at once, and four pontoon bridges were laid across the Neuse on the 11th. The city of Raleigh was entered without opposition on the 13th, and in a day or two afterwards followed the convention between General Sherman and the rebel General Joseph E. Johnston. At the time of this con-

vention we had pushed a pontoon train out to Aven's ford, on Cape Fear river, and had built a bridge there.

After the surrender of the rebel forces, the forces composing the right and left wings, as already described, commenced their march to Washington.

Upon the arrival at Washington, the pontoon trains which had done such efficient service were turned over to an officer designated by the Engineer bureau. One of them had been hauled on wagons from Nashville, Tennessee, *via* Chattanooga, Atlanta, Savannah and Raleigh, to this city. And the others had in like manner been hauled over the same route from Chattanooga, and they had been in almost daily use for a year, with one single removal of the canvas covers, and were in excellent condition when delivered here.

Can any facts go further to show the value of the canvas train in campaigns of the character described? No wooden boats would have stood a moiety of the rough usage bestowed upon these. A few days' hauling over the mountains of Georgia, or the corduroy roads of the Carolina swamps, would have used them up.

As the result of experience, it is suggested that a change be made in the wagons of the canvas pontoon train, so that the wheels and axles shall conform to those in use in the quartermaster's department, and the balance of the wood-work be that proposed by Colonel Pettes.

It may be mentioned that the bridge equipage, in charge of the 58th Indiana volunteers, was hauled all the way from Chattanooga to Washington on the ordinary quartermaster's wagon, the convenience of which was constantly observed for 1,300 miles.

The constant practice of our troops has made them tolerably good judges of what constitutes a good defensive line, and lightened the labors of the engineer staff very materially.

The accuracy of the fire of sharpshooters on both sides led the troops to adopt the "head log" on all their rifle-trenches. This is a good stout log of hard wood, which is cut as long as possible, and laid upon blocks placed on the superior slope, a foot or two outside the interior crest. The blocks supporting the "head log" raise it sufficiently from the parapet to allow the musket to pass through underneath it, and steady aim to be taken, while the log covers the head from the enemy's fire. Frequently the blocks are replaced by skids, which rest on the ground in rear of the trench, so that if the "head log" is knocked off the parapet by artillery fire, it rolls along these skids to the rear without injuring anybody; many miles of these "head logs" were examined without finding any indication that their use had been otherwise than advantageous. There was no evidence that a single man had been killed on either side by splinters thrown from them by artillery projectiles, or from logs thrown off the parapet by the same means.

*Recapitulation of work done by engineer troops and troops under engineer direction during the campaigns covered by this report.*

What campaign.	Pontoon bridge built, in feet and miles.	Trestle bridge built, in feet and miles.	Miles of road con- royed (estimated.)	Miles of railroad de- stroyed (estimated.)	Miles of road survey- ed and mapped.
Atlanta campaign.....	3,500	3,330	100	26	980
Savannah campaign.....	3,460	1,700	60	240	1,700
Goldsboro' campaign.....	7,720	4,000	400	120	2,500
March to Washington.....	3,000	.....	20	.....	1,600
Total in feet.....	17,680	9,030	.....	.....	.....
Total in miles.....	3.35	1.7	580	386*	6,780

*Narrative collated from the Report of Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Stickney, corps of engineers, 3d June, 1865, to General Richard Delafield, chief engineer United States army. (See plans Nos. 3 and 11.)*

While remaining in Goldsboro', from March 24 to April 10, the pontoon train was put in complete repair as far as material at hand would admit. Thirty new canvas boat covers were received, and all but ten of the old covers sent to Newbern.

April 10 the army moved out from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, arriving at the latter place on the 14th. The next day the 15th army corps proceeded to Morrisville and the 17th army corps to Jones's Station, at which places they were halted on account of the negotiations for the surrender of the enemy's army. None of the bridges over the streams between Goldsboro' and Raleigh were destroyed; but the planks were in most cases thrown off and were soon replaced, causing no delay of any consequence. The roads were in very bad condition between Goldsboro' and Pineville, the 15th army corps being obliged to build two hundred and fourteen (214) feet of wagon bridges over sloughs, 175 feet of foot-bridges, and thirteen thousand one hundred and ninety-six (13,196) yards of corduroy. The 17th army corps made four hundred and twenty-six (426) feet of bridges and sixteen thousand nine hundred and eighteen (16,918) yards of corduroy. The army remained in the vicinity of Raleigh till April 29, when, the rebel army having surrendered, it started on its homeward march towards Petersburg, where it arrived May 6. The roads were in excellent condition, and bridges standing over all the rivers except the Neuse and Roanoke. The army arrived at Robinson's ferry, on the Roanoke, May 3, the pontoon train being in advance. This river is seven hundred and forty feet wide at the point at which the army crossed, and the depth of water from five to ten feet. The pontoon train contained only five hundred and eighty (580) feet of bridging; but they found four large wooden boats on the river, which were rigged up with centre-pieces, made four trestles, and the bridge was ready for crossing by 8 a. m. on the 4th, after a hard night's work. After remaining two days at Petersburg the army moved to Manchester.

The major general commanding informed Captain Stickney that from Manchester up they would find bridges over all streams, as they were to be left for

them by the army of the Potomac, which preceded them; consequently he did not think it necessary to procure more chess.

On the 12th of May the 17th army corps started for Alexandria, the 15th army corps on the following day, and arrived there on the 19th. The roads were generally good all the way from Raleigh to Alexandria, and the army moved with surprising celerity. He was disappointed, however, about the bridges, there being none over the Pamunkey or Occoquan rivers. The former was very much swollen, the water overflowing the southern bank to the depth of about two and a half (2½) feet when they first arrived, the morning of May 13, and continued to rise during the day and following night.

The pontoon bridge was laid and some trains passed over that afternoon; but before the next morning the water rose so high that it became necessary to build a kind of trestle bridge about thirty (30) yards in length to approach the pontoons. This was done by the first Michigan engineers and 17th army corps pioneers.

Lieutenant Colonel Wm. Tweeddale, with his regiment, the 1st Missouri engineers, had charge of the pontoon train.

The pontoon train has, most of the time, been divided into two sections—one section moving with each army corps, and each section being accompanied by a portion of the 1st Missouri engineers.

The 1st Michigan engineers moved with the 17th army corps, but were under Captain Stickney's orders only on the occasion at the Roanoke river.

Following is a statement of places where pontoon bridges were laid:

April 14, over Neuse river, at Battle's bridge, 160 feet.

April 29, over Neuse river, at Ferrel's bridge, 200 feet.

May 3, over Roanoke river, at Robinson's ferry, 740 feet.

May 13, over Pamunkey river, at Little Paige's bridge, 200 feet.

May 18, over Occoquan river, at Occoquan, 280 feet.

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*Narrative collated from the report of Lieutenant Colonel and Brevet Brigadier General Comstock, of the corps of engineers, of the 21th January, 1865, addressed to General Terry, and copy to General Delafield, Chief Engineer.*

He submits the following report of engineer operations, in connexion with the capture of Fort Fisher, together with a sketch of that work, and another of the country in its vicinity. (See plans Nos. 5 and 6.)

Fort Fisher is situated on the peninsula between the Cape Fear river and the Atlantic ocean, about a mile and a half northeast of Federal Point. For five miles north of Federal Point this peninsula is sandy and low, not rising more than fifteen feet above high tide; the interior abounding in fresh water swamps, often wooded and almost impassable, while much of the dry land, until one gets within half a mile of Fort Fisher, is covered with wood or low undergrowth, except a strip about three hundred yards wide along the sea-shore.

The landing of the troops composing the expedition was effected on the sea-beach, about five miles north of Fort Fisher, on January 12, 1865, and Paine's division was at once pushed across to Cape Fear river with instructions to take up a line to be held against any attack from the direction of Wilmington. This line on the morning of January 13 was already defensible, and was further strengthened during the day; while on the 14th a second line was laid out and begun under charge of Lieutenant J. H. Price, in rear of its left. Pioneer companies were organized in Ames's and Paine's divisions; and, as during the 14th the fire of the rebel gunboat Chickamauga killed and wounded a number of our men, Lieutenant O'Keeffe, with his company of the 15th regiment New York volunteer engineers, was directed to build a battery for two thirty-pounder rifle Parrott guns on the bank of the river to keep her off.

On the afternoon of January 14 a reconnoissance was pushed, under direction

of the major general commanding, to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advanced work taken possession of. This was at once turned into a defensive line to be held against any attempt from Fort Fisher. The reconnoissance showed that the palisading in front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire; only nine guns could be seen on the land front, where sixteen had been counted on Christmas day. The steady, though not rapid, fire of the navy prevented the enemy from using either artillery or musketry on the reconnoitring party. It seemed probable that troops could be got within two hundred yards of the work without serious loss, and it was a matter of great doubt whether the necessary ammunition could be supplied by the open beach if regular approaches were determined on. It was decided to assault, and the assault was made on the 15th, at 3½ p. m., after three hours of navy fire, by three deployed brigades, following one another at intervals of about three hundred yards, and each making its final rush for the west end of the land face, from a rough rifle-pit about three hundred yards from the work.

At the point attacked, the palisading was less injured than elsewhere, it being partially hidden, and it was necessary to use axes to cut, and timbers to batter it down, in order that troops might pass readily through it. Powder-sacks for blowing these palisades down had been prepared, but were not used.

After seven hours' fighting, gaining traverse by traverse, the work was won.

Fort Fisher consists of two fronts; the first or land front, running across the peninsula, at this point seven hundred yards wide, is four hundred and eighty yards in length, while the second, or sea front, runs from the right of the first, parallel to the beach, to the mound battery, a distance of thirteen hundred yards. The land front is intended to resist any attack from the north; the sea front to prevent any of our naval vessels from running through New inlet or landing troops on Federal Point.

*First land front.*—This front consists of a half bastion on the left or Cape Fear river side, connected by a curtain with a bastion on the ocean side. The parapet is twenty-five feet thick, averages twenty feet in height, with traverses rising ten feet above it, and running back on their tops, which were from eight to twelve feet in thickness, to a distance of from thirty to forty feet from the interior crest. The traverses on the left half bastion were about twenty-five feet in length on top. The earth for this heavy parapet, and the enormous traverses, at their inner ends more than thirty feet in height, was obtained partly from a shallow exterior ditch, but mainly from the interior of the work.

Between each pair of traverses there was one or two guns. The traverses on the right of this front were only partially completed. A palisade which is loop-holed, and has a banquette, runs in front of this face at a distance of about fifty feet in front of the foot of the exterior slope, from the Cape Fear river to the ocean, with a position for a gun between the left of the front and the river, and another between the right of the front and the ocean. Through the middle traverse on the curtain was a bomb-proof postern, whose exterior opening was covered by a small redan for two field-pieces, to give flank fire along the curtain.

The traverses were generally bomb-proofed for men or magazines. The slopes of the work appear to have been revetted with marsh sod, or covered with grass, and to have had an inclination of forty-five degrees or a little less. On those slopes most exposed to navy fire the revetment or grassing has been entirely destroyed, and the inclination reduced to thirty degrees.

The ends of traverses as they rise above the parapet are very ragged; still all damage done to the earth-work can be readily repaired, *its strength being about the same as before the bombardment.*

The damage done by the navy fire was, 1st, to the palisades, which were so injured as in most places to be little obstacle to assaulting troops; 2d, to guns and carriages. There were originally on the front *twenty-one guns and three mortars*; of these *three-fourths* were rendered unserviceable by injuries to either

gun or carriage. The gun in the right bastion, the field-pieces in front of the postern, and one or two mortars, were used against the assaulting troops.

There was a formidable system of torpedoes two hundred yards in advance of this front, the torpedoes being about eighty feet apart, and each containing about one hundred pounds of powder. They were connected with the fort by three sets of wires; fortunately, the sets leading directly to those over which the army and navy columns moved had been cut by shells, and no torpedo was exploded.

*Second sea front.*—This front consists of a series of batteries, mounting in all *twenty-four guns*, the different batteries being connected by a strong infantry parapet so as to form a continuous line. The same system of heavy traverses for the protection of the guns is used as on the land front, and these traverses are also generally bomb-proofed.

Captain M. Adams, 4th New Hampshire volunteers, and First Lieutenant J. H. Price, 4th United States colored troops, commanding pioneer companies of Ames's and Paine's divisions, and First Lieutenant K. S. O. Kuppe, commanding company of 15th New York volunteer engineers, have, with their commands, been of great service in the construction of batteries and defensive works. First Lieutenant A. H. Knowlton, 4th New Hampshire volunteers, assisted in making sketches of Fort Fisher; as also Private Schultze, 15th New York volunteer engineers.

It may be added that in thirty bomb-proofs and magazines, and their passages, there were 14,500 feet of floor space, not including the main magazine, which was exploded, and whose dimensions are unknown.

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*Narrative from Major McAlester's report of June 1, 1865, forwarded to General Delafield, Chief Engineer United States army.*

The maps and plans (Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10) indicate in sufficient detail the engineer operations in the late campaign of the army of West Mississippi in southern Alabama, against the defences of the city of Mobile. The principal of these took place before Spanish fort. Those before Blakely had been barely initiated when the place fell by assault.

Formal siege operations not having been ordered or contemplated at Spanish fort, the attention of the engineer officers was exclusively directed to the location and construction of batteries for the reception of the field guns, with the troops and the siege guns, as rapidly as they could be delivered on the ground, and the construction of such trenches as were needed simply to communicate with the batteries. On the 30th of March, however, by special authority of the major general commanding, Major McAlester directed the advanced rifle trenches and pits to be connected and widened to six feet, together with a sufficient number of approaches thereto, for the convenience of troops posted to resist sorties of the garrison. These were completed by the 4th of April. Subsequently this advanced parallel trench became a second parallel by the uniting and widening in like manner the rifle trenches and breastworks constructed on the advanced crests of the ravines first occupied, forming for some purposes a first parallel.

The investment of Spanish fort by land took place on the 27th of March. On the 29th of March he located a battery of eight thirty-pounder Parrott rifle guns on the southeast shore of Minette bay, against batteries Huger and Tracy, and the rebel gunboats, (all of which enfiladed the ravine occupied by our right,) and the Spanish fort communications by Blakely river. This battery accomplished all its proposed objects quite satisfactorily at ranges varying from *twenty-four hundred to thirty-three hundred yards*. Fire was opened from this battery on the 31st March, as also from eighteen siege guns (including six twenty-

pounder rifles and eight mortars) and forty-one field guns, all in position on that date against Spanish fort itself. No enfilading batteries yet complete.

On the 4th April there were in position against Spanish fort thirty-eight siege guns (including six twenty-pounder rifles and sixteen mortars) and thirty-seven field guns, all of which, (seventy-five,) with the Minette bay battery against batteries Huger and Tracy, opened fire at 5 p. m., and continued till 7 p. m. The enfilading batteries not quite ready.

On the 8th April there were in position against Spanish fort fifty-three siege guns (including nine twenty-pounder rifles and sixteen mortars) and thirty-seven field guns. Ten siege rifles and five siege howitzers on our left centre enfiladed the enemy's centre and left, and four siege howitzers close in, near our extreme right, enfiladed the enemy's centre. The Minette bay battery, bearing on batteries Huger and Tracy, contained on this date four thirty-pounder and two one-hundred-pounder rifles.

The final bombardment from all these guns opened at 5.30 p. m., and continued till 7.30 p. m. During the bombardment a lodgement was effected within the enemy's line on his extreme left. At about midnight the entire fort was in our possession. Spanish fort line had a development of two miles, and an armament of about forty guns, seven of which were Coehorn mortars, two were eight-inch columbiads, four were heavy Parrott rifles, and the remainder siege and field guns.

The development of the enemy's Blakely line was two and a half miles, and the armament between forty and fifty guns, principally field guns and howitzers. The land investment of Blakely was completed on the 5th April. On the 6th, in order to obtain command of the enemy's water communications with Mobile, from Blakely as well as Spanish fort and batteries Huger and Tracy, (the navy having failed in this,) McAlester established a battery for two one hundred-pounder Parrott rifles on the spur immediately north of the head of Minette bay. On the 9th April, the one-hundred-pounders not having arrived, four thirty-pounder Parrott rifles were placed in this battery, and opened fire on the rebel landing at Blakely, and the rebel transports moving on Tensas river. On that day there were in position against Blakely twenty-four field guns, and against the rebel gunboats, which were stationed so as to enfilade our right, (at a point just above Blakely,) four thirty-pounder rifles. Early in the morning McAlester asked for twenty-eight siege guns and sixteen siege mortars, and took immediate steps to place them in position against Blakely. At 5.30 p. m. the place was assaulted successfully.

On the 10th April batteries were begun on the shores of Minette bay, eight hundred yards north of Minette bayou, for two one-hundred-pounder and eight thirty-pounder Parrott rifles against batteries Huger and Tracy, which were still occupied by the enemy. On the afternoon of the 11th the thirty-pounders opened fire, together with the battery built on the southeast shore of Minette bay, in connexion with operations against Spanish fort, on batteries Huger and Tracy. At night of the same day the latter were evacuated.

Major McAlester refers particularly to the services of Brevet Major J. C. Palfrey, captain of engineers, senior engineer 13th army corps, and Brevet Captain C. J. Allen, corps of engineers, senior engineer 16th army corps, in front of Spanish fort. The gallantry and professional skill displayed by them in conducting engineering operations on their respective fronts, and their energy and faithfulness in carrying out orders and instructions, are worthy of unre-served commendation and substantial recognition.

Senior engineers and engineers of corps and divisions did valuable service throughout the campaign.

Captain Patten, of the Inspector General's department, volunteered his services to construct several batteries in front of Spanish fort and on Minette bay, and they were well appreciated.

WEST POINT, N. Y. *June 26, 1865.*

SIR: The board of visitors invited this year to attend the annual examination of the United States Military Academy, and to inquire generally into the condition of the institution, respectfully submit the following as their report:

The members of the board, being nearly all present, on the 2d instant entered at once upon the discharge of their duties. Within a few days, others arriving, the whole number was complete, with the exception of one gentleman on the list who has not appeared; and from that time until the termination of their labors, to day, they have continued to devote themselves, with more or less constant participation of each, to the business for which they assembled.

This somewhat protracted session has been occasioned, not merely by the usual great variety of subjects presented for investigation and consideration, but by the size of the graduating class of cadets, more numerous than any heretofore ever sent from the academy, and the necessarily longer time required for their examination. The board believe, however, that the time has not been unprofitably employed.

The board, after organization, and at other times during their stay, have visited and carefully inspected the various buildings, grounds, library, scientific apparatus, and other property attached to and used for the purposes of the academy, and have, during a considerable portion of each day, attended the examinations of the several classes, and have also witnessed the exhibition of the drill of the cadets in the various branches of military service.

The training, drill, and discipline of the cadets in all that relates to the duties of the soldier appear to the board to be of the first and highest order; and they doubt if a finer or more creditable exhibition in those particulars can be made by a body of military students at any other institution in the world.

The average proficiency of the young men of the graduating class, as indicated by their answers and performances in the examination room, was only fair, or at least not above the ordinary measure of other first-rate educational establishments in this country.

This is perhaps principally owing to an attempt to crowd too much into the last year of the academic course; a difficulty which may in some degree be remedied by a proposed new arrangement of the subjects taught during the four years given to instruction here. But it was evident that there was more than a proper and allowable difference between the sections of the class in question; and that some of those lowest on the list would hardly be considered as coming up to the standard necessary to secure the honors of a noble national institution like this.

In one particular, especially, the members of the board could not help but remark a too prevailing deficiency, even in the highest classes. There was an almost general want of distinctness and precision in the language in which the cadets expressed their answers when under examination, exhibited even in frequent and inexcusable errors of pronunciation and of grammatical construction. While the board did not yet expect proof of finished cultivation and scholarship, it is thought that more pains taken on the part both of instructors and pupils might have avoided at least such common and careless inaccuracy, and would have secured a habit of exactness not to be altogether overcome or confused, even under the ordeal of examination.

The subjects of discipline, instruction, police, administration, and fiscal affairs, to which the attention of the board is by law especially directed, were referred to standing committees; and the reports of those committees are hereto appended, as parts of this report.

As a means of obtaining direct and reliable information to guide them in their inquiries and reflections, the board considered it proper, also, at an early day after their organization, to apply to those officers immediately connected with the gov-

ernment and instruction of the academy. Accordingly, the following resolution was passed, and a copy thereof communicated to the superintendent and each member of the academic staff:

*Resolved*, That the superintendent of the Military Academy and the several members of the academic staff be invited to communicate to this board their views and suggestions in writing, for the future management and requirements of the institution, and what changes, if any, are necessary for its increased usefulness."

And afterwards, by further resolution, the same invitation was sent to each member of the military staff of the academy.

In compliance with this request, answers have been received from the superintendent, and from the majority of the members of the academic and military staffs, which, as being of more or less interest, and some of them containing valuable views and statements, are also appended and submitted herewith. Several of the officers have not, however, made any reply, nor thought proper to give the board the benefit of their suggestions.

In this connexion it is thought proper to record a difference of opinion in relation to their respective powers and duties, which has arisen between the board and the superintendent of the academy, and the disposition made of the question. This record is due to those who may come after us, as serving to define and construe the power and practice of any future board of visitors.

Understanding that an order had been issued by the superintendent to the several members of the academic and military staffs, requiring them to transmit such communications as the board of visitors had invited them to make, only through him as "the usual official channel," the board considered it a just interpretation of the duty in which they were engaged, to pass and convey to the superintendent the following resolutions:

*Resolved*, That this board, deriving its existence and authority by appointment of the President, under the provisions of a law of the United States, is charged by that law, and by the instructions of the appointing power, to inquire into, and report for the information of Congress, 'the actual state of the discipline, instruction, police, administration, fiscal affairs and other concerns' of the Military Academy; that the information sought for by the board, in the discharge of their duties, by inquiry and request for written or other communications from the members of the academic and military staffs, or from any other officers or persons within the command at West Point, is of the nature of testimony; and this board does not recognize the right of the superintendent of the academy and commandant of the post to supervise the said testimony, whether written or oral, or to require the same to pass through his hands, but denies the propriety of his claim to any such supervision or inspection.

*Resolved*, That the secretary immediately communicate a copy of the foregoing resolution to Brigadier General Cullum, the superintendent of the academy."

These resolutions being forwarded by the superintendent to the War Department for instructions, the board are gratified to learn, from copies of correspondence communicated to them, that the Secretary of War is of opinion that "the department has no authority over the board of visitors to direct its course of procedure for acquiring information upon the points concerning which it is required to make report." If it were otherwise, it must be very obvious that circumstances might some time exist under which a board of visitors might be crippled of its usefulness, and defeated in the pursuits of the very information it might be most important to obtain. These remarks, however, and the course of the present board in this matter, are not to be understood as meaning any impeachment of the present superintendent, so far as relates to the general exercise of the duties of his office, or as intimating any disposition manifested on his part to interfere with or limit the general scope of the inquiries instituted by them. On the contrary, the most perfect facility in every other respect for

pursuing their investigations has been most courteously, and at all times, afforded by General Cullum himself, as well as by all others sharing in the government or management of the academy. There was only an issue made with him in regard to the proper legal power of the visitors, in which they believed him honestly mistaken in his intervention; and they considered it a duty to themselves and to the government to maintain and vindicate their right of free investigation. But, to their surprise and regret, they find that General Cullum does not understand the letter of the Secretary of War to him as sustaining the position taken by the board, but still persists in requiring the information given by his officers to come only through him. Several such communications, when the call for them was renewed, have been thus forwarded just as the board is closing its session. By reference to the most of these it will be seen that the writers are remarkably reticent or unwilling to speak in regard to the academy in any way; and it is only to be left to conjecture how far such declining to testify may or may not have been affected by the fact that their letters must pass under the examination of their commanding officer.

Referring to the accompanying reports of the several committees charged with the consideration of special subjects, and to the suggestions furnished by officers of the academy, it is not deemed necessary to repeat the details contained therein, nor enlarge the views and reasoning on the different points presented. The members of the board are agreed in the following general conclusions and recommendations, which they propose as embodying all that they think most important now to be urged for the future increased usefulness of the institution:

1. We are of opinion that the law should be so changed as that the superintendency of the academy may be thrown open to the whole army, instead of confining the selection, as now, to an officer of the engineer corps. The institution having ceased to be only, or mainly, a school for engineers, as at first established, and having become the one great national military and polytechnic institute of our country, the reason for such exclusiveness no longer exists, and it is recommended that the appointment be free hereafter to every arm of the service.

2. Looking to the probable organization and increase of the army of the United States, and finding that with the present accommodations, and at a comparatively small increased expense, a greater number can be educated than are now admitted to the academy, we recommend that the corps of cadets be increased to four hundred; but this increase should of course be made gradually and in successive years, so as to keep up a due proportion and equality of numbers in the different classes. We desire, however, not to be understood in this recommendation as proposing to interfere with a system which we trust will be adopted for commissioning a large proportion of officers from the ranks or from civil life, on proper examination. The demand will be ample enough to require both sources of supply; and we are clearly satisfied that, in justice to the many meritorious officers and soldiers of volunteers who have shown their patriotic devotion to the country in its late hour of trial and need, selections should be made, and commissions given to all those who can establish claims to appointment by reasonable proof of capacity and acquirements, taken in connexion with actual service in the field. On this point, too, we beg leave to suggest that it might be a wise and just act of legislation for Congress to extend the age of admission to the academy to twenty-four years, for the benefit of those young men who have been not less than two years in the military service of the United States during the late war of rebellion, thus making their cases exceptional to the general rule.

3. Since the act of 1812 the standard of admission to the academy has been limited to reading, writing, the four ground rules of arithmetic, proportion, and vulgar and decimal fractions. We adopt the recommendation contained in the report of the Committee on Instruction, that the standard for admission be raised

by the addition of English grammar, descriptive geography, particularly of our own country, and the history of the United States. With the standard thus raised, not only a better class of students would enter the academy, but a great and very much-needed relief to the crowded courses of the first and second classes would be obtained by the transfer of studies proposed by the committee, which could be effected in consequence of the time saved by the previous acquirement of the branches recommended.

4. As connected with this raising of the standard of qualification for admission to the academy, we recommend such change of the law as will require appointments of cadets to be made, under proper conditions and restrictions, one year in advance of the date when they are to enter the institution. This will secure readiness for examination and many of the advantages that would be derived from the establishment of a preparatory school.

5. We repeat the recommendation made so often by former boards of visitors, that some legislative provision be made for competitive examination of candidates for cadetships. Such examinations, for convenience and economy, ought to be held in the several States or districts from which the appointments are to be made, under the supervision of the members of Congress, who by usage have the nominations, and at the expense of the government, which expense need be but trifling in amount, as compared with the great advantages to be gained by the selection of the most promising aspirants.

6. Candidates may now be admitted between the ages of 16 and 21. We recommend that in future no one be received who is under 17 or more than 22 years of age. The severity of the physical training and discipline is such that youths of 16 often do not possess the requisite strength and power of endurance. A greater maturity of mind and body of those entering seems desirable.

7. Our attention has been attracted to the fact that under existing regulations the cadets are forbidden to wear whiskers and moustaches. This may seem to be a matter of small consideration; but we are of opinion that while the present close-shaven faces detract from the manly and soldierly appearance of the corps, nothing is gained by this rule, but, on the contrary, perhaps something lost in point of health. We recommend that the regulation be so amended as to allow the entire beard and whiskers to be worn, only requiring that they be kept closely and neatly trimmed, and with as much regard as possible to uniformity of style.

8. In view of the fact that a very large proportion of the cadets who are returned to the academy, after having been found deficient and dismissed by the academic board, fail in their subsequent examinations and are again dismissed, we are decidedly of opinion that the best interests of the institution require that great caution and discrimination should be used in returning those who have thus failed.

9. In accordance with the report of the Committee on Administration, we desire to record our strong disapprobation of the too prevalent habit of profane swearing, as existing among the cadets, and earnestly to recommend that every proper expedient be used to check and suppress a practice so unbecoming and pernicious; and we also advise the establishment of public daily prayers for the cadets, at such hours as may not conflict with other exercises in the academy, and in accordance with the practice of other colleges in the country.

10. It will be observed that the Committee on Administration have in their report animadverted with severity on the practice of "hazing," consisting in the gross imposition by the cadets of the classes above on those newly arrived or of the fourth class, as well as their forced exaction from those neophytes of the performance of the most menial offices. The Committee on Discipline have commented on the same subject, and urged the continuance of measures for its effectual suppression. It is, in fact, the English system of "fagging," carried

here sometimes to barbarous extremes. No good, but much harm, can come of such selfish and oppressive custom, and we trust that the Secretary of War will continue to sustain the authorities of the academy in their efforts, by abridgement of furloughs and other fitting punishments, to entirely break it up.

11. We concur in the view taken by the Committee on Discipline of the propriety of introducing into the system of punishments of cadets a more marked distinction between gross offences, or such as involve moral turpitude, and such as are more strictly conventional, and in violation only of necessary regulations. Many delinquencies of the latter class, which are now punished by demerit marks, and which marks accumulate against the offender, who may be only careless and mischievous, but not bad or unpromising, and go to affect his class standing, it appears to us might better be followed by some fitting penalty on the spot, and so done with. For such comparatively trivial offences a prompt and certain punishment would be better, without reserving the added chances of degradation or dismissal, except in cases of repeated petty misdoing, where the penalty might still be loss of future standing, not for the original breach of rules, but for the spirit of incorrigibility manifested, by perseverance in such behavior.

12. We recommend that a first assistant professor of the Spanish language be provided for, to be put on the same footing as first assistant professor in the other branches of study. The board are gratified to learn, from the clear and full statement reported by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, that the accounts of the academy and post have been kept during the past year in the most accurate and satisfactory manner.

Among the objects of proper expenditure to be brought to the attention of Congress, the board of visitors especially urge for favorable consideration the great necessity for an improved system of ventilation and heating of the barracks and other academic buildings; an improvement in the apparatus for cooking for the cadets; repairs of the hospital building, including the introduction of baths for the sick; the construction of water-closets in the library building, and a supply of new furniture for the recitation rooms, much of that now in use having become dilapidated and worthless. The need of appropriations for these several purposes is set forth fully in the report of the Committee on Police, and the board concur in their recommendations. The Secretary of War can cause exact estimates of the cost of these several proposed supplies and improvements to be furnished to him, if he should prefer not to depend on those submitted by that committee.

The board concur also with the recommendations made by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, that sufficient appropriations be made for the removal and enlargement of the gas house and works, which are now inadequate to the wants of the academy and post; for the removal and reconstruction of the magazine, which is now in strange and dangerous proximity to the engineer barrack and other buildings, and for a thorough repair of the officers' quarters.

Another improvement proposed by the Committee on Administration has been thought by the board worthy of special mention and recommendation. It is an extension of the cemetery. If the argument for enlargement of that most interesting and sacred spot should not prevail over the objection of economy, it is hoped that a sum may be obtained at least sufficient to repair the present dilapidated enclosure and clear up the neglected paths, so as to show decent respect for the last resting place of the honored brave, and the smitten hopes of our country, whose graves occupy that beautiful plateau.

Among many improvements made during the administration of the present superintendent is one of peculiar and touching interest: it is the device of placing on the walls of the chapel neat marble tablets, or mural monuments, inscribed with the names of those dead army officers who have in the past been made illustrious by rank, or gallant deeds of arms, or have fallen in battle. It was a happy

thought to be executed at this particular place. It is most fitting that the United States Military Academy, the nation's great school of arms, should be made to perpetuate such names and histories; thus keeping before the eyes and present in the memories of the young men here educated the noble example of faithful service and devotion to our common country.

The board recommend that the tasteful and enduring record thus begun shall be continued, and that means be furnished to extend the same mark of respect to all the officers of our army, regulars and volunteers alike, who have suffered and fallen in the war just closed in a glorious and successful struggle to vindicate the honor and maintain the life of the nation. Happy for the recreants who fought to destroy their government if, in the light shed from such a brilliant roll of the faithful, their names and treasonable career could be thrown into deeper shadow of oblivion!

For continuing the erection of these memorial tablets, including a mural monument to Washington, for which an appropriate design has been made, the board earnestly recommend an appropriation by Congress of five thousand dollars.

Such a sum will also enable the superintendent to finish a now incomplete arrangement for the preservation of many of the most interesting trophies of war which have accumulated here; and especially to inscribe suitably with the names of the battles in which they were taken some of the finer pieces of ordnance that have been captured during the rebellion and sent here for keeping. Let these lasting lessons, engraved on stone, and bronze, and iron, fill and stimulate the hearts and minds of those whose special task it must be hereafter to aid in upholding and defending our flag and all that it represents.

Let those who may come here in the future to prepare for such duty from States once in insurrection hail the sight of these proofs that the parricidal attempt of their fathers was a failure. And let all unite in cultivating by every help and influence that which now, more than ever before, seems to be a growing and strengthening sentiment at this national school of military and general science, that the truest and most precious interests, duties, and inheritance of the soldier and the citizen are one, the same, and can never be separated.

ROBERT C. SCHENCK, *of Ohio,*  
*President of the Board.*  
F. A. CONKLING *of New York,*  
*Secretary of the Board.*  
JOHN M. FESSENDEN, *Massachusetts.*  
ALFRED P. ROCKWELL, *Connecticut.*  
J. F. DRIGGS, *Michigan.*  
THOMAS COTTMAN, *Louisiana.*  
D. H. BINGHAM, *Alabama.*  
MORTON S. WILKINSON, *Minnesota.*  
J. D. LYMAN, *New Hampshire.*  
CHRIS. C. COX, *Maryland.*  
A. G. MACKAY, *South Carolina.*  
J. B. THOMAS, *California.*  
A. P. KELSEY, *Maine.*  
J. W. NYE, *Nevada.*  
HENRY W. LEE, *Iowa.*  
DAVID L. SWAIN, *North Carolina.*  
WYLLY WOODBRIDGE, *Georgia.*

WEST POINT, N. Y., *June 26, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 5th instant, transmitting a resolution of the board of visitors requesting the academic staff to "communicate in writing their views and suggestions regarding the future management and requirements of this institution, &c., &c." Official duties have prevented my giving it earlier attention. I now have to reply as follows:

The laws enacted in 1802 and 1812, under authority of which the Military Academy was established, were an acknowledgment by Congress of the necessity of a special training for officers of engineers and artillery. At that time the wants of the military service were inconsiderable as compared with those of the present day, and the prevailing ideas of what a military education should include were widely different from those which prevail now. Whatever may have been the original design of its founders, it is clear that in its sphere of usefulness the Military Academy has far outgrown that which was primarily proposed. Its graduates not only fill all grades of command in the army, but large numbers have returned to the pursuits of civil life, and carried with them into almost every community in the land the influences they have there received.

The experience of the present war has impressed on the national mind not only the advantages, but the absolute necessity, of a military education for officers of our army, and has proved the value of the academy in giving that training; but it has also deepened a wide-spread conviction of the importance of imbuing its graduates with such a spirit of true nationality and unswerving loyalty, that at no future time shall the spectacle be presented of men educated at the nation's expense, and fostered by its hand, turning against it in the hour of its severest trials, and using the knowledge they owed to its generosity to destroy it. Established, as the academy was, as a school of engineers and artillery; managed, as it has been for over sixty years, by the engineer department, that department would have been neglectful of its trust if it had been forgetful of the special duties assigned it, and had not made its interests, if not of the first, at least of eminent importance. But to make the school more strictly of national value and less special than heretofore, its administration must be modified and placed on a broader foundation, for experience teaches how unwise it is to intrust important national interests to any one set of men who have one principal end to subserve, whose antecedents and whose professional experiences are identical, and who, from the very nature of their interests, their education and their habits, no matter what may be the changes in the wants of the army or the country, find it difficult to adjust themselves to the new order of things these changes necessarily create. The Military Academy has well answered what was originally required of it, and much more; it has given good engineers and numbers of other gallant officers to the army. But now that the whole army, vastly increased in numbers, looks to it more than ever before as the fountain-head of its professional education, it seems but proper, and more consonant with our experience in all other branches of the government, that the academy should be re-established on a broader and more liberal basis, at once more consonant with the character of, and more worthy, the great nation which sustains it. Without discussing at length the reasons for the changes here proposed, I shall simply present them as follows. I consider it of the first importance that the whole matter of military education should be taken out of the hands of the engineer department, to which it is now by law solely intrusted, and that the administration of the affairs of the Military Academy, and any other national military schools for special purposes which it may hereafter seem proper to establish, shall be confided, under due authority of law, to a *separate bureau of the War Department*, distinct and

independent of all the other bureaus of that department—termed, for instance, the *Bureau of Military Education*.

This bureau should be charged with all the details of business connected with the Military Academy now assigned to the engineer bureau at Washington, and should be the sole medium between the academy and the Secretary of War. It should have at its head a *general officer*, selected from all the general officers in service, solely for his fitness for the duty, to be appointed to the position by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.

It should be provided by law that no officer should hold the office after reaching the age of fifty (50) years.

The superintendent of the Military Academy should be the very best man who could be selected from the whole army. The position demands the highest order of ability, joined with a peculiar aptitude for its special duties; and in the selection of such a man there should be *no restriction whatever as to corps or rank*.

It would be a most remarkable condition of things if outside of the corps of engineers there could be found no officer competent to execute the duties of this position; but if the officers of engineers were superior to all others in the army in their fitness for the duty, the selection could then be made, as now, from that body. In view of the importance of the trust and the number of officers constantly on duty at the post, the superintendent should have *the local rank and the pay and emoluments of a brigadier general*.

No officer should be appointed to or retain the position after he was *fifty (50) years of age*.

#### ACADEMIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMOTION IN THE ARMY.

The recommendations of the academic board for the promotion of graduates into the army are based on the *general standing* of the class according to merit in the various studies pursued: in general terms, those who graduate the highest being recommended for the engineers and all other corps *below*; all coming after these, for the ordnance and corps below; the next in order of merit for the artillery, cavalry and infantry, and the lower half of the class for the cavalry and infantry. There is no fixed rule followed as to where the lines of demarcation between these grades of merit shall be drawn; but the theory is, that only those are recommended for special corps who are eminently fitted for them. Too many instances can be adduced to show that *practically* this is not the case, but that the distinctions deduced from the *numerical* positions of the graduates are for the most part entirely arbitrary, and convey no exact idea of the fitness of the individual for particular duties or pursuits of the *practical* nature of which he must necessarily be entirely ignorant. When these recommendations come to be taken in connexion with the actual wants of the service at the time a class graduates, still greater inconsistencies arise, and the results are that constantly appointments are made most unsuitable and unfortunate, if fitness alone is considered as the standard.

So long as the academy retains its present status as a school of engineers, in the eye of the law, so long it may be proper that the present system of promotion from the academy to the army should obtain; but if the school is to be used for the benefit of the army as a whole, it appears to me to be much more just to the graduates and to the various corps, as well as more consistent with the spirit of our government, to put every graduate at once into such arm of service *in the line of the army* as each may select, where, by actual duty with troops for one or two years, he may first acquire that practical every-day knowledge essential to every officer, no matter what his position or talents, and from the line pass to that special staff-corps for whose duties he has an aptitude, by pre-

senting himself before a board of officers of that corps, and undergoing such an examination as may be prescribed for such applicant.

Vacancies in the staff corps should only be filled from the line of the army in this way. It is more just to those meritorious officers in the line who may not have graduated at West Point, while it deprives the graduate of the Military Academy of none of the advantages which his West Point education has given him. It avoids all appearances of exclusiveness in the selection of staff officers; it makes the officers of each staff corps responsible for the new men who are allowed to enter its ranks, and fills these corps with devoted and willing servants.

#### SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION.

The present system of having professors appointed from civil life at the heads of departments of instruction, assisted by officers of the army detailed for the purpose, is a good one, provided that, in the case of the professors, a suitable selection is originally made, and that age, disease, or other infirmity has not impaired their powers; and that in the case of the officers, those only are selected as assistants whose talents and acquirements peculiarly fit them for the special duties they are called upon to perform.

With regard to the professors, in the usual order of events, the time must inevitably arrive when they will not be as well fitted for their duties as in the prime of life; the burdens of advancing age must, of necessity, impair their physical if not their mental vigor, and thus unfit them for the labors which their positions demand.

Owing to the comparatively recent establishment of the present system of instruction, this question has not yet presented itself for practical solution, but it is one which must soon be met and answered.

I would suggest that by means of suitable legislation it be provided that after a certain period of continued service as a professor, say twenty years, or after any incumbent shall have attained fifty years of age, such professor be honorably retired, and the vacancy filled by a new appointment; that professors so retired should receive the full pay to which they might be entitled at the date of their surrendering their office; and that, so long as they held their retired positions, they should be considered as honorary members of the academic board, but having no privilege of voting with it when acting as a deliberative body. Liberality in this matter is true economy, as with such inducements the best talent could be secured; and by fixing the limit of age at fifty, the institution will be likely to secure the services of these gentlemen during the best period of life, when they will not be so apt, as later, to rely solely on the antecedents and experience of the past, and fail to keep pace with the advances of the age in their several specialties.

The duties of chaplain and professor of ethics are now united in one person, and in this matter a change is much needed. In addition to the unsuitableness of a clergyman for the position of an instructor in common, international, and military law, as well as the practice of courts-martial, there is abundant work in each department for one person. Both are most important, and should not be neglected. But if it is proper that the duties of both should be executed, it is proper that suitable provision should be made for each. As it is now, the position is one of great responsibility; and no matter how assiduous the incumbent may be, some of his duties must be neglected. The government can afford to correct this faulty economy, and it should be done as soon as possible.

With regard to the officers detailed as assistants, it should be provided *by law* that no officer of the army should return to the academy as an instructor in any branch in which cadets are students, under a period of five years from the date

of his graduation, and that no officer be detailed for any duty at the academy who has not served with troops, doing the duties appropriate to his corps, for at least one year. The reason for this is, that cadets do not and cannot have that respect for men with whom they have been associated at the academy, as they would for officers who are socially entire strangers, and whom they know have actually served with troops. The evils arising from a violation of these rules are too apparent to need special comment.

Where officers prove themselves fitted for the academic duties intrusted to them, they should not be removed from the position without the most urgent reasons, and as a rule they should remain at the academy at least three or four years.

Unless some such rule is established great injury results to the educational interests of the cadets, who, especially in the lower sections of the classes, find it difficult to accommodate themselves to the idiosyncracies of a succession of teachers, each of whom has a different method of imparting instruction. So far as the officer himself is concerned, nothing is better calculated to discourage in him any desire for improvement, or to render him discontented with his position.

The course of ordnance and gunnery, to a military man, is one of the most important studied at the academy. Too little time is now given to the subject. Captain Benton's work—the only text-book used—contains five hundred pages of octavo matter, which is arranged so as to give twenty-seven lessons of, say, eighteen pages each, and nine lessons on review, of fifty-five pages each. The most attentive student cannot master the subject in this brief period, and to acquire a good knowledge of it will need at least double the time now devoted to it. Of the two studies pursued by the first class—Spanish and ordnance—there can be no hesitation as to which is of the highest importance to an officer, and probably from the time given to Spanish the required time could best be taken.

A suitable room for making trials with the electro-ballistic machine, and other apparatus used in teaching this branch, is much needed. No conveniences whatever for such a purpose are now available.

#### INCREASE OF THE CORPS.—MANNER OF MAKING APPOINTMENTS.

The question of increasing the number of cadets depends entirely upon the plan adopted by the government concerning the appointment of officers in the army, and the numerical size of the army. For one of 50,000 men, organized on the present system, not less than 3,500 officers will be required. The current casualties from all causes in ordinary times of peace may be stated at about eight per cent. of the whole number in service, or about 280 new appointments would have to be made annually, to keep the force of officers at its maximum number.

For the purpose of encouraging the enlistment of an intelligent and reliable class of American young men, say one-third of these vacancies should be filled directly from the rank and file of the army, either as the reward for gallant and meritorious services, or upon the recommendation of boards of examiners appointed for the purpose; the other two-thirds of the appointments should be given to graduates of the Military Academy, all of whom should be commissioned in the line of the army, as heretofore prescribed. This would require about two hundred graduates each year; and if the course of study extended over four years, would give between eight and nine hundred cadets under instruction at the same time.

To meet the casualties usual in such cases, and to give two hundred graduates, two hundred and fifty appointments must necessarily be made each year. A portion of these would be made, as now, by members of the House of Representatives and the President; but I deem it of great importance, and a measure productive of the greatest benefit to the army, in recommending its ranks to the

young men of the country, that at least one hundred, or certainly one-third, of these appointments be given to young men in the ranks of the army.

Such a plan would afford every young man in the nation an opportunity of competing for a West Point cadetship, unassisted by any political influences; and as a further reward for his talents and industry, the opportunity of competing for a position in a staff corps, which positions are now (except in the Ordnance department, under the law of March 3, 1864) entirely beyond the reach of any except graduates of the Military Academy.

#### INSPECTIONS.

No matter what plans may be adopted for the administration of the academy and for interior discipline and instruction of the cadets, thorough inspections, frequently made, of all parts of the machinery of the institution, are imperatively required to insure the best results, and to enable the people to judge correctly of the manner in which its affairs are administered by those charged with this duty.

There should be two kinds of inspections and inspectors. An inspection in the name of the nation by a board of visitors appointed by the President, as now provided by law, whose duty it should be to make themselves perfectly acquainted, by frequent and critical examinations, with the actual state of discipline, instruction, police, administration, fiscal, and all other important concerns of the academy; in short, to see that a healthy national tone pervades the institution, and that the wishes of the nation are carried out fully and properly.

The board should be appointed to serve for one year. A portion of its members should be selected with a view to their acquirements in the particular sciences taught at the academy; a portion for their legal, and others for their military attainments, with the object of having on the board one member thoroughly conversant with at least one of the subjects taught.

I mention the appointment of members for *one year* in order that time may be given for several visits to the academy. To inspect any matter or object critically requires a perfect knowledge of every detail on the part of the inspector; and as most of the members of the board must necessarily be unfamiliar with the interior working of the different parts of the system of administration, time is needed to enable them to comprehend and grasp the whole subject.

The inspections of the board should be made at least three times a year, and such visits should be *unexpected*, in order that the academy may be examined in its *real every-day condition*, rather than, as now, merely in June, at a time when it wears its holiday garments in anticipation of the annual official visit of the board. For instance, the want of a proper system of ventilation and heating can only be appreciated by visiting the public buildings in the winter months; the method of imparting instruction from day to day in the section rooms can only be judged of when the usual routine of study is in progress. No correct judgment can be formed on these matters in the month of June, when fires are extinguished and all academic duty is suspended.

With regard to local improvements which are needed, the subject of heating and ventilating the public buildings first demands attention. A very cursory examination of the arrangements for these purposes, now in use, will convince any one familiar with such matters of their radical defects and of the importance of an entire reformation in this respect. From my own observation I can assert that there is not a room or hall among all the buildings here, in which, at present, every principle of good ventilation is not violated or ignored.

I am of the opinion that if these buildings were properly warmed and ventilated, it would reduce the percentage of sickness in the corps from ten to twenty per cent.

The board (of which I am a member) having this subject under consideration will shortly be able to make their report. It will recommend that the general features of the systems adopted for the purposes required at the New York State insane asylum at Utica, and the new city hospital at Boston, be carried out here. To be effectual, the reformation must be thorough, no matter what it cost; any temporizing with present defects, or patching, will only prove the most costly in the end.

The magazine, now situated just below the plain, in the midst of the village, occupied by the enlisted men belonging to the post, and their families, and but seventy or eighty feet from the engineer barracks, (about to be occupied by one hundred men,) is a standing comment on the inconsistency of the military principles taught cadets and our every-day practice. Should any accident occur, of course no one would be to blame. Every dictate of prudence requires that it should be at once removed to a better site.

A building for the preservation of the many valuable trophies now deposited here, for the models required for purposes of instruction in the departments of engineering, ordnance, and artillery, for a museum of arms, both foreign and American, and containing, besides, a suitable hall for holding examinations, is greatly needed.

In conclusion it may be remarked, that while none can deny that the Military Academy has during the war most signally proved its inestimable value to the nation, and its loyal graduates have won for their *alma mater* a name of which she may justly be proud, it cannot be gainsaid that, as in all such establishments, there still exists room for improvement, and that while the academy has many warm friends, it also has many opponents. It should be our aim to remove the objections which are urged by the latter, and make it so national in its influences and so complete in its training that there can be no room for cavil.

It has been urged, with some truth, that the tendency of a West Point education is to make officers of the army somewhat forgetful of the fact that they are citizens of a republic as well as military custodians of its rights, and that their training is apt to make them ignore those questions of national interest which in a republican form of government naturally interest and agitate the people. It remains to be seen whether the mental and social training necessary for a thorough military education can be made reconcilable and consistent with the spirit of our American institutions; but I sincerely believe that a judicious, liberal and wise system of military instruction on a national basis can be devised, which will be consonant with, and yet characteristic of, our institutions, and which will give to the nation a class of educated military men, who, in their devotion to the service and profession they shall choose, will never forget the higher duties and obligations they owe to that nation as American citizens.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. T. BALCH,

*Captain Ordnance Corps, Instructor Ordnance and Gunnery.*

Hon. F. A. CONKLING,  
*Secretary Board of Visitors, present.*

## REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,

ORDNANCE OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,

October 20, 1865.

SIR: I submit the following report of the principal operations of the Ordnance department during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1865, with such remarks and recommendations as the interests of that branch of the military service seem to require.

The fiscal resources and the disbursements of the department, during the year, were as follows, viz:

Amount of appropriations remaining in the treasury June 30, 1864.....	\$4, 978, 791 97
In the government depositories, to the credit of disbursing officers, on same date.....	1, 797, 387 16
Amount of appropriations from 30th June, 1864, to 30th June, 1865, including the fixed annual appropriation for arming and equipping the militia.....	38, 800, 000 00
Received since June 30, 1864, on account of damages to arms in hands of troops, from sales of arms to officers, and of condemned stores, and from all other sources not before mentioned.....	207, 476 97
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>45, 783, 656 10</b>
Amount of expenditures since June 30, 1864.....	\$43, 112, 531 27
In the government depositories, to the credit of disbursing officers, June 30, 1865.....	2, 671, 124 83
Amount of appropriations remaining in the Treasury same date, .....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>45, 783, 656 10</b>

The estimates for the next fiscal year call for appropriations only for continuing the armament of our permanent fortifications, and for the work already begun for increasing the manufacturing and storage capacity of the arsenals, including a distinct provision for the proper storage and care of gunpowder. These are all measures not confined to the necessities of war, but requisite for keeping up a suitable preparation for any contingency, and for preserving the large and valuable munitions of war which the country now possesses.

The manufacturing capacity of the arsenals was steadily increased from the date of my last report until May, when the sudden termination of hostilities made it apparent that the immediate demand for munitions of war, beyond the supply then on hand and contracted for, had ceased.

Measures were promptly taken to reduce the manufacture and purchase of supplies, and to provide for necessary storage, and for preserving the vast quantities of ordnance and ordnance stores which had been issued to the armies and captured from the enemy. Extensive temporary buildings have been erected at some of the principal arsenals, and much of this property has already been received and securely stored in them.

Large and commodious fire-proof workshops are now being erected at Allegheny, Watervliet, and Frankford arsenals; and so much of these buildings as will not be required, in time of peace, for manufacturing purposes, can be advantageously used as storehouses, of which the want of an adequate supply is now manifest.

It is in contemplation to erect extensive fire-proof workshops at Washington

arsenal, which is considered an eligible position for a first-class arsenal. A portion of these shops can likewise be used for storing the large quantities of ordnance supplies which are now necessarily kept in insecure temporary buildings at that arsenal. Money for this object has already been appropriated by Congress.

The importance to the country of having the armaments placed in the forts as rapidly as they can be prepared to receive them is so evident, that I have caused the manufacture of sea-coast gun-carriages to be continued as rapidly as practicable at the two arsenals which possess the proper facilities for making them; and orders have been given to the several founders, who have been engaged in making heavy guns for this department, for as many guns as carriages can be made for.

I have been informed by the chief engineer that he will be prepared to receive guns in the forts faster than carriages can now be made, and it is in contemplation to increase the capacity for manufacturing sea-coast carriages.

Experimental wrought-iron field and siege gun-carriages have also been made and tested, with results so satisfactory as to render it certain that these carriages may be advantageously substituted for the wooden carriages, and it is proposed to make no more gun-carriages of wood.

The smooth-bore cannon of large calibre which have been used during the war have given satisfaction, and are regarded as perfectly reliable. The great importance of having reliable rifled guns of large calibre is universally admitted, and the attention of this government, and of the nations of Europe, has been directed to that object; but so far, it is believed, without entire success in its accomplishment.

The many failures, by bursting, of the celebrated Parrott guns in the land and naval service have weakened confidence in them, and make it the imperative duty of this department to seek elsewhere for a more reliable rifle gun.

Mr. Horatio Ames, of Falls Village, Connecticut, invented a plan of making wrought-iron guns, which many believe would possess those qualities which are so very desirable for guns of heavy calibre, and although the cost of these guns was necessarily very great in comparison with the cost of cast-iron guns, a conditional order was given to Mr. Ames to manufacture fifteen of them for the government; the condition being that the guns should be superior to any rifled guns in the service. One of these guns was fired under the direction of a board of officers, who unanimously expressed the opinion that the "Ames wrought-iron guns possess, to a degree never before equalled by any cannon of equal weight offered to our service, the essential qualities of great lateral and longitudinal strength, and great powers of endurance under heavy charges; that they are not liable to burst explosively and without warning, even when fired under very high charges; and that they are well adapted to the wants of the service generally, but especially whenever long ranges and high velocities are required." The board also expressed the opinion that the fifteen Ames seven-inch guns possessed sufficient weight and strength to receive an eight-inch bore, and recommended that the gun which had been fired under their direction should be reamed up to eight inches and subjected to further trial.

They further decided, that Mr. Ames had fulfilled the obligation incurred by him in his contract to furnish the gun, and that so many of the guns as should endure a proof of ten rounds with the service charge, and pass the proper inspection, should be accepted and paid for.

Two of the fourteen guns burst in proof, exhibiting serious defects in their manufacture—defects in welding—which I had been apprehensive could not be avoided. The guns which endured the proof of ten rounds were accepted and paid for by this department.

The gun which was fired under the direction of the board was bored up to eight inches and fired twenty-four times with service charges, when it burst.

exhibiting the same defects that were developed in the other guns which burst. The failures in subsequent firing indicate that these guns cannot be relied upon, and that no more of them ought to be made for the department.

Believing that, with our present knowledge of the properties of metals and our skill in working them, reliable rifle guns of large calibre can be made of cast-iron, I have, with your sanction, caused a pair of eight-inch rifle guns of the supposed proper model and weight to be made. These guns are now at Fort Munroe, undergoing extreme proof, and should their endurance be satisfactory, it is proposed to have other guns like them made.

#### NATIONAL ARMORY.

The capacity of this establishment for the manufacture of muskets was not increased after the date of my last report, and upon the conclusion of hostilities, in view of the large number of muskets on hand of a model which will probably become obsolete very soon, the manufacture was reduced as rapidly as it could be done with economy; and at present no new muskets are being assembled. Only those parts which were in different stages of advancement are being finished.

In my last report I stated that it was in contemplation to change the manufacture at the national armory as soon as the best model for a breech-loading musket could be established, and that details for effecting this measure would receive the early attention of this bureau. Extensive experiments have been made by a board of officers, and also under my direction and supervision, to effect that object; but as yet, no arm has been presented which I have been willing to recommend for adoption. The selection of a proper model is considered so important a measure, that I have preferred to act slowly and with great care in its selection, rather than take a false step and have to retrace it. I hope to be able very soon to recommend a model for your approval.

A plan for altering the muzzle-loading musket into efficient breech-loaders has been devised by the master armorer at Springfield armory, which appears to be superior to any other that I have seen. I have taken measures to have five thousand muskets altered according to it, and will have some of them issued to troops for trial as soon as the alterations can be made.

The muskets of the prescribed pattern which have been turned in by the troops are being cleaned and repaired.

The number of Springfield muskets on hand and suitable for issue will reach nearly one million, while the number of foreign and captured muskets will exceed half a million. As none of the latter class will probably be required for issue, and as the care and preservation of them will be attended with considerable expense, they should be sold whenever suitable prices can be obtained for them. This recommendation will apply to other ordnance stores of a perishable nature, which are in excess of the wants of the department.

In my last annual report I called your attention to the danger of keeping large quantities of gunpowder at our arsenals, which are generally in the vicinity of closely populated districts, and recommended that a suitable site for a depot capable of storing at least one hundred thousand barrels of gunpowder should be acquired. The conclusion of the war has left this department with vast supplies of gunpowder and prepared ammunition on hand, all of which has to be stored at the arsenals, and much of it in buildings which are entirely unfit for the purpose; thereby endangering the safety of the arsenals, and in some cases of private property in the vicinity. This evil cannot be corrected too soon, and I earnestly call your attention to the necessity of obtaining from Congress authority to purchase a suitable site for a powder depot.

In my annual estimate I have asked for an appropriation for the purchase of

a site and the erection of magazines. Only so much powder as may be necessary to supply the current wants of the army should be kept at the arsenals.

The military reserve at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, being a suitable position for a powder depot, for supplying the Mississippi valley, and a portion of it having some years ago been assigned to this department for the erection of powder magazines, I have taken measures to have three magazines, capable of containing five thousand barrels each, erected on it; and two of them will be finished this fall.

In my last annual report I stated that, in pursuance of the provisions of the act of Congress approved April 19, 1864, possession had been taken of Rock island, for the purpose of building and maintaining thereon an arsenal for the construction, deposit, and repairs of arms and munitions of war. The United States has not yet acquired a title to the property which has been taken possession of. It is important that the provisions of the act of Congress above referred to should be carried into effect, and a complete title to all of Rock island acquired by the United States before any permanent buildings are commenced. I recommend that this be done with as little delay as practicable. Evidences of title to the land, of which possession has been taken, have been forwarded to you for examination by the Attorney General, as is required by the act above referred to.

Adjacent to Rock island, and connected with it by a dam, is a small island, known as Benham's island, of which possession has not been taken. It appears to have been the intention of Congress in passing the act above referred to that the United States should have full and complete possession and control of Rock island for military purposes. Should Benham's island, or any other small islands or accretions in the river, lying between Rock island and the shores of Illinois and Iowa, be held by private parties, with the right of way across the island as is now claimed by the owner of Benham's island, the principal object of the law will be thereby defeated.

If additional legislation is necessary to give the United States full possession and control of the whole of Rock island, including the adjacent island, I recommend that it be asked of Congress.

The buildings erected as a prison and barracks on Rock island have been turned over to the Ordnance department, and are now used as storehouses, &c.

Several of the southern arsenals have been reoccupied, and it is the intention of the department to reoccupy all of them, except the Fayetteville arsenal, in North Carolina, which was destroyed.

An extensive powder-mill at Augusta, Georgia, and a large armory (unfinished) and a laboratory at Macon, Georgia, which were built by the rebel government, have fallen into possession of this department. The necessary measures for preserving the property have been taken.

The number of permanent United States arsenals and armories, exclusive of temporary depots established for war purposes, most of which have been, and all of which will soon be discontinued, is now twenty-eight. In addition to the command and supervision of these, the officers of this department are charged with the inspection of materials and manufacture of ordnance, gunpowder, and such small-arms and equipments as are made for the government at the foundries, powder-mills, and other private establishments. These duties furnish constant employment for all the officers of the ordnance corps now authorized by law, the total number of which is sixty-four. The arsenals alone require, as a minimum number in time of peace, fifty-six, and the bureau and inspection duties at least eight more. During the late rebellion the want of a greater number of regular ordnance officers, educated for and experienced in their peculiar duties, was seriously felt; and the necessity, arising from the inadequate provision in this respect, of the frequent employment of acting ordnance officers, caused much embarrassment and confusion, and was detrimental to the public service

and interest. These now require that the additional offices of the ordnance department authorized temporarily by sections 4 and 12 of the act of March 3, 1863, shall be continued as part of the military peace establishment.

The tabular statements accompanying this report show in detail the ordnance, arms, and other ordnance supplies which have been procured and issued through this department during the past fiscal year. The armies in the field were amply and well supplied in this respect. The permanent fortifications have had their armaments kept in order, and strengthened and increased by the addition of guns of heavy calibre and great efficiency.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. B. DYER,

*Brigadier General and Chief of Ordnance.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

*Statement of ordnance, arms, ammunition, and other ordnance stores procured and supplied to the army, and the quantity remaining on hand at the close of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865.*

Articles.	On hand June 30, 1864.	Purchased, fabricated and turned in by the army during the year ending June 30, 1865.	Issued to the army and expended in manufacture during the year ending June 30, 1865.	On hand June 30, 1865.
Field guns of different calibres .....	875	1, 235	354	1, 756
Siege guns and mortars of different calibres .....	346	424	32	738
Sea-coast guns and mortars of different calibres ..	812	612	593	831
Cannon balls, shells, and other projectiles for field guns .....	278, 324	969, 130	676, 815	570, 639
Cannon balls, shells, and other projectiles for siege guns and mortars .....	193, 297	332, 305	14, 779	510, 823
Cannon balls, shells, and other projectiles for sea-coast guns and mortars .....	469, 619	317, 658	178, 235	609, 042
Artillery carriages for field service .....	618	725	448	895
Artillery carriages for siege service .....	134	131	109	156
Artillery carriages for sea-coast forts .....	790	545	797	538
Mortar beds .....	142	329	7	464
Caissons .....	616	639	307	948
Travelling forges .....	70	116	87	99
Battery wagons .....	67	97	42	122
Muskets and rifles .....	1, 167, 405	426, 571	398, 404	1, 195, 572
Carbines .....	22, 616	142, 201	99, 051	65, 766
Pistols .....	34, 821	70, 744	37, 503	68, 062
Swords and sabres .....	80, 645	112, 067	64, 692	128, 020
Sets of infantry accoutrements .....	355, 434	336, 130	271, 925	419, 639
Sets of cavalry accoutrements .....	68, 428	127, 850	93, 281	102, 997
Sets of horse equipments .....	26, 958	142, 497	95, 030	74, 425
Sets of artillery harness for two horses .....	3, 029	4, 069	1, 255	5, 843
Saddle blankets .....	79, 829	238, 388	197, 940	120, 277
Rounds of ammunition for field guns .....	793, 455	702, 156	286, 925	1, 208, 686
Rounds of ammunition for siege guns and mortars ..	53, 009	42, 738	15, 236	80, 511
Rounds of ammunition for sea-coast guns and mortars ..	4, 805	54, 465	4, 631	54, 639
Rounds of ammunition for small-arms .....	209, 315, 880	261, 636, 538	188, 784, 530	282, 167, 888
Percussion caps .....	150, 931, 237	178, 211, 512	238, 063, 778	91, 078, 971
Friction primers .....	1, 251, 842	2, 242, 900	1, 583, 640	1, 911, 102
Fuzes .....	980, 854	1, 300, 012	719, 678	1, 561, 188
Pounds of powder .....	2, 329, 230	6, 619, 925	5, 582, 330	3, 366, 825
Pounds of nitre .....	8, 120, 240	-----	21, 254	8, 098, 986
Pounds of sulphur .....	622, 054	-----	213, 122	408, 932
Pounds of lead .....	30, 668, 929	19, 743, 668	10, 751, 494	39, 661, 103
Pounds of lead balls .....	6, 128, 502	11, 295, 637	11, 906, 208	5, 517, 931

A. B. DYER,

*Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance.*

## REPORT OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER OF THE ARMY.

OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER,  
Washington, October 20, 1865.

SIR: In answer to your communication of the 7th instant, I have the honor to submit the following annual report of the operations of the signal corps for the year ending October 20, 1865:

On the 1st of November, 1864, the corps was represented in the field by the following detachments, thoroughly equipped, active, and energetic, to wit:

Detachments.	Officers of signal corps.	Acting officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Privates.
Office of the signal officer.....	3	.....	2	9
Department of Washington.....	6	1	5	66
Signal camp of instruction.....	16	4	3	86
Army of the Potomac.....	12	3	13	167
Department of Virginia and North Carolina.....	15	8	14	137
Department of the South.....	7	.....	13	39
Department of the Cumberland.....	9	10	10	87
Department of the Tennessee.....	6	7	7	140
Department of the Ohio.....	4	4	1	42
Military division of West Mississippi.....	10	15	10	210
Department of Kansas.....	2	5	2	51
Middle military division.....	8	8	2	168
Department of the Susquehanna.....	4	1	2	64
Total.....	102	66	84	1,266
		168	1,350	

Such was the disposition of the corps, and the following, in general terms, the nature of services performed:

The duties of the corps during the past year were better understood than in previous years, which gave to it more tone and character, and enabled it to approximate in most of the military departments to its true position.

In one—the department of the Gulf—it combined all the branches of the corps of information which it was designed, and of right ought to be. Here it added to aerial telegraphing, telescopic reconnoitring, and general scouting, the entire secret service department, thus having all information usually gathered from these sources flow into one common centre, where it was compared, classified, reduced to logical form, and then laid before the commanding general to be acted upon. The advantage arising from thus concentrating these services is specially apparent in the fact that particular reports and doubtful information could be thoroughly sifted and tested in two, three, or more, different modes, by the one officer having control of the several means for collecting knowledge of the enemy's movements and designs.

In other military departments, as I have stated, the corps only approximated to this more perfect system of economy. But as the value of concentration in military organizations was being daily more and more recognized, these duties, if the war had continued, would undoubtedly have been eventually assigned to the corps, wherever a detachment of it would have been placed upon duty.

In the army of the Potomac our duties were limited to signal communication, observing and reporting the changes and movements of the enemy, and such aid duty as we were called upon to perform.

In the armies operating under Major General Sherman the signal detachment added to signalling and telescopic reconnoitring general scouting, courier, guide, and aid duty.

The detachment in the department of the South was limited to keeping communication open between the several military posts along the coast, and between the land and naval forces, when operating in conjunction.

Upon the plains a detachment operated with the various expeditions against the Indians, keeping open communication between detached parties and the main body of the army.

In the department of Pennsylvania the signal detachment was employed in watching the crossings of the Potomac, as well as doing general outpost duty, with instructions to give timely information to the commanding general of any threatening danger, that it might be met upon the threshold of the department, and overcome before any injury could be done to the community.

In the department of Virginia and North Carolina, in addition to communicating by signals between portions of the army, and the observing of the movements of the enemy, the detachment was beneficially employed in various expeditions and operations of the army and navy combined, connecting the commanders of the two forces so immediately as to make their several efforts harmonize in such manner that their blows fell with double effect upon the strongholds and battalions of the enemy.

The insurrectionary armies having been, at the opening of the spring campaign, forced to surrender, and the power of the government having been re-established to its rightful extent, the great work of disbanding and returning to the conditions of peace the military force of the United States was commenced. The signal corps of the army having been organized by an act of Congress—which in some of its provisions had a view to permanency, but gave to the corps only an organization for the term of the rebellion—was, by various orders from the War Department, materially reduced, until all that portion of it on duty east of the Mississippi river was mustered out and discharged.

There now remain the detachment in the military division of the Mississippi, numbering nine officers, two non-commissioned officers, and thirty-five enlisted men, and the detachment in the military division of the Gulf, numbering fifteen officers, thirteen non-commissioned officers, and eighty-six enlisted men. These detachments are operating with the troops upon the plains, and throughout Texas, and along the southwestern boundary.

#### OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER.

The office of the signal officer is three-fold in its character. It is, first, the headquarters of the corps, where the records are collected, completed, and filed, and has advisory superintendence and control of the special duties of the corps, and of all assignments of officers and men to signal duty. Second, a purchasing and disbursing office, from which supplies of signal stores and equipments are issued to the various detachments of the corps in the field. Third, an office for the examining of the signal accounts and returns of signal stores of all officers responsible to government for such property.

Connected with this office are two clerks of "class two," to wit, Messrs. Simeon White and Alexander Ashley, appointed in 1863. To the ability and faithful exertions of these persons is owing much of the degree of system and perfection attained in the records of the office.

## EXPENDITURES, ETC.

There were expended during the year ending September 30, 1865, of the sums appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865, eight thousand five hundred and thirty-seven dollars and six cents, leaving a balance, which, added to that yet remaining of former appropriations, and to the amount appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1866, makes the sum of two hundred and forty-eight thousand and sixty-two dollars still available.

## SPECIAL SERVICES.

Having thus given a general view of the corps, its strength, duties, and expenses, I propose, without entering into a detailed statement of the constant and various acts of service performed, which were part and parcel of every battle fought, and campaign made, during the year, and which played in each a more or less important function, to merely place upon record, through the War Department, several instances where the operations of the corps were of such vital importance that all who read must acknowledge that the signal corps was a valuable adjunct to the army, and rendered such material service in the great contest just closed that its members can view with pride and infinite self-satisfaction a substantial record, made in the face of the difficulties that usually attend the introduction of a new element into any old established system.

The first instance of the kind referred to which I shall mention occurred in October, 1864, and just previous to the commencement of the great campaign of General Sherman from the northern part of Georgia to the sea-coast. That great leader, whose military genius never allowed him to overlook any visible means to aid in securing success, or guard against any and all possible occurrences to endanger his plans, in whatever enterprise undertaken, seeing the liability of his telegraph wires communicating with his depot of supplies at Alatoona being cut, he established, in addition, a line of signal communication through which he afterwards, when the enemy obtained a lodgement in his rear and cut his telegraph wires, as was foreseen, transmitted his orders and instructions that saved from capture Alatoona, its garrison, and stores of supplies, the value of which, at that time and place, cannot be computed, as without them it can well be doubted whether the great campaign, which exposed the great weakness of the enemy and propagated the seeds of the coming dissolution of the rebellion, could have been executed for months later. In connexion with this transaction, General Sherman states: "In several instances this corps (signal corps) has transmitted orders and brought me information of the greatest importance that could not have reached me in any other way. I will instance one most remarkable case. When the enemy had cut our wires and actually made a lodgement on our railroad about Big Shanty, the signal officers on Vining's hill, Kenesaw, and Alatoona sent my orders to General Corse, at Rome, whereby General Corse was enabled to reach Alatoona just in time to defend it. Had it not been for the services of this corps on that occasion, I am satisfied we should have lost the garrison at Alatoona and a most valuable depository of provisions there, which was worth to us and the country more than the aggregate expense of the whole signal corps for one year." This will serve to evince the important character of the services of the corps at times when operating with the army alone. The following account will demonstrate its eminent usefulness where the army and navy operated in conjunction. In the expedition organized to attack Fort Fisher, in the month of January of this year, an army signal officer was with Admiral Porter, commanding the fleet, and others with General Terry, commanding the land forces, who, by means of signals, placed these commanding officers in such immediate communication that the fire of the navy, which otherwise must have slackened after the assault commenced upon the part of the army, was kept up without cessation as the enemy was driven

from traverse to traverse. In this connexion Admiral Porter, in a communication to the Secretary of the Navy, which induced the latter to tender the thanks of the Navy Department to the War Department for this efficient agency, states: "Through Mr. Clemens (signal officer) I was in constant communication with General Terry, even during the assault on Fort Fisher, and was enabled to direct the fire of the New Ironsides to the traverses occupied by the enemy, without fear of hurting our own people, from my complete reliance on him." Thus, through this mobile system of visual telegraphing, the army and navy are made to act as a unit. During the war there were more forcible instances of this kind than the above, when, in most important crises, it would have been impossible for the navy to have rendered the necessary assistance save through the aid of army signals, by means of which its fire was directed to unseen points with almost as much facility and certainty as could have been done if the gunners would have had the object of their aim in view. I would also state here that improvements were made during the year in the simple cipher apparatus used by the corps in sending secret messages which, if they did not absolutely defy deciphering, were of such an intricate and complex character that messages sent thereby cannot possibly be interpreted by the uninitiated within such period as to be of any service to the enemy, even should the messages fall into his hands.

With these references to special transactions of the corps, and having accorded to its members the merit and thanks so well earned by earnest patriotism, by zealous, faithful, and constant exertion to render services throughout the war to their country, and by the success achieved, and having conceded to them the claim that no class of the military was more anxious to be useful, or welcomed with more satisfaction additional duties, we will conclude this report by calling attention to the necessity for additional action, in order to afford, in the future, to the army the requisite signal service.

As experience has clearly demonstrated the eminent advantage of having a signal officer attached to garrisons and posts liable to be besieged, in order to secure communication over the heads of an enemy, should occasion arise, and of having a sufficient number of signal officers as a nucleus that would be immediately available in the event of future wars, it is submitted that such action should be taken by the authorities as would secure for such contingencies the properly instructed officers. This can be done in two modes: either by continuing a small permanent organization with specifically defined duties, or by detailing a certain number of officers from other branches of the service, and directing them to report to the signal officer of the army to be instructed, with a view to their being assigned to such garrisons and posts as it may be deemed necessary to provide with means of signal communication.

If the former mode be adopted, it is recommended that a board of officers, more or less acquainted with the past services of this department, be appointed to report the form of the required organization, and to define, as far as practicable, the specific duties to be assigned it, to avoid, in the future, the great stumbling-block which was left in the way in the past organization, and which, in many instances, crippled the usefulness of the corps by its not being properly understood what it could do, or was expected to do.

It is presumed that no argument need be presented in favor of a new organization, as it is self-evident greater interest would be taken in the service, and greater perfection attained in it, than in a simply acting corps.

I have the honor, sir, to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. FISHER,

*Chief Signal Officer and Colonel U. S. A.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

*Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

## REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL.

## WAR DEPARTMENT,

*Bureau of Military Justice, November 13, 1865.*

SIR: In compliance with your directions, I have the honor to submit as follows in regard to the business transacted by this Bureau since March, 1865, the date of my last official report.

The operations of the Bureau during this period—of about seven and two-thirds months—are briefly presented by the following summary:

1. Number of records of general courts-martial and military commissions received, reviewed, and filed, 16,591.

2. Number of special reports made as to the regularity of proceedings, the pardon of military offenders, the remission or commutation of sentences, and upon the numerous miscellaneous subjects and questions referred for the opinion of this office, including, also, letters of instruction upon military law and practice to judge advocates, reviewing officers, and others, 6,123.

By comparing these details with those presented in March last, it will be perceived that the number of records reviewed is slightly, and that of the special reports very much greater, in proportion to the period of time embraced, than that specified in my last official communication upon the subject, and that the business of the Bureau, especially as an advisory branch of the War Department, has not yet been diminished or sensibly affected by the altered condition of public affairs.

The "Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General," issued by the Bureau in January last, has, as it is inferred from the commendatory judgment expressed to me by department and other commanders, and the fact that it has come into extensive use throughout the army, proved of considerable advantage to the service in contributing to establish a uniformity of decision and action in the administration of military justice; and it is proposed, with your approval, to prepare during the coming winter an enlarged edition of the same, containing, in connexion with those already published, a selection of the official opinions communicated by me during the past year. The present edition of the work has, indeed, because of the constant demand for copies, been very nearly exhausted.

I have to express my satisfaction with the ability and efficiency with which the officers, as well as the clerks, connected with the Office have performed their several duties; and to add that, while the close of the rebellion will doubtless gradually induce a considerable falling off in the business of the Bureau, it is conceived, as this business will probably not be materially diminished for a twelve-month, that the present organization of this branch of the public service may well be continued by Congress.

In concluding this report of the business of this Bureau, it is thought proper to advert to two cases of unusual public importance, which were prepared under its supervision, and tried by military commission, since the last session of Congress—that of the assassins of President Lincoln and their accomplices, and that of Wirz, the keeper of the rebel prison at Andersonville, Georgia.

The first of these cases was brought to trial in May last before a court convened by the President, and composed of two major generals, one brevet major general, three brigadier generals, one brevet brigadier general, a brevet colonel, and a lieutenant colonel. The government was represented by the Judge Advocate General of the army, assisted by an experienced military judge advocate, and by a distinguished lawyer, who had also lately acted for the United States in the conduct of a most important prosecution by court-martial. The

accused were defended by counsel of their own selection, seven in number. The trial occupied fifty-three days—between three and four hundred witnesses, in all, having been examined—and was concluded by seven able and elaborate arguments of counsel; the final reply thereto, and argument, of Hon. John A. Bingham, on the part of the United States, being annexed hereto as part of this report. The formal brief review of the case by this Bureau is also appended.

The inevitable result of this trial had been generally anticipated throughout the country, and has now become matter of history. The most deeply guilty of the conspirators were sentenced to be hung, and their sentence was summarily executed by order of the President. Of the others, three were condemned to imprisonment for life, and one to an imprisonment for six years, at hard labor; and these are now undergoing confinement at the military prison at the Dry Tortugas, Florida.

A full and complete record of the testimony and of the proceedings of the commission has been prepared under the supervision of an officer of the government, and will presently be given to the public. To this publication reference must be had for the details of the evidence upon this momentous state trial.

The case of Wirz was conducted before a commission also constituted by the President, and composed of one major general, three brevet major generals, two brigadier generals, one brevet brigadier general, one brevet colonel, and one lieutenant colonel; the prisoner being represented by two counsel of his choice. The victims of the accused had been so numerous that the mass of testimony was nearly as great as that adduced upon the former trial, and the period of time occupied by the investigation even longer. The number of witnesses examined was one hundred and forty-eight. Of these a considerable proportion had been connected with the rebel military service. Beside the evidence from these sources, much important testimony obtained from the archives of the rebel government—including the records of the prison at Andersonville—was also laid before the commission. The capital sentence in the case was forthwith approved by the President, and this criminal has recently paid such penalty as the law could impose for his repeated murders and other atrocious violations of the laws of civilized warfare.

As it would be impossible to present, in the limits of a brief official report, even an abstract of the evidence upon this trial, a copy is herewith submitted of the address of Colonel N. P. Chipman, judge advocate, which, while containing a lucid discussion of the questions of law involved, exhibits also a most faithful summary of the testimony, much of which, indeed, is set forth in the very language of the witnesses. A copy of the formal review of the proceedings, addressed by this Bureau to the President on the 31st ultimo, is also annexed. It is submitted whether a publication of the record of this case, (similar to that undertaken by private enterprise in the instance of the trial of the assassins,) or of an abridgment of the same, prepared by some proper person, may not well be authorized by Congress, not only that a permanent memorial of the testimony and proceedings may be preserved, but also that the facts of such testimony may be made accessible to every student of the rebellion.

A peculiar characteristic of these state trials, and that which must invest them with a deep historical importance, is the fact, that, while the accused were in each case adjudged to have been guilty of the crimes with which they were charged, the *complicity* in those crimes of *chiefs of the rebellion* was declared by the court in their findings, and upon testimony which is deemed to have fully warranted the conclusions reached. In each case the proof justified the conviction that the prisoners before the court were not merely personally criminals, but *conspirators*; that they were the hirelings and accomplices of the cabal of traitors of whom Davis was the acknowledged chief, and that these traitors were in fact, as well as in law, equally with the accused, responsible for the detestable deeds which were adduced in evidence. The assassination of the

President was portrayed by the testimony as an inspiration of the rebellion, authorized from its seat of government, and executed through its paid agents, whose plan of action was first matured within the territory of a neighboring friendly power.

It is proper to remark that events and testimony disclosed subsequent to this trial have added a powerful support to the conclusions arrived at by the court in reference to the complicity of rebel leaders in the assassination of the President.

The barbarities of Wirz, which resulted in the sacrifice of the lives of at least ten thousand of our helpless prisoners in his hands, were also clearly shown to have been but the revolting features of a system, doubtless devised at Richmond, for the destruction, by starvation and fatal cruelties, of all the federal prisoners of war who should come into the enemy's hands. As there is no baseness too infamous to be incompatible with treason, so, for the execution of the details of this inhuman scheme, fit agents were readily found wearing the rebel uniform, and to these were committed the care and custody of Union prisoners. The administration of Wirz, however, though atrocious in the extreme, was but a striking example of the general system of treatment by the enemy of prisoners of war. Of the enforcement of this system throughout the south, at Richmond, Belle Isle, Salisbury, North Carolina, Florence, South Carolina, Macon and Millen, Georgia, Tuscaloosa, Florida, and at many other localities, the cruelties of Andersonville, as is made to appear by testimony on file in this bureau, were but a forcible illustration. For the result—for the almost countless deaths and lasting injuries by wounds, by starvation, by inhuman punishments, by the maiming and laceration by dogs, by every brutality and by every neglect—the chiefs of the rebel confederacy, the instigators and leaders of the rebellion, should be held responsible; and for these they will be held responsible by the judgment of history and by the abhorrence of the civilized world.

It is to be added that in this case, also, the complicity of the rebel executive in the crimes of the accused was declared by the court in its findings.

This report cannot well be closed without its bearing testimony to the worth and efficiency of *Military Commissions* as judicial tribunals in time of war, as illustrated by these two trials.

These commissions, originating in the necessities of the rebellion, had been proved, by the experience of three years, indispensable for the punishment of public crimes in regions where other courts had ceased to exist, and in cases of which the local criminal courts could not legally take cognizance, or which, by reason of intrinsic defects of machinery, they were incompetent to pass upon. These tribunals had long been a most powerful and efficacious instrumentality in the hands of the Executive for the bringing to justice of a large class of malefactors in the service or interest of the rebellion, who otherwise would have altogether escaped punishment; and it had, indeed, become apparent that, without their agency, the rebellion could hardly, in some quarters, have been suppressed. So conspicuous had the importance of these commissions, and the necessity for their continuance, become, that the highest civil courts of the country had recognized them as part of the military judicial system of the government, and Congress, by repeated legislation, had confirmed their authority and indeed extended their jurisdiction.

But it was not until the two cases under consideration came on to be tried by the Military Commission that its highest excellence was exhibited. It was not merely in that it was unincumbered by the technicalities and inevitable embarrassments attending the administration of justice before civil tribunals, or in the fact that it could so readily avail itself of the military power of the government for the execution of its processes and the enforcement of its orders, that its efficacy (though in these directions most conspicuous) was chiefly illustrated.

It was rather in the extended reach which it could give to its investigation, and in the wide scope which it could cover by testimony, that its practical and pre-eminent use and service were displayed. It was by means of this freedom of view and inquiry that the element of *conspiracy*, which gave to these cases so startling a significance, was enabled to be traced and exposed, and that the fact that the infamous crimes which appeared in proof were fruits borne by the rebellion and authorized by its head was published to the community and to the world. By no other species of tribunal, and by no other known mode of judicial inquiry, could this result have been so successfully attained; and it may truly be said that without the aid and agency of the Military Commission one of the most important chapters in the annals of the rebellion would have been lost to history, and the most complete and reliable disclosure of its inner and real life, alike treacherous and barbaric, would have failed to be developed.

It is due not only to the late President, who, as commander-in-chief, unhesitatingly employed this tribunal in the suppression of crimes connected with the rebellion, but to the heads of the military departments and other commanders, who so resolutely and effectively availed themselves of its simple but potent machinery; to the national legislatures, which, recognizing its continuance as indispensable during the war, have confirmed and increased its jurisdiction; and to the intelligence and good sense of the people at large, who, disregarding the shallow and disloyal clamors raised against it, have appreciated its service to the country, that this brief testimony to its value, as an arm of the military administration, evidenced alike by the fairness of its judgments and by its enlightened and vigorous action, should be publicly and formally borne by this Bureau.

J. HOLT,  
*Judge Advocate General.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Bureau of Military Justice, July 5, 1865.*

*To the President:*

The following named persons, David E. Herold, G. A. Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, Michael O'Laughlin, Edward Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Mary E. Surratt, and Samuel A. Mudd, were tried by military commission convened at Washington, D. C., on the 9th day of May, 1865, by order of the President of the United States, on the following charge and specification:

CHARGE 1.	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
<i>Specification.</i>	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

After their arraignment under the foregoing charge and specification, the prisoners severally pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court. Their plea was, after mature deliberation, overruled, whereupon they severally pleaded not guilty. The investigation of the case upon its merits immediately commenced, and was continued until the 29th of June, when all the evidence having been introduced, and the arguments for the prosecution and in behalf of the prisoners having been presented, the commission proceeded to deliberate upon their findings.

The findings and sentences pronounced by the court were as follows:

The prisoners Herold, Atzerodt, and Payne were found guilty, except of the words alleging confederation and conspiracy with Edward Spangler in the crimes charged, and were sentenced to death.

Mary E. Surratt was found guilty, except of the words alleging conspiracy with Edward Spangler, and her receiving and concealing in her house the prisoners Arnold and O'Laughlin, and was sentenced to death.

Michael O'Laughlin was found guilty, except of the words alleging that he lay in wait for, with intent to murder, Lieutenant General Grant, and also of those alleging conspiracy with Spangler, and was sentenced to imprisonment for life.

Samuel Arnold was found guilty, except of conspiring with Edward Spangler, and was sentenced to imprisonment for life.

Samuel A. Mudd was found guilty, excepting of the words alleging conspiracy with Spangler, and those which allege his receiving and concealing Payne, Surratt, O'Laughlin, Atzerodt, Arnold, and Mary E. Surratt in his house, and was sentenced to imprisonment for life.

The finding in the case of Edward Spangler was, of the charge, not guilty; but guilty of having feloniously and traitorously aided and abetted J. Wilkes Booth in making his escape, after having killed and murdered Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States; he, the said Spangler, at the time of aiding and abetting, as aforesaid, well knowing that the said Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, as aforesaid, had been murdered by the said J. Wilkes Booth, as aforesaid; and of the specification, not guilty, except as to those words which allege substantially the crime of which he was convicted under the charge. He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment in a penitentiary.

Having been personally engaged in the conduct of the foregoing case as judge advocate of the commission, I deem it unnecessary to enter in this report into an elaborate discussion of the immense mass of evidence submitted to the consideration of the court.

After a trial continuing for fifty-three days, in which between three and four hundred witnesses were examined for the prosecution and defence, and in which the rights of the accused were watched and zealously guarded by seven able counsel of their own selection, the commission have arrived at the conclusions presented above.

I feel further relieved from the duty of submitting a detailed review of the record, because of the full and exhaustive examination of the questions of law and fact arising in the case, which is to be found in the argument of Assistant Judge Advocate Bingham, to which, it forming a part of the record, reference is respectfully made.

The opinion is entertained that the proceedings were regular, and that the findings of the commission were fully justified by the evidence. It is thought that the highest considerations of public justice, as well as the future security of the lives of the officers of the government, demand that the sentences based on these findings should be carried into execution.

Respectfully submitted:

J. HOLT, *Judge Advocate General.*

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*Argument of John A. Bingham, special judge advocate, in reply to the several arguments in defence of Mary E. Surratt and others, charged with conspiracy and the murder of Abraham Lincoln, late President of the United States, &c.*

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: The conspiracy here charged and specified, and the acts alleged to have been committed in pursuance thereof, and with the intent laid, constitute a crime the atrocity of which has sent a shudder through the civilized world. All that was agreed upon and attempted by the alleged inciters and instigators of this crime constitutes a combination of atrocities with scarcely a parallel in the annals of the human race. Whether the prisoners at your bar are guilty of the conspiracy and the acts alleged to have been done in pursuance thereof, as set forth in the charge and specification, is a question the determination of which rests solely with this honorable court, and in passing upon which this court are the sole judges of the law and the fact.

In presenting my views upon the questions of law raised by the several counsel for the defence, and also on the testimony adduced for and against the accused, I desire to be just

to them, just to you, just to my country, and just to my own convictions. The issue joined involves the highest interests of the accused, and, in my judgment, the highest interests of the whole people of the United States.

It is a matter of great moment to all the people of this country that the prisoners at your bar be lawfully tried and lawfully convicted or acquitted. A wrongful and illegal conviction or a wrongful and illegal acquittal upon this dread issue would impair somewhat the security of every man's life, and shake the stability of the republic.

The crime charged and specified upon your record is not simply the crime of murdering a human being, but it is the crime of killing and murdering on the 14th day of April, A. D. 1865, within the military department of Washington and the intrenched lines thereof, Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, and commander-in-chief of the army and navy thereof; and then and there assaulting, with intent to kill and murder, William H. Seward, then Secretary of State of the United States; and then and there lying in wait to kill and murder Andrew Johnson, then Vice-President of the United States, and Ulysses S. Grant, then lieutenant general and in command of the armies of the United States, in pursuance of a treasonable conspiracy entered into by the accused with one John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, upon the instigation of Jefferson Davis, Jacob Thompson, and George N. Sanders and others, with intent thereby to aid the existing rebellion and subvert the Constitution and laws of the United States.

The rebellion, in aid of which this conspiracy was formed and this great public crime committed, was prosecuted for the vindication of no right, for the redress of no wrong, but was itself simply a criminal conspiracy and gigantic assassination. In resisting and crushing this rebellion the American people take no step backward, and cast no reproach upon their past history. That people now, as ever, proclaim the self-evident truth that whenever government becomes subversive of the ends of its creation, it is the right and duty of the people to alter or abolish it; but during these four years of conflict they have as clearly proclaimed, as was their right and duty, both by law and by arms, that the government of their own choice, humanely and wisely administered, oppressive of none and just to all, shall not be overthrown by privy conspiracy or armed rebellion.

What wrong had this government or any of its duly constituted agents done to any of the guilty actors in this atrocious rebellion? They themselves being witnesses, the government which they assailed had done no act, and attempted no act, injurious to them, or in any sense violative of their rights as citizens and men; and yet for four years, without cause of complaint or colorable excuse, the inciters and instigators of the conspiracy charged upon your record have, by armed rebellion, resisted the lawful authority of the government, and attempted by force of arms to blot the republic from the map of nations. Now that their battalions of treason are broken and flying before the victorious legions of the republic, the chief traitors in this great crime against your government secretly conspire with their hired confederates to achieve by assassination, if possible, what they have in vain attempted by wager of battle—the overthrow of the government of the United States and the subversion of its Constitution and laws. It is for this secret conspiracy in the interest of the rebellion, formed at the instigation of the chiefs in that rebellion, and in pursuance of which the acts charged and specified are alleged to have been done and with the intent laid, that the accused are upon trial.

The government in preferring this charge does not indict the whole people of any State or section, but only the alleged parties to this unnatural and atrocious conspiracy and crime. The President of the United States, in the discharge of his duty as commander-in-chief of the army, and by virtue of the power vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, has constituted you a military court, to hear and determine the issue joined against the accused, and has constituted you a court for no other purpose whatever. To this charge and specification the defendants have pleaded, first, that this court has no jurisdiction in the premises; and, second, not guilty. As the court has already overruled the plea to the jurisdiction, it would be passed over in silence by me but for the fact that a grave and elaborate argument has been made by counsel for the accused, not only to show the want of jurisdiction, but to arraign the President of the United States before the country and the world as a usurper of power over the lives and the liberties of the prisoners. Denying the authority of the President to constitute this commission is an averment that this tribunal is not a court of justice, has no legal existence, and therefore no power to hear and determine the issue joined. The learned counsel for the accused, when they make this averment by way of argument, owe it to themselves and to their country to show how the President could otherwise lawfully and efficiently discharge the duty enjoined upon him by his oath to protect, preserve, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

An existing rebellion is alleged and not denied. It is charged that in aid of this existing rebellion a conspiracy was entered into by the accused, incited and instigated thereto by the chiefs of this rebellion, to kill and murder the executive officers of the government, and the commander of the armies of the United States, and that this conspiracy was partly executed by the murder of Abraham Lincoln, and by a murderous assault upon the Secretary of State; and counsel reply, by elaborate argument, that although the facts be as charged, though the conspirators be numerous and at large, able and eager to complete the horrid work of assas-

sination already begun within your military encampment, yet the successor of your murdered President is a usurper if he attempts by military force and martial law, as commander-in-chief, to prevent the consummation of this traitorous conspiracy in aid of this treasonable rebellion. The civil courts, say the counsel, are open in the District. I answer, they are closed throughout half the republic, and were only open in this District on the day of this confederation and conspiracy, on the day of the traitorous assassination of your President, and are only open at this hour, by force of the bayonet. Does any man suppose that if the military forces which garrison the intrenchments of your capital, fifty thousand strong, were all withdrawn, the rebel bands who this day infest the mountain passes in your vicinity would allow this court, or any court, to remain open in this District for the trial of these their confederates, or would permit your executive officers to discharge the trust committed to them, for twenty-four hours?

At the time this conspiracy was entered into, and when this court was convened and entered upon this trial, the country was in a state of civil war. An army of insurrectionists have, since this trial begun, shed the blood of Union soldiers in battle. The conspirator, by whose hand his co-conspirators, whether present or absent, jointly murdered the President on the 14th of last April, could not be and was not arrested upon civil process, but was pursued by the military power of the government, captured, and slain. Was this an act of usurpation?—a violation of the right guaranteed to that fleeing assassin by the very Constitution against which and for the subversion of which he had conspired and murdered the President? Who in all this land is bold enough or base enough to assert it?

I would be glad to know by what law the President, by a military force acting only upon his military orders, is justified in pursuing, arresting, and killing one of these conspirators, and is condemned for arresting in like manner, and by his order subjecting to trial, according to the laws of war, any or all of the other parties to this same damnable conspiracy and crime, by a military tribunal of justice—a tribunal, I may be pardoned for saying whose integrity and impartiality are above suspicion, and pass unchallenged even by the accused themselves.

The argument against the jurisdiction of this court rests upon the assumption that even in time of insurrection and civil war no crimes are cognizable and punishable by military commission or court-martial, save crimes committed in the military or naval service of the United States, or in the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States. But that is not all the argument; it affirms that under this plea to the jurisdiction the accused have the right to demand that this court shall decide that it is not a judicial tribunal and has no legal existence.

This is a most extraordinary proposition—that the President, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, was not only not authorized but absolutely forbidden to constitute this court for the trial of the accused, and, therefore, the act of the President is void, and the gentlemen who compose the tribunal without judicial authority or power, and are not in fact or in law a court.

That I do not misstate what is claimed and attempted to be established on behalf of the accused, I ask the attention of the court to the following as the gentleman's (Mr. Johnson's) propositions:

That Congress has not authorized, and, under the Constitution, cannot authorize the appointment of this commission.

That this commission has, "as a court, no legal existence or authority," because the President, who alone appointed the commission, has no such power.

That his act "is a mere nullity—the usurpation of a power not vested in the Executive, and conferring no authority upon you."

We have had no common exhibition of law learning in this defence, prepared by a senator of the United States; but with all his experience, and all his learning and acknowledged ability, he has failed, utterly failed, to show how a tribunal constituted and sworn, as this has been, to duly try and determine the charge and specification against the accused, and by its commission not authorized to hear or determine any other issues whatever, can rightfully entertain, or can by any possibility pass upon, the proposition presented by this argument of the gentleman for its consideration.

The members of this court are officers in the army of the United States, and by order of the President, as commander-in-chief, are required to discharge this duty, and are authorized in this capacity to discharge no other duty, to exercise no other judicial power. Of course, if the commission of the President constitutes this a court for the trial of this case only, as such court it is competent to decide all questions of law and fact arising in the trial of the case. But this court has no power, as a court, to declare the authority by which it was constituted null and void, and the act of the President a mere nullity, a usurpation. Has it been shown by the learned gentleman, who demands that this court shall so decide, that officers of the army may lawfully and constitutionally question in this manner the orders of their commander-in-chief, disobey, set them aside, and declare them a nullity and a usurpation? Even if it be conceded that the officers thus detailed by order of the commander-in-chief may question and utterly disregard his order and set aside his authority, is it possible, in the nature of things, that any body of men, constituted and qualified as a tribunal of justice, can sit in judgment upon the proposition that they are not a court for any purpose,

and finally decide judicially, as a court, that the government which appointed them was without authority? Why not crown the absurdity of this proposition by asking the several members of this court to determine that they are not men—living, intelligent, responsible men! This would be no more irrational than the question upon which they are asked to pass. How can any sensible man entertain it? Before he begins to reason upon the proposition he must take for granted, and therefore decide in advance, the very question in dispute, to wit, his actual existence.

So with the question presented in this remarkable argument for the defence: before this court can enter upon the inquiry of the want of authority in the President to constitute them a court, they must take for granted and decide the very point in issue, that the President had the authority, and that they are in law and in fact a judicial tribunal; and having assumed this, they are gravely asked, as such judicial tribunal, to finally and solemnly decide and declare that they are not in fact or in law a judicial tribunal, but a mere nullity and non-entity. A most lame and impotent conclusion!

As the learned counsel seems to have great reverence for judicial authority, and requires precedent for every opinion, I may be pardoned for saying that the objection which I urge, against the possibility of any judicial tribunal, after being officially qualified as such, entertaining, much less judicially deciding, the proposition that it has no legal existence as a court, and that the appointment was a usurpation and without authority of law, has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States.

That court says: "The acceptance of the judicial office is a recognition of the *authority* from which it is derived. If a court should enter upon the inquiry. (whether the *authority* of the government which established it existed,) and should come to the conclusion that the government under which it acted had been put aside, it would cease to be a court and be *incapable* of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and *authority* of the government under which it is exercising judicial power." (Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard, 40.)

That is the very question raised by the learned gentleman in his argument—that there was no *authority* in the President, by whose act alone this tribunal was constituted, to vest it with judicial power to try this issue; and by the order upon your record, as has already been shown, if you have no power to try this issue for want of authority in the commander-in-chief to constitute you a court, you are no court, and have no power to try any issue, because his order limits you to this issue, and this alone.

It requires no very profound legal attainments to apply the ruling of the highest judicial tribunal of this country, just cited, to the point raised, not by the pleadings, but by the argument. This court exists as a judicial tribunal by authority only of the President of the United States; the acceptance of the office is an acknowledgment of the validity of the authority conferring it, and if the President had no authority to order, direct, and constitute this court to try the accused, and, as is claimed, did, in so constituting it, perform an unconstitutional and illegal act, it necessarily results that the order of the President is void and of no effect; that the order did not and could not constitute this a tribunal of justice, and therefore its members are incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question presented.

There is a marked distinction between the question here presented and that raised by a plea to the jurisdiction of a tribunal whose existence as a court is neither questioned nor denied. Here it is argued, through many pages, by a learned senator and a distinguished lawyer, that the order of the President, by whose authority alone this court is constituted a tribunal of military justice, is unlawful. If unlawful, it is void and of no effect, and has created no court; therefore this body, not being a court, can have no more power as a court to decide any question whatever than have its individual members power to decide that they as men do not in fact exist.

It is a maxim of the common law—the perfection of human reason—that what is impossible the law requires of no man.

How can it be possible that a judicial tribunal can decide the question that it does not exist, any more than that a rational man can decide that he does not exist?

The absurdity of the proposition so elaborately urged upon the consideration of this court cannot be saved from the ridicule and contempt of sensible men by the pretence that the court is not asked judicially to decide that it is not a court, but only that it has no jurisdiction; for it is a fact not to be denied that the whole argument for the defence on this point is that the President had not the lawful authority to issue the order by which alone this court is constituted, and that the order for its creation is null and void.

Gentlemen might as well ask the Supreme Court of the United States, upon a plea to the jurisdiction, to decide, as a court, that the President had no lawful authority to nominate the judges thereof severally to the Senate, and that the Senate had no lawful authority to advise and consent to their appointment, as to ask this court to decide, as a court, that the order of the President of the United States constituting it a tribunal for the sole purpose of this trial was not only without authority of law, but against and in violation of law. If this court is not a lawful tribunal, it has no existence, and can no more speak as a court than the dead, much less pronounce the judgment required at its hands—that it is not a court, and that the President of the United States, in constituting it such to try the question upon the charge and specification preferred, has transcended his authority and violated his oath of office.

Before passing from the consideration of the proposition of the learned senator, that this is not a court, it is fit that I should notice that another of the counsel for the accused (Mr. Ewing) has also advanced the same opinion, certainly with more directness and candor, and without any qualification. His statement is, "You," gentlemen, "are no court under the Constitution." This remark of the gentleman cannot fail to excite surprise, when it is remembered that the gentleman, not many months since, was a general in the service of the country, and as such, in his department in the west, proclaimed and enforced martial law by the constitution of military tribunals for the trial of citizens not in the land or naval forces, but who were guilty of military offences for which he deemed them justly punishable before military courts, and accordingly he punished them. Is the gentleman quite sure, when that account comes to be rendered for these alleged unconstitutional assumptions of power, that he will not have to answer for more of these alleged violations of the rights of citizens by illegal arrests, convictions, and executions, than any of the members of this court? In support of his opinion that this is no court, the gentleman cites the 3d article of the Constitution, which provides "that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as Congress may establish," the judges whereof "shall hold their offices during good behavior."

It is a sufficient answer to say to the gentleman, that the power of this government to try and punish military offences by military tribunals is no part of the "judicial power of the United States," under the 3d article of the Constitution, but a power conferred by the 8th section of the 1st article; and so it has been ruled by the Supreme Court in *Dyres vs. Hoover*, 20 Howard, 78. If this power is so conferred by the 8th section, a military court authorized by Congress, and constituted as this has been, to try all persons for military crimes in time of war, though not exercising "the judicial power" provided for in the 3d article, is nevertheless a court as constitutional as the Supreme Court itself. The gentleman admits this to the extent of the trial by courts-martial of persons in the military or naval service, and by admitting it he gives up the point. There is no express grant for any such tribunal, and the power to establish such a court, therefore, is implied from the provisions of the 8th section, 1st article, that "Congress shall have power to provide and maintain a navy," and also "to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces." From these grants the Supreme Court infer the power to establish courts-martial, and from the grants in the same 8th section, as I shall notice hereafter, that "Congress shall have power to declare war," and "to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry this and all other powers into effect," it is necessarily implied that in time of war Congress may authorize military commissions, to try all crimes committed in aid of the public enemy, as such tribunals are necessary to give effect to the power to make war and suppress insurrection.

Inasmuch as the gentleman, (General Ewing.) for whom, personally, I have a high regard as the military commander of a western department, made a liberal exercise, under the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, of this power to arrest and try military offenders not in the land or naval forces of the United States, and inflicted upon them, as I am informed, the extreme penalty of the law, by virtue of his military jurisdiction, I wish to know whether he proposes, by his proclamation of the personal responsibility awaiting all such usurpations of judicial authority, that he himself shall be subjected to the same stern judgment which he invokes against others—that, in short, he shall be drawn and quartered for inflicting the extreme penalties of the law upon citizens of the United States in violation of the Constitution and laws of his country? I trust that his error of judgment in pronouncing this military jurisdiction a usurpation and violation of the Constitution may not rise up in judgment to condemn him, and that he may never be subjected to pains and penalties for having done his duty heretofore in exercising this rightful authority, and in bringing to judgment those who conspired against the lives and liberties of the people.

Here I might leave this question, committing it to the charitable speeches of men, but for the fact that the learned counsel has been more careful in his extraordinary argument to denounce the President as a usurper, than to show how the court could possibly decide that it has no judicial existence, and yet that it has judicial existence.

A representative of the people and of the rights of the people before this court, by the appointment of the President, and which appointment was neither sought by me nor desired, I cannot allow all that has here been said by way of denunciation of the murdered President and his successor to pass unnoticed. This has been made the occasion by the learned counsel, Mr. Johnson, to volunteer, not to defend the accused, Mary E. Surratt, not to make a judicial argument in her behalf, but to make a political harangue, a partisan speech against his government and country, and thereby swell the cry of the armed legions of sedition and rebellion that but yesterday shook the heavens with their infernal enginery of treason and filled the habitations of the people with death. As the law forbids a senator of the United States to receive compensation, or fee, for defending in cases before civil or military commissions, the gentleman volunteers to make a speech before this court, in which he denounces the action of the Executive department in proclaiming and executing martial law against rebels in arms, their aiders and abettors, as a usurpation and a tyranny. I deem it my duty to reply to this denunciation, not for the purpose of presenting thereby any question for the decision of this court, for I have shown that the argument of the gentleman presents no question for its decision as a court, but to repel, as far as I may be able, the unjust aspersion at-

tempted to be cast upon the memory of our dead President, and upon the official conduct of his successor.

I propose now to answer fully all that the gentleman (Mr. Johnson) has said of the want of jurisdiction in this court, and of the alleged usurpation and tyranny of the Executive, that the enlightened public opinion to which he appeals may decide whether all this denunciation is just—whether, indeed, conspiring against the whole people, and confederation and agreement in aid of insurrection to murder all the executive officers of the government, cannot be checked or arrested by the Executive power. Let the people decide this question; and in doing so, let them pass upon the action of the senator as well as upon the action of those whom he so arrogantly arraigns. His plea in behalf of an expiring and shattered rebellion is a fit subject for public consideration and for public condemnation.

Let that people also note, that while the learned gentleman, (Mr. Johnson,) as a volunteer, without pay, thus condemns as a usurpation the means employed so effectually to suppress this gigantic insurrection, the New York News, whose proprietor, Benjamin Wood, is shown by the testimony upon your record to have received from the agents of the rebellion twenty-five thousand dollars, rushes into the lists to champion the cause of the rebellion, its aiders and abettors, by following to the letter his colleague, (Mr. Johnson,) and with greater plainness of speech, and a fervor intensified, doubtless, by the twenty-five thousand dollars received, and the hope of more, denounces the court as a usurpation and threatens the members with the consequences!

The argument of the gentleman, to which the court has listened so patiently and so long, is but an attempt to show that it is unconstitutional for the government of the United States to arrest upon military order and try before military tribunals, and punish upon conviction, in accordance with the laws of war and the usages of nations, all criminal offenders acting in aid of the existing rebellion. It does seem to me that the speech, in its tone and temper, is the same as that which the country has heard for the last four years uttered by the armed rebels themselves and by their apologists, averring that it was unconstitutional for the government of the United States to defend by arms its own rightful authority and the supremacy of its laws.

It is as clearly the right of the republic to live and to defend its life until it forfeits that right by crime, as it is the right of the individual to live so long as God gives him life, unless he forfeits that right by crime. I make no argument to support this proposition. Who is there here or elsewhere to cast the reproach upon my country that for her crimes she must die? Youngest born of the nations! is she not immortal by all the dread memories of the past—by that sublime and voluntary sacrifice of the present, in which the bravest and noblest of her sons have laid down their lives that she might live, giving their serene brows to the dust of the grave, and lifting their hands for the last time amidst the consuming fires of battle? I assume, for the purposes of this argument, that self-defence is as clearly the right of nations as it is the acknowledged right of men, and that the American people may do in the defence and maintenance of their own rightful authority against organized armed rebels, their aiders and abettors, whatever free and independent nations anywhere upon this globe, in time of war, may of right do.

All this is substantially denied by the gentleman in the remarkable argument which he has here made. There is nothing further from my purpose than to do injustice to the learned gentleman or to his elaborate and ingenious argument. To justify what I have already said, I may be permitted here to remind the court that nothing is said by the counsel touching the conduct of the accused, Mary E. Surratt, as shown by the testimony; that he makes confession at the end of his arraignment of the government and country that he has not made such argument, and that he leaves it to be made by her other counsel. He does take care, however, to arraign the country and the government for conducting a trial with closed doors and before a secret tribunal, and compares the proceedings of this court to the Spanish Inquisition, using the strongest words at his command to intensify the horror which he supposes his announcement will excite throughout the civilized world.

Was this dealing fairly by this government? Was there anything in the conduct of the proceedings here that justified any such remark? Has this been a secret trial? Has it not been conducted in open day, in the presence of the accused, and in the presence of seven gentlemen learned in the law, who appeared from day to day as their counsel? Were they not informed of the accusation against them? Were they deprived of the right of challenge? Was it not secured to them by law, and were they not asked to exercise it? Has any part of the evidence been suppressed? Have not all the proceedings been published to the world? What, then, was done, or intended to be done, by the government which justifies this clamor about a Spanish Inquisition?

That a people assailed by organized treason over an extent of territory half as large as the continent of Europe, and assailed in their very capital by secret assassins banded together and hired to do the work of murder by the instigation of these conspirators, may not be permitted to make inquiry, even with closed doors, touching the nature and extent of the organization, ought not to be asserted by any gentleman who makes the least pretensions to any knowledge of the law, either common, civil, or military. Who does not know that at the common law all inquisitions touching crimes and misdemeanors, preparatory to indictment by the grand inquest of the state, is made with closed doors?

In this trial no parties accused, nor their counsel, nor the reporters of this court, were at any time excluded from its deliberations when any testimony was being taken; nor has there been any testimony taken in the case with closed doors, save that of a few witnesses, who testified, not in regard to the accused or either of them, but in respect to the traitors and conspirators not on trial, who were alleged to have incited this crime. Who is there to say that the American people, in time of armed rebellion and civil war, have not the right to make such an examination as secretly as they may deem necessary, either in a military or civil court?

I have said this, not by way of apology for anything the government has done or attempted to do in the progress of this trial, but to expose the animus of the argument, and to repel the accusation against my country sent out to the world by the counsel. From anything that he has said, I have yet to learn that the American people have not the right to make their inquiries secretly, touching a general conspiracy in aid of an existing rebellion, which involves their nationality and the peace and security of all.

The gentleman then enters into a learned argument for the purpose of showing that, by the Constitution, the people of the United States cannot, in war or in peace, subject any person to trial before a military tribunal, whatever may be his crime or offence, unless such person be in the military or naval service of the United States. The conduct of this argument is as remarkable as its assaults upon the government are unwarranted, and its insinuations about the revival of the Inquisition and secret trials are inexcusable. The court will notice that the argument, from the beginning almost to its conclusion, insists that no person is liable to be tried by military or martial law before a military tribunal, save those in the land and naval service of the United States. I repeat, the conduct of this argument of the gentleman is remarkable. As an instance, I ask the attention, not only of this court, but of that public whom he has ventured to address in this tone and temper, to the authority of the distinguished Chancellor Kent, whose great name the counsel has endeavored to press into his service in support of his general proposition, that no person save those in the military or naval service of the United States is liable to be tried for any crime whatever, either in peace or in war, before a military tribunal.

The language of the gentleman, after citing the provision of the Constitution, "that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger," is, "that this exception is designed to leave in force, not to enlarge, the power vested in Congress by the original Constitution to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; that the land or naval forces are the terms used in both, have the same meaning, and until lately have been supposed by every commentator and judge to exclude from military jurisdiction offences committed by citizens not belonging to such forces." The learned gentleman then adds: "Kent, in a note to his 1st Commentaries, 341, states, and with accuracy, that 'military and naval crimes and offences, committed while the party is attached to and under the immediate authority of the army and navy of the United States and in actual service, are not cognizable under the common-law jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.'" I ask this court to bear in mind that this is the only passage which he quotes from this note of Kent in his argument, and that no man possessed of common sense, however destitute he may be of the exact and varied learning in the law to which the gentleman may rightfully lay claim, can for a moment entertain the opinion that the distinguished chancellor of New York, in the passage just cited, intimates any such thing as the counsel asserts, that the Constitution excludes from military jurisdiction offences committed by citizens not belonging to the land or naval forces.

Who can fail to see that Chancellor Kent, by the passage cited, only decides that military and naval crimes and offences committed by a party attached to and under the immediate authority of the army and navy of the United States, and in actual service, are not cognizable under the common-law jurisdiction of the courts of the United States? He only says they are not cognizable under its common-law jurisdiction; but by that he does not say or intimate, what is attempted to be said by the counsel for him, that "all crimes committed by citizens are by the Constitution excluded from military jurisdiction," and that the perpetrators of them can under no circumstances be tried before military tribunals. Yet the counsel ventures to proceed, standing upon this passage quoted from Kent, to say that, "according to this great authority, every other class of persons and every other species of offences are within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and entitled to the protection of the proceeding by presentment or indictment and the public trial in such a court."

Whatever that great authority may have said elsewhere, it is very doubtful whether any candid man in America will be able to come to the very learned and astute conclusion that Chancellor Kent has so stated in the note or any part of the note which the gentleman has just cited. If he has said it elsewhere, it is for the gentleman, if he relies upon Kent for authority, to produce the passage. But was it fair treatment of this "great authority"—was it not taking an unwarrantable privilege with the distinguished chancellor and his great work, the enduring monument of his learning and genius, to so mutilate the note referred to, as might leave the gentleman at liberty to make his deductions and assertions under cover of the great name of the New York chancellor, to suit the emergency of his case, by omitting

the following passage, which occurs in the same note, and absolutely excludes the conclusion so defiantly put forth by the counsel to support his argument? In that note Chancellor Kent says:

“*Military* law is a system of regulations for the government of the armies in the service of the United States, authorized by the act of Congress of April 10, 1806, known as the Articles of War, and *naval* law is a similar system for the government of the navy, under the act of Congress of April 23, 1800. But *martial* law is quite a distinct thing, and is founded upon paramount necessity, and proclaimed by a *military chief*.”

However unsuccessful, after this exposure, the gentleman appears in maintaining his monstrous proposition, that the American people are by their own Constitution forbidden to try the aiders and abettors of armed traitors and rebellion before military tribunals, and subject them, according to the laws of war and the usages of nations, to just punishment for their great crimes, it has been made clear from what I have already stated that he has been eminently successful in mutilating this beautiful production of that great mind; which act of mutilation every one knows is violative alike of the laws of peace and war. Even in war the divine creations of art and the immortal productions of genius and learning are spared.

In the same spirit, and it seems to me with the same unfairness as that just noted, the learned gentleman has very adroitly pressed into his service, by an extract from the Autobiography of the war-worn veteran and hero, General Scott, the names of the late Secretary of War, Mr. Marcy, and the learned ex-Attorney General, Mr. Cushing. This adroit performance is achieved in this way: after stating the fact that General Scott in Mexico proclaimed martial law for the trial and punishment by military tribunals of persons guilty of “assassination, murder, and poisoning,” the gentleman proceeds to quote from the Autobiography, “that this order, when handed to the then Secretary of War (Mr. Marcy) for his approval, ‘a startle at the title (martial law order) was the only comment he then or ever made on the subject,’ and that it was ‘soon silently returned as too explosive for safe handling.’ ‘A little later (he adds) the Attorney General (Mr. Cushing) called and asked for a copy, and the law officer of the government, whose business it is to speak on all such matters, was stricken with *legal dumbness*.’” Thereupon the learned gentleman proceeds to say: “How much more startled and more paralyzed would these great men have been had they been consulted on such a commission as this! A commission, not to sit in another country, and to try offences not provided for in any law of the United States, civil or military, then in force, but in their own country, and in a part of it where there are laws providing for their trial and punishment, and civil courts clothed with ample powers for both, and in the daily and undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction.”

I think I may safely say, without stopping to make any special references, that the official career of the late Secretary of War (Mr. Marcy) gave no indication that he ever doubted or denied the constitutional power of the American people, acting through their duly constituted agents, to do any act justified by the laws of war, for the suppression of a rebellion or to repel invasion. Certainly there is nothing in this extract from the Autobiography which justifies any such conclusion. He was startled, we are told. It may have been as much the admiration he had for the boldness and wisdom of the conqueror of Mexico as any abhorrence he had for the trial and punishment of “assassins, poisoners, and murderers,” according to the laws and usages of war.

But the official utterances of the ex-Attorney General, (Cushing,) with which the gentleman doubtless was familiar when he prepared this argument, by no means justify the attempt here made to quote him as authority against the proclamation and enforcement of martial law in time of rebellion and civil war. That distinguished man, not second in legal attainments to any who have held that position, has left an official opinion of record touching this subject. Referring to what is said by Sir Mathew Hale, in his *History of the Common Law*, concerning martial law, wherein he limits it, as the gentleman has seemed by the whole drift of his argument desirous of doing, and says that it is “not in truth and in reality law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law—the necessity of government, order, and discipline in an army,” Mr. Cushing makes this just criticism: “This proposition is a mere composite blunder, a total misapprehension of the matter. It confounds *martial law* and *law military*; it ascribes to the former the uses of the latter; it erroneously assumes that the government of a body of troops is a necessity more than of a body of civilians or citizens. It confounds and confuses all the relations of the subject, and is an apt illustration of the incompleteness of the notions of the common-law jurists of England in regard to matters not comprehended in that limited branch of legal science. \* \* \* Military law, it is now perfectly understood in England, is a branch of the law of the land, applicable only to certain acts of a particular class of persons and administered by special tribunals; but neither in that nor in any other respect essentially differing as to foundation in constitutional reason from admiralty, ecclesiastical, or, indeed, chancery and common law. \* \* \* It is the system of rules for the government of the army and navy established by successive acts of Parliament. \* \* \* Martial law, as exercised in any country by the commander of a foreign army, is an element of the *jus belli*.

“It is incidental to the state of solemn war, and appertains to the law of nations. \* \* \* Thus, while the armies of the United States occupied different provinces of the Mexican republic, the respective commanders were not limited in authority by any local law. They

allowed, or rather required the magistrates of the country, municipal or judicial, to continue to administer the laws of the country among their countrymen; but in subjection, always, to the military power, which acted summarily and according to discretion, when the belligerent interests of the conqueror required it, and which exercised jurisdiction, either summarily or by means of military commissions, for the protection or the punishment of citizens of the United States in Mexico."—*Opinions of Attorneys General*, vol. viii, 366-369.

Mr. Cushing says, "That, it would seem, was one of the forms of martial law;" but he adds, that such an example of martial law administered by a foreign army in the enemy's country "does not enlighten us in regard to the question of martial law in one's own country and as administered by its military commanders. That is a case which the law of nations does not reach. Its regulation is of the domestic resort of the organic laws of the country itself, and regarding which, as it happens, there is no definite or explicit legislation in the United States, as there is none in England.

"Accordingly, in England, as we have seen, Earl Grey assumes that when martial law exists it has no legal origin, but is a mere fact of necessity, to be legalized afterwards by a bill of indemnity, if there be occasion. I am not prepared to say that, under existing laws, such may not also be the case in the United States."—*Ibid.*, 370.

After such a statement, wherein ex-Attorney General Cushing very clearly recognizes the right of this government, as also of England, to employ martial law as a means of defence in a time of war, whether domestic or foreign, he will be as much surprised when he reads the argument of the learned gentleman, wherein he is described as being struck with *legal dumbness* at the mere mention of proclaiming martial law, and its enforcement by the commander of our army in Mexico, as the late Secretary of War was startled with even the mention of its title.

Even some of the reasons given, and certainly the power exercised by the veteran hero himself, would seem to be in direct conflict with the propositions of the learned gentleman.

The Lieutenant General says, he "excludes from his order cases already cognizable by court-martial, and limits it to cases not provided for in the act of Congress establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States." Has not the gentleman who attempts to press General Scott into his service argued and insisted upon it, that the commander of the army cannot subject the soldiers under his command to any control or punishment whatever, save that which is provided for in the articles?

It will not do, in order to sustain the gentleman's hypothesis, to say that these provisions of the Constitution, by which he attempts to fetter the power of the people to punish such offences in time of war within the territory of the United States, may be disregarded by an officer of the United States in command of its armies, in the trial and punishment of its soldiers in a foreign war. The law of the United States for the government of its own armies follows the flag upon every sea and in every land.

The truth is, that the right of the people to proclaim and execute martial law is a necessary incident of war, and this was the right exercised, and rightfully exercised, by Lieutenant General Scott in Mexico. It was what Earl Grey has justly said was a "fact of necessity," and I may add, an act as clearly authorized as was the act of fighting the enemy when they appeared before him.

In making this exception, the lieutenant general followed the rule recognized by the American authorities on military law, in which it is declared that "many crimes committed even by military officers, enlisted men, or camp retainers, cannot be tried under the rules and articles of war. Military commissions must be resorted to for such cases, and these commissions should be ordered by the same authority, be constituted in a similar manner and their proceedings be conducted according to the same general rules, as general courts-martial."—*Benet*, 15.

There remain for me to notice, at present, two other points in this extraordinary speech: First, that martial law does not warrant a military commission for the trial of military offences—that is, offences committed in time of war in the interests of the public enemy, and by concert and agreement with the enemy; and second, that martial law does not prevail in the United States, and has never been declared by any competent authority.

It is not necessary, as the gentleman himself has declined to argue the first point—whether martial law authorizes the organization of military commissions by order of the commander-in-chief to try such offences—that I should say more than that the authority just cited by me shows that such commissions are authorized under martial law, and are created by the commander for the trial of all such offences, when their punishment by court-martial is not provided for by the express statute law of the country.

The second point—that martial law has not been declared by any competent authority—is an arraignment of the late murdered President of the United States for his proclamation of September 24, 1862, declaring martial law throughout the United States; and of which, in Lawrence's edition of Wheaton on International Law, p. 522, it is said, "Whatever may be the inference to be deduced either from constitutional or international law, or from the usages of European governments, as to the legitimate depository of the power of suspending the writ of *habeas corpus*, the virtual abrogation of the judiciary in cases affecting individual liberty, and the establishment as *matter of fact* in the United States, by the Executive alone, of martial law, not merely in the insurrectionary districts, or in cases of military occupancy

but throughout the entire Union, and not temporarily, but as an institution as permanent as the insurrection on which it professes to be based, and capable, on the same principle, of being revived in all cases of foreign as well as civil war, are placed beyond question by the President's proclamation of September 24, 1862." That proclamation is as follows:

"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

"A PROCLAMATION.

"Whereas it has become necessary to call into service not only volunteers, but also portions of the militia of the States, by a draft, in order to suppress the insurrection existing in the United States, and disloyal persons are not adequately restrained by the ordinary processes of law from hindering this measure, and from giving aid and comfort in various ways to the insurrection: Now, therefore, be it ordered that during the existing insurrection, and as a necessary means for suppressing the same, all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to rebels, against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or military commission.

"Second. That the writ of *habeas corpus* is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court-martial or military commission.

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington this 24th day of September, A. D. 1862, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"By the President:

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD,  
"Secretary of State."

This proclamation is duly certified from the War Department to be in full force and not revoked, and is evidence of record in this case; and but a few days since a proclamation of the President, of which this court will take notice, declares that the same remains in full force.

It has been said by another of the counsel for the accused (Mr. Stone) in his argument, that, admitting its validity, the proclamation ceases to have effect with the insurrection, and is terminated by it. It is true the proclamation of martial law only continues during the insurrection; but inasmuch as the question of the existence of an insurrection is a political question, the decision of which belongs exclusively to the political department of the government, that department alone can declare its existence, and that department alone can declare its termination, and by the action of the political department of the government every judicial tribunal in the land is concluded and bound. That question has been settled for fifty years in this country by the Supreme Court of the United States: First, in the case of *Brown vs. The United States*, (8 Cranch;) also in the prize cases, (2 Black, 641.) Nothing more, therefore, need be said upon this question of an *existing* insurrection than this: The political department of the government has heretofore proclaimed an insurrection; that department has not yet declared the insurrection ended, and the event on the 14th of April, which robbed the people of their chosen Executive, and clothed this land in mourning, bore sad but overwhelming witness to the fact that the rebellion is not ended. The fact of the insurrection is not an open question to be tried or settled by parol, either in a military tribunal or in a civil court.

The declaration of the learned gentleman who opened the defence, (Mr. Johnson,) that martial law has never been declared by any competent authority, as I have already said, arraigns Mr. Lincoln for a usurpation of power. Does the gentleman mean to say that, until Congress authorizes it, the President cannot proclaim and enforce martial law in the suppression of armed and organized rebellion? Or does he only affirm that this act of the late President is a usurpation?

The proclamation of martial law in 1862 a usurpation! though it armed the people in that dark hour of trial with the means of defence against traitorous and secret enemies in every State and district of the country; though by its use some of the guilty were brought to swift and just judgment, and others deterred from crime or driven to flight; though by this means the innocent and defenceless were protected; though by this means the city of the gentleman's residence was saved from the violence and pillage of the mob and the torch of the incendiary. But, says the gentleman, it was a usurpation, forbidden by the laws of the land!

The same was said of the proclamations of blockade issued April 19 and 27, 1861, which declared a blockade of the ports of the insurgent States, and that all vessels violating the same were subjects of capture, and, together with the cargo, to be condemned as prize. Inasmuch as Congress had not then recognized the fact of civil war, these proclamations were denounced as void. The Supreme Court decided otherwise, and affirmed the power of the Executive thus to subject property on the seas to seizure and condemnation. I read from that decision:

"The Constitution confers upon the President the whole executive power; he is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; he is commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States. \* \* \* Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties as commander-in-chief in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided *by him*, and this court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the government to which this power was intrusted. He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.

"The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure under the circumstances peculiar to the case." (2 Black, 670.)

It has been solemnly ruled by the same tribunal, in an earlier case, "that the power is confided to the Executive of the Union to determine when it is necessary to call out the militia of the States to repel invasion," as follows: "That he is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act according to his belief of the facts. If he does so act, and decides to call forth the militia, his orders for this purpose are in strict conformity with the provisions of the law; and it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence, that every act done by a subordinate officer, in obedience to such orders, is equally justifiable. The law contemplates that, under such circumstances, orders shall be given to carry the power into effect; and it cannot, therefore, be a correct inference that any other person has a just right to disobey them. The law does not provide for any appeal from the judgment of the President, or for any right in subordinate officers to review his decision, and in effect defeat it. Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts." (12 Wheaton, 31.)

In the light of these decisions, it must be clear to every mind that the question of the existence of an insurrection, and the necessity of calling into requisition for its suppression both the militia of the States and the army and navy of the United States, and of proclaiming martial law, which is an essential condition of war, whether foreign or domestic, must rest with the officer of the government who is charged by the express terms of the Constitution with the performance of this great duty for the common defence and the execution of the laws of the Union.

But it is further insisted by the gentleman in this argument that Congress has not authorized the establishment of military commissions, which are essential to the judicial administration of martial law and the punishment of crimes committed during the existence of a civil war, and especially that such commissions are not so authorized to try persons other than those in the military or naval service of the United States, or in the militia of the several States, when in the actual service of the United States. The gentleman's argument assuredly destroys itself, for he insists that Congress, as the legislative department of the government, can pass no law which, either in peace or war, can constitutionally subject any citizen not in the land or naval forces to trial for crime before a military tribunal, or otherwise than by a jury in the civil courts.

Why does the learned gentleman now tell us that Congress has not authorized this to be done, after declaring just as stoutly that by the fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution no such military tribunals can be established for the trial of any person not in the military or naval service of the United States, or in the militia when in actual service, for the commission of any crime whatever in time of war or insurrection? It ought to have occurred to the gentleman, when commenting upon the exception in the fifth article of the Constitution, that there was a reason for it very different from that which he saw fit to assign, and that reason, manifestly upon the face of the Constitution itself, was, that by the eighth section of the first article it is expressly provided that Congress shall have power to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces, and to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for *governing* such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, and that, inasmuch as military discipline and order are as essential in an army in time of peace as in time of war, if the Constitution would leave this power to Congress in peace, it must make the exception, so that rules and regulations for the government of the army and navy should be operative in time of peace as well as in time of war; because the provisions of the Constitution give the right of trial by jury **IN TIME OF PEACE** in all criminal prosecutions by indictment, in terms embracing every human being that may be held to answer for crime in the United States; and therefore if the eighth section of the first article was to remain in full force **IN TIME OF PEACE**, the exception must be made; and, accordingly, the exception was made. But, by the argument we have listened to, this court is told, and the country is told, that **IN TIME OF WAR**—a war which involves in its dread issue the lives and interests of us all—the guarantees of the Constitution are in full force for the benefit of those who conspire with the enemy, creep into your camps, murder in cold blood, in the interests of the invader or insurgent, the commander-in-chief of your army, and secure to him the slow and weak provisions of the civil law; while the soldier, who may, when overcome by the demands of exhausted nature, which cannot be re-

sisted, have slept at his post, is subject to be tried upon the spot by a military tribunal and shot. The argument amounts to this: that as military courts and military trials of civilians in time of war are a usurpation and tyranny, and as soldiers are liable to such arrests and trial, Sergeant Corbett, who shot Booth, should be tried and executed by sentence of a military court, while Booth's co-conspirators and aiders should be saved from any such indignity as a military trial! I confess that I am too dull to comprehend the logic, the reason, or the sense of such a conclusion. If there is any one *entitled* to this privilege of a civil trial, at a remote period, and by a jury of the District, IN TIME OF CIVIL WAR, when the foundations of the republic are rocking beneath the earthquake tread of armed rebellion, that man is the defender of the republic. It will never do to say, as has been said in this argument, that the soldier is not liable to be tried in time of war by a military tribunal for any other offence than those prescribed in the rules and articles of war. To my mind nothing can be clearer than that citizen and soldier alike, in time of civil or foreign war, after a proclamation of martial law, are triable by military tribunals for all offences of which they may be guilty, in the interests of, or in concert with, the enemy.

These provisions, therefore, of your Constitution for indictment and trial by jury in civil courts of *all crimes* are, as I shall hereafter show, silent and inoperative in time of war when the public safety requires it.

The argument to which I have thus been replying, as the court will not fail to perceive, nor that public to which the argument is addressed, is a labored attempt to establish the proposition, that, by the Constitution of the United States, the American people cannot, even in a civil war the greatest the world has ever seen, employ martial law and military tribunals as a means of successfully asserting their authority, preserving their nationality, and securing protection to the lives and property of all, and especially to the persons of those to whom they have committed, officially, the great trust of maintaining the national authority. The gentleman says, with an air of perfect confidence, that he denies the jurisdiction of military tribunals for the trial of civilians in time of war, because neither the Constitution nor laws justify, but on the contrary repudiate them, and that all the experience of the past is against it. I might content myself with saying that the practice of all nations is against the gentleman's conclusion. The struggle for our national independence was aided and prosecuted by military tribunals and martial law, as well as by arms. The contest for American nationality began with the establishment, very soon after the firing of the first gun at Lexington on the 19th day of April, 1775, of military tribunals and martial law. On the 30th of June, 1775, the Continental Congress provided that "whosoever, *belonging to the continental army*, shall be convicted of holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to the enemy, either indirectly or directly, shall suffer such punishment as by a court-martial shall be ordered." This was found not sufficient, inasmuch as it did not reach those *civilians* who, like certain civilians of our day, claim the protection of the civil law in time of war against military arrests and military trials for military crimes. Therefore the same Congress, on the 7th of November, 1775, amended this provision by striking out the words "belonging to the continental army," and adopting the article as follows:

"*All persons* convicted of holding a treacherous correspondence with, or giving intelligence to the enemy, shall suffer death or such other punishment as a general court-martial shall think proper."

And on the 17th of June, 1776, the Congress added an additional rule:

"That all persons, not members of nor owing allegiance to any of the United States of America, who should be found lurking as spies in or about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States, or any of them, shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of nations, by the sentence of a court-martial, or such other punishment as a court-martial shall direct."

Comprehensive as was this legislation, embracing as it did soldiers, citizens, and aliens, subjecting all alike to trial for their military crimes by the military tribunals of justice, according to the law and the usage of nations, it was found to be insufficient to meet that most dangerous of all crimes committed in the interests of the enemy by citizens in time of war—the crime of conspiring together to assassinate or seize and carry away the soldiers and citizens who were loyal to the cause of the country. Therefore, on the 27th of February, 1778, the Congress adopted the following resolution:

"*Resolved*, That whatever inhabitant of these States shall kill, or seize, or take any loyal citizen or citizens thereof and convey him, her, or them to any place within the power of the enemy, or shall ENTER INTO ANY COMBINATION for such purpose, or attempt to carry the same into execution, or hath assisted or shall assist therein, or shall, by giving intelligence, acting as a guide, or in any manner whatever aid the enemy in the perpetration thereof, he shall suffer death by the judgment of a court-martial as a traitor, assassin, or spy, if the offence be committed within seventy miles of the headquarters of the grand or other armies of these States where a general officer commands."—*Journals of Congress*, vol. ii, pp. 459, 460.

So stood the law until the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. Every well-informed man knows that at the time of the passage of these acts the courts of justice, having cognizance of all crimes against persons, were open in many of the States, and that by their several constitutions and charters, which were then the supreme law for the punishment of crimes committed within their respective territorial limits, no man was liable to conviction

out by the verdict of a jury. Take, for example, the provisions of the constitution of North Carolina, adopted on the 10th of November, 1776, and in full force at the time of the passage of the last resolution by Congress above cited, which provisions are as follows:

“That no freeman shall be put to answer any criminal charge but by indictment, presentment, or impeachment.”

“That no freeman shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men in open court, as heretofore used.”

This was the law in 1778 in all the States, and the provision for a trial by jury every one knows meant a jury of twelve men, impanelled and qualified to try the issue in a civil court. The conclusion is not to be avoided, that these enactments of the Congress under the Confederation set aside the trial by jury within the several States, and expressly provided for the trial by court-martial of “any of the inhabitants” who, during the revolution, might, contrary to the provisions of said law, and in aid of the public enemy, give them intelligence, or kill any loyal citizens of the United States, or enter into any combination to kill or carry them away. How comes it, if the argument of the counsel be true, that this enactment was passed by the Congress of 1778, when the constitutions of the several States at that day as fully guaranteed trial by jury to every person held to answer for a crime, as does the Constitution of the United States at this hour? Notwithstanding this fact, I have yet to learn that any loyal man ever challenged, during all the period of our conflict for independence and nationality, the validity of that law for the trial for military offences by military tribunals of all offenders as the law, not of peace, but of war, and absolutely essential to the prosecution of war. I may be pardoned for saying that it is the accepted common law of nations that martial law is at all times and everywhere essential to the successful prosecution of war, whether it be a civil or a foreign war. The validity of these acts of the Continental and Confederate Congress I know was challenged, but only by men charged with the guilt of their country’s blood.

Washington, the peerless, the stainless, and the just, with whom God walked through the night of that great trial, enforced this just and wise enactment upon all occasions. On the 30th of September, 1780, Joshua H. Smith, by the order of General Washington, was put upon his trial before a court-martial, convened in the State of New York, on the charge of there aiding and assisting Benedict Arnold, in a combination with the enemy, to *take, kill, and seize* such loyal citizens or soldiers of the United States as were in garrison at West Point. Smith objected to the jurisdiction, averring that he was a private citizen, not in the military or naval service, and therefore was only amenable to the civil authority of the State, whose constitution had guaranteed the right of trial by jury to all persons held to answer for crime. (Chandler’s Criminal Trials, vol. 2, p. 187.) The constitution of New York then in force had so provided; but, notwithstanding that, the court overruled the plea, held him to answer, and tried him. I repeat, that when Smith was thus tried by court-martial, the constitution of New York as fully guaranteed trial by jury in the civil courts to all civilians charged and held to answer for crimes within the limits of that State, as does the Constitution of the United States guarantee such trial within the limits of the District of Columbia. By the second of the Articles of Confederation each State retained “its sovereignty,” and every power, jurisdiction, and right not *expressly* delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. By those articles there was no express delegation of judicial power; therefore the States retained it fully.

If the military courts, constituted by the commander of the army of the United States under the Confederation, who was appointed only by a resolution of the Congress, without any *express* grant of power to authorize it—his office not being created by the act of the people in their fundamental law—had jurisdiction in every State to try and put to death “any inhabitant” thereof who should *kill* any loyal citizen or enter into “any combination” for any such purpose therein in time of war, notwithstanding the provisions of the constitution and laws of such States, how can any man conceive that under the Constitution of the United States, which is the supreme law over every State, anything in the constitution and laws of such State to the contrary notwithstanding, and the supreme law over every Territory of the republic as well, the Commander-in-Chief of the army of the United States, who is made such by the Constitution, and by its supreme authority clothed with the power and charged with the duty of directing and controlling the whole military power of the United States in time of rebellion or invasion, has not that authority?

I need not remind the court that one of the marked differences between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United States was, that, under the Confederation, the Congress was the sole depository of all federal power. The Congress of the Confederation, said Madison, held “the command of the army.” (Fed., No. 38.) Has the Constitution, which was ordained by the people the better “to insure domestic tranquillity and to provide for the common defence,” so fettered the great power of self-defence against armed insurrection or invasion that martial law, so essential in war, is forbidden by that great instrument? I will yield to no man in reverence for or obedience to the Constitution of my country, esteeming it, as I do, a new evangel to the nations, embodying the democracy of the New Testament—the absolute equality of all men before the law, in respect of those rights of human nature which are the gift of God, and therefore as universal as the material structure of man. Can it be that this Constitution of ours, so divine in its spirit of justice, so beneficent in its results, so full of wisdom and goodness and truth, under which we became one people,

a great and powerful nationality, has, in terms or by implication, denied to this people the power to crush armed rebellion by war, and to arrest and punish, during the existence of such rebellion, according to the laws of war and the usages of nations, secret conspirators, who aid and abet the public enemy?

Here is a conspiracy, organized and prosecuted by armed traitors and hired assassins, receiving the moral support of thousands in every State and district, who pronounced the war for the Union a failure, and your now murdered but immortal commander-in-chief a tyrant; the object of which conspiracy, as the testimony shows, was to aid the tottering rebellion which struck at the nation's life. It is in evidence that Davis, Thompson, and others, chiefs in this rebellion, in aid of the same, agreed and conspired with others to poison the fountains of water which supply your commercial metropolis, and thereby murder its inhabitants; to secretly deposit in the habitations of the people and in the ships in your harbors inflammable materials, and thereby destroy them by fire; to murder by the slow and consuming torture of famine your soldiers, captive in their hands; to import pestilence in infected clothes to be distributed in your capital and camps, and thereby murder the surviving heroes and defenders of the republic, who, standing by the holy graves of your unreturning brave, proudly and defiantly challenge to honorable combat and open battle all public enemies, that their country may live; and, finally, to crown this horrid catalogue of crime, this sum of all human atrocities, conspired, as charged upon your record, with the accused and John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, to kill and murder in your capital the executive officers of your government and the commander of your armies. When this conspiracy, entered into by these traitors, is revealed by its attempted execution, and the foul and brutal murder of your President in the capital, you are told that it is unconstitutional, in order to arrest the further execution of the conspiracy, to interpose the military power of this government for the arrest, without civil process, of any of the parties thereto, and for their trial by a military tribunal of justice. If any such rule had obtained during our struggle for independence we never would have been a nation. If any such rule had been adopted and acted upon now, during the fierce struggle of the past four years, no man can say that our nationality would have thus long survived.

The whole people of the United States by their Constitution have created the office of President of the United States and commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and have vested, by the terms of that Constitution, in the person of the President and commander-in-chief the power to enforce the execution of the laws, and preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.

The question may well be asked: If, as commander-in-chief, the President may not, in time of insurrection or war, proclaim and execute martial law, according to the usages of nations, how can he successfully perform the duties of his office—execute the laws, preserve the Constitution, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion?

Martial law and military tribunals are as essential to the successful prosecution of war as are men, and arms, and munitions. The Constitution of the United States has vested the power to declare war and raise armies and navies exclusively in the Congress, and the power to prosecute the war and command the army and navy exclusively in the President of the United States. As, under the Confederation, the commander of the army, appointed only by the Congress, was by the resolution of that Congress empowered to act as he might think proper for the good and welfare of the service, subject only to such restraints or orders as the Congress might give; so, under the Constitution, the President is, by the people who ordained that Constitution and declared him commander-in-chief of the army and navy, vested with full power to direct and control the army and navy of the United States, and employ all the forces necessary to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and execute the laws, as enjoined by his oath and the very letter of the Constitution, subject to no restriction or direction save such as Congress may from time to time prescribe.

That these powers for the common defence, intrusted by the Constitution exclusively to the Congress and the President, are, in time of civil war or foreign invasion, to be exercised without limitation or restraint, to the extent of the public necessity, and without any intervention of the federal judiciary or of State constitutions or State laws, are facts in our history not open to question.

The position is not to be answered by saying you make the American Congress thereby omnipotent, and clothe the American Executive with the asserted attribute of hereditary monarchy—the king can do no wrong. Let the position be fairly stated—that the Congress and President, in war as in peace, are but the agents of the whole people, and that this unlimited power for the common defence against armed rebellion or foreign invasion is but the power of the people intrusted exclusively to the legislative and executive departments as their agents, for any and every abuse of which these agents are directly responsible to the people—and the demagogue cry of an omnipotent Congress, and an Executive invested with royal prerogatives, vanishes like the baseless fabric of a vision. If the Congress corruptly, or oppressively, or wantonly abuse this great trust, the people, by the irresistible power of the ballot, hurl them from place. If the President so abuse the trust, the people by their Congress withhold supplies, or by impeachment transfer the trust to better hands, strip him of the franchises of citizenship and of office, and declare him forever disqualified to hold any position of honor, trust, or power under the government of his country.

I can understand very well why men should tremble at the exercise of this great power by a monarch whose person, by the constitution of his realm, is inviolable, but I cannot conceive how any American citizen, who has faith in the capacity of the whole people to govern themselves, should give himself any concern on the subject. Mr. Hallam, the distinguished author of the Constitutional History of England, has said :

“Kings love to display the divinity with which their flatterers invest them in nothing so much as in the instantaneous execution of their will, and to stand revealed, as it were, in the storm and thunderbolt when their power breaks through the operation of secondary causes and awes a prostrate nation without the intervention of law.”

How just are such words when applied to an irresponsible monarch ! how absurd when applied to a whole people, acting through their duly appointed agents, whose will, thus declared, is the supreme law, to awe into submission and peace and obedience, not a prostrate nation, but a prostrate rebellion ! The same great author utters the fact which all history attests, when he says :

“It has been usual for all governments, during actual rebellion, to proclaim martial law for the suspension of civil jurisdiction ; and this anomaly I must admit,” he adds, “is very far from being less indispensable at such unhappy seasons where the ordinary mode of trial is by jury, than where the right of decision resides in the court.”—*Const. Hist.*, vol. i, ch. 5, p. 326.

That the power to proclaim martial law, and fully or partially suspend the civil jurisdiction, federal and State, in time of rebellion or civil war, and punish by military tribunals all offences committed in aid of the public enemy, is conferred upon Congress and the Executive, necessarily results from the unlimited grants of power for the common defence to which I have already briefly referred. I may be pardoned for saying that this position is not assumed by me for the purposes of this occasion, but that early in the first year of this great struggle for our national life I proclaimed it as a representative of the people, under the obligation of my oath, and, as I then believed, and still believe, upon the authority of the great men who formed and fashioned the wise and majestic fabric of American government.

Some of the citations which I deemed it my duty at that time to make, and some of which I now reproduce, have, I am pleased to say, found a wider circulation in books that have since been published by others.

When the Constitution was on trial for its deliverance before the people of the several States, its ratification was opposed on the ground that it conferred upon Congress and the Executive unlimited power for the common defence. To all such objectors—and they were numerous in every State—that great man, Alexander Hamilton, whose words will live as long as our language lives, speaking to the listening people of all the States, and urging them not to reject that matchless instrument which bore the name of Washington, said :

“The authorities essential to the care of the common defence are these : To raise armies ; to build and equip fleets ; to prescribe rules for the government of both ; to direct their operations ; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist WITHOUT LIMITATION ; because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.

“The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite ; and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. \* \* \* This power ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defence. \* \* \* It must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defence and protection of the community in any manner essential to its efficacy ; that is, in any manner essential to the formation, direction, or support of the national forces.”

He adds the further remark : “This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it ; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal—the *means* ought to be proportioned to the *end* ; the persons from whose agency the attainment of any *end* is expected ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained.”—*Federalist*, No. 23.

In the same great contest for the adoption of the Constitution, Madison, sometimes called the Father of the Constitution, said :

“Is the power of declaring war necessary ? No man will answer this question in the negative. \* \* \* Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary ? \* \* \* It is involved in the power of self-defence. \* \* \* With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defence be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offence ? \* \* \* The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. \* \* \* It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain, because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power.”—*Federalist*, No. 41.

With this construction, proclaimed both by the advocates and opponents of its ratification, the Constitution of the United States was accepted and adopted, and that construction has been followed and acted upon by every department of the government to this day.

It was as well understood then in theory as it has since been illustrated in practice, that the judicial power, both federal and State, had no voice and could exercise no authority in the

conduct and prosecution of a war, except in subordination to the political department of the government. The Constitution contains the significant provision, "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it"

What was this but a declaration that in time of rebellion or invasion the public safety is the highest law? that so far as necessary the civil courts (of which the commander-in-chief, under the direction of Congress, shall be the sole judge) must be silent, and the rights of each citizen, as secured in time of peace, must yield to the wants, interests, and necessities of the nation? Yet we have been gravely told by the gentleman, in his argument, that the maxim *salus populi suprema est lex* is but fit for a tyrant's use. Those grand men, whom God taught to build the fabric of empire, thought otherwise when they put that maxim into the Constitution of their country. It is very clear that the Constitution recognizes the great principle which underlies the structure of society and of all civil government, that no man lives for himself alone, but each for all; that, if need be, some must die, that the State may live, because at best the individual is but for to-day, while the commonwealth is for all time. I agree with the gentleman in the maxim which he borrows from Aristotle, "Let the public weal be under the protection of the law;" but I claim that in war, as in peace, by the very terms of the Constitution of the country, the public safety is under the protection of the law; that the Constitution itself has provided for the declaration of war for the common defence, to suppress rebellion, to repel invasion, and, by express terms, has declared that whatever is necessary to make the prosecution of the war successful may be done, and ought to be done, and is therefore constitutionally lawful.

Who will dare to say that in time of civil war "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law?" This is a provision of your Constitution than which there is none more just or sacred in it; it is, however, only the law of peace, not of war. In peace, that wise provision of the Constitution must be, and is, enforced by the civil courts; in war, it must be, and is, to a great extent, inoperative and disregarded. The thousands slain by your armies in battle were deprived of life "without due process of law." All spies arrested, convicted, and executed by your military tribunals in time of war are deprived of liberty and life "without due process of law;" all enemies captured and held as prisoners of war are deprived of liberty "without due process of law;" all owners, whose property is forcibly seized and appropriated in war, are deprived of their property "without due process of law." The Constitution recognizes the principle of common law, that every man's house is his castle; that his home, the shelter of his wife and children, is his most sacred possession; and has therefore specially provided "that no soldier shall, *in time of peace*, be quartered in any house without the consent of its owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law," [III Amend.]; thereby declaring that, in time of war, Congress may by law authorize, as it has done, that without the consent and against the consent of the owner, the soldier may be quartered in any man's house, and upon any man's hearth. What I have said illustrates the proposition that in time of war the civil tribunals of justice are wholly or partially silent, as the public safety may require; that the limitations and provisions of the Constitution in favor of life, liberty, and property are therefore wholly or partially suspended. In this I am sustained by an authority second to none with intelligent American citizens. Mr. John Quincy Adams, than whom a purer man or wiser statesman never ascended the chair of the Chief Magistracy in America, said in his place in the House of Representatives, in 1836, that:

"In the authority given to Congress by the Constitution of the United States to declare war, all the powers incident to war are by necessary implication conferred upon the government of the United States. Now the powers incidental to war are derived, not from their internal municipal source, but from the laws and usages of nations. There are, then, in the authority of Congress and of the Executive two classes of powers altogether different in their nature, and often incompatible with each other, the war power and the peace power. The peace power is limited by regulations and restricted by provisions prescribed within the Constitution itself. The war power is limited only by the laws and usages of nations. This power is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional, but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, of property, and of life."

If this be so, how can there be trial by jury for military offences in time of civil war? If you cannot and do not try the armed enemy before you shoot him, or the captured enemy before you imprison him, why should you be held to open the civil courts and try the spy, the conspirator, and the assassin, in the secret service of the public enemy, by jury, before you convict and punish him? Why not clamor against holding imprisoned the captured armed rebels, deprived of their liberty without due process of law? Are they not citizens? Why not clamor against slaying for their crime of treason, which is cognizable in the civil courts, by your rifled ordnance and the leaden hail of your musketry in battle these public enemies, without trial by jury? Are they not citizens? Why is the clamor confined exclusively to the trial by military tribunals of justice of traitorous spies, traitorous conspirators, and assassins hired to do secretly what the armed rebel attempts to do openly—murder your nationality by assassinating its defenders and its executive officers? Nothing can be clearer than that the rebel captured prisoner, being a citizen of the republic, is as much entitled to trial by jury before he is committed to prison as the spy or the aider and abettor of the treason

by conspiracy and assassination, being a citizen, is entitled to such trial by jury before he is subjected to the just punishment of the law for his great crime. I think that in time of war the remark of Montesquieu, touching the civil judiciary, is true, that "it is next to nothing." Hamilton well said, "The Executive holds the sword of the community; the judiciary has no direction of the strength of society; it has neither force nor will; it has judgment alone, and is dependent for the execution of that upon the arm of the Executive." The people of these States so understood the Constitution, and adopted it and intended thereby, without limitation or restraint, to empower their Congress and Executive to authorize by law and execute by force whatever the public safety might require to suppress rebellion or repel invasion.

Notwithstanding all that has been said by the counsel for the accused to the contrary, the Constitution has received this construction from the day of its adoption to this hour. The Supreme Court of the United States has solemnly decided that the Constitution has conferred upon the government authority to employ all the means necessary to the faithful execution of all the powers which that Constitution enjoins upon the government of the United States, and upon every department and every officer thereof. Speaking of that provision of the Constitution which provides that "Congress shall have power to make all laws that may be necessary and proper to carry into effect all powers granted to the government of the United States, or to any department or officer thereof," Chief Justice Marshall, in his great decision in the case of *McCulloch vs. State of Maryland*, says:

"The powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of execution, and the government, in all sound reason and fair interpretation, must have the choice of the means which it deems the most convenient and appropriate to the execution of the power. \* \* \* The powers of the government were given for the welfare of the nation; they were intended to endure for ages to come, and to be adapted to the various crises in human affairs. To prescribe the specific means by which government should, in all future time, execute its power, and to confine the choice of means to such narrow limits as should not leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate and conducive to the end, would be most unwise and pernicious." (4 Wheaton, 420.)

Words fitly spoken! which illustrated at the time of their utterance the wisdom of the Constitution in providing this general grant of power to meet every possible exigency which the fortunes of war might cast upon the country, and the wisdom of which words, in turn, has been illustrated to-day by the gigantic and triumphant struggle of the people during the last four years for the supremacy of the Constitution, and in exact accordance with its provisions. In the light of these wonderful events the words of Pinckney, uttered when the illustrious Chief Justice had concluded this opinion, "The constitution of my country is immortal!" seem to have become words of prophecy. Has not this great tribunal, through the chief of all its judges, by this luminous and profound reasoning, declared that the government may by law authorize the executive to employ, in the prosecution of war, the ordinary means, and all the means necessary and adapted to the end? And in the other decision, before referred to, in the 8th of Cranch, arising during the late war with Great Britain, Mr. Justice Story said:

"When the legislative authority, to whom the right to declare war is confided, has declared war in its most unlimited manner, the executive authority, to whom the execution of the war is confided, is bound to carry it into effect. He has a discretion vested in him as to the manner and extent, but he cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established among civilized nations. He cannot lawfully exercise powers or authorize proceedings which the civilized world repudiates and disclaims. The sovereignty as to declaring war and limiting its effects rests with the legislature. The sovereignty as to its execution rests with the President." (Brown vs. United States, 8 Cranch, 153.)

Has the Congress, to whom is committed the sovereignty of the whole people to declare war, by legislation restricted the President, or attempted to restrict him, in the prosecution of this war for the Union, from exercising all the "powers" and adopting all the "proceedings" usually approved and employed by the civilized world? He would, in my judgment, be a bold man who asserted that Congress has so legislated; and the Congress which should by law fetter the executive arm when raised for the common defence would, in my opinion, be false to their oath. That Congress may prescribe rules for the government of the army and navy and the militia when in actual service, by articles of war, is an express grant of power in the Constitution, which Congress has rightfully exercised, and which the Executive must and does obey. That Congress may aid the Executive by legislation in the prosecution of a war, civil or foreign, is admitted. That Congress may restrain the Executive, and arraign, try, and condemn him for wantonly abusing the great trust, is expressly declared in the Constitution. That Congress shall pass all laws NECESSARY to enable the Executive to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion, is one of the express requirements of the Constitution, for the performance of which the Congress is bound by an oath.

What was the legislation of Congress when treason fired its first gun on Sumter? By the act of 1795 it is provided that whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any State, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceeding, or by the powers vested in the marshals, it

shall be lawful by this act for the President to call forth the militia of such State, or of any other State or States, as may be necessary to suppress such combinations and to cause the laws to be executed. (1st Statutes at Large, 424.) By the act of 1807 it is provided that in case of insurrection or obstruction to the laws either of the United States or of any individual State or Territory, where it is lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ for such purpose such part of the land or naval forces of the United States as shall be judged necessary. (2d Statutes at Large, 443.)

Can any one doubt that by these acts the President is clothed with full power to determine whether armed insurrection exists in any State or Territory of the Union; and if so, to make war upon it with all the force he may deem necessary or be able to command? By the simple exercise of this great power it necessarily results that he may, in the prosecution of the war for the suppression of such insurrection, suspend, as far as may be necessary, the civil administration of justice by substituting in its stead martial law, which is simply the common law of war. If in such a moment the President may make no arrests without civil warrant, and may inflict no violence or penalties on persons (as is claimed here for the accused) without first obtaining the verdict of juries and the judgment of civil courts, then is this legislation a mockery, and the Constitution, which not only authorized but enjoined its enactment, but a glittering generality and a splendid bauble. Happily the Supreme Court has settled all controversy on this question. In speaking of the Rhode Island insurrection the court say:

“The Constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided for an emergency of this kind and authorized the general government to interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the hands of that department.” \* \* \* “By the act of 1795 the power of deciding whether the exigency has arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere is given to the President.”

The court add:

“When the President has acted and called out the militia, is a circuit court of the United States authorized to inquire whether his decision was right? If it could, then it would become the duty of the court, provided it came to the conclusion that the President had decided incorrectly, to discharge those who were arrested or detained by the troops in the service of the United States.” \* \* \* “If the judicial power extends so far, the guarantee contained in the Constitution of the United States is a guarantee of anarchy and not of order.” \* \* \* “Yet if this right does not reside in the courts when the conflict is raging, if the judicial power is at that time bound to follow the decision of the political, it must be equally bound when the contest is over. It cannot, when peace is restored, punish as offences and crimes the acts which it before recognized and was bound to recognize as lawful.” (Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard, 42, 43.)

If this be law, what becomes of the volunteer advice of the volunteer counsel, by him given without money and without price, to this court, of their responsibility, their *personal* responsibility, for obeying the orders of the President of the United States in trying persons accused of the murder of the Chief Magistrate and commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in time of rebellion, and in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into with the public enemy? I may be pardoned for asking the attention of the court to a further citation from this important decision, in which the court say the employment of military power to put down an armed insurrection “is essential to the existence of every government, and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to any other government; and if the government of the State deem the armed opposition so formidable as to require the use of military force and the declaration of MARTIAL LAW, we see no ground upon which this court can question its authority.” (*Ibid.*) This decision in terms declared that under the act of 1795 the President had power to decide and did decide the question so as to exclude further inquiry whether the State government which thus employed force and proclaimed martial law was the government of the State, and therefore was permitted to act. If a State may do this to put down armed insurrection, may not the federal government as well? The reason of the man who doubts it may justly be questioned. I but quote the language of that tribunal in another case before cited, when I say the Constitution confers upon the President the whole executive power.

We have seen that the proclamation of blockade made by the President was affirmed by the Supreme Court as a lawful and valid act, although its direct effect was to dispose of the property of whoever violated it, whether citizen or stranger. It is difficult to perceive what course of reasoning can be adopted, in the light of that decision, which will justify any man in saying that the President had not the like power to proclaim martial law in time of insurrection against the United States, and to establish, according to the customs of war among civilized nations, military tribunals of justice for its enforcement, and for the punishment of all crimes committed in the interests of the public enemy.

These acts of the President have, however, all been legalized by the subsequent legislation of Congress, although the Supreme Court decided, in relation to the proclamation of blockade,

that no such legislation was necessary. By the act of August 6, 1861, ch. 63, sec. 3, it is enacted that—

“All the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States, after the 4th of March, 1861, respecting the army and navy of the United States, and calling out, or relating to, the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved in all respects, legalized, and made valid to the same extent and with the same effect as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.” (12 Stat. at Large, 326.)

This act legalized, if any such legalization was necessary, all that the President had done from the day of his inauguration to that hour, in the prosecution of the war for the Union. He had suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and resisted its execution when issued by the Chief Justice of the United States; he had called out and accepted the services of a large body of volunteers for a period not previously authorized by law; he had declared a blockade of the southern ports; he had declared the southern States in insurrection; he had ordered the armies to invade them and suppress it; thus exercising, in accordance with the laws of war, power over the life, the liberty, and the property of the citizens. Congress ratified it and affirmed it.

In like manner, and by subsequent legislation, did the Congress ratify and affirm the proclamation of martial law of September 25, 1862. That proclamation, as the court will have observed, declared that during the existing insurrection all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to the rebels against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or *military commission*; and, second, that the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, &c., by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court-martial or *military commission*.

One would suppose that it needed no argument to satisfy an intelligent and patriotic citizen of the United States that, by the ruling of the Supreme Court cited, so much of this proclamation as declares that all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, shall be subject to martial law and be liable to trial and punishment by court-martial or military commission, needed no ratification by Congress. Every step that the President took against rebels and insurgents was taken in pursuance of the rules of war, and was an exercise of martial law. Who says that he should not deprive them, by the authority of this law, of life and liberty? Are the aiders and abettors of these insurgents entitled to any higher consideration than the armed insurgents themselves? It is against these that the President proclaimed martial law, and against all others who were guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States. Against these he suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and these, and only such as these, were by that proclamation subjected to trial and punishment by court-martial or military commission.

That the proclamation covers the offence charged here, no man will or dare for a moment deny. Was it not a disloyal practice? Was it not aiding and abetting the insurgents and rebels to enter into a conspiracy with them to kill and murder, within your capital and your intrenched camp, the Commander-in-Chief of our army, your Lieutenant General, and the Vice-President, and the Secretary of State, with intent thereby to aid the rebellion and subvert the Constitution and laws of the United States? But it is said that the President could not establish a court for their trial, and therefore Congress must ratify and affirm this proclamation. I have said before that such an argument comes with ill grace from the lips of him who declared as solemnly that neither by the Congress nor by the President could either the rebel himself or his aider or abettor be lawfully or constitutionally subjected to trial by any military tribunal, whether court-martial or military commission. But the Congress did ratify, in the exercise of the power vested in them, every part of this proclamation. I have said, upon the authority of the fathers of the Constitution, and of its judicial interpreters, that Congress has power by legislation to aid the Executive in the suppression of rebellion, in executing the laws of the Union when resisted by armed insurrection, and in repelling invasion.

By the act of March 3, 1863, the Congress of the United States, by the first section thereof, declared that during the present rebellion the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States or any part thereof. By the fourth section of the same act it is declared that any order of the President, or under his authority, made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, shall be a defence in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, pending or to be commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment, made, done, or committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by virtue of such order. By the fifth section it is provided, that if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or shall be commenced in any State court against any officer, civil or military, or against any other person, for any arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wrongs done or committed, or any act omitted to be done at any time during the present rebellion, by virtue of or under color of any authority derived from or exercised by or under

the President of the United States, if the defendant shall, upon appearance in such court, file a petition stating the facts upon affidavit, &c., as aforesaid, for the removal of the cause for trial to the circuit court of the United States, it shall be the duty of the State court, upon his giving security, to proceed no further in the cause or prosecution. Thus declaring that all orders of the President, made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, and all acts done in pursuance thereof, shall be held valid in the courts of justice. Without further inquiry, these provisions of this statute embrace Order 141, which is the proclamation of martial law, and necessarily legalize every act done under it, either before the passage of the act of 1863 or since. Inasmuch as that proclamation ordered that all rebels, insurgents, their aiders and abettors, and persons guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States, at any time during the existing insurrection, should be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by a *military commission*, the sections of the law just cited declaring lawful all acts done in pursuance of such order, including, of course, the trial and punishment by military commission of all such offenders, as directly legalized this order of the President as it is possible for Congress to legalize or authorize any executive act whatever. (12 Stat. at Large, 755-'6.)

But, after assuming and declaring with great earnestness in his argument that no person could be tried and convicted for such crimes by any military tribunal, whether a court-martial or a military commission, save those in the land and naval service in time of war, the gentleman makes the extraordinary statement that the creation of a military commission must be authorized by the legislative department, and demands, if there be any such legislation, "let the statute be produced." The statute has been produced. - The power so to try, says the gentleman, must be authorized by Congress, when the demand is made for such authority. Does not the gentleman thereby give up his argument, and admit, that if the Congress has so authorized the trial of all aiders and abettors of rebels or insurgents for whatever they do in aid of such rebels and insurgents during the insurrection, the statute and proceedings under it are lawful and valid? I have already shown that the Congress have so legislated by expressly legalizing Order No. 141, which directed the trial of all rebels, their aiders and abettors, by military commission. Did not Congress expressly legalize this order by declaring that the order shall be a defence in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, for acts done in pursuance of it? No amount of argument could make this point clearer than the language of the statute itself. But, says the gentleman, if there be a statute authorizing trials by military commission, "let it be produced."

By the act of March 3, 1863, it is provided, in section 30, that in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, murder and assault with intent to kill, &c., when committed by persons in the military service, shall be punishable by the sentence of a court-martial or *military commission*, and the punishment of such offences shall never be less than those inflicted by the laws of the State or district in which they may have been committed. By the 38th section of the same act, it is provided that all persons who, in time of war or rebellion against the United States, shall be found lurking or acting as spies in or about the camps, &c., of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be triable by a *military commission*, and shall, upon conviction, suffer death. Here is a statute which expressly declares that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, who in time of rebellion shall be found acting as spies, shall suffer death upon conviction by a military commission. Why did not the gentleman give us some argument upon this law? We have seen that it was the existing law of the United States under the Confederation. Then, and since, men not in the land or naval forces of the United States have suffered death for this offence upon conviction by courts-martial. If it was competent for Congress to authorize their trial by courts-martial, it was equally competent for Congress to authorize their trial by military commission, and accordingly they have done so. By the same authority the Congress may extend the jurisdiction of military commissions over all military offences or crimes committed in time of rebellion or war in aid of the public enemy; and it certainly stands with right reason, that if it were just to subject to death, by the sentence of a military commission, all persons who should be guilty merely of lurking as spies in the interest of the public enemy in time of rebellion, though they obtained no information, though they inflicted no personal injury, but were simply overtaken and detected in the endeavor to obtain intelligence for the enemy, those who enter into conspiracy with the enemy not only to lurk as spies in your camp, but to lurk there as murderers and assassins, and who, in pursuance of that conspiracy, commit assassination and murder upon the Commander-in-Chief of your army within your camp and in aid of rebellion, should be subject in like manner to trial by military commission. (Stat. at Large, 12, 736-'7, ch. 8.)

Accordingly, the President having so declared, the Congress, as we have stated, have affirmed that his order was valid, and that all persons acting by authority, and consequently as a court pronouncing such sentence upon the offender as the usage of war requires, are justified by the law of the land. With all respect, permit me to say that the learned gentleman has manifested more acumen and ability in his elaborate argument by what he has omitted to say than by anything which he has said. By the act of July 2, 1864, cap. 215, it is provided that the commanding general in the field, or the commander of the department, as the case may be, shall have power to carry into execution all sentences against guerilla marauders for robbery, arson, burglary, &c., and for violation of the laws and customs of war, as well as sentences against spies, mutineers, deserters, and murderers.

From the legislation I have cited, it is apparent that military commissions are expressly

recognized by the law-making power; that they are authorized to try capital offences against citizens not in the service of the United States, and to pronounce the sentence of death upon them; and that the commander of a department, or the commanding general in the field, may carry such sentence into execution. But, says the gentleman, grant all this to be so; Congress has not declared in what manner the court shall be constituted. The answer to that objection has already been anticipated in the citation from *Benét*, wherein it appeared to be the rule of the law martial that in the punishment of all military offences not provided for by the written law of the land, military commissions are constituted for that purpose by the authority of the commanding officer or the Commander-in-Chief, as the case may be, who selects the officers of a court-martial; that they are similarly constituted, and their proceedings conducted according to the same general rules. That is a part of the very law martial which the President proclaimed, and which the Congress has legalized. The Proclamation has declared that all such offenders shall be tried by military commissions. The Congress has legalized the same by the act which I have cited; and by every intendment it must be taken that, as martial law is by the Proclamation declared to be the rule by which they shall be tried, the Congress, in affirming the act of the President, simply declared that they should be tried according to the customs of martial law; that the commission should be constituted by the Commander-in-Chief according to the rule of procedure known as martial law; and that the penalties inflicted should be in accordance with the laws of war and the usages of nations. Legislation no more definite than this has been upon your statute-book since the beginning of the century, and has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States valid for the punishment of offenders.

By the 32d article of the act of 23d April, 1800, it is provided that "all crimes committed by persons belonging to the navy, which are not specified in the foregoing articles, shall be punished according to the laws and customs in such cases at sea." Of this article the Supreme Court of the United States say that when offences and crimes are not given in terms or by definition, the want of it may be supplied by a comprehensive enactment such as the 32d article of the rules for the government of the navy; which means that courts-martial have jurisdiction of such crimes as are not specified, but which have been recognized to be crimes and offences by the usages in the navies of all nations, and that they shall be punished according to the laws and customs of the sea. (*Dynes vs. Hoover*, 20 Howard., 82)

But it is a fact that must not be omitted in the reply which I make to the gentleman's argument, that an effort was made by himself and others in the Senate of the United States, on the 3d of March last, to condemn the arrests, imprisonments, &c., made by order of the President of the United States in pursuance of his proclamation, and to reverse, by the judgment of that body, the law which had been before passed affirming his action, which effort most signally failed.

Thus we see that the body which by the Constitution, if the President had been guilty of the misdemeanors alleged against him in this argument of the gentleman, would, upon presentation of such charge in legal form against the President, constitute the high court of impeachment for his trial and condemnation, has decided the question in advance, and declared upon the occasion referred to, as they had before declared by solemn enactment, that this order of the President declaring martial law and the punishment of all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, by military commission, should be enforced during the insurrection, as the law of the land, and that the offenders should be tried, as directed, by military commission. It may be said that this subsequent legislation of Congress, ratifying and affirming what had been done by the President, can have no validity. Of course it cannot if neither the Congress nor the Executive can authorize the proclamation and enforcement of martial law in the suppression of rebellion for the punishment of all persons committing military offences in aid of that rebellion. Assuming, however, as the gentleman seemed to assume by asking for the legislation of Congress, that there is such power in Congress, the Supreme Court of the United States has solemnly affirmed that such ratification is valid. (2 Black, 671.)

The gentleman's argument is full of citations of English precedent. There is a late English precedent bearing upon this point—the power of the legislature, by subsequent enactment, to legalize executive orders, arrests, and imprisonment of citizens—that I beg leave to commend to his consideration. I refer to the statute of 11 and 12 Victoria, ch. 35, entitled "An act to empower the lord lieutenant, or other chief governor or governors of Ireland, to apprehend and detain until the first day of March, 1849, such persons as he or they shall suspect of conspiring against her Majesty's person and government," passed July 25, 1848, which statute in terms declares that all and every person and persons who is, are, or shall be, within that period, within that part of the United Kingdom of England and Ireland called Ireland at or on the day the act shall receive her Majesty's royal assent, or after, by warrant for high treason or treasonable practices, or suspicion of high treason or treasonable practices, signed by the lord lieutenant, or other chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being, or his or their chief secretary, for such causes as aforesaid, may be detained in safe custody without bail or main prize, until the first day of March, 1849; and that no judge or justice shall bail or try any such person or persons so committed, without order from her Majesty's privy council, until the said first day of March, 1849, any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding. The 2d section of this act provides that, in cases where any persons have been, before the passing of the act, arrested, committed, or detained for such cause by war

rant or warrants signed by the officers aforesaid, or either of them, it may be lawful for the person or persons to whom such warrants have been or shall be directed to detain such person or persons in his or their custody in any place whatever in Ireland; and that such person or persons to whom such warrants have been or shall be directed shall be deemed and taken, to all intents and purposes, lawfully authorized to take into safe custody and be the lawful jailers and keepers of such persons so arrested, committed, or detained.

Here the power of arrest is given by the act of Parliament to the governor or his secretary; the process of the civil courts was wholly suspended; bail was denied and the parties imprisoned, and this not by process of the courts, but by warrant of a chief governor or his secretary; not for crimes charged to have been committed, but for being *suspected* of treasonable practices. Magna charta, it seems, opposes no restraint, notwithstanding the parade that is made about it in this argument, upon the power of the Parliament of England to legalize arrests and imprisonments made before the passage of the act upon an executive order, and without colorable authority of statute law, and to authorize like arrests and imprisonments of so many of six million of people as such executive officers might *suspect* of treasonable practices.

But, says the gentleman, whatever may be the precedents, English or American, whatever may be the provisions of the Constitution, whatever may be the legislation of Congress, whatever may be the proclamations and orders of the President as commander-in-chief, it is a usurpation and a tyranny in time of rebellion and civil war to subject any citizen to trial for any crime before military tribunals, save such citizens as are in the land or naval forces, and against this usurpation, which he asks this court to rebuke by solemn decision, he appeals to public opinion. I trust that I set as high a value upon enlightened public opinion as any man. I recognize it as the reserved power of the people which creates and dissolves armies, which creates and dissolves legislative assemblies, which enacts and repeals fundamental laws, the better to provide for personal security by the due administration of justice. To that public opinion upon this very question of the usurpation of authority, of unlawful arrests, and unlawful imprisonments, and unlawful trials, condemnations, and executions by the late President of the United States, an appeal has already been taken. On this very issue the President was tried before the tribunal of the people, that great nation of freemen who cover this continent, looking out upon Europe from their eastern and upon Asia from their western homes. That people came to the consideration of this issue not unmindful of the fact that the first struggle for the establishment of our nationality could not have been, and was not, successfully prosecuted without the proclamation and enforcement of martial law, declaring, as we have seen, that any inhabitant who, during that war, should kill any loyal citizen, or enter into any combination for that purpose, should, upon trial and conviction before a military tribunal, be sentenced as an assassin, traitor, or spy, and should suffer death, and that in this last struggle for the maintenance of American nationality the President but followed the example of the illustrious Father of his Country. Upon that issue the people passed judgment on the eighth day of last November, and declared that the charge of usurpation was false.

From this decision of the people there lies no appeal on this earth. Who can rightfully challenge the authority of the American people to decide such questions for themselves? The voice of the people thus solemnly proclaimed, by the omnipotence of the ballot, in favor of the righteous order of their murdered President, issued by him for the common defence, for the preservation of the Constitution and for the enforcement of the laws of the Union, ought to be accepted, and will be accepted, I trust, by all just men, as the voice of God.

**MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:** I have said thus much touching the right of the people, under their Constitution, in time of civil war and rebellion, to proclaim through their Executive, with the sanction and approval of their Congress, martial law, and enforce the same according to the usage of nations.

I submit that it has been shown that, by the letter and spirit of the Constitution as well as by its contemporaneous construction, followed and approved by every department of the government, this right is in the people; that it is inseparable from the condition of war, whether civil or foreign, and absolutely essential to its vigorous and successful prosecution; that, according to the highest authority upon constitutional law, the proclamation and enforcement of martial law are "usual under all governments in time of rebellion;" that our own highest judicial tribunal has declared this, and solemnly ruled that the question of the necessity for its exercise rests exclusively with Congress and the President; and that the decision of the political departments of the government, that there is an armed rebellion and a necessity for the employment of military force and martial law in its suppression, concludes the judiciary.

In submitting what I have said in support of the jurisdiction of this honorable court and of its constitutional power to hear and determine this issue, I have uttered my own convictions; and for their utterance in defence of my country, and its right to employ all the means necessary for the common defence against armed rebellion and secret treasonable conspiracy in aid of such rebellion, I shall neither ask pardon nor offer apology. I find no words with which more fitly to conclude all I have to say upon the question of the jurisdiction and constitutional authority of this court than those employed by the illustrious Lord Brougham to the House of Peers in support of the bill before referred to, which empowered the lord lieu-

tenant of Ireland, and his deputies, to apprehend and detain for the period of seven months or more, all such persons within that island as they should *suspect* of conspiracy against her Majesty's person and government. Said that illustrious man, "A friend of liberty I have lived, and such will I die; nor care I how soon the latter event may happen if I cannot be a friend of liberty without being a friend of traitors at the same time—a protector of criminals of the deepest dye—an accomplice of foul rebellion and of its concomitant, civil war, with all its atrocities and all its fearful consequences." (Hansard's Debates, 3d series, vol. 100, p. 635.)

**MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:** It only remains for me to sum up the evidence and present my views of the law arising upon the facts in the case on trial. The questions of fact involved in the issue are—

First. Did the accused, or any two of them, confederate and conspire together as charged? and,

Second. Did the accused, or any of them, in pursuance of such conspiracy, and with the intent alleged, commit either or all of the several acts specified?

If the conspiracy be established as laid, it results that whatever was said or done by either of the parties thereto in the furtherance or execution of the common design, is the declaration or act of all the other parties to the conspiracy; and this, whether the other parties, at the time such words were uttered or such acts done by their confederates, were present or absent—here, within the intrenched lines of your capital, or crouching behind the intrenched lines of Richmond, or awaiting the results of their murderous plot against their country, its Constitution and laws, across the border, under the shelter of the British flag.

The declared and accepted rule of law in cases of conspiracy is that—

"In prosecutions for conspiracy it is an established rule that where several persons are proved to have combined together for the same illegal purpose, any act done by one of the party in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and in reference to the common object, is, in the contemplation of law as well as in sound reason, the act of the whole party; and, therefore, the proof of the act will be evidence against any of the others, who were engaged in the same general conspiracy, without regard to the question whether the prisoner is proved to have been concerned in the particular transaction." (Phillips on Evidence, p. 210.)

The same rule obtains in cases of treason: "If several persons agree to levy war, some in one place and some in another, and one party do actually appear in arms, this is a levying of war by all, as well those who were not in arms as those who were, if it were done in pursuance of the original concert, for those who made the attempt were emboldened by the confidence inspired by the general concert, and therefore these particular acts are in justice imputable to all the rest." (1 East., Pleas of the Crown, p. 97; Roscoe, 84.)

In *Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout*, 4 Cranch, 126, Marshall, Chief Justice, rules: "If war be actually levied—that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting, by force, a treasonable purpose—all those who perform any part—*however minute, or however remote from the scene of action*, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors."

In *United States vs. Cole et al.*, 5 McLean, 601, Mr. Justice McLean says: "A conspiracy is rarely, if ever, proved by positive testimony. When a crime of high magnitude is about to be perpetrated by a combination of individuals, they do not act openly but covertly and secretly. The purpose formed is known only to those who enter into it. Unless one of the original conspirators betray his companions and give evidence against them, their guilt can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. \* \* It is said by some writers on evidence that such circumstances are stronger than positive proof. A witness swearing positively, it is said, may misapprehend the facts or swear falsely, but that circumstances cannot lie.

"The common design is the essence of the charge; and this may be made to appear when the defendants steadily pursue the same object, whether acting separately or together, by common or different means, all leading to the same unlawful result. And where *prima facie* evidence has been given of a combination, the acts or confessions of one are evidence against all. \* \* It is reasonable that where a body of men assume the attribute of individuality, whether for commercial business or for the commission of a crime, the association should be bound by the acts of one of its members in carrying out the design."

It is a rule of the law, not to be overlooked in this connexion, that the conspiracy or agreement of the parties, or some of them, to act in concert to accomplish the unlawful act charged, may be established either by direct evidence of a meeting or consultation for the illegal purpose charged, or more usually, from the very nature of the case, by circumstantial evidence. (2 Starkie, 232.)

Lord Mansfield ruled that it was not necessary to prove the actual fact of a conspiracy, but that it might be collected from collateral circumstances. (Parson's Case, 1 W. Blackstone, 392.)

"If," says a great authority on the law of evidence, "on a charge of conspiracy, it appear that two persons by their acts are pursuing the same object, and often by the same means, or one performing part of the act, and the other completing it, for the attainment of the same object, the jury may draw the conclusion there is a conspiracy. If a conspiracy be

formed, and a person join in it afterwards, he is equally guilty with the original conspirators." (Roscoe, 415.)

"The rule of the admissibility of the acts and declarations of any one of the conspirators, said or done in furtherance of the common design, applies in cases as well where only part of the conspirators are indicted, or upon trial, as where all are indicted and upon trial. Thus, upon an indictment for murder, if it appear that others, together with the prisoner, conspired to commit the crime, the act of one, done in pursuance of that intention, will be evidence against the rest." (2d Starkie, 237.)

They are all alike guilty as principals. (Commonwealth vs. Knapp, 9 Pickering, 496; 10 Pickering, 477; 6 Term Reports, 528; 11 East., 584.)

What is the evidence, direct and circumstantial, that the accused, or either of them, together with John H. Surratt, John Wilkes Booth, Jefferson Davis, George N. Sanders, Beverley Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, Clement C. Clay, George Harper, and George Young, did combine, confederate, and conspire, in aid of the existing rebellion, as charged, to kill and murder, within the military department of Washington, and within the fortified and intrenched lines thereof, Abraham Lincoln, late, and, at the time of the said combining, confederating, and conspiring, President of the United States of America and commander-in-chief of the army and navy thereof; Andrew Johnson, Vice-President of the United States; William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States; and Ulysses S. Grant, lieutenant general of the armies thereof, and then in command, under the direction of the President?

The time, as laid in the charge and specification, when this conspiracy was entered into is immaterial, so that it appear by the evidence that the criminal combination and agreement were formed before the commission of the acts alleged. That Jefferson Davis, one of the conspirators named, was the acknowledged chief and leader of the existing rebellion against the government of the United States, and that Jacob Thompson, George N. Sanders, Clement C. Clay, Beverley Tucker, and others named in the specification, were his duly accredited and authorized agents to act in the interests of said rebellion, are facts established by the testimony in this case beyond all question. That Davis, as the leader of said rebellion, gave to those agents, then in Canada, commissions in blank, bearing the official signature of his war minister, James A. Seddon, to be by them filled up and delivered to such agents as they might employ to act in the interests of the rebellion within the United States, and intended to be a cover and protection for any crimes they might therein commit in the service of the rebellion, is also a fact established here, and which no man can gainsay. Who doubts that Kennedy, whose confession, made in view of immediate death, as proved here, was commissioned by those accredited agents of Davis to burn the city of New York? that he was to have attempted it on the night of the presidential election, and that he did, in combination with his confederates, set fire to four hotels in the city of New York on the night of the 25th of November last? Who doubts that, in like manner, in the interests of the rebellion and by the authority of Davis, these his agents also commissioned Bennett H. Young to commit arson, robbery, and the murder of unarmed citizens, in St. Albans, Vermont? Who doubts, upon the testimony shown, that Davis, by his agents, deliberately adopted the system of starvation for the murder of our captive soldiers in his hands; or that, as shown by the testimony, he sanctioned the burning of hospitals and steamboats, the property of private persons, and paid therefor from his stolen treasure the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars in gold? By the evidence of Joseph Godfrey Hyams it is proved that Thompson—the agent of Jefferson Davis—paid him money for the service he rendered in the infamous and fiendish project of importing pestilence into our camps and cities to destroy the lives of citizens and soldiers alike, and into the house of the President for the purpose of destroying his life. It may be said, and doubtless will be said, by the pensioned advocates of this rebellion, that Hyams, being infamous, is not to be believed. It is admitted that he is infamous, as it must be conceded that any man is infamous who either participates in such a crime or attempts in anywise to extenuate it. But it will be observed that Hyams is supported by the testimony of Mr. Sanford Conover, who heard Blackburn and the other rebel agents in Canada speak of this infernal project, and by the testimony of Mr. Wall, the well-known auctioneer of this city, whose character is unquestioned, that he received this importation of pestilence, (of course without any knowledge of the purpose,) and that Hyams consigned the goods to him in the name of J. W. Harris—a fact in itself an acknowledgment of guilt; and that he received afterwards a letter from Harris, dated Toronto, Canada West, December 1, 1864, wherein Harris stated that he had not been able to come to the States since his return to Canada, and asked for an account of the sale. He identifies the Godfrey Joseph Hyams who testified in court as the J. W. Harris who imported the pestilence. The very transaction shows that Hyams's statement is truthful. He gives the names of the parties connected with this infamy, (Clement C. Clay, Dr. Blackburn, Rev. Dr. Stuart Robinson, J. C. Holcombe—all refugees from the confederacy in Canada,) and states that he gave Thompson a receipt for the fifty dollars paid to him, and that he was by occupation a shoemaker; in none of which facts is there an attempt to discredit him. It is not probable that a man in his position in life would be able to buy five trunks of clothing, ship them all the way from Halifax to Washington, and then order them to be sold at auction, without regard to price, solely upon his own account. It is a matter of notoriety that a part of his statement is verified by

the results at Newbern, North Carolina, to which point, he says, a portion of the infected goods were shipped, through a sutler; the result of which was, that nearly two thousand citizens and soldiers died there about that time with the yellow fever.

That the rebel chief, Jefferson Davis, sanctioned these crimes, committed and attempted through the instrumentality of his accredited agents in Canada—Thompson, Clay, Tucker, Sanders, Cleary, &c.—upon the persons and property of the people of the north, there is positive proof on your record. The letter brought from Richmond, and taken from the archives of his late pretended government there, dated February 11, 1865, and addressed to him by a late rebel senator from Texas, W. S. Oldham, contains the following significant words: "When Senator Johnson, of Missouri, and myself waited on you a few days since, in relation to the project of annoying and harassing the enemy by means of burning their shipping, towns, &c., &c., there were several remarks made by you upon the subject which I was not fully prepared to answer, but which, upon subsequent conference with parties proposing the enterprise, I find cannot apply as objections to the scheme. First, the 'combustible materials' consist of several preparations, and not one alone, and can be used without exposing the party using them to the least danger of detection whatever. \* \* \* Second, there is no necessity for sending persons in the military service into the enemy's country, but the work may be done by agents. \* \* \* I have seen enough of the effects that can be produced to satisfy me that in most cases, without any danger to the parties engaged, and in others but very slight, we can, first, burn every vessel that leaves a foreign port for the United States; second, we can burn every transport that leaves the harbor of New York, or other northern port, with supplies for the armies of the enemy in the south; third, burn every transport and gunboat on the Mississippi river, as well as devastate the country of the enemy, and fill his people with terror and consternation. \* \* \* For the purpose of satisfying your mind upon the subject, I respectfully, but earnestly, request that you will give an interview with General Harris, formerly a member of Congress from Missouri, who, I think, is able, from conclusive proofs, to convince you that what I have suggested is perfectly feasible and practicable."

No one can doubt, from the tenor of this letter, that the rebel Davis only wanted to be satisfied that this system of arson and murder could be carried on by his agents in the north successfully and without detection. With him it was not a crime to do these acts, but only a crime to be detected in them. But Davis, by his indorsement on this letter, dated the 20th of February, 1865, bears witness to his own complicity and his own infamy in this proposed work of destruction and crime for the future, as well as to his complicity in what had before been attempted without complete success. Kennedy, with his confederates, had failed to burn the city of New York. The "combustibles" which Kennedy had employed were, it seems, defective. This was "a difficulty to be overcome." Neither had he been able to consummate the dreadful work without subjecting himself to detection. This was another "difficulty to be overcome." Davis, on the 20th of February, 1865, indorsed upon this letter these words: "Secretary of State, at his convenience, see General Harris and learn what plan he has for *overcoming the difficulties heretofore experienced.* J. D."

This indorsement is unquestionably proved to be the handwriting of Jefferson Davis, and it bears witness on its face that the monstrous proposition met his approval, and that he desired his rebel secretary of state, Benjamin, to see General Harris and learn how to overcome the difficulty heretofore experienced, to wit, the inefficiency of "the combustible materials" that had been employed, and the liability of his agents to detection. After this, who will doubt that he had endeavored, by the hand of incendiaries, to destroy by fire the property and lives of the people of the north, and thereby "fill them with terror and consternation;" that he knew his agents had been unsuccessful; that he knew his agents had been detected in their villany and punished for their crime; that he desired through a more perfect "chemical preparation," by the science and skill of Professor McCulloch, to accomplish successfully what had before been unsuccessfully attempted?

The intercepted letter of his agent, Clement C. Clay, dated St. Catherine's, Canada West, November 1, 1864, is an acknowledgment and confession of what they had attempted, and a suggestion made through J. P. Benjamin, rebel secretary of state, of what remained to be done in order to make the "chemical preparations" efficient. Speaking of this Bennett H. Young, he says: "You have doubtless learned through the press of the United States of the raid on St. Albans by about twenty-five confederate soldiers, led by Lieutenant Bennett H. Young; of their attempt and failure to burn the town; of their robbery of three banks there of the aggregate amount of about two hundred thousand dollars; of their arrest in Canada, by United States forces; of their commitment and the pending preliminary trial." He makes application, in aid of Young and his associates, for additional documents, showing that they acted upon the authority of the Confederate States government, taking care to say, however, that he held such authority at the time, but that it ought to be more explicit so far as regards the particular acts complained of. He states that he met Young at Halifax in May, 1864, who developed his plans for retaliation on the enemy; that he, Clay, recommended him to the rebel secretary of war; that after this "Young was sent back by the Secretary of War with a commission as second lieutenant to execute his plans and purposes, but to report to Hon. ——— and myself." Young afterwards "proposed passing through New England, burning some towns and robbing them of whatever he could convert to the use of the confed.

erate government. This I approved as justifiable retaliation. He attempted to burn the town of St. Albans, Vermont, and would have succeeded but for the failure of the chemical preparation with which he was armed. He then robbed the banks of funds amounting to over two hundred thousand dollars. That he was not prompted by selfish or mercenary motives I am as well satisfied as I am that he is an honest man. He assured me before going that his effort would be to destroy towns and farm-houses, but not to plunder or rob; but he said if, after firing a town, he saw he could take *funds* from a bank or any house, and thereby inflict injury upon the enemy and benefit his own government, he would do so. He added most emphatically, that whatever he took should be turned over to the government or its representatives in foreign lands. My instructions to him were, to destroy whatever was valuable; not to stop to rob, but if, after firing a town, he could seize and carry off money or treasury or bank notes, he might do so upon condition that they were delivered to the proper authorities of the confederate States"—that is, to Clay himself.

When he wrote this letter it seems that this accredited agent of Jefferson Davis was as strongly impressed with the usurpation and despotism of Mr. Lincoln's administration as some of the advocates of his aiders and abettors seem to be at this day; and he indulges in the following statement: "All that a large portion of the northern people, especially in the northwest, want to resist the oppressions of the despotism at Washington is a *leader*. They are ripe for resistance, and it may come soon after the presidential election. At all events, it must come, if our armies are not overcome, or destroyed, or dispersed. No people of the Anglo-Saxon blood can long endure the usurpations and tyrannies of Lincoln." Clay does not sign the despatch, but indorses the bearer of it as a person who can identify him and give his name. The bearer of that letter was the witness Richard Montgomery, who saw Clay write a portion of the letter, and received it from his hands, and subsequently delivered it to the Assistant Secretary of War of the United States, Mr. Dana. That the letter is in Clay's handwriting is clearly proved by those familiar with it. Mr. Montgomery testifies that he was instructed by Clay to deliver this letter to Benjamin, the rebel secretary of state, if he could get through to Richmond, and to tell him what names to put in the blanks.

This letter leaves no doubt, if any before existed in the mind of any one who had read the letter of Oldham and Davis's indorsement thereon, that "the chemical preparations" and "combustible materials" had been tried and had failed, and it had become a matter of great moment and concern that they should be so prepared as, in the words of Davis, "to overcome the difficulties heretofore experienced;" that is to say, complete the work of destruction, and secure the perpetrators against personal injury or detection in the performance of it.

It only remains to be seen whether Davis, the procurer of arson and of the indiscriminate murder of the innocent and unoffending necessarily resultant therefrom, was capable also of endeavoring to procure, and in fact did procure, the murder, by direct assassination, of the President of the United States and others charged with the duty of maintaining the government of the United States, and of suppressing the rebellion in which this arch-traitor and conspirator was engaged.

The official papers of Davis, captured under the guns of our victorious army in his rebel capital, identified beyond question or shadow of doubt, and placed upon your record, together with the declarations and acts of his co-conspirators and agents, proclaim to all the world that he was capable of attempting to accomplish his treasonable procurement of the murder of the late President, and other chief officers of the United States, by the hands of hired assassins.

In the fall of 1864, Lieutenant W. Alston addresses to "his excellency" a letter now before the court, which contains the following words:

"I now offer you my services, and if you will favor *me in my designs*, I will proceed, as soon as my health will permit, to rid *my* country of some of her deadliest enemies, by striking at the very *hearts' blood* of those who seek to enchain her in slavery. I consider nothing *dishonorable* having such a tendency. All I ask of you is, to favor me by granting me the necessary papers, &c., to travel on. \* \* \* \* *I am perfectly familiar with the north*, and feel confident that I can *execute* anything I undertake. I was in the raid last June in Kentucky, under General John H. Morgan; \* \* \* was taken prisoner; \* \* \* escaped from them by dressing myself in the garb of a citizen. \* \* \* I went through to the Canadas, from whence, by the assistance of *Colonel J. P. Holcomb*, I succeeded in working my way around and through the blockade. \* \* \* I should like to have a *personal* interview with you in order to perfect the arrangements before starting."

Is there any room to doubt that this was a proposition to *assassinate*, by the hand of this man and his associates, such persons in the north as he deemed the "deadliest enemies" of the rebellion? The weakness of the man who for a moment can doubt that such was the proposition of the writer of this letter is certainly an object of commiseration. What had Jefferson Davis to say to this proposed assassination of the "deadliest enemies" in the north of his great treason? Did the atrocious suggestion kindle in him indignation against the villain who offered, with his own hand, to strike the blow? Not at all. On the contrary, he ordered his private secretary, on the 29th of November, 1864, to indorse upon the letter these words: "Lieutenant W. Alston; accompanied raid into Kentucky, and was captured, but escaped into *Canada*, from whence he found his way back. Now offers his services to rid the country of some of its *deadliest enemies*; asks for papers, &c. Respectfully referred, by

direction of the President, to the honorable secretary of war." It is also indorsed, for attention "By order. (Signed) J. A. Campbell, assistant secretary of war."

Note the fact in this connexion, that Jefferson Davis himself, as well as his subordinates, had, before the date of this indorsement, concluded that Abraham Lincoln was "the deadliest enemy" of the rebellion. You hear it in the rebel camp in Virginia in 1863, declared by Booth, then and there present, and assented to by rebel officers, that "Abraham Lincoln must be killed." You hear it in that slaughter-pen in Georgia, Andersonville, proclaimed among rebel officers, who, by the slow torture of starvation, inflicted cruel and untimely death on ten thousand of your defenders, captives in their hands—whispering, like demons, their horrid purpose, "Abraham Lincoln must be killed." And in Canada, the accredited agents of Jefferson Davis, as early as October, 1864, and afterwards, declared that "Abraham Lincoln must be killed" if his re-election could not be prevented. These agents in Canada, on the 13th of October, 1864, delivered, in cipher, to be transmitted to Richmond by Richard Montgomery, the witness, whose reputation is unchallenged, the following communication:

"OCTOBER 13, 1864.

"We again urge the immense necessity of our gaining immediate advantages. Strain every nerve for victory. We now look upon the re-election of *Lincoln* in November as almost certain, and we need to whip his hirelings to prevent it. Besides, with *Lincoln* re-elected and his armies victorious, we need not hope even for recognition, much less the help mentioned in our last. Holcomb will explain this. Those figures of the Yankee armies are correct to a unit. *Our friends shall be immediately set to work as you direct.*"

To which an official reply, in cipher, was delivered to Montgomery by an agent of the state department in Richmond, dated October 19, 1864, as follows:

"Your letter of the 13th instant is at hand. There is yet time enough to colonize many voters before November. A blow will shortly be stricken here. It is not quite time. General Longstreet is to attack Sheridan without delay, and then move north as far as practicable towards unprotected points. This will be made instead of movement before mentioned. He will endeavor to assist the *republicans* in *collecting their ballots*. Be watchful and assist him."

On the very day of the date of this Richmond despatch Sheridan was attacked, with what success history will declare. The court will not fail to notice that the *re-election of Mr. Lincoln* is to be prevented if possible, by any and every means. Nor will they fail to notice that *Holcomb* is to "explain this"—the same person who, in Canada, was the friend and adviser of *Alston*, who proposed to Davis the assassination of the "deadliest enemies" of the rebellion.

In the despatch of the 13th of October, which was borne by Montgomery, and transmitted to Richmond in October last, you will find these words: "Our friends shall be immediately set to work as you direct." Mr. Lincoln is the subject of that despatch. Davis is therein notified that his agents in Canada look upon the re-election of Mr. Lincoln in November as almost certain. In this connexion he is assured by those agents that the *friends* of their cause are to be set to work as Davis *had directed*. The conversations, which are proved by witnesses whose characters stand unimpeached, disclose what "work" the "friends" were to do under the *direction* of Davis himself. Who were these "friends," and what was "the work" which his agents, Thompson, Clay, Tucker, and Sanders, had been directed to set them at? Let Thompson answer for himself. In a conversation with Richard Montgomery in the summer of 1864, Thompson said that "he *had his friends*, confederates, all over the northern States, who were ready and willing to go any lengths for the good of the cause of the south, and he could at any time have the *tyrant Lincoln*, or *any other of his advisers* that he chose, *put out of his way*; that they would not consider it a *crime* when done for the cause of the confederacy." This conversation was repeated by the witness in the summer of 1864 to Clement C. Clay, who immediately stated: "That is so; we are all devoted to our cause, and ready to go any length—to do anything under the sun."

At and about the time that these declarations of Clay and Thompson were made, *Alston*, who made the proposition, as we have seen, to Davis, to be furnished with papers to go north and rid the confederacy of some of its "deadliest enemies," was in Canada. He was doubtless one of the "friends" referred to. As appears by the testimony of Montgomery, Payne, the prisoner at your bar, was about that time in Canada, and was seen standing by Thompson's door, engaged in a conversation with Clay, between whom and the witness some words were interchanged, when Clay stated he (Payne) was one of *their friends*—"we trust him." It is proved beyond a shadow of doubt that in October last John Wilkes Booth, the assassin of the President, was also in Canada, and upon intimate terms with Thompson, Clay, Sanders, and other rebel agents. Who can doubt, in the light of the events which have since transpired, that he was one of the "friends" to be "set to work," as Davis had already directed—not, perhaps, as yet to assassinate the President, but to do that other work which is suggested in the letter of Oldham, indorsed by Davis in his own hand, and spread upon your record—the work of the secret incendiary, which was to "fill the people of the north with terror and consternation." The other "work" spoken of by Thompson—putting the *tyrant Lincoln* and *any of his advisers out of the way*, was work doubtless to be commenced only after the re-election of Mr. Lincoln, which they had already declared in their despatch to their employer, Davis, was with them a foregone conclusion. At all events, it was not

until after the presidential election in November that Alston proposed to Davis to go north on the work of assassination; nor was it until after that election that Booth was found in possession of the letter which is in evidence, and which discloses the purpose to assassinate the President. Being assured, however, when Booth was with them in Canada, as they had already declared in their despatch, that the re-election of Mr. Lincoln was certain, in which event there would be no hope for the confederacy, they doubtless entered into the arrangement with Booth as one of their "friends," that as soon as that fact was determined he should go "to work," and as soon as might be "rid the confederacy of the tyrant Lincoln and of his advisers."

That these persons named upon your record, Thompson, Sanders, Clay, Cleary, and Tucker, were the agents of Jefferson Davis, is another fact established in this case beyond a doubt. They made affidavit of it themselves, of record here, upon the examination of their "friends," charged with the raid upon St. Albans, before Judge Smith, in Canada. It is in evidence also by the letter of Clay, before referred to.

The testimony to which I have thus briefly referred shows, by the letter of his agents of the 13th of October, that Davis had before directed those agents to set his *friends to work*. By the letter of Clay it seems that his direction had been obeyed, and his friends had been set to work, in the burning and robbery and murder at St. Albans, in the attempt to burn the city of New York, and in the attempt to introduce pestilence into this capital and into the house of the President. It having appeared, by the letter of Alston, and the indorsement thereon, that Davis had in November entertained the proposition of sending agents, that is to say, "friends," to the north to not only "spread terror and consternation among the people" by means of his "chemical preparations," but also, in the words of that letter, "to strike," by the hands of assassins, "at the heart's blood" of the deadliest enemies in the north to the confederacy of traitors; it has also appeared by the testimony of many respectable witnesses, among others the attorneys who represented the people of the United States and State of Vermont, in the preliminary trial of the raiders in Canada, that Clay, Thompson, Tucker, Sanders and Cleary declared themselves the agents of the confederacy. It also clearly appears by the correspondence referred to, and the letter of Clay, that they were holding, and at any time able to command, blank commissions from Jefferson Davis to authorize *their friends* to do whatever work they appointed them to do, in the interests of the rebellion, by the destruction of life and property in the north.

If a *prima facie* case justifies, as we have seen by the law of evidence it does, the introduction of all declarations and acts of any of the parties to a conspiracy, uttered or done in the prosecution of the common design, as evidence against all the rest, it results, that whatever was said or done in furtherance of the common design, after this month of October, 1864, by either of these agents in Canada, is evidence not only against themselves, but against Davis as well, of his complicity with them in the conspiracy.

Mr. Montgomery testifies that he met Jacob Thompson in January, at Montreal, when he said that "a proposition had been made to him to rid the world of the tyrant Lincoln, Stanton, Grant, and some others; that he knew the men who had made the proposition were bold, daring men, able to execute what they undertook; that he himself was in favor of the proposition, but had determined to defer his answer until he had consulted his government at Richmond; that he was then only awaiting their approval." This was about the middle of January, and consequently more than a month after Alston had made his proposition direct to Davis, in writing, to go north and rid their confederacy of some of its "deadliest enemies." It was at the time of this conversation that Payne, the prisoner, was seen by the witness standing at Thompson's door in conversation with Clay. This witness also shows the intimacy between Thompson, Clay, Cleary, Tucker, and Sanders.

A few days after the assassination of the President, Beverly Tucker said to this witness "that President Lincoln deserved his death long ago; that it was a pity he didn't have it long ago, and it was too bad that the boys had not been allowed to act when they wanted to."

This remark undoubtedly had reference to the propositions made in the fall to Thompson, and also to Davis, to rid the south of its deadliest enemies by their assassination. Cleary, who was accredited by Thompson as his confidential agent, also stated to this witness that Booth was one of the party to whom Thompson had referred in the conversation in January, in which he said he knew the men who were ready to rid the world of the tyrant Lincoln, and of Stanton and Grant. Cleary also said, speaking of the assassination, "that it was a pity that the whole work had not been done," and added, "they had better look out—we are not done yet;" manifestly referring to the statement made by his employer, Thompson, before in the summer, that not only the tyrant Lincoln, but Stanton and Grant, and others of his advisers, should be put out of the way. Cleary also stated to this witness that Booth had visited Thompson twice in the winter, the last time in December, and had also been there in the summer.

Sanford Conover testified that he had been for some time a clerk in the war department at Richmond; that in Canada he knew Thompson, Sanders, Cleary, Tucker, Clay, and other rebel agents; that he knew John H. Surratt and John Wilkes Booth; that he saw Booth there upon one occasion, and Surratt upon several successive days; that he saw Surratt (whom he describes) in April last, in Thompson's room, and also in company with

Sanders; that about the 6th or 7th of April Surratt delivered to Jacob Thompson a despatch brought by him from Benjamin at Richmond, enclosing one in cipher from Davis. Thompson had before this proposed to Conover to engage in a plot to assassinate President Lincoln and his cabinet, and on this occasion he laid his hand upon these despatches and said, "this makes the thing all right," referring to the assent of the rebel authorities, and stated that the rebel authorities had consented to the plot to assassinate Lincoln, Johnson, the Secretary of War, Secretary of State, Judge Chase, and General Grant. Thompson remarked further that the assassination of these parties would leave the government of the United States entirely without a head; that there was no provision in the Constitution of the United States by which they could elect another President, if these men were put out of the way.

In speaking of this assassination of the President and others, Thompson said that it was only removing them from office, that the killing of a tyrant was no murder. It seems that he had learned precisely the same lesson that Alston had learned in November, when he communicated with Davis, and said, speaking of the President's assassination, "he did not think anything dishonorable that would serve their cause." Thompson stated at the same time that he had conferred a commission on Booth, and that everybody engaged in the enterprise would be commissioned, and if it succeeded, or failed, and they escaped into Canada, they could not be reclaimed under the extradition treaty. The fact that Thompson and other rebel agents held blank commissions, as I have said, has been proved, and a copy of one of them is of record here.

This witness also testifies to a conversation with William C. Cleary, shortly after the surrender of Lee's army, and on the day before the President's assassination, at the St. Lawrence hotel, Montreal, when speaking of the rejoicing in the States over the capture of Richmond, Cleary said, "they would put the laugh on the other side of their mouth *in a day or two*." These parties knew that Conover was in the secret of the assassination, and talked with him about it as freely as they would speak of the weather. Before the assassination he had a conversation also with Sanders, who asked him if he knew Booth well, and expressed some apprehension that Booth would "make a failure of it; that he was desperate and reckless, and he was afraid the whole thing would prove a failure."

Dr. James D. Merritt testifies that George Young, one of the parties named in the record, declared in his presence, in Canada, last fall, that Lincoln should never be inaugurated; that they had friends in Washington, who, I suppose, were some of the same friends referred to in the despatch of October 13, and which Davis had directed them "to set to work." George N. Sanders also said to him "that Lincoln would keep himself mighty close if he did serve another term;" while Steele and other confederates declared that the tyrant never should serve another term. He heard the assassination discussed at a meeting of these rebel agents in Montreal in February last. "Sanders said they had *plenty of money* to accomplish the assassination, and named over a number of persons who were ready and willing to engage in undertaking to remove the President, Vice-President, the cabinet, and some of the leading generals. At this meeting he read a letter which he had received from Davis, which justified him in making any arrangements that he could to accomplish the object." This letter the witness heard read, and it, in substance, declared that if the people in Canada and the southerners in the States were willing to submit to be governed by such a tyrant as Lincoln, he didn't wish to recognize them as friends. The letter was read openly; it was also handed to Colonel Steele, George Young, Hill, and Scott, to be read. This was about the middle of February last. At this meeting Sanders named over the persons who were willing to accomplish the assassination, and among the persons thus named was Booth, whom the witness had seen in Canada in October; also George Harper, one of the conspirators named on the record, Caldwell, Randall, Harrison, and Surratt.

The witness understood, from the reading of the letter, that if the President, Vice-President, and cabinet could be disposed of, it would satisfy the people of the north that the southerners had *friends* in the north; that a peace could be obtained on better terms; that the rebels had endeavored to bring about a war between the United States and England, and that Mr. Seward, through his energy and sagacity, had thwarted all their efforts; that was given as a reason for removing him. On the 5th or 6th of last April this witness met George Harper, Caldwell, Randall, and others, who are spoken of in this meeting at Montreal as engaged to assassinate the President and cabinet, when Harper said they were going to the States to make a row such as had never been heard of, and added that "if I (the witness) did not hear of the death of Old Abe, of the Vice-President, and of General Dix in less than ten days, I might put him down as a fool. That was on the 6th of April. He mentioned that Booth was in Washington at that time. He said they had plenty of friends in Washington, and that some fifteen or twenty were going."

This witness ascertained, on the 8th of April, that Harper and others had left for the States. The proof is that these parties could come through to Washington from Montreal or Toronto in thirty-six hours. They did come, and within the ten days named by Harper the President was murdered! Some attempts have been made to discredit this witness, (Dr. Merritt,) not by the examination of witnesses in court, not by any apparent want of truth in the testimony, but by the *ex parte* statements of these rebel agents in Canada and their hired advocates in the United States. There is a statement upon the record, verified by an official communication from the War Department, which shows the truthfulness of this witness, and that is, that before the assassination, learning that Harper and his associates had started

for the States, informed as he was of their purpose to assassinate the President, cabinet, and leading generals, Merritt deemed it his duty to call, and did call, on the 10th of April, upon a justice of the peace in Canada, named Davidson, and gave him the information, that he might take steps to stop these proceedings. The correspondence on this subject with Davidson has been brought into court. Dr. Merritt testifies, further, that after this meeting in Montreal he had a conversation with Clement C. Clay, in Toronto, about the letter from Jefferson Davis which Sanders had exhibited, in which conversation Clay gave the witness to understand that he knew the nature of the letter perfectly, and remarked that he thought "the end would justify the means." The witness also testifies to the presence of Booth with Sanders in Montreal last fall, and of Surratt in Toronto in February last.

The court must be satisfied, by the manner of this and other witnesses to the transactions in Canada, as well as by the fact that they are wholly uncontradicted in any material matter that they state, that they speak the truth, and that the several parties named on your record, Davis, Thompson, Cleary, Tucker, Clay, Young, Harper, Booth, and John H. Surratt, did combine and conspire together in Canada to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, William H. Seward, and Ulysses S. Grant. That this agreement was substantially entered into by Booth and the agents of Davis in Canada as early as October there cannot be any doubt. The language of Thompson at that time and before was, that he was in favor of the assassination. His further language was, that he knew the men who were ready to do it; and Booth, it is shown, was there at that time, and, as Thompson's secretary says, was one of the men referred to by Thompson.

The fact that others, besides the parties named on the record, were, by the terms of the conspiracy, to be assassinated, in nowise affects the case now on trial. If it is true that these parties did conspire to murder other parties, as well as those named upon the record, the substance of the charge is proved.

It is also true that if, in pursuance of that conspiracy, Booth, confederated with Surratt and the accused, killed and murdered Abraham Lincoln, the charge and specification is proved literally as stated on your record, although their conspiracy embraced other persons. In law the case stands, though it may appear that the conspiracy was to kill and murder the parties named in the record and others not named in the record. If the proof is that the accused, with Booth, Surratt, Davis, &c., conspired to kill and murder one or more of the persons named, the charge of conspiracy is proved.

The declaration of Sanders, as proved, that there was plenty of money to carry out this assassination, is very strongly corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Campbell, cashier of the Ontario Bank, who states that Thompson, during the current year preceding the assassination, had upon deposit in the Montreal branch of the Ontario Bank six hundred and forty-nine thousand dollars, besides large sums to his credit in other banks in the province.

There is a further corroboration of the testimony of Conover as to the meeting of Thompson and Surratt in Montreal, and the delivery of the despatches from Richmond on the 6th or 7th of April—first, in the fact which is shown by the testimony of Chester, that in the winter or spring Booth said he himself or some other party must go to Richmond; and, second, by the letter of Arnold dated 27th of March last, that he preferred Booth's first query, that he would first go to Richmond and see how they would take it, manifestly alluding to the proposed assassination of the President. It does not follow, because Davis had written a letter in February which, in substance, approved the general object, that the parties were fully satisfied with it, because it is clear there was to be some arrangement made about the funds; and it is also clear that Davis had not before as distinctly approved and sanctioned this act as his agents either in Canada or here desired. Booth said to Chester, "We must have money; there is money in this business, and if you will enter into it I will place three thousand dollars at the disposal of your family; but I have no money myself, and must go to Richmond," or one of the parties must go, "to get money to carry out the enterprise." This was one of the arrangements that was to be "made right in Canada." The funds at Thompson's disposal, as the banker testifies, were exclusively raised by drafts of the secretary of the treasury of the Confederate States upon London, deposited in their bank to the credit of Thompson.

Accordingly, about the 27th of March, Surratt did go to Richmond. On the 3d of April he returned to Washington, and the same day left for Canada. Before leaving, he stated to Weichmann that when in Richmond he had had a conversation with Davis and with Benjamin. The fact in this connexion is not to be overlooked, that on or about the day Surratt arrived in Montreal, April 6, Jacob Thompson, as the cashier of the Ontario Bank states, drew of these confederate funds the sum of one hundred and eighty thousand dollars in the form of certificates, which, as the bank officer testifies, "might be used anywhere."

What more is wanting? Surely no word further need be spoken to show that John Wilkes Booth was in this conspiracy; that John H. Surratt was in this conspiracy; and that Jefferson Davis and his several agents named, in Canada, were in this conspiracy. If any additional evidence is wanting to show the complicity of Davis in it, let the paper found in the possession of his hired assassin Booth come to bear witness against him. That paper contained the secret cipher which Davis used in his state department at Richmond, which he employed in communicating with his agents in Canada, and which they employed in the letter of October 13, notifying him that "their friends would be set to work as *he had*

*directed.*" The letter in cipher found in Booth's possession is translated here by the use of the cipher machine now in court, which, as the testimony of Mr. Dana shows, he brought from the rooms of Davis's state department in Richmond. Who gave Booth this secret cipher? Of what use was it to him if he was not in confederation with Davis?

But there is one other item of testimony that ought, among honest and intelligent people at all conversant with this evidence, to end all further inquiry as to whether Jefferson Davis was one of the parties, with Booth, as charged upon this record, in the conspiracy to assassinate the President and others. That is, that on the fifth day after the assassination, in the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, a telegraphic despatch was received by him, at the house of Mr. Bates, from John C. Breckinridge, his rebel secretary of war, which despatch is produced here, identified by the telegraph agent, and placed upon your record in the words following:

"GREENSBORO', April 19, 1865.

"*His Excellency President Davis:*

"President Lincoln was assassinated in the theatre in Washington on the night of the 14th instant. Seward's house was entered on the same night and he was repeatedly stabbed, and is probably mortally wounded.

"JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE."

At the time this despatch was handed to him, Davis was addressing a meeting from the steps of Mr. Bates's house, and after reading the despatch to the people he said: "If it were to be done, it were *better* it were well done." Shortly afterwards, in the house of the witness, in the same city, Breckinridge, having come to see Davis, stated his regret that the occurrence had happened, because he deemed it unfortunate for the people of the south at that time. Davis replied, referring to the assassination, "Well, general, I don't know; if it were to be done at all, it were *better* that it were well done; and if the same had been done to Andy Johnson, the beast, and to Secretary Stanton, the job would then be *complete*."

Accomplished as this man was in all the arts of a conspirator, he was not equal to the task—as happily, in the good providence of God, no mortal man is—of concealing, by any form of words, any great crime which he may have meditated or perpetrated either against his government or his fellow-men. It was doubtless furthest from Jefferson Davis's purpose to make confession, and yet he did make a confession. His guilt demanded utterance; that demand he could not resist; therefore his words proclaimed his guilt, in spite of his purpose to conceal it. He said, "if it were to be done, it were *better* it were *well done*." Would any man ignorant of the conspiracy be able to devise and fashion such a form of speech as that? Had not the President been murdered? Had he not reason to believe that the Secretary of State had been mortally wounded? Yet he was not satisfied, but was compelled to say, "it were *better* it were *well done*"—that is to say, all that had been agreed to be done had not been done. Two days afterwards, in his conversation with Breckinridge, he not only repeats the same form of expression, "if it were to be done, it were *better* it were *well done*," but adds these words: "And if the same had been done to Andy Johnson, the beast, and to Secretary Stanton, the *job* would then be *complete*." He would accept the assassination of the President, the Vice-President, of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, as a complete execution of the "job" which he had given out upon contract, and which he had "made all right," so far as the pay was concerned, by the despatches he had sent to Thompson by Surratt, one of his hired assassins. Whatever may be the conviction of others, my own conviction is that Jefferson Davis is as clearly proven guilty of this conspiracy as is John Wilkes Booth, by whose hand Jefferson Davis inflicted the mortal wound upon Abraham Lincoln. His words of intense hate, and rage, and disappointment are not to be overlooked—that the assassins had not done their work *well*; that they had not succeeded in robbing the people altogether of their constitutional Executive and his advisers; and hence he exclaims, "If they had killed Andy Johnson, the beast!" Neither can he conceal his chagrin and disappointment that the war minister of the republic, whose energy, incorruptible integrity, sleepless vigilance, and executive ability had organized day by day, month by month, and year by year, victory for our arms, had escaped the knife of the hired assassins. The job, says this procurer of assassination, was not well done; it had been *better* if it had been well done! Because Abraham Lincoln had been clear in his great office, and had saved the nation's life by enforcing the nation's laws, this traitor declares he must be murdered; because Mr. Seward, as the foreign secretary of the country, had thwarted the purposes of treason to plunge his country into a war with England, he must be murdered; because, upon the murder of Mr. Lincoln, Andrew Johnson would succeed to the presidency, and because he had been true to the Constitution and government, faithful found among the faithless of his own State, clinging to the falling pillars of the republic when others had fled, he must be murdered; and because the Secretary of War had taken care, by the faithful discharge of his duties, that the republic should live and not die, he must be murdered. Inasmuch as these two faithful officers were not also assassinated, assuming that the Secretary of State was mortally wounded, Davis could not conceal his disappointment and chagrin that the work was not "well done," that "the job was not complete!"

Thus it appears by the testimony that the proposition made to Davis was to kill and murder the deadliest enemies of the confederacy—not to kidnap them, as is now pretended here; that by the declaration of Sanders, Tucker, Thompson, Clay, Cleary, Harper and Young, the con-

spirators in Canada, the agreement and combination among them was to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln, William H. Seward, Andrew Johnson, Ulysses S. Grant, Edwin M. Stanton, and others of his advisers, and not to kidnap them; it appears from every utterance of John Wilkes Booth, as well as from the Charles Selby letter, of which mention will presently be made, that, as early as November, the proposition with him was to kill and murder, not to kidnap.

Since the first examination of Conover, who testified, as the court will remember, to many important facts against these conspirators and agents of Davis in Canada—among others, the terrible and fiendish plot disclosed by Thompson, Pallen, and others, that they had ascertained the volume of water in the reservoir supplying New York city, estimated the quantity of poison required to render it deadly, and intended thus to poison a whole city—Conover returned to Canada, by direction of this court, for the purpose of obtaining certain documentary evidence. There, about the 9th of June, he met Beverley Tucker, Sanders, and other conspirators, and conversed with them. Tucker declared that Secretary Stanton, whom he denounced as “a scoundrel,” and Judge Holt, whom he called “a bloodthirsty villain,” “could protect themselves as long as they remained in office by a guard, but that would not always be the case, and, by the Eternal, he had a large account to settle with them.” After this, the evidence of Conover here having been published, these parties called upon him and asked him whether he had been to Washington, and had testified before this court. Conover denied it; they insisted, and took him to a room, where, with drawn pistols, they compelled him to consent to make an affidavit that he had been falsely personated here by another, and that he would make that affidavit before a Mr. Kerr, who would witness it. They then called in Mr. Kerr to certify to the public that Conover had made such a denial. They also compelled this witness to furnish for publication an advertisement offering a reward of five hundred dollars for the arrest of the “infamous and perjured scoundrel” who had recently personated James W. Wallace under the name of Sanford Conover, and testified to a tissue of falsehoods before the military commission at Washington, which advertisement was published in the papers.

To these facts Mr. Conover now testifies, and also discloses the fact that these same men published, in the report of the proceedings before Judge Smith, an affidavit purporting to be his, but which he never made. The affidavit which he in fact made, and which was published in a newspaper at that time, produced here, is set out substantially upon your record, and agrees with the testimony upon the same point given by him in this court.

To suppose that Conover ever made such an affidavit voluntarily as the one wrung from him as stated is impossible. Would he advertise for his own arrest and charge himself with falsely personating himself? But the fact cannot evade observation, that when these guilty conspirators saw Conover's testimony before this court in the public prints, revealing to the world the atrocious plots of these felon conspirators, conscious of the truthfulness of his statements, they cast about at once for some defence before the public, and devised the foolish and stupid invention of compelling him to make an affidavit that he was not Sanford Conover, was not in this court, never gave this testimony, but was a practicing lawyer in Montreal! This infamous proceeding, coupled with the evidence before detailed, stamps these ruffian plotters with the guilt of this conspiracy.

John Wilkes Booth having entered into this conspiracy in Canada, as has been shown, as early as October, he is next found in the city of New York on the 11th day, as I claim, of November, in disguise, in conversation with another, the conversation disclosing to the witness, Mrs. Hudspeth, that they had some matter of personal interest between them; that upon one of them the lot had fallen to go to Washington—upon the other to go to Newbern. This witness, upon being shown the photograph of Booth, swears “that the face is the same” as that of one of those men, who she says was a young man of education and culture, as appeared by his conversation, and who had a scar like a bite near the jaw-bone. It is a fact proved here by the Surgeon General that Booth had such a scar on the side of his neck. Mrs. Hudspeth heard him say he would leave for Washington the day after to-morrow. His companion appeared angry because it had not fallen on him to go to Washington. This took place after the presidential election in November. She cannot fix the precise date, but says she was told that General Butler left New York on that day. The testimony discloses that General Butler's army was on the 11th of November leaving New York. The register of the National Hotel shows that Booth left Washington on the early morning train, November 11, and that he returned to this city on the 14th. Chester testifies positively to Booth's presence in New York early in November. This testimony shows most conclusively that Booth was in New York on the 11th November. The early morning train on which he left Washington would reach New York early in the afternoon of that day. Chester saw him there early in November, and Mrs. Hudspeth not only identifies his picture, but describes his person. The scar upon his neck near his jaw was peculiar and is well described by the witness as like a bite. On that day Booth had a letter in his possession which he accidentally dropped in the street car in the presence of Mrs. Hudspeth, the witness, who delivered it to Major General Dix the same day, and by whom, as his letter on file before this court shows, the same was transmitted to the War Department November 17, 1864. That letter contains these words:

“DEAR LOUIS: The time has at last come that we have all so wished for, and upon you everything depends. As it was decided before you left we were to cast lots, we accordingly did so, and you are to be the Charlotte Corday of the 19th century. When you remember

the fearful, solemn vow that was taken by us, you will feel there is no drawback. *Abe must die, and now.* You can choose your weapons—the cup, the knife, the bullet. The cup failed us once, and might again. Johnson, who will give *this*, has been like an enraged demon since the meeting, because it has not fallen upon him to rid the world of the monster \* \* \* You know where to find your friends. Your disguises are so perfect and complete that without one knew your face, no police telegraphic despatch would catch you. The English gentleman, *Harcourt*, must not act hastily. Remember he has ten days. *Strike for your home; strike for your country; bide your time, but strike sure.* Get introduced; congratulate him; listen to his stories; (not many more will the brute tell to earthly friends;) do anything but fail, and meet us at the appointed place within the fortnight. You will probably hear from me in Washington. Sanders is doing us no good in Canada.

“CHAS. SELBY.”

The learned gentleman, (Mr. Cox,) in his very able and carefully-considered argument in defence of O’Laughlin and Arnold, attached importance to this letter, and doubtless very clearly saw its bearing upon the case, and therefore undertook to show that the witness, Mrs. Hudspeth, must be mistaken as to the person of Booth. The gentleman assumes that the letter of General Dix, of the 17th of November last, transmitting this letter to the War Department, reads that the party who dropped the letter was heard to say that he would start to Washington on Friday night next, although the word “next” is not in the letter, neither is it in the quotation which the gentleman makes, for he quotes it fairly; yet he concludes that this would be the 18th of November.

Now, the fact is, the 11th of November last was Friday, and the register of the National Hotel bears witness that Mrs. Hudspeth is not mistaken; because her language is, that Booth said he would leave for Washington day after to-morrow, which would be Sunday, the 13th, and, if in the evening, would bring him to Washington on Monday, the 14th of November, the day on which the register shows he did return to the National Hotel. As to the improbability which the gentleman raises, on the conversation happening in a street car, crowded with people, there was nothing that transpired, although the conversation was earnest, which enabled the witness, or could have enabled any one, in the absence of this letter, or of the subsequent conduct of Booth, to form the least idea of the subject-matter of their conversation. The gentleman does not deal altogether fairly in his remarks touching the letter of General Dix; because, upon a careful examination of the letter, it will be found that he did not form any such judgment as that it was a hoax for the Sunday Mercury, but he took care to forward it to the department, and asked attention to it; when, as appears by the testimony of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Dana, the letter was delivered to Mr. Lincoln, who considered it important enough to indorse it with the word “Assassination,” and file it in his office, where it was found after the commission of this crime, and brought into this court to bear witness against his assassins.

Although this letter would imply that the assassination spoken of was to take place speedily, yet the party was to *bide his time*. Though he had entered into the preliminary arrangements in Canada, although conspirators had doubtless agreed to co-operate with him in the commission of the crime, and lots had been cast for the chief part in the bloody drama, yet it remained for him, as the leader and principal of the hired assassins, by whose hand their employers were to strike the murderous blow, to collect about him and bring to Washington such persons as would be willing to lend themselves for a price to the horrid crime and likely to give the necessary aid and support in its consummation. The letter declares that Abraham Lincoln must die, and *now*, meaning as soon as the agents can be employed and the work done. To that end you will *bide your time*. But, says the gentleman, it could not have been the same conspiracy charged here to which this letter refers. Why not? It is charged here that Booth, with the accused and others, conspired to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln—that is precisely the conspiracy disclosed in the letter. Granted that the parties on trial had not then entered into the combination; if they at any time afterward entered into it they became parties to it, and the conspiracy was still the same. But, says the gentleman, the words of the letter imply that the conspiracy was to be executed within the fortnight. Booth is directed, by the name of Louis, to meet the writer within the fortnight. It by no means follows that he was to strike within the fortnight, because he was to meet his co-conspirator within that time; and any such conclusion is excluded by the words “bide your time.” Even if the conspiracy was to be executed within the fortnight, and was not so executed, and the same party, Booth, afterwards, by concert and agreement with the accused and others, did execute it by “striking sure” and killing the President, that act, whenever done, would be but the execution of the same conspiracy. The letter is conclusive evidence of so much of this conspiracy as relates to the murder of President Lincoln. As Booth was to do anything but fail, he immediately thereafter sought out the agents to enable him to strike sure, and execute all that he had agreed with Davis and his co-confederates in Canada to do—to murder the President, the Secretary of State, the Vice President, General Grant, and Secretary Stanton.

Even Booth’s co-conspirator, Payne, now on his trial, by his defence admits all this, and says Booth had just been to Canada, “was filled with a mighty scheme, and was lying in wait for agents.” Booth asked the co-operation of the prisoner, Payne, and said: “I will

give you as much money as you want; but first you must swear to stick by me. It is in the oil business." This you are told by the accused was early in March last. Thus guilt bears witness against itself.

We find Booth in New York in November, December, and January, urging Chester to enter into this combination, assuring him that there was *money* in it; that they had "friends on the other side;" that if he would only participate in it he would never want for money while he lived, and all that was asked of him was to stand at and open *the back door of Ford's Theatre*. Booth, in his interviews with Chester, confesses that *he is without money himself*, and allows Chester to reimburse him the fifty dollars which he (Booth) had transmitted to him in a letter for the purpose of paying his expenses to Washington as one of the parties to this conspiracy. Booth told him, although he himself was penniless, "*there is money in this*—we have friends on the other side;" and if you will but engage, I will have three thousand dollars deposited at once for the use of your family.

Failing to secure the services of Chester, because his soul recoiled with abhorrence from the foul work of assassination and murder, he found more willing instruments in others whom he gathered about him. Men to commit the assassinations, horses to secure speedy and certain escape, were to be provided, and to this end Booth, with an energy worthy of a better cause, applies himself. For this latter purpose he told Chester he had already expended five thousand dollars. In the latter part of November, 1864, he visits Charles county, Maryland, and is in company with one of the prisoners, Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, with whom he lodged over night, and through whom he procures of Gardner one of the several horses which were at his disposal, and used by him and his co-conspirators in Washington on the night of the assassination.

Some time in January last, it is in testimony, that the prisoner Mudd introduced Booth to John H. Surratt and the witness Weichmann; that Booth invited them to the National Hotel; that when there, in the room to which Booth took them, Mudd went out into the passage, called Booth out, and had a private conversation with him, leaving the witness and Surratt in the room. Upon their return to the room, Booth went out with Surratt, and, upon their coming in, all three (Booth, Surratt, and Samuel A. Mudd) went out together and had a conversation in the passage, leaving the witness alone. Up to the time of this interview it seems that neither the witness nor Surratt had any knowledge of Booth, as they were then introduced to him by Dr. Mudd. Whether Surratt had, in fact, previously known Booth it is not important to inquire. Mudd deemed it necessary, perhaps a wise precaution, to introduce Surratt to Booth; he also deemed it necessary to have a private conversation with Booth shortly afterwards, and directly upon that to have a conversation together with Booth and Surratt alone. Had this conversation, no part of which was heard by the witness, been perfectly innocent, it is not to be presumed that Dr. Mudd, who was an entire stranger to Weichmann, would have deemed it necessary to hold the conversation secretly, nor to have volunteered to tell the witness, or rather pretend to tell him, what the conversation was; yet he did say to the witness, upon their return to the room, by way of apology, I suppose, for the privacy of the conversation, that Booth had some private business with him, and wished to purchase his farm. This silly device, as is often the case in attempts at deception, failed in the execution; for it remains to be shown how the fact that Mudd had private business with Booth, and that Booth wished to purchase his farm, made it at all necessary, or even proper, that they should both volunteer to call out Surratt, who up to that moment was a stranger to Booth. What had Surratt to do with Booth's purchase of Mudd's farm? And if it was necessary to withdraw and talk by themselves secretly about the sale of the farm, why should they disclose the fact to the very man from whom they had concealed it?

Upon the return of these three parties to the room, they seated themselves at a table, and upon the back of an envelope Booth traced lines with a pencil, indicating, as the witness states, the direction of roads. Why was this done? As Booth had been previously in that section of country, as the prisoner in his defence has taken great pains to show, it was certainly not necessary to anything connected with the purchase of Mudd's farm that at that time he should be indicating the direction of roads to or from it; nor is it made to appear, by anything in this testimony, how it comes that Surratt, as the witness testifies, seemed to be as much interested in the marking out of these roads as Mudd or Booth. It does not appear that Surratt was in anywise connected with or interested in the sale of Mudd's farm. From all that has transpired since this meeting at the hotel, it would seem that this plotting the roads was intended, not so much to show the road to Mudd's farm, as to point out the shortest and safest route for flight from the capital, by the houses of all the parties to this conspiracy, to their "friends on the other side."

But, says the learned gentleman, (Mr. Ewing,) in his very able argument in defence of this prisoner, why should Booth determine that his flight should be through Charles county? The answer must be obvious, upon a moment's reflection, to every man, and could not possibly have escaped the notice of the counsel himself, but for the reason that his zeal for his client constrained him to overlook it. It was absolutely essential that this murderer should have his co-conspirators at convenient points along his route, and it does not appear in evidence that by the route to his friends, who had then fled from Richmond, which the gentleman (Mr. Ewing) indicates as the more direct, but of which there is not the slightest evidence whatever, Booth had co-conspirators at an equal distance from Washington. The

testimony discloses, further, that on the route selected by him for his flight there is a large population that would be most likely to favor and aid him in the execution of his wicked purpose, and in making his escape. But it is a sufficient answer to the gentleman's question, that Booth's co-conspirator Mudd lived in Charles county.

To return to the meeting at the hotel. In the light of other facts in this case, it must become clear to the court that this secret meeting between Booth, Surratt, and Mudd was a conference looking to the execution of this conspiracy. It so impressed the prisoner—it so impressed his counsel, that they deemed it necessary and absolutely essential to their defence to attempt to destroy the credibility of the witness Weichmann.

I may say here, in passing, that they have not attempted to impeach his general reputation for truth by the testimony of a single witness, nor have they impeached his testimony by calling a single witness to discredit one material fact to which he has testified in this issue. Failing to find a breath of suspicion against Weichmann's character, or to contradict a single fact to which he testified, the accused had to fly to the last resort, an *alibi*, and very earnestly did the learned counsel devote himself to the task.

It is not material whether this meeting in the hotel took place on the 23d of December or in January. But, says the counsel, it was after the commencement or close of the congressional holiday. That is not material; but the concurrent resolution of Congress shows that the holiday commenced on the 22d December, the day before the accused spent the evening in Washington. The witness is not certain about the date of this meeting. The material fact is, did this meeting take place—either on the 23d of December or in January last? Were the private interviews there held, and was the apology made, as detailed, by Mudd and Booth, after the secret conference, to the witness? That the meeting did take place, and that Mudd did explain that these secret interviews, with Booth first, and with Booth and Surratt directly afterward, had relation to the sale of his farm, is confessedly admitted by the endeavor of the prisoner, through his counsel, to show that negotiations had been going on between Booth and Mudd for the sale of Mudd's farm. If no such meeting was held, if no such explanation was made by Mudd to Weichmann, can any man for a moment believe that a witness would have been called here to give any testimony about Booth having negotiated for Mudd's farm? What conceivable connexion has it with this case, except to show that Mudd's explanation to Weichmann for his extraordinary conduct was in exact accordance with the fact? Or was this testimony about the negotiations for Mudd's farm intended to show so close an intimacy and intercourse with Booth that Mudd could not fail to recognize him when he came flying for aid to his house from the work of assassination? It would be injustice to the able counsel to suppose that.

I have said that it was wholly immaterial whether this conversation took place on the 23d of December or in January; it is in evidence that in both those months Booth was at the National Hotel; that he occupied a room there; that he arrived there on the 22d and was there on the 23d of December last, and also on the 12th day of January. The testimony of the witness is, that Booth said he had just come in. Suppose this conversation took place in December, on the evening of the 23d, the time when it is proved by J. T. Mudd, the witness for the accused, that he, in company with Samuel A. Mudd, spent the night in Washington city. Is there anything in the testimony of that or any other witness to show that the accused did not have and could not have had an interview with Booth on that evening? J. T. Mudd testifies that he separated from the prisoner, Samuel A. Mudd, at the National Hotel early in the evening of that day, and did not meet him again until the accused came in for the night at the Pennsylvania House, where he stopped. Where was Dr. Samuel A. Mudd during this interval? What does his witness know about him during that time? How can he say that Dr. Mudd did not go up on Seventh street in company with Booth, then at the National; that he did not on Seventh street meet Surratt and Weichmann; that he did not return to the National Hotel; that he did not have this interview, and afterwards meet him, the witness, as he testifies, at the Pennsylvania House? Who knows that the congressional holiday had not in fact commenced on that day? What witness has been called to prove that Booth did not on either of those occasions occupy the room that had formerly been occupied by a member of Congress, who had temporarily vacated it, leaving his books there? Weichmann, I repeat, is not positive as to the date: he is only positive as to the fact; and he disclosed voluntarily, to this court, that the date could probably be fixed by a reference to the register of the Pennsylvania House; that register cannot, of course, be conclusive of whether Mudd was there in January or not, for the very good reason that the proprietor admits that he did not know Samuel A. Mudd, therefore Mudd might have registered by any other name. Weichmann does not pretend to know that Mudd had registered at all. If Mudd was here in January, as a party to this conspiracy, it is not at all unlikely that, if he did register at that time in the presence of a man to whom he was wholly unknown, his kinsman not then being with him, he would register by a false name. But if the interview took place in December, the testimony of Weichmann bears as strongly against the accused as if it had happened in January. Weichmann says he does not know what time was occupied in this interview at the National Hotel; that it probably lasted twenty minutes; that, after the private interviews between Mudd and Surratt and Booth, which were not of very long duration, had terminated, the parties went to the Pennsylvania House, where Dr. Mudd had rooms, and after sitting together in the common sitting-room of the hotel, they left Dr.

Mudd there about ten o'clock p. m., who remained during the night. Weichmann's testimony leaves no doubt that this meeting on Seventh street and interview at the National took place after dark, and terminated before or about ten o'clock p. m. His own witness, J. T. Mudd, after stating that he separated from the accused at the National Hotel, says after he had got through a conversation with a gentleman of his acquaintance, he walked down the avenue, went to several clothing stores, and "after awhile" walked round to the Pennsylvania House, and "very soon after" he got there Dr. Mudd came in, and they went to bed shortly afterwards. What time he spent in his "walk alone" on the avenue, looking at clothing; what period he embraces in the terms "after awhile," when he returned to the Pennsylvania House, and "soon after" which Dr. Mudd got there, the witness does not disclose. Neither does he intimate, much less testify, that he saw Dr. Mudd when he first entered the Pennsylvania House on that night after their separation. How does he know that Booth and Surratt and Weichmann did not accompany Samuel A. Mudd to that house that evening? How does he know that the prisoner and those persons did not converse together some time in the sitting-room of the Pennsylvania Hotel? Jeremiah Mudd has not testified that he met Doctor Mudd in that room, or that he was in it himself. He has, however, sworn to the fact, which is disproved by no one, that the prisoner was separated from him long enough that evening to have had the meeting with Booth, Surratt, and Weichmann, and the interviews in the National Hotel, and at the Pennsylvania House, to which Weichmann has testified? Who is there to disprove it? Of what importance is it whether it was on the 23d day of December or in January? How does that affect the credibility of Weichmann? He is a man, as I have before said, against whose reputation for truth and good conduct they have not been able to bring one witness. If this meeting did by possibility take place that night, is there anything to render it improbable that Booth and Mudd and Surratt did have the conversation at the National Hotel to which Weichmann testifies? Of what avail, therefore, is the attempt to prove that Mudd was not here during January, if it was clear that he was here on the 23d of December, 1864, and had this conversation with Booth? That this attempt to prove an *alibi* during January has failed, is quite as clear as is the proof of the fact that the prisoner was here on the evening of the 23d of December, and present in the National Hotel, where Booth stopped. The fact that the prisoner, Samuel A. Mudd, went with J. T. Mudd on that evening to the National Hotel, and there separated from him, is proved by his own witness, J. T. Mudd; and that he did not rejoin him until they retired to bed in the Pennsylvania House is proved by the same witness, and contradicted by nobody. Does any one suppose there would have been such assiduous care to prove that the prisoner was with his kinsman all the time on the 23d of December in Washington, if they had not known that Booth was then at the National Hotel, and that a meeting of the prisoner with Booth, Surratt, and Weichmann on that day would corroborate and confirm Weichmann's testimony in every material statement he made concerning that meeting?

The accused having signally failed to account for his absence after he separated from his witness, J. T. Mudd, early in the evening of the 23d of December, at the National Hotel, until they had again met at the Pennsylvania House, when they retired to rest, he now attempts to prove an *alibi* as to the month of January. In this he has failed, as he failed in the attempt to show that he could not have met Booth, Surratt, and Weichmann on the 23d of December.

For this purpose the accused calls Betty Washington. She had been at Mudd's house every night since the Monday after Christmas last, except when here at court, and says that the prisoner, Mudd, has only been away from home three nights during that time. This witness forgets that Mudd has not been at home any night or day since this court assembled. Neither does she account for the three nights in which she swears to his absence from home. First, she says he went to Gardner's party; second, he went to Giesboro', then to Washington. She does not know in what month he was away, the second time, all night. She only knows where he went, from what he and his wife said, which is not evidence; but she does testify that when he left home and was absent over night, the second time, it was about two or three weeks after she came to his house, which would, if it were three weeks, make it just about the 15th of January, 1865; because she swears she came to his house on the first Monday after Christmas last, which was the 26th day of December; so that the 15th of January would be three weeks, less one day, from that time; and it might have been a week earlier according to her testimony, as, also, it might have been a week earlier, or more, by Weichmann's testimony, for he is not positive as to the time. What I have said of the register of the Pennsylvania House, the headquarters of Mudd and Atzerodt, I need not here repeat. That record proves nothing, save that Dr. Mudd was there on the 23d of December, which, as we have seen, is a fact, along with others, to show that the meeting at the National then took place. I have also called the attention of the court to the fact that if Mudd was at that house again in January, and did not register his name, that fact proves nothing; or, if he did, the register only proves that he registered falsely; either of which facts might have happened without the knowledge of the witness called by the accused from that house, who does not know Samuel A. Mudd personally.

The testimony of Henry L. Mudd, his brother, in support of this *alibi*, is, that the prisoner was in Washington on the 23d of March, and on the 10th of April, four days before the murder! But he does not account for the absent night in January, about which Betty

Washington testifies. Thomas Davis was called for the same purpose, but stated that he was himself absent one night in January, after the 9th of that month, and he could not say whether Mudd was there on that night or not. He does testify to Mudd's absence over night three times, and fixes one occasion on the night of the 26th of January. In consequence of his own absence one night in January, this witness cannot account for the absence of Mudd on the night referred to by Betty Washington.

This matter is entitled to no further attention. It can satisfy no one, and the burden of proof is upon the prisoner to prove that he was not in Washington in January last. How can such testimony convince any rational man that Mudd was not here in January, against the evidence of an unimpeached witness, who swears that Samuel A. Mudd was in Washington in the month of January? Who that has been examined here as a witness knows that he was not?

The Rev. Mr. Evans swears that he saw him in Washington last winter, and that at the same time he saw Jarboe, the one coming out of, and the other going into, a house on H street, which he was informed on inquiry was the house of Mrs. Surratt. Jarboe is the only witness called to contradict Mr. Evans, and he leaves it in extreme doubt whether he does not corroborate him, as he swears that he was here himself last winter or fall, but cannot state exactly the time. Jarboe's silence on questions touching his own credibility leaves no room for any one to say that his testimony could impeach Mr. Evans, whatever he might swear.

Miss Anna H. Surratt is also called for the purpose of impeaching Mr. Evans. It is sufficient to say of her testimony on that point that she swears negatively only—that she did not see either of the persons named at her mother's house. This testimony neither disproves, nor does it even tend to disprove, the fact put in issue by Mr. Evans. No one will pretend, whatever the form of her expression in giving her testimony, that she could say more than that she did not know the fact, as it was impossible that she could know who was, or who was not, at her mother's house, casually, at a period so remote. It is not my purpose, neither is it needful here, to question in any way the integrity of this young woman.

It is further in testimony that Samuel A. Mudd was here on the 3d day of March last, the day preceding the inauguration, when Booth was to strike the traitorous blow; and it was, doubtless, only by the interposition of that God who stands within the shadow and keeps watch above his own, that the victim of this conspiracy was spared that day from the assassin's hand that he might complete his work and see the salvation of his country in the fall of Richmond and the surrender of its great army. Dr. Mudd was here on that day (the 3d of March) to abet, to encourage, to nerve his co-conspirator for the commission of this great crime. He was carried away by the awful purpose which possessed him, and rushed into the room of Mr. Norton at the National Hotel in search of Booth, exclaiming excitedly: "I'm mistaken: I thought this was Mr. Booth's room." He is told Mr. Booth is above, on the next floor. He is followed by Mr. Norton, because of his rude and excited behavior, and being followed, conscious of his guilty errand, he turns away, afraid of himself and afraid to be found in concert with his fellow confederate. Mr. Norton identifies the prisoner, and has no doubt that Samuel A. Mudd is the man.

The Rev. Mr. Evans also swears that, after the 1st and before the 4th day of March last, he is certain that within that time, and on the 2d or 3d of March, he saw Dr. Mudd drive into Washington city. The endeavor is made by the accused, in order to break down this witness, by proving another *alibi*. The sister of the accused, Miss Fanny Mudd, is called. She testifies that she saw the prisoner at breakfast in her father's house on the 2d of March, about 5 o'clock in the morning, and not again until the 3d of March at noon. Mrs. Emily Mudd swears substantially to the same statement. Betty Washington, called for the accused, swears that he was at home all day at work with her on the 2d of March, and took breakfast at home. Frank Washington swears that Mudd was at home all day: that he saw him when he first came out in the morning about sunrise from his own house, and knows that he was there all day with them. Which is correct, the testimony of his sisters or the testimony of his servants? The sisters say that he was at their father's house for breakfast on the morning of the 2d of March; the servants say he was at home for breakfast with them on that day. If this testimony is followed, it proves one *alibi* too much. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that the testimony of all these four witnesses can be true.

Seeing this weakness in the testimony brought to prove this second *alibi*, the endeavor is next made to discredit Mr. Norton for truth; and two witnesses, not more, are called, who testify that his reputation for truth has suffered by contested litigation between one of the impeaching witnesses and others. Four witnesses are called, who testify that Mr. Norton's reputation for truth is very good; that he is a man of high character for truth, and entitled to be believed whether he speaks under the obligation of an oath or not. The late Postmaster General, Hon. Horatio King, not only sustains Mr. Norton as a man of good reputation for truth, but expressly corroborates his testimony, by stating that in March last, about the 4th of March, Mr. Norton told him the same fact to which he swears here; that a man came into his room under excitement, alarmed his sister, was followed out by himself, and went down stairs instead of going up; and that Mr. Norton told him this before the assassination, and about the time of the inauguration. What motive had Mr. Norton at that time to fabricate this statement? It detracts nothing from his testimony that he did not at that time

mention the name of this man to his friend, Mr. King; because it appears from his testimony—and there is none to question the truthfulness of his statement—that at that time he did not know his name. Neither does it take from the force of this testimony, that Mr. Norton did not, in communicating this matter to Mr. King, make mention of Booth's name; because there was nothing in the transaction, at the time, he being ignorant of the name of Mudd, and equally ignorant of the conspiracy between Mudd and Booth, to give the least occasion for any mention of Booth or of the transaction further than as he detailed it. With such corroboration, who can doubt the fact that Mudd did enter the room of Mr. Norton, and was followed by him, on the 3d of March last? Can he be mistaken in the man? Whoever looks at the prisoner carefully once will be sure to recognize him again.

For the present I pass from the consideration of the testimony showing Dr. Mudd's connexion with Booth in this conspiracy, with the remark that it is in evidence, and I think established, both by the testimony adduced by the prosecution and that by the prisoner, that since the commencement of this rebellion John H. Surratt visited the prisoner's house; that he concealed Surratt and other rebels and traitors in the woods near his house, where for several days he furnished them with food and bedding; that the shelter of the woods by night and by day was the only shelter that the prisoner dare furnish *these friends* of his; that in November Booth visited him and remained over night; that he accompanied Booth at that time to Gardner's, from whom he purchased one of the horses used on the night of the assassination to aid the escape of one of his confederates; that the prisoner had secret interviews with Booth and Surratt, as sworn to by the witness Weichmann, in the National Hotel, whether on the 23d of December or in January, is a matter of entire indifference; that he rushed into Mr. Norton's room on the 3d of March in search of Booth; and that he was here again on the 10th of April, four days before the murder of the President. Of his conduct after the assassination of the President, which is confirmatory of all this—his conspiring with Booth and his sheltering, concealing, and aiding the flight of his co-conspirator, this felon assassin—I shall speak hereafter, leaving him for the present with the remark that the attempt to prove his character has resulted in showing him in sympathy with the rebellion, so cruel that he shot one of his slaves and declared his purpose to send several of them to work on the rebel batteries in Richmond.

What others, besides Samuel A. Mudd and John H. Surratt and Lewis Payne, did Booth, after his return from Canada, induce to join him in this conspiracy to murder the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and the Lieutenant General, with the intent thereby to aid the rebellion and overthrow the government and laws of the United States?

On the 10th of February the prisoners Arnold and O'Laughlin came to Washington and took rooms in the house of Mrs. Vantyne; were armed; were there visited frequently by John Wilkes Booth, and alone; were occasionally absent when Booth called, who seemed anxious for their return; would sometimes leave notes for them, and sometimes a request that when they came in they should be told to come to the stable. On the 18th of March last, when Booth played in "The Apostate," the witness, Mrs. Vantyne, received from O'Laughlin complimentary tickets. These persons remained there until the 20th of March. They were visited, so far as the witness knows, during their stay at her house, only by Booth, save that on a single occasion an unknown man came to see them, and remained with them over night. They told the witness they were in the "oil business." With Mudd, the guilty purpose was sought to be concealed by declaring that he was in the "land business;" with O'Laughlin and Arnold it was attempted to be concealed by the pretence that they were in the "oil business." Booth, it is proved, had closed up all connexion with oil business last September. There is not a word of testimony to show that the accused, O'Laughlin and Arnold, ever invested or sought to invest, in any way or to any amount, in the oil business; their silly words betray them; they forgot when they uttered that false statement that truth is strong, next to the Almighty, and that their crime must find them out was the irrevocable and irresistible law of nature and of nature's God.

One of their co-conspirators, known as yet only to the guilty parties to this damnable plot and to the Infinite, who will unmask and avenge all blood-guiltiness, comes to bear witness, unwittingly, against them. This unknown conspirator, who dates his letter at South Branch Bridge, April 6, 1865, mailed and postmarked Cumberland, Maryland, and addressed to John Wilkes Booth, by his initials, "J. W. B., National Hotel, Washington, D. C.," was also in the "oil speculation." In that letter he says:

"FRIEND WILKES: I received yours of March 12th, and reply as soon as practicable. I saw French, Brady, and others about the oil speculation. The subscription to the stock amounts to eight thousand dollars, and I add one thousand myself, which is about all I can stand. Now, when you sink your well, go *deep enough*; *don't fail*; everything depends upon you and your *helpers*. If you cannot get through on *your trip* after you strike oil, strike through Thornton Gap and across by Capon, Romney, and down the Branch. I can keep you *safe* from all hardships for a year. I am clear of all surveillance now that infernal Purdy is beat.

"I send this by Tom, and if he don't get drunk you will get it the 9th. At all events, it cannot be *understood* if lost.

"No more, only *Jake* will be at Green's *with the funds*.

(Signed)

LON."

That this letter is not a fabrication is made apparent by the testimony of Purdy, whose name occurs in the letter. He testified that he had been a detective in the government service, and that he had been falsely accused, as the letter recites, and put under arrest; that there was a noted rebel by the name of Green living at Thornton Gap; that there was a servant, who drank, known as "Tom," in the neighborhood of South Branch Bridge; that there is an obscure route through the gap, and as described in the letter; and that a man commonly called "Lon" lives at South Branch Bridge. If the court are satisfied—and it is for them to judge—that this letter was written before the assassination, as it purports to have been, and on the day of its date, there can be no question with any one who reads it that the writer was in the conspiracy, and knew that the time of its execution drew nigh. If a conspirator, every word of its contents is evidence against every other party to this conspiracy.

Who can fail to understand this letter? His words, "go deep enough," "don't fail," "everything depends on you and your helpers," "if you can't get through on your *trip* after you *strike oil*, strike through Thornton Gap," &c., and "I can keep you safe from all hardships for a year," necessarily imply that when he "*strikes oil*" there will be an occasion for a *flight*; that a *trip*, or route, has already been determined upon; that he may not be able to go through by that route; in which event he is to strike for Thornton Gap, and across by Capon and Romney, and down the branch, for the shelter which his co-conspirator offers him. "I am clear of all surveillance now"—does any one doubt that the man who wrote those words wished to assure Booth that he was no longer watched, and that Booth could safely hide with him from his pursuers? Does any one doubt, from the further expression in this letter, "Jake will be at Green's with the funds," that this was a part of the price of blood, or that the eight thousand dollars subscribed by others, and the one thousand additional, subscribed by the writer, were also a part of the price to be paid?

"The oil business," which was the declared business of O'Laughlin and Arnold, was the declared business of the infamous writer of this letter; was the declared business of John H. Surratt; was the declared business of Booth himself, as explained to Chester and Payne; was "*the business*" referred to in his telegrams to O'Laughlin, and meant the murder of the President, of his cabinet, and of General Grant. The first of these telegrams is dated Washington, 13th March, and is addressed to M. O'Laughlin, No. 57 North Exeter street, Baltimore, Maryland, and is as follows: "Don't you fear to neglect your business; you had better come on at once. J. Booth." The telegraphic operator, Hoffinan, who sent this despatch from Washington, swears that John Wilkes Booth delivered it to him in person on the day of its date; and the handwriting of the original telegram is established beyond question to be that of Booth. The other telegram is dated Washington, March 27, addressed "M. O'Laughlin, Esq., 57 North Exeter street, Baltimore, Maryland," and is as follows: "Get word to Sam. Come on with or without him on Wednesday morning. We sell that day sure; don't fail. J. Wilkes Booth." The original of this telegram is also proved to be in the handwriting of Booth. The sale referred to in this last telegram was doubtless the murder of the President and others—the "oil speculation," in which the writer of the letter from South Branch Bridge, dated April 6, had taken a thousand dollars, and in which Booth said there was money, and Sanders said there was money, and Atzerodt said there was money. The words of this telegram, "get word to Sam," mean Samuel Arnold, his co-conspirator, who had been with him during all his stay in Washington, at Mrs. Vantyne's. These parties to this conspiracy, after they had gone to Baltimore, had additional correspondence with Booth, which the court must infer had relation to carrying out the purposes of their confederation and agreement. The colored witness, Williams, testifies that John Wilkes Booth handed him a letter for Michael O'Laughlin, and another for Samuel Arnold, in Baltimore, some time in March last; one of which he delivered to O'Laughlin at the theatre in Baltimore, and the other to a lady at the door where Arnold boarded in Baltimore.

Their agreement and co-operation in the common object having been thus established, the letter written to Booth by the prisoner Arnold, dated March 27, 1865, the handwriting of which is proved before the court, and which was found in Booth's possession after the assassination, becomes testimony against O'Laughlin, as well as against the writer Arnold, because it is an act done in furtherance of their combination. That letter is as follows:

"DEAR JOHN: Was business so important that you could not remain in Baltimore till I saw you? I came in as soon as I could, but found you had gone to Washington. I called also to see *Mike*, but learned from his mother he had gone out with you and had not returned. I concluded, therefore, he had gone with you. How inconsiderate you have been! When I left you you stated that *we would not meet* in a month or so, and therefore I made application for employment, an answer to which I shall receive during the week. I told my parents I had ceased with you. Can I, then, under existing circumstances, act as you request? You know full well that the government suspicious something is going on there, therefore the *undertaking* is becoming more complicated. Why not *for the present* desist?—for various reasons, which, if you look into, you can readily see without my making any mention thereof. You nor any one can censure me for my present course. You have been its cause; for how can I now come after telling them I had left you? Suspicion rests upon me now from my whole family, and even parties in the country. I will be compelled to leave home any how, and how soon I care not. None, no, not one, were more in

favor of the enterprise than myself, and to-day would be there had you not done as you have. By this I mean manner of proceeding. I am, as you well know, in *need*. I am, you may say, in rags, whereas to-day I ought to be *well clothed*. I do not feel right stalking about with *means*, and more from appearances a beggar. I feel my dependence. But even all this would have been and was forgotten; for I *was one with you*. Time more *propitious* will arrive yet. Do not act rashly or in haste. I would prefer your first query, 'Go and see how it will be taken in Richmond;' and *ere long* I shall be better prepared to *again be with you*. I dislike writing; would sooner verbally make known my views. Yet your now waiting causes me thus to proceed. Do not in anger peruse this. Weigh all I have said, and, as a rational man and a *friend*, you cannot censure or upbraid my conduct. I sincerely trust this, nor ought else that shall or may occur, will ever be an obstacle to obliterate our former friendship and attachment. Write me to Baltimore, as I expect to be in about Wednesday or Thursday; or, if you can possibly come on, I will Tuesday meet you at Baltimore at B.

"Ever, I subscribe myself, your friend,

"SAM."

Here is the confession of the prisoner Arnold that he was one with Booth in this conspiracy; the further confession that they are suspected by the government of their country, and the acknowledgment that *since they parted* Booth had communicated, among other things, a suggestion which leads to the remark in this letter, "I would prefer your first query, 'Go and see how it will be taken in Richmond,' and *ere long* I shall be better prepared to *again be with you*." This is a declaration that affects Arnold, Booth, and O'Laughlin alike, if the court are satisfied; and it is difficult to see how they can have doubt on the subject, that the matter to be referred to Richmond is the matter of the assassination of the President and others, to effect which these parties had previously agreed and conspired together. It is a matter in testimony, by the declaration of John H. Surratt, who is as clearly proved to have been in this conspiracy and murder as Booth himself, that about the very date of this letter, the 27th of March, upon the suggestion of Booth, and with his knowledge and consent, he went to Richmond, not only to see "how it would be taken there," but to get funds with which to carry out the enterprise, as Booth had already declared to Chester in one of his last interviews, when he said that he or "some one of the party" would be constrained to go to Richmond for funds to carry out the conspiracy. Surratt returned from Richmond, bringing with him some part of the money for which he went, and was then going to Canada, and, as the testimony discloses, bringing with him the despatches from Jefferson Davis to his chief agents in Canada, which, as Thompson declared to Conover, made the proposed assassination "all right." Surratt, after seeing the parties here, left immediately for Canada and delivered his despatches to Jacob Thompson, the agent of Jefferson Davis. This was done by Surratt upon the suggestion, or in exact accordance with the suggestion, of Arnold, made on the 27th of March, in his letter to Booth just read; and yet you are gravely told that four weeks before the 27th of March Arnold had abandoned the conspiracy.

Surratt reached Canada with these despatches, as we have seen, about the 6th or 7th of April last, when the witness Conover saw them delivered to Jacob Thompson, and heard their contents stated by Thompson, and the declaration from him that these despatches made it "all right." That Surratt was at that time in Canada is not only established by the testimony of Conover, but it is also in evidence that he told Weichmann on the 3d of April that he was going to Canada, and on that day left for Canada, and afterwards two letters, addressed by Surratt over the *fictional* signature of John Harrison, to his mother and to Miss Ward, dated at Montreal, were received by them on the 14th of April, as testified by Weichmann and by Miss Ward, a witness called for the defence. Thus it appears that the condition named by Arnold in his letter had been complied with. Booth had "gone to Richmond," in the person of Surratt, "to see how it would be taken." The rebel authorities at Richmond had approved it, the agent had returned, and Arnold was, in his own words, thereby the better prepared to rejoin Booth in the prosecution of this conspiracy.

To this end Arnold went to Fortress Monroe. As his letter expressly declares, Booth said when they parted, "we would not meet in a month or so, and *therefore* I made application for employment, an answer to which I shall receive during the week." He did receive the answer that week from Fortress Monroe, and went there to await the "more propitious time," bearing with him the weapon of death which Booth had provided and ready to obey his call, as the act had been approved at Richmond and been made "all right." Acting upon the same fact that the conspiracy had been approved in Richmond and the *funds* provided, O'Laughlin came to Washington to identify General Grant, the person who was to become the victim of his violence in the final consummation of this crime—General Grant, whom, as is averred in the specification, it had become the part of O'Laughlin by his agreement in this conspiracy to kill and murder. On the evening preceding the assassination—the 13th of April—by the testimony of three reputable witnesses, against whose truthfulness not one word is uttered here or elsewhere, O'Laughlin went into the house of the Secretary of War, where General Grant then was, and placed himself in position in the hall where he could see him, having declared before he reached that point to

one of these witnesses that he wished to see General Grant. The house was brilliantly illuminated at the time. Two, at least, of the witnesses conversed with the accused, and the other stood very near to him, took especial notice of his conduct, called attention to it, and suggested that he be put out of the house, and he was accordingly put out by one of the witnesses. These witnesses are confident, and have no doubt, and so swear upon their oaths, that Michael O'Laughlin is the man who was present on that occasion. There is no denial on the part of the accused that he was in Washington during the day and during the night of April 13, and also during the day and during the night of the 14th; and yet, to get rid of this testimony, recourse is had to that common device, an *alibi*—a device never, I may say, more frequently resorted to than in this trial. But what an *alibi*! Nobody is called to prove it, save some men who, by their own testimony, were engaged in a drunken bebauch through the evening. A reasonable man who reads their evidence can hardly be expected to allow it to outweigh the united testimony of three unimpeached and unimpeachable witnesses who were clear in their statements, who entertain no doubt of the truth of what they say, whose opportunities to know were full and complete, and who were constrained to take special notice of the prisoner by reason of his extraordinary conduct.

These witnesses describe accurately the appearance, stature, and complexion of the accused; but because they describe his clothing as dark or black it is urged that as part of his clothing, although dark, was not black, the witnesses are mistaken. O'Laughlin and his drunken companions (one of whom swears that he drank ten times that evening) were strolling in the streets and in the direction of the house of the Secretary of War, up the avenue; but you are asked to believe that these witnesses could not be mistaken in saying they were not off the avenue above Seventh street, or on K street. I venture to say that no man who reads their testimony can determine satisfactorily all the places that were visited by O'Laughlin and his drunken associates that evening from 7 to 11 o'clock p. m. All this time, from 7 to 11 o'clock p. m., must be accounted for satisfactorily before the *alibi* can be established. Laughlan does not account for all the time, for he left O'Laughlin after 7 o'clock, and rejoined him, as he says, "I suppose about 8 o'clock." Grillet did not meet him until *half past ten*, and then only casually saw him in passing the hotel. May not Grillet have been mistaken as to the fact, although he did meet O'Laughlin after 11 o'clock the same evening, as he swears?

Purdy swears to seeing him in the bar with Grillet about half past 10; but, as we have seen by Grillet's testimony, it must have been after 11 o'clock. Murphy contradicts, *as to time*, both Grillet and Purdy; for he says it was half past 11 or 12 o'clock when he and O'Laughlin returned to Rullman's from Platz's, and Early swears the accused went from Rullman's to Second street to a dance about a quarter past 11 o'clock, when O'Laughlin took the lead in the dance and stayed about one hour. I follow these witnesses no further. They contradict each other, and do not account for O'Laughlin all the time from 7 to 11 o'clock. I repeat that no man can read their testimony without finding contradictions most material *as to time*, and coming to the conviction that they utterly fail to account for O'Laughlin's whereabouts on that evening. To establish an *alibi* the witnesses *must know the fact and testify* to it. Laughlan, Grillet, Purdy, Murphy, and Early utterly fail to prove it, and only succeed in showing that they did not know where O'Laughlin was all this time, and that some of them were grossly mistaken in what they testified, both as to *time and place*. The testimony of James B. Henderson is equally unsatisfactory. He is contradicted by other testimony of the accused as to *place*. He says O'Laughlin went up the avenue above Seventh street, but that he did not go to Ninth street. The other witnesses swear he went to Ninth street. He swears he went to Canterbury about 9 o'clock, after going back from Seventh street to Rullman's. Laughlan swears that O'Laughlin was with him at the corner of the avenue and Ninth street at 9 o'clock, and went from there to Canterbury, while Early swears that O'Laughlin went up as far as Eleventh street and returned with him and took supper at Welcker's about 8 o'clock. If these witnesses prove an *alibi*, it is really against each other. It is folly to pretend that they prove facts which make it impossible that O'Laughlin could have been at the house of Secretary Stanton, as three witnesses swear he was, on the evening of the 13th of April, looking for General Grant.

Has it not, by the testimony thus reviewed, been established *prima facie* that in the months of February, March, and April O'Laughlin had combined, confederated, and agreed with John Wilkes Booth and Samuel Arnold to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln, William H. Seward, Andrew Johnson, and Ulysses S. Grant? Is it not established beyond a shadow of doubt that Booth had so conspired with the rebel agents in Canada as early as October last; that he was in search of agents to do the work *on pay*, in the interests of the rebellion, and that in this speculation Arnold and O'Laughlin had joined as early as February; that then, and after, with Booth and Surratt, they were in the "oil business," which was the business of assassination by contract as a speculation? If this conspiracy on the part of O'Laughlin with Arnold is established even *prima facie*, the declarations and acts of Arnold and Booth, the other conspirators, in furtherance of the common design, is evidence against O'Laughlin as well as against Arnold himself or the other parties. The rule of law is, that the act or declaration of one conspirator, done in pursuance or furtherance of the common design, is the act or declaration of all the conspirators. (1 Wharton, 706.)

The letter, therefore, of his co-conspirator, Arnold, is evidence against O'Laughlin, be-

cause it is an act in the prosecution of the common conspiracy, suggesting what should be done in order to make it effective, and which suggestion, as has been stated, was followed out. The defence has attempted to avoid the force of this letter by reciting the statement of Arnold, made to Horner at the time he was arrested, in which he declared, among other things, that the purpose was to abduct President Lincoln and take him south; that it was to be done at the theatre by throwing the President out of the box upon the floor of the stage, when the accused was to catch him. The very announcement of this testimony excited derision that such a tragedy meant only to take the President and carry him gently away! This pigmy to catch the giant as the assassins hurled him to the floor from an elevation of twelve feet! The court has viewed the theatre, and must be satisfied that Booth, in leaping from the President's box, broke his limb. The court cannot fail to conclude that the statement of Arnold was but another silly device, like that of the "oil business," which, for the time being, he employed to hide from the knowledge of his captor the fact that the purpose was to murder the President. No man can for a moment believe that any one of these conspirators hoped or desired, by such a proceeding as that stated by this prisoner, to take the President alive in the presence of thousands assembled in the theatre after he had been thus thrown upon the floor of the stage, much less to carry him through the city, through the lines of your army, and deliver him into the hands of the rebels. No such purpose was expressed or hinted by the conspirators in Canada who commissioned Booth to let these assassinations on contract. I shall waste not a moment more in combatting such an absurdity.

Arnold does confess that he was a conspirator with Booth in this proposed murder; that Booth had a letter of introduction to Dr. Mudd; that Booth, O'Laughlin, Atzerodt, Surratt, a man with an alias, "Mosby," and another whom he does not know, and himself, were parties to this conspiracy, and that Booth had furnished them all with arms. He concludes this remarkable statement to Horner with the declaration that at that time, to wit, the first week of March, or four weeks before he went to Fortress Monroe, he left the conspiracy, and that Booth told him to sell his arms if he chose. This is sufficiently answered by the fact that, four weeks *afterwards*, he wrote his letter to Booth, which was found in Booth's possession after the assassination, suggesting to him what to do in order to make the conspiracy a success, and by the further fact that at the very moment he uttered these declarations part of his arms were found upon his person, and the rest not disposed of, but at his father's house.

A party to a treasonable and murderous conspiracy against the government of his country cannot be held to have abandoned it because he makes such a declaration as this, when he is in the hands of the officer of the law, arrested for his crime, and especially when his declaration is in conflict with and expressly contradicted by his written acts, and unsupported by any conduct of his which becomes a citizen and a man.

If he abandoned the conspiracy, why did he not make known the fact to Abraham Lincoln and his constitutional advisers that these men, armed with the weapons of assassination, were daily lying in wait for their lives? To pretend that a man who thus conducts himself for weeks after the pretended abandonment, volunteering advice for the successful prosecution of the conspiracy, the evidence of which is in writing, and about which there can be no mistake, has in fact abandoned it, is to insult the common understanding of men. O'Laughlin having conspired with Arnold to do this murder, is therefore as much concluded by the letter of Arnold of the 27th of March as is Arnold himself. The further testimony touching O'Laughlin, that of Streett, establishes the fact that about the 1st of April he saw him in confidential conversation with J. Wilkes Booth, in this city, on the avenue. Another man, whom the witness does not know, was in conversation. O'Laughlin called Streett to one side, and told him Booth was busily engaged with his friend—was *talking privately* to his friend. This remark of O'Laughlin is attempted to be accounted for, but the attempt failed; his counsel taking the pains to ask what induced O'Laughlin to make the remark, received the fit reply: "I did not see the interior of Mr. O'Laughlin's mind; I cannot tell." It is the province of this court to infer why that remark was made, and what it signified.

That John H. Surratt, George A. Atzerodt, Mary E. Surratt, David E. Herold, and Louis Payne entered into this conspiracy with Booth, is so very clear upon the testimony that little time need be occupied in bringing again before the court the evidence which establishes it. By the testimony of Weichmann we find Atzerodt in February at the house of the prisoner, Mrs. Surratt. He inquired for her or for John when he came and remained over night. After this and before the assassination he visited there frequently, and at that house bore the name of "Port Tobacco," the name by which he was known in Canada among the conspirators there. The same witness testifies that he met him on the street, when he said he was going to visit Payne at the Herndon House, and also accompanied him, along with Herold and John H. Surratt, to the theatre in March to hear Booth play in the Apostate. At the Pennsylvania House, one or two weeks previous to the assassination, Atzerodt made the statement to Lieutenant Keim, when asking for his knife which he had left in his room, a knife corresponding in size with the one exhibited in court, "I want that; if one fails I want the other," wearing at the same time his revolver at his belt. He also stated to Greenawalt, of the Pennsylvania House, in March, that he was nearly broke, but had friends enough to give him as much money as *would see him through*, adding, "I am going away some of these

days, but will return with as much gold as will keep me all my lifetime." Mr. Greenawalt also says that Booth had frequent interviews with Atzerodt, sometimes in the room, and at other times Booth would walk in and immediately go out, Atzerodt following.

John M. Lloyd testifies that some six weeks before the assassination, Herold, Atzerodt, and John H. Surratt came to his house at Surrattsville, bringing with them two Spencer carbines with ammunition, also a rope and wrench. Surratt asked the witness to take care of them, and to conceal the carbines. Surratt took him into a room in the house, it being his mother's house, and showed the witness where to put the carbines, between the joists on the second floor. The carbines were put there according to his directions, and concealed. Marcus P. Norton saw Atzerodt in conversation with Booth at the National Hotel about the 2d or 3d of March; the conversation was confidential, and the witness accidentally heard them talking in regard to President Johnson, and say that "the class of witnesses would be of that character that there could be little proven by them." This conversation may throw some light on the fact that Atzerodt was found in possession of Booth's bank book!

Colonel Nevens testifies that on the 12th of April last he saw Atzerodt at the Kirkwood House; that Atzerodt there asked him, a stranger, if he knew where Vice-President Johnson was, and where Mr. Johnson's room was. Colonel Nevens showed him where the room of the Vice-President was, and told him that the Vice-President was then at dinner. Atzerodt then looked into the dining-room, where Vice-President Johnson was dining alone. Robert R. Jones, the clerk at the Kirkwood House, states that on the 14th, the day of the murder, two days after this, Atzerodt registered his name at the hotel, G. A. Atzerodt, and took No. 126, retaining the room that day, and carrying away the key. In this room, after the assassination, were found the knife and revolver with which he intended to murder the Vice-President.

The testimony of all these witnesses leaves no doubt that the prisoner, George A. Atzerodt, entered into this conspiracy with Booth; that he expected to receive a large compensation for the service that he would render in its execution; that he had undertaken the assassination of the Vice-President for a price; that he, with Surratt and Herold, rendered the important service of depositing the arms and ammunition to be used by Booth and his confederates as a protection in their flight after the conspiracy had been executed; and that he was careful to have his intended victim pointed out to him, and the room he occupied in the hotel, so that when he came to perform his horrid work he would know precisely where to go and whom to strike.

I take no further notice now of the preparation which this prisoner made for the successful execution of this part of the traitorous and murderous design. The question is, did he enter into this conspiracy? His language, overheard by Mr. Norton, excludes every other conclusion. Vice-President Johnson's name was mentioned in that secret conversation with Booth, and the very suggestive expression was made between them that "little could be proved by the witnesses." His confession in his defence is conclusive of his guilt.

That Payne was in this conspiracy is confessed in the defence made by his counsel, and is also evident from the facts proved, that when the conspiracy was being organized in Canada by Thompson, Sanders, Tucker, Cleary, and Clay, this man Payne stood at the door of Thompson; was recommended and indorsed by Clay with the words "We trust him;" that after coming hither he first reported himself at the house of Mrs. Mary E. Surratt, inquired for her and for John H. Surratt, remained there for four days, having conversation with both of them; having provided himself with means of disguise, was also supplied with pistols and a knife, such as he afterwards used, and spurs, preparatory to his flight; was seen with John H. Surratt practicing with knives, such as those employed in this deed of assassination, and now before the court; was afterwards provided with lodging at the Herndon House, at the instance of Surratt; was visited there by Atzerodt, and attended Booth and Surratt to Ford's Theatre, occupying with those parties the box, as I believe, and which we may readily infer, in which the President was afterwards murdered.

If further testimony be wanting that he entered into the conspiracy, it may be found in the fact sworn to by Weichmann, whose testimony no candid man will discredit, that about the 20th of March Mrs. Surratt, in great excitement, and weeping, said that her son John had gone away not to return, when about three hours subsequently, in the afternoon of the same day, John H. Surratt reappeared, came rushing in a state of frenzy into the room, in his mother's house, armed, declaring he would shoot whoever came into the room, and proclaiming that his prospects were blasted and his hopes gone; that soon Payne came into the same room, also armed and under great excitement, and was immediately followed by Booth, with his riding-whip in his hand, who walked rapidly across the floor from side to side, so much excited that for some time he did not notice the presence of the witness. Observing Weichmann the parties then withdrew, upon a suggestion from Booth, to an upper room, and there had a private interview. From all that transpired on that occasion, it is apparent that when these parties left the house that day, it was with the full purpose of completing some act essential to the final execution of the work of assassination, in conformity with their previous confederation and agreement. They returned foiled—from what cause is unknown—dejected, angry, and covered with confusion.

It is almost imposing upon the patience of the court to consume time in demonstrating the fact, which none conversant with the testimony of this case can for a moment doubt, that

John H. Surratt and Mary E. Surratt were as surely in the conspiracy to murder the President as was John Wilkes Booth himself. You have the frequent interviews between John H. Surratt and Booth, his intimate relations with Payne, his visits from Atzerodt and Herold, his deposit of the arms to cover their flight after the conspiracy should have been executed; his own declared visit to Richmond to do what Booth himself said to Chester must be done, to wit, that he or some of the party must go to Richmond in order to get funds to carry out the conspiracy; that he brought back with him gold, the price of blood, confessing himself that he was there; that he immediately went to Canada, delivered despatches [in cipher to Jacob Thompson from Jefferson Davis, which were interpreted and read by Thompson in the presence of the witness Conover, and in which the conspiracy was approved, and, in the language of Thompson, the proposed assassination was "made all right."

One other fact, if any other fact be needed, and I have done with the evidence which proves that John H. Surratt entered into this combination; that is, that it appears by the testimony of the witness, the cashier of the Ontario Bank, Montreal, that Jacob Thompson, about the day that these despatches were delivered, and while Surratt was then present in Canada, drew from that bank of the rebel funds there on deposit the sum of one hundred and eighty thousand dollars. This being done, Surratt, finding it safer, doubtless, to go to Canada for the great bulk of funds which were to be distributed among these hired assassins than to attempt to carry it through our lines direct from Richmond, immediately returned to Washington, and was present in this city, as is proven by the testimony of Mr. Reid, *on the afternoon of the 14th of April*, the day of the assassination, booted and spurred, ready for the flight whenever the fatal blow should have been struck. If he was not a conspirator and a party to this great crime, how comes it that from that hour to this 10 man has seen him in the capital, nor has he been reported anywhere outside of Canada, having arrived at Montreal, as the testimony shows, on the 18th of April, four days after the murder! Nothing but his conscious coward guilt could possibly induce him to absent himself from his mother, as he does, upon her trial. Being one of these conspirators, as charged, every act of his in the prosecution of this crime is evidence against the other parties to the conspiracy.

That Mary E. Surratt is as guilty as her son of having thus conspired, combined, and confederated to do this murder, in aid of this rebellion, is clear. First, her house was the headquarters of Booth, John H. Surratt, Atzerodt, Payne, and Herold. She is inquired for by Atzerodt; she is inquired for by Payne; and she is visited by Booth, and holds private conversations with him. His picture, together with that of the chief conspirator, Jefferson Davis, is found in her house. She sends to Booth for a carriage to take her, on the 11th of April, to Surrattsville for the purpose of perfecting the arrangement deemed necessary to the successful execution of the conspiracy, and especially to facilitate and protect the conspirators in their escape from justice. On that occasion Booth, having disposed of his carriage, gives to the agent she employed ten dollars with which to hire a conveyance for that purpose. And yet the pretence is made that Mrs. Surratt went on the 11th to Surrattsville exclusively upon her own private and lawful business. Can any one tell, if that be so, how it comes that she should apply to Booth for a conveyance, and how it comes that he, of his own accord, having no conveyance to furnish her, should send her ten dollars with which to procure it? There is not the slightest indication that Booth was under any obligation to her, or that she had any claim upon him, either for a conveyance or for the means with which to procure one, except that he was bound to contribute, being the agent of the conspirators in Canada and Richmond, whatever money might be necessary to the consummation of this infernal plot. On that day, the 11th of April, John H. Surratt had not returned from Canada with the funds furnished by Thompson!

Upon that journey of the 11th the accused, Mary E. Surratt, met the witness John M. Lloyd at Uniontown. She called him; he got out of his carriage and came to her, and she whispered to him in so low a tone that her attendant could not hear her words, though Lloyd, to whom they were spoken, did distinctly hear them, and testifies that she told him he should have those "shooting-irons" ready, meaning the carbines which her son and Herold and Atzerodt had deposited with him, and added the reason, "for they would soon be called for." On the day of the assassination she again sent for Booth, had an interview with him in her own house, and immediately went again to Surrattsville, and then, at about six o'clock in the afternoon, she delivered to Lloyd a field-glass, and told him "to have two bottles of whiskey and the carbines ready, as they would be called for that night." Having thus perfected the arrangement she returned to Washington to her own house, at about half-past eight o'clock in the evening, to await the final result. How could this woman anticipate on Friday afternoon, at six o'clock, that these arms would be called for and would be needed that night unless she was in the conspiracy and knew the blow was to be struck, and the flight of the assassins attempted and by that route? Was not the private conversation which Booth held with her in her parlor on the afternoon of the 14th of April, just before she left on this business, in relation to the orders she should give to have the arms ready?

An endeavor is made to impeach Lloyd. But the court will observe that no witness has been called who contradicts Lloyd's statement in any material matter; neither has his general character for truth been assailed. How, then, is he impeached? It is claimed that his testimony shows that he was a party to the conspiracy. Then it is conceded by those who set up any such pretence that there was a conspiracy. A conspiracy between whom? There

can be no conspiracy without the co-operation or agreement of two or more persons. Who were the other parties to it? Was it Mary E. Surratt? Was it John H. Surratt, George A. Atzerodt, David E. Herold? Those are the only persons, so far as his own testimony or the testimony of any other witness discloses, with whom he had any communication whatever on any subject immediately or remotely touching this conspiracy before the assassination. His receipt and concealment of the arms are, unexplained, evidence that he was in the conspiracy.

The explanation is that he was dependent upon Mary E. Surratt; was her tenant; and his declaration, given in evidence by the accused herself, is that "she had ruined him, and brought this trouble upon him." But because he was weak enough, or wicked enough, to become the guilty depository of these arms, and to deliver them on the order of Mary E. Surratt to the assassins, it does not follow that he is not to be believed on oath. It is said that he concealed the facts that the arms had been left and called for. He so testifies himself, but he gives the reason that he did it only from apprehension of danger to his life. If he were in the conspiracy, his general credit being unchallenged, his testimony being uncontradicted in any material matter, he is to be believed, and cannot be disbelieved if his testimony is substantially corroborated by other reliable witnesses. Is he not corroborated touching the deposit of arms by the fact that the arms are produced in court—one of which was found upon the person of Booth at the time he was overtaken and slain, and which is identified as the same which had been left with Lloyd by Herold, Surratt, and Atzerodt? Is he not corroborated in the fact of the first interview with Mrs. Surratt by the joint testimony of Mrs. Offut and Lewis J. Weichmann, each of whom testified, (and they are contradicted by no one,) that on Tuesday, the 11th day of April, at Uniontown, Mrs. Surratt called Mr. Lloyd to come to her, which he did, and she held a *secret* conversation with him? Is he not corroborated as to the last conversation on the 14th of April by the testimony of Mrs. Offut, who swears that upon the evening of the 14th of April she saw the prisoner, Mary E. Surratt, at Lloyd's house, approach and hold conversation with him? Is he not corroborated in the fact, to which he swears, that Mrs. Surratt delivered to him at that time the field-glass wrapped in paper, by the sworn statement of Weichmann that Mrs. Surratt took with her on that occasion two packages, both of which were wrapped in paper, and one of which he describes as a small package about six inches in diameter? The attempt was made by calling Mrs. Offut to prove that no such package was delivered, but it failed; she merely states that Mrs. Surratt delivered a package wrapped in paper to her after her arrival there, and before Lloyd came in, which was laid down in the room. But whether it was *the* package about which Lloyd testifies, or the other package of the *two* about which Weichmann testifies, as having been carried there that day by Mrs. Surratt, does not appear. Neither does this witness pretend to say that Mrs. Surratt, after she had delivered it to her, and the witness had laid it down in the room, did not again take it up, if it were the same, and put it in the hands of Lloyd. She only knows that she did not see that done; but she did see Lloyd with a package like the one she received in the room before Mrs. Surratt left. How it came into his possession she is not able to state; nor what the package was that Mrs. Surratt first handed her; nor which of the packages it was she afterwards saw in the hands of Lloyd.

But there is one other fact in this case that puts forever at rest the question of the guilty participation of the prisoner, Mrs. Surratt, in this conspiracy and murder; and that is that Payne, who had lodged four days in her house—who during all that time had sat at her table, and who had often conversed with her—when the guilt of his great crime was upon him, and he knew not where else he could so safely go to find a co-conspirator, and he could trust none that was not like himself, guilty, with even the knowledge of his presence—under cover of darkness, after wandering for three days and nights, skulking before the pursuing officers of justice, at the hour of midnight, found his way to the door of Mrs. Surratt, rang the bell, was admitted, and upon being asked, "Whom do you want to see," replied, "Mrs. Surratt." He was then asked by the officer Morgan, what he came at that time of night for? to which he replied, "to dig a gutter in the morning; Mrs. Surratt had sent for him." Afterwards he said "Mrs. Surratt knew he was a poor man and *came to him*." Being asked where he last worked? he replied, "sometimes on 'I' street;" and where he boarded? he replied, "he had no boarding-house, and was a poor man who got his living with the pick," which he bore upon his shoulder, having stolen it from the intrenchments of the capital. Upon being pressed again why he came there at that time of night to go to work, he answered that he simply called to see what time he should go to work in the morning. Upon being told by the officer, who fortunately had preceded him to this house, that he would have to go to the provost marshal's office, he moved and did not answer, whereupon Mrs. Surratt was asked to step into the hall and state whether she knew this man. Raising her right hand she exclaimed, "Before God, sir, I have not seen that man before; I have not hired him; I do not know anything about him." The hall was brilliantly lighted.

If not one word had been said, the mere act of Payne in flying to her house for shelter would have borne witness against her, strong as proofs from Holy Writ. But when she denies, after hearing his declarations, that she had sent for him, or that she had gone to him and hired him, and calls her God to witness that she had never seen him, and knew nothing of him, when, in point of fact, she had seen him for four successive days in her own house, in

the same clothing which he then wore, who can resist for a moment the conclusion that these parties were alike guilty?

The testimony of Spangler's complicity is conclusive and brief. It was impossible to hope for escape after assassinating the President, and such others as might attend him in Ford's Theatre, without arrangements being first made to aid the flight of the assassin and to some extent prevent immediate pursuit.

A stable was to be provided close to Ford's Theatre, in which the horses could be concealed and kept ready for the assassin's use whenever the murderous blow was struck. Accordingly, Booth secretly, through Maddox, hired a stable in rear of the theatre and connecting with it by an alley, as early as the 1st of January last; showing that at that time he had concluded, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, to murder the President in Ford's Theatre and provide the means for immediate and successful flight. Conscious of his guilt, he paid the rent for this stable through Maddox, month by month, giving him the money. He employed Spangler, doubtless for the reason that he could trust him with the secret, as a carpenter to fit up this shed, so that it would furnish room for two horses, and provided the door with lock and key. Spangler did this work for him. Then, it was necessary that a carpenter having access to the theatre should be employed by the assassin to provide a bar for the outer door of the passage leading to the President's box, so that when he entered upon his work of assassination he would be secure from interruption from the rear. By the evidence it is shown that Spangler was in the box in which the President was murdered on the afternoon of the 14th of April, and when there damned the President and General Grant, and said the President ought to be cursed, he had got so many good men killed: showing not only his hostility to the President, but the cause of it—that he had been faithful to his oath and had resisted that great rebellion in the interest of which his life was about to be sacrificed by this man and his co-conspirators. In performing the work which had doubtless been intrusted to him by Booth, a mortise was cut in the wall. A wooden bar was prepared, one end of which could be readily inserted in the mortise and the other pressed against the edge of the door on the inside so as to prevent its being opened. Spangler had the skill and the opportunity to do that work and all the additional work which was done.

It is in evidence that the screws in "the keepers" to the locks on each of the inner doors of the box occupied by the President were drawn. The attempt has been made, on behalf of the prisoner, to show that this was done some time before, accidentally, and with no bad design, and had not been repaired by reason of inadvertence; but that attempt has utterly failed, because the testimony adduced for that purpose relates exclusively to but one of the two inner doors, while the fact is, that the screws were drawn in *both*, and the additional precaution taken to cut a small hole through one of these doors through which the party approaching and while in the private passage would be enabled to look into the box and examine the exact posture of the President before entering. It was also deemed essential, in the execution of this plot, that some one should watch at the outer door, in the rear of the theatre, by which alone the assassin could hope for escape. It was for this work Booth sought to employ Chester in January, offering \$3,000 down of the money of his employers, and the assurance that he should never want. What Chester refused to do Spangler undertook and promised to do. When Booth brought his horse to the rear door of the theatre, on the evening of the murder, he called for Spangler, who went to him, when Booth was heard to say to him, "Ned, you'll help me all you can, won't you." To which Spangler replied, "Oh, yes."

When Booth made his escape, it is testified by Colonel Stewart, who pursued him across the stage and out through the same door, that as he approached it some one slammed it shut. Ritterspaugh, who was standing behind the scenes when Booth fired the pistol and fled, saw Booth run down the passage towards the back door, and pursued him; but Booth drew his knife upon him and passed out, slamming the door after him. Ritterspaugh opened it and went through, leaving *it open* behind him, leaving Spangler inside, and in a position from which he readily could have reached the door. Ritterspaugh also states that very quickly after he had passed through this door he was followed by a large man, the first who followed him, and who was, doubtless, Colonel Stewart. Stewart is very positive that he saw this door slammed; that he himself was constrained to open it, and had some difficulty in opening it. He also testifies that as he approached the door a man stood near enough to have thrown it to with his hand, and this man, the witness believes, was the prisoner Spangler. Ritterspaugh has sworn that he left the door open behind him when he went out, and that he was first followed by the large man, Colonel Stewart. Who slammed that door behind Ritterspaugh? It was not Ritterspaugh; it could not have been Booth, for Ritterspaugh swears that Booth was mounting his horse at the time; and Stewart swears that Booth was upon his horse when he came out. That it was Spangler who slammed the door after Ritterspaugh may not only be inferred from Stewart's testimony, but it is made very clear by his own conduct afterwards upon the return of Ritterspaugh to the stage. The door being then open, and Ritterspaugh being asked which way Booth went, had answered. Ritterspaugh says: "Then I came back on the stage, where I had left Edward Spangler; he hit me on the face with his hand and said, 'Don't say which way he went.' I asked him what he meant by slapping me in the mouth? He said, 'For God's sake, shut up.'"

The testimony of Withers is adroitly handled to throw doubt upon these facts. It cannot

avail, for Withers says he was knocked in the scene by Booth, and when he "came to" he got a side view of him. A man knocked down and senseless, on "coming to" might mistake anybody by a side view for Booth.

An attempt has been made by the defence to discredit this testimony of Ritterspaugh, by showing his contradictory statements to Gifford, Carlan, and Lamb, neither of whom do in fact contradict him, but substantially sustain him. None but a guilty man would have met the witness with a blow for stating which way the assassin had gone. A like confession of guilt was made by Spangler when the witness Miles, the same evening, and directly after the assassination, came to the back door, where Spangler was standing with others, and asked Spangler who it was that held the horse, to which Spangler replied: "Hush; don't say anything about it." He confessed his guilt again when he denied to Mary Anderson the fact, proved here beyond all question, that Booth had called him when he came to that door with his horse, using the emphatic words, "No, he did not; he did not call me." The rope comes to bear witness against him, as did the rope which Atzerodt and Herold and John H. Surratt had carried to Surrattsville and deposited there with the carbines.

It is only surprising that the ingenious counsel did not attempt to explain the deposit of the rope at Surrattsville by the same method that he adopted in explanation of the deposit of this rope, some sixty feet long, found in the carpet-sack of Spangler, unaccounted for save by some evidence which tends to show that he may have carried it away from the theatre.

It is not needful to take time in the recapitulation of the evidence, which shows conclusively that David E. Herold was one of these conspirators. His continued association with Booth, with Atzerodt, his visits to Mrs. Surratt's, his attendance at the theatre with Payne, Surratt, and Atzerodt, his connexion with Atzerodt on the evening of the murder, riding with him on the street in the direction of and near to the theatre at the hour appointed for the work of assassination, and his final flight and arrest, show that he, in common with all the other parties on trial, and all the parties named upon your record not upon trial, had combined and confederated to kill and murder in the interests of the rebellion, as charged and specified against them.

That this conspiracy was entered into by all these parties, both present and absent, is thus proved by the acts, meetings, declarations, and correspondence of all the parties, beyond any doubt whatever. True it is circumstantial evidence, but the court will remember the rule before recited, that circumstances cannot lie; that they are held sufficient in every court where justice is judicially administered to establish the fact of a conspiracy. I shall take no further notice of the remark made by the learned counsel who opened for the defence, and which has been followed by several of his associates, that, under the Constitution, it requires two witnesses to prove the overt act of high treason, than to say, this is not a charge of high treason, but of a treasonable conspiracy, in aid of a rebellion, with intent to kill and murder the executive officer of the United States, and commander of its armies, and of the murder of the President in pursuance of that conspiracy, and with the intent laid, &c. Neither by the Constitution, nor by the rules of the common law, is any fact connected with this allegation required to be established by the testimony of more than one witness. I might say, however, that every substantive averment against each of the parties named upon this record has been established by the testimony of more than one witness.

That the several accused did enter into this conspiracy with John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt to murder the officers of this government named upon the record, in pursuance of the wishes of their employers and instigators in Richmond and Canada, and with intent thereby to aid the existing rebellion and subvert the Constitution and laws of the United States, as alleged, is no longer an open question.

The intent as laid was expressly declared by Sanders in the meeting of the conspirators at Montreal in February last, by Booth in Virginia and New York, and by Thompson to Conover and Montgomery; but if there were no testimony directly upon this point, the law would presume the intent, for the reason that such was the natural and necessary tendency and manifest design of the act itself.

The learned gentleman (Mr. Johnson) says the government has survived the assassination of the President, and thereby would have you infer that this conspiracy was not entered into and attempted to be executed with the intent laid. With as much show of reason it might be said that because the government of the United States has survived this unmatched rebellion, it therefore results that the rebel conspirators waged war upon the government with no purpose or intent thereby to subvert it. By the law we have seen that without any direct evidence of previous combination and agreement between these parties, the conspiracy might be established by evidence of the acts of the prisoners, or of any others with whom they co-operated, concurring in the execution of the common design. (Roscoe, 416.)

Was there co-operation between the several accused in the execution of this conspiracy? That there was is as clearly established by the testimony as is the fact that Abraham Lincoln was killed and murdered by John Wilkes Booth. The evidence shows that all of the accused, save Mudd and Arnold, were in Washington on the 14th of April, the day of the assassination, together with John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt; that on that day Booth had a secret interview with the prisoner Mary E. Surratt; that immediately thereafter she went to Surrattsville to perform her part of the preparation necessary to the successful execution of the conspiracy, and did make that preparation; that John H. Surratt had arrived

here from Canada, notifying the parties that the price to be paid for this great crime had been provided for, at least in part, by the deposit receipts of April 6th for \$180,000, procured by Thompson of the Ontario Bank, Montreal, Canada; that he was also prepared to keep watch, or strike a blow, and ready for the contemplated flight; that Atzerodt, on the afternoon of that day, was seeking to obtain a horse, the better to secure his own safety by flight, after he should have performed the task which he had voluntarily undertaken by contract in the conspiracy—the murder of Andrew Johnson, then Vice-President of the United States; that he did procure a horse for that purpose at Naylor's, and was seen about nine o'clock in the evening to ride to the Kirkwood House, where the Vice-President then was, dismount, and enter. At a previous hour Booth was in the Kirkwood House, and left his card, now in evidence, doubtless intended to be sent to the room of the Vice-President, and which was in these words: "Don't wish to disturb you. Are you at home? J. Wilkes Booth." Atzerodt, when he made application at Brook's in the afternoon for the horse, said to Weichmann, who was there, he was going to ride in the country, and that "he was going to get a horse and send for Payne." He did get a horse for Payne, as well as for himself; for it is proven that on the 12th he was seen in Washington riding the horse which had been procured by Booth, in company with Mudd, last November, from Gardner. A similar horse was tied before the door of Mr. Seward on the night of the murder, was captured after the flight of Payne, who was seen to ride away, and which horse is now identified as the Gardner horse. Booth also procured a horse on the same day, took it to his stable in the rear of the theatre, where he had an interview with Spangler, and where he concealed it. Herold, too, obtained a horse in the afternoon, and was seen between nine and ten o'clock riding with Atzerodt down the avenue from the treasury, then up Fourteenth and down F street, passing close by Ford's Theatre.

O'Laughlin had come to Washington the day before, had sought out his victim (General Grant) at the house of the Secretary of War, that he might be able with certainty to identify him, and at the very hour when these preparations were going on was lying in wait at Rullman's, on the avenue, keeping watch, and declaring, as he did, at about 10 o'clock p. m., when told that the fatal blow had been struck by Booth, "I don't believe Booth did it." During the day, and the night before, he had been visiting Booth, and doubtless encouraging him, and at that very hour was in position, at a convenient distance, to aid and protect him in his flight, as well as to execute his own part of the conspiracy by inflicting death upon General Grant, who happily was not at the theatre nor in the city, having left the city that day. Who doubts that, Booth having ascertained in the course of the day that General Grant would not be present at the theatre, O'Laughlin, who was to murder General Grant, instead of entering the box with Booth, was detailed to lie in wait, and watch and support him.

His declarations of his reasons for changing his lodgings here and in Baltimore, after the murder, so ably and so ingeniously presented in the argument of his learned counsel, (Mr. Cox,) avail nothing before the blasting fact that he did change his lodgings, and declared "he knew nothing of the affair whatever." O'Laughlin, who lurked here, conspiring daily with Booth and Arnold for six weeks to do this murder, declares, "he knew nothing of the affair." O'Laughlin, who said he was "in the oil business," which Booth and Surratt, and Payne and Arnold, have all declared meant this conspiracy, says he "knew nothing of the affair." O'Laughlin, to whom Booth sent the despatches of the 13th and 27th of March—O'Laughlin, who is named in Arnold's letter as one of the conspirators, and who searched for General Grant on Thursday night, laid in wait for him on Friday, was defeated by that Providence "which shapes our ends," and laid in wait to aid Booth and Payne, declares "he knows nothing of the matter." Such a denial is as false and inexcusable as Peter's denial of our Lord.

Mrs. Surratt had arrived at home, from the completion of her part in the plot, about half past eight o'clock in the evening. A few moments afterwards she was called to the parlor and there had a private interview with some one unseen, but whose retreating footsteps were heard by the witness Weichmann. This was doubtless the secret and last visit of John H. Surratt to his mother, who had instigated and encouraged him to strike this traitorous and murderous blow against his country.

While all these preparations were going on, Mudd was awaiting the execution of the plot, ready to faithfully perform his part in securing the safe escape of the murderers. Arnold was at his post at Fortress Monroe, awaiting the meeting referred to in his letter of March 27, wherein he says they were not "to meet for a month or so," which month had more than expired on the day of the murder, for his letter and the testimony disclose that this month of suspension began to run from about the first week in March. He stood ready with the arms which Booth had furnished him to aid the escape of the murderers by *that route*, and secure their communication with their employers. He had given the assurance in that letter to Booth, that although the government "suspected them," and the undertaking was "becoming complicated," yet "a time more propitious would arrive" for the consummation of this conspiracy in which he "was one" with Booth, and when he would "be better prepared to again be with him."

Such were the preparations. The horses were in readiness for the flight; the ropes were procured, doubtless for the purpose of tying the horses at whatever point they might be

constrained to delay and to secure their boats to their moorings in making their way across the Potomac. The five murderous camp knives, the two carbines, the eight revolvers, the Derringer, in court and identified, all were ready for the work of death. The part that each had played has already been in part stated in this argument, and needs no repetition.

Booth proceeded to the theatre about nine o'clock in the evening, at the same time that Atzerodt and Payne and Herold were riding the streets, while Surratt, having parted with his mother at the brief interview in her parlor, from which his retreating steps were heard, was walking the avenue, booted and spurred, and doubtless consulting with O'Laughlin. When Booth reached the rear of the theatre he called Spangler to him, (whose denial of that fact when charged with it, as proven by three witnesses, is very significant,) and received from Spangler his pledge to help him all he could, when, with Booth, he entered the theatre by the stage-door, doubtless to see that the way was clear from the box to the rear door of the theatre, and look upon their victim, whose exact position they could study from the stage. After this view Booth passes to the street, in front of the theatre, where, on the pavement with other conspirators yet unknown, among them one described as a low-browed villain, he awaits the appointed moment. Booth himself, impatient, enters the vestibule of the theatre from the front and asks the time. He is referred to the clock and returns. Presently, as the hour of ten o'clock approached, one of his guilty associates called the time: they wait; again, as the moments elapsed, this conspirator upon watch called the time; again, as the appointed hour draws nigh, he calls the time; and finally, when the fatal moment arrives, he repeats in a louder tone, "ten minutes past ten o'clock." Ten minutes past ten o'clock! The hour has come when the red right hand of these murderous conspirators should strike, and the dreadful deed of assassination be done.

Booth, at the appointed moment, entered the theatre, ascended to the dress-circle, passed to the right, paused a moment, looking down, doubtless to see if Spangler was at his post, and approached the outer door of the close passage leading to the box occupied by the President, pressed it open, passed in, and closed the passage door behind him. Spangler's bar was in its place, and was readily adjusted by Booth in the mortise, and pressed against the inner side of the door, so that he was secure from interruption from without. He passes on to the next door, immediately behind the President, and there stopping, looks through the aperture in the door into the President's box and deliberately observes the precise position of his victim, seated in the chair which had been prepared by the conspirators as the altar for the sacrifice, looking calmly and quietly down upon the glad and grateful people whom by his fidelity he had saved from the peril which had threatened the destruction of their government, and all they held dear this side of the grave, and whom he had come upon invitation to greet with his presence, with the words still lingering upon his lips which he had uttered with uncovered head and uplifted hand before God and his country, when on the fourth of last March he took again the oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, declaring that he entered upon the duties of his great office "with malice toward none—with charity for all." In a moment more, strengthened by the knowledge that his co-conspirators were all at their posts, seven at least of them present in the city, two of them, Mudd and Arnold, at their appointed places, watching for his coming, this hired assassin moves stealthily through the door, the fastenings of which had been removed to facilitate his entrance, fires upon his victim, and the martyr spirit of ABRAHAM LINCOLN ascends to God.

"Treason has done his worst; nor steel, nor poison,  
Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing  
Can touch him further."

At the same hour, when these accused and their co-conspirators in Richmond and Canada, by the hand of John Wilkes Booth, inflicted this mortal wound which deprived the republic of its defender, and filled this land from ocean to ocean with a strange, great sorrow, Payne, a very demon in human form, with the words of falsehood upon his lips, that he was the bearer of a message from the physician of the venerable Secretary of State, sweeps by his servant, encounters his son, who protests that the assassin shall not disturb his father, prostrate on a bed of sickness, and receives for answer the assassin's blow from the revolver in his hand, repeated again and again, rushes into the room, is encountered by Major Seward, inflicts wound after wound upon him with his murderous knife, is encountered by Hansell and Robinson, each of whom he also wounds, springs upon the defenceless and feeble Secretary of State, stabs first on one side of his throat, then on the other, again in the face, and is only prevented from literally hacking out his life by the persistence and courage of the attendant Robinson. He turns to flee, and, his giant arm and murderous hand for a moment paralyzed by the consciousness of guilt, he drops his weapons of death, one in the house, the other at the door, where they were taken up, and are here now to bear witness against him. He attempts escape on the horse which Booth and Mudd had procured of Gardner—with what success has already been stated.

Atzerodt, near midnight, returns to the stable of Naylor the horse which he had procured for this work of murder, having been interrupted in the execution of the part assigned him at the Kirkwood House by the timely coming of citizens to the defence of the Vice-President, and creeps into the Pennsylvania House at two o'clock in the morning with another of the conspirators, yet unknown. There he remained until about five o'clock, when he left, found

his way to Georgetown, pawned one of his revolvers, now in court, and fled northward into Maryland.

He is traced to Montgomery county, to the house of Mr. Metz, on the Sunday succeeding the murder, where, as is proved by the testimony of three witnesses, he said that if the man that was to follow General Grant *had* followed him, it was likely that Grant was shot. To one of these witnesses (Mr. Layman) he said, he did not think Grant had been killed; or, if he had been killed, he was killed by a man who got on the cars at the same time that Grant did; thus disclosing most clearly that one of his co-conspirators was assigned the task of killing and murdering General Grant, and that Atzerodt knew that General Grant had left the city of Washington, a fact which is not disputed, on the Friday evening of the murder, by the evening train. Thus this intended victim of the conspiracy escaped, for that night, the knives and revolvers of Atzerodt, and O'Laughlin, and Payne, and Herold, and Booth, and John H. Surratt, and, perchance, Harper and Caldwell, and twenty others, who were then here lying in wait for his life.

In the mean time Booth and Herold, taking the route before agreed upon, make directly after the assassination for the Anacostia bridge. Booth crosses first, gives his name, passes the guard, and is speedily followed by Herold. They make their way directly to Surrattsville, where Herold calls to Lloyd, "bring out those things," showing that there had been communication between them and Mrs. Surratt after her return. Both the carbines being in readiness, according to Mary E. Surratt's directions, both were brought out. They took but one. Booth declined to carry the other, saying that his limb was broken. They then declared that they had murdered the President and the Secretary of State. They then make their way directly to the house of the prisoner, Mudd, assured of safety and security. They arrived early in the morning, before day, and no man knows at what hour they left. Herold rode towards Bryantown with Mudd about three o'clock that afternoon, in the vicinity of which place he parted with him, remaining in the swamp, and was afterwards seen returning the same afternoon in the direction of Mudd's house; about which time, a little before sundown, Mudd returned from Bryantown towards his home. This village at the time Mudd was in it was thronged with soldiers in pursuit of the murderers of the President, and although great care has been taken by the defence to deny that any one said in the presence of Dr. Mudd, either there or elsewhere on that day, who had committed this crime, yet it is in evidence by two witnesses, whose truthfulness no man questions, that upon Mudd's return to his own house, that afternoon, he stated that Booth was the murderer of the President, and Boyle the murderer of Secretary Seward, but took care to make the further remark that Booth had brothers, and he did not know which of them had done the act. When did Dr. Mudd learn that Booth had brothers? And what is still more pertinent to this inquiry, from whom did he learn that either John Wilkes Booth or any of his brothers had murdered the President? It is clear that Booth remained in his house until some time in the afternoon of Saturday; that Herold left the house alone, as one of the witnesses states, being seen to pass the window; that he alone of these two assassins was in the company of Dr. Mudd on his way to Bryantown. It does not appear when Herold returned to Mudd's house. It is a confession of Dr. Mudd himself, proven by one of the witnesses, that Booth left his house on crutches, and went in the direction of the swamp. How long he remained there, and what became of the horses which Booth and Herold rode to his house, and which were put into his stable, are facts nowhere disclosed by the evidence. The owners testify that they have never seen the horses since. The accused give no explanation of the matter, and when Herold and Booth were captured they had not these horses in their possession. How comes it that, on Mudd's return from Bryantown, on the evening of Saturday, in his conversation with Mr. Hardy and Mr. Farrell, the witnesses before referred to, he gave the name of Booth as the murderer of the President and that of Boyle as the murderer of Secretary Seward and his son, and carefully avoided intimating to either that Booth had come to his house early that day, and had remained there until the afternoon; that he left him in his house and had furnished him a razor with which Booth attempted to disguise himself by shaving off his moustache? How comes it, also, that, upon being asked by those two witnesses whether the Booth who killed the President was the one who had been there last fall, he answered that he did not know whether it was that man or one of his brothers, but he understood he had some brothers, and added, that if it was the Booth who was there last fall, *he knew that one*, but concealed the fact that this man had been at his house on that day and was then at his house, and had attempted, in his presence, to disguise his person? He was sorry, very sorry, that the thing had occurred, but not so sorry as to be willing to give any evidence to these two neighbors, who were manifestly honest and upright men, that the murderer had been harbored in his house all day, and was probably at that moment, as his own subsequent confession shows, lying concealed in his house or near by, subject to his call. This is the man who undertakes to show by his own declaration, offered in evidence against my protest, of what he said afterwards, on Sunday afternoon, the 16th, to his kinsman, Dr. George D. Mudd, to whom he then stated that the assassination of the President was a most damnable act—a conclusion in which most men will agree with him, and to establish which his testimony was not needed. But it is to be remarked that this accused did not intimate that the man whom he knew the evening before was the murderer had found refuge in his house, had disguised his person, and sought concealment in the swamp upon the crutches which he had provided for him.

Why did he conceal this fact from his kinsman? After the church services were over, however, in another conversation on their way home, he did tell Dr. George Mudd that two suspicious persons had been at his house, who had come there a little before daybreak on Saturday morning: that one of them had a broken leg, which he bandaged; that they got something to eat at his house; that they seemed to be laboring under more excitement than probably would result from the injury; that they said they came from Bryantown, and inquired the way to Parson Wilmer's; that while at his house one of them called for a razor and shaved himself. The witness says, "I do not remember whether he said that this party shaved off his whiskers or his moustache, but he altered somewhat, or probably materially, his features." Finally, the prisoner, Dr. Mudd, told this witness that he, in company with the younger of the two men, went down the road towards Bryantown in search of a vehicle to take the wounded man away from his house. How comes it that he concealed in this conversation the fact proved, that he went with Herold towards Bryantown and left Herold outside of the town? How comes it that in this second conversation, on Sunday, insisted upon here with such pertinacity as evidence for the defence, but which had never been called for by the prosecution, he concealed from his kinsman the fact which he had disclosed the day before to Hardy and Farrell, that it was Booth who assassinated the President, and the fact which is now disclosed by his other confessions given in evidence for the prosecution, that it was Booth whom he had sheltered, concealed in his house, and aided to his hiding-place in the swamp? He volunteers as evidence his further statement, however, to this witness, that on Sunday evening he requested the witness to state to the military authorities that two suspicious persons had been at his house, and see if anything could be made of it. He did not tell the witness what became of Herold, and where he parted with him on the way to Bryantown. How comes it that when he was in Bryantown on the Saturday evening before, when he knew that Booth was then at his house, and that Booth was the murderer of the President, he did not himself state it to the military authorities then in that village, as he well knew? It is difficult so see what kindled his suspicions on Sunday, if none were in his mind on Saturday, when he was in possession of the fact that Booth had murdered the President, and was then secreting and disguising himself in the prisoner's own house.

His conversation with Gardner on the same Sunday at the church is also introduced here to relieve him from the overwhelming evidences of his guilt. He communicates nothing to Gardner of the fact that Booth had been in his house; nothing of the fact that he knew the day before that Booth had murdered the President; nothing of the fact that Booth had disguised or attempted to disguise himself; nothing of the fact that he had gone with Booth's associate, Herold, in search of a vehicle, the more speedily to expedite their flight; nothing of the fact that Booth had found concealment in the woods and swamp near his house, upon the crutches which he had furnished him. He contents himself with merely stating, "that we ought to raise immediately a home guard, to hunt up all suspicious persons passing through our section of country and arrest them, for there were two suspicious persons at my house yesterday morning."

It would have looked more like aiding justice and arresting felons if he had put in execution his project of a home guard on Saturday, and made it effective by the arrest of the man, then in his house, who had lodged with him last fall, with whom he had gone to purchase one of the very horses employed in this flight after the assassination, whom he had visited last winter in Washington, and to whom he had pointed out the very *route* by which he had escaped by way of his house; whom he had again visited on the 3d of last March, preparatory to the commission of this great crime, and who he knew, when he sheltered and concealed him in the woods on Saturday, was not merely a suspicious person, but was, in fact, the murderer and assassin of Abraham Lincoln. While I deem it my duty to say here, as I said before, when these declarations, uttered by the accused on Sunday, the 16th, to Gardner and George D. Mudd, were attempted to be offered on the part of the accused, that they are in no sense evidence, and, by the law, were wholly inadmissible, yet I state it as my conviction that, being upon the record upon motion of the accused himself, so far as these declarations to Gardner and George D. Mudd go, they are additional indications of the guilt of the accused, in this, that they are manifestly suppressions of the truth and suggestions of falsehood and deception; they are but the utterances and confessions of guilt.

To Lieutenant Lovett, Joshua Lloyd, and Simon Gavican, who, in pursuit of the murderer, visited his house on the 18th of April, the Tuesday after the murder, he denied positively, upon inquiry, that two men had passed his house, or had come to his house on the morning after the assassination. Two of these witnesses swear positively to his having made the denial, and the other says he hesitated to answer the question he put to him; all of them agree that he afterwards admitted that two men had been there, one of whom had a broken limb, which he had set; and when asked by this witness who that man was, he said he did not know; that the man was a stranger to him, and that the two had been there but a short time. Lloyd asked him if he had ever seen any of the parties, Booth, Herold, and Surratt, and he said he had never seen them; while it is positively proved that he was acquainted with John H. Surratt, who had been in his house; that he knew Booth, and had introduced Booth to Surratt last winter. Afterwards, on Friday, the 21st, he admitted to Lloyd that he had been introduced to Booth last fall, and that this man who came to his house on Satur-

day, the 15th, remained there from about 4 o'clock in the morning until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon; that one of them left his house on horseback, and the other walking. In the first conversation he denied ever having seen these men.

Colonel Wells also testifies that, in his conversation with Dr. Mudd on Friday, the 21st, the prisoner said that he had gone to Bryantown, or near Bryantown, to see some friends on Saturday, and that as he came back to his own house he saw the person he afterwards supposed to be Herold passing to the left of his house towards the barn, but that he did not see the other person at all after he left him in his own house, about 1 o'clock. If this statement be true, how did Dr. Mudd see the same person leave his house on crutches? He further stated to this witness that he returned to his own house about 4 o'clock in the afternoon; that he did not know this wounded man; said he could not recognize him from the photograph which is of record here, but admitted that he had met Booth some time in November, when he had some conversation with him *about lands* and horses; that Booth had remained with him that night in November, and on the next day had purchased a horse. He said he had not again seen Booth from the time of the introduction in November up to his arrival at his house on the Saturday morning after the assassination. Is not this a confession that he did see John Wilkes Booth on that morning at his house, and knew it was Booth? If he did not know him, how came he to make this statement to the witness, that "he had not seen Booth after November prior to his arrival there on the Saturday morning?"

He had said before, to the same witness, he did not know the wounded man. He said further to Colonel Wells, that when he went up stairs after their arrival, he noticed that the person he *supposed* to be Booth had shaved off his moustache. Is it not inferable from this declaration that he *then* supposed him to be Booth? Yet he declared the same afternoon, and while Booth was in his own house, that Booth was the murderer of the President. One of the most remarkable statements made to this witness by the prisoner was that he heard for the first time on Sunday morning, or late in the evening of Saturday, that the President had been murdered! From whom did he hear it? The witness (Colonel Wells) volunteers his "impression" that Dr. Mudd had said he had heard it after the persons had left his house. If the "impression" of the witness thus volunteered is to be taken as evidence—and the counsel for the accused, judging from their manner, seem to think it ought to be—let this question be answered, How could Dr. Mudd have made that impression upon anybody truthfully, when it is proved by Farrell and Hardy that on his return from Bryantown, on Saturday afternoon, he not only stated that the President, Mr. Seward and his son had been assassinated, but that Boyle had assassinated Mr. Seward, and Booth had assassinated the President? Add to this fact that he said to this witness that he left his own house at 1 o'clock, and when he returned the men were gone, yet it is in evidence, by his own declarations, that Booth left his house at 4 o'clock on crutches, and he must have been there to have seen it, or he could not have known the fact.

Mr. Williams testifies that he was at Mudd's house on Tuesday, the 18th of April, when he said that strangers had *not* been that way, and also declared that he heard *for the first time* of the assassination of the President on Sunday morning, at church. Afterwards, on Friday, the 21st, Mr. Williams asked him concerning the men who had been at his house, one of whom had a broken limb, and he confessed they had been there. Upon being asked if they were Booth and Herold, he said they were not; *that he knew Booth*. I think it is fair to conclude that he did know Booth, when we consider the testimony of Weichmann, of Norton, of Evans, and all the testimony just referred to, wherein he declares himself that he not only knew him, but that he had lodged with him, and that he had himself gone with him when he purchased his horse from Gardner last fall, for the very purpose of aiding the flight of himself or some of his confederates.

All these circumstances taken together, which, as we have seen upon high authority, are stronger as evidence of guilt than even direct testimony, leave no further room for argument, and no rational doubt that Doctor Samuel A. Mudd was as certainly in this conspiracy as were Booth and Herold, whom he sheltered and entertained, receiving them under cover of darkness on the morning after the assassination, concealing them throughout that day from the hand of offended justice, and aiding them, by every endeavor, to pursue their way successfully to their co-conspirator, Arnold, at Fortress Monroe, and in which direction they fled until overtaken and Booth was slain.

We next find Herold and his confederate, Booth, after their departure from the house of Mudd, across the Potomac, in the neighborhood of Port Conway, on Monday, the 24th of April, conveyed in a wagon. There Herold, in order to obtain the aid of Captain Jett, Ruggles, and Bainbridge, of the confederate army, said to Jett, "We are the assassins of the President;" that this was his brother with him, who, with himself, belonged to A. P. Hill's corps; that his brother had been wounded at Petersburg; that their names were Boyd. He requested Jett and his rebel companions to take them out of the lines. After this Booth joined these parties, was placed on Ruggles's horse, and crossed the Rappahannock river. They then proceeded to the house of Garrett, in the neighborhood of Port Royal, and nearly midway between Washington city and Fortress Monroe, where they were to have joined Arnold. Before these rebel guides and guards parted with them, Herold confessed that they were travelling under assumed names; that his own name was Herold and that the name of the wounded man was John Wilkes Booth, "who had killed the President." The rebels left Booth at Garrett's, where Herold revisited him, from time to time, until they were captured.

At 2 o'clock on Wednesday morning, the 26th, a party of United States officers and soldiers surrounded Garrett's barn, where Booth and Herold lay concealed, and demanded their surrender. Booth cursed Herold, calling him a coward, and bade him go, when Herold came out and surrendered himself, was taken into custody and is now brought into court. The barn was then set on fire, when Booth sprang to his feet, amid the flames that were kindling about him, carbine in hand, and approached the door, seeking, by the flashing light of the fire, to find some new victim for his murderous hand, when he was shot, as he deserved to be, by Sergeant Corbett, in order to save his comrades from wounds or death by the hands of the desperate assassin. Upon his person was found the following bill of exchange:

"No. 1492. The Ontario Bank, Montreal Branch. Exchange for £61 12s. 10d. Montreal, 27th October, 1864. Sixty days after sight of this first of exchange, second and third of the same tenor and date, pay to the order of J. Wilkes Booth £61 12s. 10d. sterling, value received, and charge to the account of this office. H. Stanus, manager. To Messrs, Glynn, Mills & Co., London."

Thus fell, by the hands of one of the defenders of the republic, this hired assassin, who, for a price, murdered Abraham Lincoln, bearing upon his person, as this bill of exchange testifies, additional evidence of the fact that he had undertaken, in aid of the rebellion, this work of assassination by the hands of himself and his confederates, for such sum as the accredited agents of Jefferson Davis might pay him or them out of the funds of the confederacy which, as is in evidence, they had in "any amount" in Canada for the purpose of rewarding conspirators, spies, poisoners, and assassins, who might take service under their false commissions, and do the work of the incendiary and the murderer upon the lawful representatives of the American people, to whom had been intrusted the care of the republic, the maintenance of the Constitution, and the execution of the laws.

The court will remember that it is in the testimony of Merritt and Montgomery and Conover that Thompson, and Sanders, and Clay, and Cleary made their boasts that they had money in Canada for this very purpose. Nor is it to be overlooked or forgotten that the officers of the Ontario Bank at Montreal testify that during the current year of this conspiracy and assassination Jacob Thompson had on deposit in that bank the sum of six hundred and forty-nine thousand dollars, and that these deposits to the credit of Jacob Thompson accrued from the negotiation of bills of exchange drawn by the secretary of the treasury of the so-called Confederate States on Frazier, Trenholm & Co., of Liverpool, who were known to be the financial agents of the Confederate States. With an undrawn deposit in this bank of four hundred and fifty-five dollars, which has remained to his credit since October last, and with an unpaid bill of exchange drawn by the same bank upon London, in his possession and found upon his person, Booth ends his guilty career in this work of conspiracy and blood in April, 1865, as he began it in October, 1864, in combination with Jefferson Davis, Jacob Thompson, George N. Sanders, Clement C. Clay, William C. Cleary, Beverley Tucker, and other co-conspirators, making use of the money of the rebel confederation to aid in the execution and in the flight, bearing at the moment of his death upon his person their money, part of the price which they paid for his great crime, to aid him in its consummation, and secure him afterwards from arrest and the just penalty which by the law of God and the law of man is denounced against treasonable conspiracy and murder.

By all the testimony in the case it is, in my judgment, made as clear as any transaction can be shown by human testimony, that John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, and the several accused, David E. Herold, George A. Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, Michael O'Laughlin, Edward Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Mary E. Surratt, and Samuel A. Mudd, did, with intent to aid the existing rebellion and to subvert the Constitution and laws of the United States, in the month of October last and thereafter, combine, confederate, and conspire with Jefferson Davis, George N. Sanders, Beverley Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, Clement C. Clay, George Harper, George Young, and others unknown, to kill and murder, within the military department of Washington, and within the intrenched fortifications and military lines thereof, Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States and commander-in-chief of the army and navy thereof; Andrew Johnson, Vice-President of the United States; William H. Seward, Secretary of State; and Ulysses S. Grant, Lieutenant General, in command of the armies of the United States; and that Jefferson Davis, the chief of this rebellion, was the instigator and procurer, through his accredited agents in Canada, of this treasonable conspiracy.

It is also submitted to the court, that it is clearly established by the testimony that John Wilkes Booth, in pursuance of this conspiracy, so entered into by him and the accused, did, on the night of the 14th of April, 1865, within the military department of Washington, and the intrenched fortifications and military lines thereof, and with the intent laid, inflict a mortal wound upon Abraham Lincoln, then President and commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, whereof he died; that in pursuance of the same conspiracy and within the said department and intrenched lines, Lewis Payne assaulted, with intent to kill and murder, William H. Seward, then Secretary of State of the United States; that George A. Atzerodt, in pursuance of the same conspiracy, and within the said department, laid in wait, with intent to kill and murder Andrew Johnson, then Vice-President of the United States; that Michael O'Laughlin, within said department, and in pursuance of said conspiracy, laid in wait to kill and murder Ulysses S. Grant, then in command of the armies of the United

States; and that Mary E. Surratt, David E. Herold, Samuel Arnold, Samuel A. Mudd, and Edward Spangler did encourage, aid, and abet the commission of said several acts in the prosecution of said conspiracy.

If this treasonable conspiracy has not been wholly executed; if the several executive officers of the United States and the commander of its armies, to kill and murder whom the said several accused thus confederated and conspired, have not each and all fallen by the hands of these conspirators, thereby leaving the people of the United States without a President or Vice-President; without a Secretary of State, who alone is clothed with authority by the law to call an election to fill the vacancy, should any arise, in the offices of President and Vice-President; and without a lawful commander of the armies of the republic, it is only because the conspirators were deterred by the vigilance and fidelity of the executive officers, whose lives were mercifully protected on that night of murder by the care of the Infinite Being who has thus far saved the republic and crowned its arms with victory.

If this conspiracy was thus entered into by the accused; if John Wilkes Booth did kill and murder Abraham Lincoln in pursuance thereof; if Lewis Payne did, in pursuance of said conspiracy, assault with intent to kill and murder William H. Seward, as stated, and if the several parties accused did commit the several acts alleged against them in the prosecution of said conspiracy, then, it is the law that all the parties to that conspiracy, whether present at the time of its execution or not, whether on trial before this court or not, are alike guilty of the several acts done by each in the execution of the common design. What these conspirators did in the execution of this conspiracy by the hand of one of their co-conspirators they did themselves; his act, done in the prosecution of the common design, was the act of all the parties to the treasonable combination, because done in execution and furtherance of their guilty and treasonable agreement.

As we have seen, this is the rule, whether all the conspirators are indicted or not; whether they are all on trial or not. "It is not material what the nature of the indictment is, provided the offence involve a conspiracy. Upon indictment for murder, for instance, if it appear that others, together with the prisoner, conspired to perpetrate the crime, the act of one done in pursuance of that intention would be evidence against the rest." (1 Whar., 706.) To the same effect are the words of Chief Justice Marshall, before cited, that whoever leagued in a general conspiracy, performed any part, however MINUTE, or however REMOTE, from the scene of *action*, are guilty as principals. In this treasonable conspiracy, to aid the existing armed rebellion, by murdering the executive officers of the United States and the commander of its armies, all the parties to it must be held as principals, and the act of one in the prosecution of the common design the act of all.

I leave the decision of this dread issue with the court, to which alone it belongs. It is for you to say, upon your oaths, whether the accused are guilty.

I am not conscious that in this argument I have made any erroneous statement of the evidence, or drawn any erroneous conclusions; yet I pray the court, out of tender regard and jealous care for the rights of the accused, to see that no error of mine, if any there be, shall work them harm. The past services of the members of this honorable court give assurance that, without fear, favor, or affection, they will discharge with fidelity the duty enjoined upon them by their oaths. Whatever else may befall, I trust in God that in this, as in every other American court, the rights of the whole people will be respected, and that the republic in this, its supreme hour of trial, will be true to itself and just to all—ready to protect the rights of the humblest, to redress every wrong, to avenge every crime, to vindicate the majesty of law, and to maintain inviolate the Constitution, whether assailed secretly or openly, by hosts armed with gold or armed with steel.

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### *Trial of Henry Wirz.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

*Bureau of Military Justice, October 31, 1865.*

#### *To the President:*

HENRY WIRZ was tried by a military commission, convened at Washington, D. C., on the twenty-third day of August, 1865, by order of the President of the United States, on the following charges and specifications:

CHARGE 1.—Maliciously, wilfully, and traitorously, and in aid of the then existing armed rebellion against the United States of America, on or before the first day of March, A. D. 1864, and on divers other days between that day and the tenth day of April, 1865, combining, confederating, and conspiring together with John H. Winder, Richard B. Winder, Joseph White, W. S. Winder, R. R. Stevenson, and others unknown, to injure the health and destroy the lives of soldiers in the military service of the United States, then held and being prison-

ers of war within the lines of the so-called Confederate States and in the military prisons thereof, to the end that the armies of the United States might be weakened and impaired, in violation of the laws and customs of war.

*Specification.*—In this: that he, the said Henry Wirz, did combine, confederate, and conspire with them, the said John H. Winder, Richard B. Winder, Joseph White, W. S. Winder, R. R. Stevenson, and others whose names are unknown, citizens of the United States aforesaid, and who were then engaged in armed rebellion against the United States, maliciously, traitorously, and in violation of the laws of war, to impair and injure the health and to destroy the lives—by subjecting to torture and great suffering, by confining in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters, by exposing to the inclemency of winter and to the dews and burning sun of summer, by compelling the use of impure water, and by furnishing insufficient and unwholesome food—of large numbers of federal prisoners, to wit, the number of thirty thousand, soldiers in the military service of the United States of America, held as prisoners of war at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, within the lines of the so-called Confederate States, on or before the first day of March, A. D. 1864, and at divers times between that day and the tenth day of April, A. D. 1865, to the end that the armies of the United States might be weakened and impaired, and the insurgents engaged in armed rebellion against the United States might be aided and comforted. And he, the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States, being then and there commandant of a military prison at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, located by authority of the so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, and as such commandant fully clothed with authority, and in duty bound to treat, care, and provide for such prisoners held as aforesaid, as were or might be placed in his custody, according to the law of war, did, in furtherance of such combination, confederation, and conspiracy, and incited thereunto by them, the said John H. Winder, Richard B. Winder, Joseph White, W. S. Winder, R. R. Stevenson, and others whose names are unknown, maliciously, wickedly, and traitorously confine a large number of such prisoners of war, soldiers in the military service of the United States, to the amount of thirty thousand men, in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters, in a close and small area of ground, wholly inadequate to their wants and destructive to their health, which he well knew and intended; and while there so confined, during the time aforesaid, did, in furtherance of his evil design, and in aid of the said conspiracy, wilfully and maliciously neglect to furnish tents, barracks, or other shelter sufficient for their protection from the inclemency of winter and the dews and burning sun of summer; and with such evil intent did take and cause to be taken from them their clothing, blankets, camp equipage, and other property of which they were possessed at the time of being placed in his custody; and with like malice and evil intent, did refuse to furnish or cause to be furnished food, either of a quality or quantity sufficient to preserve health and sustain life, and did refuse and neglect to furnish wood sufficient for cooking in summer, and to keep the said prisoners warm in winter, and did compel the said prisoners to subsist upon unwholesome food, and that in limited quantities, entirely inadequate to sustain health, which he well knew; and did compel the said prisoners to use unwholesome water, reeking with the filth and garbage of the prison and prison guard and the offal and drainage of the cook-house of said prison, whereby the prisoners became greatly reduced in their bodily strength and emaciated and injured in their bodily health; their minds impaired and their intellects broken, and many of them, to wit, the number of ten thousand, whose names are unknown, sickened and died by reason thereof, which he, the said Henry Wirz, then and there well knew and intended, and so knowing and evilly intending, did refuse and neglect to provide proper lodgings, food, or nourishment for the sick and necessary medicine and medical attendance for the restoration of their health, and did knowingly, wilfully, and maliciously, in fur-

therance of his evil designs, permit them to languish and die from want of care and proper treatment; and the said Henry Wirz, still pursuing his evil purposes, did permit to remain in the said prison, among the emaciated sick and languishing living, the bodies of the dead, until they became corrupt and loathsome and filled the air with fetid and noxious exhalations, and thereby greatly increased the unwholesomeness of the prison, insomuch that great numbers of said prisoners, to wit, the number of one thousand, whose names are unknown, sickened and died by reason thereof. And the said Henry Wirz, still pursuing his wicked and cruel purpose, wholly disregarding the usages of civilized warfare, did, at the time and place aforesaid, maliciously and wilfully subject the prisoners aforesaid to cruel, unusual, and infamous punishment upon slight, trivial, and fictitious pretences, by fastening large balls of iron to their feet, and binding large numbers of the prisoners aforesaid closely together, with large chains around their necks and feet, so that they walked with the greatest difficulty, and, being so confined, were subjected to the burning rays of the sun, often without food or drink for hours, and even days, from which said cruel treatment large numbers, to wit, the number of one hundred, whose names are unknown, sickened, fainted, and died. And he, the said Wirz, did further cruelly treat and injure said prisoners by maliciously confining them with an instrument of torture called "the stocks," thus depriving them of the use of their limbs, and forcing them to lie, sit, and stand for many hours without the power of changing position, and being without food or drink, in consequence of which many, to wit, the number of thirty, whose names are unknown, sickened and died. And he, the said Wirz, still wickedly pursuing his evil purpose, did establish and cause to be designated within the prison enclosure containing said prisoners a "dead line," being a line around the inner face of the stockade or wall enclosing said prison, and about twenty feet distant from and within said stockade; and having so established said dead line, which was in many places an imaginary line, and in many other places marked by insecure and shifting strips of board nailed upon the tops of small and insecure stakes or posts, he, the said Wirz, instructed the prison guard stationed around the top of said stockade to fire upon and kill any of the prisoners aforesaid who might touch, fall upon, pass over or under across the said "dead line;" pursuant to which said orders and instructions, maliciously and needlessly given by said Wirz, the said prison guard did fire upon and kill a large number of said prisoners, to wit, the number of about three hundred. And the said Wirz, still pursuing his evil purpose, did keep and use ferocious and bloodthirsty beasts, dangerous to human life, called bloodhounds, to hunt down prisoners of war aforesaid who made their escape from his custody and did then and there wilfully and maliciously suffer, incite, and encourage the said beasts to seize, tear, mangle, and maim the bodies and limbs of said fugitive prisoners of war, which said beasts, incited as aforesaid, then and there did, whereby a large number of said prisoners of war who, during the time aforesaid, made their escape and were recaptured, and were by the said beasts then and there cruelly and inhumanly injured, in so much that many of said prisoners, to wit, the number of about fifty, died. And the said Wirz, still pursuing his wicked purpose, and still aiding in carrying out said conspiracy, did use and cause to be used, for the pretended purposes of vaccination, impure and poisonous vaccine matter, which said impure and poisonous matter was then and there, by the direction and order of said Wirz, maliciously, cruelly, and wickedly deposited in the arms of many of said prisoners, by reason of which large numbers of them, to wit, one hundred, lost the use of their arms, and many of them, to wit, about the number of two hundred, were so injured that they soon thereafter died. All of which he, the said Henry Wirz, well knew and maliciously intended, and in aid of the then existing rebellion against the United States, with the view to assist in weakening and impairing the armies of the United States, and in furtherance of the said conspiracy, and with the full knowledge

consent, and connivance of his co-conspirators aforesaid, he, the said Wirz, then and there did.

**CHARGE 2.**—Murder, in violation of the laws and customs of war.

*Specification 1.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the eighth day of July, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and he, the said Henry Wirz, a certain pistol called a revolver then and there loaded and charged with gunpowder and bullets, which said pistol the said Henry Wirz in his hand then there had and held to, against, and upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, then and there feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did shoot and discharge, inflicting upon the body of the soldier aforesaid a mortal wound with the pistol aforesaid, in consequence of which said mortal wound, murderously inflicted by the said Henry Wirz, the said soldier thereafter, to wit, on the 9th day of July, A. D. 1864, died.

*Specification 2.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the twentieth day of September, A. D. 1864, then and there, being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did jump upon, stamp, kick, bruise, and otherwise injure with the heels of his boots, a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, of which said stamping, kicking, and bruising, maliciously done and inflicted by the said Wirz, he, the said soldier, soon thereafter, to wit, on the 20th day of September, A. D. 1864, died.

*Specification 3.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the thirteenth day of June, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States, for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and he, the said Henry Wirz, a certain pistol called a revolver then and there loaded and charged with gunpowder and bullets, which said pistol the said Henry Wirz in his hand then and there had and held to, against, and upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, then and there, feloniously and of his malice aforethought did shoot and discharge, inflicting upon the body of the soldier aforesaid a mortal wound with the pistol aforesaid, in consequence of which said mortal wound, murderously inflicted by the said Henry Wirz, the said soldier immediately, to wit, on the day aforesaid, died.

*Specification 4.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the thirtieth day of May, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and

he, the said Henry Wirz, a certain pistol called a revolver then and there loaded and charged with gunpowder and bullets, which said pistol the said Henry Wirz in his hand then and there had and held to, against, and upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, then and there, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did shoot and discharge, inflicting upon the body of the soldier aforesaid a mortal wound with the pistol aforesaid, in consequence of which said mortal wound, murderously inflicted by the said Henry Wirz, the said soldier, on the thirtieth day of May, A. D. 1864, died.

*Specification 5.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the twentieth day of August, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did confine and bind within an instrument of torture called "the stocks," a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, in consequence of which said cruel treatment, maliciously and murderously inflicted as aforesaid, he the said soldier soon thereafter, to wit, on the thirtieth day of August, A. D. 1864, died.

*Specification 6.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the first day of February, 1865, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did confine and bind within an instrument of torture called "the stocks," a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, in consequence of which said cruel treatment, maliciously and murderously inflicted as aforesaid, he, the said soldier, soon thereafter, to wit, on the sixth day of February, A. D. 1864, died.

*Specification 7.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the twentieth day of July, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did fasten and chain together several persons, soldiers belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as prisoners of war, whose names are unknown, binding the necks and feet of said prisoners closely together, and compelling them to carry great burdens, to wit, large iron balls chained to their feet, so that, in consequence of the said cruel treatment inflicted upon them by the said Henry Wirz as aforesaid, one of said soldiers, a prisoner of war as aforesaid, whose name is unknown, on the twenty-fifth day of July, A. D. 1864, died.

*Specification 8.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the fifteenth day of May, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did order a rebel soldier, whose name is unknown, then on duty as a sentinel or guard to

the prison of which said Henry Wirz was commandant, as aforesaid, to fire upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown; and, in pursuance of said order so as aforesaid, maliciously and murderously given as aforesaid, he, the said rebel soldier, did, with a musket loaded with gunpowder and bullet, then and there fire at the said soldier so as aforesaid held as a prisoner of war, inflicting upon him a mortal wound with the musket aforesaid, of which he, the said prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the day aforesaid, died.

*Specification 9.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the first day of July, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did order a rebel soldier, whose name is unknown, then on duty as a sentinel or guard to the prison of which said Wirz was commandant as aforesaid, to fire upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown; and, in pursuance of said order so as aforesaid, maliciously and murderously given as aforesaid, he, the said rebel soldier, did, with a musket loaded with gunpowder and bullet, then and there fire at the said soldier so as aforesaid held as a prisoner of war, inflicting upon him a mortal wound with the said musket, of which he, the said prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the day aforesaid, died.

*Specification 10.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the twentieth day of August, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did order a rebel soldier, whose name is unknown, then on duty as a sentinel or guard to the prison of which said Wirz was commandant as aforesaid, to fire upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown; and, in pursuance of said order so as aforesaid, maliciously and murderously given as aforesaid, he, the said rebel soldier, did, with a musket loaded with gunpowder and bullet, then and there fire at the said soldier so as aforesaid held as a prisoner of war, inflicting upon him a mortal wound with the said musket, of which he, the said prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the day aforesaid, died.

*Specification 11.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the first day of July, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did cause, incite, and urge certain ferocious and blood-thirsty animals called bloodhounds to pursue, attack, wound, and tear in pieces a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown; and, in consequence thereof, the said bloodhounds did then and there, with the knowledge, encouragement, and instigation of him, the said Wirz, maliciously and murderously given by him, attack and mortally wound the said soldier, in consequence of which said mortal wound he, the said prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the sixth day of July, A. D. 1864, died.

*Specification 12.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the twenty-seventh day of July, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did order a rebel soldier, whose name is unknown, then on duty as a sentinel or guard to the prison of which said Wirz was commandant as aforesaid, to fire upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown; and, in pursuance of said order so as aforesaid, maliciously and murderously given as aforesaid, he, the said rebel soldier, did, with a musket loaded with gunpowder and bullet, then and there fire at the said soldier, so as aforesaid held as a prisoner of war, inflicting upon him a mortal wound with the said musket, of which said mortal wound he, the said prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the day aforesaid, died.

*Specification 13.*—In this: that the said Henry Wirz an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the third day of August, A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, and with a pistol called a revolver, then and there held in the hands of the said Wirz, did beat and bruise said soldier upon the head, shoulders, and breast, inflicting thereby mortal wounds, from which said beating and bruising aforesaid, and mortal wounds caused thereby, the said soldier soon thereafter, to wit, on the fourth day of August, A. D. 1864, died.

By order of the President of the United States.

N. P. CHIPMAN,

*Colonel and Additional Aide-de-Camp, Judge Advocate.*

Upon being arraigned the prisoner's counsel submitted the following pleas:

1. That he ought not to be held or tried, for any cause, by the government of the United States, because, according to the terms of the surrender of the rebel General Johnston, under whose command he was serving at the time, it was agreed that all officers and men should be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities, so long as they observed their obligations and the laws in force where they resided.

2. That he should not be held to trial, or in custody, because at the time of his arrest he was in the enjoyment of his liberty, and was promised by Captain Noyes, of Major General Wilson's staff, that he should not be held as a prisoner, but that, after giving such verbal information to General Wilson as he was able, he should have a safe conduct to his home, which promise was violated.

3. That the commission had no jurisdiction to try him for the offences charged; also that he had been, on the 21st of August, arraigned and put on trial before the same tribunal, on the same charges, and could not be tried or "put to answer" a second time therefor. Also, that the charges and specifications were too vague and indefinite, and did not make out an offence punishable by the laws of war.

All these pleas were discussed at length on both sides, and were, after deliberation, properly overruled by the commission. A plea of "not guilty" to both charges and specifications thereto was then made by the prisoner.

The investigation of the matters alleged against the prisoner then commenced, and continued until the 21st day of October, during which time one hundred and forty-eight witnesses for the prosecution and defence were examined, and a large amount of documentary evidence found in the official papers captured at Andersonville, and among the rebel archives at Richmond, was introduced.

One of the counsel for the defence then asked for an adjournment of two weeks at least, to enable him to prepare an argument. The commission first decided to adjourn ten days, and, upon his further petition, *twelve* days for this purpose. He, however, declared that it was insufficient time, and thereupon announced that he would submit the case without remark. After an adjournment of four days an elaborate statement of the prisoner was submitted, which was prepared by him, with the aid of an able assistant, (the chief reporter of the trial, who shows himself familiar with all the material facts,) which goes over the whole case in explanation of certain acts averred, and in denial of the proof or truth of all the others.

The closing address of the judge advocate immediately followed, and thereafter the court, it appears, having maturely considered the evidence adduced, found the accused, Henry Wirz, as follows:

Of the specification to charge one, "guilty," after amending said specification to read as follows:

In this: that he, the said Henry Wirz, did combine, confederate and conspire with them, the said Jefferson Davis, James A. Seddon, Howell Cobb, John H. Winder, Richard B. Winder, Isaiah H. White, W. S. Winder, W. Shelby Reed, R. R. Stevenson, S. P. Moore, — Kerr, late hospital steward at Andersonville, James Duncan, Wesley W. Turner, Benjamin Harris, and others whose names are unknown, citizens of the United States aforesaid, and who were then engaged in armed rebellion against the United States, maliciously, traitorously, and in violation of the laws of war, to impair and injure the health and to destroy the lives—by subjecting to torture and great suffering, by confining in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters, by exposing to the inclemency of winter and to the dews and burning sun of summer, by compelling the use of impure water, and by furnishing insufficient and unwholesome food—of large numbers of federal prisoners, to wit, the number of about forty-five thousand soldiers in the military service of the United States of America, held as prisoners of war at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, within the lines of the so-called Confederate States, on or before the twenty-seventh day of March, A. D. 1864, and at divers times between that day and the tenth day of April, A. D. 1865, to the end that the armies of the United States might be weakened and impaired, and the insurgents engaged in armed rebellion against the United States might be aided and comforted. And he, the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate States, being then and there commandant of a military prison at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, located by authority of the so-called Confederate States, for the confinement of prisoners of war, and as such commandant fully clothed with authority, and in duty bound, to treat, care, and provide for such prisoners held as aforesaid, as were or might be placed in his custody, according to the law of war, did, in furtherance of such combination, confederation, and conspiracy, maliciously, wickedly, and traitorously confine a large number of such prisoners of war, soldiers in the military service of the United States, to the number of about forty-five thousand men, in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters, in a close and small area of ground, wholly inadequate to their wants and destructive to their health, which he well knew and intended; and while there so confined, during the time aforesaid, did, in furtherance of his evil design, and in aid of the said conspiracy, wilfully and maliciously neglect to furnish tents, barracks, or other shelter sufficient for their protection from the inclemency of winter and the dews and burning sun of summer, and with such evil intent did take and cause to be

taken from them their clothing, blankets, camp equipage, and other property of which they were possessed at the time of being placed in his custody; and with like malice and evil intent, did refuse to furnish or cause to be furnished food, either of a quality or quantity sufficient to preserve health and sustain life; and did refuse and neglect to furnish wood sufficient for cooking in summer, and to keep the said prisoners warm in winter, and did compel the said prisoners to subsist upon unwholesome food, and that in limited quantities entirely inadequate to sustain health, which he well knew; and did compel the said prisoners to use unwholesome water, reeking with the filth and garbage of the prison and prison guard, and the offal and drainage of the cook-house of said prison, whereby the prisoners became greatly reduced in their bodily strength, and emaciated and injured in their bodily health; their minds impaired, and their intellects broken; and many of them, to wit, about the number of ten thousand, whose names are unknown, sickened and died by reason thereof, which he, the said Henry Wirz, then and there well knew and intended; and so knowing and evilly intending, did refuse and neglect to provide proper lodgings, food, or nourishment for the sick, and necessary medicine and medical attendance for the restoration of their health, and did knowingly, wilfully, and maliciously, in furtherance of his evil designs, permit them to languish and die from want of care and proper treatment. And the said Henry Wirz, still pursuing his evil purposes, did permit to remain in the said prison, among the emaciated sick and languishing living, the bodies of the dead, until they became corrupt and loathsome, and filled the air with fetid and noxious exhalations, and thereby greatly increased the unwholesomeness of the prison, insomuch that great numbers of said prisoners, whose names are unknown, sickened and died by reason thereof. And the said Henry Wirz, still pursuing his wicked and cruel purpose, wholly disregarding the usages of civilized warfare, did, at the time and place aforesaid, maliciously and wilfully subject the prisoners aforesaid to cruel, unusual, and infamous punishment upon slight, trivial, and fictitious pretences—by fastening large balls of iron to their feet, and binding large numbers of the prisoners aforesaid closely together, with large chains around their necks and feet, so that they walked with the greatest difficulty; and, being so confined, were subjected to the burning rays of the sun, often without food or drink for hours, and even days, from which said cruel treatment large numbers, whose names are unknown, sickened, fainted, and died. And he, the said Wirz, did further cruelly treat and injure said prisoners, by maliciously tying them up by the thumbs and wilfully confining them within an instrument of torture called “the stocks,” thus depriving them of the use of their limbs, and forcing them to lie, sit, and stand for many hours without the power of changing position, and being without food or drink, in consequence of which many, whose names are unknown, sickened and died. And he, the said Wirz, still wickedly pursuing his evil purpose, did establish and cause to be designated within the prison enclosure, containing said prisoners, a “dead line,” being a line around the inner face of the stockade, or wall, enclosing said prison, and about twenty feet distant from and within said stockade; and having so established said dead line, which was in some places an imaginary line, and in other places marked by insecure and shifting strips of boards nailed upon the top of small and insecure stakes or posts, he, the said Wirz, instructed the prison guard stationed around the top of said stockade to fire upon and kill any of the prisoners aforesaid who might fall upon, pass over or under or across the said “dead line.” Pursuant to which said orders and instructions, maliciously and needlessly given by said Wirz, the said prison guard did fire upon and kill a number of said prisoners. And the said Wirz, still pursuing his evil purpose, did keep and use ferocious and bloodthirsty dogs, dangerous to human life, to hunt down prisoners of war aforesaid who made their escape from his custody, and did, then and there, wilfully and maliciously suffer, incite, and encourage

the said dogs to seize, tear, mangle, and maim the bodies and limbs of said fugitive prisoners of war, which the said dogs, incited as aforesaid, then and there did, whereby a number of said prisoners of war who, during the time aforesaid, made their escape and were recaptured, died. And the said Wirz, still pursuing his wicked purpose, and still aiding in carrying out said conspiracy, did cause to be used, for the pretended purposes of vaccination, impure and poisonous vaccine matter, which said impure and poisonous matter was then and there, by the direction and order of said Wirz, maliciously, cruelly, and wickedly deposited in the arms of many of said prisoners, by reason of which large numbers of them lost the use of their arms, and many of them were so injured that they soon thereafter died. All of which he, the said Henry Wirz, well knew and maliciously intended, and in aid of the then existing rebellion against the United States, with the view to assist in weakening and impairing the armies of the United States, and in furtherance of the said conspiracy, and with the full knowledge, consent, and connivance of his co-conspirators aforesaid, he, the said Wirz, then and there did.

Of charge 1, "Guilty," after amending said charge to read as follows:

Maliciously, wilfully, and traitorously, and in the aid of the then existing armed rebellion against the United States of America, on or before the twenty-seventh day of March, A. D. 1864, and on divers other days between that day and the tenth day of April, 1865, combining, confederating, and conspiring, together with Jefferson Davis, James A. Seddon, Howell Cobb, John H. Winder, Richard B. Winder, Isaiah H. White, W. S. Winder, W. Shelby Reed, R. R. Stevenson, S. P. Moore, — Kerr, late hospital steward at Andersonville, James Duncan, Wesley W. Turner, Benjamin Harris, and others unknown, to injure the health and destroy the lives of soldiers in the military service of the United States, then held and being prisoners of war within the lines of the so-called Confederate States, and in the military prisons thereof, to the end that the armies of the United States might be weakened and impaired, in violation of the laws and customs of war.

Of specification 1 to charge 2, "Guilty," adding the words "or about" immediately before the phrase "the ninth day of July."

Of specification 2 to charge 2, "Guilty."

Of specification 3 to charge 2, "Guilty," after striking out "June" and inserting instead "September."

Of specification 4 to charge 2, "Not guilty."

Of specification 5 to charge 2, "Guilty," after striking out the phrase "on the thirtieth day," and inserting instead the phrase "on or about the twenty-fifth day."

Of specification 6 to charge 2, "Guilty," after striking out the word "first" and inserting "fifteenth," and also striking out the phrase "on the sixth day" and inserting instead the phrase "on or about the sixteenth day."

Of specification 7 to charge 2, "Guilty," after striking out the word "twentieth" and inserting instead the word "first," and also after inserting "or about" immediately before the phrase "the twenty-fifth day."

Of specification 8 to charge 2, "Guilty."

Of specification 9 to charge 2, "Guilty."

Of specification 10 to charge 2, "Not guilty."

Of specification 11 to charge 2, "Guilty," after striking out the word "first" and inserting instead the word "sixth;" after striking out also the phrase "incite and urge" and the phrase "encouragement and instigation," and by adding the words "or about" after the word "on" where it last occurs in the specification; and also after striking out the phrase "animals called bloodhounds" and inserting the word "dogs;" and also striking out the word "bloodhounds" where it afterwards occurs and insert the word "dogs;" and also striking out the words "given by him."

Of specification 12 to charge 2, "Guilty."

Of specification 13 to charge 2, "Not guilty."

Of the second charge, "Guilty."

And the court do therefore sentence him, the said Henry Wirz, to be hanged by the neck till he be dead, at such time and place as the President of the United States may direct, two-thirds of the members of the court concurring herein.

LEW. WALLACE,

*Major General and President of Commission.*

N. P. CHIPMAN,

*Colonel and A. A. D. C., Judge Advocate.*

And the court also find the prisoner, Henry Wirz, guilty of having caused, in a manner as alleged in specification 11 to charge 2, by means of dogs, the death of three prisoners of war in his custody and soldiers of the United States, one occurring on or about the fifteenth day of May, 1864; another occurring on or about the eleventh day of July, 1864; another occurring on or about the first day of September, 1864, but which finding, as here expressed, has not and did not enter into the sentence of the court as before given.

LEW. WALLACE,

*Major General and President of Commission.*

N. P. CHIPMAN,

*Colonel and A. A. D. C., Judge Advocate.*

It is not necessary, for the purposes of this review, to go into an elaborate discussion of the questions involved in the findings on the 1st charge. From the document of the proceedings, containing more than five thousand pages, presenting a mass of evidence bearing upon these questions, no brief summary can be made which would do justice to the subject. The argument of the judge advocate sets forth an able and exhaustive examination of the material legal points raised and proof established by the trial, and forms a part of the record. It may be relied on as giving a full and just exposition of the matters which entered into the deliberations of the court, and, as particularly applicable to this branch of the case, reference is respectfully invited to pages 4838 to 5148. The opinion is expressed that the conspiracy, as described in the findings above recited, was clearly made out, and that the conclusions arrived at by the court could not, in the light of the evidence this record contains, have been avoided.

Language fails in an attempt to denounce, even in faint terms, the diabolical combination for the destruction and death, by cruel and fiendishly ingenious processes, of helpless prisoners of war who might fall into their hands, which this record shows was plotted and deliberately entered upon, and, as far as time permitted, accomplished by the rebel authorities and their brutal underlings at Andersonville prison. Criminal history presents no parallel to this monstrous conspiracy, and from the whole catalogue of infamous devices within reach of human hands, a system for the murder of men more revolting in its details could not have been planned. Upon the heads of those named by the court in its finding the guilt of this immeasurable crime is fixed—a guilt so fearfully black and horrible that the civilized world must be appalled by the spectacle.

There remains yet to be noticed the matters involved in the "second" charge. The homicides alleged to have been committed under this charge, and which the court found were committed, are of four classes: *First*, those cases of death which resulted from the biting of dogs, (specification 11;) *Second*, cases of death which resulted from confinement in the stocks and chain gang, (specifications 5, 6, 7;) *Third*, cases of prisoners killed by guards, pursuant to direct orders of Wirz, given at the time, (specifications 8, 9, and 12;) and *Fourth*, cases of prisoners killed by Wirz's own hand, (specifications 1, 2, 3.)

That all the deaths embraced in these four classes resulted from the causes

and in the manner set forth in the specifications is conceived to be very clearly established by the evidence adduced by the prosecution, and it is not deemed necessary, in the absence of any contradictory testimony directly bearing on these instances, to recite the evidence applicable to each, except it may be, briefly, that relating to the fourth class (specifications 1, 2, 3) and some acts of a similar character.

The testimony supporting the first specification is that of Felix de la Baume, a Union soldier, who states that on or about the 8th of July, 1864, he was one of a detachment of prisoners taken to Wirz's headquarters to be enrolled before being sent into the prison; that one of his comrades was attacked with epilepsy, and some of his companions, by permission of the guard, ran to the creek for water; that he, the witness, heard a shot fired, and on turning, saw Wirz fire two more, wounding two prisoners, one of whom the witness never saw nor heard of afterwards, and the other of whom he saw carried up to Wirz's headquarters in a dying condition, the wound being in the breast.

There is also the testimony of George Conway, who states that on or about the 11th of July, 1864, he saw Wirz shoot a Union prisoner within the stockade as he was stooping to pick up his cup, which had fallen under the dead line, and that the man died almost instantly.

Which of these two cases (either being, it is conceived, sufficient to sustain the allegation) the court relied on does not certainly appear.

In support of the second specification, Martin E. Hogan testifies that some time in September, when the prisoners were being removed from Andersonville to Millen, he saw Wirz take a prisoner, who was worn out with hunger and disease, by the coat collar, and, because he could not walk faster, wrench him back and stamp upon him with his boots; that the man was borne past him (witness) bleeding from his mouth and nose, and died in a short time.

The third specification is supported by the testimony of George W. Gray, who states that about the middle of September, 1864, he and a comrade, named William Stewart, a private belonging to a Minnesota regiment, went out of the stockade in charge of a guard to carry a dead body, and that after laying it in the dead-house they were on their way back to the stockade, when Wirz rode up to them and asked "by what authority they were out there;" that Stewart replied they were out there by proper authority, whereupon Wirz drew his revolver and shot Stewart, the ball taking effect in his breast and killing him instantly; and that the guard then took from his body some twenty or thirty dollars, which Wirz received and rode away.

Further evidence in regard to Wirz killing certain prisoners was presented; but the dates given by the witnesses show the murders to have been other than those alleged in the specifications. They will be referred to as illustrating the character of the prisoner and establishing a frequency and repetition of like crimes.

James H. Davidson testified that in April, as he remembered, Wirz came into the stockade one day and a lame man went up to him and asked him a question, whereupon Wirz "turned around" and shot him, and he died.

Thomas C. Alcocke states that one day (the witness seems to have no knowledge or recollection of dates) Wirz came into the stockade and a man asked him permission to go out and get some fresh air; that Wirz asked him "what he meant," and that after a few more words had passed between them, Wirz "wheeled around," pulled out a revolver, and shot him down, the ball taking effect in his breast, and death occurring about three hours afterwards. It also appears by this witness that when he remonstrated Wirz told him he "had better look out" or he "would be put in the same place," and that soon after Wirz came in with a guard and put him in irons.

Hugh R. Snee testified that some time in September, 1864, a party of Union prisoners were to be exchanged under an arrangement between General Sher-

man and the rebel Hood; that they were taken from the stockade after dark, as the heat in the day was so great that the men would have fainted; that none but able-bodied men were selected, it being stated, when they were called out, that any one who could not walk eighteen miles a day would be shot; that notwithstanding this, the men were so anxious to escape imprisonment that some too weak to perform the day's travel came out. The witness states that three, who belonged to some western regiments, were able to go but a short distance before they fainted and fell out of the ranks, and were pushed one side by the guard; that thereupon a man ran back, and, speaking in a voice he thought at the time to be that of Captain Wirz, wanted to know why they were there; that they replied they wished to get out of prison; whereupon the man said, "I'll help you out, God damn you." Witness then heard six pistol-shots, followed by a "cry as if some one was hurt," and immediately after a rebel lieutenant came past, remarking "that it was a brutal act;" that "one of them was dead," and when asked who did it, replied "The captain."

The most prominent features of the defence, under this second charge, will now be considered.

An attempt was made to prove that, during the whole of August and parts of July and September, the prisoner was sick and confined to his bed, and could not have committed the crimes charged to him in those months. In his statement to the court, however, he made no reference to his absence—doubtless for the reason that the testimony was of too general and loose a character to set up as contradictory to the explicit statements of numerous witnesses as to the dates when the crimes recorded in the finding were committed—corroborated as those statements were by official papers bearing his signature, showing that at different times during those months he was in the performance of his ordinary functions as commandant of the prison.

It was claimed that deaths resulting from the use of dogs in the capture of escaped prisoners were not crimes fastened upon Wirz, he not being present at the pursuit, and therefore not responsible. But it appears to have been the fact that this use of dogs was under Wirz's special direction; that the pursuit of prisoners was, in many instances, initiated under his immediate orders, and in some cases captures were made under his personal supervision. It was also clearly proved that a part of each pack were ferocious dogs, dangerous to life, so as to make it probable that the men, on whose track they were sent would be killed. A man overtaken by these beasts, and desiring to surrender, could not, by coming to a stand, save his life; the instinct of the dogs was for human blood, and to surrender to them was death. A most shocking illustration will be given. Two soldiers had escaped, but were overtaken; the party who captured them returned with but one, (who was so mangled that he died,) and the chief of the party, known as Turner, exulted in accounting for the other, stating that they "allowed the dogs to tear him in pieces, and left him in the woods."

As applying to the question of criminal responsibility involved in this class of homicides, the judge advocate referred the court to the well-settled principle of law, that it is not essential that the hand of the party should be the immediate occasion of the death, but that if it be shown that means *were used likely to occasion death*, and which *did* so occasion it, the party using such means is to be held responsible for the consequences.

There is but one of this class of homicides which enters into the findings of "guilty" under this charge. A discussion of the legal points involved is conceived to be needless, inasmuch as the charge is sustained by a conviction on nine other distinct allegations of murder.

As to the deaths resulting from the use of stocks and chain-gangs, the defence urged that the men were placed therein for the purposes of discipline; that they were commonly used for such purposes, and that their use at this place

was attributable to those higher in authority than Wirz, to whose orders he was subject. Upon this point it is to be observed that prisoners were put in these instruments of torture as punishment for having escaped, or having made attempts to escape from their captors, which attempts, whether successful or not, it was their right and duty as prisoners of war to make. Any punishment inflicted upon them therefor by their captors was a violation of the laws of war, and deaths resulting from such unlawful punishment are murders. This would be the judgment of the law apart from some of the peculiar circumstances which surround these crimes, and which so decidedly indicate their true character, prominent among which is the often declared *animus* of the prisoner, showing conclusively that in these and kindred barbarities he was deliberately seeking to sacrifice the lives of his victims. It was shown that these stocks and chain-gangs were under Wirz's immediate and direct control; that he exercised full authority in committing prisoners to both. While it may be, and probably is, the fact that his action in this matter was sanctioned by the rebel Winder when he was on duty at that place, it does not relieve the prisoner of responsibility for the results.

In relation to the three homicides embraced in the third class, the prisoner makes no special defence, except as to the killing of the man known as Chickamauga. He urges in his final statement that his order to the guard to shoot this man was only intended as a menace. It is clear, however, from the testimony that this order in his case, as in the others, was peremptory; and, according to his own version, it was not a command that could be construed by any subordinate as merely a menace; moreover, it was distinctly proved to have been accompanied by a threat that he would shoot the guard if the guard did not shoot this crippled soldier. He states further, and it is so found by the record, that this poor man desired to be killed, it would seem, because he was suspected by his comrades of having given information to the prison-keeper of some attempts of prisoners to escape from the stockade. This fact, however, in no degree palliates his murderer's guilt.

Of the homicides embraced in the fourth class (those committed directly by his own hands) the prisoner's statement notices but one—that of Stewart, sworn to by the witness Gray. It is asserted that the testimony of this witness is a pure fabrication. But there is nothing found in the examination of the record which casts a doubt on his veracity, and the court seems to have discovered nothing in his manner on the stand to raise the question of his credibility.

As to all those cases not heretofore specially mentioned, the defence insists that the allegations were too vague and indefinite, and that the testimony is insufficient to sustain them, and also that it is altogether improbable that such murders could have been committed without coming to the knowledge of various witnesses who stated that they had never heard of such crimes at Andersonville. No evidence being submitted which contradicts the concurrent and explicit statements of the witnesses who gave positive testimony of their perpetration, these murders are fastened to Wirz's hands.

Many points were raised by both sides relating to the admission of evidence as the trial progressed. These were fully debated at the time. No discussion of them here is deemed necessary, it not being found that competent proof material to the prisoner's defence on the specific offences of which the court pronounced him guilty was excluded. Much latitude seems to have been given him. He was allowed to show special acts of kindness to prisoners, and to introduce declarations made by himself in explanation of his acts. Letters and official reports, and oral testimony of his personal efforts, offered as indicating his interest in and a care for the comfort of the prisoners, were also admitted. It is shown that every witness asked for by the defence was subpoenaed, except certain rebel functionaries, who, for reasons stated at the time, did not appear on the stand. But the judge advocate proposed that if the counsel for the de-

fence would set forth according to the common rule, by affidavit, *what* he expected and *had reason to believe* any witness who did not so appear *would* testify, it would be admitted of record that such witness would so testify. This proposition was not accepted. One hundred and six witnesses were subpoenaed for the defence, of whom sixty-eight reported; but thirty-nine of these, many of them soldiers of our army and sufferers at Andersonville, were discharged by the prisoner's counsel without being put upon the stand.

A review of the proceedings leads to the opinion that no prejudice to the legal rights of the prisoner can be successfully claimed to have resulted from any decision which excluded testimony he desired to introduce. The trial is believed to have been conducted in accordance with the regulations governing military courts, and the record presents no error which can be held to invalidate the proceedings.

The annals of our race present nowhere, and at no time, a darker field of crime than that of Andersonville, and it is fortunate for the interests alike of public justice and of historic truth that from this field the veil has been so faithfully and so completely lifted. All the horrors of this pandemonium of the rebellion are laid bare to us in the broad, steady light of the testimony of some hundred and fifty witnesses, who spoke what they had seen and heard and suffered, and whose evidence given under oath, and subjected to cross-examination and to every other test which human experience has devised for the ascertainment of truth, must be accepted as affording an immovable foundation for the sentence pronounced.

The proof under the second charge shows that some of our soldiers, for mere attempts to escape from their oppressors, were given to ferocious dogs to be torn in pieces; that others were confined in stocks and chains till life yielded to the torture; and that others were wantonly shot down at Wirz's bidding or by his own hand. Here in the presence of these pitiless murders of unarmed and helpless men, so distinctly alleged and proved, Justice might well claim the prisoner's life. There remain, however, to be contemplated crimes yet more revolting, for which he and his co-conspirators must be held responsible. The Andersonville prison records (made exhibits in this case) contain a roster of over thirteen thousand (13,000) dead—buried, naked, maimed and putrid, in one vast sepulchre. Of these, a surgeon of the rebel army, who was on duty at this prison, testifies that at least three-fourths died of the treatment inflicted on them while in confinement; and a surgeon of our own army, who was a prisoner there, states that four-fifths died from this cause. Under this proof, which has not been assailed, nearly ten thousand, if not more, of these deaths must be charged directly to the account of Wirz and his associates. This wide-spread sacrifice of life was not made suddenly, or under the influence of wild, ungovernable passion, but was accomplished slowly and deliberately by packing upwards of thirty thousand men, like cattle, in a fetid pen, a mere cesspool, there to die for need of air to breathe, for want of ground on which to lie, for lack of shelter from sun and rain, and from the slow agonizing process of starvation, when air and space, and shelter and food were all within the ready gift of their tormentors. This work of death seems to have been a saturnalia of enjoyment for the prisoner, who, amid these savage orgies, evinced such exultation, and mingled with them such nameless blasphemy and ribald jests as at times to exhibit him rather as a demon than a man. It was his continual boast that by these barbarities he was destroying more Union soldiers than rebel generals were butchering on the battle-field. He claimed to be doing the work of the rebellion, and faithfully, in all his murderous cruelty and baseness, did he represent its spirit. It is by looking upon the cemeteries which have been filled from Libby, Belle Isle, Salisbury, Florence, and Andersonville and other rebel prisons, and recalling the prolonged sufferings of the patriots who are sleeping there, that we can best understand the inner and

real life of the rebellion, and the hellish criminality and brutality of the traitors who maintained it. For such crimes human power is absolutely impotent to enforce any adequate atonement.

It may be added, in conclusion, that the court before which the prisoner was tried was composed of officers high in rank, and eminent for their faithful services and probity of character, and that several of them were distinguished for their legal attainments. The investigation of the case was conducted throughout with patience and impartiality, and the conclusion reached is one from which the overwhelming volume of testimony left no escape. It is recommended that the sentence be executed.

J. HOLT,  
*Judge Advocate General.*

The Secretary of War respectfully submits the report of the Judge Advocate General upon the case of Henry Wirz.

To the PRESIDENT.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
*November 3, 1865.*

The proceedings, finding, and sentence of the court in the within case are approved, and it is ordered that the sentence be carried into execution by the officer commanding the department of Washington on Friday, the tenth day November, 1865, between the hours of 6 o'clock a. m. and twelve o'clock noon.

ANDREW JOHNSON,  
*President of the United States.*

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REPORT OF GENERAL HITCHCOCK ON THE SUBJECT OF EXCHANGE.

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,  
*November 22, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following statement, as my general report for the current year, on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war; in doing which I find it necessary to revert to some facts of a precedent date in order that the subject may be the better understood.

At an early period of the rebellion, a cartel for the exchange of prisoners was agreed upon in conformity with the authority of the President, as communicated to General Dix by the Secretary of War in the following despatch, which contains on its face an important limitation, carefully guarding against any recognition of the rebel government, the object having expressly in view the humane purpose of extending relief to prisoners of war:

“WAR DEPARTMENT,  
“*Washington City, July 12, 1862.*

“The President directs me to say that he authorizes you to negotiate a general exchange of prisoners with the enemy.

“You will take immediate measures for that purpose, observing proper caution against any recognition of the rebel government, and confining the negotiation to the subject of exchange. The cartel between the United States and Great Britain has been considered a proper regulation as to the relative exchange value of prisoners.

“EDWIN M. STANTON,  
“*Secretary of War.*

“Major General JOHN A. DIX, *Fortress Monroe.*”

The agreement, signed by General Dix on the part of the government, and General Hill on the part of the rebels, was duly announced in public orders by authority dated War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, September 25, 1862, a copy of which is hereunto annexed.

So long as the cartel for the exchange of prisoners was respected in the south, it was faithfully observed by the government, and there is no doubt that its faithful execution would have been continued by the government until the end of the war, unless properly revoked by competent authority, if the rebel authorities had not most distinctly violated its terms, under circumstances, indeed, of great aggravation.

The first indication on the part of the rebels of a disposition to disregard the cartel became public through a message by Jefferson Davis to the rebel congress, in which, after alluding to the proclamation of the President announcing emancipation, he makes use of the following language:

"I shall, unless in your wisdom you deem some other course more expedient, deliver to the several State authorities all commissioned officers of the United States that may hereafter be captured by our forces in any of the States embraced in the proclamation, that they may be dealt with in accordance with the laws of those States providing for the punishment of criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection."

This announcement of Mr. Davis was made January 12, 1863, and received the modified approval of the rebel congress, as shown in the following sections of an act approved May 1, 1863, to wit:

"SEC. 4. That every white person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such, who, during the present war, shall command negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate States, or who shall arm, train, organize or prepare negroes or mulattoes for military service against the Confederate States, or who shall voluntarily aid negroes or mulattoes in any military enterprise, attack or conflict in such service, shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection, and shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court.

"SEC. 5. Every person, being a commissioned officer or acting as such in the service of the enemy, who shall, during the present war excite, attempt to excite, or cause to be excited, a servile insurrection, or who shall incite, or cause to be incited, a slave to rebel, shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court."

\* \* \* \* \*

"SEC. 7. All negroes and mulattoes who shall be engaged in war or be taken in arms against the Confederate States, or shall give aid or comfort to the enemies of the Confederate States, shall, when captured in the Confederate States, be delivered to the authorities of the State or States in which they shall be captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such State or States."

When the message just referred to became known to the President, he saw at once the necessity of meeting it, and gave instructions to retain such rebel officers as might be captured, in order to be in a position to check the rebel government and restrain the execution of its avowed purpose, in violation of the cartel.

This proceeding, initiated by the rebel government in violation of the cartel, ultimated in the cessation of exchanges, which, as the history of the matter shows, became unavoidable, and was entirely due to the rebel government.

Coincident with the proceedings with regard to the exchange of prisoners of war, the rebels inaugurated a system of seizing unoffending citizens of the United States, and subjecting them to maltreatment, in various ways, in order to effect a particular object, which became apparent when a demand was made

for their release. For this purpose quite a number of citizens of Pennsylvania were carried into captivity by General Lee, when he penetrated into that State in 1863.

When a demand was made for the release of this class of prisoners, it was met by a most positive declaration that no citizen prisoner in rebel hands should be released unless the government would enter into an agreement with the rebel authorities not to arrest any one on account of his opinions or on account of his sympathy with the rebel cause; and this declaration was repeated again and again by the rebel authorities whenever the government demanded the release or exchange of said citizen prisoners.

It will require but the slightest glance at this subject to convince any one of the utter impossibility of acquiescing in the demand of the rebel authorities, as a pre-requisite to the release of the citizens thus held in bondage. Such an agreement on the part of the United States would have been a virtual acknowledgment of the independence of the rebel government, and would have foreclosed all proceedings of the United States against all persons whomsoever engaged in the crime of treason and rebellion. It was absolutely impossible to acquiesce in the demand of the South on that point, and this is the reason why this class of prisoners was beyond the reach of the government, except through the power of its armies, which finally settled the entire question by putting an end to the rebellion itself.

At the commencement of the cessation of exchanges the rebels held a few prisoners of war over and above the number of rebels held by the government, but the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson threw the balance largely the other way; and, as the prisoners captured by General Grant and General Banks were left in the south on parole, the rebel authorities determined to make use of them, not merely in violation of the cartel, but in open contempt of the laws of war. They first ordered that body of men to be assembled at a place called Enterprise, in Mississippi; on pretence of facilitating measures for their supplies, but in reality with the distinct purpose, as we are now compelled to believe, of throwing them into the rebel ranks to meet the anticipated conflict which, it was seen, was near at hand in East Tennessee, and which accordingly took place at the memorable battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga; in which battles many of the captured prisoners paroled in the south by Generals Grant and Banks took part, without having been duly exchanged, although the rebel authorities made an ex parte declaration of exchange in their favor without proper authority, which was protested against by the United States.

It must be understood that the rebels might at any time have resumed the system of exchange agreed upon in the cartel by receding from the assumed right of disposing of captured Union officers as required in the act passed by the rebel Congress, before alluded to, and agreeing to the exchange of colored troops; but they would never agree to acknowledge the right of colored troops to treatment due to prisoners of war; and, as the government of the United States had exercised the right of employing colored troops as a part of the force against the rebels, their claim to such protection as the government could give was one which did not admit of discussion.

When the rebels discovered that the suspension of exchanges was operating against them, they resorted to the horrible expedient of subjecting the prisoners they held to starvation and exposure to the elements, without the protection of quarters or tents, after first robbing them of their money and most of their clothing, and without regard to seasons or their inclemencies, in the hope of forcing the government into a system of exchanges which should have the effect, not only of leaving in their hands all of the colored prisoners they had taken, but of throwing into their ranks the entire body of prisoners held by the federal power, then greatly in excess over the prisoners held by the rebels. This fact is proved by the declarations of the Richmond papers, at the time

when a few exchanges were made, that the rebel agent, Colonel Ould, had not sent over the lines the number of prisoners equivalent to those received, but only a proportionate number, the ratio being determined by Colonel Ould, in view of the number of prisoners held in the south against those held in the north—the claim to hold in reserve the colored prisoners in the south having never been abandoned. This fact was further established by the official records of the commissary general of prisoners, by which it appeared that, after sending several boat-loads of exchanged prisoners each way, the rebels were constantly falling in debt. Upon observing this fact, and noticing the publications in Richmond, I called upon the commissary general of prisoners for a tabular statement of the result, and the statement showed an indebtedness in our favor of over five hundred men; which statement was handed to the Secretary of War, who thereupon directed an order to General Grant to assume the entire control of the matter of exchanges, with authority to give such orders as he might think proper on the subject. General Grant at once reverted to first principles, and directed that Colonel Ould, or the rebel authorities, should be notified that colored troops should be treated as prisoners of war when captured; and, as the rebels were not willing to accede to this requirement, no further exchanges were made.

Upon the receipt at the War Department of the first intelligence of the inhuman treatment to which our prisoners were subjected at Richmond, the Secretary of War, without a moment's hesitation, gave instructions to our agent of exchange, at Fortress Monroe, to send forward supplies from the public stores for their relief, and large quantities of provisions and clothing were accordingly sent for distribution among the prisoners, and every possible effort was made to afford that sort of relief, even at the hazard of large portions of the supplies being wasted, or, what was worse, misappropriated to the benefit of our enemies, who, it soon appeared, made use of these supplies for their own advantage, leaving our prisoners still to suffer. But even this did not destroy the hope of the Secretary that some portion of the supplies would, at least, be permitted to reach its destination, and the orders to send that relief were left in force until the rebels themselves, shamed, perhaps, by the scandalous state of things, then likely to become historical, refused to receive any further supplies through the agents of the government.

In the mean time the sympathies of friends in the north were naturally awakened, and large quantities of supplies of all kinds were sent to Fortress Monroe, whence they were forwarded for the relief of the prisoners at Richmond; but the moment they passed beyond the control of our agents they fell into the hands of the most unprincipled and shameless scoundrels that ever disgraced humanity. It is in proof that large quantities of supplies furnished by the benevolence of the north for the relief of suffering humanity in southern prisons, were piled up in sight of the objects for whose relief those supplies were sent, but beyond the line of the prison guards; and while the prisoners were thus in sight of their own boxes, they were not only forbidden to touch them, but compelled to witness depredations upon them by the guards themselves, who feasted upon their contents, leaving the victims of war a prey to that merciless barbarism which will make one of the darkest pages in the history of a rebellion which will itself remain an astonishment to all posterity for its almost causeless existence.

Many have supposed that it was in the power of the government to afford relief to the prisoners in the south by a resort to retaliatory treatment of rebel prisoners in the north. It is difficult to meet a suggestion of this kind by an appeal to the instincts of civilized humanity, because the mere suggestion supposes the absence of those instincts, and implies a willingness to see the public sentiment degraded into barbarism, which would have put the nation itself on the footing of savages, whose only excuse for their barbarity is their ignorance and their exclusion from the civilized world. The day must come when every

true American will be proud of the reflection that the government was strong enough to crush the rebellion without losing the smallest element of its humanity or its dignity, and stands before the world unimpeached in its true honor and glory.

It may be observed that no one imagined, prospectively, the horrors which came to light at Andersonville, the full enormity of which only became known at the close of the military events which ended the war. Had they been known when at their worst, the government would have had the choice of but three measures: first, the rebel prisoners might have been sent south, we to receive in return such white prisoners as they might have held, leaving the colored troops to their fate; second, a resort to retaliatory measures; or, lastly, for the country to wage the war with increased zeal to bring it to a legitimate end. No man can doubt which of these plans the northern people would have approved, if submitted to them, and the government only assumed to represent the people in the question.

It ought to be mentioned here, as a beautiful illustration of the moral sublime, that among the many memorials, some of them very numerous signed, which reached the War Department, praying for relief to federal prisoners suffering in the south, in nearly all of them there was an express protest against a resort to retaliation. And what was the real effect of the barbarity upon the prisoners in the south? Certainly, it was most deplorable and shocking upon individuals for the time being; but no one whose moral eyes are open can fail to see that it became in many ways a signal step, under the guidance of Providence, for bringing the rebel cause to destruction. It strengthened the feeling in the north in favor of warlike and determined measures against rebellion; it sent thousands into the army who took the field resolutely determined to punish the authors of a great crime against humanity. The enemy might almost literally have felt that it is "a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

An erroneous opinion appears to have been circulated, more or less widely, with regard to the number of colored federal troops who fell into the hands of the enemy, which makes it important to state that the actual number thus exposed to injurious treatment was very much greater than has been commonly supposed. This will sufficiently appear from the fact that, on the 21st of January, 1865, Lieutenant O. O. Poppleton, adjutant of the 111th United States colored infantry, addressed a letter, dated at Nashville, Tennessee, to Major General Butler, in the following words, to wit:

"I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a Mobile paper (rebel) containing, over the signature of D. H. Maury, major general Confederate States army, the names of five hundred and sixty-nine (569) soldiers belonging to the 106th, 110th, and 111th regiments of United States colored infantry, who were taken prisoners by a force of the enemy, under Major General N. B. Forrest, at Athens and Sulphur Branch Trestle, Alabama, on the 24th and 25th of September, 1864, and placed at work on the defences of Mobile, Alabama, by order of the rebel authorities. Lieutenant William T. Lewis, adjutant 110th United States colored infantry, has a paper of later date than this, containing the names of nearly three hundred (300) more soldiers of the same command, also at work on the defences of Mobile."

This is an official report from the adjutant of the 111th regiment colored infantry, showing that there were then, in January, 1865, at work on the fortifications about Mobile five hundred and sixty-nine (569) colored soldiers belonging to three regiments only; and a reference is made to another paper as being at that time in the hands of another officer, an adjutant also of one of those regiments, embracing the names of "nearly three hundred (300) more soldiers of the same command," making in all over eight hundred (800) colored soldiers of the United States army at work, under rebel officers, on the fortifications around Mobile alone.

When the government determined to employ colored troops in its armies, the principle was recognized that they were entitled to protection; and, accordingly, it was claimed that the class of troops referred to should receive such treatment from the enemy as was due to other troops employed in the defence of the government. The assertion of this principle did not depend upon the number of colored troops who might at any one time be in the hands of the enemy. Every consideration of honor and humanity required the assertion of this principle as due to the troops employed in the service of the government; and, accordingly, in various communications, when the subject required it, the government agents connected with the duties of the exchange of prisoners invariably set forward the principle. But this did not prevent the exchange of prisoners, man for man and officer for officer. The difficulty on this subject was due, first, to the message of Mr. Davis to the rebel congress, already referred to, declaring his purpose to deliver to southern State authorities such white Union officers as might be captured, for trial under State laws unknown alike to the laws of Congress and to the laws of war; and, secondly, to the open contempt of the laws of war, as also stated above, in the fact that the rebel authorities released from the obligations of their parole a number of rebel prisoners, and placed them in their ranks without exchange.

During a brief period prior to the capture of Vicksburg, the rebels held more prisoners of war than the government; but after the date of that event the case was reversed, and from that time forward the government made every effort to obtain exchanges—man for man and officer for officer—but without avail, the rebel authorities persistently resisting applications for exchange unless the government would release all rebel prisoners, after they had openly violated the cartel themselves, claiming that the government should deliver to them all rebel prisoners, while they, on their part, declared their purpose of withholding from exchange such colored prisoners as they might have in their possession.

It is important to observe here, that while this controversy was pending we actually held, in prison depots in the north, about seventy thousand (70,000) prisoners of war, over and above which we had a just and valid claim for more than thirty thousand (30,000) men who had been captured and paroled in the south, chiefly at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and who had never been properly exchanged; making in all at least one hundred thousand (100,000) men whom the rebel authorities wished to draw from us in exchange for about forty thousand (40,000) of the white troops of the United States; the effect of which would have been to throw into the army of General Lee an effective force of about sixty or seventy thousand men, in fine health and able in all respects to be put immediately into the field against General Grant's army, or with which General Lee might have obtained a disposable force of some fifty or more thousand men for the purpose of entering the States of the north, and thereby possibly compelling General Grant to raise the siege of Richmond, or expose the northern States to devastation by the enemy.

It was the desire of the rebel agent of exchange to avoid making special exchanges, in the hope of drawing from us the whole of the rebel prisoners of war we held in return for inferior numbers held by the enemy. To accomplish that object, the rebel commissioner or agent of exchange not only declined to make exchanges on equal terms, in any considerable number, but refused to make special exchanges except under extraordinary influences brought to bear by the friends of interested parties; and, in repeated instances, the rebel agent took care to indorse, upon special applications, the express declaration that he neither made nor countenanced such applications.

In consequence of this state of things, and while there was a hope of effecting general exchanges, only a few applications of a special character were forwarded over the lines; but when it became apparent that a general exchange could not be effected, I received your instructions to forward all special applica-

tions for exchange, in order, as you explained the purpose at the time, to afford every possible opportunity to extend relief to as many individuals as might have the good fortune to secure southern influences for that object; and great numbers of such applications were sent over the lines, most of which, however, were never heard from afterwards.

Another fact I beg to state in connexion with this subject, as a further illustration of the efforts of the department to extend relief to federal officers and soldiers imprisoned south, to wit: The rebel authorities resorted to the system of placing individuals in close confinement, in alleged retaliation for what on our side was but the legitimate operation of the laws of war in the punishment of spies and other offenders against those laws. In the endeavor to afford relief in a particular case of this kind, the rebel agent seized the opportunity of proposing the mutual release and exchange of all prisoners in close confinement, although at that time we had no rebel prisoners thus confined except by due course of law. This proposition was manifestly unfair, and a recovered letter from the rebel agent has shown that he knew it was so. Nevertheless, the proposition was accepted by your orders; and although it effected the release of some criminals belonging to the rebel army, it carried relief to a number of federal officers and soldiers in the south who thus obtained liberation: the concession on your part having had in view the relief it promised, and, to some extent, effected, in favor of a few of our officers and soldiers.

The recovered letter alluded to was dated at City Point, March 17, 1863, and addressed to Brigadier General Winder, in the following words:

“SIR: A flag-of-truce boat has arrived with 350 political prisoners, General Barrow and several other prominent men amongst them. I wish you to send me, at four o'clock, Wednesday morning, all the military prisoners (except officers) and all the political prisoners you have. If any of the political prisoners have *on hand proof enough to convict them* of being spies or of having committed other offences which should subject them to punishment, so state opposite their names. Also, state whether you think, under all circumstances, they should be released. *The arrangement I have made works largely in our favor.* We get rid of a set of miserable wretches, and receive some of the best material I ever saw. Tell Captain Turner to put down on the list of political prisoners the names of Edward G. Egging and Eugenia Harmmermister. The President is anxious they should get off. They are here now. This, of course, is between ourselves. If you have any female political prisoner whom you can send off safely to keep her company, I would like you to send her. Two hundred and odd more political prisoners are on their way. I would be more full in my communication if I had time.

“Yours truly,

“ROBERT OULD, *Agent of Exchange.*”

It should be noticed in this report that when the subject of exchange became embarrassing, because of the unwillingness of the enemy to exchange man for man, he demanding all of the rebel prisoners we held in exchange for the white prisoners held by him, Major General Halleck, by the direction of the Secretary of War, made an effort to obtain exchanges on equal terms. For this purpose he sent a flag of truce to General Lee, then in force on the Rapidan, and proposed that species of exchange. But General Lee declined to act upon the proposition, and answered, evidently in accordance with instructions from Richmond, that the subject of exchange was in the hands of a commissioner, and he preferred to have nothing to do with it.

As a further effort to obtain this class of exchanges, the Secretary authorized various commanders, distant from Washington, to open communications with the enemy, and to effect exchanges whenever they could be made on equal terms. In the midst of these difficulties I was painfully impressed with

the impossibility of effecting exchanges on equal terms with Judge Ould; and having understood that General Butler was of the opinion that, if empowered to do so, he could make exchanges, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War and proposed to withdraw from the position of commissioner of exchange in favor of any officer who could accomplish so desirable a result; upon which, however, the Secretary did not see fit to make an order. A few days after this I was sent for from the War Office, where I found the Secretary in conversation with General Halleck on the subject of exchanges. The Secretary then informed me that General Butler had expressed the opinion above stated, and that several members of Congress had expressed a similar opinion with regard to General Butler's ability to effect exchanges, if empowered to do so. I at once said to the Secretary, "If General Butler is of opinion that he can make exchanges, I think, sir, you had better let him try." He then said that it was his wish that I should go to Fortress Monroe and confer upon General Butler the requisite power by his authority; and he thereupon wrote, in the presence of General Halleck and myself, the following order:

"WAR DEPARTMENT,  
"Washington, December 16, 1863.

"Major General HITCHCOCK, *Commissioner of Exchange of Prisoners*:

"GENERAL: You will proceed immediately to Fortress Monroe, and take any measures that may be practicable for the release, exchange, or relief of United States officers and soldiers held as prisoners by the rebels.

"You are authorized and directed to confer with Major General Butler on the subject, and may authorize him, as special agent, commissioner, or otherwise, to procure their release or exchange upon any just terms not conflicting with principles on which the department has heretofore acted in reference to the exchange of colored troops and their officers, and not surrendering to the rebels any prisoners without just equivalents. You may, if you deem it proper, relieve General Meredith, and direct him to report to the Adjutant General for orders.

"Yours truly,

"EDWIN M. STANTON,  
"Secretary of War."

Within half an hour after the writing of the above order I was on my way to Fortress Monroe, and on the morning of the 17th of December I reported to General Butler. After stating the limitations under which he would be authorized to make exchanges, I requested him to prepare instructions for himself, giving him the authority he desired, in accordance with the orders of the Secretary, stating that, when ready, I would sign them in the name of or with the authority of the Secretary. In two or three hours thereafter I called again upon General Butler, and made the instructions he had prepared official. They contained the following paragraphs:

"You are hereby instructed not to make any exchange which shall not return to you man for man, officer for officer, of equal rank with those paroled and sent forward by yourself, regarding, of course, for motives of humanity, in the earlier exchanges, those officers and men on either side who have been the longest confined.

"Colored troops and their officers will be put upon an equality in making exchanges, as of right, with other troops.

"You are permitted, in conducting the exchange, to waive for the present the consideration of the questions of parole and excess now pending between the confederate belligerent authorities and this government, leaving them untouched as they stand until further interchange of views between those authorities and yourself."

The above instructions to General Butler will show precisely the *animus* of the Secretary of War on the subject of exchanges. He was perfectly willing and anxious to make exchanges, man for man, officer for officer, and gave, as must be seen, the fullest power to General Butler to effect those exchanges. General Butler, in his conversation with me, expressed no desire to have any other instructions or powers committed to him, and appeared to be very confident of his ability to accomplish the desired result, giving me, in detail, many reasons for that confidence. I returned to the city of Washington, and within a few days the public prints announced General Butler's first attempt to make exchanges and the result. General Butler sent a boat-load of prisoners under a flag of truce to City Point, where they were offered for a like number of federal troops. It appears that, when this was reported to the rebel government, violent indignation was expressed by the rebel authorities, on the alleged ground that General Butler was an outlaw by the proclamation of Mr. Davis, and that it was an insult to employ him to accomplish any result requiring any sort of intercourse between him and the rebel authorities; but it was concluded that, inasmuch as a certain number of their troops were actually within their lines as returned prisoners of war, they should be received, and a like number of federal prisoners should be exchanged for them; but notice was given to our agent that no more prisoners would be received in that manner, and it was reported at the time that General Butler was informed that a flag of truce even should not protect him within the rebel lines.

When this was reported in Washington, the President himself, in the presence of the Secretary of War, declined to give any order on the subject, unwilling to concede to the rebels the right to dictate what agents this government should employ in its public business; but it was plain to be seen that the real object of the rebel authorities was to avoid making equal exchanges of man for man and officer for officer, their purpose being to deliver to us, as before stated, only a proportionate number of prisoners held by them as against those held by us; and because General Butler's instructions required the exchange of man for man, made the employment of General Butler in the business of exchange a pretext for refusing those equal exchanges. This was evident, because, in point of fact, General Butler did not personally appear in the business—that is, he did not accompany the flag of truce—and, if there had been any disposition on the part of the rebels to make equal exchanges, they knew those exchanges would be made through the agency of another officer, and not personally by General Butler; and thus the real purpose of the rebels becomes manifest, their object being to draw from us all of their own troops in our hands, giving us in exchange only such white troops of the federal forces as they might hold.

After this experiment by General Butler, matters remained in suspense for some time, no exchanges being made.

At length two federal officers, who had escaped from rebel prisons, gave me their opinion, in this city, that if we would send to City Point, for exchange, a body of three, four, or five hundred rebel officers, demanding a like number in return, the feeling in the south, they believed, would be such that the rebel authorities would not dare to refuse the exchange; and if that succeeded, they would not dare thereafter to refuse to exchange private soldiers. I thought very well of this suggestion, and addressed a note to the Secretary of War, communicating it, and recommending its trial. The Secretary at once accepted the suggestion, and directed General Canby, then on duty in the War Office, to require General Butler to make that trial. But General Butler thought proper to send a mixed boat-load of officers and men.

Here, then, was another effort to make exchanges on equal terms. The enemy accepted the prisoners sent over the lines, but did not return a like number. This fact was publicly stated by the newspapers at Richmond, and was con-

firmed by official reports received at the office of General Hoffman, the commissary general of prisoners, after several boat-loads had passed. When the purpose of the rebel commissioner became apparent, not to make exchanges man for man, but only in proportionate numbers, the fact, with the evidence for it, was submitted to the Secretary of War, and then it was, as stated above, that General Grant was instructed to take the subject under his own supervision, with the result already alluded to.

After General Butler took charge of the duties in connexion with the exchange of prisoners, I was not officially advised of his proceedings, because, he being of senior rank to myself, made no reports to me; but in August, 1864, there was published in the journals of the day a letter, over the signature of General Butler, of the highest importance in connexion with this subject. No official copy was furnished to me, and I have never seen the letter of Judge Ould to which it refers, the authenticity of which, however, is sufficiently vouched in the letter of General Butler, which commences, addressed to Judge Ould, in these words:

“SIR: Your note to Major Mulford, assistant agent of exchange, under date of the 10th of August, has been referred to me. You therein state that Major Mulford *has several times proposed to exchange prisoners respectively held by the two belligerents, officer for officer and man for man; and that the offer has also been made by other officials having charge of matters connected with the exchange of prisoners, and that this proposal has been heretofore declined by the confederate authorities.* That you now consent to the above proposition, and agree to deliver to you (Major Mulford) the prisoners held in captivity by the confederate authorities, provided you agree to deliver an equal number of officers and men.”

This letter, cited by General Butler from Colonel Ould, shows, conclusively, by whom the proposition for an equal exchange was originally made. It shows, also, that it had been *repeatedly* made by the government, and had been as repeatedly refused by the rebel authorities.

The matter had been placed in General Butler's hands, and he answered Judge Ould's letter, asking some preliminary explanations, which I believe were never made, and the opportunity of a final action upon Judge Ould's letter was thus cut off by himself.

The reasons which induced General Butler's action may no doubt be seen, in part at least, in the letter he addressed to Judge Ould, which was published in the journals of the day. I have never heard that the matter was referred to the Secretary of War, and have never understood that he gave any order in the premises.

We learn from General Butler's letter that Judge Ould did not reach his conclusion in reference to Major Mulford's proposition until a period of eight months had elapsed.

It is impossible to approach the subject of this report without being solemnly impressed by a sense of the horrors inflicted upon the prisoners of war in the south; but, in making the report, I have felt imperatively called upon to confine myself to facts connected immediately with the subject of exchanges, leaving inferences to be drawn by others. I attach hereto such official letters and telegraphic despatches as have either originated in my office or have reached me, as may throw light upon the subject of this report.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. A. HITCHCOCK,

*Major Gen. Vols., Commissioner for Exchange of Prisoners.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

*Telegrams and letters accompanying the report of General Hitchcock on the subject of exchanges.*

[General Orders, No. 142.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, September 25, 1862.

The following is the cartel under which prisoners are exchanged in the existing war with the southern States:

HAXALL'S LANDING ON JAMES RIVER, VA., July 22, 1862.

The undersigned, having been commissioned by the authorities they respectively represent to make arrangements for a general exchange of prisoners of war, have agreed to the following articles:

**ARTICLE 1.** It is hereby agreed and stipulated that all prisoners of war held by either party, including those taken on private armed vessels known as privateers, shall be discharged upon the conditions and terms following:

Prisoners to be exchanged man for man and officer for officer; privateers to be placed upon the footing of officers and men of the navy.

Men and officers of lower grades may be exchanged for officers of a higher grade, and men and officers of different services may be exchanged according to the following scale of equivalents:

A general commanding in chief or an admiral shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or for sixty privates or common seamen.

A flag officer or major general shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or for forty privates or common seamen.

A commodore carrying a broad pennant or a brigadier general shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or twenty privates or common seamen.

A captain in the navy or a colonel shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or for fifteen privates or common seamen.

A lieutenant colonel or a commander in the navy shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or for ten privates or common seamen.

A lieutenant commander or a major shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or for eight privates or common seamen.

A lieutenant or a master in the navy or a captain in the army or marines shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or six privates or common seamen.

Master's mates in the navy or lieutenants and ensigns in the army shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or four privates or common seamen.

Midshipmen, warrant officers in the navy, masters of merchant vessels, commanders of privateers, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or three privates or common seamen.

Second captains, lieutenants, or mates, of merchant vessels or privateers, and all petty officers in the navy and all non-commissioned officers in the army or marines, shall be severally exchanged for persons of equal rank or for two privates or common seamen; and private soldiers or common seamen shall be exchanged for each other man for man.

**ARTICLE 2.** Local, State, civil, and militia rank held by persons not in actual military service will not be recognized, the basis of exchange being the grade actually held in the naval and military service of the respective parties.

**ARTICLE 3.** If citizens held by either party on charges of disloyalty or any alleged civil offence are exchanged, it shall only be for citizens. Captured sutlers, teamsters, and all civilians in the actual service of either party, to be exchanged for persons in similar position.

**ARTICLE 4.** All prisoners of war to be discharged on parole in ten days after their capture and the prisoners now held and those hereafter taken to be transported to the points mutually agreed upon, at the expense of the capturing party. The surplus prisoners not exchanged shall not be permitted to take up arms again, nor to serve as military police or constabulary force in any fort, garrison, or field-work held by either of the respective parties, nor as guards of prisons, depots, or stores, nor to discharge any duty usually performed by soldiers, until exchanged under the provisions of this cartel. The exchange is not to be considered complete until the officer or soldier exchanged for has been actually restored to the lines to which he belongs.

**ARTICLE 5.** Each party, upon the discharge of prisoners of the other party, is authorized to discharge an equal number of their own officers and men from parole, furnishing at the same time to the other party a list of their prisoners discharged and of their own officers and men relieved from parole; thus enabling each party to relieve from parole such of their own officers and men as the party may choose. The lists thus mutually furnished will keep both parties advised of the true condition of the exchange of prisoners.

**ARTICLE 6.** The stipulations and provisions above mentioned to be of binding obligation during the continuance of the war, it matters not which party may have the surplus of prisoners, the great principles involved being, 1st. An equitable exchange of prisoners, man for man, officer for officer, or officers of higher grade exchanged for officers of lower grade, or for privates according to the scale of equivalents; 2d. That privateers and officers and men of different services may be exchanged according to the same scale of equivalents; 3d. That all prisoners, of whatever arm of service, are to be exchanged or paroled in ten days from

the time of their capture, if it be practicable to transfer them to their own lines in that time; if not, as soon thereafter as practicable; 4th. That no officer, soldier, or employé in the service of either party is to be considered as exchanged and absolved from his parole until his equivalent has actually reached the lines of his friends; 5th. That the parole forbids the performance of field, garrison, police, or guard, or constabulary duty.

JOHN A. DIX,  
*Major General.*  
D. H. HILL,  
*Major General C. S. A.*

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES.

ARTICLE 7. All prisoners of war now held on either side, and all prisoners hereafter taken, shall be sent with all reasonable despatch to A. M. Aikens's, below Dutch Gap, on the James river, Virginia, or to Vicksburg, on the Mississippi river, in the State of Mississippi, and there exchanged or paroled until such exchange can be effected, notice being previously given by each party of the number of prisoners it will send, and the time when they will be delivered at those points respectively; and in case the vicissitudes of war shall change the military relations of the places designated in this article to the contending parties so as to render the same inconvenient for the delivery and exchange of prisoners, other places, bearing as nearly as may be the present local relations of said places to the lines of said parties, shall be by mutual agreement substituted. But nothing in this article contained shall prevent the commanders of two opposing armies from exchanging prisoners or releasing them on parole at other points mutually agreed on by said commanders.

ARTICLE 8. For the purpose of carrying into effect the foregoing articles of agreement, each party will appoint two agents, to be called agents for the exchange of prisoners of war, whose duty it shall be to communicate with each other, by correspondence or otherwise, to prepare the lists of prisoners, to attend to the delivery of the prisoners at the places agreed on, and to carry out promptly, effectually, and in good faith all the details and provisions of the said articles of agreement.

ARTICLE 9. And in case any misunderstanding shall arise in regard to any clause or stipulation in the foregoing articles, it is mutually agreed that such misunderstanding shall not interrupt the release of prisoners on parole, as herein provided, but shall be made the subject of friendly explanations, in order that the object of this agreement may neither be defeated nor postponed.

JOHN A. DIX,  
*Major General.*  
D. H. HILL,  
*Major General C. S. A.*

By order of the Secretary of War:

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant General.*

[Telegrams.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, April 21, 1862.*

Major General JOHN E. WOOL, *Commanding at Fortress Monroe*:

The President cordially approves your response to Colonel Huger in respect to the exchange of prisoners. I would be very glad to effect an exchange for Colonels Corcoran and Wilcox as soon as it can properly be done, and also to have all the rest at Richmond exchanged.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, June 18, 1862.*

Major General McCLELLAN:

The Adjutant General has just submitted to me your telegram addressed to him and dated the thirteenth instant, respecting the exchange of prisoners. This subject has for several months been under the direction of General Wool, who had several negotiations with Howell Cobb and General Huger. The last arrangement made was broken off, by the rebel authorities denying Huger's authority to make the arrangement for Corcoran's exchange. It is believed that their real reason for breaking off was to obtain an arrangement that would secure the release of General Buckner. The President has for some days been considering the question of agreeing to a general exchange, but has not yet decided, because strong opposition is manifested to the exchange of Buckner. I have ordered the Adjutant General to send you

immediately, by mail, a copy of the correspondence between General Wool and General Huger, which will enable you fully to understand the question in dispute when General Wool left Fortress Monroe.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, July 8, 1862.*

Major General DIX, *Fortress Monroe* :

General McClellan shortly before the late battles made an arrangement for the exchange of prisoners taken on either side by the forces before Richmond. It is the desire of this department to carry the arrangement into effect. I wish you would communicate with him. I also, with the consent of the President, whom you will consult, authorize you to negotiate for a general exchange of all prisoners taken and held or paroled on both sides—the exchange to be on the principles of the cartel between the United States and Great Britain in the last war with that power.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, July 14, 1862.*

Major General JOHN A. DIX :

If there should be any failure or delay to effect a general exchange, I would be very glad to have you arrange the exchange of Colonel John Kenly, 1st Maryland, for Colonel C. A. Sugg, 50th Tennessee, if it can possibly be done.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, July 14, 1862.*

Major General DIX, *Fort Monroe* :

Some place convenient to Fortress Monroe, as City Point, or such other as you may designate, can be fixed for the exchange of prisoners in the east.

Vicksburg or some adjacent point for exchange in the west.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, July 16, 1862.*

Major General DIX, *Fort Monroe* :

You will please procure all the information you can respecting the names and condition of our prisoners held by the rebels, and make report to this department after your interview with General Hill.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, July 25, 1862.*

Major General DIX, *Fortress Monroe* :

You and Major General Franklin have been appointed our agents for the exchange of prisoners. The agents appointed by the rebels will be at Aiken at twelve meridian to-morrow where you will please meet them. Advise General McClellan whether you will be present or not.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, July 25, 1862.

Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN :

Major General Dix and Major General Franklin are appointed our agents for the exchange of prisoners. If either of them cannot attend, you may name some one to take his place. General Dix has been notified of time and place of meeting.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, July 25, 1862.

Major General DIX, *Fortress Monroe* :

The rolls of prisoners held by us are not on file in this department. They have been ordered to be made out with all despatch. The number of prisoners of war held by us is reported to be over twenty thousand. The rolls will be ready in as brief a time as possible. I have named you and General Franklin as our agents of exchange. The commissary general of prisoners thinks he can have the rolls in five days. They will be transmitted to you as soon as possible.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, July 25, 1862—6.50 p. m.

Major General DIX, *Fortress Monroe* :

A despatch from General McClellan states that the agent for exchange of prisoners on the part of the confederates is to be at Aiken's to-morrow at twelve o'clock. I think you had better go up and explain why our rolls of prisoners are not ready, and that they will be furnished and the prisoners sent on immediately. General McClellan can then appoint General Franklin or some one else to act as agent, and General Halleck designate an agent at Vicksburg. It is important there should be no misunderstanding, and you can prevent it better than any one else. Your visit to Point Lookout appears to be of minor importance than this.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, July 29, 1862.

Major General DIX, *Fortress Monroe* :

Adjutant General Thomas will take the prisoners to be exchanged from Fort Delaware stopping at Fortress Monroe. He will consult with you respecting the course to be taken with the prisoners referred to in your telegram.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, March 29, 1863.

Colonel LUDLOW, *Fortress Monroe, Virginia* :

General Burnside reports that the seventy-first Indiana, about seven hundred strong, are at Camp Morton awaiting exchange. Please say whether they have or have not been exchanged, and if not, procure their exchange as speedily as possible.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, March 29, 1863.

Colonel LUDLOW, *Fortress Monroe* :

The seventy-first Indiana was captured on the twenty-eighth of December last at Muldraugh's Hill, Kentucky. Please get them exchanged as soon as possible.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, April 10, 1863.

Colonel W. H. LUDLOW, *Fort Monroe, Virginia* :

Make the exchanges indicated in your telegram of this morning. Ask Mr. Ould for information concerning a report of thirteen United States officers, said to be confined at Atlanta, Georgia, including Lieutenant Colonel Hopeman and Major Weidner. They were taken at Hartsville, Tennessee, December 7. Report specially the result.

E. A. HITCHCOCK,  
*Major General Volunteers, Commanding, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, 7TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Fort Monroe, June 24, 1863.*

COLONEL: I enclose to you for your information copies of correspondence in relation to exchange of citizen prisoners, and which some time ago were submitted to the Secretary of War, and has his approval.

You will see how impracticable at present exchanges of citizens are, and how little hope there is of any speedy removal of obstacles. The only prospect I can now see of such removal is a pressure upon the confederate authorities by the friends of the citizen prisoners *we hold*.

It required six months' hard labor for me to succeed in effecting the previous exchanges or releases of our citizens held by the confederates.

I would recommend that you send here no more confederate citizens until I inform you of some prospects of obtaining equivalents for them.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. LUDLOW,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Agent for Exchange of Prisoners.*

Colonel Wm. HOFFMAN, *Commissary General of Prisoners.*

I send also copies of correspondence in relation to threatened retaliation on officers, which has also received the approval of the Secretary of War.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Richmond, Virginia, May 22, 1863.*

SIR: In several of your late communications you have appealed to me for the release of political prisoners held by us. I am ready to deliver every one of them when you do the same charity. Until then not one of them shall be released except at our own pleasure. You asked in a late communication for the release of the sheriff of Bourbon county. Are you aware that you now hold some half dozen or more harmless and inoffensive old men as hostages, whom you do not even pretend to release, and yet ask the sheriff's deliverance? You have now thousands of helpless non-combatants in your prisons, not arrested as dangerous persons to your armies, but incarcerated because it is supposed they are loyal to their own country.

Their number is increasing every day. *I will listen to no proposition for the release of non-combatants that is not based upon the delivery of all whom you have in custody, coupled with some distinct written understanding as to future conduct in respect to such captures.* If this is not agreeable let God save the right. I hope there will be no further mistake between us in regard to this matter. I trust I have made myself sufficiently distinct.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. OULD, *Agent of Exchange.*

Lieutenant Colonel Wm. H. LUDLOW, *Agent of Exchange.*

NOTE.—The passage underscored in this letter refers to a claim on the part of the rebels that the government should not only release all non-combatants held as prisoners on account of the war, but should enter into an agreement to make no more arrests of that character; the effect of which would have been to relieve all citizens engaged in treason and rebellion from all proceedings, as if no treason had been or could be committed.

E. A. HITCHCOCK,  
*Commissioner of Exchange*

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Richmond, Virginia, May 22, 1863.*

SIR: I perceive by the northern papers that Captains McGrow and Corbin were shot to death with musketry on Friday, the 15th instant, at or near Sandusky, Ohio.

These were the cases which I brought to your attention when last I saw you. These men were duly authorized to recruit within the limits of Kentucky. They were tried by a court-

martial up on the charge of recruiting within your lines. They were sentenced to be shot, and that sentence was approved by General Burnside and President Lincoln. The confederate government has ordered that two captains now in our custody shall be selected for execution in retaliation for this gross barbarity. The order will be speedily executed. Your papers refer to other cases of parties condemned to death upon the same charge, they are some five or six in number. In view of the awful vortex into which things are plunging, I give you notice that in the event of the execution of these persons, retaliations to an equal extent at least will be visited upon your own officers, and if that is found ineffectual, the number will be increased. The Great Ruler of nations must judge who is responsible for the initiation of this chapter of horrors.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. OULD,  
*Agent of Exchange.*

Lieutenant Colonel WM. H. LUDLOW, *Agent of Exchange.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, 7TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Fort Monroe, May 25, 1863.*

SIR: In reply to your communication of the 22<sup>d</sup> in relation to citizen prisoners, I have to state that I have demanded them, and not as you informed me "appealed to you for them;" you probably, however, mean the same thing. I have demanded them because I have delivered to you their equivalents with the understanding that you were to release them. I bring to your mind the cases of Lewis and Scully; you distinctly and without reservation told me that these men should be delivered on the day following the delivery to you of a large number of your citizen prisoners. Their names were especially mentioned, and I have not yet received them. I shall deliver to you no more political or citizen prisoners except at our own pleasure, and *no such agreement or understanding as you propose will be for a moment entertained.*

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. LUDLOW,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Agent for Exchange of Prisoners.*

Hon. ROBERT OULD,  
*Agent for Exchange of Prisoners.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, 7TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Fort Monroe, Va., May 25, 1863.*

SIR: Captains McGrow and Corbin were executed upon conviction of being spies. They were also guilty of recruiting within our lines. Without waiting to know the facts or evidence in these cases, for you have admitted that you were acting on mere general newspaper statements, which give neither facts nor evidence, orders have been given, as you inform me, that two of our officers now in your custody are to be selected for execution in retaliation for what you term "gross barbarity," and that the order will be speedily executed. I give you formal notice that for each officer so executed one of your officers in our hands will be immediately put to death, and if this number be not sufficient it will be increased. The United States government has been most lenient in their treatment of prisoners who have fallen into their hands. This leniency has been abused, and by your own admissions your officers and men have come within our lines for the purpose ostensibly of recruiting, but really as spies. They have been taken in citizens' dress, under all the circumstances clearly surrounding the character of a spy, and in accepting such service they have taken upon themselves all its responsibility and the consequences of capture, and yet you propose to select brave and honorable officers who have been captured in fair and open fight on the battle-field and barbarously put them to death in retaliation for the just punishment of spies.

I call to your mind, among numerous other instances the barbarous execution of the brave men, who, under orders of General Mitchell, captured a locomotive and train and penetrated with it into the interior of Georgia, for the sole purpose, as was and is well known, of destroying the railroad communications. They were executed as spies, and yet the United States government has not retaliated for this act.

Were I in your place, I should hardly dare to invoke the judgment of the Great Ruler of nations upon the responsibility for the initiation of this what you most properly term chapter of horrors.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. LUDLOW,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Agent for Exchange of Prisoners.*

Hon. ROBERT OULD,  
*Agent for Exchange of Prisoners.*

[Telegram.—Sent 4.45 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, June 29, 1865.*

Colonel LUDLOW, *Commissioner of Exchange, Fortress Monroe:*

You will exert yourself to procure the release of Richardson and Browne, Tribune reporters, captured at Vicksburg. Browne's health is said to be failing. If they are held as hostages, or for any special reason, ascertain and report it.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., *February 5, 1864.*

SIR: A. D. Richardson and Julius Browne, correspondents of the New York Tribune, are said to be prisoners in Richmond. I am induced to believe that we have some prisoners at Nashville available for their exchange.

Will you be so good as to inform me whether you can accomplish the release of the Tribune correspondents, and what you desire may be done for that object?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. A. HITCHCOCK,

*Major General U. S. Vols., Comm'r for Exchange of Prisoners.*

Major General B. F. BUTLER,

*Commanding, &c., Fort Monroe.*

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER FOR EXCHANGE,  
*Fort Monroe, Va., February 9, 1864.*

SIR: Your communication of the 3d instant was received. I shall make an effort to negotiate an exchange of the New York Tribune correspondents with the rebel authorities by the next flag-of-truce boat.

I have the honor, general, to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,

*Major General and Commissioner for Exchange.*

Major General E. A. HITCHCOCK,

*Commissioner for Exchange, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA,  
OFFICE COMMISSIONER FOR EXCHANGE,  
*Fort Monroe, Va., April 4, 1864.*

SIR: Your communication in regard to James M. Brown, newspaper correspondent, has been received.

Application will be made to Commissioner Ould to procure his exchange.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,

*Major General and Commissioner for Exchange.*

Colonel W. HOFFMAN,

*Commissary General of Prisoners, Washington, D. C.*

NOTE.—This was in answer to a renewed effort to effect a release in this case.

E. A. H., *Commissioner of Exchange.*

[Telegram.—Sent 4.2 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, November 11, 1863.*

Brigadier General MEREDITH, *Fortress Monroe:*

You are authorized to transmit any funds that may be furnished to you for the use of our prisoners in Richmond, taking a receipt from the person to whom you deliver them for transmission, and sending a copy thereof to this department.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

*Secretary of War.*

[Telegram.—Sent 6 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, November 11, 1863.*C. C. FULTON, Esq., *Baltimore, Maryland :*

General Meredith has been instructed to transmit any funds that may be supplied for the use of our prisoners in Richmond. The government cannot, of course, be responsible that they will reach their destination. Those who send funds must run that risk.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

[Telegram.—Sent 11.30 a. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, December 2, 1863.*Brigadier General MEREDITH, *Fortress Monroe, Virginia :*

Yesterday I directed General Hitchcock to ascertain from you, first, whether supplies furnished by this government for our prisoners at Richmond were received and forwarded by the rebel agent; and, second, whether supplies furnished by State agents would be received by the rebel agents and forwarded. No answer has been received to these inquiries. You will please immediately make a direct answer to both questions.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, February 10, 1864.*

I do not think it expedient to send a flag-of-truce boat, with women and children, nor to give advertisement in Baltimore, Washington, and elsewhere, at present, as you propose to do. If there be any residents of Norfolk whom you want to send away for cause you are authorized to do so, but not to put other persons across the lines.

Your proposed declaration of the exchange is, in the opinion of this department, irregular, and ought not to be made, because it would be seized upon as a justification of the irregular and improper course pursued by the rebels; and besides, from its indefiniteness, would not afford protection to our own troops, and would lead to serious embarrassment in the final arrangement of exchange, if one can be made. The reasons for this opinion are more particularly set forth in the reply furnished to you by Major General Hitchcock upon this subject. I think that, upon consideration of that report, you will yourself be satisfied that the proposed declaration of exchange is premature, and would afford serious advantages to the rebels in the present controversy.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*Major General B. F. BUTLER, *Fortress Monroe, Virginia.*

True copy :

A. E. H. JOHNSON,

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, February 14, 1864.*

Yesterday's Intelligencer contains an account of a recent interview between Mr. Fulton, of the Baltimore American, and Commissioner Ould, at City Point, in which the latter stated that, with a view of ameliorating the condition of the prisoners on both sides, he had made a proposition to this government, two weeks previous, that a number of our surgeons should be allowed to pass through their lines to visit and remain with our prisoners wherever they might be, and with full liberty of the city, and permission to go to any point, when necessary for the performance of their duties. They would also be allowed to act as commissaries for the prisoners, and to order through the lines such stores as they might deem necessary, and to receive and distribute them. In return he had asked that the same privilege be granted to their side, and expressed surprise at not receiving any reply.

No proposition of this nature having been received here, the Secretary of War directs that you report whether that or any other proposition from that source, not submitted to this department, has been received by you; and if so, to submit them without delay.

By order of the Secretary of War :

ED. R. S. CANBY, *Brigadier General, A. A. G.*Major General B. F. BUTLER,  
*Commanding Department Virginia and North Carolina, Fort Monroe, Virginia.*

True copy :

A. E. H. JOHNSON.

[Telegram.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, March 10, 1864.*Major General B. F. BUTLER, *Fortress Monroe* :

You will please furnish to me a report of the number of prisoners delivered by you to the enemy for exchange since you entered upon your present command, with the respective dates of delivery, designating the names and rank of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and the names of the privates. Upon receiving the rolls, with this designation, Colonel Hoffman, commissary of prisoners, will be ordered to designate the like number of our officers and men who may be declared exchanged. Those to be declared exchanged will be taken from those who have been longest on parole. This is the mode in which declarations of exchange, under present circumstances, should be made.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War*

A. E. H. JOHNSON.

True copy :

[Telegram.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, February 29, 1864.*Major General BUTLER, *Fortress Monroe* :

You may exercise your own discretion as to the time and number of officers to be sent for exchange. Representations made by escaped officers led this department to the conclusion that if one or two hundred officers were sent to City Point by you, and offered in exchange for the same number of ours, the rebels would not dare to refuse; hence the order was given you. But if you deem it more advantageous to the service to delay its execution, you may do so.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

A. E. H. JOHNSON.

True copy :

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*In field, Culpeper C. H., Va., April 17, 1864.*

I have the honor herewith to enclose for your information a copy of my letter of instructions to Major General B. F. Butler, commanding department of Virginia and North Carolina, touching the exchange of prisoners.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*In field, Culpeper C. H., Va., April 17, 1864.*

**GENERAL:** Your report of negotiations with Mr. Ould, Confederate States agent, touching the exchange of prisoners, has been referred to me by the Secretary of War, with directions to furnish you such instructions on the subject as I may deem proper.

After a careful examination of your report, the only points on which I deem instructions necessary are—

1. Touching the validity of the paroles of the prisoners captured at Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

2. The status of colored prisoners.

As to the *first*, no arrangement for the exchange of prisoners will be acceded to that does not fully recognize the validity of these paroles, and provide for the release to us of a sufficient number of prisoners now held by the confederate authorities to cancel any balance that may be in our favor by virtue of these paroles. Until there are released to us an equal number of officers and men as were captured and paroled at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, not another confederate prisoner of war will be paroled or exchanged.

As to the *second*, no distinction whatever will be made in the exchange between white and colored prisoners; the only question being, were they, at the time of their capture, in the military service of the United States. If they were, the same terms as to treatment while prisoners, and conditions of release and exchange, must be exacted and had in the case of colored soldiers as in the case of white soldiers.

Non-acquiescence by the confederate authorities in both or either of these propositions will be regarded as a refusal on their part to agree to the further exchange of prisoners, and will be so treated by us.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General B. F. BUTLER,  
*Com'dg Dept. of Virginia and North Carolina, Fortress Monroe, Virginia.*

[Telegram.—Sent 3.45 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, May 4, 1864.*

Major General BUTLER, *Fortress Monroe :*

The commissary of prisoners is preparing a declaration of exchange, which will be made at once.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*  
A. E. H. JOHNSON.

True copy :

[Received cipher 7 a. m., August 22.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*City Point, Va., 5 p. m., August 21, 1864.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

Please inform General Foster that on no circumstances will he be authorized to make exchange of prisoners of war.

Exchanges simply re-enforce the enemy at once, whilst we do not get the benefit of those received for two or three months, and lose the majority entirely. I telegraph this from just hearing that some five or six hundred more prisoners had been sent to General Foster.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

[Telegram.—Received in cipher 7 a. m., August 26.]

CITY POINT, VA., 7.30 p. m.,  
*August 25, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff :*

I see by the Richmond Examiner of to-day that General Canby is about exchanging the prisoners captured at Fort Gaines. I hope General Canby will be instructed to make no more exchanges. It is giving the enemy re-enforcements at a time when they are of immediate importance to him.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

STEAMER NEW YORK, FLAG OF TRUCE,  
*Varina, Va., August 22, 1864.*

SIR: Having been informed that Major Nathan Goff, a federal officer, is held by the confederate authorities in close confinement, said to be in retaliation for a prisoner similarly held by the United States authorities, in the person of Major Thomas D. Armsly, Confederate States army. I now propose the release and delivery to their respective governments of each of the above-named parties, and in case you accept this proposition, will deliver to you, in my next trip, Major Armsly. Will you do it?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. MULFORD,  
*Major and Assistant Agent for Exchange.*

Hon. R. OULD,  
*Agent for Exchange, Richmond, Va.*

(*The following indorsement on the preceding letter.*)

AUGUST 22, 1864.

I accept this proposition. I would further suggest that all difficulties connected with the detention of officers and men, on both sides, in close confinement or irons, can be satisfactorily adjusted on the basis herein indicated. Let all prisoner of war on each side be released from confinement (close) or irons, as the case may be, and either placed in the condition of other prisoners, or sent to their respective homes for their equivalents.

R. OULD, *Agent for Exchange.*

True copy :

JOHN E. MULFORD,  
*Major and Assistant Agent for Exchange.*

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,  
September 3, 1864.

SIR: The proposition of Colonel Ould of the 22d ultimo, indorsed upon a communication from yourself, transmitted to this office in the following words, to wit, that "all prisoners of war, on each side, be released from confinement (close) or irons as the case may be, and either placed in the condition of other prisoners, or sent to their respective homes for their equivalents," has been submitted this morning to the Secretary of War, who directs that it be accepted.

Orders have been sent to Colonel Hoffman, Commissary General of Prisoners, to give immediate effect on our part to this accepted proposition, and you are requested so to advise Colonel Ould, in order that no time may be lost in carrying the proposition into effect on his part. There has been some delay here in order to make the necessary inquiries to ascertain the individuals to be affected by the proposition, and I learn of but three prisoners on our side in the condition presumed by the proposition, to wit: Daniel Davis, a lieutenant under sentence of a military court; Frank Battles, a captain under special instructions from the Commissary General of Prisoners; and William McBlair, temporarily confined for an attempt to elude a hospital guard. You can furnish Colonel Ould with this statement as an answer to his inquiry on the subject.

We shall expect, of course, to be informed within reasonable time of the full completion of this business on the part of Colonel Ould, and that all prisoners of war held in close confinement or in irons, in the south, are *placed in the condition of other prisoners*.

I take this occasion to remark that Colonel Ould appears to have been under a misapprehension with regard to the number of prisoners of war held in close confinement on this side, as well as the reasons governing particular cases.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. A. HITCHCOCK,

*Major Gen. Vols., Com'r for Exchange of Prisoners.*

Major JOHN E. MULFORD.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Richmond, Va., September 12, 1864.*

SIR: Your communication of the 10th instant, accepting a proposition made by me some time ago, that "all prisoners of war on each side be released from confinement (close) or irons, as the case may be, and either placed in the condition of other prisoners or sent to their respective homes for their equivalents," has been received. You do not state whether these parties are to be mutually surrendered, or to be held as prisoners of war. I would prefer that they shall all be delivered, the party having the excess to receive proper equivalents. Please inform me what is the understanding in this respect.

You are very much mistaken in supposing that there are only three persons held by the federal authorities in close confinement or irons. Besides those named by you, there are George P. Sims, W. P. Burgess, John Marrs, and Thomas M. Campbell, at Johnson's island, and Captain Gordon at Fort Delaware. I was also notified that on the 18th of July last, the commanding officer at Fort Delaware had been ordered by the Secretary of War to place Captain James P. Brown, company K, Tennessee cavalry, 1st Lieutenant B. I. Brailford, company E, 1st Texas, 1st Lieutenant R. H. C. Bailey, company A, Foster's cavalry, and 1st Lieutenant A. W. Dogier, company F, 6th South Carolina cavalry, in close confinement (in cells.) I am quite confident, also, that there is a number of our officers and soldiers in close confinement in irons or at hard labor at Alton. I think some will also be found at St. Louis and in other prisons east and west.

Since the receipt of your communication, I have received one from General Butler in relation to the same subject-matter. He proposes to except from the operation of the agreement those under charges or regularly convicted, before some competent tribunal, of offences known to municipal laws, the laws of nations or of war. This offer I cannot accept. Have you one confederate soldier in close confinement or in irons, who is not under charges or has not been regularly convicted? Is there any probability that we will ever agree as to the true interpretation of the laws of nations or of war? We have not yet, and never will. I have no objection to the proposition as far as it relates to municipal laws, for the confederate government has always held that soldiers are responsible to the proper authorities for crimes committed by them either before or after capture.

I sincerely hope that in this matter we will have no misunderstanding. It is my desire that all on both sides who are in close confinement or in irons, shall be immediately released and put in the condition of other prisoners of war. I make no exception save when the officer or soldier has offended against municipal laws. I will thank you to communicate the proposition contained in this letter to General Hitchcock, and let me know at an early date whether it is accepted by your government.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

RO. OULD, *Agent of Exchange.*

Major JOHN E. MULFORD,  
*Assistant Agent of Exchange.*

NOTE.—The difficulties implied or stated in this letter were all removed by order of the Secretary of War in a general authority, which was afterwards carried out by specific orders from Lieutenant General Grant, the object being, at every possible sacrifice, to relieve as many Union prisoners as could be reached by the measure.

E. A. HITCHCOCK,  
Major Gen. Vols., Com'r of Exchange.

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WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, October 4, 1864.*

By direction of the President a correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and Mr. Mallory, in relation to the exchange of naval prisoners, has been referred to you, with authority, in your discretion, to arrest or consummate the exchange under the supervision of General Butler, and in accordance with the principles maintained by him in his correspondence with Mr. Ould. The correspondence, with a letter of instructions to you from the President, will be forwarded by special messenger.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Lieutenant General GRANT.  
A true copy:

A. E. H. JOHNSON.

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EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, October 5, 1864.*

I enclose you a copy of a correspondence in regard to a contemplated exchange of naval prisoners through your lines, and not very distant from your headquarters. It only came to the knowledge of the War Department and myself yesterday, and it gives us some uneasiness; I therefore send it to you with the statement, that as the numbers to be exchanged under it are small, and so much has already been done to effect the exchange, I hope you may find it consistent to let it go forward under the general supervision of General Butler, and particularly in reference to the points he holds vital in exchanges; still you are at liberty to arrest the whole operation if in your judgment the public good requires it.

Yours, truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Lieutenant General GRANT.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMIES,  
*Washington, D. C., January 21, 1865.*

SIR: I have authorized Colonel Mulford, agent of exchange, to renew negotiations for the exchange of all prisoners now held by either party. The first interview between our agent and Colonel Ould, rebel agent, has already been had. No doubt but what an arrangement will be entered into. Indeed, on the strength of that interview, an exceedingly limited one is now going on near Richmond.

Yours, truly,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieut. General.*

We are sending supplies to our prisoners at least weekly. They are received by officers of our own selection, released federal prisoners, who distribute them as directed.

U. S. G.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 15, 1864.*

GENERAL: A communication signed Robert Ould, agent of exchange, dated October 7, instant, mailed at Fortress Monroe, and addressed to me, is herewith referred to you, together with a paper that accompanied it, bearing the same signature, dated October 6, and addressed to Major John E. Mulford, assistant agent of exchange. You are authorized and instructed to take such action in reference to such papers, and the subject-matter to which they relate, as you may deem best adapted to the relief of our soldiers held as prisoners by the rebels. You are also authorized to take any steps that you may deem proper to effect the release and exchange of our soldiers, and all loyal persons, held as prisoners by the rebel authorities.

It is the desire of the President that no efforts, consistent with national safety and honor, be spared to effect the prompt release of all soldiers and loyal persons in captivity to the rebels as prisoners of war, or on any other grounds; and the subject is committed to you, with full authority to act in the premises as you shall deem right and proper.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Lieutenant General GRANT.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Richmond, Virginia, October 7, 1864.*

SIR: On the 6th instant I addressed the accompanying letter to Major Jno. E. Mulford, assistant agent of exchange. I think it proper to notify you that I have done so, in order that you may be made acquainted at an early date with the views of the confederate authorities in relation to the matters to which that communication refers.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

RO. OULD, *Agent of Exchange.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

OCTOBER 15, 1864.

Referred to Lieutenant General Grant, with authority to act upon the subject in such manner as he may deem proper, and with authority to take such measures as he deems consistent with national honor and safety for the release of all soldiers and loyal persons held by the rebels in captivity.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Richmond, Virginia, October 6, 1864.*

SIR: As it appears to be more than probable that a large number of prisoners will be held in captivity by both belligerents during the coming winter, the cause of humanity to which, though foes, we all owe a common allegiance, demands that some measures should be adopted for the relief of such as are held by either party. To that end, I propose that each government shall have the privilege of forwarding for the use and comfort of such of its prisoners as are held by the other necessary articles of food and clothing. The manner of their distribution, with all proper safeguards, can be agreed upon in the future. A fair reciprocity is only asked. The articles that can be mutually sent can also be made the subject of agreement. I propose that each may send necessary clothing and blankets, and rations of meat, bread, coffee, sugar, tobacco, pickles, and vinegar. I would suggest that the receipt of the stores and their distribution among the prisoners for whom they are intended might be authenticated by the certificate of the senior officer at the respective camps or depots. In order to carry out this arrangement with effectiveness, it would be necessary that we should make purchases outside the limits of the Confederate States, and then to ship them to one of your ports. It would be impracticable to send the stores by your flag-of-truce boats. Of course the supplies referred to in this communication are to be considered as being in addition to such rations as are furnished by the government which has the prisoners in custody. Neither belligerent is to be discharged from the obligation of feeding and clothing the prisoners in its charge.

This is a matter of such grave importance that I sincerely trust an early and favorable response will be made.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

RO. OULD, *Agent of Exchange.*

Major JOHN E. MULFORD,  
*Assistant Agent of Exchange.*

CITY POINT, VA., *January 13, 1865.*

COLONEL: The letter of Judge R. Ould, agent of exchange, Confederate States, of date "Richmond, September 12, 1864," in answer to yours of the 10th of the same month, accepting the propositions made by him under date of August 22, 1864, that "all prisoners of war on each side be released from confinement, close or irons, as the case may be, and either placed in the condition of other prisoners of war or sent to their respective homes for equivalent," has been duly referred to me for my consideration and action, and I am of the opinion that the proposition as made by Judge Ould, and accepted by the government through you, is just and equally fair and beneficial to both sides. You will, therefore, communicate to Judge Ould, without delay, that our government stands by its acceptance of his proposition heretofore referred to, without excepting from its operations any of the cases proposed by General Butler and referred to in his (Judge Ould's) letter of September 12, that the parties for whose release said agreement was made shall all be mutually delivered, the party having the excess to receive proper equivalents, and that you are authorized to carry the agreement into immediate effect on our side.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Colonel JOHN E. MULFORD,  
*Assistant Agent of Exchange.*

[Telegram.—Received 12.20 p. m., 15th.]

CITY POINT, VA., *January 15, 1865.*

Major General N. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

Under the arrangement for the release and exchange of prisoners of war set forth in the letter of which the following is a copy, Judge Ould has notified Colonel Mulford, assistant agent of exchange, that orders have gone out for the release of all prisoners coming within said agreement held by their side. You will therefore please direct all prisoners that come within said agreement, held by us, to be released and sent to Fort Monroe, there to be detained subject to the orders of Colonel Mulford.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

[Telegram.—Received 6.10 p. m., January 16.]

CITY POINT, VA., *January 16, 1865.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

My order to send prisoners to Fort Monroe does not include the five hundred sent to Morris island.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, January 21, 1865.*

SIR: In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 21st December, calling for the correspondence in reference to the exchange of prisoners, I have the honor to submit herewith the report of the Adjutant General, together with such communications upon the subject as have not heretofore been published.

The correspondence of Major General Butler details the action in regard to the exchange of prisoners under the authority conferred upon him by the order of the War Department.

On the 15th October the subject of exchanges was placed under the direction of Lieutenant General Grant, with full authority to take any steps he might deem proper to effect the release and exchange of our soldiers and of loyal persons held as prisoners by the rebel authorities. He was instructed that it was the desire of the President that no efforts, consistent with national safety and honor, should be spared to effect the prompt release of all soldiers and loyal persons in captivity to the rebels as prisoners of war, or on any other grounds, and the subject was committed to him with full authority to act in the premises as he should deem right and proper. Under this authority, the subject of exchanges has from that time continued in his charge, and such efforts have been made as he deemed proper to obtain the release of our prisoners.

An arrangement was made for the supply of our prisoners—the articles to be distributed under the direction of our own officers, paroled for that purpose; and the corresponding privilege was extended to the rebel authorities. In order to afford every facility for relief, special exchanges have been offered, whenever desired, on behalf of our prisoners. Such exchanges have in a few instances been permitted by the rebel authorities, but in many others they have been denied.

A large number of exchanges, including all the sick, has been effected within a recent period. The Commissary General of Prisoners has been directed to make a detailed report of all the exchanges that have been accomplished since the general exchange ceased. It will be furnished to the House of Representatives as soon as completed.

The last communication of General Grant gives reason to believe that a full and complete exchange of all prisoners will speedily be made. It also appears from his statement that weekly supplies are furnished to our prisoners and distributed by officers of our own selection. His letter is subjoined, as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*Washington, D. C., January 21, 1865.*

“SIR: I have authorized Colonel Mulford, agent of exchange, to renew negotiations for the exchange of all prisoners now held by either party. The first interview between our agent and Colonel Ould, rebel agent, has already been had. No doubt but that an arrangement will be entered into. Indeed, on the strength of that interview, an exchange—limited one—is now going on near Richmond.

“Yours truly,

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

‘Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

"P. S.—We are sending supplies to our prisoners at least weekly. They are received by officers of our own selection, (released federal prisoners,) who distribute them as directed.  
"U. S. G."

Supplies furnished by friends of prisoners are also forwarded for distribution in the same manner. The nature of the supplies authorized to be furnished by individuals is specified in the annexed order of the department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Hon. SCHUYLER COLFAX,

*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

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[Received 12.25 a. m., 6th February, in cipher.]

CITY POINT, VA., *February 5, 1865—11.30 p. m.*

Will you please say to the President that Lieutenant Markleit has been released from prison and is now on his way north.

Arrangements for exchange of all prisoners are now complete and exchanges will go on rapidly. All but two of those who were in close confinement in Richmond are now on the steamer New York.

I am also in receipt of communication from General Hayes, acknowledging receipt of supplies of clothing for our prisoners, and the completion of arrangements for transportation and distribution.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

NOTE.—This has the appearance of being a special case, but it was a *trial case*, persevered in with the view of securing the release of all of the same class, and which was accomplished.

E. A. HITCHCOCK,

*Major Gen. of Vols., Com'r of Exchange.*

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[Telegram.—Received in cipher, 2 p. m., 16th.]

CITY POINT, VA., *February 16, 1865—12 m.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

Our prisoners will probably be delivered to us as fast as they possibly can be got through without reference to the numbers received from us. To expedite their delivery I have authorized those west of the Mississippi to be delivered to any point on the river, those in the southwest at Mobile, and those in North Carolina at Wilmington or Richmond. Their equivalents will be delivered on the James river.

Please notify Canby and Schofield of this and direct them to receive all prisoners delivered to them. General Canby had better send all that are delivered on the Mississippi to Benton barracks to be paid and furloughed. Those received at Mobile can be sent either there or to Annapolis, according to the direction transports may be taking at the time of their delivery. Schofield of course will send all he receives to Annapolis.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

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[Telegram.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, April 9, 1865.*

Lieutenant General GRANT:

Some thousands of our prisoners in the hands of the rebels are still undelivered. Can any arrangement be made to hasten their release?

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

## LIST OF REPORTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

Report of Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, of the armies of the United States, 1864-'65.

Reports of Major Generals G. G. Meade and P. H. Sheridan, of the campaign before Richmond and Petersburg, 1865.

Major General W. T. Sherman's report of the campaign of Atlanta, 1864.

Major General W. T. Sherman's report of the campaign of Georgia and capture of Savannah, 1864.

Major General W. T. Sherman's report of the campaign of the Carolinas, 1865.

Major General W. T. Sherman's report of Johnston's surrender, &c., 1865.

Major General P. H. Sheridan's report of operations in the Shenandoah valley, from Winchester to the armies in front of Petersburg, between February 27, and March 28, 1865.

Major General G. H. Thomas's report of operations from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865, including battles of Franklin and Nashville.

Major General G. H. Thomas's report of operations in the department of the Cumberland, from January 20 to June 1, 1865.

Major General D. Hunter's report of operations in West Virginia, 1864.

Major General B. F. Butler's report of operations against Fort Fisher, 1864.

Major General A. H. Terry's report of the capture of Fort Fisher, 1865.

Major General W. S. Rosecrans's report of operations against Price, in the department of Missouri.

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*Report of Lieutenant General U. S. Grant.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

*Washington, D. C., July 22, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to command the same:

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, re-enforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both north and south, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of

the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: The Mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by federal troops from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points in southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than 80,000 effective men that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. The *let-alone policy* had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. But the one-half, or 40,000 men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the Mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga a small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the Potomac river, a small area about the mouth of James river covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the Potomac lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and Newbern, in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the south a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier, and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under Major General W. T.

Sherman. In addition to these armies, he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in northeast Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign.

Major General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the military division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the Mississippi river to the Alleghanies, and the department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him if it was in the power of the army of the Potomac to do so. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible.

Major General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red river against Shreveport, Louisiana, (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command,) was notified by me on the 15th of March of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the Red river expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red river with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him, (General Banks,) instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 21st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows :

"1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the Red river to General Steele and the navy.

"2d. That you abandon Texas entirely with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi river, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can be resumed west of the river. According to your last return this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say, concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against

Mobile. With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with the Admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base, but, from your long service in the Gulf department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

“Major General N. P. BANKS.”

Major General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how to co-operate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major General B. F. Butler:

“FORT MONROE, VA., *April 2, 1864.*

“GENERAL: In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have co-operative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.

“It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: The army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty—I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men—to operate on the south side of James river, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, under Major General Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department.

“General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.

“When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

“The fact that has already been stated—that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the army of the Potomac—must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James river as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.

“All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you so as to cut the railroad about Hick's ford about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

“You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders details and instructions you may give for the execution of this order.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

“Major General B. F. BUTLER.”

On the 16th, these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper and Richmond if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his (General Butler's) army on the James river; that, could I be certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force under command of Major General Sigel was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.

General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request, General Sigel was instructed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down the Tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the New river bridge and the salt-works at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the east. If he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north and still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James river, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of Petersburg and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was re-enforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As the army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James river.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received.

The movement of the army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night the whole army was across the Rapidan, (the 5th and 6th corps crossing at Germania ford, and the 2d corps at United States ford, the cavalry, under Major General Sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about 4,000 wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed and ably-commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the 5th, Major General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness.

General Burnside, with the 9th corps, was, at the time the army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock river and Alexandria railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the 7th reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwith-

standing his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th the march was commenced towards Spottsylvania Court-House, the 5th corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. On the 8th General Warren met a force of the enemy which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the 9th General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manœuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major General John Sedgwick, commanding the 6th army corps. Major General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. The 2d corps, Major General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of Johnston's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manœuvring and awaiting the arrival of re-enforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court-House, orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at 12 o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the afternoon of the 19th Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The 5th corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the 6th corps. The 2d and 9th corps got up about the same time, the 2d holding the railroad bridge and the 9th lying between that and Jericho ford. General Warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. On the 25th General Sheridan rejoined the army of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad track; recaptured about four hundred of our men, on their way to Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond, (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault) re-crossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow's Bridge, under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's landing, on the James river, where he communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, and making it comparatively easy to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James river, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with the 10th corps. At the same time he sent a force of 1,800 cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of 3,000 cavalry, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the roads south of Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 6th he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the

Petersburg and Richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, *May 9, 1864.*”

“Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With 1,700 cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, and have safely brought them to our present position. These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond.

“General Kautz with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same day with our movement up James river, forced the Blackwater, burned the railroad bridge at Stony creek, below Petersburg, cutting in two Beauregard’s force at that point.

“We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which with proper supplies we can hold out against the whole of Lee’s army. I have ordered up the supplies.

“Beauregard with a large portion of his force was left south by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

“General Grant will not be troubled with any further re-enforcements to Lee from Beauregard’s force.

“BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,

“*Major General.*”

“Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*”

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy’s first line of defences at Drury’s Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina and bring them to the defence of those places. On the 16th the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury’s Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there.

On the 12th General Kautz with his cavalry was started on a raid against the Danville railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chola stations, destroying them, the railroad track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence crossing to the South Side road, struck it at Wilson’s, Wellsville, and Black and White stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessels, and our gunboats there, and after severe fighting the place was carried by assault and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most if not all the re-enforcements brought from the south by Beauregard against the army of the Potomac. In addition to this re-enforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than 15,000 men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia.

The position at Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained, and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they be sent forward, under command of Major General W. F. Smith, to join the army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May the 9th army corps, commanded by Major General A. E.

Burnside, was assigned to the army of the Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of Major General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover town to turn the enemy's position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, and the 6th corps led the advance; crossed the Pamunky river at Hanover town after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe but successful engagement with the enemy at Haw's shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately ordered by General Meade along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the South Anna river, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which had just arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at 5 p. m. by the 6th corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps and in front of General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but were repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was impossible by any flank movement to interpose between him and the city. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg railroad—a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James river, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I

had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Gordonsville, to effectually break up the railroad connexion between Richmond and the Shenandoah valley and Lynchburg; and, when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James river, by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply except by the canal.

On the 7th two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June General Butler sent a force of infantry under General Gillmore, and cavalry under General Kautz, to capture Petersburg if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point General Smith's command by water, via the White House, to reach there in advance of the army of the Potomac. This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could re-enforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th; one division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps reached James river, at Wilcox's landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th.

During three long years the armies of the Potomac and northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage-ground of either. The southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern territory. Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack it was in the open field. The details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of Major General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to James river, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, Brigadier General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to

occupy all the available roads between the army and our water base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement of the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the first of May. General Crook, who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averill. They crossed the mountains by separate routes. Averill struck the Tennessee and Virginia railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New river and Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including New river bridge, forming a junction with Crook at Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar creek. Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, and Major General Hunter was appointed to supersede him. His instructions were embraced in the following despatches to Major General H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army :

“NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA., May 20, 1864.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. \* \* \*

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*”

“Major General H. W. HALLECK.”

“JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

“If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army. \* \* \*

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*”

“Major General H. W. HALLECK.”

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and moving up the Shenandoah valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and after a battle of ten hours routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle 1,500 men, 3 pieces of artillery, and 300 stand of small-arms. On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averill at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was very successful, and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would no doubt have captured that (to the enemy,) important point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James river canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. I have never taken exception to the operations of General Hunter, and I am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of

his instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country.

To return to the army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced crossing the James river on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's landing. The laying of the pontoon bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the remainder of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by a steamer to Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I would return at once to the army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done; that we could re-enforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason, that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines northeast of Petersburg from the Appomattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about 7 p. m. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had re-enforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear—the moon shining brightly—and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But instead of taking these troops, and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack was ordered to be made at 6 o'clock that evening by the troops under Smith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until 6 o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy to an interior line from which he could not be dislodged. The advantages in position gained by us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop Petersburg toward the Southside railroad, as far as possible, without attacking fortifications.

On the 6th the enemy, to re-enforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting no doubt to get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox's landing, under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler, at Bermuda Hundred of which General Butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him.

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket line the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. Between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and reoccupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected the pontoon bridge with Bermuda Hundred.

On the 19th General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, arrived at the White House just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevillian Station on the morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevillian Station to Louisa Court House. This occupied until 3 o'clock p. m., when he advanced in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy re-enforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage, (the country furnishing but inferior grazing,) and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at that place he moved to the James river, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the army of the Potomac.

On the 22d General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the army of the James, moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon railroad at Ream's Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road and the Southside road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry; he reached Burksville Station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville railroad to Roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon railroad crossing of Stony creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left, with a view of reaching Ream's Station, (supposing it to be in our possession.) At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter General Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway river and coming in safely on our left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connexion by railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the Anna rivers and making him wary of the situation of his army in the Shenan-

doah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the James river and joined the force General Butler had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the 2d corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete) and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha river, thus laying the Shenandoah valley open for raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he returned northward, and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha river, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton roads from the Gulf department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred-days men, and detachments from the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg; General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shepardstown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the river and occupied Maryland heights. On the 6th the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards Frederick city. General Wallace with Ricketts's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought

the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two divisions of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about 280 in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night. Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by telegraph, at 11.45 p. m. on the 12th, the assignment of Major General H. G. Wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th General Averill encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond, I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave Washington. Subsequently the 19th corps was excepted from the order to return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania, which on the 30th burned Chambersburg and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelly, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get despatches through and return answers back; so that often orders would be given, and then information would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the departments of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna and the middle department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to Major General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, whilst our forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the 4th I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions:

“MONOCACY BRIDGE, MD.,

“August 5, 1864—8 p. m.

“GENERAL: Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper’s Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroads, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper’s Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route from Washington *via* Rockville may be taken into account.

“There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering, at least, 5,000 men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start tomorrow. In pushing up the Shenandoah valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed—they should rather be protected—but the people should be informed that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

“Bear in mind the object is to drive the enemy south, and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes.

“Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

“Major General D. HUNTER.”

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached Halls-town that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper’s Ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained at Monocacy, until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of Washington.

On the 7th of August the middle department and the departments of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna were constituted into the “Middle military division,” and Major General Sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the army of the Potomac. The first reached him at Harper’s Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. The two armies lay in such a position—the enemy on the west bank of the Opequan creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berrysville—that either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these circumstances, I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan’s feelings as to what

would be the probable result, I left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. I met him at Charleston, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instructions necessary—Go in! For the convenience of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th General Sheridan attacked General Early at the crossing on the Opequan creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until 5 o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequan creek to Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The enemy rallied and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of Cedar creek.

Having received considerable re-enforcements, General Early again returned to the valley, and on the 9th of October his cavalry encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and 350 prisoners. On the night of the 18th the enemy crossed the mountains which separated the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and Newtown. At this juncture General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced, arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy was defeated with great slaughter and the loss of most of his artillery and trains and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the north via the Shenandoah valley. I was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the army of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan's army to the army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from Petersburg to re-enforce Early in the Shenandoah valley. I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, of the army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division, (Kershaw's) of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th and took possession of the Weldon railroad. During the day he had considerable fighting. To regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. On the

night of the 20th the troops on the north side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front of Petersburg. On the 25th the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Ream's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September a branch railroad was completed from the City Point and Petersburg railroad to the Weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the 28th the 10th corps, Major General Birney, and the 18th corps, Major General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below Chapin's farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and the New Market road and intrenchments. This success was followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gillmore, immediately in front of the Chapin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. The position captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond that I determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th General Meade sent out a reconnoissance, with a view to attacking the enemy's line if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works near Poplar Spring church. In the afternoon troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery—eight or nine pieces. This he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th the army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it towards the South Side railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton plank road, where it crosses Hatcher's run. At this point we were six miles distant from the South Side railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left, the enemy moved out across Hatcher's run, in the gap between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement General Butler made a demonstration on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg road, and also on the York River railroad. In the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th of February our lines were extended to Hatcher's run, and the Weldon railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively, by Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at Dalton; but finding the enemy's positions at Buzzard Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, whilst Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south. Late on the 17th his rear guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had again disappeared. He was vigorously pursued and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but, during the ensuing night, retreated across the Etowah. Whilst these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's division of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman having given his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th the advance, under General Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point. The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New Hope church and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last named places and concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the 2d of July Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the Chattahoochie.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochie to give his men rest and get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations, crossed the Chattahoochie, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of July. About 1 p. m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of the Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major General Howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing his line of communications across the Chattahoochie, moved his main force round by the

enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and, after defeating the enemy near Rough and Ready, Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton and driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro', and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook, Garrard and Stoneman to cut the remaining railroad communication with Atlanta. The first two were successful—the latter disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt, skillful and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon his line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. To guard against this danger Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West Tennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the morning of the 10th of June General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. In the mean time Major General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the army of the Tennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from Red river, where they had done most excellent service. He was directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting continued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois volunteers. Colonel H., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but received for

reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New Jersey volunteers, that, being placed there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry, and the 1st regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison fought bravely until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June he attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports at the commencement of the Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by General Sherman under A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of March and reached the designated point on Red river one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces at Fort De Russey, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort De Russey, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison—about 350 men, 11 pieces of artillery, and many small-arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing 210 prisoners and 4 pieces of artillery.

On the 28th he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel General Taylor at Cane river. By the 26th General Banks had assembled his whole army at Alexandria and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the morning of April 6 he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th his advance engaged the enemy near Pleasant Hill and drove him from the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the 8th, at Sabine Cross-roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night General Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet, which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point Coupée near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of this expedition, and

the lateness of the season rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March Major General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th army corps to co-operate with General Banks's expedition on Red river, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined near Elkin's ferry, in Washita county, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red river, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's mill, in Dallas county, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas river. He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the 30th of April the enemy attacked him while crossing Saline river at Jenkins's ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss was about 600 in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Major General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "military division of west Mississippi," was therefore directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the Mississippi river. General Smith met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our loss was about 40 killed and 70 wounded.

In the latter part of July General Canby sent Major General Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile bay. On the 8th of August Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th Fort Morgan was invested, and after a severe bombardment surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to 1,464 prisoners and 104 pieces of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General Price, with a force of about 10,000 men, had reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and drive him back, while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September Price attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri river, and continued up that river towards Kansas. General Curtis, commanding department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to northern Arkansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20 the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. Soon after the

surrender, two regiments of re-enforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th one column of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in the direction of Athens, which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved towards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on every exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the south, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon reported to the southwest of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if we attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows:

"CENTREVILLE, GA., *October 10*—noon.

"Despatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa river, 12 miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the re-enforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General*.

"Lieut. Gen. GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this despatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter: "I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be re-enforced to the maximum; that, after you get Wilmington you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed

to hold the Mississippi river, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of mine of date September 12, in answer to a despatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia, &c.

"CITY POINT, VA., October 11, 1864—11 a. m.

"Your despatch of October 10 received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee river, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee river. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men, little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army I would prefer that; but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieut. General.*

"Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN."

"KINGSTON, GA., October 11—11 a. m.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa river, south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the defensive. With the 25,000 men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city—send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochie.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

"Lieut. Gen. GRANT."

"CITY POINT, VA., October 11, 1864—11.30 p. m.

"Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieut. General.*

"Major Gen. W. T. SHERMAN."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads leading east and west through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi river. General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the mean time to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps, Major General Stanley commanding, and the 23d corps, Major General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to report to Major General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry

division he designed to move with through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi river, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah river, and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's line of communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. General Foster, commanding department of the south, also sent an expedition, *via* Broad river, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier General E. D. Osband, (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry,) captured, on the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central railroad bridge and trestle-work over Big Black river, near Canton, thirty miles of the road and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. The expedition from the department of the south, under the immediate command of Brigadier General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad river and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of 746 in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Talifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee river, near Florence. On the 28th Forrest reached the Tennessee, at Fort Hieman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north

side of the Tennessee river, above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of all the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of re-enforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force commanded by General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was 1,750 killed, 702 prisoners, and 3,800 wounded. Among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was 2,300. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This left the field to the enemy—not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned—so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee river, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's command and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this re-enforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th of December General Thomas attacked Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started west to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington city, I received General Thomas's despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of December our advance forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee river. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, fifteenth Pennsylvania volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transpor-

tation and the enemy's pontoon bridge. The details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major General Grierson, started from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood's army, 4,000 new English carbines, and large amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the southwest, he struck the Mississippi Central railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine shops and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5.

During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station, to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia—destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and 198 prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear river was such that it required watching for so great a distance, that without possession of the land north of New inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the assemblage in Hampton roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both north and south. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the expedition until the latter part of November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with Major General Buier, to Hampton roads, where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of starting. A force of 6,500 men was regarded as sufficient. The time of

starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December, if not before. Learning on the 30th of November that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make all arrangements for the departure of Major General Weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December the following instructions were given :

“ CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864.

“ GENERAL : The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear river and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected whilst the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

“ The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops.

“ Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against Richmond without delay.

“ U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

“ Major General B. F. BUTLER.”

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. They were so sent ; but General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence until he read General Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition was detained several days at Hampton roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to replenish ; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from Beaufort ; but it would seem from the notice taken of it in the southern newspapers that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier General Curtis, pushed up towards the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition.

The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th.

On the return of the expedition, officers and men—among them Brevet Major General (then Brevet Brigadier General) M. R. Curtis, First Lieutenant G. W. Ross, — regiment Vermont volunteers, First Lieutenant George W. Walling and Second Lieutenant George Simpson, 142d New York volunteers—voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a despatch from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was that, when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This time I selected Brevet Major General (now Major General) A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about 1,500, and a small siege train. The latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions :

“CITY POINT, VA., *January 3, 1865.*”

“GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will, then, proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic blockading squadron.

“It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

“My own views are that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or re-enforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.

“A siege train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

“Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

“In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

“General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore, and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should you require them they will be sent to you.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*”

“Brevet Major General A. H. TERRY.”

Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp, (now brevet brigadier general,) who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned in orders as chief engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition; and that in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving on the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by 3 o'clock p. m. was completed without loss. On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. Our loss was—killed, 110; wounded, 536. On the 16th and 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's island, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear river.

At my request Major General B. F. Butler was relieved, and Major General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the command of the department of Virginia and North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas's surplus troops—fields from which they would co-operate with other movements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications, at Eastport, in readiness for orders. On the 7th of January General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. This direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and Newbern. On the 26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General Canby. By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for its destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of Major General Sherman. The following instructions were given him:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *January 31, 1865.*

"GENERAL:           \*           \*           \*           Your movements are intended as co-operative with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast—as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for 60,000 men and 20,000 animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps he has

taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty to cut loose from your base and strike for the interior to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

"Major General J. M. SCHOFIELD."

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah—his army entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion—I sent orders to General Sherman, on the 6th of December, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make preparations to start, as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and South Carolina and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the 23d corps, Major General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about 21,000 men; that we had at Fort Fisher about 8,000 men; at Newbern about 4,000; that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to Newbern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear river. Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.

After fighting on the 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro' during the night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro' in two columns—one from Wilmington, and the other from Newbern—and to repair the railroads leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape Fear river, toward Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column from Newbern was attacked on the 8th of March at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse river was crossed and Kinston, occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's bridge, on the Neuse river, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the 22d.

By the 1st of February General Sherman's whole army was in motion from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, *via* Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape Fear river. On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro'. He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in the engagement was about 600. The enemy's loss was much greater. On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance, ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself, and awaited re-enforcements, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st, (crossing the Neuse river ten miles above there, at Cox's bridge, where General Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon bridge, on the 22d,) thus forming a junction with the columns from Newbern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January General Thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee, by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition, (and Sherman having passed out of the State of South Carolina,) on the 27th of February I directed General Thomas to change his course, and ordered him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of February the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

“CITY POINT, VA., *February 14, 1865.*”

“General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about 20,000 men, besides A. J. Smith’s command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. Hood’s army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby’s movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your stand-point easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be three-fold: first, to attract as much of the enemy’s force as possible to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy’s line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above.

“Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than 5,000 men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received.

“To insure success, your cavalry should go with as little wagon train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses.

“Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be to send under these directions.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*”

“Major General G. H. THOMAS.”

On the 15th he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the city, north of James river, should be cut off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to re-enforce Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of these objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as follows:

“CITY POINT, VA., *February 20, 1865—1 p. m.*”

“GENERAL: As soon as it is possible to travel I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after Mosby’s gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you could strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or five thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile bay with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*”

“Major General P. H. SHERIDAN.”

On the 25th I received a despatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as to the

points he might be expected to move on this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer the following telegram was sent him :

“CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

“GENERAL: Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start. I think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or Newbern.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

“Major General P. H. SHERIDAN.”

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about 5,000 each. On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated on Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and 1,600 prisoners, 11 pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, 200 wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and 17 battle flags, were captured. The prisoners, under an escort of 1,500 men, were sent back to Winchester. Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here he remained two days, destroying the railroad toward Richmond and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna river, and awaiting the arrival of his trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River canal to New Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the James river at that place, but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved down the railroad toward Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court-House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the South Side railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court-House, the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunky to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas :

“CITY POINT, VA., March 7, 1865—9.30 a. m.

“GENERAL: I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull’s Gap and fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as required. With Bull’s Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling stock that may be caught west of that.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

“Major General G. H. THOMAS.”

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions—one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major General Wilson against the enemy’s vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee under Major General Stoneman towards Lynchburg—and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan’s cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James were confronting the enemy under Lee in his defences of Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, re-enforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro’; General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan’s cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, before he was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James river at Jones’s landing, and formed a junction with the army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move General Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:

“CITY POINT, VA., March 24, 1865.

“GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond will be moved by our left for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville railroads. Two corps of the army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher’s run nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards Dinwiddie Court-House.

“The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon road and the Jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony creek. General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier General Benham, to be added to the defences of City Point. Major General Parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject, of course, to orders from the commander of the army of the Potomac. The 9th army corps will be left intact to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

“General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the army of the Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the army of the Potomac, and the colored division the right column. During the movement Major General Weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the army of the James.

“The movement of troops from the army of the James will commence on the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition from General Ord's command will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon road he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks, and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the army of the James the same number of days' supply with the army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders.

“All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as much as possible. Whilst I would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready, and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up, so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves, principally, for the defence of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James, except enclosed works—only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

“By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, whilst they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*”

“Major Generals MEADE, ORD, and SHERIDAN.”

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox river towards our left) and carried Fort Steadman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us; but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded and 1,900 prisoners. Our loss was 68 killed, 337 wounded, and 506 missing. General Meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and 834 prisoners. The enemy

made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was 52 killed, 864 wounded, and 207 missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg. General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the mean time. I explained to him the movement I had ordered to commence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirely successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies, and also prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the Danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th Major General Ord, with two divisions of the 24th corps, Major General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps, Brigadier General Birney commanding, and McKenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions were given to General Sheridan:

"CITY POINT, VA., *March 28, 1865.*

"GENERAL: The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn road at 3 a. m. to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about 9 a. m., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court-House. Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the South Side road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that, in like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

"Major General P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court-House, and the left of our infantry line extended to the Quaker road, near its intersection with the Boydton plank road. The position of the troops, from left to right, was as follows: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:

“GRAVELLY CREEK, *March 29, 1865.*

“GENERAL: Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem plank road to Hatcher’s run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatcher’s we pushed forward to find the enemy’s position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker road intersects the Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney’s mill, and was pushing on when last heard from.

“I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy’s roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy’s cavalry may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one army here until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal officer at Cobb’s Hill reported, at 11.30 a. m., that a cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

“Major General P. H. SHERIDAN.”

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court-House towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in force. General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton plank road to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess’s mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy’s lines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting us, as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, therefore, to extend my line no further, but to re-enforce General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy’s right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy’s lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted Fort Steadman, particularly favored this. The enemy’s intrenched picket line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment’s run from one to the other. Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys’ corps, to report to General Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the 31st General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the third division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his

cavalry got possession of the Five Forks, but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, re-enforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards Dinwiddie Court-House. Here General Sheridan displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of woods and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture he despatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie Court-House. General McKenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon after, receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could hold our position on the Boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April, General Sheridan, re-enforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between 5,000 and 6,000 prisoners. About the close of this battle Brevet Major General Charles Griffin relieved Major General Warren in command of the 5th corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General Miles's division of Humphreys' corps was sent to re-enforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until 4 o'clock in the morning, (April 2.) when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong, enclosed works—the most salient and commanding south of Petersburg—thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement ensued and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main road along the Appomattox river. During the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated toward Danville. On the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville along the South Side road; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. On the 4th General Sheridan struck the Danville road near Jettersville, where he learned

that Lee was at Amelia Court-House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th I addressed Major General Sherman the following communication :

“WILSON’S STATION, April 5, 1865.

“GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragons, at 20,000, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee’s and Johnston’s armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro’, or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

“Major General W. T. SHERMAN.”

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west of Jettersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with his cavalry, (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his reaching Jettersville,) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from Burkesville toward Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier General Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the head of Lee’s column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy’s movements, and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which the enemy immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon General Sheridan struck the enemy south of Sailor’s creek, captured 16 pieces of artillery, and about 400 wagons, and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of 6,000 or 7,000 prisoners, among whom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps and General Ord’s command contributed greatly to the day’s success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward’s Court-House; the 6th corps, General Ord’s command, and one division of cavalry, on Farmville, and the 2d corps by the High Bridge road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee’s chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from Farmville :

“APRIL 7, 1865.

“GENERAL: The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the army of northern Virginia.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

“General R. E. LEE.”

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received, at Farmville, the following :

“APRIL 7, 1865.

“GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern

Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

“R. E. LEE, *General*.”

“Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT.”

To this I immediately replied :

“APRIL 8, 1865.

“GENERAL: Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the army of northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say that *peace* being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of northern Virginia will be received.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.”

“General R. E. LEE.”

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight for Appomattox Station, followed by General Ord's command and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and captured 25 pieces of artillery a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from General Lee :

“APRIL 8, 1865.

“GENERAL: I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the army of northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 a. m., to-morrow, on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies.

“R. E. LEE, *General*.”

“Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT.”

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox :

“APRIL 9, 1865.

“GENERAL: Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for 10 a. m. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, &c.,

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.”

“General R. E. LEE.”

On the morning of the 9th General Ord's command and the 5th corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the following from General Lee :

“ APRIL 9, 1865.

“ GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the picket line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

“ R. E. LEE, *General*.

“ Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT.”

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence :

“ APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, VA., April 9, 1865.

“ GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern Virginia on the following terms, to-wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

“ U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

“ General R. E. LEE.”

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

“ GENERAL: I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the army of northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

“ R. E. LEE, *General*.

“ Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT.”

The command of Major General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin and McKenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole south caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. The day preceding news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and General Johnston, which resulted, on the 18th, in an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the rail-

road at Wytheville, Chambersburg and Big Lick. The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between New river and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro' on the North Carolina railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro' and between Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured 400 prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing 14 pieces of artillery and 1,364 prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges toward Charlotte. Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for a movement from Mobile bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of March. The 16th corps, Major General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish river; the 13th corps, under Major General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish river, both moving thence on Spanish fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major General Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of April. During the night the enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. These successes practically opened to us the Alabama river, and enabled us to approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major General Wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until March 22, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba river. On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended by Forrest with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed the Alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to General Canby marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got fifteen hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy-yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the 20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, twelve hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General Howell Cobb. General Wilson hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit, and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas, and Major General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major General Canby. This surrender did

not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel president and vice-president; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement—among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person—and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief despatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the west and the east fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. The western armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of the east commenced their battles on the river from which the army of the Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonist at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia. The splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories, removed all sectional jealousies, (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much,) and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the United States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

*Lieutenant General.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
November 18, 1865.

Official copy.

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

*Reports of Major Generals Meade and Sheridan of the campaign before Richmond and Petersburg.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 30, 1865.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit herewith a succinct report of the operations of this army in the recent campaign resulting in the evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg, and terminating in the surrender of the army of northern Virginia.

On the 29th ultimo, in pursuance of orders received from the lieutenant general commanding, the second and fifth corps were moved across Hatcher's run, the former by the Vaughan road, the latter by the old stage road crossing at Perkins's. The second corps, holding the extreme left of the line before Petersburg prior to moving, was relieved by Major General Gibbon, commanding two divisions of the twenty-fourth corps.

Major General Humphreys, commanding second corps, was directed, after crossing Hatcher's run, to take position with his right resting on Hatcher's run, and his left extending to the Quaker road. Major General Warren, commanding fifth corps, was directed at first to take position at the intersection of the Vaughan and Quaker roads, and subsequently, about noon of the 29th, he was ordered to move up the Quaker road beyond Gravelly run.

These orders were duly executed, and by evening Major General Humphreys was in position, his right resting near Dabney's mill, and his left near Gravelly meeting-house, on the Quaker road. In taking this position Major General Humphreys encountered but little opposition, meeting only a small force in a line of rifle-pits, who were quickly driven out. Major General Warren was delayed in his movement by having to rebuild the bridge over Gravelly run. The advance of his column, Brigadier General Griffin's division, was attacked about 4 p. m., when about a mile and a half beyond Gravelly run, by Bushrod Johnson's division. A spirited engagement ensued, in which Griffin handsomely repulsed and drove the enemy, capturing over 100 prisoners.

On the 30th, Major General Humphreys again advanced, driving the enemy into his main line of works, and by night occupying a line from the Crow house, on Hatcher's run, to the intersection of the Dabney's mill and Boydton plank roads.

Major General Warren during this day advanced on the Quaker road to its intersection with the Boydton plank, and pushed Ayres's division in a northwesterly direction over to the White Oak road. No fighting of any consequence occurred this day except picket skirmishing and exchange of artillery shots from the respective lines, now close to each other.

During the night of the 30th, Major General Humphreys, who had intrenched his line, was directed to relieve Griffin's division, fifth corps, by Miles's division, and Major General Warren was ordered to move both Crawford and Griffin within supporting distance of Ayres, whose position on the extreme left was considered likely to invite attack.

On the 31st, about 10 a. m., Ayres, under General Warren's orders, advanced to dislodge the enemy in position on the White Oak road. Ayres's attack was unsuccessful, and was followed by such a vigorous attack of the enemy that Ayres was compelled to fall back upon Crawford, who, in turn, was so strongly pressed by the enemy as to force both divisions back in considerable disorder to the position occupied by Griffin, when the pursuit of the enemy ceased. Immediately on ascertaining the condition of affairs, Major General Humphreys was ordered to move to Warren's support, and that officer promptly sent Miles's division to attack in flank the force operating against Warren.

This movement was handsomely executed by Miles, who, attacking the enemy vigorously, drove him back to his former position on the White Oak road, capturing several colors and many prisoners.

In the mean time Warren advanced with Griffin's division, supported by such portions of Ayres's and Crawford's divisions as could be rallied, and regaining the position held by Ayres in the morning, Griffin attacked with Chamberlain's brigade, driving the enemy and securing a lodgment on the White Oak road.

These operations over, hearing heavy firing to the left and rear, which was presumed to be the cavalry moving up from Dinwiddie Court House, Warren was directed to send a brigade down the White Oak road to co-operate with the cavalry. This brigade by night reached the crossing of Gravelly run, by the road leading through J. Boisseau's, where, not meeting any enemy, it bivouacked.

During the night, having been directed to send support to Major General Sheridan at Dinwiddie Court House, Major General Warren was ordered to move with his whole corps, two divisions by the White Oak road and one by the Boydton plank road. Major General Humphreys was ordered to extend his left as far as practicable consistent with its security.

During the foregoing operations, the sixth and ninth corps remained in the lines in front of Petersburg, with orders to watch the enemy closely, and, in the event of the lines in their front being weakened, to attack.

On April 1, after consultation with the lieutenant general commanding, believing from the operations on his right that the enemy's lines on his left must be thinly held, orders were sent to Major Generals Wright and Parke to attack the next morning at 4. About 7 p. m., intelligence having been received of the brilliant success of the cavalry and fifth corps at Five Forks, orders were sent to Generals Parke and Wright to open their batteries and press the enemy's picket line. At the same time, Miles's division, second corps, was detached to the support of Major General Sheridan, and Major General Humphreys advised of the intended attacks of the twenty-fourth, sixth, and fifth corps, and directed to hold his two remaining divisions ready to co-operate in the same, should they prove successful.

On the 2d of April, Major General Wright attacked at 4 a. m., carrying everything before him, taking possession of the enemy's strong line of works, and capturing many guns and prisoners. After carrying the enemy's line in his front, and reaching the Boydton plank road, Major General Wright turned to his left and swept down the enemy's line of intrenchments till near Hatcher's run, where, meeting the head of the twenty-fourth corps, General Wright retraced his steps and advanced on the Boydton plank road towards Petersburg, encountering the enemy in an inner line of works immediately around the city. Major General Wright deployed his corps confronting their works, in conjunction with the twenty-fourth and part of the second corps.

Major General Parke's attack at 4 a. m. was also successful, carrying the enemy's lines, capturing guns and prisoners, but the position of the ninth corps confronting that portion of the enemy's line, the longest held and most strongly fortified, it was found he held a second and inner line, which Major General Parke was unable to carry. Receiving a despatch during the morning from Major General Parke, reporting his being pressed by the enemy, the troops left in City Point defences, under Brigadier General Benham and Brevet Brigadier General Collins, were ordered up to General Parke's support; their prompt arrival enabling them to render material assistance to General Parke in holding his lines.

So soon as Major General Wright's success was reported, Major General Humphreys was ordered to advance with the remaining divisions of his corps; Hays, on the right, advanced and captured a redoubt in front of the Crow house, taking a gun and over 100 prisoners. Mott, on the left, on advancing on the Boydton plank road, found the enemy's line evacuated. Hays and Mott pushed forward and joined the sixth corps confronting the enemy. Early in the morning Miles, reporting his return to his position on the White Oak road, was ordered to advance on the Clairborne road simultaneously with Mott and Hays. Miles perceiving the enemy were moving to his right, pursued and overtook him

at Sutherland's station, where a sharp engagement took place, Miles handling his single division with great skill and gallantry, capturing several guns and many prisoners. On receiving intelligence of Miles being engaged, Hays was sent to his support, but did not reach the field till the action was over.

At 3 a. m. of the 2d of April, Major Generals Parke and Wright reported no enemy in their front, when, on advancing, it was ascertained Petersburg was evacuated.

Wilcox's division, ninth corps, was ordered to occupy the town, and the second, sixth, and ninth corps immediately moved up the river, reaching that night the vicinity of Sutherland's station.

The next three days, the 3d, 4th, and 5th, the pursuit was continued along the river and Namozine roads—the fifth corps following the cavalry, and the second and sixth following the fifth; the ninth having been detached to guard the South Side railroad. The progress of the troops was greatly impeded by the bad character of the road, the presence of the supply trains of the fifth corps and cavalry, and by the frequent changes of position of the cavalry, to whom the right of way was given. On the night of the 4th, receiving a despatch from Major General Sheridan that his army was in position at Amelia Court House, immediate orders were given for the resumption of the march by the troops of the second and sixth corps, reaching Jettersville between 4 and 5 p. m., where the fifth corps was found intrenched expecting an attack. No attack being made, on the morning of the 6th of April the three corps were moved in the direction of Amelia Court House, with the intention of attacking the enemy if found there; but soon after moving, intelligence was received that Lee had moved from Amelia Court House towards Farmville. The directions of the corps were changed, and the six corps moved from the right to the left. The second corps was ordered to move on Deatonsville, and the fifth and sixth corps to move in parallel direction on the right and left respectively.

The second corps soon came up with the enemy and commenced a rear-guard fight, which continued all day till evening, when the enemy was so crowded in attempting to cross Sailor's creek that he had to abandon a large train. Guns, colors, and prisoners were taken in these successful operations of the second corps.

The sixth corps, on the left of the second, came up with the enemy posted on Sailor's creek. Major General Wright attacked with two divisions, and completely routed the enemy. In this attack the cavalry under Major General Sheridan, was operating on the left of the sixth corps, whilst Humphreys was pressing on the right. The result of the combined operations was the capture of Lieutenant General Ewell and four other general officers, with most of Ewell's corps.

The next day, the 7th of April, the fifth corps was moved to the left towards Prince Edward's Court House. The second corps resumed the direct pursuit of the enemy, coming up with him at High bridge over the Appomattox. Here the enemy made a feeble stand with his rear-guard, attempting to burn the railroad and common bridge. Being driven off by Humphreys, he succeeded in burning three spans of the railroad bridge, but the common bridge was saved, which Humphreys immediately crossed in pursuit, the enemy abandoning 18 guns at this point. Humphreys came up with the enemy at the intersection of the High Bridge and Farmville roads, where he was found intrenched behind rail breastworks, evidently making a stand to cover the withdrawal of his trains. Before reaching this point Humphreys had detached Barlow's division to the left towards Farmville. Near Farmville Barlow found the enemy, who was about evacuating the place, which operation was hastened by a successful attack of Barlow's.

When Humphreys ascertained the position of the enemy, Barlow was re-

called, but did not reach Humphreys till evening, and after an unsuccessful assault had been made by part of Miles's division.

The sixth corps moved early in the morning towards Farmville, but finding the road occupied, first by the cavalry and subsequently by the twenty-fourth corps, it was too late in the afternoon before it reached that place, where it was found the enemy had destroyed the bridge. On learning the position of Humphreys, orders were sent to Wright to cross and attack in support. By great exertions a bridge for infantry was constructed, over which Wright crossed, but it was nightfall before this could be effected.

The next day, April 8, the pursuit was continued on the Lynchburg stage road. On the 9th, at 12 m., the head of the second corps, when within three miles of Appomattox Court House, came up with the enemy. At the same time I received a letter from General Lee, asking for a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for surrender. Soon after receiving this letter, Brigadier General Forsyth, of General Sheridan's staff, came through the enemy's lines and notified me a truce had been made by Major General Ord, commanding the troops on the other side of Appomattox Court House. In consequence of this I replied to General Lee that I should suspend hostilities for two hours. At the expiration of that time I received the instructions of the lieutenant general commanding to continue the armistice until further orders, and about 4 p. m. I received the welcome intelligence of the surrender of the army of northern Virginia.

It has been impossible, in the foregoing brief outline of operations, to do full justice to the several corps engaged; for this purpose reference must be had to the reports of corps and division commanders, which will be forwarded as soon as received. At the same time I would call attention to the handsome repulse of the enemy by Griffin's division, fifth corps, on the 29th ultimo; to the important part taken by the fifth corps in the battle of Five Forks; to the gallant assault, on the 2d instant, by the sixth corps—in my judgment the decisive movement of the campaign; to the successful attack of the sixth corps in the battle of Sailor's creek; to the gallant assault, on the 2d instant, of the ninth corps, and the firmness and tenacity with which the advantages then gained were held against all assaults of the enemy; to the brilliant attack of Miles's division, second corps, at Sutherland's station; to the energetic pursuit and attack of the enemy by the second corps, on the 6th instant, terminating in the battle of Sailor's creek; and to the prompt pursuit the next day, with Barlow's and Miles's attacks, as all evincing the fact that this army, officers and men, all nobly did their duty, and deserve the thanks of the country. Nothing could exceed the cheerfulness with which all submitted to fatigue and privations to secure the coveted prize—the capture of the army of northern Virginia.

The absence of official reports precludes my forwarding any statement of casualties, or lists of the captures of guns, colors, and prisoners. To my staff, general and personal, I am indebted, as I ever have been, for the most zealous and faithful discharge of their duties.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE G. MEADE,  
*Major General U. S. A., Commanding.*

Colonel T. S. BOWERS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, *May 16, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following narrative of the operations of my command during the recent campaign in front of Petersburg and Richmond, terminating with the surrender of the rebel army of northern Virginia, at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, on April 9, 1865.

On March 26 my command, consisting of the first and third cavalry divisions, under the immediate command of Brevet Major General Wesley Merritt, crossed the James river by the bridge at Jones's landing, having marched from Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley, *via* White House, on the Pamunkey river.

On March 27 this command went into camp near Hancock station, on the military railroad in front of Petersburg, and on the same day the second cavalry division, which had been serving with the army of the Potomac, reported to me under the command of Major General George Crook.

The effective force of these three divisions was as follows: General Merritt's command, first and third divisions, 5,700; General Crook's command, second division, 3,300. Total effective force, 9,000.

With this force I moved out on the 29th March, in conjunction with the armies operating against Richmond, and in the subsequent operations I was under the immediate orders of the lieutenant general commanding.

I moved by the way of Reams's station, on the Weldon railroad, and Malon's crossing, on Rowanty creek, where we were obliged to construct a bridge.

At this point our advance encountered a small picket of the rebel cavalry and drove it to the left across Stony creek, capturing a few prisoners, from whom, and from my scouts I learned that the enemy's cavalry was at or near Stony Creek depot, on the Weldon railroad, on our left flank and rear. Believing that it would not attack me, and that by pushing on to Dinwiddie Court House I could force it to make a wide detour, we continued the march, reaching the Court House about 5 o'clock p. m., encountering only a small picket of the enemy, which was driven away by our advance.

It was found necessary to order General Custer's division, which was marching in rear, to remain near Malon's crossing, on the Rowanty creek, to assist and protect our trains, which were greatly retarded by the almost impassable roads of that miry section. The first and second divisions went into camp covering the Vaughan, Flat Foot, Boydton plank, and Five Forks roads, which all intersect at Dinwiddie Court House, rendering this an important point, and from which I was expected to make a cavalry raid on the South Side railroad, and thence join General Sherman, or return to Petersburg, as circumstances might dictate. However, during the night the lieutenant general sent me instructions to abandon the contemplated raid and act in concert with the infantry under his immediate command, and turn the right flank of Lee's army if possible.

Early on the morning of the 30th March I directed General Merritt to send the first division, Brigadier General Devin commanding, to gain possession of the Five Forks on the White Oak road, and directed General Crook to send General Davies's brigade of his division to the support of General Devin.

Gregg's brigade, of Crook's division, was held on the Boydton plank road, and guarded the crossing of Stony creek, forcing the enemy's cavalry, that was moving from Stony Creek depot to form a connexion with the right of their army, to make a wide detour, as I had anticipated, on the south roads of Stony creek and west of Chamberlain's bed—a very fatiguing march in the bad condition of the roads. A very heavy rain fell during this day, aggravating the swampy nature of the ground, and rendering the movements of troops almost impossible. General Merritt's reconnoissance developed the enemy in strong force on the White Oak road in the vicinity of the Five Forks, and there was some heavy skirmishing throughout the day. Next morning, March 31, General Merritt advanced towards the Five Forks with the first division, and meeting with considerable opposition, General Devin's brigade, of Crook's division, was ordered to join him, while General Crook, advancing on the left with the two other brigades of his division, encountered the enemy's cavalry at Chamberlain's creek, at a point a little north and west of Dinwiddie, making demonstrations to cross. Smith's brigade was ordered to hold them in check and Gregg's brigade to a position on his right. The advance of the first division got possession of the Five

Forks, but in the mean time the fifth army corps, which had advanced towards the White Oak road from the Vaughan road, was attacked and driven back, and, withdrawing from that point, this force of the enemy marched rapidly from the front of the fifth corps to the Five Forks, driving in our cavalry advance, and, moving down on roads west of Chamberlain's creek, attacked General Smith's brigade, but were unable to force his position. Abandoning the attempt to cross in his front, this force of the enemy's infantry succeeded in effecting a crossing higher up the creek, striking General Davies's brigade of the second division, which, after a gallant fight, was forced back upon the left flank of the first division, thus partially isolating all this force from my main line covering Dinwiddie Court House.

Orders were at once given to General Merritt to cross this detached force over to the Boydton plank road, and march down to Dinwiddie Court House and come into the line of battle. The enemy, deceived by this movement, followed it up rapidly, making a left wheel, and presenting his rear to my line of battle. When his line was nearly parallel to mine, General Gibbs's brigade of the first division, and General Irvin Gregg's brigade of the second division, were ordered to attack at once, and General Custer was directed to bring up two of his brigades rapidly, leaving one brigade of his division with the trains that had not yet reached Dinwiddie Court House. In the gallant attack made by Gibbs and Gregg the enemy's wounded fell into our hands, and he was forced to face by the rear rank, and give up his movement, which, if continued, would have taken in flank and rear the infantry line of the army of the Potomac. When the enemy had faced to meet this attack a very obstinate and handsomely contested battle ensued, in which, with all his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, the enemy was unable to drive five brigades of our cavalry, dismounted, from an open plain in front of Dinwiddie Court House. The brunt of their cavalry attack was borne by General Smith's brigade, which had so gallantly held the crossing of Chamberlain's creek in the morning. His command again held the enemy in check with determined bravery, but the heavy force brought against his right flank finally compelled him to abandon his position on the creek, and fall back to the main line immediately in front of Dinwiddie Court House. As the enemy's infantry advanced to the attack, our cavalry threw up slight breastworks of rails at some points along our lines, and when the enemy attempted to force this position they were handsomely repulsed, and gave up the attempt to gain possession of the Court House. It was after dark when the firing ceased, and the enemy lay on their arms that night not more than one hundred yards in front of our lines. The commands of Generals Devin and Davies reached Dinwiddie Court House without opposition by way of the Boydton plank road, but did not participate in the final action of the day. In this well-contested battle the most obstinate gallantry was displayed by my entire command. The brigades commanded by General Gibbs and Colonels Stagg and Fitzhugh, in the first division, Generals Davies, Gregg, and Smith, in the second division, Colonels Pennington and Capehart, in the third division, vied with each other in their determined efforts to hold in check the superior force of the enemy; and the skilful management of their troops in this peculiarly difficult country entitles the brigade commanders to the highest commendation.

Generals Crook, Merritt, Custer, and Devin, by their courage and ability, sustained their commands, and executed the rapid movements of the day with promptness and without confusion.

During the night of the 31st of March my headquarters were at Dinwiddie Court House, and the Lieutenant General notified me that the fifth corps would report to me, and should reach me by midnight. This corps had been offered to me on the 30th instant, but very much desiring the sixth corps, which had been with me in the Shenandoah valley, I asked for it, but on account of the delay which would occur in moving that corps from its position in the lines in

front of Petersburg, it could not be sent to me. I respectfully submit herewith my brief accounts of the operations of the day, the response to which was the ordering of the fifth corps to my support and my command, as also the despatch of the Lieutenant General notifying me of his action. I understood that the fifth corps, when ordered to report to me, was in position near S. Dabney's house, in the angle between the Boydton road and the Five Forks road.

Had General Warren moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant General, there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddie Court House. Ayres's division moved down the Boydton plank road during the night, and in the morning moved west *via* R. Boisseau's house, striking the Five Forks road about two and a half miles north of Dinwiddie Court House. General Warren, with Griffin's and Crawford's divisions, moved down the road by Crump's house, coming into the Five Forks, near J. Boisseau's house, between 7 and 8 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of April. Meantime I moved my cavalry force at daylight against the enemy's lines in my front, which gave way rapidly, moving off by the right flank and crossing Chamberlain's creek. This hasty movement was accelerated by the discovery that two divisions of the fifth corps were in their rear, and that one division was moving towards their left and rear.

The following were the instructions sent to General Warren :

“CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS,  
“*Dinwiddie C. H., April 1, 1865—3 a. m.*”

“I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leading to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A. Adams's house, which leads out across Chamberlain's bed or run. I understand you have a division at J. Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his flanks. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this side of Adams's house, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that may escape you by a flank attack. Do not fear my leaving here. If the enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight.

“P. H. SHERIDAN, *Major General.*”

“Major General WARREN,

“*Commanding Fifth Army Corps.*”

As they fell back the enemy were rapidly followed by General Merritt's two divisions, General Devin on the right and General Custer on the left; General Crook in rear. During the remainder of the day General Crook's division held the extreme left and rear, and was not seriously engaged.

I then determined that I would drive the enemy, with the cavalry, to the Five Forks, press them inside of their works, and make a feint to turn their right flank, and meanwhile quietly move up the fifth corps with a view to attacking their left flank, crush the whole force, if possible, and drive westward those who might escape, thus isolating them from their army at Petersburg. Happily, this conception was successfully executed. About this time General McKenzie's division of cavalry, from the army of the James, reported to me, and consisted of about 1,000 effective men. I directed General Warren to hold fast at J. Boisseau's house, refresh his men, and be ready to move to the front when required; and General McKenzie was ordered to rest in front of Dinwiddie Court House until further orders.

Meantime General Merritt's command continued to press the enemy, and by impetuous charges drove them from two lines of temporary works; General

Custer guiding his advance on the widow Gilliam's house and General Devin on the main Five Forks road. The courage displayed by the cavalry officers and men was superb, and about 2 o'clock the enemy was behind his works on the White Oak road, and his skirmish line drawn in. I then ordered up the fifth corps on the main road, and sent Brevet Major Gillispie, of the engineers, to turn the head of the column off on the Gravelly Church road, and put the corps in position on this road obliquely to and at a point but a short distance from the White Oak road, and about one mile from the Five Forks. Two divisions of the corps were to form the front line, and one division was to be held in reserve in column of regiments opposite the centre.

I then directed General Merritt to demonstrate as though he was attempting to turn the enemy's right flank, and notified him that the fifth corps would strike the enemy's left flank, and ordered that the cavalry should assault the enemy's works as soon as the fifth corps became engaged, and that would be determined by the volleys of musketry. I then rode over to where the fifth corps was going into position, and found them coming up very slowly. I was exceedingly anxious to attack at once, for the sun was getting low, and we had to fight or go back. It was no place to intrench, and it would have been shameful to have gone back with no results to compensate for the loss of the brave men who had fallen during the day. In this connexion, I will say that General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done, and his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed. As soon as the corps was in position, I ordered an advance in the following formation: Ayres's division on the left in double lines, Crawford's division on the right in double lines, and Griffin's division in reserve, behind Crawford, and the White Oak road was reached without opposition.

While General Warren was getting into position I learned that the left of the second corps of the army of the Potomac, on my right, had been swung around from the direction of its line of battle until it fronted on the Boydton road, and parallel to it, which afforded an opportunity to the enemy to march down the White Oak road and attack me in right and rear. General McKenzie was therefore sent up the Crump road, with directions to gain the White Oak road if possible, but to attack at all hazards any enemy found, and if successful, then march down that road and join me. General McKenzie executed this with courage and skill, attacking a force of the enemy on the White Oak road, and driving it towards Petersburg. He then countermarched, and joined me on the White Oak road just as the fifth corps advanced to the attack, and I directed him to swing round with the right of the infantry and gain possession of the Ford road at the crossing of Hatcher's run. The fifth corps, on reaching the White Oak road, made a left wheel, and burst on the enemy's left flank and rear like a tornado, and pushed rapidly on, orders having been given that if the enemy was routed there should be no halt to reform broken lines. As stated before, the firing of the fifth corps was the signal to General Merritt to assault, which was promptly responded to, and the works of the enemy were soon carried at several points by our brave cavalrymen. The enemy were driven from their strong line of works and completely routed, the fifth corps doubling up their left flank in confusion, and the cavalry of General Merritt dashing on to the White Oak road, capturing their artillery and turning it upon them, and, riding into their broken ranks, so demoralized them that they made no serious stand after their line was carried, but took to flight in disorder. Between 5,000 and 6,000 prisoners fell into our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward, and were pursued until long after dark by Merritt's and McKenzie's cavalry for a distance of six miles.

During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. During the engagement portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy

fire, and simply from want of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Warren did not exert himself to inspire. I therefore relieved him from the command of the fifth corps, authority for this action having been sent to me, before the battle, unsolicited. When the pursuit was given up, I directed General Griffin, who had been ordered to assume command of the fifth corps, to collect his corps at once, march two divisions back to Gravelly church, and put them into position at right angles to the White Oak road, facing towards Petersburg, while Bartlett's division, (Griffin's old,) covered the Ford road to Hatcher's run. General Merritt's cavalry went into camp on the widow Gilliam's plantation, and General McKenzie took position on the Ford road at the crossing of Hatcher's run. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops in this battle, and of the gallantry of their commanding officers, who appeared to realize that the success of the campaign and fate of Lee's army depended upon it. They merit the thanks of the country and reward of the government. To Generals Griffin, Ayres, Bartlett, and Crawford, of the fifth corps, and to Generals Merritt, Custer, Devin, and McKenzie, of the cavalry, great credit is due; and to their subordinate commanders they will undoubtedly award the praise which is due to them for the hearty co-operation, bravery, and ability which were everywhere displayed. At daylight on the morning of April 2, General Miles's division of the second corps reported to me, coming over from the Boydton plank road. I ordered it to move up the White Oak road towards Petersburg, and attack the enemy at the intersection of that road with the Claiborne road, where he was in position in heavy force, and I followed General Miles immediately with two divisions of the fifth corps. Miles forced the enemy from this position and pursued with great zeal, pushing him across Hatcher's run, and following him up on the road to Sutherland's depot. On the north side of the run I overtook Miles, who was anxious to attack, and had a very fine and spirited division. I gave him permission, but about this time General Humphreys came up, and, receiving notice from General Meade that General Humphreys would take command of Miles's division, I relinquished it at once, and faced the fifth corps by the rear. I afterwards regretted giving up this division, as I believe the enemy could at that time have been crushed at Sutherland's depot. I returned to Five Forks, and marched out the Ford road towards Hatcher's run.

The cavalry had in the mean time been sent westward to cross Hatcher's run and break up the enemy's cavalry, which had collected in considerable force north of that stream, but they would not stand to fight, and our cavalry pursued them in a direction due north to the Namozine road. Crossing Hatcher's run with the fifth corps, the South Side railroad was struck at Ford's depot, meeting no opposition, and the fifth corps marched rapidly toward Sutherland's depot, in flank and rear of the enemy opposing Miles. As he approached that point the force of the enemy fled before the fifth corps could reach them, retreating along the main road by the Appomattox river, the cavalry and Crawford's division of the fifth corps engaging them slightly about dusk. On the morning of the 3d our cavalry took up the pursuit, routing the enemy's cavalry, and capturing many prisoners. The enemy's infantry was encountered at Deep creek, where a severe fight took place. The fifth corps followed up the cavalry rapidly, picking up many prisoners and five pieces of abandoned artillery, and a number of wagons. The fifth corps, with Crook's division of cavalry, encamped that night (the 4th) at Deep creek, on the Namozine road, neither of these commands having been engaged during the day. On the morning of the 4th General Crook was ordered to strike the Danville railroad between Jettersville and Burke's station, and then move up toward Jettersville. The fifth corps moved rapidly to that point, as I had learned from my scouts that the enemy was at Amelia Court House, and everything indicated that they were collecting at that point. On arriving at Jettersville, about 5 o'clock p. m., I learned without doubt that Lee and his army were at Amelia Court House.

The 5th corps was at once ordered to intrench, with a view to holding Jetersville until the main army could come up. It seems to me that this was the only chance the army of northern Virginia had to save itself, which might have been done had General Lee promptly attacked and driven back the comparatively small force opposed to him and pursued his march to Burksville Junction. A despatch from General Lee's chief commissary to the commissary at Danville and Lynchburg, requiring two hundred thousand rations to be sent to meet the army at Burksville, was here intercepted. So soon as I found that the entire army of the enemy was concentrated at Amelia Court House, I forwarded promptly all the information I had obtained to General Meade and the Lieutenant General. On the morning of April 5 General Crook was directed to send General Davies's brigade to make a reconnoissance to Paine's Crossroads on our left and front, and ascertain if the enemy was making any movement towards that flank to escape. General Davies struck a train of one hundred and eighty wagons, escorted by a considerable force of the enemy's cavalry, which he defeated, capturing five pieces of artillery. He destroyed the wagons and brought in a large number of prisoners. Gregg's and Smith's brigades of the second division were sent out to support Davies, and some heavy fighting ensued, the enemy having sent a strong force of infantry to attack and cut off Davies's brigade, which attempt was unsuccessful. During the afternoon, and after the arrival of the second corps at Jetersville, which General Meade requested me to put in position, he being ill, the enemy demonstrated strongly in front of Jetersville against Smith's and Gregg's brigades of Crook's division of cavalry, but no serious attack was made. Early on the morning of April 6 General Crook was ordered to move to the left to Deatonsville, followed by Custer's and Devin's divisions of General Merritt's command. The 5th corps had been returned to the command of General Meade at his request. I afterwards regretted giving up the corps.

When near Deatonsville the enemy's trains were discovered moving in the direction of Burksville or Farmville, escorted by heavy masses of infantry and cavalry, and it soon became evident that the whole of Lee's army was attempting to make its escape. Crook was at once ordered to attack the trains, and, if the enemy was too strong, one of the divisions would pass him while he held fast and pressed the enemy, and attack at a point further on, and this division was ordered to do the same, and so on, alternating, and this system of attack would enable us finally to strike some weak point. This result was obtained just south of Sailor's creek and on the high ground over that stream. Custer took the road, and Crook and Devin coming up to his support, 16 pieces of artillery were captured and about 400 wagons destroyed, and many prisoners were taken, and three divisions of the enemy's infantry were cut off from the line of retreat. Meantime Colonel Stagg, commanding the Michigan brigade of the first division, was held at a point about two and a half miles south of Deatonsville, and with this force and a section of Miller's battery, which shelled the trains with excellent effect while Colonel Stagg demonstrated to attack them, thus keeping a large force of the enemy from moving against the rest of the cavalry and holding them until the arrival of the 6th corps, which was marching to report to me. I felt so strongly the necessity of holding this large force of the enemy that I gave permission to General Merritt to order Colonel Stagg's brigade to make a mounted charge against their lines, which was most gallantly done, the men leaving many of their horses dead almost up to the enemy's works.

On the arrival of the head of the 6th corps the enemy commenced withdrawing. Major General Wright was ordered to put Seymour's division into position at once and advance and carry the road, which was done at a point about two miles or two miles and a half from Deatonsville. As soon as the road was in our possession, Wright was directed to push General Seymour on, the enemy falling back, skirmishing briskly. Their resistance growing stubborn, a halt was called to get up Wheaton's division of the 6th corps, which went into position

on the left of the road, Seymour being on the right. Wheaton was ordered to guide right, with his right connecting with Seymour's left and resting on the road. I still felt the great importance of pushing the enemy, and was unwilling to wait for Getty's division of the 6th corps to get up. I therefore ordered an advance, sending word to General Humphreys, who was on the road to our right, and requesting him to push on, as I felt confident that we could break up the enemy. It was apparent, from the absence of artillery fire and the manner in which they gave way when pressed, that the force of the enemy opposed to us was a heavy rear guard. The enemy was driven until our lines reached Sailor's creek; and, from the north bank, I could see our cavalry on the high ground above the creek and south of it, and the long line of smoke from the burning wagons. A cavalryman, who, in a charge, cleared the enemy's works and came through their lines, reported to me what was in front. I regret that I have forgotten the name of this gallant young soldier. As soon as General Wright could get his artillery into position I ordered the attack to be made on the left, and sent Colonel Stagg's brigade of cavalry to strike and flank the extreme right of the enemy's line. The attack by the infantry was not executed exactly as I had directed, and a portion of our line in the open ground was broken by the terrible fire of the enemy, who were in position on commanding ground south of the creek.

This attack by Wheaton's and Seymour's divisions was splendid, but no more than I had reason to expect from the gallant 6th corps. The cavalry in rear of the enemy attacked simultaneously, and the enemy, after a gallant resistance, were completely surrounded, and nearly all threw down their arms and surrendered. General Ewell, commanding the enemy's forces, and a number of other general officers, fell into our hands, and a very large number of prisoners. I have never ascertained exactly how many prisoners were taken in this battle. Most of them fell into the hands of the cavalry, but they are no more entitled to claim them than the 6th corps, to which command equal credit is due for the good results of this engagement. Both the cavalry and the 6th corps encamped south of Sailor's creek that night, having followed up the small remnant of the enemy's forces for several miles. In reference to the participation of the 6th corps in this action I desire to add that the Lieutenant General had notified me that this corps would report to me. Major McClellan and Lieutenant Colonel Franklin, of General Wright's staff, had successively been sent forward to report the progress of the corps in coming up, and on the arrival of Major General Wright he reported his corps to me, and from that time until after the battle received my orders and obeyed them; but after the engagement was over and General Meade had communicated with General Wright, the latter declined to make his report to me until directed to do so by the Lieutenant General.

On the 7th instant the pursuit was continued early in the morning by the cavalry, General Crook in the advance. It was discovered that the enemy had not been cut off by the army of the James, and under the belief that he would attempt to escape on the Danville road through Prince Edward Court House, General Merritt was ordered to move his two divisions to that point, passing around the left of the army of the James. General Crook continued the direct pursuit, encountering the main body of the enemy at Farmville, and again on the north side of the Appomattox, where the enemy's trains were attacked by General Gregg, and a sharp fight with the enemy's infantry ensued, in which General Gregg was unfortunately captured.

On arriving at Prince Edward Court House I found General McKenzie, with his division of cavalry from the army of the James, and ordered him to cross the bridge on the Buffalo river and make a reconnoissance to Prospect Station, on the Lynchburg railroad, and ascertain if the enemy were moving past that point. Meantime I heard from General Crook that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox, and General Merritt was then moved on and en-

camped at Buffalo creek, and General Crook was ordered to recross the Appomattox and encamp at Prospect Station. On the morning of the 8th Merritt and McKenzie continued the march to Prospect Station, and Merritt's and Crook's commands then moved on to Appomattox depot, a point on the Lynchburg railroad, five miles south of Appomattox Court House. Shortly after the march commenced, Sergeant White, one of my scouts, notified me that there were four trains of cars at Appomattox depot loaded with supplies for General Lee's army; Generals Merritt and Crook were at once notified, and the command pushed on briskly for twenty-eight miles. General Custer had the advance, and on nearing the depot skilfully threw a force in rear of the trains and captured them. Without halting a moment he pushed on, driving the enemy (who had reached the depot about the same time as our cavalry) in the direction of Appomattox Court House, capturing many prisoners and 25 pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and a large park of wagons. General Devin coming up, went in on the right of Custer. The fighting continued till after dark, and the enemy being driven to Appomattox Court House, I at once notified the Lieutenant General, and sent word to Generals Ord and Gibbon, of the army of the James, and General Griffin, commanding the 5th corps, who were in rear, that if they pressed on there was now no means of escape for the enemy, who had reached "the last ditch." During the night, although we knew that the remnant of Lee's army was in our front, we held fast with the cavalry to what we had gained, and ran the captured trains back along the railroad to a point where they would be protected by our infantry that was coming up. The 24th and 5th corps, and one division of the 25th corps, arrived about daylight on the 9th at Appomattox depot.

After consulting with General Ord, who was in command of these corps, I rode to the front, near Appomattox Court House, and just as the enemy in heavy force was attacking the cavalry with the intention of breaking through our lines, I directed the cavalry, which was dismounted, to fall back, gradually resisting the enemy, so as to give time for the infantry to form its lines and march to the attack, and when this was done, to move off to the right flank and mount. This was done, and the enemy discontinued his attack as soon as he caught sight of our infantry. I moved briskly around the left of the enemy's line of battle, which was falling back rapidly, (heavily pressed by the advance of the infantry,) and was about to charge the trains and the confused mass of the enemy, when a white flag was presented to General Custer, who had the advance, and who sent the information to me at once that the enemy desired to surrender.

Riding over to the left at Appomattox Court House, I met Major General Gordon, of the rebel service, and Major General Wilcox. General Gordon requested a suspension of hostilities, pending negotiations for a surrender then being held between Lieutenant General Grant and General Lee. I notified him that I desired to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood, but as there was nothing definitely settled in the correspondence, and as an attack had been made on my lines with the view to escape, under the impression our force was only cavalry, I must have some assurance of an intended surrender. This General Gordon gave by saying that there was no doubt of the surrender of General Lee's army. I then separated from him, with an agreement to meet these officers again in half an hour at Appomattox Court house. At the specified time, in company with General Ord, who commanded the infantry, I again met this officer, also Lieutenant General Longstreet, and received from them the same assurance, and hostilities ceased until the arrival of Lieutenant General Grant.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN, *Major General.*

Brevet Major General JOHN A. RAWLINS, *Chief of Staff.*

CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS,  
*Dinwiddie Court House, March 31, 1865.*

The enemy's cavalry attacked me about 10 o'clock to-day on the road coming in from the west and a little north of Dinwiddie Court House. This attack was very handsomely repulsed by General Smith's brigade of Crook's division, and the enemy was driven across Chamberlain's creek. Shortly afterwards the enemy's infantry attacked on the same creek in heavy force, and drove in General Davis's brigade, and advancing rapidly gained the forks of the road at J. Boisseau's. This forced Devin, who was in advance, and Davies, to cross to the Boydton road. General Gregg's brigade and General Gibbs's brigade, who had been towards Dinwiddie, then attacked the enemy in the rear very handsomely. This stopped the march towards the left of our infantry, and finally caused them to turn towards Dinwiddie and attack us in heavy force. The enemy then again attacked at Chamberlain's creek and forced Smith's position. At this time Capehart and Pennington's brigades of Custer's division came up and a very handsome fight occurred.

The enemy have gained some ground, but we still hold in front of Dinwiddie, and Davies and Devin are coming down the Boydton road to join us.

The opposing force was Pickett's division, Wise's independent brigade of infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee's, Rosser's, and W. H. Lee's cavalry commands.

The men have behaved splendidly. Our loss in killed and wounded will probably number 450 men; very few were lost as prisoners.

We have of the enemy a number of prisoners.

This force is too strong for us. I will hold on to Dinwiddie Court House until I am compelled to leave.

Our fighting to-day was all dismounted.

P. H. SHERIDAN, *Major General.*

Lieutenant General GRANT,  
*Commanding Armies United States.*

DABNEY MILLS,  
*March 31, 1865—10.05 p. m.*

The 5th corps has been ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J. Boisseau's and one down the Boydton road. In addition to this I have sent McKenzie's cavalry, which will reach you by the Vaughan road.

All these forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-night.

You will assume command of the whole force sent to operate with you, and use it to the best of your ability to destroy the force which your command has fought so gallantly to-day.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General P. H. SHERIDAN.

Official copy:

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *November 18, 1865.*

*Major General W. T. Sherman's report of the campaign of Atlanta.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Atlanta, Georgia, September 15, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have heretofore from day to day, by telegraph, kept the War Department and the general-in-chief advised of the progress of events, but now

it becomes necessary to review the whole campaign which has resulted in the capture and occupation of the city of Atlanta.

On the 14th day of March, 1864, at Memphis, Tennessee, I received notice from General Grant, at Nashville, that he had been commissioned lieutenant general and commander-in chief of the armies of the United States, which would compel him to go east, and that I had been appointed to succeed him as commander of the division of the Mississippi. He summoned me to Nashville for a conference, and I took my departure the same day, and reached Nashville, *via* Cairo, on the 17th, and accompanied him on his journey eastward as far as Cincinnati. We had a full and complete understanding of the policy and plans for the ensuing campaign, covering a vast area of country, my part of which extended from Chattanooga to Vicksburg. I returned to Nashville, and on the 25th began a tour of inspection, visiting Athens, Decatur, Huntsville, and Larkin's Ferry, Alabama; Chattanooga, Loudon, and Knoxville, Tennessee. During this visit I had interviews with Major General McPherson, commanding the army of the Tennessee, at Huntsville; Major General Thomas, commanding the army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga; and Major General Schofield, commanding the army of the Ohio, at Knoxville. We arranged in general terms the lines of communication to be guarded, the strength of the several columns and garrisons, and fixed the 1st day of May as the time when all things should be ready. Leaving these officers to complete the details of organization and preparation, I returned again to Nashville on the 2d of April, and gave my personal attention to the question of supplies. I found the depots at Nashville abundantly supplied and the railroads in very fair order, and that steps had already been taken to supply cars and locomotives to fill the new and increased demands of the service, but the impoverished condition of the inhabitants of East Tennessee, more especially in the region around about Chattanooga, had forced the commanding officers of posts to issue food to the people. I was compelled to stop this, for a simple calculation showed that a single railroad could not feed the armies and the people too, and of course the army had the preference, but I endeavored to point the people to new channels of supply. At first my orders operated very hardly, but the prolific soil soon afforded early vegetables, and ox wagons hauled meat and bread from Kentucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust that those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day have already seen in the result a perfect justification of my course. At once the storehouses at Chattanooga began to fill, so that by the 1st of May a very respectable quantity of food and forage had been accumulated there, and from that day to this, stores have been brought forward in wonderful abundance, with a surplus that has enabled me to feed the army well during the whole period of time, although the enemy has succeeded more than once in breaking our road for many miles at different points.

During the month of April I received from Lieutenant General Grant a map with a letter of instructions, which is now at Nashville, but a copy will be procured, and made part of this report. Subsequently I received from him notice that he would move from his camps about Culpeper, Virginia, on the 5th of May, and he wanted me to do the same from Chattanooga. My troops were still dispersed, and the cavalry, so necessary to our success, was yet collecting horses at Nicholasville, Kentucky, and Columbus, Tennessee. On the 27th of April I put all the troops in motion towards Chattanooga, and on the next day went there in person. My aim and purpose was to make the army of the Cumberland 50,000 men, that of the Tennessee 35,000, and that of the Ohio 15,000. These figures were approximated, but never reached, the army of the Tennessee, failing to receive certain divisions that were still kept on the Mississippi river, resulting from the unfavorable issue of the Red River expedition. But on the 1st day of May the effective strength of the several armies for offensive purposes was about as follows:

## ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS COMMANDING.

Infantry .....	54, 568
Artillery .....	2, 377
Cavalry .....	3, 828
	<hr/>
Total .....	60, 773
Guns .....	130
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## ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, MAJOR GENERAL M'PHERSON COMMANDING.

Infantry .....	22, 437
Artillery .....	1, 404
Cavalry .....	624
	<hr/>
Total .....	24, 465
Guns .....	96
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## ARMY OF THE OHIO, MAJOR GENERAL SCHOFIELD COMMANDING.

Infantry .....	11, 183
Artillery .....	679
Cavalry .....	1, 697
	<hr/>
Total .....	13, 559
Guns .....	28
	<hr/> <hr/>

Grand aggregate number of troops, 98,797; guns, 254.

About these figures have been maintained during the campaign, the number of men joining from furlough and hospitals about compensating for the loss in battle and from sickness. These armies were grouped on the morning of May 6, as follows: that of the Cumberland at and near Ringgold; that of the Tennessee at Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga; and that of the Ohio near Red Clay, on the Georgia line, north of Dalton.

The enemy lay in and about Dalton, superior to me in cavalry, (Wheeler's,) and with three corps of infantry and artillery, viz: Hardee's, Hood's, and Polk's, the whole commanded by General Joseph Johnston, of the confederate army. I estimated the cavalry under Wheeler at about 10,000, and the infantry and artillery at about 45,000 or 50,000 men.

To strike Dalton in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge known as the Rocky Face, through which was a pass between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, known as the Buzzard Roost, through which lay the railroad and wagon-road. It was narrow, well obstructed by abatis, and flooded by water caused by dams across Mill creek. Batteries also commanded it in its whole length from the spurs on either side, and more especially from a ridge at the further end, like a traverse, directly across its debouche. It was, therefore, necessary to turn it. On its north front the enemy had a strong line of works behind Mill creek, so that my attention was at once directed to the south. In that direction I found Snake Creek Gap, affording me a good practicable way to reach Resaca, a point on the enemy's railroad line of communication, eighteen miles below Dalton. Accordingly I ordered General McPherson to move rapidly from his position at Gordon's Mill, *via* Ship's Gap, Villanow, and Snake Creek Gap, directly on Resaca, or the railroad at any point below Dalton, and to make a bold attack. After breaking the railroad well, he was ordered to fall back to a strong defensive position near Snake creek, and stand ready to fall upon the enemy's flank when he retreated, as I judged he would. During the

movement, General Thomas was to make a strong feint of attack in front, while General Schofield pressed down from the north.

General Thomas moved from Ringgold on the 7th, occupying Tunnel Hill facing the Buzzard Roost Gap, meeting with little opposition and pushing the enemy's cavalry well through the gap. General McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap on the 8th, completely surprising a brigade of cavalry which was coming to watch and hold it, and on the 9th General Schofield pushed down close on Dalton, from the north, whilst General Thomas renewed his demonstration against Buzzard Roost and Rocky Faced Ridge, pushing it almost to a battle. One division, General Newton's, of the 4th corps, General Howard's, carried the ridge, and turning south towards Dalton, found the crest too narrow and too well protected by rock epaulments, to enable him to reach the gorge or pass. Another division, General Geary's, of the 20th corps, General Hooker's, also made a bold push for the summit, to the south of the pass, but the narrow road, as it approached the summit, was too strongly held by the enemy to be carried. This, however, was only designed as a demonstration, and worked well, for General McPherson was thereby enabled to march within a mile of Resaca almost unopposed. He found Resaca too strong to be carried by assault, and although there were many good roads leading from north to south, endangering his left flank from the direction of Dalton, he could find no road by which he could rapidly cross over to the railroad, and accordingly he fell back and took strong position near the east end of Snake Creek Gap. I was somewhat disappointed at the result, still appreciated the advantage gained, and on the 10th ordered General Thomas to send General Hooker's corps to Snake Creek Gap in support of General McPherson, and to follow with another corps, the 14th, General Palmer's, leaving General Howard with the 4th corps to continue to threaten Dalton in front, whilst the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek Gap. On the same day General Schofield was ordered to follow by the same route, and on the 11th the whole army, excepting General Howard's corps, and some cavalry left to watch Dalton, was in motion on the west side of Rocky Faced Ridge for Snake Creek Gap and Resaca. The next day we moved against Resaca, General McPherson on the direct road, preceded by General Kilpatrick's cavalry; General Thomas to come up on his left and General Schofield on his right. General Kilpatrick met and drove the enemy's cavalry from a cross road within two miles of Resaca, but received a wound which disabled him and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, who, according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca and drove them within their fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of "bald" hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left abreast the town. General Thomas came up on his left, facing Camp creek, and General Schofield broke his way through the dense forest to General Thomas's left. Johnston had left Dalton, and General Howard entered it and pressed his rear. Nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This fact enabled his army to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively good roads constructed beforehand, partly from the topographical nature of the country, and partly from the foresight of the rebel chief. At all events, on the 14th of May we found the rebel army in a strong position behind Camp creek, occupying the forts at Resaca, and his right on some high chestnut hills to the north of the town. I at once ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's ferry in the direction of Calhoun; a division of the 16th corps, commanded by General Sweeny, to cross and threaten Calhoun; also the cavalry division of General Garrard to move from its position at Villanow down towards Rome, to cross the Oostanaula and break the railroad below Calhoun and above Kingston if possible, and with the main army I pressed against

Resaca at all points. General McPherson got across Camp creek near its mouth and made a lodgement close up to the enemy's works, on hills that commanded, with short-range artillery, the railroad and trussel bridges; and General Thomas pressing close along Camp creek valley, threw General Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main Dalton road, and down it close to Resaca.

General Schofield came up close on his left, and a heavy battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the 15th, during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several strong hills, captured a four-gun battery and many prisoners. That night Johnston escaped, retreating south across the Oostanaula, and the next morning we entered the town in time to save the road bridge, but the railroad bridge was burned.

The whole army started in pursuit, General Thomas directly on his heels, General McPherson by Lay's ferry, and General Schofield by obscure roads to the left. We found in Resaca another four-gun battery and a good lot of stores.

General McPherson during the 16th got across at Lay's ferry. General Thomas had to make some additional bridges at Resaca, but General Schofield had more trouble, and made a wide circuit to the left by Fite's and Field's ferries across the Connasauga and Coosawattee rivers, which form the Oostanaula. On the 17th all the armies moved south by as many different roads as we could find, and General Thomas had sent by my orders a division, General Jeff. C. Davis, along the west bank of the Oostanaula, to Rome. Near Adairsville we again found signs of the rebel army, and of a purpose to fight, and about sunset of that day, General Newton's division in the advance, had a pretty sharp encounter with his rear guard, but the next morning he was gone, and we pushed on through Kingston to a point four miles beyond, where we found him again in force on ground comparatively open, and well adapted to a grand battle. We made the proper dispositions. General Schofield approaching Cassville from the north, to which point General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, and I had drawn General McPherson's army from Woodland to Kingston to be in close support. On the 19th the enemy was in force about Cassville with strong forts, but as our troops converged on him again he retreated in the night time across the Etowah river, burning the road and railroad bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in complete possession of the most valuable country above the Etowah river.

Holding General Thomas's army about Cassville, General McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield's at Cassville depot and toward the Etowah bridge, I gave the army a few days' rest and also time to bring forward supplies for the next stage of the campaign. In the mean time General Jeff. C. Davis had got possession of Rome with its forts, some eight or ten guns of heavy calibre, and its valuable mills and foundries. We also secured possession of two good bridges across the Etowah river near Kingston, giving us the means of crossing toward the south. Satisfied that the enemy could and would hold us in check at the Allatoona Pass, I resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right, and having supplied our wagons for twenty days' absence from our railroad, I left a garrison at Rome and Kingston, and on the 23d put the army in motion for Dallas."

General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of Conasene creek, near Kingston, and moved for his position to the south of Dallas *via* Van Wert. General Davis's division moved directly from Rome for Dallas by Van Wert. General Thomas took the road *via* Euharlee and Burnt Hickory, whilst General Schofield moved by other roads more to the east, aiming to come up on General Thomas's left.

General Thomas's head of column skirmished with the enemy's cavalry about Burnt Hickory and captured a courier with a letter of General Johnston, showing he had detected the move and was preparing to meet us about Dallas. The

country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded, with few and obscure roads.

On the 25th of May General Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory for Dallas, his troops on three roads, General Hooker having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin Vine creek, on the main Dallas road, he found a respectable force of the enemy's cavalry at a bridge to his left. He rapidly pushed them across the creek, saving the bridge, though on fire, and followed out eastward about two miles, where he first encountered infantry, whose pickets he drove some distance until he encountered the enemy's line of battle, and his leading division, General Geary's, had a severe encounter. General Hooker's other two divisions were on other roads, and he ordered them in, although the road he was then following, by reason of the presence of the enemy, led him north of Dallas about four miles.

It was near 4 o'clock p. m. before General Hooker got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed two divisions and by my order made a bold push to secure possession of a point known as the New Hope Church, where three roads meet from Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas. Here a hard battle was fought, and the enemy was driven back to New Hope Church; but having hastily thrown up some parapets, and a stormy, dark night having set in, General Hooker was unable to drive the enemy from those roads. By the next morning we found the enemy well intrenched substantially in front of the road leading from Dallas to Marietta. We were consequently compelled to make dispositions on a larger scale. General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas was deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield was directed towards our left so as to strike and turn the enemy's right. General Garrard's cavalry operated with General McPherson, and General Stoneman with General Schofield. General McCook looked to our rear.

Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and dense forests, it took us several days to deploy close to the enemy, when I resolved gradually to work towards our left, and when all things were ready to push for the railroad east of Allatoona. In making our development before the enemy about New Hope many severe, sharp encounters occurred between parts of the army, details of which will be given at length in reports of subordinate commanders. On the 28th General McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church, to enable me with the rest of the army to extend still more to the left and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy made a bold and daring assault on him at Dallas.

Fortunately our men had erected good breastworks and gave the enemy a terrible and bloody repulse. After a few days' delay, for effect, I renewed my orders to General McPherson to move to his left about five miles and occupy General Thomas's position in front of New Hope Church, and Generals Thomas and Schofield were ordered to move a corresponding distance to their left. This move was effected with ease and safety on the 1st of June, and by pushing our left well around we occupied all the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth, after which I pushed General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the east end of the pass, and General Garrard's cavalry around by the rear to the west end of the pass. Both of these commands reached the points designated without trouble, and we thereby accomplished our real purpose of turning the Allatoona Pass.

Ordering the railroad bridge across the Etowah to be at once rebuilt, I continued working by the left, and on the 4th of June had resolved to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church and move to the railroad about Ackworth, when he abandoned his intrenchments, after which we moved readily to Ackworth and reached the railroad on the 6th of June. I at once examined in person the Allatoona Pass and found it admirably adapted to our use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defence and garrison, and as

soon as the railroad bridge was finished across the Etowah our stores came forward to our camps by rail.

At Ackworth General Blair overtook us on the 8th of June with two divisions of the 17th corps that had been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry, Colonel Long's, of General Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This accession of force about compensated for our losses in battle and the detachments left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona.

On the 9th of June, our communications to the rear being secure and supplies ample, we moved forward to Big Shanty.

Kenesaw, the bold and striking Twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills trending off to the northeast, terminating to our view in another peak called Brushy mountain. To our right was the smaller hill called Pine mountain, and beyond it in the distance Lost mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Kenesaw, Pine mountain, and Lost mountain, form a triangle, Pine mountain the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost mountain the base, covering perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal stations. The summits were covered with batteries and the spurs were alive with men, busy in felling trees, digging pits, and preparing for the grand struggle impending.

The scene was enchanting, too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamors of war; but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it. On approaching close to the enemy I found him occupying a line full twelve miles long, more than he could hold with his force. General McPherson was ordered to move towards Marietta, his right on the railroad, General Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine mountain, and General Schofield off toward Lost mountain; General Garrard's cavalry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right, and General McCook looking to our rear and communications. Our depot was at Big Shanty.

By the 11th of June our lines were close up, and we made dispositions to break the line between Kenesaw and Pine mountains. General Hooker was on its right and front, General Howard on its left and front, and General Palmer between it and the railroad. During a sharp cannonading from General Howard's right or General Hooker's left, General Polk was killed on the 14th, and on the morning of the 15th Pine mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost mountain. At the same time General McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. Pushing our operations on the centre as vigorously as the nature of the ground would permit, I had again ordered an assault on the centre, when, on the 17th, the enemy abandoned Lost mountain and the long line of admirable breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw. We continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber and across most difficult ravines, until we found him again strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw as his salient, his right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, and his left behind Nose's creek, covering his railroad back to the Chattahoochee. This enabled him to contract his lines and strengthen them accordingly.

From Kenesaw he could look down upon our camps and observe every movement, and his batteries thundered away, but did us little harm, on account of the extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over our heads as we lay close up against his mountain town.

During our operations about Kenesaw the weather was villanously bad; the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering our narrow wooded roads mere mud gulleys, so that a general movement would have been impossible, but our men daily worked closer and closer to the intrenched foe and kept up an

incessant picket firing galling to him. Every opportunity was taken to advance our general lines closer and closer to the enemy.

General McPherson watching the enemy on Kenesaw and working his left forward, General Thomas swinging as it were on a grand left wheel, his left on Kenesaw connecting with General McPherson, and General Schofield all the time working to the south and east along the old Sandtown road. On the 22d, as General Hooker had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his right, the enemy, Hood's corps, with detachments from the others, suddenly sallied and attacked. The blow fell mostly on General Williams's division of General Hooker's corps, and a brigade of General Hascall's division of General Schofield's army.

The ground was comparatively open, and although the enemy drove in the skirmish line, an advanced regiment of General Schofield, sent out purposely to hold him in check until some preparations could be completed for his reception, yet when he reached our line of battle he received a terrible repulse, leaving his dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. This is known as the affair of the "Kulp House." Although inviting the enemy at all times to commit such mistakes, I could not hope for him to repeat them after the examples of Dallas and the "Kulp House," and upon studying the ground I had no alternative in my turn but to assault his lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines.

All looked to me to "out flank." An army to be efficient must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I wanted, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory. The general point selected was the left centre; because, if I could thrust a strong head of column through at that point by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and one half miles, it would reach the railroad below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and centre from its line of retreat, and then, by turning on either part, it could be overwhelmed and destroyed. Therefore, on the 24th of June, I ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the 27th, giving three days' notice for preparation and reconnoissance; one to be made near Little Kenesaw by General McPherson's troops, and the other about a mile further south by General Thomas's troops. The hour was fixed, and all the details given in Field Orders No. 28, of June 24. On the 27th of June the two assaults were made at the time and in the manner prescribed, and both failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker and McCook; Colonel Rice and others badly wounded. Our aggregate loss being near 3,000, whilst we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed breastworks. Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly, and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them.

It would not do to rest long under the influence of a mistake or failure, and accordingly General Schofield was working strong on the enemy's left; and on the 1st of July I ordered General McPherson to be relieved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, and rapidly to throw his whole army by the right down to and threaten Nickajack creek and Turner's ferry across the Chattahoochee, and I also pushed Stoneman's cavalry to the river below Turner's.

General McPherson commenced his movement the night of July 2, and the effect was instantaneous. The next morning Kenesaw was abandoned, and with the first dawn of day I saw our skirmishers appear on the mountain top. General Thomas's whole line was then moved forward to the railroad and turned south in pursuit toward the Chattahoochee. In person I entered Marietta at

8½ in the morning, just as the enemy's cavalry vacated the place. General Logan's corps of General McPherson's army, which had not moved far, was ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in flank and rear, and, if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee; but Johnston had foreseen and provided against all this, and had covered his movement well. He had intrenched a strong *tête du pont* at the Chattahoochee, with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna camp-meeting ground, five miles from Marietta.

Here General Thomas found him, his front covered by a good parapet, and his flanks behind the Nickajack and Rottenwood creeks. Ordering a garrison for Marietta, and General Logan to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, I overtook General Thomas at Smyrna. On the 4th of July we pushed a strong skirmish line down the main road, capturing the entire line of the enemy's pits and made strong demonstrations along Nickajack creek and about Turner's ferry. This had the desired effect, and the next morning the enemy was gone, and the army moved to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas's left flank resting on it near Paice's ferry, General McPherson's right at mouth of Nickajack, and General Schofield in reserve. The enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength, covering the railroad and pontoon bridges, and beyond the Chattahoochee. Heavy skirmishing along our whole front during the 5th demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee river, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage by means of bridges, except at one or two very difficult fords.

To accomplish this result I judged it would be more easy of execution before the enemy had made more thorough preparation or regained full confidence, and accordingly I ordered General Schofield across from his position on the Sandtown road to Smyrna camp ground, and next to the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Soap's creek, and effect a lodgement on the east bank. This was most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the 7th of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon bridge and a trestle bridge, and effecting a strong lodgement on high and commanding ground, with good roads leading to the east. At the same time General Garrard moved rapidly on Roswell and destroyed the factories which had supplied the rebel armies with cloth for years. Over one of these, the woollen factory, the nominal owner displayed the French flag, which was not respected of course. A neutral surely is no better than one of our own citizens, and we do not permit our own citizens to fabricate cloth for hostile uses.

General Garrard was then ordered to secure the shallow ford at Roswell and hold it until he could be relieved by infantry; and as I contemplated transferring the army of the Tennessee from the extreme right to the left, I ordered General Thomas to send a division of his infantry that was nearest up to Roswell to hold the ford until General McPherson could send up a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was sent and held the ford until the arrival of General Dodge's corps, which was soon followed by General McPherson's whole army. About the same time General Howard had also built a bridge at Powers's ferry; two miles below, General Schofield had crossed over and taken position on his right. Thus during the 9th we had secured three good and safe points of passage over the Chattahoochee above the enemy, with good roads leading to Atlanta, and Johnston abandoned his *tête du pont*, burned his bridges, and left us undisputed masters north and west of the Chattahoochee at daylight of the 10th of July.

This was one if not the chief object of the campaign, viz: the advancement of our lines from the Tennessee to the Chattahoochee; but Atlanta lay before us only eight miles distant, and was too important a place in the hands of an enemy to be left undisturbed with its magazines, stores, arsenals, work-shops, found-

ries, &c., and more especially its railroads, which converge there from the four great cardinal points. But the men had worked hard and needed rest, and we accordingly took a short spell. But in anticipation of this contingency I had collected a well-appointed force of cavalry, about 2,000 strong, at Decatur, Alabama, with orders, on receiving notice by telegraph, to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa at the railroad bridge or the Ten Islands, and thence by the most direct route to Opelika. There is but one stem of finished railroad connecting the channels of trade and travel between Georgia and Alabama and Mississippi, which runs from Montgomery to Opelika, and my purpose was to break it up effectually and thereby cut off Johnston's army from that source of supply and re-enforcement.

General Rousseau, commanding the district of Tennessee, asked permission to command the expedition, and received it. As soon as Johnston was well across the Chattahoochee, and as I had begun to manœuvre on Atlanta, I gave the requisite notice, and General Rousseau started punctually on the 10th of July. He fulfilled his orders and instructions to the very letter, whipping the rebel General Clanton en route; he passed through Talladega, and reached the railroad on the 16th, about twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and broke it well up to that place; also, three miles of the branch towards Columbus and two towards West Point. He then turned north and brought his command safely to Marietta, arriving on the 22d, having sustained a trifling loss, not to exceed 30 men.

The main armies remained quiet in their camps on the Chattahoochee until the 16th of July, but the time was employed in collecting stores at Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining's Station, strengthening the railroad guards and garrisons, and in improving the pier bridges and roads leading across the river. Generals Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted well down the river to draw attention in that direction, and all things being ready for a general advance I ordered it to commence on the 17th; General Thomas to cross at Powers's and Paice's ferry bridges and to march by Buckhead; General Schofield was already across at the mouth of Soaps's creek and to march by Cross Keys; and General McPherson to direct his course from Roswell straight against the Augusta road at some point east of Decatur near Stone mountain. General Garrard's cavalry acted with General McPherson, and Generals Stoneman and McCook watched the river and roads below the railroad. On the 17th the whole army advanced from their camps and formed a general line along the Old Peach Tree road.

Continuing on a general right wheel General McPherson reached the Augusta railroad on the 18th at a point seven miles east of Decatur, and with General Garrard's cavalry and General Morgan L. Smith's infantry division of the 15th corps, broke up a section of about four miles, and General Schofield reached the town of Decatur.

On the 19th General McPherson turned along the railroad into Decatur, and General Schofield followed a road toward Atlanta leading by Colonel Howard's house and the distillery, and General Thomas crossed Peach Tree creek in force by numerous bridges in the face of the enemy's intrenched lines. All found the enemy in more or less force and skirmished heavily.

On the 20th all the armies had closed in, converging towards Atlanta, but as a gap existed between Generals Schofield and Thomas, two divisions of General Howard's corps of General Thomas's army were moved to the left to connect with General Schofield, leaving General Newton's division of the same corps on the Buckhead road. During the afternoon of the 20th, about 4 p. m., the enemy sallied from his works in force and fell in line of battle against our right centre, composed of General Newton's division of General Howard's corps, on the main Buckhead road, of General Hooker's corps next south, and General Johnston's division of General Palmer's corps. The blow was sudden and somewhat unexpected, but General Newton had hastily covered his front

by a line of rail piles which enabled him to meet and repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's whole corps was uncovered and had to fight on comparatively open ground, and it, too, after a very severe battle, drove the enemy back to his intrenchments, and the action in front of General Johnston was comparatively light, that division being well intrenched. The enemy left on the field over 500 dead, about 1,000 wounded, 7 stands of colors, and many prisoners. His loss could not have fallen short of 5,000, whereas ours was covered by 1,500 killed, wounded, and missing; the greater loss fell on General Hooker's corps from its exposed condition.

On the 21st we felt the enemy in his intrenched position, which was found to crown the heights overlooking the comparatively open ground of the valley of Peach Tree creek, his right beyond the Augusta road to the east, and his left well toward Turner's ferry on the Chattahoochee, at a general distance from Atlanta of about four miles.

On the morning of the 22d, somewhat to my surprise, this whole line was found abandoned, and I confess I thought the enemy had resolved to give up Atlanta without further contest; but General Johnston had been relieved of his command and General Hood substituted. A new policy seemed resolved on, of which the bold attack on our right was the index. Our advancing ranks swept across the strong and well finished parapet of the enemy and closed in upon Atlanta until we occupied a line in the form of a general circle of about two miles' radius, when we again found him occupying in force a line of finished redoubts, which had been prepared for more than a year, covering all the roads leading into Atlanta; and we found him also busy in connecting those redoubts with curtains strengthened by rifle trenches, abatis, and *chevaux-de-frise*.

General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, continued to follow substantially the railroad, with the 15th corps, General Logan, the 17th, General Blair, on its left, and the 16th, General Dodge, on its right; but as the general advance of all the armies contracted the circle, the 16th corps, General Dodge, was thrown out of line by the 15th connecting on the right with General Schofield near the Howard house. General McPherson, the night before, had gained a high hill to the south and east of the railroad, where the 17th corps had, after a severe fight, driven the enemy, and it gave him a most commanding position within easy view of the very heart of the city. He had thrown out working parties to it, and was making preparations to occupy it in strength with batteries. The 16th corps, General Dodge, was ordered from right to left to occupy this position and make it a strong general left flank. General Dodge was moving by a diagonal path or wagon track leading from the Decatur road in the direction of General Blair's left flank.

About 10 a. m. I was in person with General Schofield examining the appearance of the enemy's lines opposite the distillery, where we attracted enough of the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry to satisfy me the enemy was in Atlanta in force, and meant to fight, and had gone to a large dwelling close by, known as the Howard house, where General McPherson joined me. He described the condition of things on his flank and the disposition of his troops. I explained to him that if we met serious resistance in Atlanta, as present appearances indicated, instead of operating against it by the left I would extend to the right, and that I did not want him to gain much distance to the left. He then described the hill occupied by General Leggett's division of General Blair's corps as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta railroad on account of its commanding nature. I therefore ratified his disposition of troops, and modified a previous order I had sent him in writing to use General Dodge's corps, thrown somewhat in reserve by the closing up our line, to break up railroad, and I sanctioned its going, as already ordered by General McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify that position. The general remained with me until near noon, when some reports reaching us that indicated

a movement of the enemy on that flank, he mounted and rode away with his staff. I must here also state that the day before I had detached General Garrard's cavalry to go to Covington, on the Augusta road, forty-two miles east of Atlanta, and from that point to send detachments to break the two important bridges across the Yellow and Ucofauhatchee rivers, tributaries of Ocmulgee, and General McPherson had also left his wagon train at Decatur under a guard of three regiments, commanded by Colonel (now General) Sprague. Soon after General McPherson left me at the Howard house, as before described, I heard the sounds of musketry to our left rear—at first mere pattering shots, but soon they grew in volume, accompanied with artillery, and about the same time the sound of guns was heard in the direction of Decatur. No doubt could longer be entertained of the enemy's plan of action, which was to throw a superior force on our left flank, whilst he held us with his forts in front, the only question being as to the amount of force he could employ at that point. I hastily transmitted orders to all points of our centre and right to press forward and give full employment to all the enemy in his lines, and for General Schofield to hold as large a force in reserve as possible, awaiting developments. Not more than half an hour after General McPherson had left me, viz., about 12½ m. of the 22d, his adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel Clark, rode up and reported that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner; that he had ridden from me to General Dodge's column, moving as heretofore described, and had sent off nearly all his staff and orderlies on various errands, and himself had passed into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of General Giles A. Smith's division, which was General Blair's extreme left; that a few minutes after he had entered the woods a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and his horse had come out riderless, having two wounds. The suddenness of this terrible calamity would have overwhelmed me with grief, but the living demanded my whole thoughts. I instantly despatched a staff officer to General John A. Logan, commanding the 15th corps, to tell him what had happened; that he must assume command of the army of the Tennessee, and hold stubbornly the ground already chosen, more especially the hill gained by General Leggett the night before.

Already the whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's corps had sallied from Atlanta, and by a wide circuit to the east had struck General Blair's left flank, enveloped it, and his left had swung around until it hit General Dodge in motion. General Blair's line was substantially along the old line of rebel trench, but it was fashioned to fight outwards. A space of wooded ground of near half a mile intervened between the head of General Dodge's column and General Blair's line, through which the enemy had poured, but the last order ever given by General McPherson was to hurry a brigade (Colonel Wangelin's) of the 15th corps across from the railroad to occupy this gap. It came across on the double quick and checked the enemy. Whilst Hardee attacked in flank, Stewart's corps was to attack in front directly out from the main works, but fortunately their attacks were not simultaneous. The enemy swept across the hill, which our men were then fortifying, and captured the pioneer company, its tools, and almost the entire working party, and bore down on our left until he encountered General Giles A. Smith's division of the 17th corps, who was somewhat "in air," and forced to fight first from one side of the old rifle parapet and then from the other, gradually withdrawing, regiment by regiment, so as to form a flank to General Leggett's division, which held the apex of the hill, which was the only part that was deemed essential to our future plans. General Dodge had caught and held well in check the enemy's right, and punished him severely, capturing many prisoners. Smith (General Giles A.) had gradually given up the extremity of his line and formed a new one, whose right connected with General Leggett, and his left refused—facing southeast. On this ground, and in this order, the men fought well and desperately for near four hours, checking

and repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the enemy's ranks at the angle was terrible, and great credit is due both Generals Leggett and Giles A. Smith and their men for their hard and stubborn fighting. The enemy made no further progress on that flank, and by 4 p. m. had almost given up the attempt. In the mean time Wheeler's cavalry, unopposed, (for General Garrard was absent at Covington by my order,) had reached Decatur and attempted to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel (now General) Sprague covered them with great skill and success, sending them to the rear of Generals Schofield and Thomas, and not drawing back from Decatur until every wagon was safe except three, which the teamsters had left, carrying off the mules. On our extreme left the enemy had taken a complete battery of six guns, with its horses, (Murray's,) of the regular army, as it was moving along unsupported and unapprehensive of danger in a narrow, wooded road in that unguarded space between the head of General Dodge's column and the line of battle on the ridge above, but most of the men escaped to the bushes. He also got two other guns on the extreme left flank, that were left on the ground as General Giles A. Smith drew off his men in the manner heretofore described. About 4 p. m. there was quite a lull, during which the enemy felt forward on the railroad and main Decatur road, and suddenly assailed a regiment which, with a section of guns, had been thrown forward as a kind of picket, and captured the two guns. He then advanced rapidly and broke through our lines at that point, which had been materially weakened by the withdrawal of Colonel Martin's brigade, sent by General Logan's orders to the extreme left. The other brigade, General Lightburn, which held this part of the line, fell back in some disorder about four hundred yards, to a position held by it the night before, leaving the enemy for a time in possession of two batteries, one of which, a 20-pounder Parrott battery of four guns, was most valuable to us, and separating General Woods's and General Harrow's divisions of the 15th corps, that were on the right and left of the railroad. Being in person close by the spot, and appreciating the vast importance of the connexion at that point, I ordered certain batteries of General Schofield to be moved to a position somewhat commanding, by a left flank fire, and ordered an incessant fire of shells on the enemy within sight and the woods beyond, to prevent his re-enforcing. I also sent orders to General Logan, which he had already anticipated, to make the 15th corps regain its lost ground at any cost, and instructed General Woods, supported by General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the parapet down from where he held it until he saved the batteries and recovered the lost ground. The whole was executed in superb style, at times our men and the enemy fighting across the narrow parapet, but at last the enemy gave way and the 15th corps regained its position and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which were out of view, and had been removed by the enemy within his main work. With this terminated the battle of the 22d, which cost us 3,722 killed, wounded, and prisoners.

But among the dead was Major General McPherson, whose body was recovered and brought to me in the heat of battle, and I had sent it in charge of his personal staff back to Marietta, on its way to his northern home. He was a noble youth of striking personal appearance, of the highest professional capacity, and with a heart abounding in kindness, that drew to him the affections of all men. His sudden death devolved the command of the army of the Tennessee on the no less brave and gallant General Logan, who nobly sustained his reputation and that of his veteran army, and avenged the death of his comrade and commander. The enemy left on the field his dead and wounded and about a thousand well prisoners. His dead alone are computed by General Logan at 3,240, of which number 2,200 were from actual count, and of these he delivered to the enemy under a flag of truce sent in by him (the enemy) 800 bodies. I entertain no doubt that in the battle of July 22 the enemy sustained an aggre-

gate loss of full 8,000 men. The next day General Garrard returned from Covington, having succeeded perfectly in his mission, and destroyed the bridges at Ulcofauhatchee and Yellow rivers, beside burning a train of cars, a large quantity of cotton, (2,000 bales,) and the depots of stores at Covington and Conyer's Station, and bringing in 200 prisoners and some good horses, losing but two men, one of whom was killed by accident. Having, therefore, sufficiently crippled the Augusta road, and rendered it useless to the enemy, I then addressed myself to the task of reaching the Macon road, over which, of necessity, came the stores and ammunition that alone maintained the rebel army in Atlanta.

Generals Schofield and Thomas had closed well up, holding the enemy behind his inner intrenchments. I first ordered the army of the Tennessee to prepare to vacate its line and to shift by the right below Proctor's creek, and General Schofield to extend up to the Augusta road. About the same time General Rousseau had arrived from his expedition to Opelika, bringing me about 2,000 good cavalry, but of course fatigued with its long and rapid march, and ordering it to relieve General Stoneman at the river about Sandtown, I shifted General Stoneman to our left flank, and ordered all my cavalry to prepare for a blow at the Macon road, simultaneous with the movement of the army of the Tennessee towards East Point. To accomplish this I gave General Stoneman the command of his own and General Garrard's cavalry, making an effective force of full 5,000 men, and to General McCook I gave his own and the new cavalry brought by General Rousseau, which was commanded by Colonel Harrison, of the eighth Indiana cavalry, in the aggregate about 4,000. These two well-appointed bodies were to move in concert, the former by the left around Atlanta to McDonough, and the latter by the right on Fayetteville, and on a certain night, viz: July 28, they were to meet on the Macon road, near Lovejoy's, and destroy it in the most effectual manner. I estimated this joint cavalry could whip all Wheeler's cavalry, and could otherwise fully accomplish its task, and I think so still. I had the officers in command to meet me, and explained the movement perfectly, and they entertained not a doubt of perfect success. At the very moment almost of starting General Stoneman addressed me a note asking permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the road, to be allowed, with his command proper, to proceed to Macon and Anderson, and release our prisoners of war confined at those points. There was something most captivating in the idea, and the execution was within the bounds of probability of success. I consented that after the defeat of Wheeler's cavalry, which was embraced in his orders, and breaking the road, he might attempt it with his cavalry proper, sending that of General Garrard back to its proper flank of the army. Both cavalry expeditions started at the time appointed. I have as yet no report from General Stoneman, who is a prisoner of war at Macon, but I know that he despatched General Garrard's cavalry to Flat Rock, for the purpose of covering his own movement to McDonough, but for some reason unknown to me he went off towards Covington, and did not again communicate with General Garrard at Flat Rock. General Garrard remained there until the 29th, skirmishing heavily with a part of Wheeler's cavalry, and occupying their attention; but hearing nothing from General Stoneman, he moved back to Conyer's, where, learning that General Stoneman had gone to Covington and south, on the east side of the Ocmulgee, he returned and resumed his position on our left. It is known that General Stoneman kept to the east of the Ocmulgee to Clinton, sending detachments off to the east, which did a large amount of damage to the railroad, burning the bridges of Walnut creek and Oconee, and destroying a large number of cars and locomotives, and with his main force appeared before Macon. He did not succeed in crossing the Ocmulgee at Macon, or in approaching Andersonville, but retired

in the direction whence he came, followed by various detachments of mounted men under a General Iverson. He seems to have become hemmed in, and gave consent to two-thirds of his force to escape back, whilst he held the enemy in check with the remainder, about 700 men, and a section of light guns. One brigade, Colonel Adams, came in almost intact. Another, commanded by Colonel Capron, was surprised on the way back and scattered; many were captured and killed, and the balance got in, mostly unarmed and afoot; and the General himself surrendered his small command, and is now a prisoner at Macon. His mistake was in not making the first concentration with Generals McCook and Garrard near Lovejoy's, according to his orders, which is yet unexplained.

General McCook, in the execution of his part, went down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to near Rivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge, with which he was provided, crossed his command, and moved rapidly on Palmetto station of the West Point road, where he tore up a section of track, leaving a regiment to create a diversion towards Campbelltown; which regiment fulfilled its duty and returned to camp by way of, and escorting back, the pontoon bridge train. General McCook then rapidly moved to Fayetteville, where he found a large number of the wagons belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta. These he burned to the number of 500, killing 800 mules, and carrying along others, and taking 250 prisoners, mostly quartermasters and men belonging to the trains. He then pushed for the railroad, reaching it, at Lovejoy's Station, at the time appointed. He burned the depot, tore up a section of the road, and continued to work until forced to leave off to defend himself against an accumulating force of the enemy. He could hear nothing of General Stoneman, and finding his progress east too strongly opposed he moved south and west, and reached Newman, on the West Point road, where he encountered an infantry force coming from Mississippi to Atlanta, which had been stopped by the break he had made at Palmetto. This force, with the pursuing cavalry, hemmed him in and forced him to fight. He was compelled to drop his prisoners and captures and cut his way out, losing some 500 officers and men; among them a most valuable officer, Colonel Harrison, who, when fighting his men as skirmishers on foot, was overcome and made prisoner, and is now at Macon. He cut his way out, reached the Chattahoochee, crossed, and got to Marietta without further loss.

General McCook is entitled to much credit for thus saving his command, which was endangered by the failure of General Stoneman to reach Lovejoy's. But on the whole the cavalry raid is not deemed a success, for the real purpose was to break the enemy's communications, which, though done, was on so limited a scale that I knew the damages would soon be repaired.

Pursuant to the general plan, the army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines near the Decatur road during the night of July 26, and on the 27th moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor's creek, and south to prolong our line due south, facing east. On that day, by appointment of the President of the United States, Major General Howard assumed the command of the army of the Tennessee, and had the general supervision of the movement, which was made *en echelon*, General Dodge's corps (16th) on the left nearest the enemy, General Blair's corps (17th) next to come up on the right, and General Logan's corps (15th) to come up on its right and refused as a flank, the whole to gain as much ground due south from the flank already established on Proctor's creek as was consistent with the proper strength. General Dodge's men got into line in the evening of the 27th, and General Blair's came into line on his right early on the morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting-house called Ezra church, near some large open field by the poor-house, on a road known as Bell's Ferry or Licksillet road. Here the 15th corps, General Logan's, joined on and refused along a ridge, well wooded, which partially commanded a view over

the same fields. About 10 a. m. all the army was in position, and the men were busy in throwing up the accustomed piles of rails and logs, which after a while assumed the form of a parapet. The skill and rapidity with which our men construct them is wonderful, and is something new in the art of war. I rode along this whole line about that time, and as I approached Ezra church there was considerable artillery firing enfilading the road in which I was riding, killing an orderly's horse just behind my staff. I struck across an open field to where General Howard was standing in the rear of the 15th corps, and walked up to the ridge with General Morgan L. Smith to see if the battery which enfiladed the main road and the line of rail piles could not be disposed of, and heard General Smith give the necessary orders for the deployment of one regiment forward and another to make a circuit to the right, when I returned to where General Howard was, and remained there until 12 o'clock. During this time there was nothing to indicate serious battle, save the shelling by one or at most two batteries from beyond the large field in front of the 15th corps.

Wishing to be well prepared to defeat the enemy if he repeated his game of the 22d, I had, the night before, ordered General Davis's division of General Palmer's corps, which, by the movement of the army of the Tennessee, had been left, as it were, in reserve, to move down to Turner's ferry, and thence towards White Hall or East Point, aiming to reach the flank of General Howard's new line, hoping that in case of an attack this division would, in turn, catch the attacking force in flank or rear at an unexpected moment. I explained it to General Howard, and bade him expect the arrival of such a force in case of battle. Indeed, I expected to hear the fire of its skirmishers by noon. General Davis was sick that day, and Brigadier General Morgan commanded the division, which had marched early for Turner's ferry, but many of the roads laid down on our maps did not exist at all, and General Morgau was delayed thereby. I rode back to make more particular inquiries as to this division, and had just reached General Davis's headquarter's at Proctor's creek, when I heard musketry open heavily on the right. The enemy had come out of Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road, and formed his masses in the open fields behind a swell of ground, and after the artillery firing I have described, advanced in parallel lines directly against the 15th corps, expecting to catch that flank in air. His advance was magnificent, but founded in an error that cost him sadly, for our men coolly and deliberately cut down his men, and in spite of the efforts of the rebel officers his ranks broke and fled. But they were rallied again and again, as often as six times at some points, and a few of the rebel officers and men reached our line of rail piles only to be killed or hauled over as prisoners.

These assaults occurred from noon until about 4 p. m., when the enemy disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands; as many as 642 dead were counted and buried, and still others are known to have been buried which were not counted by the regular detailed burial parties.

General Logan on this occasion was conspicuous, as on the 22d, his corps being chiefly engaged; but General Howard had drawn from the other corps, 16th and 17th, certain reserves which were near at hand but were not used. Our entire loss is reported less than 600, whereas that of the enemy in killed and wounded not less than 5,000. Had General Davis's division come up on the Bell's Ferry road, as I calculated, at any time before four o'clock, what was simply a complete repulse would have been a disastrous rout to the enemy; but I cannot attribute the failure to want of energy or intelligence, and must charge it, like many other things in this campaign, to the peculiar tangled nature of the forests, and absence of roads that would admit the rapid movement of troops.

This affair terminated all efforts of the enemy to check our extensions by the flank, which afterwards proceeded with comparative ease, but he met our exten-

sions to the south by rapid and well-constructed forts and rifle-pits built between us and the railroad to and below East Point, remaining perfectly on the defensive.

Finding that the right flank of the army of the Tennessee did not reach, I was forced to shift General Schofield to that flank also, and afterwards General Palmer's corps of General Thomas's army. General Schofield moved from the left on the 1st of August, and General Palmer's corps followed at once, taking a line below Utoy creek, and General Schofield prolonged it to a point near East Point. The enemy made no offensive opposition, but watched our movements and extended his lines and parapets accordingly.

About this time several changes in important commands occurred which should be noted. General Hooker, offended that General Howard was preferred to him as successor to General McPherson, resigned his command of the 20th corps, to which General Slocum was appointed; but he was at Vicksburg, and until he joined, the command of the corps devolved on General A. S. Williams, who handled it admirably. General Palmer also resigned the command of the 14th corps, and General Jeff. C. Davis was appointed to his place. Major General D. S. Stanley had succeeded General Howard in command of the 4th corps.

From the 2d to the 5th we continued to extend to the right, demonstrating strongly on the left and along our whole line. General Reilley's brigade of General Cox's division, General Schofield's army, on the 5th, tried to break through the enemy's line about a mile below Utoy creek, but failed to carry the position, losing about 400 men, who were caught in the entanglements and abatis; but the next day the position was turned by General Hascal, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close up to and facing the enemy below Utoy creek. Still he did not gain the desired foothold on either the West Point or Macon railroad. The enemy's line at that time must have been near fifteen miles long, extending from near Decatur to below East Point. This he was enabled to do by the use of a large force of State militia, and his position was so masked by the shape of ground that we were unable to discover the weak parts.

I had become satisfied that, to reach the Macon road, and thereby control the supplies for Atlanta, I would have to move the whole army; but, before beginning, I ordered down from Chattanooga four 4½-inch rifled guns, to try their effect. These arrived on the 10th, and were put to work night and day, and did execution on the city, causing frequent fires and creating confusion, yet the enemy seemed determined to hold his forts even if the city were destroyed. On the 16th of August I made my Orders No. 57, prescribing the mode and manner of executing the grand movement by the right flank, to begin on the 18th. This movement contemplated the withdrawal of the 20th corps, General Williams, to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee bridge, and the march of the main army to the West Point railroad, near Fairborn, and afterwards to the Macon road, at or near Jonesboro', with our wagons loaded with provisions for fifteen days. About the time of the publication of these orders I learned that Wheeler, with a large mounted force of the enemy, variously estimated from 6,000 to 10,000 men, had passed around by the east and north, and had made his appearance on our lines of communication near Adairsville, and had succeeded in capturing 900 of our beef cattle, and had made a break of the railroad near Calhoun. I could not have asked anything better, for I had provided well against such a contingency, and this detachment left me superior to the enemy in cavalry. I suspended the execution of my orders for the time being, and ordered General Kilpatrick to make up a well-appointed force of about 5,000 cavalry, and to move from his camp about Sandtown during the night of the 18th to the West Point road, and break it good

near Fairborn; then to proceed across to the Macon road, and tear it up thoroughly, to avoid, as far as possible, the enemy's infantry, but to attack any cavalry he could find. I thought this cavalry would save the necessity of moving the main army across, and that in case of his success it would leave me in better position to take full advantage of the result.

General Kilpatrick got off at the time appointed and broke the West Point road, and afterwards reached the Macon road at Jonesboro', where he whipped Ross's cavalry and got possession of the railroad, which he held for five hours, damaging it considerably; but a brigade of the enemy's infantry which had been despatched below Jonesboro' in cars was run back and disembarked, and with Jackson's rebel cavalry made it impossible for him to continue his work. He drew off to the east and made a circuit, and struck the railroad about Lovejoy's Station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who moved on shorter lines, when he charged through their cavalry, taking many prisoners, of which he brought in seventy, and captured a four-gun battery, which he destroyed, except one gun, which he brought in. He estimated the damage done to the road as enough to interrupt its use for ten days, after which he returned by a circuit north and east, reaching Decatur on the 22d. After an interview with General Kilpatrick I was satisfied that whatever damage he had done would not produce the result desired, and I renewed my orders for the movement of the whole army. This involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, taking the field with our main force, and using it against the communications of Atlanta instead of against its intrenchments. All the army commanders were at once notified to send their surplus wagons, incumbrances of all kinds, and sick, back to our intrenched position at the bridge, and that the movement would begin during the night of the 25th. Accordingly, all things being ready, the 4th corps, General Stanley, drew out of its lines on our extreme left and marched to a position below Proctor's creek. The 20th corps, General Williams, moved back to the Chattahoochee. This movement was made without loss, save a few things left in our camps by thoughtless officers or men. The night of the 26th the movement continued, the army of the Tennessee drawing out and moving rapidly by a circuit well towards Sandtown and across Camp creek, the army of the Cumberland below Utoy creek, General Schofield, remaining in position. This was effected with the loss of but a single man in the army of the Tennessee, wounded by a shell from the enemy. The third move brought the army of the Tennessee on the West Point railroad, above Fairborn, the army of the Cumberland about Red Oak, and General Schofield closed in near Digs and Mims. I then ordered one day's work to be expended in destroying that road, and it was done with a will. Twelve and one-half miles were destroyed, the ties burned, and the iron rails heated and tortured by the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with trunks of trees, with logs, rock, and earth, intermingled with loaded shells, prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Having personally inspected this work, and satisfied with its execution, I ordered the whole army to move the next day eastward by several roads; General Howard, on the right, towards Jonesboro', General Thomas, the centre, by Shoal Creek church, to Couch's, on the Decatur and Fayetteville road, and General Schofield, on the left, about Morrow's mills. An inspection of the map will show the strategic advantages of this position. The railroad from Atlanta to Macon follows substantially the ridge or "divide" between the waters of Flint and Ocmulgee rivers, and from East Point to Jonesboro' makes a wide bend to the east. Therefore the position I have described, which had been well studied on paper, was my first "objective." It gave me "interior lines," something our enemy had enjoyed too long, and I was anxious for once to get the inside track, and therefore my haste and desire to secure it.

The several columns moved punctually on the morning of the 29th. General Thomas on the centre encountered little opposition or difficulty save what resulted from the narrow roads and reached his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Schofield being closer to the enemy, who still clung to East Point, moved cautiously on a small circle around that point and came into position towards Rough-and-Ready; and General Howard, having the outer circle, had a greater distance to move. He encountered cavalry, which he drove rapidly to the crossing of Shoal creek, where the enemy also had artillery. Here a short delay occurred and some cannonading and skirmishing, but General Howard started them again and kept them moving, passed the Renfro Place, on the Decatur road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders of that day, but he wisely and well kept on and pushed on towards Jonesboro', saved the bridge across Flint river, and did not halt until darkness compelled him, within half a mile of Jonesboro'. Here he rested for the night, and on the morning of August 31, finding himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he deployed the 15th corps and disposed the 16th and 17th on its flanks. The men covered their front with the usual parapet, and were soon prepared to act offensively or defensively as the case called for.

I was that night with General Thomas at Couch's, and as soon as I learned that General Howard had passed Renfro's I directed General Thomas to send to that place a division of General Jeff. C. Davis's corps, to move General Stanley's corps in connexion with General Schofield towards Rough-and-Ready, and then to send forward due east a strong detachment of General Davis's corps to feel for the railroad. General Schofield was also ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near Rough-and-Ready. These movements were progressing during the 31st, when the enemy came out of his works at Jonesboro' and attacked General Howard in position, as described. General Howard was admirably situated to receive him, and repulsed the attack thoroughly. The enemy attacked with Lee's and Hardee's corps, and after a contest of over two hours withdrew, leaving over 400 dead on the ground, and his wounded, of which about 300 were left in Jonesboro', could not have been much less than 2,500. Hearing the sounds of battle at Jonesboro' about noon, orders were renewed to push the other movements on the left and centre, and about 4 p. m. the reports arrived simultaneously that General Howard had thoroughly repulsed the enemy at Jonesboro', that General Schofield had reached the railroad a mile below Rough-and-Ready and was working up the road, breaking it as he went; that General Stanley, of General Thomas's army, had also got the road below General Schofield and was destroying its working south, and that General Baird, of General Davis's corps, had struck it still lower down within four miles of Jonesboro'.

Orders were at once given for all the army to turn on Jonesboro', General Howard to keep the enemy busy whilst General Thomas should move down from the north, with General Schofield on his left. I also ordered the troops, as they moved down, to continue the thorough destruction of the railroad, because we had it then, and I did not know but that events might divert our attention. General Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch the roads to our rear, the north. General Kilpatrick was sent south, down the west bank of Flint, with instructions to attack or threaten the railroad below Jonesboro'. I expected the whole army would close down on Jonesboro' by noon of the 1st of September. General Davis's corps, having a shorter distance to travel, was on time and deployed, facing south, his right in connexion with General Howard, and his left on the railroad. General Stanley and General Schofield were coming down along the Rough-and-Ready road and along the railroad, breaking it as they came. When General Davis joined to General Howard, General Blair's corps, on General Howard's left, was thrown in reserve, and was immediately sent well to the right, below Jonesboro', to act against that flank along with General Kilpatrick's

cavalry. About 4 p. m. General Davis was all ready and assaulted the enemy's lines across open fields, carrying them very handsomely, and taking as prisoners the greater part of Govan's brigade, including its commander, with two four-gun batteries. Repeated orders were sent to Generals Stanley and Schofield to hurry up, but the difficult nature of the country and the absence of roads are the reasons assigned why these troops did not get well into position for attack before night rendered further operations impossible. Of course the next morning the enemy was gone, and had retreated south. About 2 o'clock that night the sounds of heavy explosions were heard in the direction of Atlanta, distant about twenty miles, with a succession of minor explosions, and what seemed like the rapid firing of cannon and musketry. These continued for about an hour, and again about 4 a. m. occurred another series of similar discharges, apparently nearer us, and these sounds could be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum or the blowing up of the enemy's magazines. Nevertheless, at daybreak, on finding the enemy gone from his lines at Jonesboro', I ordered a general pursuit south, General Thomas following to the left of the railroad, General Howard on its right, and General Schofield keeping off about two miles to the east. We overtook the enemy again near Lovejoy's station in a strong intrenched position, with his flanks well protected behind a branch of Walnut creek to the right and a confluent of the Flint river to his left. We pushed close up and reconnoitred the ground, and found he had evidently halted to cover his communications with the McDonough and Fayetteville road.

Rumors began to arrive through prisoners captured that Atlanta had been abandoned during the night of September 1; that Hood had blown up his ammunition trains, which accounted for the sounds so plainly heard by us and which were yet unexplained; that Stewart's corps was then retreating towards McDonough and that the militia had gone off toward Covington. It was then too late to interpose and prevent their escape, and I was satisfied with the substantial success already gained. Accordingly I ordered the work of destroying the railroad to cease and the troops to be held in hand ready for any movement that further information from Atlanta might warrant.

General Jeff. C. Davis's corps had been left above Jonesboro', and General Garrard's cavalry was still further back, and the latter was ordered to send back to Atlanta and ascertain the exact truth and the real situation of affairs. But the same night, viz. of September 4, a courier arrived from General Slocum reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, blown up seven trains of cars, and had retreated on the McDonough road. General Slocum had entered and taken possession on 2d of September.

The object of my movement against the railroad was therefore already reached and concluded, and as it was idle to pursue our enemy in that wooded country with a view to his capture, I gave orders on the 4th for the army to prepare to move back slowly to Atlanta. On the 5th we drew back to the vicinity of Jonesboro', five miles, where we remained a day. On the 7th we moved to Rough-and-Ready, seven miles, and the next day to the camps selected, viz: the army of the Cumberland grouped around about Atlanta, the army of the Tennessee about East Point, and that of the Ohio at Decatur, where the men now occupy clean and healthy camps.

I have not yet received full or satisfactory accounts of Wheeler's operations to our rear, further than that he broke the road about Calhoun and then made his appearance at Dalton, where Colonel Laibold held him in check until General Steedman arrived from Chattanooga and drove him off. He then passed up into East Tennessee, and made quite a stay at Athens, but on the first show of pursuit he kept on north across the Little Tennessee, and crossing the Holston near Strawberry Plains, reached the Clinch near Clinton, and passed over towards Sequatchee and McMinnville. Thence he seems to have gone to Murfreesboro'

and Lebanon and across to Franklin. He may have committed damage to the property of citizens, but has injured us but little, the railroads being repaired about as fast as he broke them. From Franklin he has been pursued towards Florence, and out of the State, by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger, but the amount of execution they have done to him is not yet reported. Our roads and telegraph are all repaired, and the cars run with regularity and speed.

I must bear full and liberal testimony to the energetic and successful management of our railroads during the campaign. No matter when or where a break has been made, the repair train seemed on the spot, and the damage was repaired generally before I knew of the break. Bridges have been built with surprising rapidity, and the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost before the echoes of the skirmish fire had ceased. Some of these bridges, those of the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and Chattahoochee, are fine, substantial structures, and were built in inconceivably short time almost out of material improvised on the spot.

Colonel W. W. Wright, who has charge of the "construction and repairs," is not only a most skilful but a wonderfully ingenious, industrious, and zealous officer, and I can hardly do him justice. In like manner the officers charged with running the trains have succeeded to my entire satisfaction, and have worked in perfect harmony with the quartermasters and commissaries, bringing forward abundant supplies with such regularity that at no one time have we wanted for provisions, forage, ammunition, or stores of any essential kind.

Colonel L. C. Easton, chief quartermaster, and Colonel A. Beckwith, chief commissary, have also succeeded, in a manner surprising to all of us, in getting forward supplies. I doubt if ever an army was better supplied than this, and I commend them most highly for it, because I know that more solicitude was felt by the Lieutenant General commanding, and by the military world at large, on this than on any other one problem involved in the success of the campaign.

Captain T. G. Baylor, chief ordnance officer, has in like manner kept the army well supplied at all times with every kind of ammunition. To Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, I am more than ordinarily indebted for keeping me supplied with maps and information of roads and topography, as well as in the more important branch of his duties in selecting lines and military positions. My own personal staff has been small but select.

Brigadier General W. F. Barry, an officer of enlarged capacity and great experience, has filled the office of chief of artillery to perfection, and Lieutenant Colonel E. D. Kittoe, chief medical inspector, has done everything possible to give proper aid and direction to the operations of that important department. I have never seen the wounded removed from the fields of battle, cared for, and afterwards sent to proper hospitals in the rear with more promptness, system, care, and success, than during this whole campaign, covering over one hundred days of actual battle and skirmish.

My aides-de-camp, Major J. C. McCoy, Captain L. M. Dayton, and Captain J. C. Audenried, have been ever zealous and most efficient, carrying my orders day and night to distant points of our extended lines with an intelligence and zeal that insured the perfect working of machinery, covering from ten to twenty-five miles of ground, when the least error in the delivery and explanation of an order would have produced confusion; whereas in great measure, owing to the intelligence of these officers, orders have been made so clear that these vast armies have moved side by side, sometimes crossing each other's tracks through a difficult country of over a hundred and thirty-eight miles in length without confusion or trouble.

Captain Dayton has also fulfilled the duties of my adjutant general, making all orders and carrying on the official correspondence.

Three inspectors general completed my staff: Brigadier General J. M. Corse,

who has since been assigned the command of a division of the 16th corps at the request of General Dodge; Lieutenant Colonel W. Warner, of the 76th Ohio, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ewing, inspector general of the 15th corps, and captain 13th United States regulars.

These officers, of singular energy and intelligence, have been of immense assistance to me in handling these large armies.

My three "armies in the field" were commanded by able officers, my equals in rank and experience—Major General George H. Thomas, Major General J. M. Schofield, and Major General O. O. Howard. With such commanders I had only to indicate the object desired, and they accomplished it. I cannot overestimate their services to the country, and must express my deep and heartfelt thanks that, coming together from different fields, with different interests, they have co-operated with a harmony that has been productive of the greatest amount of success and good feeling. A more harmonious army does not exist.

I now enclose their reports, and those of the corps, division, and brigade commanders, a perusal of which will fill up the sketch which I have endeavored to make. I also submit tabular statements of our losses in battle by wounds and sickness; also, lists of prisoners captured, sent to the rear, and exchanged; also, of the guns and materials of war captured, beside the important country, towns, and arsenals of the enemy that we now "occupy and hold."

All of which is respectfully submitted.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*November 18, 1865.*

Official copy:

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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*Major General W. T. Sherman's report of the campaign of Georgia.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Savannah, Georgia, January 1, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to offer my report of the operations of the armies under my command since the occupation of Atlanta, in the early part of September last, up to the present date.

As heretofore reported, in the month of September, the army of the Cumberland, Major General Thomas commanding, held the city of Atlanta; the army of the Tennessee, Major General Howard commanding, grouped about East Point; and the army of the Ohio, Major General Schofield commanding, held Decatur. Many changes occurred in the composition of these armies in consequence of the expiration of the time of service of many of the regiments. The opportunity was given to us to consolidate the fragments, re clothe and equip the men, and make preparations for the future campaign. I also availed myself of the occasion to strengthen the garrisons to our rear, to make our communications more secure, and sent Wagner's division of the 4th corps, and Morgan's division of the 14th corps, back to Chattanooga, and Corse's division of the 15th corps to Rome. Also a thorough reconnoissance was made of Atlanta, and a new line of works begun, which required a smaller garrison to hold.

During this month, the enemy, whom we had left at Lovejoy's Station, moved westward toward the Chattahoochee, taking position facing us and covering the West Point railroad, about Palmetto Station. He also threw a pontoon bridge across the Chattahoochee, and sent cavalry detachments to the west, in the direction of Carrolton and Powder springs. About the same time President Davis visited Macon, and his army at Palmetto, and made harangues referring to an active campaign against us. Hood still remained in command of the confederate forces, with Cheatham, S. D. Lee, and Stewart, commanding his three corps, and Wheeler in command of his cavalry, which had been largely re-enforced.

My cavalry consisted of two divisions. One was stationed at Decatur, under command of Brigadier General Garrard; the other, commanded by Brigadier General Kilpatrick, was posted near Sandtown, with a pontoon bridge over the Chattahoochee, from which he could watch any movement of the enemy towards the west.

As soon as I became convinced that the enemy intended to assume the offensive, namely, September 28, I sent Major General Thomas, second in command, to Nashville, to organize the new troops expected to arrive, and to make preliminary preparations to meet such an event.

About the 1st of October some of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance on the west of the Chattahoochee, and one of his infantry corps was reported near Powder springs; and I received authentic intelligence that the rest of his infantry was crossing to the west of the Chattahoochee. I at once made my orders that Atlanta and the Chattahoochee railroad bridge should be held by the 20th corps, Major General Slocum, and on the 4th of October put in motion the 15th and 17th corps, and the 4th, 14th, and 23d corps, to Smyrna camp ground; and on the 5th moved to the strong position about Kenesaw. The enemy's cavalry had by a rapid movement got upon our railroad at Big Shanty, and broken the line of telegraph and railroad, and with a division of infantry (French's) had moved against Allatoona, where were stored about a million of rations. Its redoubts were garrisoned by three small regiments under Colonel Tourtellotte, 4th Minnesota.

I had anticipated this movement, and had by signal and telegraph ordered General Corse to re-enforce that post from Rome. General Corse had reached Allatoona with a brigade during the night of the 4th, just in time to meet the attack by French's division on the morning of the 5th. In person I reached Kenesaw mountain about 10 a. m. of the 5th, and could see the smoke of battle and hear the faint sounds of artillery. The distance, eighteen miles, was too great for me to make in time to share in the battle, but I directed the 23d corps, Brigadier General Cox commanding, to move rapidly from the base of Kenesaw, due west, aiming to reach the road from Allatoona to Dallas, threatening the rear of the forces attacking Allatoona. I succeeded in getting a signal message to General Corse during his fight, notifying him of my presence. The defence of Allatoona by General Corse was admirably conducted, and the enemy repulsed with heavy slaughter. His description of the defence is so graphic that it leaves nothing for me to add; and the movement of General Cox had the desired effect of causing the withdrawal of French's division rapidly in the direction of Dallas.

On the 6th and 7th I pushed my cavalry well toward Burnt Hickory and Dallas, and discovered that the enemy had moved westward, and inferred that he would attempt to break our railroad again in the neighborhood of Kingston. Accordingly, on the morning of the 8th, I put the army in motion through Allatoona Pass to Kingston, reaching that point on the 10th. There I learned that the enemy had feigned on Rome, and was passing the Coosa river on a pontoon bridge about eleven miles below Rome. I therefore, on the 11th, moved to Rome, and pushed Garrard's cavalry and the 23d corps, under General Cox, across the Oostenaula, to threaten the flanks of the enemy passing

north. Garrard's cavalry drove a cavalry brigade of the enemy to and beyond the Narrows, leading into the valley of the Chattooga, capturing two field-pieces and taking some prisoners. The enemy had moved with great rapidity, and made his appearance at Resaca, and Hood had in person demanded its surrender. I had from Kingston re-enforced Resaca by two regiments of the army of the Tennessee. I at first intended to move the army into the Chattooga valley to interpose between the enemy and his line of retreat down the Coosa, but feared that General Hood would in that event turn eastward by Spring Place, and down the Federal road, and therefore moved against him at Resaca. Colonel Weaver, at Resaca, afterward re-enforced by General Raum's brigade, had repulsed the enemy from Resaca, but he had succeeded in breaking the railroad from Tilton to Dalton, and as far north as the tunnel. Arriving at Resaca on the evening of the 14th, I determined to strike Hood in flank, or force him to battle, and directed the army of the Tennessee, General Howard, to move to Snake Creek Gap, which was held by the enemy, while General Stanley, with the 4th and 14th corps, moved by Tilton cross the mountains to the rear of Snake Creek Gap, in the neighborhood of Villanow.

The army of the Tennessee found the enemy occupying our old lines in Snake Creek Gap, and on the 15th skirmished for the purpose of holding him there until Stanley could get to his rear. But the enemy gave way about noon, and was followed through the gap, escaping before General Stanley had reached the further end of the pass. The next day, the 16th, the armies moved directly toward Lafayette, with a view to cut off Hood's retreat. We found him intrenched in Ship's Gap, but the leading division (Wood's) of the 15th corps rapidly carried the advanced posts held by two companies of a South Carolina regiment, making them prisoners. The remaining eight companies escaped to the main body near Lafayette. The next morning we passed over into the valley of the Chattooga, the army of the Tennessee moving in pursuit, by Lafayette and Alpine, toward Blue pond; the army of the Cumberland, by Summerville and Melville Post Office, to Gaylesville, and the army of the Ohio and Garrard's cavalry from Villanow, Dirttown valley, and Gover's Gap, to Gaylesville. Hood, however, was little incumbered with trains, and marched with great rapidity, and had succeeded in getting into the narrow gorge formed by the Lookout range abutting against the Coosa river, in the neighborhood of Gadsden. He evidently wanted to avoid a fight.

On the 19th all the armies were grouped about Gaylesville, in the rich valley of the Chattooga, abounding in corn and meat, and I determined to pause in my pursuit of the enemy, to watch his movements and live on the country. I hoped that Hood would turn toward Guntersville and Bridgeport. The army of the Tennessee was posted near Little river, with instructions to feel forward in support of the cavalry, which was ordered to watch Hood in the neighborhood of Will's valley, and to give me the earliest notice possible of his turning northward. The army of the Ohio was posted at Cedar Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon across the Coosa, and to feel forward to Center and down in the direction of Blue mountain. The army of the Cumberland was held in reserve at Gaylesville; and all the troops were instructed to draw heavily for supplies from the surrounding country. In the mean time communications were opened to Rome, and a heavy force set to work in repairing the damages done to our railroads. Atlanta was abundantly supplied with provisions, but forage was scarce, and General Slocum was instructed to send strong foraging parties out in the direction of South river and collect all the corn and fodder possible, and to put his own trains in good condition for further service.

Hood's movement and strategy had demonstrated that he had an army capable of endangering at all times my communications, but unable to meet me in open fight. To follow him would simply amount to being decoyed away from Georgia, with little prospect of overtaking and overwhelming him. To remain on

the defensive would have been bad policy for an army of so great value as the one I then commanded, and I was forced to adopt a course more fruitful in results than the naked one of following him to the southwest. I had previously submitted to the commander-in-chief a general plan, which amounted substantially to the destruction of Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and sallying forth from Atlanta, through the heart of Georgia, to capture one or more of the great Atlantic seaports. This I renewed from Gaylesville, modified somewhat by the change of events.

On the 26th of October, satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand mountain, I detached the 4th corps, Major General Stanley, and ordered him to proceed to Chattanooga and report to Major General Thomas at Nashville. Subsequently, on the 30th October, I also detached the 23d corps, Major General Schofield, with the same destination; and delegated to Major General Thomas full power over all the troops subject to my command, except the four corps with which I designed to move into Georgia. This gave him the two divisions under A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, but *en route* for Tennessee, the two corps named, and all the garrisons in Tennessee, as also all the cavalry of my military division, except one division under Brigadier General Kilpatrick, which was ordered to rendezvous at Marietta. Brevet Major General Wilson had arrived from the army of the Potomac to assume command of the cavalry of my army, and I despatched him back to Nashville with all dismounted detachments, and orders as rapidly as possible to collect the cavalry serving in Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, organize, and equip them, and report to Major General Thomas for duty. These forces I judged would enable General Thomas to defend the railroad from Chattanooga back, including Nashville and Decatur, and give him an army with which he could successfully cope with Hood should the latter cross the Tennessee northward.

By the 1st of November Hood's army had moved from Gadsden and made its appearance in the neighborhood of Decatur, where a feint was made; he then passed on to Tusculumbia and laid a pontoon bridge opposite Florence. I then began my preparations for the march through Georgia, having received the sanction of the commander-in-chief for carrying into effect my plan, the details of which were explained to all my corps commanders and heads of staff departments, with strict injunctions of secrecy. I had also communicated full details to General Thomas, and had informed him I would not leave the neighborhood of Kingston until he felt perfectly confident that he was entirely prepared to cope with Hood, should he carry into effect his threatened invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky. I estimated Hood's force at 35,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.

I moved the army of the Tennessee by slow and easy marches on the south of the Coosa back to the neighborhood of Smyrna camp ground, and the 14th corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, to Kingston, whither I repaired in person on the 2d of November. From that point I directed all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed for my contemplated march, all the sick and wounded, refugees, &c., to be sent back to Chattanooga; and the four corps above mentioned, with Kilpatrick's cavalry, were put in the most efficient condition possible for a long and difficult march. This operation consumed the time until the 11th of November, when everything being ready, I ordered General Corse, who still remained at Rome, to destroy the bridges there, all foundries, mills, shops, warehouses, or other property that could be useful to an enemy, and to move to Kingston. At the same time the railroad in and about Atlanta, and between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, was ordered to be utterly destroyed. The garrisons from Kingston northward were also ordered to draw back to Chattanooga, taking with them all public property and all railroad stock, and to take up the rails from Resaca back, saving them, ready to be replaced whenever future interests should demand. The railroad between the Etowah and the Oostenaula was left

untouched, because I thought it more than probable we would find it necessary to reoccupy the country as far forward as the line of the Etowah. Atlanta itself is only of strategic value as long as it is a railroad centre; and as all the railroads leading to it are destroyed, as well as all its foundries, machine-shops, warehouses, depots, &c., it is of no more value than any other point in north Georgia; whereas the line of the Etowah, by reason of its rivers and natural features, possesses an importance which will always continue. From it all parts of Georgia and Alabama can be reached by armies marching with trains down the Coosa or the Chattahoochee valleys.

On the 12th of November my army stood detached and cut off from all communication with the rear. It was composed of four corps—the 15th and 17th, constituting the right wing, under Major General O. O. Howard; the 14th and 20th corps, constituting the left wing, under Major General H. W. Slocum; of an aggregate strength of 60,000 infantry; one cavalry division, in aggregate strength 5,500, under Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick, and the artillery reduced to the minimum, one gun per thousand men.

The whole force was moved rapidly and grouped about Atlanta on the 14th November. In the mean time Captain O. M. Poe had thoroughly destroyed Atlanta, save its mere dwelling-houses and churches, and the right wing, with General Kilpatrick's cavalry, was put in motion in the direction of Jonesboro' and McDonough, with orders to make a strong feint on Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about Planters' Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon in seven days, exclusive of the day of march. On the same day General Slocum moved with the 20th corps by Decatur and Stone mountain, with orders to tear up the railroad from Social Circle to Madison, to burn the large and important railroad bridge across the Oconee, east of Madison, and turn south and reach Milledgeville on the seventh day, exclusive of the day of march. In person I left Atlanta on the 16th, in company with the 14th corps, Brevet Major General Jeff. C. Davis, by Lithonia, Covington, and Shady Dale, directly on Milledgeville. All the troops were provided with good wagon trains, loaded with ammunition, and supplies approximating twenty days' bread, forty days' sugar and coffee, a double allowance of salt for forty days, and beef cattle equal to forty days' supplies. The wagons were also supplied with about three days' forage, in grain. All were instructed, by a judicious system of foraging, to maintain this order of things as long as possible, living chiefly if not solely upon the country, which I knew to abound in corn, sweet potatoes, and meats.

My first object was, of course, to place my army in the very heart of Georgia, interposing between Macon and Augusta, and obliging the enemy to divide his forces to defend not only those points, but Millen, Savannah, and Charleston. All my calculations were fully realized. During the 22d General Kilpatrick made a good feint on Macon, driving the enemy within his intrenchments, and then drew back to Griswoldville, where Walcott's brigade of infantry joined him to cover that flank, whilst Howard's trains were closing up and his men scattered, breaking up railroads. The enemy came out of Macon and attacked Walcott in position, but was so roughly handled that he never repeated the experiment. On the eighth day after leaving Atlanta, namely, on the 23d, General Slocum occupied Milledgeville and the important bridge across the Oconee there, and Generals Howard and Kilpatrick were in and about Gordon.

General Howard was then ordered to move eastward, destroying the railroad thoroughly in his progress as far as Tennille Station, opposite Sandersville, and General Slocum to move to Sandersville by two roads. General Kilpatrick was ordered to Milledgeville, and thence move rapidly eastward, to break the railroad which leads from Millen to Augusta, then to turn upon Millen and rescue our prisoners of war supposed to be confined at that place. I accompanied the 20th corps from Milledgeville to Sandersville, approaching which place, on the 25th, we found the bridges across Buffalo creek burned, which delayed us three

hours. The next day we entered Sandersville, skirmishing with Wheeler's cavalry, which offered little opposition to the advance of the 20th and 14th corps, entering the place almost at the same moment.

General Slocum was then ordered to tear up and destroy the Georgia Central railroad, from Station 13 (Tennille) to Station 10, near the crossing of Ogeechee; one of his corps substantially following the railroad, the other by way of Louisville, in support of Kilpatrick's cavalry. In person I shifted to the right wing, and accompanied the 17th corps, General Blair, on the south of the railroad, till abreast of Station 9½, (Barton;) General Howard, in person, with the 15th corps, keeping further to the right, and about one day's march ahead, ready to turn against the flank of any enemy who should oppose our progress. At Barton I learned that Kilpatrick's cavalry had reached the Augusta railroad about Waynesboro', where he ascertained that our prisoners had been removed from Millen, and therefore the purpose of rescuing them, upon which we had set our hearts, was an impossibility. But as Wheeler's cavalry had hung around him, and as he had retired to Louisville to meet our infantry, in pursuance of my instructions not to risk battle unless at great advantage, I ordered him to leave his wagons and all incumbrances with the left wing, and moving in the direction of Augusta, if Wheeler gave him the opportunity, to indulge him with all the fighting he wanted. General Kilpatrick, supported by Baird's division of infantry of the 14th corps, again moved in the direction of Waynesboro', and encountering Wheeler in the neighborhood of Thomas's Station, attacked him in position, driving him from three successive lines of barricades handsomely through Waynesboro' and across Brier creek, the bridges over which he burned; and then, with Baird's division, rejoined the left wing, which in the mean time had been marching by easy stages of ten miles a day in the direction of Lumpkin's Station and Jacksonboro'.

The 17th corps took up the destruction of the railroad at the Ogeechee, near Station 10, and continued it to Millen; the enemy offering little or no opposition, although preparation had seemingly been made at Millen.

On the 3d of December the 17th corps, which I accompanied, was at Millen; the 15th corps, General Howard, was south of the Ogeechee, opposite Station 7, (Scarboro'); the 20th corps, General Slocum, on the Augusta railroad, about four miles north of Millen, near Buckhead church, and the 14th corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, in the neighborhood of Lumpkin's Station, on the Augusta railroad. All were ordered to march in the direction of Savannah—the 15th corps to continue south of the Ogeechee, the 17th to destroy the railroad as far as Ogeechee church—and four days were allowed to reach the line from Ogeechee church to the neighborhood of Halley's ferry, on the Savannah river. All the columns reached their destinations on time, and continued to march on their several roads; General Davis following the Savannah river road, General Slocum the middle road by way of Springfield, General Blair the railroad, and General Howard still south and west of the Ogeechee, with orders to cross to the east bank opposite "Eden Station," or Station No 2.

As we approached Savannah the country became more marshy and difficult, and more obstructions were met, in the way of felled trees, where the roads crossed the creek, swamps, or narrow causeways; but our pioneer companies were well organized, and removed the obstruction in an incredibly short time. No opposition from the enemy worth speaking of was encountered until the heads of columns were within fifteen miles of Savannah, where all the roads leading to the city were obstructed more or less by felled timber, with earthworks and artillery. But these were easily turned and the enemy driven away, so that by the 10th of December the enemy was driven within his lines at Savannah. These followed substantially a swampy creek which empties into the Savannah river about three miles above the city, across to the head of a corresponding stream which empties into the Little Ogeechee. These streams were singularly

favorable to the enemy as a cover, being very marshy, and bordered by rice fields, which were flooded either by the tide-water or by inland ponds, the gates to which were controlled and covered by his heavy artillery. The only approaches to the city were by five narrow causeways, namely, the two railroads, and the Augusta, the Louisville, and the Ogeechee dirt roads; all of which were commanded by heavy ordnance, too strong for us to fight with our light field-guns. To assault an enemy of unknown strength at such a disadvantage appeared to me unwise, especially as I had so successfully brought my army, almost unscathed, so great a distance, and could surely attain the same result by the operation of time. I therefore instructed my army commanders to closely invest the city from the north and west, and to reconnoitre well the ground in their fronts, respectively, whilst I gave my personal attention to opening communications with our fleet, which I knew was waiting for us in Tybee, Wassaw, and Ossabaw sounds.

In approaching Savannah, General Slocum struck the Charleston railroad near the bridge, and occupied the river bank as his left flank, where he had captured two of the enemy's river boats, and had prevented two others (gunboats) from coming down the river to communicate with the city; while General Howard, by his right flank, had broken the Gulf railroad at Fleming's and way stations and occupied the railroad itself down to the Little Ogeechee, near "Station 1;" so that no supplies could reach Savannah by any of its accustomed channels. We, on the contrary, possessed large herds of cattle, which we had brought along or gathered in the country, and our wagons still contained a reasonable amount of breadstuffs and other necessaries, and the fine rice crops of the Savannah and Ogeechee rivers furnished to our men and animals a large amount of rice and rice straw. We also held the country to the south and west of the Ogeechee as foraging ground. Still, communication with the fleet was of vital importance, and I directed General Kilpatrick to cross the Ogeechee by a pontoon bridge, to reconnoitre Fort McAllister, and to proceed to St. Catherine's sound, in the direction of Sunbury or Kilkenny Bluff, and open communication with the fleet. General Howard had previously, by my direction, sent one of his best scouts down the Ogeechee in a canoe for a like purpose. But more than this was necessary. We wanted the vessels and their contents; and the Ogeechee river, a navigable stream, close to the rear of our camps, was the proper avenue of supply.

The enemy had burned the road-bridge across the Ogeechee, just below the mouth of the Canoochee, known as "King's bridge." This was reconstructed in an incredibly short time, in the most substantial manner, by the 58th Indiana, Colonel Buel, under the direction of Captain Reese, of the engineer corps, and on the morning of the 13th December the second division of the 15th corps, under command of Brigadier General Hazen, crossed the bridge to the west bank of the Ogeechee and marched down with orders to carry by assault Fort McAllister, a strong enclosed redoubt, manned by two companies of artillery and three of infantry, in all about 200 men, and mounting 23 guns *en barbette*, and one mortar. General Hazen reached the vicinity of Fort McAllister about 1 p. m., deployed his division about the place, with both flanks resting upon the river, posted his skirmishers judiciously behind the trunks of trees whose branches had been used for abatis, and about 5 p. m. assaulted the place with nine regiments at three points, all of them successfully. I witnessed the assault from a rice mill on the opposite bank of the river, and can bear testimony to the handsome manner in which it was accomplished.

Up to this time we had not communicated with our fleet. From the signal station at the rice mill our officers had looked for two days over the rice fields and salt marsh in the direction of Ossabaw sound, but could see nothing of it. But while watching the preparations for the assault on Fort McAllister, we discovered in the distance what seemed to be the smoke-stack of a steamer, which

became more and more distinct, until about the very moment of the assault she was plainly visible below the fort, and our signal was answered. As soon as I saw our colors fairly planted upon the walls of McAllister, in company with General Howard I went in a small boat down to the fort and met General Hazen, who had not yet communicated with the gunboat below, as it was shut out to him by a point of timber. Determined to communicate that night, I got another small boat and a crew and pulled down the river till I found the tug Dandelion, Captain Williamson, United States navy, who informed me that Captain Duncan, who had been sent by General Howard, had succeeded in reaching Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster, and that he was expecting them hourly in Ossabaw sound. After making communications to those officers, and a short communication to the War Department, I returned to Fort McAllister that night, and before daylight was overtaken by Major Strong, of General Foster's staff, advising me that General Foster had arrived in the Ogeechee, near Fort McAllister, and was very anxious to meet me on board his boat. I accordingly returned with him, and met General Foster on board the steamer Nemaha; and after consultation determined to proceed with him down the sound in hopes to meet Admiral Dahlgren. But we did not meet him until we reached Wassaw sound about noon. I there went on board the admiral's flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, after having arranged with General Foster to send us from Hilton Head some siege ordnance and some boats suitable for navigating the Ogeechee river. Admiral Dahlgren very kindly furnished me with all the data concerning his fleet and the numerous forts that guarded the inland channels between the sea and Savannah. I explained to him how completely Savannah was invested at all points, save only the plank road on the South Carolina shore, known as the "Union causeway," which I thought I could reach from my left flank across the Savannah river. I explained to him that if he would simply engage the attention of the forts along Wilmington channel, at Beaulieu and Rosedew, I thought I could carry the defences of Savannah by assault as soon as the heavy ordnance arrived from Hilton Head. On the 15th the admiral carried me back to Fort McAllister, whence I returned to our lines in the rear of Savannah.

Having received and carefully considered all the reports of division commanders, I determined to assault the lines of the enemy as soon as my heavy ordnance came from Port Royal, first making a formal demand for surrender. On the 17th, a number of thirty-pounder Parrott guns having reached King's bridge, I proceeded in person to the headquarters of Major General Slocum, on the Augusta road, and despatched thence into Savannah, by flag of truce, a formal demand for the surrender of the place; and on the following day received an answer from General Hardee refusing to surrender.

In the mean time further reconnoissances from our left flank had demonstrated that it was impracticable or unwise to push any considerable force across the Savannah river, for the enemy held the river opposite the city with iron-clad gunboats, and could destroy any pontoons laid down by us between Hutchinson's island and the South Carolina shore, which would isolate any force sent over from that flank. I therefore ordered General Slocum to get into position the siege guns, and make all the preparations necessary to assault, and report to me the earliest moment when he could be ready, whilst I should proceed rapidly round by the right and make arrangements to occupy the Union causeway from the direction of Port Royal. General Foster had already established a division of troops on the peninsula or neck between the Coosawatchie and Tullifinney rivers, at the head of Broad river, from which position he could reach the railroad with his artillery. I went to Port Royal in person, and made arrangements to re-enforce that command by one or more divisions, under a proper officer, to assault and carry the railroad, and thence turn toward Savannah until it occupied the causeway in question. I went on board the admiral's flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, which put out to sea on the night of the 20th. But the wind

was high, and increased during the night, so that the pilot judged Ossabaw bar impassable, and ran into the Tybee, whence we proceeded through the inland channels into Wassaw sound, and thence through Romney marsh. But the ebb tide caught the Harvest Moon and she was unable to make the passage. Admiral Dahlgren took me in his barge, and pulling in the direction of Vernon river we met the army tug Red Legs, bearing a message from my adjutant, Captain Dayton, of that morning, the 21st, to the effect that our troops were in possession of the enemy's lines, and were advancing without opposition into Savannah, the enemy having evacuated the place during the previous night.

Admiral Dahlgren proceeded up the Vernon river in his barge, while I transferred to the tug, in which I proceeded to Fort McAllister, and thence to the rice-mill, and on the morning of the 22d rode into the city of Savannah, already occupied by our troops.

I was very much disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his garrison, and had to content myself with the material fruits of victory without the cost of life which would have attended a general assault. The substantial results will be more clearly set forth in the tabular statements of heavy ordnance and other public property acquired, and it will suffice here to state that the important city of Savannah, with its valuable harbor and river, was the chief object of the campaign. With it we acquire all the forts and heavy ordnance in its vicinity, with large stores of ammunition, shot and shells, cotton, rice, and other valuable products of the country. We also gain locomotives and cars, which, though of little use to us in the present condition of the railroads, are a serious loss to the enemy; as well as four steamboats gained, and the loss to the enemy of the iron-clad Savannah, one ram, and three transports, blown up or burned by them the night before.

Formal demand having been made for the surrender, and having been refused, I contend that everything within the line of the intrenchments belongs to the United States, and I shall not hesitate to use it, if necessary, for public purposes. But inasmuch as the inhabitants generally have manifested a friendly disposition, I shall disturb them as little as possible consistently with the military rights of present and future military commanders, without remitting in the least our just rights as captors.

After having made the necessary orders for the disposition of the troops in and about Savannah, I ordered Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, to make a thorough examination of the enemy's works in and about Savannah, with a view to making it conform to our future uses. New lines of defences will be built, embracing the city proper, Forts Jackson, Thunderbolt, and Pulaski retained, with slight modifications in their armanent and rear defences. All the rest of the enemy's forts will be dismantled and destroyed, and their heavy ordnance transferred to Hilton Head, where it can be more easily guarded. Our base of supplies will be established in Savannah as soon as the very difficult obstructions placed in the river can be partially removed. These obstructions at present offer a very serious impediment to the commerce of Savannah, consisting of crib-work of logs and timber heavily bolted together, and filled with cobble stones which formerly paved the streets of Savannah. All the channels below the city were found more or less filled with torpedoes, which have been removed by order of Admiral Dahlgren; so that Savannah already fulfils the important part it was designed in our plans for the future.

In thus sketching the course of events connected with this campaign I have purposely passed lightly over the march from Atlanta to the sea-shore, because it was made in four or more columns, sometimes at a distance of fifteen or twenty miles from each other, and it was impossible for me to attend but one. Therefore I have left it to the army and corps commanders to describe in their own language the events which attended the march of their respective columns. These reports are herewith submitted, and I beg to refer to them for further de-

tails. I would merely sum up the advantages which I conceive have accrued to us by this march.

Our former labors in north Georgia had demonstrated the truth that no large army, carrying with it the necessary stores and baggage, can overtake and capture an inferior force of the enemy in his own country. Therefore no alternative was left me but the one I adopted, namely, to divide my forces, and with the one part act offensively against the enemy's resources, while with the other I should act defensively, and invite the enemy to attack, risking the chances of battle. In this conclusion I have been singularly sustained by the results. General Hood, who, as I have heretofore described, had moved to the westward near Tusculumbia, with a view to decoy me away from Georgia, finding himself mistaken, was forced to choose either to pursue me, or to act offensively against the other part left in Tennessee. He adopted the latter course; and General Thomas has wisely and well fulfilled his part of the grand scheme in drawing Hood well up into Tennessee until he could concentrate all his own troops and then turn upon Hood, as he has done, and destroy or fatally cripple his army. That part of my army is so far removed from me that I leave, with perfect confidence, its management and history to General Thomas.

I was thereby left with a well-appointed army to sever the enemy's only remaining railroad communications eastward and westward, for over one hundred miles, namely, the Georgia State railroad, which is broken up from Fairburn Station to Madison and the Oconee, and the Central railroad from Gordon clear to Savannah, with numerous breaks on the latter road from Gordon to Eatonton, and from Millen to Augusta, and the Savannah and Gulf railroad. We have also consumed the corn and fodder in the region of country thirty miles on either side of a line from Atlanta to Savannah, as also the sweet potatoes, cattle, hogs, sheep and poultry, and have carried away more than ten thousand horses and mules, as well as a countless number of their slaves. I estimate the damage done to the State of Georgia and its military resources at \$100,000,000; at least twenty millions of which has inured to our advantage, and the remainder is simple waste and destruction. This may seem a hard species of warfare, but it brings the sad realities of war home to those who have been directly or indirectly instrumental in involving us in its attendant calamities.

The campaign has also placed this branch of my army in a position from which other great military results may be attempted, besides leaving in Tennessee and north Alabama a force which is amply sufficient to meet all the chances of war in that region of our country.

Since the capture of Atlanta my staff is unchanged, save that General Barry, chief of artillery, has been absent, sick, since our leaving Kingston. Surgeon Moore, United States army, is chief medical director, in place of Surgeon Kittoe, relieved to resume his proper duties as a medical inspector. Major Hitchcock, assistant adjutant general, has also been added to my staff, and has been of great assistance in the field and office. Captain Dayton still remains as my adjutant general. All have, as formerly, fulfilled their parts to my entire satisfaction.

In the body of my army I feel a just pride. Generals Howard and Slocum are gentlemen of singular capacity and intelligence, thorough soldiers and patriots, working day and night, not for themselves, but for their country and their men. General Kilpatrick, who commanded the cavalry of this army, has handled it with spirit and dash to my entire satisfaction, and kept a superior force of the enemy's cavalry from even approaching our infantry columns or wagon trains.

His report is full and graphic. All the division and brigade commanders merit my personal and official thanks, and I shall spare no efforts to secure them commissions equal to the rank they have exercised so well. As to the rank and file, they seem so full of confidence in themselves that I doubt if they want a compliment from me; but I must do them the justice to say that whether called

on to fight, to march, to wade streams, to make roads, clear out obstructions, build bridges, make "corduroy," or tear up railroads, they have done it with alacrity and a degree of cheerfulness unsurpassed. A little loose in foraging, they "did some things they ought not to have done," yet, on the whole, they have supplied the wants of the army with as little violence as could be expected, and as little loss as I calculated. Some of these foraging parties had encounters with the enemy which would in ordinary times rank as respectable battles. The behavior of our troops in Savannah has been so manly, so quiet, so perfect, that I take it as the best evidence of discipline and true courage. Never was a hostile city, filled with women and children, occupied by a large army with less disorder, or more system, order, and good government. The same general and generous spirit of confidence and good feeling pervades the army which it has ever afforded me especial pleasure to report on former occasions.

I avail myself of this occasion to express my heartfelt thanks to Admiral Dahlgren and the officers and men of his fleet, as also to General Foster and his command, for the hearty welcome given us on our arrival at the coast, and for their steady and prompt co-operation in all measures tending to the result accomplished.

I send herewith a map of the country through which we have passed; reports from General Howard, General Slocum, and General Kilpatrick, and their subordinates, respectively, with the usual lists of captured property, killed, wounded, and missing, prisoners of war taken and rescued; as also copies of all papers illustrating the campaign; all of which are respectfully submitted by

Your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*Chief of Staff, Washington City, D. C.*

Official copy :

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*November 18, 1865.*

*Major General William T. Sherman's report of the campaign of the Carolinas.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Goldsboro', N. C., April 4, 1865.*

GENERAL: I must now endeavor to group the events of the past three months connected with the armies under my command, in order that you may have as clear an understanding of the late campaign as the case admits of. The reports of subordinate commanders will enable you to fill up the picture.

I have heretofore explained how, in the progress of our arms, I was enabled to leave in the west an army under Major General George H. Thomas, of sufficient strength to meet emergencies in that quarter, while in person I conducted another army, composed of the 14th, 15th, 17th, and 20th corps, and Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, to the Atlantic slope, aiming to approach the grand theatre of war in Virginia by the time the season would admit of military operations in that latitude. The first lodgement on the coast was made at Savannah, strongly fortified and armed, and valuable to us as a good sea-port with its navigable stream inland. Near a month was consumed there in refitting the army, and in making the proper disposition of captured property, and other local matters; but by the 15th of January I was all ready

to resume the march. Preliminary to this, General Howard, commanding the right wing, was ordered to embark his command at Thunderbolt, transport it to Beaufort, South Carolina, and thence by the 15th of January make a lodgement on the Charleston railroad, at or near Pocotaligo. This was accomplished punctually, at little cost, by the 17th corps, Major General Blair, and a depot for supplies was established near the mouth of Pocotaligo creek, with easy water communication back to Hilton Head.

The left wing, Major General Slocum, and the cavalry, Major General Kilpatrick, were ordered to rendezvous about the same time near Robertsville and Coosawhatchie, South Carolina, with a depot of supplies at Pureysburg, or Sister's ferry, on the Savannah river. General Slocum had a good pontoon bridge constructed opposite the city, and the "Union causeway" leading through the low rice-fields opposite Savannah was repaired and "corduroyed," but before the time appointed to start, the heavy rains of January had swelled the river, broken the pontoon bridge, and overflowed the whole "bottom," so that the causeway was four feet under water, and General Slocum was compelled to look higher up for a passage over the Savannah river. He moved up to Sister's ferry, but even there the river with its overflowed bottoms was near three miles wide, and he did not succeed in getting his whole wing across until during the first week of February.

In the mean time General Grant had sent me Grover's division of the 19th corps to garrison Savannah, and had drawn the 23d corps, Major General Schofield, from Tennessee, and sent it to re-enforce the commands of Major Generals Terry and Palmer, operating on the coast of North Carolina, to prepare the way for my coming.

On the 18th of January I transferred the forts and city of Savannah to Major General Foster, commanding the department of the south, imparted to him my plans of operation, and instructed him how to follow my movements inland by occupying in succession the city of Charleston and such other points along the sea-coast as would be of any military value to us. The combined naval and land forces under Admiral Porter and General Terry had on the 15th of January captured Fort Fisher and the rebel forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river, giving me an additional point of security on the sea-coast. But I had already resolved in my own mind, and had so advised General Grant, that I would undertake at one stride to make Goldsboro', and open communication with the sea by the Newbern railroad, and had ordered Colonel W. W. Wright, superintendent of military railroads, to proceed in advance to Newbern, and to be prepared to extend the railroad out from Newbern to Goldsboro' by the 15th of March.

On the 19th of January all preparations were complete and the orders of march given. My chief quartermaster and commissary, Generals Eaton and Beckwith, were ordered to complete the supplies at Sister's ferry and Pocotaligo, and then to follow our movement coastwise, looking for my arrival at Goldsboro', North Carolina, about March 15, and opening communication with me from Morehead City.

On the 22d of January I embarked at Savannah for Hilton Head, where I held a conference with Admiral Dahlgren, United States navy, and Major General Foster, commanding the department of the south, and next day proceeded to Beaufort, riding out thence on the 24th to Pocotaligo, where the 17th corps, Major General Blair, was encamped. The 15th corps was somewhat scattered—Woods's and Hazen's divisions at Beaufort, John E. Smith marching from Savannah by the coast road, and Corse still at Savannah, cut off by the storms and freshet in the river. On the 25th a demonstration was made against the Combahee ferry and railroad bridge across the Salkehatchie, merely to amuse the enemy, who had evidently adopted that river as his defensive line against our supposed *objective*, the city of Charleston. I reconnoitred the line

in person, and saw that the heavy rains had swollen the river so that water stood in the swamps for a breadth of more than a mile, at a depth of from one to twenty feet. Not having the remotest intention of approaching Charleston, a comparatively small force was able, by seeming preparations to cross over, to keep in their front a considerable force of the enemy disposed to contest our advance on Charleston. On the 27th I rode to the camp of General Hatch's division of Foster's command, on the Tullafuiney and Coosawhatchie rivers, and directed those places to be evacuated, as no longer of any use to us. That division was then moved to Pocotaligo to keep up the feints already begun, until we should with the right wing move higher up and cross the Salkehatchie about Rivers's or Broxton's bridge.

On the 29th I learned that the roads back of Savannah had at last become sufficiently free of the flood to admit of General Slocum putting his wing in motion, and that he was already approaching Sister's ferry, whither a gunboat, the Pontiac, Captain Luce, kindly furnished by Admiral Dahlgren, had preceded him to cover the crossing. In the mean time three divisions of the 15th corps had closed up at Pocotaligo, and the right wing had loaded its wagons and was ready to start. I therefore directed General Howard to move one corps, the 17th, along the Salkehatchie, as high up as Rivers's bridge, and the other, the 15th, by Hickory Hill, Loper's Cross-roads, Anglesey post office, and Beaufort's bridge. Hatch's division was ordered to remain at Pocotaligo, feigning at the Salkehatchie railroad bridge and ferry, until our movement turned the enemy's position and forced him to fall behind the Edisto.

The 17th and 15th corps drew out of camp on the 31st of January, but the real march began on the 1st of February. All the roads northward had for weeks been held by Wheeler's cavalry, who had, by details of negro laborers, felled trees, burned bridges, and made obstructions to impede our march. But so well organized were our pioneer battalions, and so strong and intelligent our men, that obstructions seemed only to quicken their progress. Felled trees were removed and bridges rebuilt by the heads of columns before the rear could close up. On the 2d of February the 15th corps reached Loper's Cross-roads, and the 17th was at Rivers's bridge. From Loper's Cross-roads I communicated with General Slocum, still struggling with the floods of the Savannah river at Sister's ferry. He had two divisions of the 20th corps, General Williams, on the east bank, and was enabled to cross over on his pontoons the cavalry of Kilpatrick. General Williams was ordered to Beaufort's bridge by way of Lawtonville and Allandale, Kilpatrick to Blackville via Barnwell, and General Slocum to hurry the crossing at Sister's ferry as much as possible, and overtake the right wing on the South Carolina railroad. General Howard, with the right wing, was directed to cross the Salkehatchie and push rapidly for the South Carolina railroad at or near Midway. The enemy held the line of the Salkehatchie in force, having infantry and artillery intrenched at Rivers's and Beaufort's bridges. The 17th corps was ordered to carry Rivers's bridge, and the 15th corps Beaufort's bridge. The former position was carried promptly and skilfully by Mower's and Giles A. Smith's divisions of the 17th corps, on the 3d of February, by crossing the swamp, nearly three miles wide, with water varying from knee to shoulder deep. The weather was bitter cold, and Generals Mower and Smith led their divisions in person, on foot, waded the swamp, made a lodgement below the bridge, and turned on the rebel brigade which guarded it, driving it in confusion and disorder towards Branchville. Our casualties were one officer and seventeen men killed, and seventy men wounded, who were sent to Pocotaligo. The line of the Salkehatchie being thus broken, the enemy retreated at once behind the Edisto at Branchville, and the whole army was pushed rapidly to the South Carolina railroad at Midway, Bamberg, (or Lowry's Station,) and Graham's Station. The 17th corps, by threatening Branchville, forced the enemy to burn the railroad bridge and Walker's bridge

below, across the Edisto. All hands were at once set to work to destroy the railroad track. From the 7th to the 10th of February this work was thoroughly prosecuted by the 17th corps, from the Edisto up to Bamberg, and by the 15th corps from Bamberg up to Blackville. In the mean time General Kilpatrick had brought his cavalry rapidly by Barnwell to Blackville, and had turned towards Aiken, with orders to threaten Augusta, but not to be drawn needlessly into a serious battle. This he skilfully accomplished, skirmishing heavily with Wheeler's cavalry, first at Blackville and afterward at Williston and Aiken. General Williams, with two divisions of the 20th corps, marched to the South Carolina railroad at Graham's Station, on the 8th, and General Slocum reached Blackville on the 10th. The destruction of the railroad was continued by the left wing from Blackville up to Windsor. By the 11th of February all the army was on the railroad from Midway to Johnson's Station, thereby dividing the enemy's forces, which still remained at Branchville and Charleston on the one hand, Aiken and Augusta on the other.

We then began the movement on Orangeburg. The 17th corps crossed the South Fork of Edisto river at Binnaker's bridge, and moved straight for Orangeburg, while the 15th corps crossed at Holman's bridge and moved to Poplar Springs in support. The left wing and cavalry were still at work on the railroad, with orders to cross the South Edisto at New and Guidnard's bridges, move to the Orangeburg and Edgefield road, and there await the result of the attack on Orangeburg. On the 12th the 17th corps found the enemy intrenched in front of the Orangeburg bridge, but swept him away by a dash, and followed him, forcing him across the bridge, which was partially burned. Behind the bridge was a battery in position, covered by a cotton and earth parapet, with wings as far as could be seen. General Blair held one division (Giles A. Smith's) close up to the Edisto, and moved the other two to a point about two miles below, where he crossed Force's division by a pontoon bridge, holding Mower's in support. As soon as Force emerged from the swamp the enemy gave ground, and Giles Smith's division gained the bridge, crossed over, and occupied the enemy's parapet. He soon repaired the bridge, and by 4 p. m. the whole corps was in Orangeburg and had begun the work of destruction on the railroad. Blair was ordered to destroy this railroad effectually up to Lewisville, and to push the enemy across the Congaree and force him to burn the bridges, which he did on the 14th; and without wasting time or labor on Branchville or Charleston, which I knew the enemy could no longer hold, I turned all the columns straight on Columbia.

The 17th corps followed the State road, and the 15th crossed the North Edisto from Poplar Springs at Schilling's bridge, above the mouth of "Cawcaw Swamp" creek, and took a country road which came into the State road at Zeigler's. On the 15th the 15th corps found the enemy in a strong position at Little Congaree bridge, (across Congaree creek,) with a *tête du pont* on the south side, and a well-constructed fort on the north side, commanding the bridge with artillery. The ground in front was very bad, level, and clear, with a fresh deposit of mud from a recent overflow. General Charles R. Woods, who commanded the leading division, succeeded, however, in turning the flank of the *tête du pont* by sending Stone's brigade through a cypress swamp to the left; and following up the retreating enemy promptly, he got possession of the bridge and the fort beyond. The bridge had been partially damaged by fire, and had to be repaired for the passage of artillery, so that night closed in before the head of the column could reach the bridge across Congaree river in front of Columbia. That night the enemy shelled our camps from a battery on the east side of the Congaree, above Granby. Early next morning (February 16) the head of column reached the bank of the Congaree, opposite Columbia, but too late to save the fine bridge which spanned the river at that point. It was burned by the enemy. While waiting for the pontoons to come to the front we could see

people running about the streets of Columbia, and occasionally small bodies of cavalry, but no masses. A single gun of Captain De Grass's battery was firing at their cavalry squads, but I checked his firing, limiting him to a few shots at the unfinished State House walls, and a few shells at the railroad depot to scatter the people who were seen carrying away sacks of corn and meal that we needed. There was no white flag or manifestation of surrender. I directed General Howard not to cross directly in front of Columbia, but to cross the Saluda at the factory, three miles above, and afterward Broad river, so as to approach Columbia from the north. Within an hour of the arrival of General Howard's head of column at the river opposite Columbia, the head of column of the left wing also appeared, and I directed General Slocum to cross the Saluda at Zion church, and thence to take roads direct for Winnsboro', breaking up, *en route*, the railroads and bridges about Alston.

General Howard effected a crossing of the Saluda, near the factory, on the 16th, skirmishing with cavalry, and the same night made a flying bridge across Broad river, about three miles above Columbia, by which he crossed over Stone's brigade, of Woods's division, 15th corps. Under cover of this brigade a pontoon bridge was laid on the morning of the 17th. I was in person at this bridge, and at 11 a. m. learned that the mayor of Columbia had come out in a carriage and made a formal surrender of the city to Colonel Stone, twenty-fifth Iowa infantry, commanding third brigade, first division, 15th corps. About the same time a small party of the 17th corps had crossed the Congaree in a skiff, and entered Columbia from a point immediately west. In anticipation of the occupation of the city, I had made written orders to General Howard touching the conduct of the troops. These were to destroy absolutely all arsenals and public property not needed for our own use, as well as all railroads, depots, and machinery useful in war to an enemy, but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and harmless private property. I was the first to cross the pontoon bridge, and in company with General Howard rode into the city. The day was clear, but a perfect tempest of wind was raging. The brigade of Colonel Stone was already in the city, and was properly posted. Citizens and soldiers were on the streets, and general good order prevailed. General Wade Hampton, who commanded the confederate rear guard of cavalry, had, in anticipation of our capture of Columbia, ordered that all cotton, public and private, should be moved into the streets and fired, to prevent our making use of it. Bales were piled everywhere, the rope and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were blown about in the wind, lodged in the trees and against houses, so as to resemble a snow storm. Some of these piles of cotton were burning, especially one in the very heart of the city, near the court-house, but the fire was partially subdued by the labor of our soldiers. During the day the 15th corps passed through Columbia and out on the Camden road. The 17th did not enter the town at all; and, as I have before stated, the left wing and cavalry did not come within two miles of the town.

Before one single public building had been fired by order, the smouldering fires, set by Hampton's order, were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around. About dark they began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The whole of Woods's division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the flames which, by midnight, had become unmanageable, and raged until about 4 a. m., when the wind subsiding they were got under control. I was up nearly all night, and saw Generals Howard, Logan, Woods, and others, laboring to save houses and protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter, and even of bedding and wearing apparel. I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And without hesitation I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a

silly "Roman stoicism," but from folly and want of sense, in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been imprisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina. During the 18th and 19th the arsenal, railroad depots, machine-shops, foundries, and other buildings were properly destroyed by detailed working parties, and the railroad track torn up and destroyed down to Kingsville and the Wateree bridge, and up in the direction of Winnsboro'.

At the same time the left wing and cavalry had crossed the Saluda and Broad rivers, breaking up railroad about Alston, and as high up as the bridge across Broad river on the Spartanburg road, the main body moving straight for Winnsboro', which General Slocum reached on the 21st of February. He caused the railroad to be destroyed up to Blackstakes depot, and then turned to Rocky Mount, on the Catawba river. The 20th corps reached Rocky Mount on the 22d, laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed over during the 23d. Kilpatrick's cavalry followed, and crossed over in a terrible rain during the night of the 23d, and moved up to Lancaster, with orders to keep up the delusion of a general movement on Charlotte, North Carolina, to which General Beauregard and all the cavalry of the enemy had retreated from Columbia. I was also aware that Cheatham's corps, of Hood's old army, was aiming to make a junction with Beauregard at Charlotte, having been cut off by our rapid movement on Columbia and Winnsboro'. From the 23d to the 26th we had heavy rains, swelling the rivers and making the roads almost impassable. The 20th corps reached Hanging Rock on the 26th, and waited there for the 14th corps to get across the Catawba. The heavy rains had so swollen the river that the pontoon bridge broke, and General Davis had very hard work to restore it and get his command across. At last he succeeded, and the left wing was all put in motion for Cheraw.

In the mean time the right wing had broken up the railroad to Winnsboro', and thence turned for Peay's ferry, where it was crossed over the Catawba before the heavy rains set in, the 17th corps moving straight on Cheraw *via* Young's bridge, and the 15th corps by Tiller's and Kelly's bridges. From this latter corps detachments were sent into Camden to burn the bridge over the Wateree, with the railroad depot, stores, &c. A small force of mounted men under Captain Duncan was also despatched to make a dash and interrupt the railroad from Charleston to Florence, but it met Butler's division of cavalry, and after a sharp night skirmish on Mount Elon was compelled to return unsuccessful. Much bad road was encountered at Lynch's creek, which delayed the right wing about the same length of time as the left wing had been at the Catawba.

On the 2d of March the leading division of the 20th corps entered Chesterfield, skirmishing with Butler's division of cavalry, and the next day about noon the 17th corps entered Cheraw, the enemy retreating across the Pedee, and burning the bridge at that point. At Cheraw we found much ammunition and many guns which had been brought from Charleston on the evacuation of that city. These were destroyed, as also the railroad trestles and bridges down as far as Darlington. An expedition of mounted infantry was also sent down to Florence, but it encountered both cavalry and infantry, and returned, having only broken up in part the branch road from Florence to Cheraw.

Without unnecessary delay the columns were again put in motion, directed on Fayetteville, North Carolina, the right wing crossing the Pedee at Cheraw, and the left wing and cavalry at Sneedboro'. General Kilpatrick was ordered to keep well on the left flank, and the 14th corps, moving by Love's bridge, was given the right to enter and occupy Fayetteville first. The weather continued unfavorable and roads bad, but the 14th and 17th corps reached Fayetteville on

the 11th of March, skirmishing with Wade Hampton's cavalry, that covered the rear of Hardee's retreating army, which, as usual, had crossed Cape Fear river, burning the bridge. During the march from the Pedee General Kilpatrick had kept his cavalry well on the left and exposed flank. During the night of the 9th March his three brigades were divided to picket the roads. General Hampton detecting this dashed in at daylight and gained possession of the camp of Colonel Spencer's brigade, and the house in which General Kilpatrick and Colonel Spencer had their quarters. The surprise was complete, but General Kilpatrick quickly succeeded in rallying his men, on foot, in a swamp near by, and by a prompt attack, well followed up, regained his artillery, horses, camp, and everything save some prisoners whom the enemy carried off, leaving their dead on the ground.

The 12th, 13th, and 14th were passed at Fayetteville, destroying absolutely the United States arsenal and the vast amount of machinery which had formerly belonged to the old Harper's Ferry United States arsenal. Every building was knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and ruined by the first regiment Michigan engineers, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, chief engineer. Much valuable property of great use to an enemy was here destroyed, or cast into the river.

Up to this period I had perfectly succeeded in interposing my superior army between the scattered parts of my enemy. But I was then aware that the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been re-enforced by Cheatham's corps from the west, and the garrison of Augusta, and that ample time had been given to move them to my front and flank about Raleigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear river ahead of me, and could therefore complete the junction with the other armies of Johnston and Hoke, in North Carolina. And the whole, under the command of the skilful and experienced Joe Johnston, made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme caution in making the last step necessary to complete the march I had undertaken. Previous to reaching Fayetteville I had despatched to Wilmington from Laurel Hill church two of our best scouts with intelligence of our position and my general plans. Both of these messengers reached Wilmington, and, on the morning of the 12th of March, the army tug Davidson, Captain Ainsworth, reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, bringing me full intelligence of events from the outer world. On the same day this tug carried back to General Terry, at Wilmington, and General Schofield, at Newbern, my despatches, to the effect that, on Wednesday, the 15th, we would move for Goldsboro', *feigning* on Raleigh, and ordering them to march straight for Goldsboro', which I expected to reach about the 20th. The same day the gunboat Eolus, Captain Young, United States navy, also reached Fayetteville, and through her I continued to have communication with Wilmington until the day of our actual departure. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville, two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape Fear river, one opposite the town, the other three miles below.

General Kilpatrick was ordered to move up the plank road to, and beyond Averysboro'. He was to be followed by four divisions of the left wing, with as few wagons as possible; the rest of the train, under escort of the two remaining divisions of that wing, to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsboro'. In like manner General Howard was ordered to send his trains, under good escort, well to the right, toward Faison's depot and Goldsboro', and to hold four divisions, *light*, ready to go to the aid of the left wing if attacked while in motion. The weather continued very bad, and the roads had become mere quagmire. Almost every foot of it had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of wheels. Still time was so important that punctually, according to order, the columns moved out from Cape Fear river on Wednesday, the 15th of March. I accompanied General Slocum, who, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the

river or plank road that day to Kyle's Landing, Kilpatrick skirmishing heavily with the enemy's rear guard about three miles beyond, near Taylor's Hole creek. At General Kilpatrick's request, General Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades. Next morning the column advanced in the same order, and developed the enemy, with artillery, infantry, and cavalry, in an intrenched position in front of the point where the road branches off toward Goldsboro' through Bentonville. On an inspection of the map it was manifest that Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow swampy neck between Cape Fear and South rivers, in hopes to hold me to save time for the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point to his rear, namely, Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro.' Hardee's force was estimated at 20,000 men. It was necessary to dislodge him that we might have the use of the Goldsboro' road, as also to keep up the feint on Raleigh as long as possible. General Slocum was, therefore, ordered to press and carry the position, only difficult by reason of the nature of the ground, which was so soft that horses would sink everywhere, and even men could hardly make their way over the common pine barren.

The 20th corps, General Williams, had the lead, and Ward's division the advance. This was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the position of a brigade of Charleston heavy artillery armed as infantry, (Rhett's,) posted across the road behind a light parapet, with a battery of guns enfilading the approach across a cleared field. General Williams sent a brigade (Case's) by a circuit to his left that turned this line, and by a quick charge broke the brigade, which rapidly retreated back to a second line better built and more strongly held. A battery of artillery (Winniger's) well posted, under the immediate direction of Major Reynolds, chief of artillery of 20th corps, did good execution on the retreating brigade, and on advancing Ward's division over this ground General Williams captured 3 guns and 217 prisoners, of which 68 were wounded and left in a house near by with a rebel officer, 4 men, and five days' rations. One hundred and eight rebel dead were buried by us. As Ward's division advanced, he developed a second and stronger line, when Jackson's division was deployed forward on the right of Ward, and the two divisions of Jeff. C. Davis's (14th) corps on the left, well toward the Cape Fear. At the same time Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert with General Williams, was ordered to draw back his cavalry and mass it on the extreme right, and, in concert with Jackson's right, to feel forward for the Goldsboro' road. He got a brigade on the road, but it was attacked by McLaws's rebel division furiously, and though it fought well and hard, the brigade drew back to the flank of the infantry. The whole line advanced late in the afternoon, drove the enemy well within his intrenched line, and pressed him so hard that the next morning he was gone, having retreated in a miserable stormy night over the worst of roads. Ward's division of infantry followed to and through Averysboro', developing the fact that Hardee had retreated, not on Raleigh but on Smithfield. I had the night before directed Kilpatrick to cross South river at a mill-dam to our right rear and move up on the east side toward Elevation. General Slocum reports his aggregate loss in this affair, known as that of Aversyboro', at 12 officers and 65 men killed and 477 wounded. We lost no prisoners. The enemy's loss can be inferred from his dead (108) left for us to bury. Leaving Ward's division to keep up a show of pursuit, Slocum's column was turned to the right, built a bridge across the swollen South river, and took the Goldsboro' road, Kilpatrick crossing to the north in the direction of Elevation, with orders to move eastward, watching that flank. In the mean time the wagon trains and guards, as also Howard's column, were wallowing along the miry roads toward Bentonville and Goldsboro'. The enemy's infantry, as before stated, had retreated on Smithfield, and his cavalry retreated across our front in the same direction, burning the bridges across Mill creek. I continued with the head of Slocum's column and

camped the night of the 18th with him on the Goldsboro' road, twenty-seven miles from Goldsboro', about five miles from Bentonville, and where the road from Clinton to Smithfield crosses the Goldsboro' road. Howard was at Lee's store only two miles south, and both columns had pickets three miles forward to where the two roads came together and became common to Goldsboro'.

All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in motion. I therefore directed Howard to move his right wing by the new Goldsboro' road, which goes by way of Falling Creek church. I also left Slocum and joined Howard's column with a view to open communication with General Schofield, coming up from Newbern, and Terry from Wilmington. I found General Howard's column well strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and did not overtake him in person until he had reached Falling Creek church, with one regiment forward to the cross roads near Cox's bridge across the Neuse. I had gone from General Slocum about six miles when I heard artillery in his direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff officers overtaking me, explaining that his leading division (Carlin's) had encountered a division of rebel cavalry, (Dibbrell's,) which he was driving easily. But soon other staff officers came up, reporting that he had developed near Bentonville the whole of the rebel army under General Johnston himself. I sent him orders to call up the two divisions guarding his wagon trains, and Hazen's division of the 15th corps, still back near Lee's store, to fight defensively until I could draw up Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive Station, and with the remaining three divisions of the 15th corps come up on Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's bridge. In the mean time, while on the road, I received couriers from both Generals Schofield and Terry. The former reported himself in possession of Kinston, delayed somewhat by want of provisions, but able to march so as to make Goldsboro' on the 21st; and Terry was at or near Faison's depot. Orders were at once despatched to Schofield to push for Goldsboro' and to make dispositions to cross Little river in the direction of Smithfield, as far as Millard; to General Terry to move to Cox's bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and establish a crossing; and to Blair to make a night march to Falling Creek church; and at daylight the right wing, General Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in rapid motion on Bentonville. By subsequent reports I learned that General Slocum's head of column had advanced from its camp of March 18, and first encountered Dibbrell's cavalry, but soon found his progress impeded by infantry and artillery. The enemy attacked his head of column, gaining a temporary advantage, and took three guns and caissons of General Carlin's division, driving the two leading brigades back on the main body. As soon as General Slocum realized that he had in his front the whole confederate army, he promptly deployed the two divisions of the 14th corps, General Davis, and rapidly brought up on their left the two divisions of the 20th corps, General Williams. These he arranged on the defensive, and hastily prepared a line of barricades. General Kilpatrick also came up at the sound of artillery and massed on the left. In this position the left wing received six distinct assaults by the combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, under the immediate command of General Johnston himself, without giving an inch of ground, and doing good execution on the enemy's ranks, especially with our artillery, the enemy having little or none.

Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield with great rapidity, and without unnecessary wheels, intending to overwhelm my left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating columns. But he "reckoned without his host." I had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayetteville, and was prepared for it. During the night of the 19th, General Slocum got up his wagon train with its guard of two divisions, and Hazen's division of the 15th corps, which re-enforcement enabled him to make his position impregnable. The right

wing found rebel cavalry watching its approach, but unable to offer any serious opposition until our head of column encountered a considerable body behind a barricade at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the battle-field of the day before. This body of cavalry was, however, quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. On moving forward the 15th corps, General Logan found that the enemy had thrown back his left flank, and had constructed a line of parapet connecting with that toward General Slocum, in the form of a bastion, its salient on the main Goldsboro' road interposing between General Slocum on the west and General Howard on the east, while the flanks rested on Mill creek, covering the road back to Smithfield. General Howard was instructed to proceed with due caution until he had made strong connexion on his left with General Slocum. This he soon accomplished, and by 4 p. m. of the 20th a complete and strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his intrenched position, and General Johnston, instead of catching us in detail, was on the defensive, with Mill creek and a single bridge to his rear. Nevertheless, we had no object to accomplish by a battle, unless at an advantage, and therefore my general instructions were to press steadily with skirmishers alone, to use artillery pretty freely on the wooded space held by the enemy, and to feel pretty strongly the flanks of his position, which were, as usual, covered by the endless swamps of this region of country. I also ordered all empty wagons to be sent at once to Kinston for supplies, and other impediments to be grouped near the Neuse, south of Goldsboro', holding the real army in close contact with the enemy, ready to fight him if he ventured outside his parapets and swampy obstructions.

Thus matters stood about Bentonville on the 21st of March. On the same day General Schofield entered Goldsboro' with little or no opposition, and General Terry had got possession of the Neuse river at Cox's bridge, ten miles above, with a pontoon bridge laid and a brigade across, so that the three armies were in actual connexion, and the great object of the campaign was accomplished.

On the 21st a steady rain prevailed, during which General Mower's division of the 17th corps, on the extreme right, had worked well to the right around the enemy's flank, and had nearly reached the bridge across Mill creek, the only line of retreat open to the enemy. Of course there was extreme danger that the enemy would turn on him all his reserves, and, it might be, let go his parapets to overwhelm Mower. Accordingly I ordered at once a general attack by our skirmish line from left to right. Quite a noisy battle ensued, during which General Mower was enabled to regain his connexion with his own corps by moving to his left rear. Still he had developed a weakness in the enemy's position of which advantage might have been taken; but that night the enemy retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets to fall into our hands, with many dead unburied, and wounded in his field hospitals. At daybreak of the 22d pursuit was made two miles beyond Mill creek, but checked by my order. General Johnston had utterly failed in his attempt, and we remained in full possession of the field of battle.

General Slocum reports the losses of the left wing about Bentonville at 9 officers and 145 men killed, 51 officers and 816 men wounded, and 3 officers and 223 men missing, taken prisoners by the enemy; total, 1,247. He buried on the field 167 rebel dead, and took 338 prisoners.

General Howard reports the losses of the right wing at 2 officers and 35 men killed, 12 officers and 289 men wounded, and 1 officer and 60 men missing; total, 399. He also buried 100 rebel dead and took 1,287 prisoners.

The cavalry of Kilpatrick was held in reserve, and lost but few, if any, of which I have no report as yet. Our aggregate loss at Bentonville was 1,646.

I am well satisfied that the enemy lost heavily, especially during his assaults on the left wing during the afternoon of the 19th; but as I have no data save his dead and wounded left in our hands, I prefer to make no comparisons.

Thus, as I have endeavored to explain, we had completed our march on the 21st, and had full possession of Goldsboro', the real "objective," with its two railroads back to the sea-ports of Wilmington and Beaufort, North Carolina. These were being rapidly repaired by strong working parties directed by Colonel W. W. Wright, of the railroad department. A large number of supplies had already been brought forward to Kinston, to which place our wagons had been sent to receive them. I therefore directed General Howard and the cavalry to remain at Bentonville during the 22d, to bury the dead and remove the wounded, and on the following day all the armies to move to the camps assigned them about Goldsboro', there to rest and receive the clothing and supplies of which they stood in need. In person I went on the 22d to Cox's bridge to meet General Terry, whom I met for the first time, and on the following day rode into Goldsboro', where I found General Schofield and his army. The left wing came in during the same day and next morning, and the right wing followed on the 24th, on which day the cavalry moved on Mount Olive Station and General Terry back to Faison's. On the 25th the Newbern railroad was finished and the first train of cars came in, thus giving us the means of bringing from the depot at Morehead City full supplies to the army.

It was all-important that I should have an interview with the general-in-chief, and presuming that he could not at this time leave City Point, I left General Schofield in chief command, and proceeded with all expedition by rail to Morehead City, and thence by steamer to City Point, reaching General Grant's headquarters on the evening of the 27th of March. I had the good fortune to meet General Grant, the President, Generals Meade, Ord, and others of the army of the Potomac, and soon learned the general state of the military world, from which I had been in a great measure cut off since January. Having completed all necessary business, I re-embarked on the navy steamer *Bat*, Captain Barnes, which Admiral Porter placed at my command, and returned *via* Hatteras inlet and Newbern, reaching my own headquarters in Goldsboro' during the night of the 30th. During my absence full supplies of clothing and food had been brought to camp, and all things were working well.

I have thus rapidly sketched the progress of our columns from Savannah to Goldsboro', but for more minute details must refer to the reports of subordinate commanders and of staff officers, which are not yet ready, but will in due season be forwarded and filed with this report. I cannot even with any degree of precision recapitulate the vast amount of injury done the enemy, or the quantity of guns and materials of war captured and destroyed. In general terms, we have traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsboro', with an average breadth of forty miles, consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn meal, &c. The public enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. A map herewith, prepared by my chief engineer, Colonel Poe, with the routes of the four corps and cavalry, will show at a glance the country traversed. Of course the abandonment to us by the enemy of the whole sea-coast from Savannah to Newbern, North Carolina, with its forts, dock-yards, gunboats, &c., was a necessary incident to our occupation and destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply. But the real object of this march was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865. This was completely accomplished on the 21st of March by the junction of the three armies and occupation of Goldsboro'.

In conclusion, I beg to express, in the most emphatic manner, my entire satisfaction with the tone and temper of the whole army. Nothing seems to dampen their energy, zeal, or cheerfulness. It is impossible to conceive a march involving more labor and exposure, yet I cannot recall an instance of bad temper by the way, or hearing an expression of doubt as to our perfect success in the

end. I believe that this cheerfulness and harmony of action reflects upon all concerned quite as much real honor and fame as "battles gained" or "cities won," and I therefore commend all—generals, staff, officers and men—for these high qualities, in addition to the more soldierly ones of obedience to orders and the alacrity they have always manifested when danger summoned them "to the front."

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*Chief of Staff, Washington City, D. C.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF NORTH CAROLINA, ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*Goldsboro', N. C., April 3, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the troops under my command since January 1, 1865, the date of my last report addressed to Major General George H. Thomas, commanding department of the Cumberland, under whose command I was then serving.

On the 2d of January, 1865, I marched with the 23d army corps from Columbia, Tennessee, and arrived at Clifton, on the Tennessee river, on the 8th, under orders to embark my troops at that point and move to Eastport, Mississippi. But before the embarkation had commenced I received, January 14, an order from the Lieutenant General commanding, through the chief of staff of the army, to move with the 23d army corps to Annapolis, Maryland. Accordingly the movement was commenced on the following day. The troops moved with their artillery and horses, but without wagons, by steam transports to Cincinnati, Ohio, and thence by rail to Washington, District of Columbia, and Alexandria, Virginia, a second order from Washington having changed the destination from Annapolis.

Although in mid-winter, and weather unusually severe, even for that season, the movement was effected without delay, accident, or suffering on the part of the troops. By the 31st of January the whole command had arrived at Washington and Alexandria.

At Alexandria great and unavoidable delay was caused by the freezing of the Potomac, which rendered its navigation impossible much of the time for several weeks. Meanwhile I met the Lieutenant General commanding, at Fortress Monroe, and went with him to the mouth of Cape Fear river to consult with Rear-Admiral Porter and Major General Terry relative to future operations. On my return to Washington an order was issued from the War Department creating the department of North Carolina, and assigning me to its command.

My instructions from the Lieutenant General commanding, as well as those received from you, through Major General Foster, made the ultimate object of my operations the occupation of Goldsboro', the opening of railroad communication between that point and the sea-coast, the accumulation of supplies for your army, and the junction of my force with your main army at or near Goldsboro'. Wilmington was made my first objective, because it would afford a valuable auxiliary base to Morehead City in the event of our junction being made at Goldsboro', as designed, and because its possession by us would be of great value to you in case the movement of the enemy's main army or other circumstances should render advisable a concentration of your army at some point further south than Goldsboro'.

As soon as it became possible to navigate the Potomac I started from Alex-

andria with the third division 23d my corps, under command of Major General J. D. Cox, and reached the mouth of Cape Fear river on the 9th of February, and landed upon the peninsula near Fort Fisher.

Major General A. H. Terry, with about 8,000 men, then held a line across the peninsula about two miles above the fort, and occupied Smithville and Fort Caswell on the south side of the river, while the naval squadron, under Rear-Admiral Porter, occupied positions in Cape Fear river and off the coast, covering the flanks of General Terry's line.

The enemy occupied Fort Anderson on the west bank, with a collateral line running to a large swamp about three-fourths of a mile distant, and a line opposite Fort Anderson running across the peninsula from Cape Fear river to Masonboro' sound. His position was impregnable against direct attack, and could be turned only by crossing Masonboro' sound above his left or passing around the swamp which covered his right.

The force I then had seemed too small for so extended a movement as either of those mentioned; but time being important, I determined to make the attempt without waiting for the arrival of more of my troops. On the 11th of February I pushed forward General Terry's line, supported by General Cox's division, drove in the enemy's pickets, and intrenched in a new position, close enough to the enemy's line to compel him to hold the latter in force. I then made preparation to send a fleet of navy boats and pontoons by sea to a point on the beach above the enemy's position, while a force composed of General Cox's and General Ames's divisions was to march along the beach in the night to the point where the boats were to land, haul them across the beach into the sound, and cross the latter to the main land in rear of Hoke's position. The weather, however, became so stormy as to render the execution of this plan impossible. On the night of February 14, I attempted to move the pontoons upon their wagons along the beach with the troops, but the unusually high tides caused by the heavy sea-wind made it impracticable to reach the point of crossing before daylight in the morning, when our movement would be discovered by the enemy before a crossing of the sound could be secured. Hence, after a hard night's work the attempt was abandoned, and I turned attention to the enemy's right, where I would not have to contend with the difficulties of both land and sea. General Cox's and General Ames's divisions were crossed over to Smithville, where they were joined by Colonel Moore's brigade of General Couch's division, which had just debarked, and advanced along the main Wilmington road until they encountered the enemy's position at Fort Anderson and adjacent works. Here two brigades were intrenched to occupy the enemy, while General Cox, with his other two brigades and General Ames's division, started around the swamp, covering the enemy's right, to strike the Wilmington road in rear of Fort Anderson. The distance to be travelled was about fifteen miles. The enemy, warned by his cavalry of General Cox's movement, hastily abandoned his works on both sides of the river during the night of February 19, and fell back behind Town creek on the west, and to a corresponding position, covered by swamps, on the east. We thus gained possession of the main defences of Cape Fear river and of Wilmington, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance, and a large amount of ammunition. Our loss was but trifling.

On the following day General Cox pursued the enemy to Town creek, behind which he was found intrenched, and had destroyed the only bridge. General Terry also encountered the enemy in his new position, and in force superior to General Terry's. General Ames's division was recrossed to the east bank and joined General Terry in the night of the 19th.

On the 20th General Cox crossed Town creek below the enemy's position, by the use of a single flat boat found in the stream, and by wading through swamps reached the enemy's flank and rear, attacked and routed him, capturing two pieces of artillery, 375 prisoners, besides the killed and wounded, and dispersed

the remainder. During the night General Cox rebuilt the bridge, crossed his artillery, and the next morning pushed on toward Wilmington without opposition.

General Terry was unable to make any further advance, but occupied the attention of all of Hoke's force so that he could not send any to replace that which Cox had destroyed. On the 21st General Cox secured a portion of the enemy's pontoon bridge across Brunswick river, which he had attempted to destroy, put a portion of his troops on to Eagle island, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear above Wilmington. The enemy at once set fire to his steamers, cotton and military and naval stores, and abandoned the town. Our troops entered without opposition early on the morning of February 22, and General Terry pursued the enemy across Northeast river.

Our total loss in the operations from February 11 to the capture of Wilmington was about 200 officers and men killed and wounded. That of the enemy was not less than 1,000 killed, wounded and prisoners; fifty-one pieces of heavy ordnance, fifteen light pieces, and a large amount of ammunition fell into our hands.

It affords me pleasure to acknowledge the cordial and constant co-operation of the naval squadron under Rear-Admiral Porter, so far as the nature of the operations would admit.

Having no rolling stock at Wilmington, and being nearly destitute of wagon transportation, I was compelled to operate from Newbern alone for the capture of Goldsboro'. I had already sent to Newbern about 5,000 troops belonging to the various corps of your army, and directed Brigadier General I. N. Palmer to move, with as little delay as practicable, with all his available force toward Kinston, to cover the workmen engaged in repairing the railroad. As soon as Wilmington was secured, I also sent General Ruger's division, 23d army corps, which was then arriving at Cape Fear inlet, by sea to Morehead City, to re-enforce the column moving from Newbern. On the 25th, finding that General Palmer had not moved, as was expected, I sent Major General Cox to take command at Newbern and push forward at once.

General Couch's division, which had nearly completed its debarcation when Wilmington was captured, was brought to that place, and that division, with General Cox's, temporarily commanded by Brigadier General Riley, was prepared as rapidly as possible to join the column moving from Newbern by a land march. These arrangements were made because of the scarcity of both land and sea transportation. It was not until March 6 that I was able to obtain wagons enough, including those belonging to General Terry's command, to move the two divisions from Wilmington to Kinston.

On the 6th, General Couch started with the two divisions, second and third, of the 23d corps, and marched, *via* Onslow and Richland's, for Kinston. On the same day I went by sea to Morehead City, and joined General Cox beyond Newbern on the 8th. General Cox had advanced to Wise's Forks, about one and a half mile below Southwest creek, and the railroad was in rapid process of reconstruction.

The force in front of General Cox, which appeared to consist of Hoke's division and a small body of reserves, had fallen back behind Southwest creek, and General Cox had sent two regiments, under Colonel Upham, 15th Connecticut infantry, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. The enemy, having been re-enforced by a portion of the old army of Tennessee, recrossed the creek some distance above the Dover road, came down in rear of Colonel Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, about seven hundred men.

The enemy then advanced and endeavored to penetrate between General Carter's and General Palmer's divisions, occupying the Dover road and the railroad respectively, but was checked by General Ruger's division, which was just

arriving upon the field. There was no engagement during the day beyond light skirmishing, and the loss on either side, with the exception of the prisoners captured from Colonel Upham, was insignificant.

It being evident that the enemy's force was at least equal to that of General Cox, and that re-enforcements were arriving as rapidly as they could be brought by rail, I directed General Cox to put his troops in position, intrench them securely, and await the arrival of General Couch.

On the 9th the enemy pressed our lines strongly, and felt for its flanks. Heavy skirmishing was kept up during the day, but no assault was made. On the 10th the enemy having been largely re-enforced, and doubtless learning of the approach of General Couch's column, made a heavy attack upon General Cox's left and centre, but was decisively repulsed and with heavy loss. Both attacks were met mainly by General Ruger's division, a portion of that division having been rapidly transferred from the centre to the left to meet the attack there, and then returned to the centre in time to repel the attack on that portion of the line. The enemy retreated in confusion from the field, leaving his killed and wounded, also a large number of arms and intrenching tools, and during the night fell back across the Neuse and burned the bridge. Our loss in this engagement was about three hundred killed and wounded; that of the enemy probably about fifteen hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Couch effected his junction with General Cox on the following day.

Having no pontoon train I was unable to cross the Neuse until the bridge could be repaired, or the pontoons which had just arrived from the north could be brought by rail from Morehead City. The crossing was effected without opposition on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned Kinston and moved rapidly toward Smithfield to join the force under Johnston, which was concentrating to oppose your advance from Fayetteville.

Immediately upon the occupation of Kinston I put a large force of troops to work upon the railroad, in aid of the construction corps under Colonel Wright, rebuilt the wagon bridge over the Neuse, and brought forward supplies preparatory to a further advance.

I moved from Kinston on the morning of the 20th, and entered Goldsboro' with but slight opposition on the evening of the 21st.

The portion of my command which had remained at Wilmington, under Major General Terry, moved from that point March 15, reached Faison's depot on the 20th, and, in compliance with your orders, moved from that point to Cox's bridge, and secured a crossing of the Neuse on the 22d. Your plans for the concentration of your entire army about this place having been fully accomplished on the 23d and 24th, I then had the honor of reporting to you in person and uniting my troops to their old comrades in arms after a separation of near five months, marked by unparalleled marches and brilliant achievements, which will ever furnish bright pages in military history, and, it is hoped, prove decisive in their results upon the present rebellion.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.*

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ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
 Goldsboro', N. C., March 31, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of the artillery of the armies under your command during the Carolina campaign of February and March, 1865.

In consideration of the peculiarities of the campaign, involving long and rapid marches over bad roads, and at an inclement season of the year, the same precautions which were so advantageously taken for your Savannah campaign of last autumn were again observed. The number of guns was reduced to one per thousand effective bayonets, and each artillery carriage was provided with eight draught animals.

The whole number of field batteries was sixteen, comprising sixty-eight guns, which were distributed and of calibres as follows:

	20-pounder Parrotts.	12-pounders.	3-inch rifles.	Total.
Right wing { 15th army corps.....	4	10	4	18
{ 17th army corps.....		4	10	14
Left wing { 14th army corps.....		8	8	16
{ 20th army corps.....		8	8	16
Cavalry division.....			4	4
Total.....	4	30	34	68

Including the reserve supply, each gun was furnished with three hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition.

A careful and critical personal inspection, made a few days preceding our departure from Savannah, satisfied me that in all essentials the artillery was in excellent condition for any kind of work. The results fully justified these expectations. During the whole march the artillery supplied itself, unaided by infantry or cavalry, with provisions for its officers and men, forage for its animals, and to a great extent with fresh horses and mules captured in the country. A tabular statement is appended to this report, showing the extent to which this unusual artillery service was performed.

No gun or artillery carriage of any description was abandoned, disabled, or at any time even a temporary impediment to the march of the infantry columns—a fact the more creditable to the artillery, since in many places the roads were of the worst possible description.

Although the nature of your operations did not, except at the battles of Averysboro' and Bentonville, call for any general use of artillery, yet in support of skirmish lines, brushing away cavalry, and covering the crossings of several difficult and important rivers, it was advantageously used at the following-named times and places, namely:

January 20, 1865, Pocotaligo, 17th army corps.

January 22, 1865, Combahee, 15th army corps.

January 29, 1865, Robertsville, 20th army corps.

February 1, 1865, Hickory Hill, 15th army corps.

February 2, 1865, Lawtonville, 20th army corps.

February 2, 1865, Whippy Swamp, 17th army corps.

February 3, 1865, "Store" at Duck creek, 15th army corps.

February 6, 1865, Little Salkehatchie, 15th army corps.

February 9, 1865, Binnaker's bridge, 17th army corps.

February 11, 1865, North Edisto, 17th army corps.

February 15, 1865, Congaree creek, 15th army corps.

February 16, 1865, Columbia, 15th and 17th army corps.

February 17, 1865, Broad river, 15th army corps.

March 16, 1865, Little Rockfish creek, 15th army corps.

At the battle of Averysboro', March 16, the batteries of the 20th corps were

promptly and judiciously posted by Major Reynolds, the chief of artillery of that corps, and by the precision and rapidity of their fire did most excellent service in dislodging the enemy from his intrenched line, and the consequent capture of three of his guns.

At the battle of Bentonville, March 19, 20, and 21, it was the fortune of the artillery to play a more conspicuous part. The batteries of the 14th and 20th corps were hotly engaged on the 19th, and after the first temporary advantage gained by the enemy, in which the 19th Indiana battery, not by any fault of its own, lost three of its guns, (one of which was recaptured next day,) they poured in a fire so steady, rapid, and effective, that all of the enemy's frequently repeated assaults were successfully repulsed. On the 20th, and particularly on the 21st, the batteries of the 15th corps lent most efficient aid in advancing our own lines, in repelling the enemy's assaults, and in inflicting heavy loss upon him. Both of these fields of battle gave abundant proof of the precision of our artillery fire.

The following tabular statements will exhibit the amounts of provisions and forage, and the number of animals captured by the unaided labors of the artillery, the casualties among officers, enlisted men, and animals, the expenditure of ammunition, and the number of guns lost by us and captured from the enemy :

PROVISIONS, ANIMALS, FORAGE, ETC.

By what batteries procured.	Flour.	Corn meal.	Bacon.	Beef, &c.	Potatoes.	Corn.	Hay and fodder.	Horses.	Mules.
	<i>Pounds.</i>								
Twentieth army corps...	8,000	10,000	25,000	50,000	50,000	350,000	300,000	96	602
Fourteenth army corps...	3,000	5,200	4,360	8,065	.....	219,920	91,800	53	85
Fifteenth army corps....	4,900	5,700	23,000	2,300	37,440	499,000	90,000	50	63
Seventeenth army corps.	2,000	3,200	18,000	.....	.....	218,000	106,000	50	33
	17,900	24,100	70,360	60,365	87,440	1,284,920	587,800	249	783

CASUALTIES.

	OFFICERS.				ENLISTED MEN.				HORSES.		MULES.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Fourteenth army corps .....	1	.....	.....	.....	4	6	1	.....	25	.....	.....	.....
Twentieth army corps .....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	14	1	.....	.....	3	.....	.....
Fifteenth army corps .....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	5	3	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Seventeenth army corps .....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	1	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cavalry division .....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	1	13	.....	10	.....	.....	.....
	1	.....	.....	.....	7	27	19	.....	35	3	.....	.....

EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION.

Command.	No. of rounds.
Fourteenth army corps .....	1,007
Twentieth army corps .....	832
Army of Tennessee .....	1,665
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>3,504</b>

## GUNS CAPTURED AND LOST.

	No. of guns captured from enemy.	No. of guns lost by us.
Columbia.....	43	—
Cheraw.....	25	—
Fayetteville.....	26	—
Averysboro'.....	3	—
Bentons.....	—	2
	—	—
Total.....	97	2
	==	==

Of these, all were serviceable, and about four-fifths were field guns of recent and approved pattern.

If to the operations of your armies, the legitimate fruits of which they really are, be credited the guns captured at Charleston and Wilmington, (excluding from the number of the latter those captured at Fort Fisher and the other forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river,) the total artillery captured during the past ten months by troops under your immediate command will exceed 700 guns.

Throughout the campaign the ammunition, fuzes, and primers proved unusually good and reliable, the only fault observed being sand cracks and insufficient bursting charges in a few of the 20-pounder Parrott projectiles, want of care in the screwing of the Bohrmann fuze in 12-pounder projectiles, and insufficient bursting charges in many of the Hotchkiss 3-inch shell and case-shot. Ammunition and fuzes received from St. Louis arsenal appear to be more complained of (especially the fuzes) than that received from other places.

In conclusion I am gratified to be able to commend the officers and men for attention to their duties in preparation for the field, and for good conduct after entering it; for the details of which I respectfully invite attention to the sub-reports which will be laid before you.

The services of the following named officers give evidence of industry, intelligence, and gallant conduct, and entitle them to notice and reward, namely:

Major Osborn, 1st New York artillery, chief of artillery army of Tennessee; Major Reynolds, 1st New York artillery, chief of artillery 20th army corps; Major Waterhouse, 1st Illinois artillery, chief of artillery 17th army corps; Lieutenant Colonel Ross, 1st Michigan artillery, chief of artillery 15th army corps; Major Houghtaling, 1st Illinois artillery, chief of artillery 14th army corps.

I respectfully ask that each of these officers, who have also served faithfully and creditably through the Atlanta and Savannah campaigns, be recommended for promotion by brevet.

The officers of my staff, Major Dickson, inspector of artillery; Captain Marshall, assistant adjutant general; Captain Merritt and Lieutenant Verplanck, aides-de-camp, at all times performed cheerfully and well the duties with which they were charged.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

WILLIAM F. BARRY,  
*Brev. Maj. Gen., Chief of Artillery.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.*

*Wheeler to General Howard.*GRAHAM'S, S. C., *February 7, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to propose that if the troops of your army be required to discontinue burning the houses of our citizens I will discontinue burning cotton.

As an earnest of the good faith in which my proposition is tendered I leave at this place about 300 bales cotton unharmed, worth, in New York, over a quarter of a million, and in our currency one and a half million. I trust my having commenced will cause you to use your influence to insure the acceptance of the proposition by your whole army.

I trust that you will not deem it improper for me to ask that you will require the troops under your command to discontinue the wanton destruction of property not necessary for their sustenance.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

J. WHEELER,  
*Major General C. S. A.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*United States Army, Commanding, &c.*

*Answer by General Sherman.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, February 8, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours, addressed to General Howard, is received by me. I hope you will burn all cotton, and save us the trouble. We don't want it; and it has proven a curse to our country. All you don't burn I will.

As to private houses, occupied by peaceful families, my orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to anybody, I care little about, as the owners have thought them of no use to themselves. I don't want them destroyed, but do not take much care to preserve them.

I am, with respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General J. WHEELER,  
*Commanding Cavalry Corps, Confederate Army.*

*General Sherman to Wade Hampton.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, February 24, 1865.*

GENERAL: It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after captured and labelled, "death to all foragers." One instance of a lieutenant and seven men near Chesterville, and another of twenty, "near a ravine eighty rods from the main road," about three miles from Feasterville. I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner.

I hold about 1,000 prisoners captured in various ways and can stand it as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge, and suggest that you give notice to the people at large that every life taken by them simply results in the death of one of your confederates.

Of course you cannot question my right to "forage on the country." It is a war right as old as history. The manner of exercising it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions, I will forbid all foraging. But I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage or provisions; therefore must collect directly of the people. I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men; but I cannot permit an enemy to judge, or punish with wholesale murder.

Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war; but they were to be expected; and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow, and made war inevitable, ought not, in fairness, to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our war right to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers to the extent of life for life.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General United States Army.*

Lieut. General WADE HAMPTON,

*Commanding Cavalry Forces, C. S. A.*

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*Wade Hampton to General Sherman.*

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, *February 27, 1865.*

GENERAL: Your communication of the 24th instant reached me to-day. In it you state that it has been officially reported that your foraging parties are "murdered" after capture. You go on to say that you have "ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner;" that is to say, you have ordered a number of confederate soldiers to be "murdered." You characterize your order in proper terms, for the public voice, even in your own country, where it seldom dares to express itself in vindication of truth, honor, or justice, will surely agree with you in pronouncing you guilty of murder if your order is carried out. Before dismissing this portion of your letter I beg to assure you that, for every soldier of mine "murdered" by you, I shall have executed at once *two* of yours, giving in all cases preference to any officers who may be in my hands.

In reference to the statement you make regarding the death of your foragers, I have only to say that I know nothing of it; that no orders given by me authorize the killing of prisoners after capture; and I do not believe my men killed any of yours, except under circumstances in which it was perfectly legitimate and proper that they *should* kill them. It is a part of the system of the thieves, whom you designate as your foragers, to fire the dwellings of those citizens whom they have robbed. To check this inhuman system, which is justly execrated by every civilized nation, I have directed my men to shoot down all of your men who are caught burning houses. This order shall remain in force so long as you disgrace the profession of arms by allowing your men to destroy private dwellings.

You say that I cannot, of course, question your right to forage on the country. "It is a right as old as history." I do not, sir, question that right. But there is a right older even than this, and one more inalienable—the right that every man has to defend his home, and to protect those who are dependent on him; and from my heart I wish that every old man and boy in my country, who can fire a gun, would shoot down, as he would a wild beast, the men who are desolating their land, burning their homes, and insulting their women.

You are particular in defining and claiming "war rights." May I ask if you enumerate among these the right to fire upon a defenceless city without notice; to burn that city to the ground after it had been surrendered by the inhabitants

who claimed, though in vain, that protection which is always accorded in civilized warfare to non-combatants; to fire the dwelling-houses of citizens after robbing them, and to perpetrate even darker crimes than these—crimes too black to be mentioned?

You have permitted, if you have not ordered, the commission of these offences against humanity and the rules of war; you fired into the city of Columbia without a word of warning after its surrender by the mayor, who demanded protection to private property; you laid the whole city in ashes, leaving amidst its ruins thousands of old men and helpless women and children, who are likely to perish of starvation and exposure. Your line of march can be traced by the lurid light of burning houses; and in more than one household there is an agony far more bitter than that of death. The Indian scalped his victim regardless of age or sex, but, with all his barbarity, he always respected the persons of his female captives. *Your* soldiers, more savage than the Indian, insult those whose natural protectors are absent.

In conclusion, I have only to request that whenever you have any of my men "murdered" or "disposed of"—for the terms seem synonymous with you—you will let me hear of it, that I may know what action to take in the matter. In the mean time I shall hold fifty-six of your men as hostages for those whom you have ordered to be executed.

I am yours, &c.,

WADE HAMPTON, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN, *United States Army.*

Official copy :

E. D. TOWNSEND, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *November 18, 1865.*

*Major General Sherman's report of Johnston's surrender, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, City Point, Virginia, May 9, 1865*

GENERAL: My last official report brought the history of events, as connected with the armies in the field subject to my immediate command, down to the 1st of April, when the army of Ohio, Major General J. M. Schofield commanding, lay at Goldsboro' with detachments distributed so as to secure and cover our routes of communication and supply back to the sea at Wilmington and Morehead City; Major General A. H. Terry, with the 10th corps, being at Faison's depot; the army of the Tennessee, Major General O. O. Howard commanding, was encamped to the right and front of Goldsboro', and the army of Georgia, Major General H. W. Slocum commanding, to its left and front; the cavalry, Brevet Major General J. Kilpatrick commanding, at Mount Olive. All were busy in repairing the wear and tear of our then recent and hard march from Savannah, or in replenishing clothing and stores necessary for a further progress.

I had previously, by letter and in person, notified the Lieutenant General commanding the armies of the United States that the 10th of April would be the earliest possible moment at which I could hope to have all things in readiness, and we were compelled to use our railroads to the very highest possible limit in order to fulfil that promise. Owing to a mistake in the railroad department in sending locomotives and cars of the five-foot gauge, we were limited to the use of the few locomotives and cars of the four-foot-eight-and-a-half-inch gauge already in North Carolina, with such of the old stock as was captured by Major General Terry at Wilmington and on his way up to Goldsboro'. Yet such judi-

cious use was made of these, and such industry displayed in the railroad management, by Generals Easton and Beckwith, and Colonel Wright and Mr. Van Dyne, that by the 10th of April our men were all reloaded, the wagons reloaded, and a fair amount of forage accumulated ahead.

In the mean time Major General George Stoneman, in command of a division of cavalry operating from East Tennessee in connexion with Major General George H. Thomas, in pursuance of my orders of January 21, 1865, had reached the railroad about Greensboro', North Carolina, and had made sad havoc with it, and had pushed along it to Salisbury, destroying *en route* bridges, culverts, depots, and all kinds of rebel supplies, and had extended the break in the railroad down to the Catawba bridge.

This was fatal to the hostile armies of Lee and Johnston, who depended on that road for supplies and as their ultimate line of retreat. Major General J. H. Wilson, also in command of the cavalry corps organized by himself under Special Field Orders No. —, of October 24, 1864, at Gaylesville, Alabama, had started from the neighborhood of Decatur and Florence, Alabama, and moved straight into the heart of Alabama, on a route prescribed for General Thomas after he had defeated General Hood at Nashville, Tennessee; but the roads being too heavy for infantry, General Thomas had devolved that duty on that most energetic young cavalry officer, General Wilson, who, imbued with the proper spirit, has struck one of the best blows of the war at the waning strength of the confederacy. His route was one never before touched by our troops, and afforded him abundance of supplies as long as he was in motion, namely, by Tuscaloosa, Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, and Macon. Though in communication with him, I have not been able to receive as yet his full and detailed reports, which will in due time be published and appreciated. Lieutenant General Grant, also in immediate command of the armies about Richmond, had taken the initiative in that magnificent campaign which, in less than ten days, compelled the evacuation of Richmond, and resulted in the destruction and surrender of the entire rebel army of Virginia under command of General Lee.

The news of the battles about Petersburg reached me at Goldsboro' on the 6th of April. Up to that time my purpose was to move rapidly northward, feigning on Raleigh and striking straight for Burksville, thereby interposing between Johnston and Lee. But the auspicious events in Virginia had changed the whole military problem, and in the expressive language of Lieutenant General Grant, "the confederate armies of Lee and Johnston" became the "strategic points." General Grant was fully able to take care of the former, and my task was to capture or destroy the latter. Johnston at that time, April 6, had his army well in hand about Smithfield, interposing between me and Raleigh. I estimated his infantry and artillery at 35,000, and his cavalry from 6,000 to 10,000. He was superior to me in cavalry, so that I held General Kilpatrick in reserve at Mount Olive, with orders to recruit his horses and be ready to make a sudden and rapid march on the 10th of April.

At daybreak of the day appointed all the heads of columns were in motion straight against the enemy, Major General H. W. Slocum taking the two direct roads for Smithfield; Major General O. O. Howard making a circuit by the right and feigning up the Weldon road to disconcert the enemy's cavalry; Generals Terry and Kilpatrick moving on the west side of the Neuse river and aiming to reach the rear of the enemy between Smithfield and Raleigh. General Schofield followed General Slocum in support.

All the columns met, within six miles of Goldsboro', more or less cavalry, with the usual rail barricades, which were swept before us as chaff, and by 10 a. m. of the 11th the 14th corps entered Smithfield, the 20th corps close at hand. Johnston had rapidly retreated across the Neuse river, and, having his railroad to lighten up his trains, could retreat faster than we could pursue. The rains had also set in, making the resort to corduroy absolutely necessary

to pass even ambulances. The enemy had burned the bridge at Smithfield, and as soon as possible Major General Slocum got up his pontoons and crossed over a division of the 14th corps. We there heard of the surrender of Lee's army at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, which was announced to the armies in orders, and created universal joy. Not an officer or soldier of my armies but expressed a pride and satisfaction that it fell to the lot of the armies of the Potomac and James so gloriously to overwhelm and capture the entire army that held them so long in check, and their success gave new impulse to finish up our task. Without a moment's hesitation we dropped our trains and marched rapidly in pursuit to and through Raleigh, reaching that place at 7.30 a. m. of the 13th, in a heavy rain. The next day the cavalry pushed on through the rain to Durham's Station, the 15th corps following as far as Morrisville Station, and the 17th corps to Jones's Station. On the supposition that Johnston was tied to his railroad as a line of retreat, by Hillsboro', Greensboro', Salisbury, Charlotte, &c., I had turned the other columns across the bend of that road towards Ashboro'. (See Special Field Orders No. 55.) The cavalry, Brevet Major General J. Kilpatrick commanding, was ordered to keep up a show of pursuit towards the "Company's Shops," in Alamance county; Major General O. O. Howard to turn to the left by Hackney's Crossroads, Pittsboro', St. Lawrence, and Ashboro'; Major General H. W. Slocum to cross Cape Fear river at Aven's ferry, and move rapidly by Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox's Mills; Major General J. M. Schofield was to hold Raleigh and the road back, and with his spare force to follow an intermediate route.

By the 15th, though the rains were incessant and the roads almost impracticable, Major General Slocum had the 14th corps, Brevet Major General Davis commanding, near Martha's Vineyard, with a pontoon bridge laid across Cape Fear river at Aven's ferry, with the 20th corps, Major General Mower commanding, in support, and Major General Howard had the 15th and 17th corps stretched out on the roads toward Pittsboro', whilst General Kilpatrick held Durham's Station and Chapel Hill University.

Johnston's army was retreating rapidly on the roads from Hillsboro' to Greensboro', he himself at Greensboro'. Although out of place as to time, I here invite all military critics who study the problems of war to take their maps and compare the position of my army on the 15th and 16th of April, with that of General Halleck about Burksville and Petersburg, Virginia, on the 26th of April, when, according to his telegram to Secretary Stanton, he offered to relieve me of the task of "cutting off Johnston's retreat." Major General Stoneman at the time was at Statesville, and Johnston's only line of retreat was by Salisbury and Charlotte. It may be that General Halleck's troops can outmarch mine, but there is nothing in their past history to show it, or it may be that General Halleck can inspire his troops with more energy of action. I doubt that also, save and except in this single instance, when he knew the enemy was ready to surrender or disperse, as advised by my letter of April 18, addressed to him when chief of staff at Washington city, and delivered at Washington on the 21st instant by Major Hitchcock, of my staff.

Thus matters stood at the time I received General Johnston's first letter and made my answer of April 14, copies of which were sent with all expedition to Lieutenant General Grant and the Secretary of War, with my letter of April 15. I agreed to meet General Johnston in person at a point intermediate between our pickets on the 17th at noon, provided the position of the troops remained *statu quo*. I was both willing and anxious thus to consume a few days, as it would enable Colonel Wright to finish our railroad to Raleigh.

Two bridges had to be built and twelve miles of new road made. We had no iron except by taking up that on the branch from Goldsboro' to Weldon. Instead of losing by time I gained in every way, for every hour of delay possible was required to reconstruct the railroad to our rear and improve the condition of

our wagon roads to the front, so desirable in case the negotiations failed and we be forced to make the race of near two hundred miles to head off or catch Johnston's army, then retreating towards Charlotte.

At noon of the day appointed I met General Johnston for the first time in my life, although we had been interchanging shots constantly since May, 1863.

Our interview was frank and soldier-like, and he gave me to understand that further war on the part of the confederate troops was folly, that *the cause* was lost, and that every life sacrificed after the surrender of Lee's army was the highest possible crime. He admitted that the terms conceded to General Lee were magnanimous and all he could ask, but he did want some general concessions that would enable him to allay the natural fears and anxiety of his followers, and enable him to maintain his control over them until they could be got back to the neighborhood of their homes, thereby saving the State of North Carolina the devastations inevitably to result from turning his men loose and unprovided on the spot, and our pursuit across the State.

He also wanted to embrace in the same general proposition the fate of all the confederate armies that remained in existence. I never made any concession as to his own army, or assumed to deal finally and authoritatively in regard to any other, but it did seem to me that there was presented a chance for peace that might be deemed valuable to the government of the United States, and was at least worth the few days that would be consumed in reference.

To push an army whose commander had so frankly and honestly confessed his inability to cope with me were cowardly and unworthy the brave men I led.

Inasmuch as General Johnston did not feel authorized to pledge his power over the armies in Texas, we adjourned to meet the next day at noon. I returned to Raleigh and conferred freely with all my general officers, *every one* of whom urged me to conclude terms that might accomplish so complete and desirable an end. All dreaded the weary and laborious march after a fugitive and dissolving army back towards Georgia, almost over the very country where we had toiled so long. There was but one opinion expressed, and if contrary ones were entertained they were withheld, or indulged in only by that class who shun the fight and the march, but are loudest, bravest, and fiercest when danger is past. I again met General Johnston on the 18th, and we renewed the conversation. He satisfied me then of his *power* to disband the rebel armies in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, as well as those in his immediate command, namely, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia.

The points on which he expressed especial solicitude were, lest their States were to be dismembered and denied representation in Congress, or any separate political existence whatever, and that the absolute disarming his men would leave the south powerless and exposed to depredations by wicked bands of assassins and robbers.

President Lincoln's message of 1864; his amnesty proclamation; General Grant's terms to General Lee, substantially extending the benefits of that proclamation to all officers above the rank of colonel; the invitation to the Virginia legislature to reassemble in Richmond by General Weitzel, with the approval of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant, then on the spot; a firm belief that I had been fighting to re-establish the Constitution of the United States; and last, and not least, the general and universal desire to close a war any longer without organized resistance, were the leading facts that induced me to pen the "Memorandum" of April 18, signed by myself and General Johnston.

It was designed to be, and so expressed on its face, as a mere "basis" for reference to the President of the United States and constitutional commander-in-chief, to enable him, if he chose, at one blow to dissipate the military power of the confederacy which had threatened the national safety for years. It admitted of modification, alteration, and change. It had no appearance of an ultimatum, and by no false reasoning can it be construed into an usurpation of power on my

part. I have my opinions on the questions involved, and I will stand by the memorandum; but this forms no part of a military report. Immediately on my return to Raleigh I despatched one of my staff, Major Hitchcock, to Washington, enjoining him to be most prudent and careful to avoid the spies and informers that would be sure to infest him by the way, and to say nothing to anybody until the President could make known to me his wishes and policy in the matter.

The news of President Lincoln's assassination on the 14th of April (wrongly reported to me by telegraph as having occurred on the 11th) reached me on the 17th, and was announced to my command on the same day in Special Field Orders No 56. I was duly impressed with its horrible atrocity and probable effect upon the country; but when the property and interests of millions still living were involved, I saw no good reason to change my course, but thought rather to manifest real respect for his memory by following after his death that policy which, if living, I feel certain he would have approved, or at least not rejected with disdain.

Up to that hour I had never received one word of instruction, advice, or counsel as to the "plan or policy" of government looking to a restoration of peace on the part of the rebel States of the south. Whenever asked for an opinion on the points involved, I had always evaded the subject. My letter to the mayor of Atlanta has been published to the world, and I was not rebuked by the War Department for it.

My letter to Mr. N——W——, at Savannah, was shown by me to Mr. Stanton before its publication, and all that my memory retains of his answer is that he said, like my letters generally, it was sufficiently "emphatic, and could not be misunderstood."

Both these letters asserted my belief that, according to Mr. Lincoln's proclamations and messages, when the people of the south had laid down their arms and submitted to the lawful power of the United States, *ipso facto* the war was over as to them; and furthermore, that if any State in rebellion would conform to the Constitution of the United States, "cease war," elect senators and representatives to Congress, if admitted, (of which each house of Congress alone is the judge,) that State became *instantly* as much in the Union as New York or Ohio. Nor was I rebuked for this expression, though it was universally known and commented on at the time. And again, Mr. Stanton, in person, at Savannah, speaking of the terrific expenses of the war and difficulty of realizing the money necessary for the daily wants of the government, impressed me most forcibly with the necessity of bringing the war to a close as soon as possible for *financial reasons*.

On the evening of April 23 Major Hitchcock reported his return to Morehead City with despatches, of which fact General Johnston, at Hillsboro', was notified, so as to be ready in the morning for an answer. At 6 o'clock a. m. on the 24th Major Hitchcock arrived, accompanied by General Grant and members of his staff, who had not telegraphed the fact of his coming over our exposed road for prudential reasons.

I soon learned that the memorandum was disapproved, without reasons assigned, and I was ordered to give the forty-eight hours' notice, and resume hostilities at the close of that time, governing myself by the substance of a despatch then enclosed, dated March 3, 12 noon, at Washington, District of Columbia, from Secretary Stanton to General Grant, at City Point, but not accompanied by any part of the voluminous matter so liberally lavished on the public in the New York journals of the 24th of April. That was the *first* and *only time* I ever saw that telegram, or had one word of instruction on the important matter involved in it; and it does seem strange to me that every bar-room loafer in New York can read in the morning journals "official" matter that is withheld from a general whose command extends from Kentucky to North Carolina.

Within an hour a courier was riding from Durham's Station towards Hillsboro' with notice to General Johnston of the suspension of the truce and renewing my

demand for the surrender of the armies under his immediate command, (see two letters, April 24, 6 a. m.) and at 12 noon I had the receipt of his picket officer.

I therefore published my Orders No. 62 to the troops, terminating the truce at 12 m. on the 26th, and ordered all to be in readiness to march at that hour on the routes prescribed in Special Field Order No. 55, April 14, from the positions held April 18.

General Grant had orders from the President, through the Secretary of War, to direct military movements, and I explained to him the exact position of the troops, and he approved of it most emphatically; but he did not relieve me or express a wish to assume command. All things were in readiness, when, on the evening of the 25th, I received another letter from General Johnston asking another interview to renew negotiations.

General Grant not only approved, but urged me to accept, and I appointed a meeting at our former place at noon of the 26th, the very hour fixed for the renewal of hostilities. General Johnston was delayed by an accident to his train, but at 2 p. m. arrived. We then consulted, concluded and signed the final terms of capitulation. These were taken by me back to Raleigh, submitted to General Grant, and met his immediate approval and signature. General Johnston was not even aware of the presence of General Grant at Raleigh at the time.

Thus was surrendered to us the second great army of the so-called confederacy, and though undue importance has been given to the so-called negotiations which preceded it, and a rebuke and public disfavor cast on me wholly unwarranted by the facts, I rejoice in saying it was accomplished without further ruin and devastation to the country, without the loss of a single life to those gallant men who had followed me from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, and without subjecting brave men to the ungracious task of pursuing a fleeing foe that did not want to fight. As for myself, I know my motives, and challenge the instance during the past four years where an armed and defiant foe stood before me that I did not go in for a fight, and I would blush for shame if I had ever insulted or struck a fallen foe. The instant the terms of surrender were approved by General Grant, I made my Orders No. 65, assigning to each of my subordinate commanders his share of the work, and with General Grant's approval, made Special Field Orders No. 66, putting in motion my old army (no longer required in Carolina) northward for Richmond. General Grant left Raleigh at 9 a. m. of the 27th, and I glory in the fact that during his three days' stay with me I did not detect in his language or manner one particle of abatement in the confidence, respect, and affection that have existed between us throughout all the varied events of the past war, and though we have honestly differed in opinion in other cases, as well as this, still we respected each other's honest convictions.

I still adhere to my then opinions, that by a few general concessions, "glittering generalities," all of which in the end must and will be conceded to the organized States of the south, that this day there would not be an armed battalion opposed to us within the broad area of the dominions of the United States. Robbers and assassins must in any event result from the disbandment of large armies, but even these should be and could be taken care of by the local civil authorities without being made a charge on the national treasury. On the evening of the 28th, having concluded all business requiring my personal attention at Raleigh, and having conferred with every army commander and delegated to him the authority necessary for his future action, I despatched my headquarter wagons by land along with the 17th corps, the office in charge of General Webster from Newbern to Alexandria, Virginia, by sea, and in person, accompanied only by my personal staff, hastened to Savannah to direct matters in the interior of South Carolina and Georgia. I had received across the rebel telegraph wires cipher despatches from General Wilson at Macon, to the effect that he was in receipt of my Orders No. 65, and would send General Upton's division to Augusta, and General McCook's division to Tallahassee, to receive the sur-

render of those garrisons, take charge of the public property, and execute the paroles required by the terms of surrender. He reported a sufficiency of forage for his horses in southwest Georgia, but asked me to send him a supply of clothing, sugar, coffee, &c., by way of Augusta, Georgia, whence he could get it by rail.

I therefore went rapidly to Goldsboro' and Wilmington, reaching the latter city at 10 a. m. of the 29th, and the same day embarked for Hilton Head in the blockade-runner *Russia*, Captain A. M. Smith. I found General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding department of the south, at Hilton Head, on the evening of April 30, and ordered him to send to Augusta at once what clothing and small stores he could spare for General Wilson, and to open up a line of certain communication and supply with him at Macon. Within an hour the captured steamboats *Jeff. Davis* and *Amazon*, both adapted to the shallow and crooked navigation of the Savannah river, were being loaded, the one at Savannah and the other at Hilton Head. The former started up the river on the 1st of May, in charge of a very intelligent officer (whose name I cannot recall) and 48 men, all the boat could carry, with orders to occupy temporarily the United States arsenal at Augusta, and to open up communication with General Wilson at Macon in the event that General McCook's division of cavalry was not already there. The *Amazon* followed next day, and General Gillmore had made the necessary orders for a brigade of infantry, to be commanded by General Molyneaux, to follow by a land march to Augusta as its permanent garrison. Another brigade of infantry was ordered to occupy Orangeburg, South Carolina, the point furthest in the interior that can at present be reached by rail from the sea-coast. (Charleston.)

On the 1st of May I went on to Savannah, where General Gillmore also joined me, and the arrangements ordered for the occupation of Augusta were consummated.

At Savannah I found the city in the most admirable police, under direction of Brevet Major General Grover, and the citizens manifested the most unqualified joy to hear that, so far as they were concerned, the war was over. All classes, Union men as well as former rebels, did not conceal, however, the apprehensions naturally arising from a total ignorance of the political conditions to be attached to their future state. Anything at all would be preferable to this dread uncertainty.

On the evening of the 2d of May I returned to Hilton Head, and there, for the first time, received the New York papers of April 28, containing Secretary Stanton's despatch of 9 a. m. of the 27th of April to General Dix, including General Halleck's, from Richmond, of 9 p. m. of the night before, which seems to have been rushed with extreme haste before an excited public, namely, morning of the 28th. You will observe from the dates that these despatches were running back and forth from Richmond and Washington to New York, and there published, while General Grant and I were together in Raleigh, North Carolina, adjusting, to the best of our ability, the terms of surrender of the only remaining formidable rebel army in existence at the time east of the Mississippi river. Not one word of intimation had been sent to me of the displeasure of the government with my official conduct, but only the naked disapproval of a skeleton memorandum sent properly for the action of the President of the United States.

The most objectionable features of my memorandum had already (April 24) been published to the world in violation of official usage, and the contents of my accompanying letters to General Halleck, General Grant, and Mr. Stanton, of even date, though at hand, were suppressed.

In all these letters I had stated clearly and distinctly that Johnston's army would *not* fight, but, if pushed, would "disband" and "scatter" into small and dangerous guerilla parties as injurious to the interests of the United States as to the rebels themselves; that all parties admitted that the rebel cause of the south was abandoned; that the negro was free; and that the temper of all was most favorable to a lasting peace. I say all these opinions of mine were with-

held from the public with a seeming purpose; and I do contend that my official experience and former services, as well as my past life and familiarity with the people and geography of the south, entitled my opinions to at least a decent respect.

Although this despatch (Mr. Stanton's of April 27) was printed "official," it had come to me only in the questionable newspaper paragraph, headed "Sherman's truce disregarded."

I had already done what General Wilson wanted me to do, namely, had sent him supplies of clothing and food, with clear and distinct orders and instructions how to carry out in western Georgia the terms for the surrender of arms and paroling of prisoners made by General Johnston's capitulation of April 26, and had properly and most opportunely ordered General Gillmore to occupy Orangeburg and Augusta, strategic points of great value at all times, in peace or war; but as the Secretary had taken upon himself to order my subordinate generals to disobey my "orders," I explained to General Gillmore that I would no longer confuse him or General Wilson with "orders" that might conflict with those of the Secretary, which, as reported, were sent, not through me, but in open disregard of me and of my lawful authority.

It now becomes my duty to paint, in justly severe character, the still more offensive and dangerous matter of General Halleck's despatch of April 26 to the Secretary of War, embodied in his to General Dix of April 27.

General Halleck had been chief of staff of the army at Washington, in which capacity he must have received my official letter of April 18, wherein I wrote clearly that if Johnston's army about Greensboro' were "pushed" it would "disperse," an event I wished to prevent. About that time he seems to have been sent from Washington to Richmond to command the new military division of the James, in assuming charge of which, on the 22d, he defines the limits of his authority to be the "department of Virginia, the army of the Potomac, and such part of North Carolina *as may not be occupied by the command of Major General Sherman.*" (See his General Orders No. 1.) Four days later, April 26, he reports to the Secretary that he has ordered Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright to invade that part of North Carolina which *was* occupied by my command, and pay "no regard to any truce or orders of" mine. They were ordered to "*push* forward, regardless of any orders save those of Lieutenant General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat." He knew at the time he penned that despatch and made those orders, that Johnston was not retreating, but was halted under a forty-eight hours' truce with me, and was laboring to surrender his command and prevent its dispersion into guerilla bands, and that I had on the spot a magnificent army at my command, amply sufficient for all purposes required by the occasion.

The plan of cutting off a retreat from the direction of Burksville and Danville is hardly worthy one of his military education and genius. When he contemplated an act so questionable as the violation of a "truce" made by competent authority within his sphere of command, he should have gone himself and not have sent subordinates, for he knew I was bound in honor to *defend* and *maintain* my *own* truce and pledge of faith, even at the cost of many lives.

When an officer pledges the faith of his government, he is bound to defend it, and he is no soldier who would violate it knowingly.

As to Davis and his stolen treasure, did General Halleck, as chief of staff or commanding officer of the neighboring military division, notify me of the facts contained in his despatch to the Secretary? No, he did not. If the Secretary of War wanted Davis caught, why not order it, instead of, by publishing in the newspapers, putting him on his guard to hide away and escape? No orders or instructions to catch Davis or his stolen treasure ever came to me; but, on the contrary, I was led to believe that the Secretary of War rather preferred he

should effect an escape from the country if made "unknown" to him. But even on this point I enclose a copy of my letter to Admiral Dahlgren, at Charleston, sent him by a fleet steamer from Wilmington on the 25th of April, two days before the bankers of Richmond had imparted to General Halleck the important secret as to Davis's movements, designed doubtless to stimulate his troops to march their legs off to catch *their* treasure for *their* own use.

I know now that Admiral Dahlgren did receive my letter on the 26th, and had acted on it *before* General Halleck had even thought of the matter; but I don't believe a word of the treasure story; it is absurd on its face, and General Halleck or anybody has my full permission to chase Jeff. Davis and cabinet, with their stolen treasure, through any part of the country occupied by my command.

The last and most obnoxious feature of General Halleck's despatch is wherein he goes out of his way and advises that my subordinates, Generals Thomas, Stoneman, and Wilson, should be instructed not to obey "Sherman's" commands.

This is too much, and I turn from the subject with feelings too strong for words, and merely record my belief that so much mischief was never before embraced in so small a space as in the newspaper paragraph headed "Sherman's truce disregarded," authenticated as "official" by Mr. Secretary Stanton, and published in the New York papers of April 28.

During the night of May 2, at Hilton Head, having concluded my business in the department of the south, I began my return to meet my troops then marching toward Richmond from Raleigh. On the morning of the 3d we ran into Charleston harbor, where I had the pleasure to meet Admiral Dahlgren, who had, in all my previous operations from Savannah northward, aided me with a courtesy and manliness that commanded my entire respect and deep affection; also General Hatch, who, from our first interview at his Tullafinny camp, had caught the spirit of the move from Pocotaligo northward, and had largely contributed to our joint success in taking Charleston and the Carolina coast. Any one who is not *satisfied* with war should go and see Charleston, and he will pray louder and deeper than ever that the country may in the long future be spared any more war. Charleston and secession being synonymous terms, the city should be left as a sample, so that centuries may pass away before that false doctrine is again preached in our Union.

We left Charleston on the evening of the 3d of May, and hastened with all possible speed back to Morehead City, which we reached at night of the 4th. I immediately communicated by telegraph with General Schofield at Raleigh, and learned from him the pleasing fact that the Lieutenant General commanding the armies of the United States had reached the Chesapeake in time to countermand General Halleck's orders, and prevent his violating my truce, invading the area of my command, and driving Johnston's surrendering army into fragments. General Johnston had fulfilled his agreement to the very best of his ability; and the officers charged with issuing the paroles at Greensboro' reported about thirty thousand (30,000) already made, and that the greater part of the North Carolina troops had gone home without waiting for their papers, but that all of them would doubtless come into some one of the military posts, the commanders of which are authorized to grant them. About eight hundred (800) of the rebel cavalry had gone south, refusing to abide the terms of the surrender, and it was supposed they would make for Mexico. I would sincerely advise that they be encouraged to go and stay; they would be a nuisance to any civilized government, whether loose or in prison.

With the exception of some plundering on the part of Lee's and Johnston's disbanded men, all else in North Carolina was "quiet." When to the number of men surrendered at Greensboro' are added those at Tallahassee, Augusta, and Macon, with the scattered squads who will come in at other military posts,

I have no doubt fifty thousand (50,000) armed men will be disarmed and restored to civil pursuits by the capitulation made near Durham's Station, North Carolina, on the 26th of April, and that, too, without the loss of a single life to us.

On the 5th of May I received and here subjoin a further despatch from General Schofield, which contains inquiries I have been unable to satisfy, similar to those made by nearly every officer in my command whose duty brings him in contact with citizens. I leave you to do what you think expedient to provide the military remedy.

[By telegraph.]

“RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, *May 5, 1865.*

“When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said the lines had been extended to embrace this and other States south. The order, it seems, has been modified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee. I think it would be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once. I hope the government will make known its policy as the organ of State governments without delay. Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled state until that is done; the people are now in a mood to accept almost anything which promises a definite settlement.

“What is to be done with the freedmen is the question of all, and is the all-important question. It requires prompt and wise action to prevent the negro from becoming a huge elephant on our hands. If I am to govern this State, it is important for me to know it at once. If another is to be sent here, it cannot be done too soon, for he will probably undo the most that I shall have done. I shall be glad to hear from you freely when you have time to write.

“I will send your message to Wilson at once.

“J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major General.*

“Major General W. T. SHERMAN,  
“*Morehead City.*”

I give this despatch entire, to demonstrate how intermingled have become civil matters with the military, and how almost impossible it has become for an officer in authority to act a pure military part.

There are no longer armed enemies in North Carolina, and a soldier can deal with no other sort. The marshals and sheriffs with their *posses* (of which the military may become a part) are the only proper officers to deal with civil criminals and marauders. But I will not be drawn out in a discussion of this subject, but instance the case to show how difficult is the task become to military officers, when men of the rank, education, experience, nerve, and good sense of General Schofield feel embarrassed by them.

General Schofield, at Raleigh, has a well-appointed and well-disciplined command, is in telegraph communication with the controlling parts of his department, and remote ones in the direction of Georgia, as well as with Washington, and has military possession of all strategic points.

In like manner General Gillmore is well situated in all respects except as to rapid communication with the seat of the general government. I leave him also with every man he ever asked for, and in full and quiet possession of every strategic point in his department; and General Wilson has in the very heart of Georgia the strongest, best appointed, and best equipped cavalry corps that ever fell under my command; and he has now, by my recent action, opened to him a source and route of supply by way of Savannah river that simplifies his military problem, so that I think I may with a clear conscience leave them and turn my attention once more to my special command, the army with which I have been associated through some of the most eventful scenes of this or any war.

I hope and believe none of these commanders will ever have reason to reproach me for any “orders” they may have received from me, and the President

of the United States may be assured that all of them are in position, ready and willing to execute to the letter and in spirit any orders he may give. I shall henceforth cease to give them any orders at all, for the occasion that made them subordinate to me is past, and I shall confine my attention to the army composed of the 15th and 17th, the 14th and 20th corps, unless the commanding general of the armies of the United States orders otherwise.

At 4 p. m. of May 9 I reached Manchester, on the James river, opposite Richmond, and found that all the four corps had arrived from Raleigh, and were engaged in replenishing their wagons for the resumption of the march towards Alexandria.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

General JOHN A. RAWLINS,  
*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

Official copy :

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *November 18, 1865.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE SOUTHWEST,  
*New Orleans, Louisiana, July 16, 1865.*

GENERAL : I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my command in the campaign from Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley, to the armies in front of Petersburg, beginning February 27, and ending March 28.

The command consisted of the first and third divisions of cavalry, of the army of the Shenandoah, under the immediate command of Brevet Major General Wesley Merritt, Brevet Major General George A. Custer, commanding the third division, and Brigadier General T. C. Devin, the first. The following was the effective force :

*Effective force first and third cavalry divisions, army of the Shenandoah, February 28, 1865.—Major General Wesley Merritt, chief of cavalry.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
First cavalry division, Brigadier General T. C. Devin, commanding.....	260	4,787	
One section (companies C and E) fourth United States artillery.....	2	52	
Third cavalry division, Brevet Major General George A. Custer, commanding.....	240	4,600	
One section (company M) second United States artillery.....	1	45	
Total.....	503	9,484	9,987

On the morning of February 27, 1865, we marched from Winchester up the valley pike with five days' rations in haversacks, and fifteen days' rations of coffee, sugar and salt in wagons, thirty pounds of forage on each horse, one

wagon for division headquarters, eight ambulances and our ammunition train. No other wagons, except a pontoon train of eight boats, were permitted to accompany the command.

My orders were to destroy the Virginia Central railroad, the James River canal, capture Lynchburg, if practicable, and then join Major General Sherman wherever he might be found in North Carolina, or return to Winchester, but in joining General Sherman I must be governed by the position of affairs after the capture of Lynchburg.

The command was in fine condition, but the weather was very bad, as the spring thaw, with heavy rains had already come on.

The valley and surrounding mountains were covered with snow which was fast disappearing, putting all the streams nearly past fording. On our first day's march we crossed Cedar creek, Tumbling river, and Tom's brook, and went into camp at Woodstock, having marched thirty miles. At 6 o'clock in the morning of the 28th instant the march was resumed through Edinburg and across the north fork of the Shenandoah river and through Newmarket, going into camp at Lacey's spring, nine miles north of Harrisonburg; the crossing of the north fork of the Shenandoah was by a pontoon bridge. Small bands of guerillas hovered on our flanks during the day, but no effort was made to drive them off, and no damage was done by them; distance marched, twenty-nine miles. The march was resumed at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, through Harrisonburg and Mount Crawford, and camp pitched on Middle river at Kline's mills. Guerillas hovered around us during the march, and at Mount Crawford General Rosser, with two or three hundred cavalry, attempted to burn the bridge over the middle fork of the Shenandoah, but did not succeed; two of Capehart's regiments swam the river above the bridge, charged Rosser and routed him, driving him rapidly to Kline's mills, the advance pushing almost to Staunton; but few of the enemy were killed, thirty taken prisoners, and twenty ambulances and wagons with their contents were captured and destroyed; our loss was five men wounded. Kline's mills are seven miles from Staunton, where the headquarters of General Early were said to be. Not knowing but that he would fight at Staunton, Colonel Stagg's brigade of General Devin's division was ordered to destroy the railroad bridge over Christian's creek, between Staunton and Waynesboro, to prevent his getting re-enforcements by rail, or in case he would not stand to prevent him carrying off supplies and ordnance stores; the bridge was burned, but General Early, learning of our approach, made hasty retreat to Waynesboro', leaving word in Staunton that he intended to fight at that place. The next morning we entered Staunton. The question then arose in my mind whether I should pursue my course on to Lynchburg, leaving General Early in my rear, or go out and fight him with my cavalry against his infantry and what cavalry he could collect, defeat him, and open a way through Rock Fish Gap, and have everything in my own hands for the accomplishment of that portion of my instructions which directed the destruction of the Central railroad and James River canal. I decided upon the latter course, and General Custer's division, (3d,) composed of Colonels Wells, Pennington, and Capehart's brigades, was directed to take up the pursuit, followed closely by General Devin's division, composed of General Gibbs's and Colonels Fitzhugh's and Stagg's brigades. The rain had been pouring in torrents for two days and the roads were bad beyond description; nevertheless the men pushed boldly on, although horses and men could scarcely be recognized for the mud which covered them. General Custer found General Early, as he had promised, at Waynesboro', in a well-chosen position, with two brigades of infantry and some cavalry under General Rosser, the infantry occupying breastworks. Custer, without waiting for the enemy to get up his courage over the delay of a careful reconnoissance, made his dispositions for attack at once, sending three regi-

ments around the left flank of the enemy, which was somewhat exposed by being advanced from instead of resting upon the bank of the river in his immediate rear; he, with the other two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted, at a given signal, boldly attacked and impetuously carried the enemy's works, while the 5th New York and the 1st Connecticut cavalry, who were formed in column of fours, charged over the breastwork and continued the charge through the little town of Waynesboro', sabering a few men as they went along, and did not stop until they had crossed the south fork of the Shenandoah river, which was immediately in General Early's rear, where they formed as foragers, and with drawn sabres held the east bank of the stream. The enemy threw down their arms and surrendered with cheers at the suddenness with which they were captured. The general officers present at this engagement were Generals Early, Long, Wharton, Lilley, and Rosser, and it has always been a wonder to me how they escaped, unless they hid in obscure places in the houses of the town. Colonel Capehart, with his brigade, continued the pursuit of the enemy's train which was stretched for miles over the mountains, and the other two brigades pushed rapidly after him, with orders to encamp on the east side of the Blue Ridge. The substantial results of this brilliant fight were eleven pieces of artillery with horses and caissons complete, about two hundred wagons and teams, all loaded with subsistence, camp and garrison equipage, ammunition and officers' baggage, seventeen battle-flags, and sixteen hundred officers and enlisted men. The results in a military point of view were very great, as the crossing of the Blue Ridge, covered with snow as it was, at any other point would have been difficult. Before leaving Staunton for Waynesboro' I obtained information of a large amount of rebel property at Swoop's depot, on the Lexington railroad, and sent a party to destroy it, which was done; a list of which property will be attached to this report. General Custer's division encamped at Brookfield, on the east side of the Blue Ridge, General Devin's division remaining at Waynesboro'. The next morning the prisoners were sent back to Winchester under a guard of about fifteen hundred men, commanded by Colonel J. H. Thompson, 1st New Hampshire cavalry, who safely reached that point, notwithstanding he was harassed by General Rosser's command as far as the crossing of the north fork of the Shenandoah near Mount Jackson, at which point General Rosser made a fierce attack upon him and tried to rescue the prisoners, but he was handsomely repulsed by Colonel Thompson, who captured some of his men and finally arrived at his destination with all his own prisoners and some of Rosser's men besides. General Devin resumed his march at 6 a. m., leaving General Gibbs's brigade to destroy the iron bridge over the south fork of the Shenandoah, and to burn and destroy the captured wagons and their contents. General Custer moved on towards Charlottesville, destroying much government property and subsistence at Greenwood depot and Ivy Station, also the railroad and the large bridge over Meacham's river, arriving at Charlottesville at 4 p. m., the mayor and several of the most prominent citizens meeting him in the suburbs of the city and delivering up the keys of the public buildings.

The roads from Waynesboro' to Charlottesville had, from the incessant rains and spring thaws, become so terribly cut up, and the mud was of such a depth, that it was impossible for our train to reach Charlottesville under two days. I therefore notified the command that we would remain two days at this point for the purpose of resting, refitting, and destroying the railroad; parties were sent well out towards Gordonsville to break the railroad, and also about fifteen miles towards Lynchburg for the same purpose, to prevent troops massing on me from either Richmond or Lynchburg. A thorough and systematic destruction of the railroads was then commenced, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna river, and the work was continued until the evening of the 5th instant, when General Gibbs reported with our trains; forage

and subsistence was found in great abundance in the vicinity of Charlottesville. Commodore Hollins of the confederate navy was killed while trying to escape from a scouting party from General Custer's division. This necessary delay forced me to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg, but trusty scouts had been sent there to find out the state of affairs in that vicinity. When the time to start came I determined to separate into two columns, sending General Devin's division, under immediate command of General Merritt, to Scottsville, thence to march along the James River canal, destroying every lock as far as Newmarket, while with Custer's division I pushed on up the Lynchburg railroad through North and South Gardens, destroying it as far as Amherst Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg, and then moved across the country and united with General Merritt's column at Newmarket.

General Merritt started on the morning of the 6th, first sending the 1st Michigan cavalry, Colonel Maxwell commanding, down the Rivanna river to Palmyra and towards Columbia, with directions to rejoin him at Scottsville. General Merritt thoroughly accomplished his orders, destroying all large flour mills, woollen factories, and manufacturing establishments, tearing up and demolishing all the locks on the James River canal from Scottsville to Newmarket. I had directed him to try and obtain possession of the bridge across the James river at Duiguidsville, intending to hold it and strike the South Side railroad at Appomattox depot, and follow up its destruction to Farmville, where the High Bridge crosses the Appomattox. A bold dash was made to secure this bridge, but without avail, as the enemy had covered it with inflammable materials and set it on fire the instant their scouts signalled the approach of our forces; they also and by the same means burned the bridge across the James river at Hardwicksville, leaving me master of all the country north of the James river. My eight pontoons would not reach half way across the river, and my scouts from Lynchburg reported the enemy concentrating at that point from the west, together with a portion of General Pickett's division from Richmond and Fitz Lee's cavalry. It was here that I fully determined to join the armies of the Lieutenant General in front of Petersburg, instead of going back to Winchester, and also make a more complete destruction of the James River canal and the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg railroads connecting Richmond with Lynchburg and Gordonsville. I now had all the advantage, and by hurrying quickly down the canal and destroying it as near Richmond as Goochland or beyond, and then moving up to the railroad and destroying it as close up to the city as possible in the same manner I did towards Lynchburg, I felt convinced I was striking a hard blow by destroying the means of supply to the rebel capital, and, to a certain extent, the army of northern Virginia, besides leaving the troops now concentrating at Lynchburg without anything to oppose them, and forcing them to return to Richmond. This conception was at once decided upon and Colonel Fitzhugh's brigade was ordered to proceed to Goochland and beyond, immediately, destroying every lock upon the canal and cutting the banks wherever practicable. The next morning the entire command moved from Newmarket down the canal, leisurely and completely destroying the locks and banks about the aqueducts, and in some places cutting the banks; the rain and mud still impeded us, and the command, particularly the transportation, was much worn and fatigued; however, by replacing our worn-out mules with those captured from General Early's trains, and with the assistance of nearly two thousand negroes who attached themselves to the command, we managed to get along in very good shape, reaching Columbia on the evening of the 10th instant, at which place we were rejoined by Colonel Fitzhugh's brigade.

Colonel Fitzhugh had destroyed the canal about eight miles east of Goochland, thereby reducing it to a very small length. At Columbia we took one day's rest, and I here sent a communication to the Lieutenant General command-

ing the armies, notifying him of our success, position, and condition, and requesting supplies to be sent to White House. My anxiety now was to be able to cross the Pamunkey. I felt confident that the enemy would march out a heavy force and try to destroy my command and prevent me from crossing the river. The railroad from Richmond to Gordonsville was still intact, and to go south of the Pamunkey river, and between it and Richmond, I regarded as too hazardous, and I was fearful that the enemy might use it to get on my flank and rear. General Custer was therefore directed to strike the railroad at Frederick's Hall and General Merritt at Louisa Court House. General Custer was ordered to thoroughly destroy the track towards Richmond as far as Beaver Dam, while General Merritt did the same thing from Louisa Court House to Frederick's Hall. While at this latter place Major Young's scouts from Richmond notified me of preparations being made there to prevent me from getting to the James river, and that Pickett's division of infantry was coming back from Lynchburg *via* the Southside railroad, as was also the cavalry, but that no advance from Richmond had yet taken place. I at once determined that there was no way to stop me unless General Longstreet marched directly for the White House, and that he would be unable to do so if I pushed boldly on towards Richmond, as he would be forced to come out and meet me near Ashland, then I could withdraw, cross South and North Anna and march to White House on north side of the Pamunkey. It proved true. But, to divert from the narrative, when General Custer struck Frederick's Hall Station he entered it so suddenly that he captured the telegraph office with all the despatches. Among them was one from Lieutenant General Early to General Lee, stating that he had been informed that Sheridan's forces were approaching Goochland, and that he intended to move up with two hundred cavalry which he had, and attack them in the flank at daylight. General Custer immediately ordered a regiment of cavalry in pursuit of this bold party, which in about two hours it overtook, attacked, and captured or dispersed in every direction, Lieutenant General Early escaping on a side road with five or six orderlies and two staff officers; he was, however, closely followed by a small detachment, and his staff officers captured, he barely escaping over the South Anna with a single orderly, and the next day he made his way to Richmond, after a campaign in the Shenandoah valley in which he lost nearly the whole of his army, together with his battle-flags, and nearly every piece of artillery which his troops opened upon us, and also a large part of his transportation. But to resume: General Custer in the morning of the 14th instant was directed to push down the Negro-foot road and cross the South Anna. He sent his scouting parties up to within eleven miles of Richmond, where they burned a hospital train. The object of this move was to divert the attention of the enemy from the North and South Anna bridges and bridges over Little river, which Merritt was ordered to destroy with Devin's division; Custer's main column meanwhile being held at the Negro-foot crossing of the South Anna. General Merritt was ordered to follow the railroad to Hanover Junction, cross the Little river, and go into camp on the north bank of South Anna. In the attack upon the railroad bridge over the South Anna, the 5th United States cavalry charged up to the bridge, dismounted, dashed across it, and drove away the company of artillery who tried to defend it, and turned their own guns—four 20-pounder Parrotts—upon them. I here received a despatch from the Lieutenant General that supplies were at the White House for me, and one brigade of infantry; and also captured the following despatch, which led me to doubt whether General Longstreet had yet determined in his own mind where I was going:

HANOVER JUNCTION, *March* 14—11.25.

[By telegraph from Richmond.]

COLONEL HASKELL: General Longstreet desires you to follow the enemy if he goes east, until he crosses the Rapidan or Blue Ridge. If he goes towards the Peninsula follow as far as you can.

By order of Lieutenant General Ewell:

T. O. CHESTNEY,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Next morning General Custer was ordered to move by the Negro-foot crossing of the South Anna, and thence to Ashland, and General Devin was ordered to proceed to the same point. This developed the situation. The prisoners captured in front of Ashland reported Longstreet, with Pickett's and Johnson's divisions and Fitz Lee's cavalry, on the Ashland road, in the direction of Richmond, and four miles from Ashland. My course was now clear and the feint successful. General Devin was quickly ordered to the north side of the South Anna and General Custer was ordered to follow, sending Colonel Pennington's brigade to amuse the enemy, cover his front, and gradually fall back. The whole command was, meanwhile, ordered to cross the North Anna and go into camp at Carmel church, and at daylight take up the line of march for White House, *via* Mangohick church. I then knew I could get to White House before the enemy, and that he could not operate upon the Chickahominy, as it would be too close to the lines of the army of the James. The enemy, finding that he had made a mistake, moved rapidly, during the night, towards the Pamunkey, through Hanover Court House, but forgot his pontoon trains and could not cross the river; it would have made no difference, however, as I then could have gotten to the White House without question.

At daylight on the morning of the 16th we leisurely resumed the march to White House, encamping at Mangohick church. On the 17th we marched to and encamped at Prince William Court House. On the 18th we reached Indiantown and on the 19th crossed the Pamunkey, at White House, on the railroad bridge, which had been repaired by Lieutenant Colonel Babcock, of Lieutenant General Grant's staff; we here found supplies in abundance.

The amount of private and public property collected for the use of the enemy, and destroyed, and the destruction of lines of communication and supplies was very great and beyond estimating.

Every bridge on the Central railroad, between Richmond and Lynchburg, except the one over the Chickahominy and that over the James river at Lynchburg, and many of the culverts, were destroyed. The James River canal was disabled beyond any immediate repair. There, perhaps, never was a march where nature offered such impediments and shrouded herself in such gloom as upon this. Incessant rain, deep and almost impassable streams, swamps and mud were overcome with a constant cheerfulness on the part of the troops that was truly admirable. Both officers and men appeared buoyed up by the thought that we had completed our work in the valley of the Shenandoah, and that we were on our way to help our brothers in arms in front of Petersburg in the final struggle.

Our loss in horses was considerable, almost entirely from hoof-rot. After refitting at White House until the 24th instant we resumed our march, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones's bridge, and arriving at and crossing the James river on the evening of March 25, and on the following day, by direction of the Lieutenant General, went into camp at Hancock's Station, on the railroad in front of Petersburg. The whole number of prisoners captured on the march was about sixteen hundred, but some of them we were obliged to parole, as they were unable to keep up with the column, though, after the first three days, our marches did not average over eighteen miles per day.

To General Merritt, chief of cavalry, Generals Custer and T. C. Devin, division commanders, Generals Gibbs and Wells and Colonels Fitzhugh, Capehart, Stagg, and Pennington, brigade commanders, my staff, and every officer and man of the 1st and 3d cavalry divisions, I return my sincere thanks for patriotic, uncomplaining, and soldierly conduct.

To Major H. H. Young, of my staff, chief of scouts, and the thirty or forty men of his command who took their lives in their hands, cheerfully going wherever ordered, to obtain that great essential of success—*information*—I tender my gratitude. Ten of these men were lost. Our entire loss during the march did not exceed one hundred men; and some of these we left by the wayside, unable to bear the fatigues of the march.

This report should be regarded as the preface of my report of operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, as my command only rested one day before its commencement.

I forward herewith list of prisoners captured, and property destroyed.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN, *Major General.*

Brevet Major General JOHN A. RAWLINS,

*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

Official:

E. D. TOWNSEND, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *November 18, 1865.*

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*Major General G. H. Thomas's report of the operations of the army under his command from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Eastport, Mississippi, January 20, 1865.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the date of the occupation of Atlanta, Georgia, as follows:

From the 7th to the 30th of September the 4th, 14th, and 20th army corps, composing the army of the Cumberland, remained quietly in camp around the city of Atlanta. The enemy was reported posted in the neighborhood of Jonesboro'. During the greater portion of the above-mentioned period an armistice existed between the two armies for the purpose of exchanging prisoners captured on both sides during the preceding campaign.

About the 20th of September the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee river near Waterloo, Alabama, and appeared in front of Athens, Alabama, on the 23d, after having destroyed a portion of the railroad between the latter place and Decatur, Alabama. Considerable skirmishing took place, and the garrison, Colonel Campbell, 110th United States colored troops, commanding, withdrew into the fort. By nightfall the town was completely invested, and the quartermaster and commissary buildings destroyed by the enemy. On the morning of the 24th the enemy opened on the fort with a 12-pounder battery, firing from two directions, north and west, which was answered by the artillery of the garrison. Later two flags of truce were received, demanding a surrender, which was declined by Colonel Campbell, when he was requested to grant Major General Forrest a personal interview, and complied with the request. At this interview Colonel Campbell *allowed* himself to become convinced by the rebel commander that it was useless to contend against the largely superior force of the enemy confronting him, and was induced to surrender his command. The garrison, at the time, consisted of 450 men belonging to the 106th, 110th, and 111th United States colored troops,

and about 150 men of the 3d Tennessee cavalry. Thirty minutes after the evacuation of the fort re-enforcements, consisting of the 18th Michigan and 102d Ohio regiments, arrived, and after a severe fight were also forced to yield. Forrest then moved toward Pulaski, destroying the railroad as he advanced, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch Trestle, and skirmished heavily all day of the 27th with the garrison of Pulaski, but withdrew toward nightfall. Major General Rousseau was present at Pulaski during the engagement, having collected such troops as he could spare from other points of his command to assist in staying the progress of the enemy in the destruction of our railroad communications.

On the 29th Forrest withdrew from the immediate vicinity of the railroad, after having thoroughly destroyed it from Athens to within five miles of Pulaski, and on the same day the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad was cut near Tullahoma and Decherd by small parties from his command, sent out for the purpose; but the road was again in running order on the 30th. As Forrest changed the scene of his operations from the Decatur railroad over to the one leading to Chattanooga, General Rousseau moved rapidly by rail around through Nashville to Tullahoma, and prepared for his reception. On the same day (29th September) 5,000 men from the district of the Etowah, Major General J. B. Steedman commanding, crossed to the north of the Tennessee river to check Forrest's movements and protect and keep open the communication by rail with Chattanooga.

Newton's division, 4th corps, was ordered from Atlanta September 26, and replaced Steedman's command at Chattanooga on the 28th. Morgan's division, of the 14th corps, started from Atlanta for the same purpose on the 29th of September, and to re-enforce the troops operating against Forrest.

In compliance with verbal instructions from Major General Sherman, I left Atlanta with Morgan's division to take immediate charge of affairs in Tennessee, and reached Nashville October 3.

On the withdrawal of Forrest's troops from Athens, a garrison was sent to reoccupy the post by Brigadier General R. S. Granger, commanding district of northern Alabama, who also sent a scouting party from Huntsville toward Fayetteville to locate the enemy. This party ascertained that Forrest passed through Fayetteville on the night of the 29th, and moved toward Decherd. After passing Fayetteville, however, he divided his forces, part going south through New Market toward Huntsville, and the remainder, under Forrest in person, moved through Lynchburg towards Columbia. The first column, 4,000 strong, under Buford, appeared in front of Huntsville during the evening of the 30th, and immediately sent in a summons to the garrison to surrender, which the latter refused to do. The enemy remained throughout the night in the vicinity of the town, and repeated the demand for its surrender on the morning of October 1, and, meeting with an answer similar to the one received on the night previous, he moved off in the direction of Athens, which place was attacked by him at about 3 p. m. without effect, the garrison holding its own nobly. The second column (under Forrest in person, and estimated at 3,000 men) made its appearance near Columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not attack that place.

During these operations of Forrest in Middle Tennessee, small parties of the enemy made their appearance in the neighborhood of McMinnville and Liberty, but made no serious demonstrations.

Morgan's division, of the 14th army corps, which started from Atlanta on the 29th of September, reached Stevenson during the morning of the 1st of October, and pushed on towards Huntsville immediately, reaching that place during the night, and set out for Athens at an early hour on the morning of the 2d, repairing the railroad as it advanced. The enemy, under Buford, resumed the attack on Athens on the 2d, but was again handsomely repulsed by the garrison.

son, consisting of the 73d Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel Slade commanding. Failing in this second attempt, Buford moved off toward Elk river, pursued by a small force of our cavalry belonging to General Granger's command. The other column, under Forrest, started from near Columbia on the morning of the 3d, and moved off in the direction of Mount Pleasant, paroling all his prisoners before his departure. During his stay in the neighborhood he destroyed about five miles of railroad between Carter's creek and Spring Hill, including three bridges. The enemy's intention to make good his escape to the south side of the Tennessee river being now evident, directions were given to General Morgan, at Athens, to move with his division toward Bainbridge, and endeavor to secure the crossing at that place in advance of Forrest, while General Rousseau, already on the way to Columbia from Nashville with a force of 4,000 mounted men, hastily collected together, was to push after the enemy through Mount Pleasant, and press him in the rear. Croxton's brigade of cavalry started from Farmington, and, moving through Lewisburg, pursued a southwesterly course towards Lawrenceburg. The above was the position of the troops on the morning of October 3. On the same day information reached me that Major General Washburne, with 3,000 cavalry and 1,500 infantry, was moving up the Tennessee river to participate in the operations against Forrest. Directions were sent him on the 4th to leave his infantry at Johnsonville, move with his cavalry by water to Clifton, and thence across the country toward Pulaski, joining General Rousseau's column at that point. Lieutenant Commander Forrest, United States navy, commanding the naval force on the upper Tennessee, was requested to send some gunboats down the river to Florence, Alabama, and endeavor to prevent the enemy crossing in that vicinity, if the high stage of water then prevailing in the Tennessee would admit of his crossing the upper shoals with his gunboats.

Morgan's division reached Rogersville during the evening of the 4th, having been delayed by high water in crossing Elk river; and on the same night Forrest passed through Lawrenceburg. A report was received to the effect that Buford's command succeeded in crossing the Tennessee river at Brown's ferry on the 3d instant.

On the 6th General Washburne reached Waynesboro', still moving eastward, and on the same day General Morgan came up with the enemy's rear guard at Shoal Creek bridge, and skirmished with it slightly, but still not in time to prevent the main body of the enemy from safely effecting a crossing of the Tennessee at Bainbridge. Thus both columns of the enemy succeeded in escaping, although closely pursued by our forces. On the 8th directions were sent to General Rousseau to destroy all ferry-boats and other means of crossing the river, and then move his command below Florence to await further orders. At the same time General Morgan was directed to return to Athens.

Pending these operations in Tennessee the whole aspect of affairs about Atlanta had undergone a change. Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee river, and had sent one corps of his army to destroy the railroad between Alatoona and Marietta, which he had effectually accomplished for a distance of over twenty miles, interrupting all communication between the forces in Tennessee and the main army with General Sherman in Georgia. He then moved around south of Rome to the west side of the Coosa river, and, taking a northeasterly course, marched toward Summerville and Lafayette, threatening Chattanooga and Bridgeport.

The following dispositions were made on the 11th: Croxton's cavalry brigade was to move to some point sufficiently near his supplies at Athens, and not too far removed from the Tennessee river to protect its crossings from Decatur down as far as Eastport; Morgan's division, of the 14th corps, to move without delay from Athens to Chattanooga by rail, and Steedman's command following Morgan's from Decatur to Bridgeport. General Rousseau's troops were re-

called from below Florence, and ordered to concentrate at Athens without delay. The district of northern Alabama, comprising the posts of Decatur, Huntsville, Stevenson, and intermediate points, was left with its ordinary garrisons, and our whole attention turned toward Hood's movements in northern Georgia.

On the 12th the enemy's cavalry attacked Resaca, but the place was resolutely held by Watkins's brigade of cavalry, and the railroad bridge saved from destruction. The same day Brigadier General Wagner reported from Chattanooga the enemy's cavalry, 250 strong, had occupied La Fayette, Georgia; whereupon directions were sent him to call in the detachments at Tunnel Hill, Ringgold, and intermediate points along the railroad between there and Chattanooga, and quietly make preparations to defend his post. On the 13th one corps of Hood's army appeared in front of Dalton, and a summons to surrender, signed by Hood in person, was sent in to Colonel Johnson, 44th United States colored troops, commanding the garrison. Colonel Johnson being convinced of the uselessness of contending against so overwhelming a force of the enemy, and knowing there was no succor at hand, complied with the demand.

On the 14th Morgan's division reached Chattanooga, and General Steedman's command arrived at Bridgeport, where he received orders to proceed to Chattanooga.

After remaining at Dalton one day, during which he destroyed about five miles of railroad, the enemy moved off to the westward, through Nickajack Gap, to rejoin the remainder of Hood's army near Summerville, to which point he had been followed by General Sherman with the 4th, 14th, 15th, and 17th corps, the 20th corps having been left behind at Atlanta to hold the place.

In compliance with instructions from Major General Sherman, Morgan's division, of the 14th corps, and Wagner's, of the 4th, were sent from Chattanooga to rejoin their respective commands at Summerville.

A force of 1,500 men was set to work under the direction of Colonel W. W. Wright, chief engineer United States military railroads, to repair the railroad south of Chattanooga, there being twenty-four miles of rails and ties totally destroyed, besides several important bridges carried away by high water; yet, with characteristic energy on the part of Colonel Wright and Captain J. C. Van Duzer, superintendent of military telegraph, the repairs were rapidly carried forward. Telegraphic communication with Atlanta was restored on the 21st, and trains commenced running regularly on the 28th. On the latter date the enemy was at Gadsden, Alabama, whilst General Sherman's forces were at Gaylesville, both armies remaining inactive and watchful of the other's movements. Whilst at the latter place Special Field Order No. 105, military division of the Mississippi, was issued by General Sherman, and the substance of it sent to me by telegraph, as follows:

"In the event of military movements or the accidents of war separating the general in command from his military division, Major General George H. Thomas, commanding the department of the Cumberland, will exercise command over all the troops and garrisons not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief."

A written communication, received a few days previous, in which I was instructed to remain in Tennessee and defend the line of the Tennessee river, gave a detailed account of his plans for a campaign into the heart of Georgia. The 14th and 20th corps of my command were to go with General Sherman, the 4th corps remaining with me in Tennessee. My instructions were to pursue the enemy if he followed General Sherman's column, but, in any event, to hold Tennessee. On the 26th the enemy's infantry made its appearance in strong force in front of Decatur, Alabama, and during the afternoon attacked the garrison, but not vigorously, and without effect. Re-enforcements, amounting to two full regiments, were sent from Chattanooga to General Granger at

that point, and he was directed to hold his post at all hazards. On the 27th the enemy commenced intrenching his position around Decatur, working steadily throughout the day, and skirmishing continually, but no artillery was used. At night their camp-fires showed a heavy force. Under cover of the darkness, and with a strong column, the enemy drove in our pickets and established a line of rifle-pits within five hundred yards of the town. On the 28th a sortie was made by a part of the garrison, which advanced under cover of the guns of the fort down the river-bank and around to the rear of the enemy's pits, clearing them of their occupants and capturing 120 prisoners belonging to Cheatham's division, besides killing and wounding a number. The same day the 14th United States colored troops, Colonel Morgan commanding, carried one of the enemy's batteries up the river, after driving off the supports; the guns were spiked, and the command returned to Decatur. Our loss was three officers killed, and several officers and men wounded.

General Grauger estimated the force opposing him at one corps, and his scouts informed him there was also a corps at Warrenton, Alabama, with Russell's brigade of cavalry at Gunter'sville on the river; Roddy's division of cavalry was picketing the south side of the Tennessee from Decatur to Tusculumbia, and Forrest, with the main cavalry force, was reported at Corinth, Mississippi, with outposts at Eastport and along the west bank of the Tennessee. On the 29th General Grauger reported the enemy in his front to be withdrawing from Decatur toward Courtland. The same day General Croxton, commanding a brigade of cavalry picketing the north bank of the river, reported the enemy crossing at the mouth of Cypress creek, two miles below Florence, stating at the same time that he would move with all the force he could spare to drive the enemy back. Directions were sent to General Hatch, commanding a division of cavalry at Clifton, on the east bank of the Tennessee, to move to the support of Croxton at Florence, impressing upon both commanders the necessity of keeping the enemy from crossing to the north side of the river until the 4th corps, already on its way from General Sherman in Georgia, could arrive and get into position to meet him.

Hood's plans had now become evident, and from information gained through prisoners, deserters and other sources, his intention was to cross into Middle Tennessee. To enable him to supply his army, he had been repairing the Mobile and Ohio railroad for some time previous, and trains were now running as far north as Corinth and thence east to Cherokee Station, bringing his supplies by that route from Selma and Montgomery.

The advance division (Wood's) of the 4th corps reached Athens on the 31st, the other two divisions of the corps following along rapidly. The 23d corps, Major General J. M. Schofield commanding, having been ordered by Major General Sherman to take post at Resaca and report to me for orders, was immediately ordered by me to Pulaski, (as soon as I learned Hood had appeared in force on the south side of the Tennessee,) and was also on its way, moving in rear of the 4th corps.

The enemy effected a lodgement for his infantry on the north side of the Tennessee, about three miles above Florence, on the 31st, notwithstanding Croxton's endeavors to drive him back, and his cavalry in heavy force pressed Croxton across Shoal creek to its east bank. Orders were immediately sent to General Stanley to concentrate the 4th corps at Pulaski and await further instructions. In the mean time Forrest was moving eastward from Corinth, Mississippi, and from Paris, Tennessee, making his appearance on the 28th at Fort Heiman, an earthwork on the west bank of the Tennessee, about seventy-five miles from Paducah, where he captured gunboat No. 55 and two transports on the 31st, having previously burned the steamer Empress. His force was composed of seventeen regiments of cavalry with nine pieces of artillery. On the 2d he had succeeded in planting batteries above and below Johnsonville, (one of our bases

of supplies on the Tennessee river, and the western terminus of the Northwestern railroad,) completely blockading the river and isolating at that place three gunboats, eight transports, and about a dozen barges. The garrison was composed of about 1,000 men of the forty-third Wisconsin, twelfth United States colored troops, and a detachment of the eleventh Tennessee cavalry, all under command of Colonel C. R. Thompson, twelfth United States colored troops. The naval forces, under command of Lieutenant E. M. King, attacked the enemy's batteries below Johnsonville, but were repulsed after a severe contest, but not before they recaptured from the enemy one of the transports above mentioned, having on board two 20-pounder Parrott guns, and a considerable quantity of quartermaster's stores, and forcing the enemy to destroy the gunboat No. 55. captured on the 31st.

On the 4th the enemy opened on the gunboats, transports, and on the town, from batteries posted on the opposite bank of the river, to which the artillery of the garrison and the gunboats gave a brisk response. The latter becoming disabled, and as great fears were entertained of their being seized by the enemy, it was resolved to fire them, as also the transports, to prevent their falling into his hands. In carrying this into operation, the flames spread to the buildings of the commissary and quartermaster's departments, and also to a large amount of stores on the levee, soon converting the whole into a mass of ruins. The loss to the government, as far as estimated, is set down at one and a half million of dollars, of which about three hundred thousand dollars belongs to the subsistence department, and the remainder to the quartermaster's department. I believe there was no cause to apprehend that the enemy could effect a crossing at Johnsonville, and the destruction of public property was consequently unnecessary.

On the morning of the 5th the enemy again opened fire on the garrison, and after a furious cannonade of more than an hour's duration withdrew from his position across the river and disappeared. He crossed the Tennessee above Johnsonville by means of two large flat-boats constructed by his men and two small boats belonging to one of the gunboats, and then moved off in the direction of Clifton. Major General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, arrived in Nashville on the 5th, and was immediately started towards Johnsonville by rail, reaching that place the same night and finding the enemy had already retreated. Directions were then sent General Schofield to leave a sufficiently strong force for the defence of that post, and with the balance of his command proceed to carry out the instructions already given him, namely, to join the 4th corps at Pulaski, and assume command of all the troops in the vicinity, watch the movements of Hood, and retard his advance into Tennessee as much as possible, without risking a general engagement, until Major General A. J. Smith's command could arrive from Missouri, and Major General J. H. Wilson could have time to remount the cavalry regiments dismounted to furnish horses for Kilpatrick's division, which was to accompany General Sherman in his march through Georgia.

At this time I found myself confronted by the army which, under General J. E. Johnston, had so skilfully resisted the advance of the whole active army of the military division of the Mississippi from Dalton to the Chattahoochee, reinforced by a well equipped and enthusiastic cavalry command of over twelve thousand men, led by one of the boldest and most successful cavalry commanders in the rebel army.

My information from all sources confirmed the reported strength stated of Hood's army to be from forty to forty-five thousand infantry, and from twelve to fifteen thousand cavalry. My effective force at this time consisted of the 4th corps, about twelve thousand, under Major General D. S. Stanley; the 23d corps, about ten thousand, under Major General J. M. Schofield; Hatcher's division of cavalry, about four thousand; Croxton's brigade, twenty-five hun-

dred, and Capron's brigade of about twelve hundred. The balance of my force was distributed along the railroad, and posted at Murfreesboro', Stevenson, Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to keep open our communications and hold the posts above named, if attacked, until they could be re-enforced, as up to this time it was impossible to determine which course Hood would take—advance on Nashville, or turn toward Huntsville. Under these circumstances it was manifestly best to act on the defensive until sufficiently re-enforced to justify taking the offensive.

My plans and wishes were fully explained to General Schofield, and, as subsequent events showed, properly appreciated and executed by him.

From the 1st to the 10th of November the enemy's position at Florence had remained materially unchanged. He had laid a pontoon bridge by mooring it to the piers of the old railroad bridge, at that place, and had crossed over one corps of infantry (S. D. Lee's) and two divisions of cavalry; the other two corps (Stuart's and Cheatham's) were still on the south side of the river. His cavalry had pushed out to Shoal creek, skirmishing continually with Hatch's and Croxton's commands along the line of that stream, but showing no disposition to advance beyond.

General Sherman's uncertain position at Kingston, Georgia, where he still remained in camp, had much to do with detaining the enemy, doubtless causing considerable speculation as to his future movements. On the 12th of November communication with General Sherman was severed, the last despatch from him leaving Cartersville, Georgia, at 2.25 p. m. on that date. He had started on his great expedition from Atlanta to the sea-board, leaving me to guard Tennessee or to pursue the enemy if he followed the commanding general's column. It was therefore with considerable anxiety that we watched the forces at Florence, to discover what course they would pursue with regard to General Sherman's movements, determining thereby whether the troops under my command, numbering less than half those under Hood, were to act on the defensive in Tennessee, or take the offensive in Alabama.

The enemy's position at Florence remained unchanged up to the 17th November, when he moved Cheatham's corps to the north side of the river with Stuart's corps preparing to follow. The same day part of the enemy's infantry, said to be Lee's corps, moved up the Lawrenceburg road to Bough's mill, on Shoal creek, skirmishing at that point with Hatcher's cavalry, and then fell back a short distance to some bluffs, where it went into camp.

The possibility of Hood's forces following General Sherman was now at an end, and I quietly took measures to act on the defensive. Two divisions of infantry, under Major General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me from Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in the department, and detachments collected from points of minor importance, would swell my command, when concentrated, to an army nearly as large as that of the enemy. Had the enemy delayed his advance a week or ten days longer I would have been ready to meet him at some point south of Duck river, but Hood commenced his advance on the 19th, moving on parallel roads from Florence towards Waynesboro, and shelled Hatch's cavalry out of Lawrenceburg on the 22d. My only resource then was to retire slowly towards my re-enforcements, delaying the enemy's progress as much as possible, to gain time for re-enforcements to arrive and concentrate.

General Schofield commenced removing the public property from Pulaski preparatory to falling back towards Columbia. Two divisions of Stanley's corps had already reached Lynnville, a point fifteen miles north of Pulaski, to cover the passage of the wagons and protect the railroad. Capron's brigade of cavalry was at Mount Pleasant, covering the approach to Columbia from that direction; and in addition to the regular garrison there was at Columbia a brigade of Ruger's division, 23d army corps. I directed the two remaining brigades of

Ruger's division, then at Johnsonville, also to move, one by railroad around through Nashville to Columbia, the other by road *via* Waverly to Centerville, and occupy the crossings of Duck river, near Columbia, Williamsport, Gordon's ferry, and Centreville.

Since the departure of General Sherman about seven thousand men belonging to his column had collected at Chattanooga, comprising convalescents returning to their commands and men returning from furlough. These men had been organized into brigades, to be made available at such points as they might be needed. My command had also been re-enforced by twenty new one-year regiments, most of which, however, were absorbed in replacing old regiments whose terms of service had expired.

On the 23d, in accordance with directions previously given him, General Granger commenced withdrawing the garisons from Athens, Decatur, and Huntsville, Alabama, and moved off toward Stevenson, sending five new regiments of that force to Murfreesboro', and retaining at Stevenson the original troops of his command. This movement was rapidly made by rail, and without opposition on the part of the enemy. That same night General Schofield evacuated Pulaski and moved towards Columbia, reporting himself in position at that place on the 24th. The commanding officer at Johnsonville was directed to evacuate that post after removing all public property, and retire to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, and thence to Clarksville. During the 24th and 25th the enemy skirmished with General Schofield's troops at Columbia, but showed nothing but dismounted cavalry until the morning of the 26th, when his infantry came up and pressed our line strongly during that day and the 27th, but without assaulting. As the enemy's movements showed an undoubted intention to cross above or below the town, General Schofield withdrew to the north bank of Duck river during the night of the 27th and took up a new position, where the command remained during the 28th, undisturbed. Two divisions of the 23d corps were placed in line in front of the town, holding all the crossings in its vicinity, while Stanley's corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin pike, was held in readiness to repel any vigorous attempt the enemy should make to force a crossing; the cavalry, under command of Brevet Major General Wilson, held the crossings above those guarded by the infantry. About 2 a. m. on the 29th the enemy succeeded in pressing back General Wilson's cavalry, and effected a crossing on the Lewisburg pike; at a later hour part of his infantry crossed at Huey's mills, six miles above Columbia. Communication with the cavalry having been interrupted, and the line of retreat toward Franklin being threatened, General Schofield made preparations to withdraw to Franklin; General Stanley, with one division of infantry, was sent to Spring Hill, about fifteen miles north of Columbia, to cover the trains and hold the road open for the passage of the main force, and dispositions were made preparatory to a withdrawal, to meet any attack coming from the direction of Huey's mills. General Stanley reached Spring Hill just in time to drive off the enemy's cavalry and save the trains; but later he was attacked by the enemy's infantry and cavalry combined, who engaged him heavily and nearly succeeded in dislodging him from the position, the engagement lasting until dark. Although not attacked from the direction of Huey's mills, General Schofield was busily occupied all day at Columbia resisting the enemy's attempts to cross Duck river, which he successfully accomplished, repulsing the enemy many times with heavy loss. Giving directions for the withdrawal of the troops as soon as covered by the darkness, at a late hour in the afternoon General Schofield, with Ruger's division, started to the relief of General Stanley, at Spring Hill, and when near that place he came upon the enemy's cavalry, but they were easily driven off. *At Spring Hill the enemy was found bivouacking within eight hundred yards of the road.* Posting a brigade to hold the pike at this point, General Schofield, with Ruger's division, pushed on to

Thompson's station, three miles beyond, where he found the enemy's camp-fires still burning, a cavalry force having occupied the place at dark, but had disappeared on the arrival of our troops. General Ruger then quietly took possession of the cross-roads.

The withdrawal of the main force from in front of Columbia was safely effected after dark on the 29th; Spring Hill was passed without molestation about midnight, and, making a night march of twenty-five miles, the whole command got into position at Franklin at an early hour on the morning of the 30th, the cavalry moving on the Lewisburg pike, on the right or east of the infantry.

At Franklin General Schofield formed line of battle on the southern edge of the town to await the coming of the enemy, and in the meanwhile hastened the crossing of the trains to the north side of Harpeth river.

On the evacuation of Columbia orders were sent to Major General Milroy, at Tullahoma, to abandon that post and retire to Murfreesboro', joining forces with General Rousseau at the latter place. General Milroy was instructed, however, to maintain the garrison in the block-house at Elk River bridge. Nashville was placed in a state of defence and the fortifications manned by the garrison, reinforced by a volunteer force which had been previously organized into a division under Brevet Brigadier General J. L. Donaldson, from the employés of the quartermasters' and commissary departments. This latter force, aided by railroad employés, the whole under the direction of Brigadier General Tower, worked assiduously to construct additional defences. Major General Steedman, with a command numbering 5,000, composed of detachments belonging to General Sherman's column, left behind at Chattanooga, (of which mention has heretofore been made,) and also a brigade of colored troops, started from Chattanooga by rail on the 29th of November, and reached Cowan on the morning of the 30th, where orders were sent him to proceed direct to Nashville. At an early hour on the morning of the 30th the advance of Major General A. J. Smith's command reached Nashville by transports from St. Louis. My infantry force was now nearly equal to that of the enemy, although he still outnumbered me very greatly in effective cavalry, but as soon as a few thousand of the latter arm could be mounted I should be in a condition to take the field offensively and dispute the possession of Tennessee with Hood's army.

The enemy followed closely after General Schofield's rear guard in the retreat to Franklin, and upon coming up with the main force formed rapidly and advanced to assault our works, repeating attack after attack during the entire afternoon, and as late as 10 p. m. his efforts to break our line were continued. General Schofield's position was excellently chosen, with both flanks resting on the river, and his men firmly held their ground against an overwhelming enemy, who was repulsed in every assault along the whole line. Our loss, as given by General Schofield in his report transmitted herewith, (and to which I respectfully refer,) is 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 missing, making an aggregate of 2,326. We captured and sent to Nashville 702 prisoners, including one general officer, and thirty-three stands of colors. Major General D. S. Stanley, commanding 4th corps, was severely wounded at Franklin whilst engaged in rallying a portion of his command which had been temporarily overpowered by an overwhelming attack of the enemy. At the time of the battle the enemy's loss was known to be severe, and was estimated at 5,000. The exact figures were only obtained, however, on the re-occupation of Franklin by our forces, after the battles of December 15 and 16, at Brentwood Hills, near Nashville, and are given as follows: buried upon the field, 1,750; disabled and placed in hospital at Franklin, 3,800; which, with the 702 prisoners already reported, makes an aggregate loss to Hood's army of 6,252, among whom were 6 general officers killed, 6 wounded, and 1 captured. The important results of this signal victory cannot be too highly appreciated, for it not only seriously

checked the enemy's advance and gave General Schofield time to remove his troops and all his property to Nashville, but it also caused deep depression among the men of Hood's army, making them doubly cautious in their subsequent movements.

Not willing to risk a renewal of the battle on the morrow, and having accomplished the object of the day's operations, namely, to cover the withdrawal of his trains, General Schofield, by my advice and direction, fell back during the night to Nashville, in front of which city line of battle was formed by noon of the 1st December, on the heights immediately surrounding Nashville, with Major General A. J. Smith's command occupying the right, his right resting on the Cumberland river, below the city; the 4th corps (Brigadier General Wood temporarily in command) in the centre; and General Schofield's troops (23d army corps) on the left, his left extending to the Nolensville pike. The cavalry, under General Wilson, was directed to take post on the left of General Schofield, which would make secure the interval between his left and the river above the city.

General Steedman's troops reached Nashville about dark on the evening of the 1st of December, taking up a position about a mile in advance of the left centre of the main line, and on the left of the Nolensville pike. This position being regarded as too much exposed, was changed on the 3d, when, the cavalry having been directed to take post on the north side of the river at Edgefield, General Steedman occupied the space on the left of the line vacated by its withdrawal.

During the afternoon of the 2d the enemy's cavalry in small parties engaged our skirmishers, but it was only on the afternoon of the 3d that his infantry made its appearance, when, crowding in our skirmishers, he commenced to establish his main line, which, on the morning of the 4th, we found he had succeeded in doing, with his salient on the summit of Montgomery Hill, within six hundred yards of our centre, his main line occupying the high ground on the southeast side of Brown's creek, and extending from the Nolensville pike—his extreme right—across the Franklin and Granny White pikes in a westerly direction to the hills south and southwest of Richland creek, and down that creek to the Hillsboro' pike, with cavalry extending from both his flanks to the river. Artillery was opened on him from several points on the line, without eliciting any response.

The block-house at the railroad crossing of Overall's creek, five miles north of Murfreesboro', was attacked by Bates's division of Cheatham's corps on the 4th, but held out until assistance reached it from the garrison at Murfreesboro'. The enemy used artillery to reduce the block-house, but although seventy-four shots were fired at it, no material injury was done. General Milroy coming up with three regiments of infantry, four companies of the thirteenth Indiana cavalry, and a section of artillery, attacked the enemy and drove him off. During the 5th 6th and 7th, Bates's division, re-enforced by a division from Lee's corps and 2,500 of Forrest's cavalry, demonstrated heavily against Fortress Rosecrans, at Murfreesboro', garrisoned by about 8,000 men, under command of General Rousseau. The enemy showing an unwillingness to make a direct assault, General Milroy, with seven regiments of infantry, was sent out on the 8th to engage him. He was found a short distance from the place on the Wilkerson pike, posted behind rail breastworks, was attacked and routed, our troops capturing 207 prisoners and two guns, with a loss of 30 killed and 175 wounded. On the same day Buford's cavalry entered the town of Murfreesboro', after having shelled it vigorously, but he was speedily driven out by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery.

On retiring from before Murfreesboro' the enemy's cavalry moved northward to Lebanon and along the bank of the Cumberland in that vicinity, threatening to cross to the north side of the river and interrupt our railroad communication with Louisville, at that time our only source of supplies, the enemy having block-

aded the river below Nashville by batteries along the shore. The navy department was requested to patrol the Cumberland above and below Nashville with the gunboats then in the river, to prevent the enemy from crossing, which was cordially and effectually complied with by Lieutenant Commanding Le Roy Fitch, commanding eleventh division Mississippi squadron. At the same time General Wilson sent a cavalry force to Gallatin to guard the country in that vicinity.

The position of Hood's army around Nashville remained unchanged, and, with the exception of occasional picket firing, nothing of importance occurred from the 3d to the 15th December. In the mean while I was preparing to take the offensive without delay; the cavalry was being remounted under the direction of General Wilson as rapidly as possible, and new transportation furnished where it was required.

During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy under Breckinridge, Duke, and Vaughn was operating in the eastern portion of the State against Generals Ammen and Gillem. On the 13th November, at midnight, Breckinridge, with a force estimated at 3,000, attacked General Gillem near Morristown, routing him and capturing his artillery, besides taking several hundred prisoners; the remainder of the command, about 1,000 in number, escaped to Strawberry Plains, and thence to Knoxville. General Gillem's force consisted of 1,500 men, composing three regiments of Tennessee cavalry and six guns, belonging formerly to the fourth division of cavalry, army of the Cumberland, but had been detached from my command at the instance of Governor Andrew Johnson, and were then operating independently under Brigadier General Gillem. From a want of co-operation between the officers directly under my control and General Gillem may be attributed in a great measure the cause of the latter's misfortune.

Following up his success, Breckinridge continued moving southward through Strawberry Plains, to the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, but on the 18th withdrew as rapidly as he had advanced. General Ammen's troops, re-enforced by 1,500 men from Chattanooga, re-occupied Strawberry Plains on that day.

About this period Major General Stoneman, left at Louisville by General Schofield to take charge of the department of the Ohio during his absence with the army in the field, started for Knoxville to take general direction of affairs in that section, having previously ordered Brevet Major General Burbridge to march with all his available force in Kentucky, by way of Cumberland Gap, to Gillem's relief. On his way through Nashville General Stoneman received instructions from me to concentrate as large a force as he could get in East Tennessee, move against Breckinridge, and either destroy his force or drive it into Virginia, and, if possible, destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad from the Tennessee line as far into Virginia as he could go without endangering his command. November 23 General Stoneman telegraphed from Knoxville that the main force of the enemy was at New Market, eight miles north of Strawberry Plains, and General Burbridge was moving on Cumberland Gap from the interior of Kentucky, his advance expecting to reach Barboursville that night. On the 6th of December, having received information from East Tennessee that Breckinridge was falling back towards Virginia, General Stoneman was again directed to pursue him, and destroy the railroad as far across the State line as possible, say twenty-five miles.

Leaving him to carry out these instructions, I will return to the position at Nashville.

Both armies were ice-bound for a week previous to the 14th of December, when the weather moderated. Being prepared to move, I called a meeting of the corps commanders on the afternoon of that day, and having discussed the plan of attack until thoroughly understood, the following Special Field Order No. 342 was issued:

“Paragraph IV. As soon as the state of the weather will admit of offensive

operations, the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order :

“Major General A. J. Smith, commanding a detachment of the army of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on and near the Harding pike, in front of his present position, will make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left.

“Major General Wilson, commanding the cavalry corps, military division of Mississippi, with three divisions, will move on and support General Smith's right, assisting, as far as possible, in carrying the left of the enemy's position, and be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable opportunity occurs. Major General Wilson will also send one division on the Charlotte pike to clear that road of the enemy, and observe in the direction of Bell's Landing, to protect our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it will rejoin the main force.

“Brigadier General T. J. Wood, commanding 4th army corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Laurens's Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the 4th corps on the Hillsboro' pike to support General Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position on the Montgomery Hill.

“Major General Schofield, commanding 23d army corps, will replace Brigadier General Kimball's division of the 4th corps with his troops, and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Laurens's Hill with a strong skirmish line. He will move with the remainder of his force in front of the works and co-operate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the enemy.

“Major General Steedman, commanding district of the Etowah, will occupy the interior line in rear of his present position, stretching from the reservoir on the Cumberland river to Fort Negley, with a strong skirmish line, and mass the remainder of his force in its present position, to act according to the exigencies which may arise during these operations.

“Brigadier General Miller, with the troops forming the garrison of Nashville, will occupy the interior line from the battery on hill 210 to the extreme right, including the enclosed work on the Hyde's Ferry road.

“The quartermaster's troops, under command of Brigadier General Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the battery on hill 210.

“The troops occupying the interior line will be under the direction of Major General Steedman, who is charged with the immediate defence of Nashville during the operations around the city.

“Should the weather permit, the troops will be formed to commence operations at 6 a. m. on the 15th, or as soon thereafter as practicable.”

On the morning of the 15th of December, the weather being favorable, the army was formed and ready at an early hour to carry out the plan of battle promulgated in the Special Field Order of the 14th. The formation of the troops was partially concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, as also by a dense fog, which only lifted towards noon. The enemy was apparently totally unaware of any intention on our part to attack his position, and more especially did he seem not to expect any movement against his left flank. To divert his attention still further from our real intentions, Major General Steedman had, on the evening of the 14th, received orders to make a heavy demonstration with his command against the enemy's right, east of the Nolensville pike, which he accomplished with great success and some loss, succeeding, however, in attracting the enemy's attention to that part of his line, and inducing him to draw reinforcements from toward his centre and left. As soon as General Steedman had completed his movement, the commands of Generals Smith and Wilson moved out along the Harding pike and commenced the grand movement of the day by wheeling to the left and advancing against the enemy's position across

the Harding and Hillsboro' pikes. A division of cavalry (Johnson's) was sent at the same time to look after a battery of the enemy's on the Cumberland river at Bell's Landing, eight miles below Nashville. General Johnson did not get into position until late in the afternoon, when, in conjunction with the gun-boats under Lieutenant Commander Le Roy Fitch, the enemy's battery was engaged until after nightfall, and the place was found evacuated in the morning. The remainder of General Wilson's command, Hatch's division leading and Knipe in reserve, moving on the right of General A. J. Smith's troops, first struck the enemy along Richland creek, near Harding's house, and drove him back rapidly, capturing a number of prisoners, wagons, &c., and continuing to advance, whilst slightly swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was splendidly carried by assault at 1 p. m. by a portion of Hatch's division, dismounted, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that captured the first position, taking four more guns and about 300 prisoners. The infantry, McArthur's division of General A. J. Smith's command, on the left of the cavalry, participated in both of the above assaults, and indeed the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry who should first gain the works; as they reached the position nearly simultaneously, both lay claim to the artillery and prisoners captured.

Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as I expected he would have done, I directed General Schofield to move his command (the 23d corps) from the position in reserve to which it had been assigned, over to the right of General Smith, enabling the cavalry thereby to operate more freely in the enemy's rear. This was rapidly accomplished by General Schofield, and his troops participated in the closing operations of the day.

The 4th corps, Brigadier General T. J. Wood commanding, formed on the left of General A. J. Smith's command, and as soon as the latter had struck the enemy's flank, assaulted the Montgomery Hill, Hood's most advanced position, at 1 p. m., which was most gallantly executed by the third brigade, second division, Colonel P. Sidney Post, 59th Illinois, commanding, capturing a considerable number of prisoners. Connecting with the left of Smith's troops, (Brigadier General Garrard's division,) the 4th corps continued to advance, and carried the enemy's entire line in its front by assault and captured several pieces of artillery, about 500 prisoners, some stands of colors, and other material. The enemy was driven out of his original line of works and forced back to a new position along the base of Harpeth Hills, still holding his line of retreat to Franklin by the main pike through Brentwood and by the Granny White pike. Our line at nightfall was readjusted, running parallel to and east of the Hillsboro' pike—Schofield's command on the right, Smith's in the centre, and Wood's on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield; Steedman holding the position he had gained early in the morning.

The total result of the day's operations was the capture of sixteen pieces of artillery and 1,200 prisoners, besides several hundred stands of small-arms and about forty wagons. The enemy had been forced back at all points with heavy loss, and our casualties were unusually light. The behavior of the troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement, and the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, strictly adhered to.

The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the night on the ground occupied at dark, whilst preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the morrow.

At 6 a. m. on the 16th Wood's corps pressed back the enemy's skirmishers across the Franklin pike to the eastward of it, and then swinging slightly to the right, advanced due south from Nashville, driving the enemy before him until he came upon his new main line of works, constructed during the night, on what is called Overton's Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the

Franklin pike. General Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and formed his command on the left of General Wood, effectually securing the latter's left flank, and made preparations to co-operate in the operations of the day. General A. J. Smith's command moved on the right of the 4th corps, (Wood's,) and establishing connexion with General Wood's right, completed the new line of battle. General Schofield's troops remained in the position taken up by them at dark on the day previous, facing eastward and toward the enemy's left flank, the line of the corps running perpendicular to General Smith's troops. General Wilson's cavalry, which had rested for the night at the six-mile post on the Hillsboro' pike, was dismounted and formed on the right of Schofield's command, and by noon of the 16th had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear, and stretched across the Granny White pike, one o his two outlets towards Franklin.

As soon as the above dispositions were completed, and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued. Our entire line approached to within six hundred yards of the enemy's at all points. His centre was weak as compared with either his right, at Overton's Hill, or his left, on the hills bordering the Granny White pike; still I had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin.

About 3 p. m. Post's brigade of Wood's corps, supported by Streight's brigade of the same command, was ordered by General Wood to assault Overton's Hill. This intention was communicated to General Steedman, who ordered the brigade of colored troops commanded by Colonel Morgan (14th United States colored troops) to co-operate in the movement. The ground on which the two assaulting columns formed being open and exposed to the enemy's view, he, readily perceiving our intention, drew re-enforcements from his left and centre to the threatened point. This movement of troops on the part of the enemy was communicated along the line from left to right.

The assault was made, and received by the enemy with a tremendous fire of grape, canister, and musketry, our men moving steadily onward up the hill until near the crest, when the reserves of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting column a most destructive fire, causing the men first to waver and then to fall back, leaving their dead and wounded—black and white indiscriminately mingled—lying amid the abatis, the gallant Colonel Post among the wounded. General Wood readily reformed his command in the position it had previously occupied, preparatory to a renewal of the assault.

Immediately following the effort of the 4th corps, Generals Smith and Schofield's commands moved against the enemy's works in their respective fronts, carrying all before them, irreparably breaking his lines in a dozen places, and capturing all of his artillery and thousands of prisoners, among the latter four general officers. Our loss was remarkably small, scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that did escape were pursued over the tops of Brentwood or Harpeth Hills.

General Wilson's cavalry, dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and, gaining firm possession of the Granny White pike, cut off his retreat by that route.

Wood's and Steedman's troops hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, rushed impetuously forward, renewing the assault on Overton's Hill, and although meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible, artillery and innumerable prisoners falling into our hands. The enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion through the Brentwood Pass, the 4th corps in a close pursuit, which was continued for several miles, when darkness closed the scene and the troops rested from their labors.

As the 4th corps pursued the enemy on the Franklin pike, General Wilson hastily mounted Knipe's and Hatch's divisions of his command, and di-

rected them to pursue along the Granny White pike and endeavor to reach Franklin in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came upon the enemy's cavalry, under Chalmers, posted across the road and behind barricades. The position was charged by the 12th Tennessee cavalry, Colonel Spalding commanding, and the enemy's lines broken, scattering him in all directions, and capturing quite a number of prisoners, among them Brigadier General E. W. Rucker.

During the two days' operations there were 4,462 prisoners captured, including 287 officers of all grades from that of major general, 53 pieces of artillery, and thousands of small-arms. The enemy abandoned on the field all of his dead and wounded.

Leaving directions for the collection of the captured property, and for the care of the wounded left on the battle-field, the pursuit was continued at daylight on the 17th. The 4th corps pushed on towards Franklin by the direct pike, whilst the cavalry moved by the Granny White pike to its intersection with the Franklin pike, and then took the advance.

Johnson's division of cavalry was sent by General Wilson direct to Harpeth river, on the Hillsboro' pike, with directions to cross and move rapidly towards Franklin. The main cavalry column, with Knipe's division in advance, came up with the enemy's rear guard strongly posted at Hollow Tree Gap, four miles north of Franklin; the position was charged in front and in flank simultaneously, and handsomely carried, capturing 413 prisoners and 3 colors. The enemy then fell back rapidly to Franklin, and endeavored to defend the crossing of Harpeth river at that place; but Johnson's division coming up from below on the south side of the stream, forced him to retire from the river bank, and our cavalry took possession of the town, capturing the enemy's hospitals, containing over 2,000 wounded, of whom about 200 were our own men.

The pursuit was immediately continued, by Wilson, towards Columbia, the enemy's rear guard slowly retiring before him to a distance of about five miles south of Franklin, where the enemy made a stand in some open fields just north of West Harpeth river, and seemed to await our coming. Deploying Knipe's division as skirmishers, with Hatch's in close support, General Wilson ordered his body guard, the 4th United States cavalry, Lieutenant Hedges commanding, to charge the enemy. Forming on the pike in column of fours, the gallant little command charged, with sabres drawn, breaking the enemy's centre, whilst Knipe's and Hatch's men pressed back his flanks, scattering the whole command, and causing them to abandon their artillery. Darkness coming on during the engagement enabled a great many to escape, and put an end to the day's operations.

The 4th corps, under General Wood, followed immediately in rear of the cavalry as far as Harpeth river, where it found the bridges destroyed and too much water on the fords for infantry to cross. A trestle bridge was hastily constructed from such materials as lay at hand, but could not be made available before nightfall. General Steedman's command moved in rear of General Wood, and camped near him on the banks of the Harpeth. Generals Smith and Schofield marched with their corps along the Granny White pike, and camped for the night at its intersection with the Franklin pike. The trains moved with their respective commands, carrying ten days' supplies and one hundred rounds of ammunition.

On the 18th the pursuit of the enemy was continued by General Wilson, who pushed on as far as Rutherford's creek, three miles from Columbia. Wood's corps crossed to the south side of Harpeth river and closed up with the cavalry. The enemy did not offer to make a stand during the day. On arriving at Rutherford's creek the stream was found to be impassable on account of high water, and running a perfect torrent. A pontoon bridge, hastily constructed at Nashville during the presence of the army at that place, was on

its way to the front, but the bad condition of the roads, together with the incompleteness of the train itself, had retarded its arrival. I would here remark that the splendid pontoon train properly belonging to my command, with its trained corps of pontoniers, was absent with General Sherman.

During the 19th several unsuccessful efforts were made by the advanced troops to cross Rutherford's creek, although General Hatch succeeded in lodging a few skirmishers on the south bank. The heavy rains of the preceding few days had inundated the whole country and rendered the roads almost impassable. Smith's and Schofield's commands crossed to the south side of Harpeth river, General Smith advancing to Spring Hill, whilst General Schofield encamped at Franklin. On the morning of the 20th General Hatch constructed a floating bridge from the *débris* of the old railroad bridge over Rutherford's creek, and crossing his entire division pushed out for Columbia, but found, on reaching Duck river, the enemy had succeeded the night before in getting everything across, and had already removed his pontoon bridge; Duck river was very much swollen and impassable without a bridge. During the day General Wood improvised a foot bridge over Rutherford's creek, at the old road bridge, and by nightfall had succeeded in crossing his infantry entire, and one or two of his batteries, and moved forward to Duck river.

The pontoon train coming up to Rutherford's creek about noon of the 21st, a bridge was laid during the afternoon and General Smith's troops were enabled to cross. The weather had changed from dismal rain to bitter cold, very materially retarding the work in laying the bridge, as the regiment of colored troops to whom that duty was intrusted seemed to become unmanned by the cold and totally unequal to the occasion. On the completion of the bridge at Rutherford's creek, sufficient material for a bridge over Duck river was hastily pushed forward to that point, and the bridge constructed in time enough to enable Wood to cross late in the afternoon of the 22d and get into position on the Pulaski road, about two miles south of Columbia. The water in the river fell rapidly during the construction of the bridge, necessitating frequent alterations and causing much delay. The enemy, in his hasty retreat, had thrown into the stream several fine pieces of artillery, which were rapidly becoming uncovered, and were subsequently removed.

Notwithstanding the many delays to which the command had been subjected, I determined to continue the pursuit of Hood's shattered forces, and for this purpose decided to use General Wilson's cavalry and General Wood's corps of infantry, directing the infantry to move on the pike whilst the cavalry marched on its either flank across the fields; the remainder of the command, Smith's and Schofield's corps, to move along more leisurely, and to be used as the occasion demanded.

Forrest and his cavalry, and such other detachments as had been sent off from his main army whilst besieging Nashville, had rejoined Hood at Columbia. He had formed a powerful rear guard, made up of detachments from all his *organized* force, numbering about 4,000 infantry, under General Walthall, and all his available cavalry, under Forrest. With the exception of his rear guard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and barefooted men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their cause to put an end to their sufferings. The rear guard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the last.

During the 23d General Wilson was occupied crossing his command over Duck river, but took the advance on the 24th, supported by General Wood, and came up with the enemy just south of Lynnville, and also at Buford's Station, at both of which places the enemy made a short stand, but was speedily dislodged, with a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our advance was so rapid as to prevent the destruction of the bridges over Richland creek. Christmas morning, the 25th, the enemy, with our cavalry at his heels, evacuated Pulaski,

and was pursued towards Lamb's ferry, over an almost impracticable road and through a country devoid of sustenance for man or beast. During the afternoon Harrison's brigade found the enemy strongly intrenched at the head of a heavily-wooded and deep ravine, through which ran the road, and into which Colonel Harrison drove the enemy's skirmishers, and then waited for the remainder of the cavalry to close up before attacking; but before this could be accomplished the enemy, with something of his former boldness, sallied from his breastworks and drove back Harrison's skirmishers, capturing and carrying off one gun belonging to battery I, 4th United States artillery, which was not recovered by us, notwithstanding the ground lost was almost immediately regained. By nightfall the enemy was driven from his position, with a loss of about fifty prisoners. The cavalry had moved so rapidly as to out-distance its trains, and both men and animals were suffering greatly in consequence, although they continued uncomplainingly to pursue the enemy. General Wood's corps kept well closed up on the cavalry, camping on the night of December 25 six miles out from Pulaski, on the Lamb's Ferry road, and pursuing the same route as the cavalry, reached Lexington, Alabama, thirty miles from Pulaski, on the 28th, on which date, having definitely ascertained that the enemy had made good his escape across the Tennessee at Bainbridge, I directed further pursuit to cease. At Pulaski the enemy's hospital, containing about 200 patients, fell into our hands, and four guns were found in Richland creek. About a mile south of the town he destroyed twenty wagons loaded with ammunition, belonging to Cheatham's corps, taking the animals belonging to the train to help pull his pontoons. The road from Pulaski to Bainbridge, and indeed back to Nashville, was strewn with abandoned wagons, limbers, small-arms, blankets, &c., showing most conclusively the disorder of the enemy's retreat.

During the foregoing operations with the advance, Smith's and Schofield's troops were in motion towards the front, General Smith's command reaching Pulaski on the 27th, whilst General Schofield was directed to remain at Columbia for the time being.

On our arrival at Franklin, on the 18th, I gave directions to General Steedman to move with his command across the country from that point to Murfreesboro', on the Chattanooga railroad, from whence he was to proceed by rail to Decatur, Alabama, *via* Stevenson, being joined at Stevenson by Brigadier General R. S. Granger and the troops composing the garrisons of Huntsville, Athens, and Decatur. Taking general direction of the whole force, his instructions were to reoccupy the points in northern Alabama evacuated at the period of Hood's advance, then cross the Tennessee with the balance of his force and threaten the enemy's railroad communications west of Florence.

General Steedman reoccupied Decatur on the 27th, and proceeded to carry out the second portion of his instructions; finding, however, that the enemy had already made good his escape to the south side of the Tennessee, and any movement on his railroad would be useless.

On announcing the result of the battles to Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, commanding Mississippi squadron, I requested him to send as much of his force as he could spare around to Florence, on the Tennessee river, and endeavor to prevent Hood's army from crossing at that point; which request was most cordially and promptly complied with. He arrived at Chickasaw, Mississippi, on the 24th, destroyed there a rebel battery, and captured two guns with caissons at Florence Landing. He also announced the arrival at the latter place of several transports with provisions.

Immediately upon learning of the presence at Chickasaw, Mississippi, of the gunboats and transports with provisions, I directed General Smith to march overland from Pulaski to Clifton, *via* Lawrenceburg and Waynesboro', and take post at Eastport, Mississippi. General Smith started for his destination on the 29th of December.

On the 30th of December I announced to the army the successful completion

of the campaign, and gave directions for the disposition of the command, as follows: Smith's corps to take post at Eastport, Mississippi; Wood's corps to be concentrated at Huntsville and Athens, Alabama; Schofield's corps to proceed to Dalton, Georgia; and Wilson's cavalry, after sending one division to Eastport, Mississippi, to concentrate balance at or near Huntsville. On reaching the several positions assigned to them, the different commands were to go into winter quarters and recuperate for the spring campaign.

The above not meeting the views of the general-in-chief, and being notified by Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, United States army, that it was not intended for the army in Tennessee to go into winter quarters, orders were issued, on the 31st of December, for Generals Schofield, Smith, and Wilson to concentrate their commands at Eastport, Mississippi, and that of General Wood at Huntsville, Alabama, preparatory to a renewal of the campaign against the enemy in Mississippi and Alabama.

During the active operations of the main army in Middle Tennessee, General Stoneman's forces in the northeastern portion of the State were also very actively engaged in operating against Breckinridge, Duke and Vaughn. Having quietly concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem at Bean's Station, on the 12th of December General Stoneman started for Bristol, his advance under General Gillem striking the enemy under Duke at Kingsport, on the north fork of the Holston river, killing, capturing or dispersing the whole command. General Stoneman then sent General Burbridge to Bristol, where he came upon the enemy under Vaughn, and skirmished with him until the remainder of the troops—Gillem's column—came up, when Burbridge was pushed on to Abingdon with instructions to send a force to cut the railroad at some point between Saltville and Wytheville, in order to prevent re-enforcements coming from Lynchburg to the salt works. Gillem also reached Abingdon on the 15th, the enemy under Vaughn following on a road running parallel to the one used by our forces. Having decided merely to make a demonstration against the salt works, and to push on with the main force after Vaughn, General Gillem struck the enemy at Marion early on the 16th, and after completely routing him, pursued him to Wytheville, Virginia, capturing all his artillery and trains, and 198 prisoners. Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, was destroyed, as also the extensive lead works near the town, and the railroad bridges over Reedy creek. General Stoneman then turned his attention towards Saltville, with its important salt works. The garrison of that place, reinforced by Giltner's, Crosby's and Witcher's commands, and the remnants of Duke's, all under command of Breckinridge in person, followed our troops as they moved on Wytheville, and on returning General Stoneman met them at Marion, where he made preparations to give Breckinridge battle, and disposed his command so as to effectually assault the enemy in the morning, but Breckinridge retreated during the night, and was pursued a short distance into North Carolina, our troops capturing some of his wagons and caissons.

General Stoneman then moved on Saltville with his entire command, capturing at that place eight pieces of artillery and a large amount of ammunition of all kinds, two locomotives, and quite a number of horses and mules. The extensive salt works were destroyed by breaking the kettles, filling the wells with rubbish, and burning the buildings. His work accomplished, General Stoneman returned to Knoxville, accompanied by General Gillem's command, General Burbridge's proceeding to Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap. The country marched over was laid waste to prevent its being used again by the enemy—all mills, factories, bridges, &c., being destroyed. The command had everything to contend with as far as the weather and roads were concerned, yet the troops bore up cheerfully throughout, and made each twenty-four hours an average march of forty-two and a half miles.

The pursuit of Hood's retreating army was discontinued by my main forces on the 29th December on reaching the Tennessee river; however, a force of cavalry

numbering 600 men, made up from detachments of the 15th Pennsylvania, 2d Michigan, 10th, 12th and 13th Indiana regiments, under command of Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania, operating with Steedman's column, started from Decatur, Alabama, in the direction of Hood's line of retreat in Mississippi. The enemy's cavalry, under Roddy, was met at Leighton, with whom Colonel Palmer skirmished and pressed back in small squads towards the mountains. Here it was ascertained that Hood's trains passed through Leighton on the 28th December, and moved off toward Columbus, Mississippi. Avoiding the enemy's cavalry, Colonel Palmer left Leighton on the 31st December, moved rapidly *via* La Grange and Russellville, and by the Cotton-gin road, and overtook the enemy's pontoon train, consisting of 200 wagons and 78 pontoon boats, when ten miles out from Russellville. This he destroyed. Having learned of a large supply train on its way to Tuscaloosa, Colonel Palmer started on the 1st of January towards Aberdeen, Mississippi, with a view of cutting it off, and succeeded in surprising it about 10 p. m. on the same evening, just over the line in Mississippi. The train consisted of 110 wagons and 500 mules, the former of which were burned, and the latter sabred or shot. Returning *via* Tollgate, Alabama, and on the old military and Hacksburg roads, the enemy, under Roddy, Biffles and Russel, was met near Russellville and along Bear creek, whilst another force under Armstrong was reported to be in pursuit of our forces. Evading the force in his front by moving off to the right, under cover of the darkness, Colonel Palmer pushed for Moulton, coming upon Russel when within twelve miles of Moulton and near Thorn Hill, attacked him unexpectedly, utterly routing him, and capturing some prisoners, besides burning five wagons. The command then proceeded to Decatur without molestation, and reached that place on the 6th of January, after a march of two hundred and fifty miles. One hundred and fifty prisoners were captured, and nearly 1,000 stand of arms destroyed. Colonel Palmer's loss was one killed and two wounded.

General Hood, while investing Nashville, had sent into Kentucky a force of cavalry numbering about 800 men, and two guns, under the command of Brigadier General Lyon, with instructions to operate against our railroad communications with Louisville. McCook's division of cavalry was detached on the 14th December and sent to Bowling Green and Franklin to protect the road. After capturing Hopkinsville, Lyon was met by Lagrange's brigade near Greengburg, and after a sharp fight was thrown into confusion, losing one gun, some prisoners and wagons; the enemy succeeding, however, by making a wide detour *via* Elizabethtown and Glasgow, in reaching the Cumberland river, and crossing at Burkville, from where General Lyon proceeded, *via* McMinnville and Winchester, Tennessee, to Larkinsville, Alabama, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and attacked the little garrison at Scottsboro' on the 10th of January. Lyon was here again repulsed and his command scattered, our troops pursuing him towards the Tennessee river, which, however, he, with about 200 of his men and his remaining piece of artillery, succeeding in crossing. The rest of his command scattered in squads among the mountains. Colonel W. J. Palmer, commanding 15th Pennsylvania cavalry, with 150 men, crossed the river at Paint Rock and pursued Lyon to near Red Hill, on the road from Warrentown to Tuscaloosa, at which place he surprised his camp during the night of the 14th January, capturing Lyon himself, his one piece of artillery, and about 100 of his men with their horses. Lyon being in bed at the time of his capture, asked his guard to permit him to dress himself, which was acceded to, when, watching his opportunity, Lyon seized a pistol, shot the sentinel dead upon the spot, and escaped in the darkness. This was the only casualty during the expedition.

To Colonel Palmer and his command is accorded the credit of giving Hood's army the last blow of the campaign, at a distance of over two hundred miles from where we first struck the enemy on the 15th December, near Nashville.

To all of my sub-commanders, (Major Generals Schofield, Stanley, Rousseau,

Steedman, Smith, and Wilson, and Brigadier General T. J. Wood,) their officers and men, I give expression of my thanks and gratitude for their generous self-sacrifice and manly endurance under the most trying circumstances and in all instances. Too much praise cannot be accorded to an army which, hastily made up from the fragments of three separate commands, can successfully contend against a force numerically greater than itself and of more thoroughly solid organization, inflicting on it a most crushing defeat—almost an annihilation.

Receiving instructions unexpectedly from General Sherman in September to repair to Tennessee and assume general control of the defences of our line of communication in the rear of the army of the Mississippi, and not anticipating a separation from my immediate command, the greater number of my staff officers were left behind at Atlanta, and did not have an opportunity to join me, after General Sherman determined on making his march through Georgia, before the communications were cut. I had with me Brigadier General W. D. Whipple, my chief of staff; Surgeon G. E. Cooper, medical director; Captains Henry Stone, Henry M. Cist, and Robert H. Ramsey, assistant adjutants general; Captain Henry Beman, acting chief commissary; Captains John P. Willard and S. C. Kellogg, aides-de-camp; and Lieutenant M. Kelly, chief of couriers; all of whom rendered important service during the battles of the 15th and 16th and during the pursuit. I cordially commend their services to favorable consideration.

There were captured from the enemy during the various actions of which the foregoing report treats, 13,189 prisoners of war, including 7 general officers and nearly 1,000 other officers of all grades, 72 pieces of serviceable artillery, and — battle-flags. During the same period over 2,000 deserters from the enemy were received, to whom the oath was administered. Our own losses will not exceed 10,000 in killed, wounded, and missing.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a consolidated return of casualties, the report of Colonel J. G. Parkhurst, provost marshal general, and that of Captain A. Mordecai, chief of ordnance. That of Surgeon G. S. Cooper, medical director, will be forwarded as soon as he is enabled to complete it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. A., Commanding.*

Col. R. M. SAWYER, *Ass't Adj't General, Mil. Div. Mississippi.*

OFFICE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL,

DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Nashville, Tennessee, February 4, 1865.*

*Report of prisoners of war captured from September 7, 1864, to January, 20, 1865.*

Captured.	Major generals.	Brig. generals.	Colonels.	Lieut. colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Non-commis's'd officers.	Privates.	Surgeons and chaplains.
September 7 to 30.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	4	17	145	5
October .....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	12	40	151	1,135	1
November .....	.....	.....	2	3	1	7	25	87	550	3
December .....	1	7	14	10	18	173	487	1,512	6,336	77
January 1 to 20.....	.....	.....	.....	1	2	18	45	120	842	3
Total.....	1	7	16	14	22	212	601	1,887	9,008	89

Grand total, 11,857.

*Report of rebel deserters received at Nashville, Tennessee, from September 7, 1864, up to 20th January, 1865.*

Received.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Non - comm'd officers.	Privates.	Surgeons.	Chaplains.
September 7 to 30 .....		1	6	70		
October .....			8	96		
November .....		1	3	68		
December .....	2	6	28	281	2	1
January 1 to 20 .....	5	15	61	660		
Total .....	7	23	106	1,175	2	1

Grand total, 1,314.

*Prisoners of war exchanged during the month of September, 1864.*

Commissioned officers .....	128
Non-commissioned officers .....	225
Privates .....	979
Total .....	<u>1,332</u>

(Equivalent to 2,045 privates.)

Aggregate of prisoners of war captured from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865, (inclusive,) 13,189.

*Report of rebel deserters received outside of Nashville office, from September 7, 1864 to January 20, 1865.*

Date of reception.	Officers.	Enlisted men.
From September 7 to September 30 .....		75
From October 1 to October 31 .....	2	146
From November 1 to November 30 .....		80
From December 1 to December 31 .....		14
From January 1 to January 31 .....	18	558
Total .....	20	873

Grand total, 893.

Aggregate of rebel deserters to whom the oath has been administered from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865, 2,207.

Respectfully submitted :

J. G. PARKHURST,  
Colonel and P. M. G.

OFFICE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE, DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND,  
Nashville, Tennessee, February 5, 1865.

GENERAL: In compliance with your instructions of the 20th ultimo, I have the honor to submit the following report of ordnance material captured from the

enemy by the army under your command, between the 1st October, 1864, and the 20th January, 1865, all of which material has been received by the Ordnance department :

- 42 light 12-pounder guns, rebel model.
- 7 light 12-pounder guns United States model.
- 7 light 12-pounder howitzers, United States model.
- 3 3-inch rifles, rebel model.
- 2 10-pounder Parrotts, 2.9-inch, United States model.
- 1 3-inch wrought-iron rifle, United States model.
- 2 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, United States model.
- 59 field carriages and limbers, complete.
- 2 field carriages and limbers without wheels.
- 2 field carriages, no limbers.
- 16 field caissons and limbers.
- 4 field caissons, no limbers.
- 3, 079 infantry small-arms of different models, no bayonets.
- 262 bayonets, of different models.
- 1, 208 cartridge-boxes, infantry.
- 238 cartridge-box plates.
- 234 cartridge-box belts.
- 141 cartridge-box belt-plates.
- 178 waist belts.
- 181 waist-belt plates.
- 166 bayonet scabbards.
- 364 cap pouches.
- 231 gun slings.

Of the above :

2 12-pounder guns, carriages and limbers, were captured by Major General Millroy at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, December, 1864.

1 12-pounder howitzer, carriage, and limber, was captured by Colonel Palmer from the command of the rebel General Lyon, near Huntsville, Alabama.

2 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, carriages, and limbers, were captured by Major General Steedman, near Decatur, Alabama.

3 12-pounder guns, carriages, and limbers; 1 10-pounder Parrott rifle and carriage; 1 3-inch wrought-iron rifle and carriage, United States, were captured at Columbia, Tennessee.

All the remaining artillery and carriages, and all the small-arms and accoutrements, were captured before Nashville, on the 15th and 16th December, 1864.

The larger number of ammunition chests captured were filled with ammunition in good condition, and six wagons, loaded with similar ammunition, were captured before this place.

I am informed that there are, in addition to what are reported above, four guns and carriages now at Pulaski, Tennessee, and three or four guns in the Duck river, at Columbia, Tennessee, all captured from the enemy or abandoned by him in his retreat to the Tennessee river.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. MORDECAI,

*Captain Ordnance, Chief of Ordnance Dep't Cumberland.*

Major General G. H. THOMAS, U. S. A.,

*Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Eastport, Miss.*

Official copy :

E. D. TOWNSEND,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 18, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
Nashville, June 1, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the date of the last report made by me, January 20, as follows:

General A. J. Smith's corps, at that period, was with me at Eastport, Mississippi; four divisions of General Wilson's cavalry were encamped on the opposite or north bank of the Tennessee river, at Waterloo and Gravelly Springs, Alabama, and the 4th corps, Major General Stanley commanding, was stationed at Huntsville, Alabama. This, with the ordinary garrisons of the country, composed my command.

The general-in-chief of the army having given up the intention of my continuing the campaign against the enemy in Mississippi and Alabama, I received an order by telegraph from Major General Halleck, chief of staff, to send General A. J. Smith's command and five thousand of General Wilson's cavalry by river, to report to Major General Canby, at New Orleans, for the purpose of taking part in an expedition at that time preparing to operate against Mobile. Smith's corps started from Eastport on the 6th of February, and Knipe's division of cavalry left Nashville on the 12th.

About the period of the departure of Smith's corps information was received, through various sources, to the effect that part of the shattered remnants of Hood's army, viz: Cheatham's and Lee's corps, were on their way from Mississippi to South Carolina, moving *via* Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, to re-enforce that portion of the enemy's army operating against General Sherman. There remained in central Mississippi, under General Taylor, but one corps of the enemy's infantry, and about seven thousand of Forrest's cavalry, the headquarters of the command being at Meridian, Mississippi.

On the 6th of February a communication was received from Lieutenant General Grant, directing an expedition, commanded by General Stoneman, to be sent from East Tennessee to penetrate North Carolina, and well down towards Columbia, South Carolina, to destroy the enemy's railroads and military resources in that section, and visit a portion of the State beyond the control or reach of General Sherman's column. As the movement was to be merely for the purpose of destruction, directions were given General Stoneman to evade any heavy engagements with the enemy's forces.

Again, on the 13th of February, General Grant telegraphed me to prepare a cavalry expedition, about ten thousand strong, to penetrate northern Alabama, acting as a co-operative force to the movement on Mobile by General Canby. Before leaving Eastport, Mississippi, I had directed General Wilson to get his command in readiness for just such a campaign, of which the above was simply an outline—my instructions being for him to move on Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, Alabama, and to capture those places if possible. After accomplishing which, he was to operate against any of the enemy's forces in the direction of Mississippi, Mobile, or Macon, as circumstances might demand. The bad state of the roads, combined with the condition of the horses of his command after completing the severe campaign in pursuit of Hood, prevented any movement for the time being, and it was only on the 22d of March that General Wilson, with Upton's, Long's, and McCook's divisions, could leave Chickasaw, Alabama. Hatch's division remained at Eastport, Mississippi, and R. W. Johnson's at Pulaski, Tennessee, it not being possible to mount them fully, to hold the country and prevent guerilla depredations.

When General Sherman was organizing his army for its march to the Atlantic seaboard, in November, he issued an order directing me to assume control of all the forces of the military division of the Mississippi not present with him and the main army in Georgia. Based on that order, all the operations of the troops within the limits of the above-mentioned military division have, during the

interval, been made under my immediate direction, and I have been held responsible for their faithful execution.

On the 30th of March General Wilson's cavalry reached Elyton, after an extremely difficult, toilsome, and exhausting march, on account of bad roads, swollen streams, and the rough nature of the country, which had also been almost entirely stripped of all subsistence for man or beast. At Elyton Croxton's brigade, of McCook's division, was detached and sent to capture and destroy Tuscaloosa, and then march to rejoin the main body near Selma.

With the remainder of his command, General Wilson pushed rapidly forward to Montevallo, where he destroyed five extensive iron works, and other valuable property. On the outskirts of the town the enemy's cavalry was found in force, attacked, routed, and pursued through Plantersville, leaving in our possession three pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. At 3 p. m., on the 2d of April, General Wilson reached the immediate vicinity of Selma, and rapidly formed Upton's and Long's divisions to attack the defences of the town—Long attacking on the Summerfield road, and Upton across a swamp deemed impassable by the enemy. Dismounting two regiments from each of the brigades of Colonels Miller and Mintz, General Long and those two officers gallantly leading their men in person, charged across an open field, five hundred yards wide, over a stockade, which they tore up as they passed, through the ditch and over the enemy's parapets, sweeping everything before them. Our loss was forty-six killed and two hundred wounded; Colonel Dobbs, 4th Ohio, among the former, and General Long and Colonels Miller and McCormick among the latter. General Upton met with less resistance than Long—entered the enemy's works and the town, capturing many prisoners. In the darkness and confusion following the assault Generals Forrest, Buford, Adams, Armstrong, and others, made their escape. Lieutenant General Dick Taylor had left earlier in the afternoon. As the fruits of the victory, however, there remained 26 guns and 2,700 prisoners, besides large amounts of ordnance and other property of great value. Twenty-five thousand bales of cotton had already been destroyed by the enemy.

General Wilson remained at Selma from the 2d to the 10th of April, resting his command and completing the destruction of the immense workshops, arsenals, and foundries, and waiting for Croxton to rejoin from his expedition to Tuscaloosa, it having been ascertained, through the enemy, that he captured Tuscaloosa and was moving to Selma *via* Eutaw. On the 10th General Wilson crossed the Alabama river and moved towards Montgomery, receiving the surrender of that town, without a contest, on the 12th. The enemy burned eighty-five thousand bales of cotton before evacuating. At Montgomery five steamboats, several locomotives, one armory, and several foundries were destroyed.

On the 14th operations were resumed by Upton's division moving through Mt. Meigs and Tuskegee towards Columbus, Georgia, and Colonel LaGrange, with three regiments of his brigade, of McCook's division, marching along the railroad to West Point *via* Opelika.

On the 16th General Upton, with about four hundred dismounted men, assaulted and carried the breastworks of Columbus, saving, by the impetuosity of his attacks, the bridges over the Chattahoochee, and capturing fifty-two field guns in position, besides twelve hundred prisoners. The rebel ram "Jackson," nearly ready for sea, and carrying an armament of six seven-inch guns, fell into our hands and was destroyed, as well as the navy yard, foundries, the arsenal and the armory, sword and pistol factory, accoutrements, shops, paper-mills, four cotton factories, fifteen locomotives, two hundred cars, and an immense amount of cotton, all of which were burned. The same day, the 16th of April, LaGrange captured Fort Taylor, at West Point, above Columbus, on the Chattahoochee, after assaulting it on three sides, the defence being stubborn.

Three hundred prisoners, three guns, and several battle-flags were taken, besides a large quantity of supplies.

On the 18th the march towards Macon was resumed, Mintz's (late Long's) division leading. By a forced march the bridges across Flint river, fifty-four miles from Columbus, were secured, compelling the abandonment by the enemy of five field-guns and a large amount of machinery; forty prisoners were captured and two cotton factories destroyed. At 6 p. m., on the 20th of April, the authorities of Macon, under protest, surrendered the city to the 17th Indiana, Colonel Mintz's advance regiment, claiming, under the provisions of an armistice then reported existing between the forces of Generals Sherman and Johnston, that the capture was contrary to the usages of war. General Wilson, not being at hand when the surrender was made, when the case was reported to him, with admirable good judgment, declined to recognize the validity of the claim asserted, as the city had been taken possession of by one of his subordinates before he (General Wilson) could be advised of the existence of an armistice, and he therefore held as prisoners of war Major Generals Howell Cobb and G. W. Smith, and Brigadier Generals Mackall, Robertson, and Mercer. On the 21st General Wilson was notified by General Sherman, from Raleigh, North Carolina, over the enemy's telegraph wires, and through the headquarters of General Joseph Johnston, that the reported armistice was a reality, and that he was to cease further operations.

To return to General Stoneman's expedition from East Tennessee. Owing to the difficulty of procuring animals for his command and the bad condition of the roads, General Stoneman was only enabled to start from Knoxville about the 20th of March, simultaneously with General Wilson's departure from Chickasaw, Alabama. In the mean time General Sherman had captured Columbia, South Carolina, and was moving northward into North Carolina. About this period reports reached me of the possibility of the evacuation of Lee's army at Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia, and in that event, of his forcing a passage through East Tennessee *via* Lynchburg and Knoxville. To guard against that contingency, Stoneman was sent towards Lynchburg to destroy the railroad and military resources of that section and of western North Carolina. The 4th army corps was ordered to move from Huntsville, Alabama, as far up into East Tennessee as it could supply itself, repairing the railroad as it advanced, forming, in conjunction with Tillson's division of infantry, a strong support for General Stoneman's cavalry column in case it should find more of the enemy than it could conveniently handle and be obliged to fall back.

With three brigades, Brown's, Miller's, and Palmer's, commanded by General Gillem, General Stoneman moved, *via* Morristown, Bull Gap, and thence eastward up the Watauga, and across Iron mountain to Beone, North Carolina, which he entered on the 1st of April, after killing or capturing about seventy-five homeguards. From Boone he crossed the Blue Ridge and went to Wilkesboro', on the Yadkin, where supplies were obtained in abundance, after which he changed his course towards southwestern Virginia.

A detachment was sent to Wytheville, and another to Salem, to destroy the enemy's depots at those places, and the railroad, whilst the main body marched on Christianburg and captured the place. The railroad to the eastward and westward of the town was destroyed for a considerable distance. The party sent to Wytheville captured that place after some fighting, and burned the railroad bridges over New river and several creeks, as well as the depots of supplies. The detachment sent to Salem did the same, and proceeded to within four miles of Lynchburg, destroying as they advanced.

A railroad was never more thoroughly dismantled than was the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad from Wytheville to near Lynchburg.

Concentrating his command General Stoneman returned to North Carolina, *via* Jacksonville and Taylorsville, and went to Germantown, where Palmer's

brigade was sent to Salem, North Carolina, to destroy the large cotton factories located there, and burn the bridges on the railroad between Greensboro' and Danville, and between Greensboro' and the Yadkin river, which was most thoroughly accomplished, after some fighting, by which we captured about four hundred prisoners.

At Salem 7,000 bales of cotton were burned by our forces.

From Germantown the main body moved south to Salisbury, where they found about 3,000 of the enemy defending the place, and drawn up in line of battle behind Grant's creek, to await Stoneman's attack. Without hesitation, a general charge was made by our men, resulting in the capture of all the enemy's artillery, fourteen pieces, and 1,364 prisoners. The remainder scattered, and were pursued.

During the two days following the troops were engaged destroying the immense depots of supplies of all kinds in Salisbury, and burning all the bridges for several miles on all the railroads leading out of the town.

On the afternoon of April 13 the command moved westward to Statesville and Lenoir, at which latter point General Stoneman left the troops to be disposed of by General Gillem, and proceeded with the prisoners and captured artillery to East Tennessee, reporting his arrival, on the 19th, at Greenville, and detailing the disposition of his troops, which was as follows: Palmer's brigade, with headquarters at Lincolnton, North Carolina, to scout down the Catawba river towards Charlotte; Brown's brigade, with headquarters at Morgantown, to connect with Palmer down the Catawba, and Miller's brigade, with General Gillem, was to take post at Ashville, with directions to open up communication through to Greenville, East Tennessee. The object in leaving the cavalry on the other side of the mountains being to obstruct, intercept, or disperse any troops of the enemy going south, and to capture trains.

General Gillem followed the directions given him, and marched on Ashville, with Miller's brigade, but was opposed at Swananoa Gap by a considerable force of the enemy.

Leaving sufficient of his force to amuse them, with the balance he moved by way of Howard's Gap, gained the enemy's rear and surprised and captured his artillery; after which he made his appearance in front of Ashville, where he was met by a flag of truce on the 23d, with the intelligence of the truce existing between Generals Sherman and Johnston, and bearing an order from General Sherman to General Stoneman for the latter to go to the railroad station at Durham's, or Hillsboro', nearly two hundred miles distant, whereas the distance to Greenville, East Tennessee, was but sixty. Coming to the conclusion that the order was issued by General Sherman under the impression that the cavalry division was still at Salisbury or Statesville, General Gillem determined to move to Greenville. The rebel General Martin, with whom he communicated under flag of truce, demanded the rendition of the artillery captured, which, of course, could not be granted, and in return General Gillem requested the rebel commander to furnish his troops with three days' rations, as by the terms of the armistice they were required to withdraw. Had it not been for this, Ashville and its garrison would have fallen into our hands.

Up to that period I had not been officially notified of the existence of any armistice between the forces of Generals Sherman and Johnston, and the information only reached me through my sub commanders, Generals Wilson and Stoneman, from Macon, Georgia, and Greenville, East Tennessee, almost simultaneously. The question naturally arose in my mind, whether the troops acting under my direction by virtue of General Sherman's Special Field Orders No. 105, series of 1864, directing me to assume control of all the forces of the military division of the Mississippi "not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief," were to be bound by an armistice or agreement made at a distance of several hundred miles from where those troops were operating, and of which they were advised

through an enemy, then in such straightened circumstances that any ruse, honorable at least in war, was likely to be practiced by him to relieve himself from his difficult position.

Then, again, General Sherman was operating with a movable column beyond the limits of his territorial command, viz., the military division of the Mississippi, and far away from all direct communication with it, whereas "the troops not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief" were operating under special instructions, and not even in co-operation with General Sherman against Johnston; but, on the contrary, General Stoneman was dismantling the country to obstruct Lee's retreat, and General Wilson was moving independently in Georgia or co-operating with General Canby.

Before I could come to any conclusion how I should proceed under the circumstances, and without disrespect to my superior officer, General Sherman, Mr. Secretary Stanton telegraphed to me from Washington on the 27th of April, and through me to my sub-commanders, to disregard all orders except those coming from General Grant or myself, and to resume hostilities at once, sparing no pains to press the enemy firmly, at the same time notifying me that General Sherman's negotiations with Johnston had been disapproved.

Based on that notification the following dispositions were made with a view of capturing President Davis and party, who, on the cessation of the armistice, had started south from Charlotte, North Carolina, with an escort variously estimated at from 500 to 2,000 picked cavalry, to endeavor to make his way to the trans-Mississippi.

General Stoneman was directed to send the brigades of Miller, Brown, and Palmer, then in western North Carolina, to concentrate at Anderson, South Carolina, and scout down the Savannah river to Augusta, Georgia, if possible, in search of the fugitives. General Gillem being absent, Colonel Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania cavalry, took command of the expedition. By rapid marching they succeeded in reaching and crossing the Savannah river in advance of Davis, and so disposed the command as to effectually cut off his retreat towards Mississippi, and forced him to alter his route towards the Atlantic coast. General Wilson, at Macon, Georgia, was also notified of the action taken at Washington on General Sherman's negotiations with Johnston, and he was directed to resume hostilities at once—especially to endeavor to intercept Davis.

Scarcely were the above orders issued and in process of execution, when notification reached me of the surrender by Johnston of all the enemy's forces east of the Chattahoochee river. General Wilson received similar notification from General Sherman, direct through the enemy's territory, and immediately took measures to receive the surrender of the enemy's establishments at Atlanta and Augusta, and to occupy those points, detailing for that purpose Brevet Major General Upton with his division. General McCook was sent with a force to occupy Tallahassee, Florida, and to receive the surrender of the troops in that vicinity. Thus a cordon of cavalry, more or less continuous, was extended across the State of Georgia from northwest to southeast, and communication established through the late so-called southern confederacy. With characteristic energy, Generals Wilson and Palmer had handbills printed and profusely circulated in all directions throughout the country, offering the President's reward for the apprehension of Davis, and nothing could exceed the watchfulness exhibited by their commands.

On the 3d of May, Davis dismissed his escort at Washington, Georgia, and accompanied by about half a dozen followers, set out to endeavor to pass our lines. Nothing definite was learned of the whereabouts of the fugitives until on the evening of the 7th of May, the first Wisconsin cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Harndon commanding, with one hundred and fifty men, ascertained at Dublin, on the Oconee river, fifty-five miles southeast from Macon, that Davis and party had crossed the river at that point during the day, and had moved

out on the Jacksonville road. At daylight on the 8th Colonel Harndon continued the pursuit, finding the camp occupied by Davis on the evening previous, between the forks of Alligator creek, which was reached just four hours after it had been vacated. The trail was pursued as far as the ford over Gum Swamp creek, Pulaski county, when darkness rendered it too indistinct to follow, and the command encamped for the night, having marched forty miles that day.

On the 9th Colonel Harndon pushed on to the Ocmulgee river, crossed at Brown's ferry, and went to Abbeville, where he ascertained Davis's train had left that place at 1 a. m. that same day, and had gone towards Irwinsville, in Irwin county. With this information Colonel Harndon moved rapidly on towards the latter town, halting within a short distance of it to wait for daylight, in order to make certain of the capture.

Before leaving Abbeville, Colonel Harndon learning of the approach, from the direction of Hawkinsville, of the 4th Michigan cavalry, Colonel Pritchard commanding, went to meet that officer, and informed him of his close pursuit of Davis; Colonel Pritchard stating in reply that he had been sent to Abbeville also to watch for Davis. After Colonel Harndon's departure, Colonel Pritchard, with part of his command, started for Irwinsville by a more direct route than that used by the detachment of the 1st Wisconsin, arriving at Irwinsville at 2 a. m. on the 10th, where, on inquiry, it was ascertained that there was a camp about a mile from town on the other road leading to Abbeville. Approaching cautiously, for fear it might be our own men, Colonel Pritchard sent a dismounted party to interpose between it and Abbeville, and then waited for daylight to move forward and surprise the occupants. Daylight appearing, a rapid advance was made, and the encampment surprised, resulting in the capture of Jefferson Davis and family, John H. Regan, postmaster general of the so-called confederacy, two aides-de-camp, the private secretary of Davis, four other officers, and eleven enlisted men.

Almost immediately after the completion of the above movement, Colonel Harndon's men coming down the Abbeville road were hailed by the party sent out during the night by Colonel Pritchard to secure the capture of the camp, and on being challenged answered "friends," but fell back, under the impression they had come upon an enemy; whereupon shots were exchanged before the real position of affairs could be ascertained, resulting in the loss on one side of two men killed and one wounded, and of three wounded on the other. Considerable feeling was caused by the manner in which the 4th Michigan effected the apprehension of Davis, to the detriment of Colonel Harndon's party, but great credit is justly due and should be given to the 1st Wisconsin cavalry for the persistency of its pursuit, and it is only to be regretted they did not arrive on the ground in time to reap the benefit of their labors. For the full particulars of the operations of both detachments I have the pleasure of referring you to the reports of Lieutenant Colonel Harndon, 1st Wisconsin, and Captain Hathaway, 4th Michigan.

With the surrender of Johnston's army to General Sherman all the detachments of the confederate armies east of the Chattahoochee signified their willingness to surrender, except a few guerilla bands who were outlawed, special directions being given to grant all such no quarter. On the 7th of May notification was received by me, *via* Eastport and Meridian, Mississippi, of the surrender of General Taylor's army to General Canby, at Citronella, Alabama, on the 4th. No armed force of the enemy east of the Mississippi remaining to interfere, I gave orders for the occupation by my forces of such portions of the reclaimed territory as it was necessary to hold whilst telegraphic and railroad communication was being restored, to the accomplishment of which the people of the country zealously gave their assistance.

May 16th General Grant, through his chief of staff, General Rawlins, directed me to order to some point north of the Tennessee river all of Wilson's cavalry except four thousand veterans, who are to remain at Macon, Augusta, and Atlanta, Georgia; those returning to be concentrated at some convenient point in Tennessee or Kentucky, preparatory to being mustered out or otherwise disposed of. All convalescents and others about the hospitals throughout my command not requiring medical treatment have, by virtue of General Orders No. 77, been mustered out of service. The quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance departments have all been reduced to the smallest scale consistent with the demands of the service. During the past three months the defences of all the posts within my command have been thoroughly inspected by Brigadier General Tower, inspector of fortifications military division of the Mississippi, whose reports, with drawings attached, I have the honor to forward herewith.

For detailed accounts of the operations of the commands of Generals Stoneman and Wilson I invite the attention of the Lieutenant General commanding to the reports of those officers, as well as to those of their subordinates, Generals Gillem, Palmer, and others. They have brought the cavalry arm of the service to a state of efficiency unequalled in other armies for long and difficult marches through the enemy's country, and particularly for self-reliance and fortitude in assaulting strong positions which might well cause hesitation in veteran infantry.

Herewith I have the honor to forward the report of Brevet Brigadier General J. G. Parkhurst, provost marshal general of my command, giving the number of prisoners and deserters registered at his office during the period of which the foregoing treats.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. A., Commanding.*

Brigadier General J. A. RAWLINS,  
*Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.*

*Report of prisoners of war received at office of the Provost Marshal General, Department of the Cumberland, from January 21 to May 31, (inclusive), 1865.*

Captured.	Colonels.	Lieut. colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Surgeons.	Ass't surgeons.	Chaplains.	Non-commiss'd officers.	Privates.
January 1 to 31 .....			1	2	6				5	85
February .....			1	2	6		3		17	102
March .....		2	1	3	6	3	1	1	9	93
April .....	1		3	17	26				61	584
May .....				3	10				8	60
Total .....	1	2	6	27	54	3	4	1	100	924

Grand total, 1,122.

*Report of rebel deserters received at Nashville, Tennessee, from January 21 to May 9, (inclusive,) 1865.*

Received.	Commiss'd officers.	Enlisted men.
January 21 to 31 .....	18	355
February .....	23	786
March .....	23	608
April .....	18	578
May 1 to 9.....	8	334
Total.....	90	2,661

Grand total, 2,751.

*Report of confederate officers and enlisted men who voluntarily surrendered themselves, and who have taken the oath of allegiance and been allowed to return to their homes, from May 10 to 31, (inclusive,) 1865.*

Officers .....	486
Enlisted men.....	3,559
Total .....	4,045

*Report of rebel deserters received and disposed of at Chattanooga office from January 21 to May 31, (inclusive,) 1865.*

Received.	Commiss'd officers.	Enlisted men.
January 1 to 31.....		21
February .....	4	103
March .....	10	422
April .....	8	519
May.....	32	1,477
Total.....	54	2,542

Grand total, 2,596.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
Office Provost Marshal General, Nashville, June 8, 1865.

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the major general commanding.

J. G. PARKHURST,  
Brevet Brigadier General and Provost Marshal General, &c.

Official:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 18, 1865.

Official copy:

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

*Report of Colonel Strother of the operations of the army under General Hunter in West Virginia.*

RICHMOND, August 10, 1865.

GENERAL: In accordance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following statement in regard to the operations of the army of West Virginia, while under your command, during the summer of 1864. I do so the more cheerfully as I have perceived that the motives and results of those operations have been less clearly understood and appreciated by the public than any other of the important campaigns of the war.

I am the better prepared to make this statement as I served throughout the campaign as your chief of staff, and, in that capacity, kept an accurate journal of movements and events as they occurred, and of the orders, motives, and information on which they were based. I was also, from long residence, travel, and previous military campaigns, well acquainted with the whole country over which these operations were conducted, and consequently may be supposed to have an intelligent understanding concerning the propriety of the movements made, and the practicability of those suggested.

I will commence by a brief explanation of the military position in the department of West Virginia when you took command.

Early in the spring of 1864 the forces heretofore scattered over this extensive department were concentrated at different points, prepared to co-operate in the grand combined movement which had been arranged against the national enemy. Simultaneously with the advance of General Grant on Richmond, and that of General Sherman on Atlanta, the co-operating columns of the army of West Virginia commenced their movements, charged with the accomplishment of the most arduous and important secondary purposes of the campaign. Their orders were to move upon the enemy's communications, destroy railroads, military depots, stores, supplies, and manufactories, crippling his resources in every way practicable, to distract his attention from the vital centres of operation, and to force him, if possible, to detach troops for the defence of distant points. As the field of operations embraced in these orders was of immense extent, interrupted by chains of rugged and lofty mountains covered to a great extent with impenetrable forests, traversed by deep and rapid rivers, its topography and even its general geography but little understood outside, the general commanding the department was allowed full discretion in arranging the plans for their accomplishment.

The movement commenced under the orders of Major General Sigel, as follows: Brigadier General Crook with his division moved from Kanawha, striking the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at New river, and destroying it for some distance. He defeated the enemy's forces that opposed him, capturing many prisoners and valuable stores.

Brigadier General Averell at the same time moved southward from Beverly, with his division, menacing the salt works near Abingdon, and co-operating with Crook in the destruction of the railroad. These forces then fell back to Lewisburg and Meadow Bluff, in Greenbrier county, awaiting further developments.

At the same time General Sigel, in person, took command of the force collected at Martinsburg, about eight thousand five hundred men of all arms, and advancing southward was met at New Market, on the Staunton turnpike, and defeated by the rebel forces under Breckinridge. On the following day, May 16, he retired to a position behind Cedar creek, about fifteen miles south of Winchester. On the 21st of May General Sigel was relieved by Major General Hunter, who assumed command of the department and the army in the field at Cedar creek.

General Sigel having been assigned to the command of the reserves, stationed

on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, made his headquarters at Martinsburg.

It was determined to resume the movement on Staunton immediately, and, with a view to further operations from that point, orders were sent to Generals Crook and Averell, then supposed to be in the vicinity of Meadow Bluff, to join us at Staunton, by forced marches, moving lightly, and depending on the country for subsistence as much as possible.

The column in the Shenandoah valley having been re-enforced to the extent of supplying the losses in the New Market campaign, with baggage and transportation reduced to the minimum allowance, cut loose from its communications, and began its advance up the valley on the 26th of May. The force was about eight thousand five hundred men of all arms, with twenty-one guns. The plan of action proposed was, to fight and overthrow any enemy that stood in the way, to seize upon Staunton, unite with Crook and Averell, and with the combined force occupy Charlottesville, from whence we might easily operate with our cavalry against the James River canal, and by crossing the river cut off the South Side railroad, thus cutting off the enemy from his chief source of supplies. The more extended plan of moving on Lynchburg by the valley route from Staunton, or through the Piedmont counties of Nelson and Amherst, directly from Charlottesville, was discussed, but left for consideration after the first part of the programme should be accomplished.

The occupation of Harrisonburg, the flank movement on Port Republic, the brilliant and decisive victory at Piedmont, and the junction with the forces under Crook and Averell, at Staunton, have all been described in a former report.

The result of the battle at Piedmont was the virtual annihilation of the enemy's military power in West Virginia and the valley of the Shenandoah. All the country west of the Blue Ridge was at our mercy. As this country was the source from which the enemy drew his principal supplies of meat, grain, forage, salt, lead, and iron, we were well aware that its possession was essential to the maintenance of his army, and that he would make the most desperate efforts to regain it. He could not hope to do so without detaching a considerable force from Lee's army, and to induce General Lee thus to weaken his army was one of our principal objects in the movement. The following letter found on the body of General William E. Jones, killed at Piedmont, indicates the views and expectations of the enemy:

“HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT, *June 1, 1864.*”

“GENERAL: This will be handed to you by General Means, of Shenandoah, who goes to meet you at my request, and will state to you fully the condition of affairs in the valley. I am holding out every inducement I can to Hunter to follow me up as far as Mount Crawford. If he does, and we can get him ‘on a run,’ we can ruin him. He is playing devilish cautious, however, and may not take the bait.

“Colonel Jackson telegraphed me last night that the enemy in Greenbrier was moving, he believed, in the direction of Staunton. If so, I can, with North river in my front, hold Hunter till you thrash Crook and Averell, and then we can pay our respects jointly to Mr. Hunter.

“Yours, respectfully,

“J. D. IMBODEN,  
“*Brigadier General.*”

“Brigadier General WM. E. JONES,  
“*Commanding and en route, Lynchburg, Va.*”

Another paper contained an appeal from the officer in command at Lynchburg, setting forth the value of that place as a centre of communications and a depot of supplies, and asking for more troops to defend it against a sudden raid of the

Yankees. This paper had been referred to General Jones by the Richmond authorities, indicating thereby that the defence of Lynchburg devolved upon him.

Another suggestive paper was a telegram from Jefferson Davis to Jones, urging him to guard especially against raids into the western portion of North Carolina, intimating that they were to be dreaded for political as well as military reasons.

These proofs of the fears and weakness of the enemy, together with the encouraging reports received from the north of General Grant's progress, induced us to hope that the plan of an extensive and damaging campaign, discussed at the outset, might now be successfully carried out. It was determined, therefore, to move on Lynchburg by way of Lexington and Buchanan, crossing the Blue Ridge at the Peaks of Otter. From Lynchburg we could operate against the South Side and Danville railroads with our cavalry, cutting off the enemy's only means of supply, liberating the Union prisoners confined at Danville, and rendering necessary the speedy evacuation of the rebel capital.

If General Lee was forced to detach a considerable force to oppose us, and prevent the execution of these designs, an equally desirable and important object would be accomplished; the main army of the rebellion would be weakened; General Grant would be relieved to that extent, while we had always safe lines of retreat open to the westward through the passes of the mountains.

In addition to these considerations, the country, we found, afforded abundant supplies for our troops, while the inhabitants were quiet and, in many instances, even favorable to us. We had also assurances that in southwestern Virginia and North Carolina we might hope for active assistance from the inhabitants. Our progress, too, revealed a much larger amount of provisions and manufactories for producing material of war than we had expected, and the destruction of this kind of property was immense.

Having sent back a convoy of prisoners, negroes, and refugees, with an empty wagon train and a strong escort of men whose terms of service had nearly expired, the army of West Virginia started southward from Staunton on the 10th of June, moving up the valley by four parallel roads. On the 11th we occupied Lexington, and there were overtaken by a supply train sent from Martinsburg, containing commissary stores, clothing, and ammunition—this latter being most essential, as our supply was short. Although these supplies were most acceptable, this train, two hundred additional wagons, embarrassed our movements considerably.

While it was important that we should have moved from Lexington without delay, we were detained, awaiting the arrival of General Duffie's column of cavalry, which marched on the road next to the Blue Ridge, and who did not report until the 13th, in the afternoon. He had crossed the bridge at Tye river Gap, struck the Charlottesville and Lynchburg railroad near Amherst Court House, destroyed it to some extent, making considerable captures of men, horses, and material. He was confused and detained by the difficult and intricate character of the country.

Upon examining these prisoners I was informed that Grant had received a severe repulse; that Sheridan, who was moving to co-operate with us at the head of the cavalry of the army of the Potomac, had been repulsed at Louisa Court House and turned back; that Breckinridge had re-enforced Vaughn at Rockfish Gap with four or five thousand men, and that Ewell's whole corps was advancing by the way of Charlottesville.

On the other hand we had news, from sources equally entitled to credit, that Lynchburg was undefended, and that its inhabitants were fleeing in panic from Sheridan's advance. Cut off from all reliable sources of information, the country filled with exaggerated and contradictory rumors, it was determined to solve the problem by a bold and decisive advance on Lynchburg.

The details of this movement through Buchanan, Peaks of Otter, and Liberty,

the action at Quaker Church, and the handsome repulse of the enemy's attack in front of Lynchburg, have already been described in your official report. In the last named action, which took place about the middle of the day on the 18th of June, we took several prisoners belonging to Ewell's corps. The statement of these men convinced us beyond a doubt that the army of the Potomac had suffered a temporary check before Petersburg; that Sheridan had been foiled in his attempt to open communication with us; and that General Lee had been enabled to detach a large force of veteran troops, under Lieutenant General Early, to operate against us; that a portion of this force was engaged in the battle then going on, and the remaining divisions were coming in rapidly, by rail, from Charlottesville.

It was now evident that the army of West Virginia was in a critical position. Two hundred and fifty miles from its base, with ammunition nearly exhausted and commissariat entirely so, with little more than sixteen thousand effective men, it was now actually engaged with a largely superior force—a force which in the course of the afternoon would be swelled to over thirty thousand men. The greatest apprehension was felt, lest the enemy would renew his attack in the course of the afternoon, as our ammunition was so nearly spent that such an attack must have proved fatal. He had been so roughly handled, however, that he determined to wait until the following morning, when, with his whole force rested and refreshed, he could fall upon us more effectively.

That night our army, with its trains and material, was quietly withdrawn, retiring by the Bedford turnpike, through Liberty and Buford's Gap to Salem, on the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. This retrograde from our hazardous position was accomplished without loss and with but little annoyance from the enemy. From Liberty to Salem, our route lay along the line of the railroad, which we destroyed as we moved, arriving at Salem about sunrise on the morning of the 21st of June. After a short halt, we took the road across the mountains to the Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs, *via* New Castle and Sweet Springs, arriving at the White Sulphur on the afternoon of the 24th.

This move into the mountains was necessary to disembarrass ourselves of the enemy's cavalry, which had overtaken and followed us from Liberty, hanging upon our rear and harassing our flanks, without doing us much actual damage, however. After we entered the mountains, they disappeared entirely, and we found ourselves at the White Sulphur with no enemy to contend with, except the natural difficulties of the country and the scarcity of provisions.

The result of the campaign, thus far, had been eminently satisfactory; and everything that had been ordered or expected had been thoroughly accomplished, with but comparatively little loss.

About fifty miles of the Virginia Central railroad had been effectually destroyed; the Virginia and Tennessee road had been destroyed to some extent for the same distance; an incredible amount of public property had been burned, including canal-boats and railroad trains loaded with ordnance and commissary stores, numerous extensive iron works, manufactories of saltpetre, musket stocks, shoes, saddles, and artillery harness, woollen cloths and grain mills; about three thousand muskets and twenty pieces of cannon, with quantities of shells and gunpowder, fell into our hands, while immense quantities of provisions, cattle and horses were captured and used by the army. We had beaten the enemy in every engagement, killing and wounding about two thousand of his men, including officers of high rank, and capturing over two thousand prisoners. We had, by a movement of unparalleled audacity, menaced the vitals of the rebellion and forced the leaders at Richmond to detach a formidable corps for their defence and security.

The vast importance of this diversion, as proved by subsequent events, will be satisfactorily established presently.

These great results had been accomplished with but little loss of men or material on our part. About fifteen hundred men, killed, wounded and missing, and eight guns disabled by a stealthy attack, while they were on the march, and inadvertently left unguarded.

Considering its orders successfully carried out, the question now was to return the army of West Virginia to its base by the speediest route and in the best condition for further active operations. At the council held at the White Sulphur on the morning of June 25 three routes were proposed: one by the Warm Springs valley, by a road running parallel with the valley of the Shenandoah. It was foreseen that Early would, in all probability, make a counter raid against the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, overthrow General Sigel's force and do much mischief. It was urged that by marching down the parallel valley, *via* Warm Springs, Franklin and Moorfield, we might arrive in time to form a junction with Sigel, and prevent the anticipated raid. By way of objection to this route, it was argued that the distance to be marched was two hundred and fifty miles, by bad roads, and through a region sparsely populated and much wasted by war; the enemy having the advantage of shorter lines, better roads, and a considerable use of railroads, could throw his force ahead of us, block up our route by felled timber, attack us in flank through the gaps in the mountains, and thus drive us still deeper into the rugged and inhospitable regions of the Alleghanies. The army, already fatigued with long marches and suffering from irregular and limited supplies, must necessarily become more disorganized at every move—while the deficiency of ammunition made it essential that we should avoid every possibility of a serious collision with the enemy. These arguments were accepted as conclusive against the proposed route. The acknowledged impossibility of obtaining supplies and the long march were equally conclusive against the Beverley route. The route by Kanawha offered an open and safe road; a million of rations within three days' march; a shorter march to Charleston, from whence, by steamboats and railways, the troops could be transported to any point on our line where they might be needed. It was shown that these advantages, the time required to reach the desired point would be less, and that the troops would arrive well fed and rested, instead of being worn out and exhausted, as they must be at the end of a long march through an impoverished country.

The Kanawha route was adopted and the troops moved, arriving at Charleston from the 30th of June to the 4th of July. On the afternoon of the 4th the commanding general and staff arrived at Parkersburg, on the Ohio river, and there were met with the information that Early had driven Sigel out of Martinsburg, and occupied the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad in strong force. This intelligence was followed by an urgent request from the Secretary of War to hurry the troops forward.

All the necessary steps had been already taken to expedite their movement from Charleston, and whatever failure there may have been on the score of promptness was owing to the low stage of water in the river. The continuance of this unprecedented drought, produced results against which human foresight could not have provided, and to overcome which human exertion was powerless. The lightest draught boats used on the river and calculated to run at all seasons continually grounded, and the troops were obliged to land and march round the bars. This unfortunate circumstance so impeded the movements that, in the aggregate, four or five days were lost. All the resources of the railroad were used to forward the troops arriving by the boats, and trains were running day and night. On the evening of July 14 the general and staff arrived at Harper's Ferry.

Early meanwhile had crossed into Maryland, fought the battle of Monocacy, and while menacing Baltimore and Washington with his light cavalry, had retired into Virginia by way of Conrad's and Edwards's ferries. Our advanced in

fantry, a weak division under Sullivan, and some cavalry under Duffie, had already been sent to harass the enemy's flank, as he moved across Loudon county. Generals Crook and Averell, with a portion of their commands, were in Martinsburg. General Wright with the 6th corps, and General Emory with the 19th corps, were understood to be following the enemy, and moving in the direction of Leesburg.

On the 15th, by telegram from Major General Halleck, the troops of the West Virginia army were placed under the command of Major General Wright, then at Poolsville. By this order General Hunter, although still in command of the department, was left without troops. Under this impression he wrote to President Lincoln, asking respectfully, but peremptorily, to be relieved of command. The President replied, explaining that the order transferring the West Virginia troops to the command of General Wright was only intended to be temporary in its effect, and to apply while those troops were necessarily serving outside the department commanded by General Hunter. He concluded by a very pressing and flattering request that he should retain his position. This request was accepted by General Hunter as a command.

Instead of retiring by way of Gordonsville, as was expected, Early moved westward, and crossing the Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap, took position on the turnpike road leading from Snicker's ferry to Winchester, his main body lying around Berryville. General Wright followed him as far as the gap. On the 18th, General Crook, then commanding the West Virginia troops, pushed across the Shenandoah, and after a sharp action with the rebel Gordon's division, was driven back with a loss of four hundred men—the enemy losing six hundred. While the sound of cannon indicated an engagement in the vicinity of Snicker's ferry, Colonel Hays was ordered to move his brigade from Halltown by a road on the west side of the Shenandoah and strike the enemy in flank.

Averell was ordered to move from Martinsburg upon Winchester. On the 20th Colonel Hays reported that his advance had been disputed by a strong body of the enemy, and that, after a prolonged skirmish, he had fallen back to Keys's ferry, being short of ammunition.

General Averell with his cavalry and Duvall's infantry, in all twenty-three hundred strong, attacked and routed a greatly superior force of the enemy near Winchester, putting five hundred men *hors de combat* and capturing four guns. About this time Early retired from Berryville towards Front Royal and Strasburg, and General Wright, with the 6th and 19th corps, returned to Washington. In the military movements since his arrival at Harper's Ferry General Hunter had no control or responsibility, except in ordering the minor co-operative moves under Hays and Averell.

Our information in regard to Early was, that he was strong and confident, apparently ready for battle when we might seek it, but coolly awaiting his opportunity. His position in the valley of the Shenandoah was maintained for the purpose of protecting the harvest in the fertile region which he covered, and for the still more important object of preventing another advance on Lynchburg. His presence was also a continual menace to Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the federal capital, and was thus calculated to create a diversion in favor of Lee at Richmond. That the enemy would fail to use his advantageous position to the utmost could hardly be supposed; the withdrawal of General Wright's forces without a decisive action was therefore regretted as premature.

General Crook reported that the enemy's retreat from Berryville was apparently in compliance with orders from rebel headquarters, and evidently not from weakness or the desire to avoid battle. A rumor of the fall of Atlanta seemed to give color to the former idea. On the 23d of July a telegram from the President was received, asking, if, "since the departure of General Wright, General Hunter had force enough to hold the enemy, should he return upon us?" It was answered that if the enemy should return in full force, we had *not* troops

enough to hold him; but our best information indicated that he was falling back under orders, and that Averell's cavalry had reconnoitred as far south as Strasburg without discovering any force.

A telegram from General Halleck indicated General Grant's views in regard to the valley. He desired that the line of the Potomac should be held with a view to the protection of Washington, in case of necessity. The line of the Manassas Gap railroad and Cedar creek was suggested; it was considered more judicious to establish a line nearer the base of supplies, and that of Aldie, Snicker's Gap, Berryville, and Winchester was decided upon. It was the decided opinion of officers who had had experience in the valley of the Shenandoah, and were well acquainted with its topography, that there was no line of defence which could be advantageously maintained against an army marching from the south, and that the idea of holding it by fortified posts was equally futile; they were liable to be penetrated and evaded with but little risk, even by an inferior enemy, and liable to be cut off, isolated, and entrapped by a superior force. The difficulty of maintaining communications was almost insurmountable. It was urged that the only mode of holding the line of the Potomac and the valley of the Shenandoah securely, was to confront the enemy with a predominating force, and drive him out or destroy him.

In obedience to orders, General Crook (now major general by brevet) took command of the forces in the field, and occupied Winchester with fourteen thousand men. On Sunday, 24th, General Early suddenly returned in heavy force, and falling upon Crook, near Kernstown, defeated him, putting about a thousand men *hors de combat*. General Crook fell back behind the Potomac, saving all his guns and material.

On the 27th his command moved down on the Maryland side of the Potomac, and took position in Pleasant valley, nearly opposite Harper's Ferry; Averell reported the enemy crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, destroying the railroad and canal, and menacing both Cumberland and Chambersburg; General Wright at Monocacy, with the 6th corps, and General Emory coming up with the 19th.

On the 28th and 29th the whole force crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and took position in Halltown and vicinity. The combined force amounted to about thirty thousand men, and along eighty or ninety guns. It was reported that the enemy was crossing with all arms at Williamsport, and driving Averell back on Chambersburg. This was believed to be only a cavalry force, and Early was supposed to be lying along the turnpike, between Martinsburg and Winchester; his main force at Bunker Hill. It was proposed to attack him between Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus cutting his army in two.

On Saturday, July 30, it was intensely hot; the trains of the 6th corps still passing through towards Halltown. About mid-day we received news from Washington that the enemy had entered Chambersburg, and that the remaining divisions of the 19th corps were *en route* to re-enforce us. Immediately afterwards orders were issued directing the whole force to fall back to Middletown valley, in Maryland; these orders, I understood, came from Washington. A retrograde movement was immediately commenced, and by the following day the whole army was in Maryland, with headquarters in Frederick city, leaving, however, a strong garrison at Harper's Ferry, under the command of General Howe. I have never been able to understand the motive of this movement, and have always considered it a most unfortunate one. The position of our troops at Halltown and Bolivar Heights was unassailable by such a force as Early commanded. It was most convenient for active operations against the enemy in any direction, and was believed to impose an effectual check on any movement of his main body toward the invasion of Maryland or toward Washington by way of Snicker's ferry, as was apprehended in some quarters. An attempt on his part to move in either direction would have exposed his flank and rear to

advantageous attack by our superior force, and have left his communications entirely at our mercy. Our retrograde movement left the whole country open to him.

August 1 we received information that McCausland had entered Chambersburg at the head of two thousand cavalry, and after burning and sacking the town, moved westward, followed by Averell, with inferior force. Duffie was ordered to unite with Averell in the pursuit.

August 2 information was received by telegraph from Washington that a heavy column of the enemy was moving on that city, *via* Rockville. Marching orders were promptly issued, and subsequently countermanded, when it was ascertained that the alarm had originated from the appearance of a squad of United States cavalry scouting near Rockville. Headquarters were moved to the Thomas Farm, on the east side of the Monocacy. News received that General Kelly had handsomely repulsed McCausland's attack on Cumberland; Early's main body still lying between Martinsburg and Winchester; small foraging parties of rebels crossing occasionally at Antietam ford, Shepherdstown, and Williamsport.

August 4 General Howe telegraphs that the enemy are menacing Harper's Ferry; General Emory, with the 19th corps, ten thousand strong, was sent there during the night.

August 5, in the afternoon, General Grant in person visited headquarters, and had a conference with General Hunter. It was understood that General Phil. Sheridan was to be assigned to the command of the troops in the departments of Washington, Susquehanna and West Virginia, and an official order to that effect was promulgated a few days after. The troops were immediately returned to their positions at Bolivar Heights and Halltown.

On the last day of August General Hunter, at his own oft-repeated request, was officially relieved of command in West Virginia. At the same time, worn out with fatigue and exposure, I resigned my commission in the volunteer service, and about the first of September received an honorable discharge from the department commander.

I have thus given a brief sketch of military movements and events participated in by the army of West Virginia while under your command, from the 21st day of May, 1864, to the 9th of August. I have always considered the movement on Lynchburg as one of the boldest and best-conducted campaigns of the war; that the motives which dictated it fully justified the hazard incurred, and that the results obtained by very inadequate forces have been fully acknowledged by those who best understood their real value. Lieutenant General Grant handsomely acknowledges that "all had been accomplished that was possible under the circumstances, and more than could have been hoped for." Jefferson Davis, in his speech to the people of Georgia, after the fall of Atlanta, informs them that "an audacious movement of the enemy up to the very walls of Lynchburg had rendered it necessary that the government should send a formidable body of troops to cover that vital point, which had otherwise been intended for the relief of Atlanta." The vital importance of Lynchburg as a reserve depot and proposed place of retreat, in case of the abandonment of Richmond, was fully appreciated by the rebel authorities; by the United States it was either not fully understood, or the approach deemed too hazardous. When the enemy saw, therefore, their fatal weakness was discovered and the approaches already reconnoitred, he was obliged to despatch a force to protect it at all hazards; nearly one-third of the flower of Lee's army, under Early, was detached for this purpose. Thus the great result was accomplished. Atlanta, unrelieved, fell before the conquering arms of Sherman. Lee's army, thus enfeebled, remained imprisoned in Richmond, and was never afterwards able to hazard an active demonstration. Early's presence in the valley of the Shenandoah convinced the government of the United States of the only effectual

policy to be pursued in that quarter. He was confronted by a superior army, attacked and annihilated. The subsequent movements of Generals Grant and Sherman brought the war to a full and fortunate conclusion. While rejoicing in the honors accorded to those great soldiers, whose fortune it has been to gather in the glorious harvest, I still feel it my duty to claim a modest wreath for that gallant army of West Virginia, which, through so much toil, danger and suffering, assisted in preparing the field for the reapers.

I am, general, with high respect, your obedient servant,

DAVID H. STROTHER,

*Late Colonel of Volunteer Cavalry and Chief of Staff.*

Major General DAVID HUNTER.

Official copy :

E. D. TOWNSEND,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *November 18, 1865.*

*Report of Major General B. F. Butler of operations against Fort Fisher, 1864.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND N. CAROLINA,

*Army of the James, in the field, January 3, 1865.*

GENERAL: On the 7th of December last, in obedience to your orders, I moved a force of about sixty-five hundred efficient men, consisting of General Ames's division of the 24th corps, and General Paine's division of the 25th corps, under command of Major General Weitzel, to an encampment near Bermuda.

On the 8th the troops embarked for Fortress Monroe.

On the 9th, Friday, I reported to Rear-Admiral Porter that the army portion of the conjoint expedition directed against Wilmington was ready to proceed.

We waited there Saturday the 10th, Sunday the 11th, and Monday the 12th.

On the 12th Rear-Admiral Porter informed me that the naval fleet would sail on the 13th, but would be obliged to put into Beaufort to take on board ammunition for the monitors.

The expedition having become the subject of remark, fearing lest its destination should get to the enemy, in order to divert from it all attention, on the morning of Tuesday the 13th, at 3 o'clock, I ordered the transport fleet to proceed up the Potomac during the day to Matthias Point, so as to be plainly visible to the scouts and signal men of the enemy on the northern neck, and to retrace their course at night and anchor under the lee of Cape Charles.

Having given the navy thirty-six hours start, at 12 o'clock noon of the 14th, Wednesday, I joined the transport fleet off Cape Henry, and put to sea, arriving at the place of rendezvous off New inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th, Thursday.

We there waited for the navy Friday the 16th, Saturday the 17th, and Sunday the 18th, during which days we had the finest possible weather and the smoothest sea.

On the evening of the 18th Admiral Porter came from Beaufort to the place of rendezvous. That evening the sea became rough, and on Monday, the 19th, the wind sprang up freshly, so that it was impossible to land troops; and by the advice of Admiral Porter, communicated to me by letter, I directed the transport fleet to rendezvous at Beaufort. This was a matter of necessity, because the transport fleet, being coaled and watered for ten days, had already waited that time, to wit: from the 9th, the day on which we were ready to sail, to the 19th.

On the 20th, Tuesday; 21st, Wednesday; 22d, Thursday; and 23d, Friday, it blew a gale. I was occupied in coaling and watering the transport fleet at Beaufort.

The Baltic, having a large supply of coal, was enabled to remain at the place of rendezvous, with a brigade on board of twelve hundred men, and General Ames reported to Admiral Porter that he would co-operate with him.

On the 23d I sent Captain Clarke, of my staff, from Beaufort, on the fast-sailing armed steamer Chamberlain, to Admiral Porter to inform him that on the evening of the 24th I would again be at the rendezvous with the transport fleet, for the purpose of commencing the attack, the weather permitting.

At four o'clock on the evening of the 24th I came in sight of Fort Fisher, and found the naval fleet engaged in bombarding it, the powder-vessel having been exploded on the morning previous about one o'clock.

Through General Weitzel I arranged with Admiral Porter to commence the landing under the cover of the gunboats as early as eight o'clock the next morning, if possible, as soon as the fire of the Half-Moon and Flag-pond Hill batteries had been silenced. These are up the shore some two or three miles above Fort Fisher.

Admiral Porter was quite sanguine that he had silenced the guns of Fort Fisher. He was then urged, if that were so, to run by the fort into Cape Fear river, and then the troops could land and hold the beach without liability of being shelled by the enemy's gunboats, (the Tallahassee being seen in the river.)

It is to be remarked that Admiral Farragut, even, had never taken a fort except by running by and cutting it off from all prospect of re-enforcements, as at Fort Jackson and Fort Morgan, and that no casemated fort had been silenced by naval fire during the war. That if the admiral would put his ships in the river the army could supply him across the beach, as we had proposed to do Farragut at Fort St. Philip. That at least the blockade of Wilmington would be thus effectual, even if we did not capture the fort. To that the admiral replied that he should probably lose a boat by torpedoes if he attempted to run by.

He was reminded that the army might lose five hundred men by the assault, and that his boat would not weigh in the balance, even in a money point of view, for a moment, with the lives of the men. The admiral declined going by, and the expedition was deprived of that essential element of success.

At 12 o'clock noon of the 25th, Sunday, Captain Glisson, commanding the covering divisions of the fleet, reported the batteries silenced and his vessels in position to cover our landing.

The transport fleet, following my flag-ship, stood in within eight hundred yards of the beach, and at once commenced debarking. The landing was successfully effected. Finding that the reconnoitring party just landed could hold the shore, I determined to land a force with which an assault might be attempted.

Brevet Brigadier General Curtis, who deserves well for his gallantry and conduct, immediately pushed up his brigade within a few hundred yards of Fort Fisher, capturing the Half-Moon battery and its men, who were taken off by the boats of the navy.

This skirmish line advanced to within seventy-five yards of the fort, protected by the glacis which had been thrown up in such form as to give cover, the garrison being completely kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, which was very rapid and continuous, their shells bursting over the work with very considerable accuracy. At this time we lost ten men wounded on the skirmish line by the shells from the fleet.

Quitting my flag-ship I went on board the Chamberlain and ran in within a few hundred yards of the fort, so that it was plainly visible.

It appeared to be a square bastioned work of very high relief, say fifteen feet, surrounded by a wet ditch some fifteen feet wide. I was protected from being enveloped by an assaulting force by a stockade which extended from the fort to the sea on the one side, and from the marshes of Cape Fear river to the salient on the other.

No material damage to the fort as a defensive work had been done.

Seventeen heavy guns bore up the beach, protected from the fire of the navy by traverses eight or ten feet high, which were undoubtedly bomb-proof shelters for the garrison.

With the garrison kept within their bomb-proofs it was easy to maintain this position; but the shells of the navy, which kept the enemy in their bomb-proofs, would keep my troops out. When those ceased falling the parapet was fully manned.

Lieutenant Walling, of the one hundred and forty-second New York, pressed up to the edge of the ditch and captured a flag which had been cut down by a shell from the navy. It is a mistake, as was at first reported to me, that any soldier entered the fort. An orderly was killed about a third of a mile from the fort and his horse taken.

In the mean time the remainder of Ames's division had captured two hundred and eighteen men and ten commissioned officers of the North Carolina reserves and other prisoners. From them I learned that Kirkland's and Hagood's brigades of Hoke's division had left the front of the army of the James, near Richmond, and were then within two miles of the rear of my forces, and their skirmishers were then actually engaged, and that the remainder of Hoke's division had come the night before to Wilmington, and were then on the march, if they had not already arrived.

I learned, also, that these troops had left Richmond on Tuesday, the 20th.

Knowing the strength of Hoke's division, I found a force opposed to me outside of the works larger than my own.

In the mean time the weather assumed a threatening aspect. The surf began to roll in so that the landing became difficult. At this time General Weitzel reported to me that to assault the work, in his judgment, and in that of the experienced officers of his command who had been on the skirmish line, with any prospect of success, was impossible.

This opinion coincided with my own, and much as I regretted the necessity of abandoning the attempt, yet the path of duty was plain. Not so strong a work as Fort Fisher had been taken by assault during the war, and I had to guide me the experience of Port Hudson, with its slaughtered thousands in the repulsed assault, and the double assault of Fort Wagner, where thousands were sacrificed in an attempt to take a work less strong than Fisher, after it had been subjected to a more continued and fully as severe fire. And in neither of the instances I have mentioned had the assaulting force in its rear, as I had, an army of the enemy larger than itself.

I therefore ordered that no assault should be made, and that the troops should re-embark.

While superintending the preparations for this the fire of the navy ceased. Instantly the guns of the fort were fully manned, and a sharp fire of musketry, grape and canister swept the plain over which the column must have advanced, and the skirmish line was returning.

Working with what diligence we could, it was impossible to get the troops again on board before the sea ran so high as to render further re-embarkation, or even the sending of supplies ashore, impossible. I lay by the shore until eleven o'clock the next day, Monday, the 26th, when having made all proper

dispositions for getting the troops on board, I gave orders to the transport fleet, as fast as they were ready, to sail for Fortress Monroe, in obedience to my instructions from the Lieutenant General.

I learned from deserters and prisoners captured, that the supposition upon which the Lieutenant General directed the expedition, that Wilmington had been denuded of troops to oppose General Sherman, was correct. That at the time when the army arrived off Wilmington, there were less than four hundred men in the garrison of Fort Fisher, and less than a thousand within twenty miles.

But the delay of three days of good weather, the 16th, 17th and 18th, waiting for the arrival of the navy, and the further delay from the terrible storm of the 21st, 22d and 23d, gave time for troops to be brought from Richmond, three divisions of which were either there or on the road.

The instructions of the Lieutenant General to me did not contemplate a siege; I had neither siege trains nor supplies for such a contingency.

The exigency of possible delay, for which the foresight of the commander of the armies had provided, had arisen, to wit: the larger re-enforcement of the garrison. This, together with the fact that the navy had exhausted their supply of ammunition in the bombardment, left me with no alternative but to return with my troops to the army of the James.

The loss of the opportunity of Friday, Saturday and Sunday, the 16th, 17th and 18th, was the immediate cause of the failure of the expedition.

It is not my province even to suggest blame to the navy for their delay of four days at Beaufort. I know none of the reasons which do or do not justify it. It is to be presumed they are sufficient.

I am happy to bring to the attention of the Lieutenant General the excellent behavior of the troops, both officers and men, which was all that could be desired.

I am under special obligations to Captain Glisson, of the Santiago de Cuba, for the able and efficient manner in which he covered our landing; to Captain Alden, of the Brooklyn, for his prompt assistance and the excellent gunnery with which the Brooklyn cleared the shores of all opposers at the moment of debarkation. Lieutenant Farquhar, of the navy, having in charge the navy boats which assisted in the landing, deserves great credit for the energy and skill with which he managed the boats through the rolling surf. Especial commendation is due to Brigadier General Graham and the officers and men of his naval brigade, for the organization of his boats and crews for landing, and the untiring energy and industry with which they all labored in re-embarking the troops during the stormy night of the 25th and the days following. For this and other meritorious services during the campaign since the first of May, which have heretofore been brought to the notice of the Lieutenant General in my official reports, I would respectfully but earnestly recommend General Graham for promotion.

The number of prisoners captured by us was three hundred, including twelve officers, two heavy rifled guns, two light guns, and six caissons.

The loss of the army was one man drowned, two men killed, one officer captured, who accidentally wandered through our pickets, and ten men wounded while upon the picket line by the shells of the navy.

Always chary of mentioning with commendation the acts of my own personal staff, yet I think the troops who saw it will agree to the cool courage and daring of Lieutenant Sidney B. DeKay, aide-de-camp, in landing on the night of the 25th, and remaining aiding in re-embarkation on the 27th.

For the details of the landing and the operations, I beg leave to refer you to the reports of Major General Weitzel, commanding the division landed, which are hereto appended.

Trusting my action will meet with the approval of the Lieutenant General, this report is respectfully submitted.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,  
*Major General*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding Armies of the United States.*

Official copy :

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *November 18, 1865.*

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*Major General A. H. Terry's report of the capture of Fort Fisher.*

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES ON FEDERAL POINT, N.C.,  
*January 25, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following detailed report of the operations which resulted in the capture of Fort Fisher and the occupation of Fort Caswell, and the other works at the mouth of the Cape Fear river.

On the 2d instant I received from the Lieutenant General, in person, orders to take command of the troops destined for the movement. They were 3,300 picked men from the second division of the 24th army corps, under Brigadier General (now Brevet Major General) Adelbert Ames, the same number from the third division of the 25th army corps, under command of Brigadier General Charles J. Paine, 1,400 men from the second brigade of the first division of the 24th army corps, under Colonel (now Brevet Brigadier General) J. C. Abbott, 7th New Hampshire volunteers, the 16th New York independent battery, with four 3-inch guns, and light battery E, 3d United States artillery, with six light 12-pounder guns. I was instructed to move them from their positions in the lines on the north side of the James river to Bermuda landing, in time to commence their embarkation on transport vessels at sunrise on the 4th instant.

In obedience to these orders, the movement commenced at noon of the 3d instant. The troops arrived at the landing at sunset, and there bivouacked for the night.

The transports did not arrive as soon as they were expected. The first of them made its appearance late in the afternoon of the 4th. One of them, the Atlantic, was of too heavy draught to come up the James; Curtis's brigade of Ames's division was therefore placed on river steamboats and sent down the river to be transferred to her.

The embarkation of the remainder of the force commenced at sunset of the 4th, and was completed at noon of the 5th instant; each vessel, as soon as it was loaded, was sent to Fortress Monroe, and at 9 o'clock p. m. of the 5th the whole fleet was collected in Hampton roads. The troops were all in heavy marching order, with four days' rations from the morning of the 4th in their haversacks, and forty rounds of ammunition in their boxes. No horses, wagons or ambulances were taken; the caissons of the artillery were left behind, but in addition to the ammunition in the limber chests, 150 rounds per gun, in packing-boxes, were embarked.

I went down the river personally with the Lieutenant General, and on the way received from him additional instructions, and the information that orders had been given for the embarkation of a siege train, to consist of twenty 30-pounder Parrott guns, four 100-pounder Parrotts, and twenty cohorn mortars,

with a detail of artillerymen and a company of engineers, so that in case siege operations should become necessary the men and material for it might be at hand.

These troops, under the command of Brevet Brigadier General H. L. Abbott, were to follow me to Beaufort, North Carolina, and await orders. It was not until this time that I was informed that Fort Fisher was the point against which we were to operate.

During the evening of the 5th orders were given for the transports to proceed to sea at 4 o'clock the next morning, and accompanying these orders were sealed letters, to be opened when off Cape Henry, directing them to rendezvous, in case of separation from the flag-ship, at a point twenty-five miles off Beaufort, North Carolina.

The vessels sailed at the appointed hour. During the 6th instant a severe storm arose which so much impeded our progress that it was not until the morning of the 8th that my own vessel arrived at the rendezvous; all the others, excepting the flag-ship of General Paine, were still behind. Leaving Brigadier General Paine to assemble the other vessels as they should arrive, I went into Beaufort harbor to communicate with Rear-Admiral Porter, commanding the North Atlantic blockading squadron, with whose fleet the forces under my command were destined to co-operate.

During the 8th nearly all of the vessels arrived at the rendezvous; some of them required repairs to their hulls, damaged by the gale, some repairs to their machinery, others needed coal or water. These vessels were brought into the harbor or to the outer anchorage, where their wants were supplied; all the others remained, until the final sailing of the expedition, from twenty to twenty-five miles off the land. The weather continued so unfavorable as to afford no prospect that we would be able to make a landing on the open beach of Federal Point until Wednesday, the 11th. On that day Admiral Porter proposed to start, but at high water there was still so much surf on the bar that the iron-clads and other vessels of heavy draught could not be gotten over it; our departure was therefore delayed till the next day.

On the morning tide of the 12th the vessels in the harbor passed out, and the whole fleet of naval vessels and transports got under way for this place. As we were leaving, the vessels containing General Abbott's command came in sight. Orders were sent to them to follow us.

We did not arrive off Federal Point until nearly nightfall; consequently, and in accordance with the decision of the admiral, the disembarkation of the troops was not commenced until the next morning. Our subsequent experience fully justified the delay; it would have been extremely difficult to land the men at night.

At 4 o'clock a. m. of the 13th, the in-shore division of naval vessels stood in close to the beach to cover the landing. The transports followed them and took positions as nearly as possible in a line parallel to and about two hundred yards outside of them. The iron-clads moved down to within range of the fort and opened fire upon it. Another division was placed to the northward of the landing place, so as to protect our men from any attack from the direction of Masonboro, inlet. At 8 o'clock nearly 200 boats, beside steam-tugs, were sent from the navy to the transports, and the disembarkation of men, provisions, tools, and ammunition simultaneously commenced.

At 3 o'clock p. m. nearly 8,000 men, with three days' rations in their haversacks, and forty rounds of ammunition in their boxes, six days' supply of hard bread in bulk, 300,000 additional rounds of small-arm ammunition, and a sufficient number of intrenching tools had been safely landed. The surf on the beach was still quite high, notwithstanding that the weather had become very pleasant, and owing to it some of the men had their rations and ammunition ruined by water; with this exception, no accident of any kind occurred.

As soon as the troops had commenced landing pickets were thrown out; they

immediately encountered outposts of the enemy, and shots were exchanged with them, but no serious engagement occurred. A few prisoners were taken, from whom I learned that Hoke's rebel division, which it was supposed had been sent further south, was still here, and that it was his outposts which we were meeting.

The first object which I had in view after landing was to throw a strong defensive line across the peninsula from the Cape Fear river to the sea, facing Wilmington, so as to protect our rear from attack while we should be engaged in operating against Fisher. Our maps indicated that a good position for such a line would be found a short distance above the head of Myrtle sound, which is a long, shallow piece of water separated from the ocean by a sand-spit of about one hundred yards in width, and communicates with it by Masonboro' inlet.

It was supposed that the right flank of a line at that point would be protected by the sound, and, being above its head, that we should by it control the beach as far up as the inlet, and thus, in case of need, be able to land supplies in quiet water there. Our landing place was selected with reference to this idea. An examination made after we landed showed that the sound for a long distance above its head was so shallow as to offer no obstacle to the passage of troops at low tide, and as the further down the peninsula we should go the shorter would be our line across it, it was determined to take up a position where the maps showed a large pond occupying nearly one-third of the width of the peninsula at about three miles from the fort. Shortly before 5 o'clock, leaving Abbott's brigade to cover our stores, the troops were put in motion for the last-named point. On arriving at it, the "pond" was found to be a sand-flat, sometimes covered with water, giving no assistance to the defence of a line established behind it. Nevertheless, it was determined to get a line across at this place, and Paine's division, followed by two of Ames's brigades, made their way through. The night was very dark, much of the ground was a marsh, and illy adapted to the construction of works, and the distance was found to be too great to be properly defended by the troops which could be spared from the direct attack upon the fort. It was not until 9 o'clock p. m. that Paine succeeded in reaching the river.

The ground still nearer the fort was then reconnoitred, and found to be much better adapted to our purposes; accordingly, the troops were withdrawn from their last position and established on a line about two miles from the work. They reached this final position at 2 o'clock a. m. of the 14th instant. Tools were immediately brought up and intrenchments were commenced. At 8 o'clock a good breastwork, reaching from the river to the sea, and partially covered by abatis, had been constructed, and was in a defensible condition. It was much improved afterward, but from this time our foothold on the peninsula was secured.

Early in the morning of the 14th the landing of the artillery was commenced, and by sunset all the light guns were gotten on shore. During the following night they were placed on the line, most of them near the river, where the enemy, in case he should attack us, would be least exposed to the fire of the gunboats.

Curtis's brigade of Ames's division was moved down toward Fisher during the morning, and at noon his skirmishers, after capturing on their way a small steamer which had come down the river with shells and forage for the garrison of the fort, reached a small unfinished outwork in front of the west end of the land front of the work.

General Curtis, Lieutenant Colonel (now Brevet Brigadier General) Comstock, the chief engineer of the expedition, and myself, under the protection of the fire of the fleet, made a careful reconnoissance of the work, getting within six hundred yards of it. The report of General Comstock, which, with its accompanying map, is appended hereto, gives a full description of it and its condition at that time.

As the result of this reconnoissance, and in view of the extreme difficulty which might be expected in landing supplies and the material for a siege on the open and often tempestuous beach, it was decided to attempt an assault the next day, provided that in the mean time the fire of the navy should so far destroy the palisades as to make one practicable.

This decision was communicated to Admiral Porter, who at once placed a division of his vessels in a position to accomplish this last-named object. It was arranged in consultation with him that a heavy bombardment from all the vessels should commence early in the morning, and continue up to the moment of the assault, and that even then it should not cease, but should be diverted from the points of attack to other parts of the work.

It was decided that the assault should be made at 3 o'clock p. m.; that the army should attack on the western half of the land face, and that a column of sailors and marines should assault at the northeast bastion.

The fire of the navy continued during the night. At 8 o'clock a. m. of the 15th, all of the vessels, except a division left to aid in the defence of our northern line, moved into position, and a fire, magnificent alike for its power and accuracy, was opened.

Ames's division had been selected for the assault. Paine was placed in command of the defensive line, having with him Abbott's brigade in addition to his own division. Ames's first brigade—Curtis's—was already at the outwork above mentioned, and in trenches close around it; his other two brigades, Pennypacker's and Bell's, were moved at noon to within supporting distance of him. At 2 o'clock preparations for the assault were commenced. Sixty sharpshooters from the 13th Indiana volunteers, armed with the Spencer repeating carbine, and forty others, volunteers from Curtis's brigade, the whole under command of Lieutenant Colonel Zent, of the 13th Indiana, were thrown forward at a run to within one hundred and seventy-five yards of the work. They were provided with shovels, and soon dug pits for shelter, and commenced firing at the parapet.

As soon as this movement commenced, the parapet of the fort was manned, and the enemy's fire, both of musketry and artillery, opened.

As soon as the sharpshooters were in position, Curtis's brigade was moved forward by regiment at the double-quick into line at about four hundred and seventy-five yards from the work. The men there lay down. This was accomplished under a sharp fire of musketry and artillery, from which, however, they soon sheltered themselves by digging shallow trenches.

When Curtis moved from the outwork, Pennypacker was brought up to it, and Bell was brought into line two hundred yards in his rear. Finding that a good cover for Curtis's men could be found on the reverse slope of a crest fifty yards in the rear of the sharpshooters, they were again moved forward one regiment at a time, and again covered themselves in trenches. Pennypacker followed Curtis and occupied the ground vacated by him, and Bell was brought up to the outwork.

It had been proposed to blow up and cut down the palisades; bags of powder, with fuzes attached, had been prepared, and a party of volunteer axemen organized; but the fire of the navy had been so effective during the preceding night and morning that it was thought unnecessary to use the powder. The axemen, however, were sent in with the leading brigade, and did good service by making openings in portions of the palisading which the fire of the navy had not been able to reach.

At 3.25 p. m. all the preparations were completed, the order to move forward was given to Ames, and a concerted signal was made to Admiral Porter to change the direction of his fire.

Curtis's brigade at once sprang from their trenches and dashed forward in line; its left was exposed to a severe enfilading fire, and it obliqued to the right

so as to envelop the left of the land front ; the ground over which it moved was marshy and difficult, but it soon reached the palisades, passed through them, and effected a lodgement on the parapet. At the same time the column of sailors and marines, under Fleet Captain K. R. Breese, advanced up the beach in the most gallant manner and attacked the northeast bastion ; but, exposed to a murderous fire, they were unable to get up the parapet. After a severe struggle and a heavy loss of valuable officers and men, it became apparent that nothing could be effected at that point, and they were withdrawn. When Curtis moved forward, Ames directed Pennypacker to move up to the rear of the sharpshooters, and brought Bell up to Pennypacker's last position, and as soon as Curtis got a foothold on the parapet, sent Pennypacker in to his support. He advanced, overlapping Curtis's right, and drove the enemy from the heavy palisading, which extended from the west end of the land face to the river, capturing a considerable number of prisoners ; then pushing forward to their left, the two brigades together drove the enemy from about one-quarter of the land face. Ames then brought up Bell's brigade, and moved it between the work and the river. On this side there was no regular parapet, but there was abundance of cover afforded to the enemy by cavities from which sand had been taken for the parapet, the ruins of barracks and storehouses, the large magazine, and by traverses, behind which they stubbornly resisted our advance. Hand-to-hand fighting of the most desperate character ensued, the huge traverses of the land face being used successively by the enemy as breastworks, over the tops of which the contending parties fired in each other's faces. Nine of these were carried, one after the other, by our men.

When Bell's brigade was ordered into action I foresaw that more troops would probably be needed, and sent an order for Abbott's brigade to move down from the north line, at the same time requesting Captain Breese to replace them with his sailors and marines. I also directed General Paine to send me one of the strongest regiments of his own division ; these troops arrived at dusk and reported to General Ames. At 6 o'clock Abbott's brigade went into the fort ; the regiment from Paine's division—the 27th United States colored troops, Brevet Brigadier General A. M. Blackman commanding—was brought up to the rear of the work, where it remained under fire for some time, and was then withdrawn. Until 6 o'clock the fire of the navy continued upon that portion of the work not occupied by us ; after that time it was directed on the beach, to prevent the coming up of re-enforcements, which it was thought might possibly be thrown over from the right bank of the river to Battery Buchanan. The fighting for the traverses continued till nearly 9 o'clock, two more of them being carried ; then a portion of Abbott's brigade drove the enemy from their last remaining strongholds, and the occupation of the work was completed.

The same brigade, with General Blackman's regiment, was immediately pushed down the point to Battery Buchanan, whither many of the garrison had fled. On reaching the battery all of the enemy who had not been previously captured were made prisoners. Among them were Major General Whiting and Colonel Lamb, the commandant of the fort.

At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon Hoke advanced against our north line, apparently with the design of attacking it ; but if such was his intention, he abandoned it after a skirmish with our pickets.

During the day Brevet Brigadier General H. L. Abbott, chief of artillery, was busily engaged in landing artillery and ammunition, so that if the assault failed, siege operations might at once be commenced.

Consequent to the fall of Fisher, the enemy, during the night of the 16th and 17th, blew up Fort Caswell, and abandoned both it and their very extensive works on Smith's island, at Smithville and Reeve's Point, thus placing in our hands all the works erected to defend the mouth of the Cape Fear river.

In all the works were found 169 pieces of artillery, nearly all of which are

heavy, over 2,000 stands of small-arms, considerable quantities of commissary stores, and full supplies of ammunition. Our prisoners numbered 112 commissioned officers and 1,971 enlisted men.

I have no words to do justice to the behavior of both officers and men on this occasion; all that men could do they did. Better soldiers never fought. Of General Ames I have already spoken in a letter recommending his promotion. He commanded all the troops engaged and was constantly under fire. His great coolness, good judgment, and skill were never more conspicuous than in this assault. Brigadier General Curtis and Colonels Pennypacker, Bell, and Abbott, the brigade commanders, led them with the utmost gallantry. Curtis was wounded after fighting in the front rank, rifle in hand; Pennypacker, while carrying the standard of one of his regiments, the first man in a charge over a traverse. Bell was mortally wounded near the palisades.

Brigadier General Paine deserves high praise for the zeal and energy displayed by him in constructing our defensive line, a work absolutely essential to our success.

Brevet Brigadier General Blackman deserves mention for the prompt manner in which he brought his regiment up to the work, and afterwards followed up the retreating enemy.

To Brevet Brigadier General C. B. Comstock, aide-de camp on the staff of the Lieutenant General, I am under the deepest obligations. At every step of our progress I received from him the most valuable assistance. For the final success of our part of the operations the country is more indebted to him than to me.

Colonel George S. Dodge, chief quartermaster of the army of the James, accompanied me as chief quartermaster of the force under my command. His able and energetic performance of his multifarious duties was all that could be wished for, and reflects the highest honor upon him.

Surgeon Norman S. Barnes, United States volunteers, medical director, and Surgeon A. J. H. Buzzell, third New Hampshire volunteers, medical inspector of the expedition, discharged their laborious duties on the field and in the hospital in a manner most creditable to their ability and humanity. I desire to express my high appreciation of the services of these officers.

I shall have the honor to submit a supplemental report in reference to those subordinate officers and enlisted men who distinguished themselves on this occasion.

I should signally fail to do my duty were I to omit to speak in terms of the highest admiration of the part borne by the navy in our operations. In all ranks, from Admiral Porter to his seamen, there was the utmost desire not only to do their proper work, but to facilitate in every possible manner the operations of the land forces. To him and to the untiring efforts of his officers and men we are indebted that our men, stores, tools, and ammunition were safely and expeditiously landed, and that our wounded and prisoners were embarked for transportation to the north; to the great accuracy and power of their fire it is owing that we had not to confront a formidable artillery in the assault, and that we were able, with but little loss, to push forward the men, preparatory to it, to a point nearly as favorable for it as the one they would have occupied had siege operations been undertaken and the work systematically approached. The assault of the sailors and marines, although it failed, undoubtedly contributed somewhat to our success, and certainly nothing could surpass the perfect skill with which the fleet was handled by its commander. Every request which I made to Admiral Porter was most cheerfully complied with, and the utmost harmony has existed between us from the outset to the present time.

I forward herewith General Ames's report.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALFRED H. TERRY, *Major General.*

Brigadier General J. A. RAWLINS,  
*Chief of Staff, City Point, Virginia.*

## HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,

*Fort Fisher, N. C., January 27, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of engineer operations in connexion with the capture of Fort Fisher, together with a sketch of that work and another of the country in its vicinity. Fort Fisher is situated on the peninsula between the Cape Fear river and the Atlantic ocean, about a mile and a half northeast of Federal Point. For five miles north of Federal Point this peninsula is sandy and low, not rising more than fifteen feet above high tide, the interior abounding in fresh-water swamps, often wooded and almost impassable, while much of the dry land, till one gets within half a mile of Fort Fisher, is covered with wood or low undergrowth, except a strip about three hundred yards wide along the sea shore. The landing of the troops composing the expedition was effected on the sea-beach, about five miles north of Fort Fisher, on January 12, and Paine's division was at once pushed across to the Cape Fear river with instructions to take up a line to be held against any attack from the direction of Wilmington. This line on the morning of January 13 was already defensible, and was further strengthened during the day, while on the 14th a second line was laid out and begun, under charge of Lieutenant J. H. Price, in rear of its left. Pioneer companies were organized in Ames's and Paine's divisions, and as during the 14th the fire of the rebel gunboat Chickamauga killed and wounded a number of our men, Lieutenant O'Keeffe, with his company of the fifteenth regiment New York volunteer engineers, was directed to build a battery for two 30-pounder Parrots on the bank of the river to keep her off.

On the afternoon of January 14 a reconnoissance was pushed, under the direction of the major general commanding, to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, a small advanced work being taken possession of. This was at once turned into a defensive line to be held against any attempt from Fort Fisher. The reconnoissance showed that the palisading in front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire; only nine guns could be seen on the land front where sixteen had been counted on Christmas day. The steady though not rapid fire of the navy prevented the enemy from using either artillery or musketry on the reconnoitring party. It seemed probable that troops could be got up within two hundred yards of the work without serious loss, and it was a matter of grave doubt whether the necessary ammunition could be supplied by the open beach if regular approaches were determined on. It was decided to assault, and the assault was made on the 15th, at half past three p. m., after three hours of heavy navy fire, by three deployed brigades following one another at intervals of about three hundred yards, and each making its final rush for the west end of the land face from a rough rifle-pit about three hundred yards from the work.

At the point attacked the palisading was less injured than elsewhere, it being partially hidden, and it was necessary to use axes to cut and timbers to batter it down, in order that troops might pass readily through it. Powder sacks for blowing these palisades down had been prepared, but were not used. After seven hours' fighting, gaining traverse by traverse, the work was won.

Fort Fisher consists of two fronts—the first, or land-front, running across the peninsula at this point, about seven hundred yards wide, is four hundred and eighty yards in length; while the second, or sea-front, runs from the right of the first parallel to the beach to the mound battery, a distance of thirteen hundred yards. The land front was intended to resist any attack from the north, the sea front to prevent any of our naval vessels from running through New inlet or landing troops on Federal Point.

1. *Land-front.*—This front consists of a half bastion on the left or Cape Fear river side, connected by a curtain, with a bastion on the ocean side. The parapet is twenty-five feet thick, averages twenty feet in height, with traverses rising ten feet above it and running back on their tops, which were from eight

to twelve feet in thickness, to a distance of from thirty to forty feet from the interior crest. The traverses on the left half bastion were about twenty-five feet in length on top.

The earth for this heavy parapet and the enormous traverses at their inner ends, more than thirty feet in height, was obtained partly from a shallow exterior ditch, but mainly from the interior of the work. Between each pair of traverses there was one or two guns. The traverses on the right of this front were only partially completed. A palisade, which is loopholed and has a banquette, runs in front of this face at a distance of about fifty feet in front of the foot of the exterior slope from the Cape Fear river to the ocean, with a position for a gun between the left of the front and the river, and another between the right of the front and the ocean. Through the middle traverse on the curtain was a bomb-proof postern, whose exterior opening was covered by a small redan for two field-pieces, to give flank fire along the curtain. The traverses were generally bomb-proofed for men or magazines. The slopes of the work appear to have been generally revetted with marsh sod, or covered with grass, and to have had an inclination of forty-five degrees, or a little less. On those slopes most exposed to navy fire the revetment or grassing has been entirely destroyed, and the inclination reduced to thirty degrees.

The ends of traverses as they rise above the parapet are very ragged. Still all damage done to the earthwork can be readily repaired, its strength being about the same as before the bombardment. The damage done by the navy fire was, first to the palisades, which were so injured as in most places to be little obstacle to assaulting troops; second, to guns and carriages. There were originally on this front twenty-one heavy guns and three mortars. Of these three-fourths were rendered unserviceable by injuries to either gun or carriage. The gun in the right bastion, the field-pieces in front of the postern, and one or two mortars were used against the assaulting troops.

There was a formidable system of torpedoes two hundred yards in advance of this front, the torpedoes being about eighty feet apart, and each containing about one hundred pounds of powder. They were connected with the fort by three sets of wires; fortunately the set leading directly to those over which the army moved, and the wire leading directly to those over which the navy column moved had been cut by shells, and no torpedo was exploded.

2. *Sea-front*.—This front consists of a series of batteries, mounting in all twenty-four heavy guns, the different batteries being connected by a strong infantry parapet, so as to form a continuous line. The same system of heavy traverses for the protection of the guns is used as on the land front, and these traverses are also generally bomb-proofed. Captain M. Adams, fourth New Hampshire volunteers, and First Lieutenant J. H. Price, fourth United States colored troops, commanding pioneer companies of Ames's and Paine's divisions, and First Lieutenant K. S. O'Keeffe, commanding company of fifteenth New York volunteer engineers, have, with their commands, been of great service in the construction of batteries and defensive works. First Lieutenant A. H. Knowlton, fourth New Hampshire volunteers, has rendered valuable assistance in making sketches of Fort Fisher, as also private Schultze, fifteenth New York volunteer engineers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. B. COMSTOCK,

*Lieut. Col. and Brev. Brig. Gen., Chief Engineer.*

Major A. TERRY,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

It may be added that in thirty bomb-proofs and magazines and their passages there were fourteen thousand five hundred square feet of floor space, not including the main magazine which was exploded, and whose dimensions are unknown.

C. B. C.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION 24TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Fort Fisher, N. C., January 16, 1865.*

I have the honor to submit the following report of the late movements and operations of this division:

On the night of the 2d the division, which had just returned to its camp from a demonstration against this point, received orders to prepare for a second expedition. It left camp on the 3d, and embarked on ocean transports at Bermuda Hundred, between the hours of 7 and 9 p. m. on the 4th instant.

The transport fleet sailed from Fortress Monroe on the morning of the 6th, and the troops disembarked some four miles north of Fort Fisher on the 13th instant.

At 3 o'clock p. m. on the 15th we stormed Fort Fisher. Brevet Brigadier General N. M. Curtis's brigade (the first) made a lodgement on the northwest angle of the fort. I immediately ordered up Colonel G. A. Pennypacker's brigade, (the second.) The enemy was at once driven from behind the palisading extending from the fort to the river, and about one-third of the work, its northwest angle, occupied by us. I then ordered up Colonel Bell's brigade (the third) and moved it forward against and in rear of the sea-face of the work, the ground being much obstructed by the ruins of the barracks, lumber, and other rubbish; the enemy being protected by traverses, and taking advantage of the cover afforded by magazines, &c., checked our advance.

Fighting of a most obstinate character continued till after dark, during which time we made considerable advancement on the left and captured about four hundred prisoners.

About 8 o'clock p. m. Colonel Abbott, with his brigade, completed the occupation of the face of the work extending from the ocean to the river. A general advance was now made, and the fort occupied without opposition.

The conduct of the officers and men of this division was most gallant. Aided by the fire of the navy and an attacking column of sailors and marines along the sea-beach, we were able to pass over the open ground in front of the fort, through the gaps in the palisading in the ditch made by the naval fire, and finally to carry the work.

Where the name of every officer and man engaged in this desperate conflict should be submitted, I shall at present only be able to give a few of those most conspicuous. It is to be hoped they all may be properly rewarded.

Brevet Brigadier General N. M. Curtis, commanding first brigade, was prominent throughout the day for his bravery, coolness, and judgment. His services cannot be overestimated. He fell a short time before dark, seriously wounded in the head by a canister shot.

Colonel G. A. Pennypacker, commanding second brigade, was seriously wounded while planting his colors on the third traverse of the work. This officer was surpassed by none, and his absence during the day most deeply felt and seriously regretted.

Colonel L. Bell, commanding third brigade, was mortally wounded while crossing the bridge in advance of the palisading. He was an able and efficient officer, one not easily replaced.

I here submit the names of the regimental commanders; and in connexion with the brigade commanders is the credit due them for the heroic conduct of their men.

Regimental commanders: First brigade, one hundred and forty-second New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel A. M. Barney; one hundred and seventeenth New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel F. H. Meyer; one hundred and twelfth New York volunteers, Colonel J. F. Smith; third New York volun-

teers, Lieutenant E. A. Behna. Second brigade, forty-eighth New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel W. B. Coan; seventy-sixth Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel J. S. Littell; forty-seventh New York volunteers, Captain J. M. McDonald; two hundred and third Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel J. W. Moore; ninety-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers, First Lieutenant J. Wainwright. Third brigade, one hundred and sixty-ninth New York volunteers, Colonel Alonzo Alden; thirteenth Indiana volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Zent; fourth New Hampshire volunteers, Captain J. H. Roberts; one hundred and fifteenth New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel N. J. Johnson. Colonel J. W. Moore, two hundred and third Pennsylvania volunteers, behaved with the most distinguished gallantry. He was killed while passing the second traverse of the fort, in advance of his regiment, waving his colors. Few equalled, none surpassed, this brave officer.

Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Zent, in command of the thirteenth Indiana, with his own regiment and a detachment of volunteers from the first brigade, numbering in all one hundred men, deployed within two or three hundred yards of the fort, and by their fire materially aided our advance.

Major J. R. Lawrence, thirteenth Indiana volunteers, and Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Colvin, one hundred and sixty-ninth New York volunteers, also behaved in the most gallant manner, and rendered efficient service in collecting and organizing the troops which had become separated from their commands in the charge, and in leading them to positions where important advantages were gained. Captain G. W. Huckins, fourth New Hampshire volunteers, and First Lieutenant J. Konig, seventh United States colored troops, aids on the staff of Colonel L. Bell, commanding third brigade, were untiring in their labors, and rendered valuable services in the absence of my staff officers, who had been stricken down in the early part of the engagement.

Privates Alric Chapin and James Spring, company G, one hundred and forty-second, D. C. Hotchkiss, company A, and O. R. Kingsland, company D, one hundred and twelfth New York volunteers, volunteered to approach to a point considerably in advance of our skirmish line, which they did do, and by this step valuable information with reference to the ditch was gained. Privates James Cadman, wounded; William Cabe, company B; George Hoyt and S. R. Porteus, company C; D. H. Morgan and Edward Petue, company E; E. H. Cooper, company G, wounded; Silas Baker, company H, missing; George Merrill and William J. McDuff, company I; Z. C. Neahel and Bruce Anderson, company K, one hundred and forty-second New York volunteers, volunteered to advance with the head of the column and cut down the palisading.

Copies of the reports of the brigade commanders will be forwarded. In them will be found lists of officers and men who particularly distinguished themselves. It is recommended that medals be bestowed upon all enlisted men mentioned.

To my staff officers I am particularly indebted for their zeal and gallantry throughout the day; they were constantly passing to and fro, and exposed to the hottest fire; I would respectfully recommend that they be brevetted for their services: Captain Charles A. Carleton, assistant adjutant general; Captain A. G. Lawrence, acting aide-de-camp; Captain H. C. Lockwood, aide-de-camp; Captain R. W. Dawson, assistant inspector general; Captain J. S. Mathews, provost marshal; Captain B. B. Keeler, mustering officer.

Captain Lawrence was the first man through the palisading, and while extending his hand to receive a guidon which he intended to place on the parapet of the work a shell exploded near him, taking off his left arm and seriously injuring his throat. He was afterward shot in the right arm. For his services on this occasion as well as those on a former one I most earnestly urge his

promotion. Captain Dawson was disabled by a wound in the left arm. To Captain Lockwood, General Whiting and Colonel Lamb surrendered with the garrison at Fort Buchanan.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. AMES,

*Brigadier General Volunteers.*

Captain A. TERRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Official copy :

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
November 18, 1865.

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*Report of Major General W. S. Rosecrans's operations against Price in the department of Missouri.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,  
*St. Louis, December 7, 1864.*

COLONEL: The commanding general of the military division is already informed, by my current official despatches, of the principal incidents of the late campaign against Price in this department; but it is proper that I should submit a more detailed and connected report of the operations, for a correct understanding of their extent and the importance of the results.

From early in the spring it was known, through the lodges of the O. A. K's and other rebel sources, that Price intended a great invasion of this State, in which he expected the co-operation of that order, and of rebels generally, and by which he hoped to obtain important military and political results. In pursuance of these plans, the lodges, with rebel recruiting officers and agents, sent into Missouri clandestinely or under cover of the amnesty oath for that purpose, began an insurrection in Platte county on the 7th of July last. From that time guerilla warfare raged in the river counties, west from Calloway on the north, and from Cooper on the south side of the Missouri.

This department having been depleted of troops, permission was obtained to raise volunteers to meet the exigencies of our situation, and under it about five complete and as many incomplete regiments of twelve-months volunteer infantry had been organized previously to the raid.

On the 3d of September General Washburn sounded the tocsin by information that the force under Shelby, at Batesville, Arkansas, was about to be joined by Price for the invasion of our State. The ripening of the corn lent to this additional color of probability, so that on the 6th Major General A. J. Smith passing Cairo with a division of infantry on the way to General Sherman, I telegraphed General Halleck the state of affairs, requesting orders for this division to halt at that point and wait until we could ascertain the designs of the enemy.

The division was halted, and on the 9th General Smith received orders from General Halleck to "operate against Price & Co.;" but, deeming it impracticable to penetrate between one and two hundred miles into Arkansas with a small column of infantry, in pursuit of a large mounted force, the exact whereabouts as well as intentions of which were still unknown, he decided to move his command to a point near St. Louis, whence he could readily move by rail or river, and await Price's movements.

From that time information accumulated showing the imminence of the raid.

On the 23d we received certain information that Price had crossed the Arkansas with two divisions of mounted men, three batteries of artillery, a large wagon train, carrying several thousand stand of small-arms, and was at or near Batesville, on White river. From this point, midway between the Mississippi and the western boundary of the State, there are three practicable routes of invasion: one by Pocahontas, into southeastern Missouri; another by West Plains and Rolla or vicinity, north, towards Jefferson City; a third by Cassville, north, either through Springfield and Sedalia, or by the Kansas border, to the Missouri river. Strong military reasons favored the movement of their main force by the central route, while a detachment should go by Pocahontas, and strip southeastern Missouri. Under these circumstances my first object was to secure our great depots at Springfield and Rolla, the hay cut during the summer, and our train of government wagons, required to maintain the troops in the Springfield district. To do this, and, as far as possible, save the scanty agriculture of the country from devastation, it was necessary to hold both Springfield and Rolla. Indeed, to have abandoned these points would have been not only to abandon the loyal people of those districts and their property to destruction, but to invite the enemy to destroy our trains while moving them, capture our stores, and beat our troops in detail.

Generals Sanborn and McNeill were therefore informed and ordered to place the trains and public property of their districts under the protection of the fortifications at Springfield and Rolla, to put their forts in the best possible state of defence, using every foot and dismounted cavalry soldier, including citizens and local militia, to the best advantage, and with all their efficient mounted force to watch the enemy's motions, and report the earliest indications of the direction of the coming storm. General Brown was ordered to concentrate all troops from the west of the central district at Sedalia, to notify the citizen guards, and see that neither they nor their arms were exposed to capture.

On the 24th Shelby was reported south of Pilot Knob, moving toward Farmington with five thousand men and four pieces of artillery. General Ewing was ordered to concentrate the troops in the southern part of his district at Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau; and to verify the accuracy of this report, which proved true, on the 26th General A. J. Smith, with two of his brigades, was ordered to a point on the Iron Mountain railroad "as far towards Pilot Knob as he deemed compatible with certainty that his position would not be turned" and the "enemy get between him and St. Louis." On the day before Sanborn had orders to move, with all his mounted force, to Rolla, it having become evident that the enemy would not probably strike west of that point.

The safety of St. Louis was vital to us; I therefore telegraphed Brigadier General H. E. Paine, commanding in Illinois, who promised me assistance from some regiments of returning "hundred-day volunteers," who, though they had already served beyond their time, generously consented to come for the defence of the city. The enrolled militia of St. Louis, though but skeleton regiments, were called out, and the citizens also requested to organize and arm. General Ewing was sent to Pilot Knob, with directions to use his utmost exertions to find out whether any more than Shelby's division was in southeast Missouri, and to that end to hold Pilot Knob until he was certain. With a soldierly comprehension of the importance of his duties, while reporting the current rumors of the advance of Price with his whole force, he expressed his doubts, and held his position until the 27th, when he sustained a terrific assault, in Fort Davidson, a small field-work in the valley, surrounded by hills within cannon range, which he held with about one thousand men, one-half raw troops—establishing, beyond question, the presence of all Price's command in that quarter. He gloriously repulsed, killing and wounding some fifteen hundred of the enemy, and lost only twenty-eight killed and fifty-six wounded, as appears from his report herewith. While Ewing's fight was going on, Shelby advanced on

Potosi, and thence to Big River bridge, threatening General Smith's advance, which withdrew from that point to within safer supporting distance of his main position at De Soto.

Previous to and pending these events the guerilla warfare in North Missouri had been waging with redoubled fury. Rebel agents, amnesty-oath takers, recruits, sympathizers, O. A. K.'s, and traitors of every hue and stripe, had warmed into life at the approach of the great invasion. Women's fingers were busy making clothes for rebel soldiers out of goods plundered by the guerillas; women's tongues were busy telling Union neighbors "their time was now coming." General Fisk, with all his force, had been scouring the brush for weeks in the river counties in pursuit of hostile bands, composed largely of recruits from among that class of inhabitants who claim protection, yet decline to perform the full duties of citizens, on the ground that they "never tuck no sides." A few facts will convey some idea of this warfare carried on by confederate agents here, while the agents abroad of their bloody and hypocritical despotism, Mason, Slidell, and Mann, in Europe, have the effrontery to tell the nations of Christendom our government carries on the war with increasing ferocity, regardless of the laws of civilized warfare. These gangs of rebels, whose families had been living in peace among their loyal neighbors, committed the most cold-blooded and diabolical murders, such as riding up to a farm-house, asking for water, and while receiving it shooting down the giver, an aged, inoffensive farmer, because he was a radical "Union man." In the single sub-district of Mexico the commanding officer furnished a list of near one hundred Union men who, in the course of six weeks, had been killed, maimed, or "run off" because they were radical "Union men" or d—d abolitionists. About the 1st of September Anderson's gang attacked a railroad train on the North Missouri road, took from it twenty-two unarmed soldiers, many on sick-leave, and, after robbing, placed them in a row and shot them in cold blood. Some of the bodies they scalped, and put others across the track and ran the engine over them. On the 27th this gang, with numbers swollen to three or four hundred, attacked Major Johnson, with about 120 men of the 39th Missouri volunteer infantry, raw recruits, and after stampeding their horses, shot every man, most of them in cold blood. Anderson, a few days later, was recognized by General Price at Booneville as confederate captain, and, with a verbal admonition to behave himself, ordered by Colonel McLane, chief of Price's staff, to proceed to north Missouri and destroy the railroads, which orders were found on the miscreant when killed by Lieutenant Colonel Cox about the 27th of October ultimo.

On the 28th, when information of Ewing's fight and Price's presence at Pilot Knob came to hand, General Smith, discovering the enemy on his front, moving to west and north in pursuance of his orders to hold the most advanced position compatible with the certainty of keeping between the enemy and St. Louis, determined to leave De Soto and retire behind the Meramec, a stream which, at from ten to fifteen miles south of St. Louis, offered considerable obstacles to the passage of a hostile force with wagons and artillery. General Ewing, finding Marmaduke's and Fagen's rebel divisions before him, and his position commanded by a numerically superior artillery, acting on suggestions made when discussing with him the possibilities of the position on the night of the 27th, spiked his heavy guns, blew up the magazine, ammunition, and supplies, and, with the field battery and remains of his command, retreated through the hills towards the Meramec valley, hoping to reach a point on the railroad from whence he could move to St. Louis. But, as will be seen from his report, the enemy pursued him, harassed his rear on the march, which he directed along a ridge where the enemy could not flank him, and overtook him near Harrison's Station, where, seizing and extending the temporary defences constructed by the militia, he displayed such vigor that, after harassing him for thirty-six hours, and making several attacks, on the approach of a detachment of Sanborn's cav-

ally, the rebels left him, and he escaped, with all his command, to Rolla. The enemy's strength and position thus developed, my first business was to secure the points he best could strike—St. Louis, Jefferson City, and Rolla. General Smith's 4,500 infantry, and the mounted force we could raise, 7th Kansas, just in from Memphis, part of the 13th Missouri volunteer cavalry, Colonel Catherwood, and the recruits of Merrill's Horse, hastily mounted and organized, a total of 1,500 men, were all the force we could place between St. Louis and an invading army of at least 15,000 mounted men, whose advance was within a day's march of the city. Meanwhile Brigadier General Pike, ably seconded by Generals Wolfe and Miller, of the Enrolled Missouri militia, had assembled and armed skeletons of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 13th, and 52d regiments of enrolled militia. The mayor and others, under the direction of the Hon. B. Gratz Brown and Major Ledergerber, organized the citizens exempt from militia duty, who volunteered for the defence of the city, into companies and regiments, numbering, by the 30th, some four or five thousand men. The 132d, 134th, 138th, 140th, and 142d Illinois hundred-day volunteers also began to arrive on the 30th, and were all in by October 1, and formed into a brigade, under Colonel Wangelin, for the immediate defence of the city, beyond which they did not wish to serve, as all of them were out over time, and many having desirable offers as substitutes.

The enemy, moving up by Potosi, seemed to halt at Richwoods, about forty miles southwest of St. Louis, in the hills between Big River and the Meramec, as if concentrating for an attack on the city. This appeared the more possible from the magnitude of his interest in it, and the fact that he did not show much force in the Meramec valley even on the 30th. On that day Major General Smith was ordered to occupy Kirkwood, which commands the Richwoods road and crossing of the Meramec to St. Louis, his cavalry to reconnoitre south and west, Colonel Merrill going as far as Franklin.

General Fisk, previously ordered to join General Brown with all his available force, reached and reported from Jefferson City to-day. At the close of it, news came that a brigade of rebel cavalry had burned the Moselle bridge, and were moving north towards Franklin. General Smith was ordered to send a brigade of infantry to support the cavalry at that point, and on the 1st of October Colonel Wolfe with his brigade reached Franklin, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove the enemy from the place, but not until he had burned the depot.

The rebels were now apparently at bay, with 1,500 cavalry and 4,500 infantry. General Smith was not in condition to attempt offensive movements against a force of 15,000 veteran mounted rebels, who could reach St. Louis from any point in the Meramec valley where he might confront them in half the time it would take his infantry to reach it. Our obvious policy under these circumstances was to keep as close as possible to the enemy without risking St. Louis, until General Mower's command should arrive from Arkansas, or at least we be able to join to Smith's our mounted forces at Rolla. Every hour's delay of the enemy in the Meramec valley brought Mower nearer and increased our chance of striking him, as it did the security of Jefferson City. On the 2d the enemy was reported massing in the vicinity of Union, on the road either to Jefferson City or Rolla, and General Smith was ordered to Franklin. But as the enemy's movements appeared to tend westward, on the 3d General Smith was advanced to Gray's summit, and General Pike moved to Franklin. On the 4th General Smith pushed his cavalry towards the Gasconade, advanced his infantry to Union, followed up by General Pike's militia. On the 5th Price's command took Herman, burned the Gasconade bridge, and was crossing that stream at the old State road ford. General Smith followed him. General Mower reported his arrival at Girardeau, out of supplies, his teams worn down, part of his cavalry dismounted and many horses unshod. Transports and supply boats were at once despatched, and on the 8th and 9th his command reached St. Louis,

from whence the infantry was pushed forward by water as rapidly as the low stage of the river would permit, to join General Smith. The cavalry under Winslow re-shod and started by land from St. Louis on the 10th, towards Jefferson City, which point it reached on the 16th instant, one day in advance of the infantry.

On the 6th the enemy began crossing the Osage at Castle Rock and one or two other fords under cover of his artillery, opposed by Colonel Phillips with the available cavalry at Jefferson City. While thus engaged, Generals McNeil and Sanborn reached Jefferson City, by a forced march, with all the mounted force from Rolla, and uniting with Fisk and Brown, gave us a garrison there of 4,100 cavalry and 2,600 infantry, mostly the new and partially organized twelve-months men, with a few citizens and militia. As this force, though capable of giving a strong battle behind intrenchments, was not very formidable to act offensively against a veteran force like that of the enemy, it was decided by General Fisk, the other three generals concurring, to oppose a moderate resistance to the enemy's advance across the Moreau, a small stream with muddy banks and bad bottom, four or five miles east of the city, and then to retire and receive his attack at the defensive line, which with industry and good judgment had been prepared by the entire laboring force, civil and military, at Jefferson City. The enemy burned the Osage bridge and crossed the river on the 6th.

On the 7th he advanced on the city, crossed the Moreau, after sharp fighting, and developed a line of battle three or four miles long, east, south, and west of the place. But after reconnoitring its apparently formidable intrenchments, warned by his Pilot Knob experience in storming earthworks, he declined attacking, and, passing his train in rear, moved around, massing on the west, and finally retiring.

On the 8th General Pleasanton, on his arrival at Jefferson under orders to assume command, despatched General Sanborn with all the available cavalry, 4,100 men, to follow and harass the enemy until General Smith's command could come up. General Smith was informed of the rebel failure at Jefferson, and directed to move by the most expeditious route to that place, where Mower's infantry were to join and the cavalry overtake him. He was to send all his cavalry, under Colonel Catherwood, in advance to report to Pleasanton, who, on its arrival, was to join Sanborn and assume direction of the provisional cavalry division thus formed. General Pike, with his militia, was charged with the control of the country and the defences of our line of communication from St. Louis to Jefferson City. Sanborn followed the rebels, attacked their rear guard at Versailles, where it was uncertain what course they would take; found they were going north towards Booneville, followed and drove them into line of battle near that place, and, when he found himself nearly enveloped by their entire army, fell back out of their reach to meet Catherwood's command and his provisions, which both arrived at California on the 14th. The enemy, taking advantage of this, crossed the Lamine at Scott's and Dug fords, and moved north towards Arrow Rock. Sanborn immediately followed this movement by Georgetown bridge, keeping between the Pacific railroad and the line of the enemy's march, and holding the line of the Blackwater, a western tributary of the Lamine, while Price, crossing a part of Shelby's command at Arrow Rock, on the Booneville ferry-boat, to the north side of the river, advanced on Glasgow, which he captured after a seven hours' fight with a part of Colonel Harding's regiment, forty-third Missouri volunteer infantry, and small detachments of the 9th Missouri State militia and seventeenth Illinois cavalry.

On the 17th our cavalry, following his westward movement, keeping south of without pressing him, until General Smith's and Mower's troops could be brought up, kept the line of the Blackwater, and on the 17th reported themselves out of supplies and the enemy between Marshall and Waverly.

On the 17th Mower's infantry, except two small regiments, arrived at Jef-

erson City, and went at once by rail to Lamine bridge to join General Smith, who, passing Jefferson by land on the 14th, had followed the cavalry movement to that point, taking charge of the supplies, which, in consequence of the destruction of the bridge by the rebels, could go by rail no farther. Winslow's cavalry, marching, reached Jefferson, the advance twenty miles beyond, at California, on the 16th, and was ordered to join General Pleasanton without delay.

On the 18th General Smith was ordered to move to Dunksburg, near the cavalry headquarters, taking five days' rations and leaving minimum garrisons to guard and handle stores at Sedalia and Lamine bridge.

The 19th found the movement accomplished, the cavalry with its centre near Cook's store, its right behind the Blackwater, and its left near Kirkpatrick's Mills towards Warrensburg. The enemy apparently hesitated in the vicinity of Marshall, as if uncertain whether to go west or double on his tracks between Sedalia and Jefferson; but our cavalry advance, receding a few miles to meet supplies and concentrate, on the 17th and 18th, seemed to decide his movement towards Lexington, where General Curtis telegraphed me on the 19th the head of his column had arrived, General Blunt, after a sharp skirmish, retiring towards Independence. I informed General Curtis of our position; that our troops reported Price near Waverly; advised that Blunt check his advance at Wellington, and as soon as we were sure his main force was moving on Lexington we would endeavor, by a forced march, to strike him in the flank.

To ascertain Price's real intentions, General Pleasanton was directed to make a strong reconnoissance towards Waverly. The results of this reached me on the morning of the 20th, and Pleasanton was directed at once to push the centre of his cavalry to Lexington, and General Smith, with his infantry, to support the movement. At 7 p. m. Pleasanton reported the enemy had left Lexington, going west, and McNeil and Sanborn entering the town.

October 21, our cavalry advance followed the enemy to Fire Creek Prairie, Brown's and Winslow's brigades reaching Lexington at 2 o'clock p. m., and the infantry at 9 p. m. of the same day. General Curtis also reported a fight with the enemy's entire force at the Little Blue from 10 a. m. to 2 p. m., and that to prevent being flanked he should retire to the Big Blue, where his militia and artillery were in strong position. Supposing the enemy could not cross the Big Blue in the face of Curtis, I despatched General Pleasanton my belief that he would move south, and that while McNeil's brigade should harass his rear, he, with the other three brigades, should move towards Lone Jack, near which would be General Smith's infantry, now marching from Lexington to Chapel Hill. At 10 o'clock p. m., a despatch from Pleasanton informed me of the receipt of these conditional orders, and that the enemy, in full force, were moving far to the west, followed by his cavalry.

October 22, Pleasanton's cavalry reached the Little Blue at 10 a. m.; found the bridge destroyed; a temporary one was constructed, the enemy's skirmishers driven, the command crossed, when the enemy opened with artillery and was steadily driven towards Independence, which place was taken by a brilliant cavalry charge, in which Catherwood's regiment captured two guns complete. Near a hundred prisoners fell into our hands, and our troops pushed the enemy's rear guard all night. At 8 p. m. Pleasanton reports, "All my brigades have been engaged. The enemy have left forty killed and many sick and wounded in my hands. Heard nothing from Curtis. If Smith can come up in case we get a fight, it will be well. Have sent McNeil's brigade to Little Santa Fé. Price is reported intrenched this side of the Big Blue. Fighting still going on with an obstinate rear guard. Let Smith come to this place." Reluctantly General Smith was despatched to move to Independence, as requested, the messenger reaching him at Chapel Hill as he was putting his column in motion to march there in response to a direct message from General Pleasanton advising him of the posture of affairs.

On the morning of the 23d Pleasonton began to move on the enemy at the crossing of the Big Blue, where the fight opened at 7 a. m. and continued until 1 p. m., when Shelby, who had been fighting General Curtis's command, finding Marmaduke and Fagan were giving way, turned on Pleasonton, and "for a moment shook Sanborn's brigade," but by the skilful use of Thurber's battery, throwing double-shotted grape and canister, and the gallant charging of our troops they were routed and fled southward, pushed by Generals Pleasonton and Curtis that night beyond Little Santa Fé.

General Smith's command, arriving at Independence, at 5 p. m. was ordered to move that night by a forced march to Hickman's mill, hoping it would strike the enemy in flank while passing that point. Had he been ordered and marched for that point instead of Independence the day before, General Smith would have arrived in time to strike the enemy's compact columns and train with 9,000 infantry and five batteries. But it was too late. He did not reach the mill until long after not only the enemy's, but our own columns had passed there. News from the cavalry fronts during the night showed that nothing remained but to push the enemy with our cavalry, allowing the infantry to follow as best it could, to act as support in case of possible reverse to us or re-enforcements which were currently reported on their way to meet the enemy.

On the 24th, with the Kansas troops in advance, we pursued the enemy until within fifteen miles of the trading post, when, at General Curtis's request, General Pleasonton's command took the lead, and at the end of sixty miles' march overtook the rebels about midnight at the Marias des Cygnes; began skirmishing, and on the 25th, at 4 a. m., opened on their bivouac with artillery, creating the greatest consternation, following it up by an attack which drove them promptly from the field, leaving in our hands horses, mules, wagons, arms, and some prisoners. Our troops followed them in a running fight until 2 o'clock p. m., when they came up with them at the Little Osage crossing, in position, with eight pieces of artillery on their line of battle. With the instinct of a true cavalry general, Pleasonton immediately ordered an attack by Benteen's and Phillips's brigades, which by a magnificent charge completely routed them, capturing eight guns, two stands of colors, Major General Marmaduke, Brigadier General Cabell, five colonels, other officers, and near one thousand prisoners, besides wagons, small-arms, &c. Sanborn's brigade, which was a mile and a half behind, and the Kansas troops, still further in rear, did not arrive in time to take part in the battle; but Sanborn's brigade led in the pursuit of the routed enemy, overtook them at a small stream a few miles beyond the battle-ground, charged them in the timber, drove them across it into the open prairie, where they formed in order of battle three miles deep. But such was the enthusiasm of the men of this brigade when they reached the edge of the wood and saw this triple line, they charged it without orders, knocked it in pieces, and chased the fugitives until night closed the pursuit, and the enemy fled under cover of the darkness, towards the Arkansas border. Besides the wagons captured during this day at the Marias des Cygnes, on the way to and at the Little Osage, the enemy had destroyed many, including ammunition wagons, and for twenty-five or thirty miles beyond the Osage battle-field, their route was strewn with debris of burning wagons and other property. Pleasonton's cavalry had now been in motion almost day and night for six days, during which it had marched at least 204 miles and fought four battles. It was pretty well exhausted and broken down, and went into Fort Scott that night for food and a little rest. He reported to me the result of his day's work—that the enemy was going at his utmost, and his own troops were so broken down it would be impossible, without fresh horses, to strike the enemy another great blow this side of the Arkansas, and recommended that Generals Sanborn and McNeil follow to support Curtis's troops in pursuit, so long as there was any prospect of damaging the enemy, and then return to Springfield and Rolla.

On the receipt of the news of the enemy's rout, General Smith, whose command was out of provisions, was directed to move to Harrisonville, and thence get supplies from Warrensburg, where one hundred wagons were waiting with provisions for our command, sending thirty thousand rations to the cavalry. Further reports of the enemy's condition satisfied me there would be no use of breaking down any more of our horses, since General Curtis, whose cavalry horses were fresher than ours, supported by Sanborn and McNeil, on their way down the State line, would be more than ample to deal with any resistance Price's command would offer this side of the Arkansas.

Orders were accordingly given, and General Pleasanton returned with Phillips's brigade, the cannon, and part of the prisoners, to Warrensburg. The Kansas troops and Benteen's brigade pursued the enemy's flying columns, a part of whom made their last stand at Newtonia, Missouri, where General Blunt overtook and attacked them on the 28th, but was being worsted when Sanborn, having marched one hundred and two miles in thirty-six hours, arrived in time to save the day. The enemy fled, making no further stand this side of the Arkansas. In a country destitute of food for man and beast, five times defeated, pursued four or five hundred miles with the loss of nearly all their artillery, ammunition, and baggage train, demoralization and destitution and want of supplies, would the rebels cross the Arkansas for supplies at the risk of falling into the hands of Thayer's forces or Steele's cavalry; and if allowed, would almost disintegrate and disband them on the way thither.

General Curtis thought pushing them was best, and accordingly followed, although he did not again overtake them. At his urgent instance, against my own judgment as well as that of Generals Sanborn and McNeil, I pushed their two brigades down to the Arkansas border, whence Sanborn sent an advance to Fort Smith, reaching there on the morning of the 8th, to notify General Thayer of the enemy's desperate condition, and the direction he had taken from Cane Hill towards the Indian nation, between Fort Smith and Fort Gibson.

Meanwhile, at Sherman's request, followed by orders from the general-in-chief, I directed Major General A. J. Smith to move his command by the most expeditious route to the Mississippi in the vicinity of St. Louis, there to embark and proceed to Nashville and report to Major General George H. Thomas.

On the 3d of November I returned to St. Louis, to be there during the election, and on the receipt of the news of the enemy having crossed the Arkansas, directed the cavalry to repair to their respective districts, and Winslow's cavalry to move by the best route and join General Thomas at Nashville.

In entering into details, I have aimed to give the general commanding a sort of military photograph of our daily condition and movements, as well for his critical judgment as for history, omitting events of whatever magnitude, not having a bearing on our movements, and most of the minor ones which did enter into their determination. I trust that the precautions taken in advance of Price's movements; the preparations before we knew where he was coming; the means taken to secure our most important points, and occupy him until we could concentrate the forces to strike him with a certainty of success, outweighing any damage he could meanwhile do us; the energy and activity in concentration; vigor in pursuit and fiery gallantry of our troops in battle, will receive the approbation of the general commanding the military division.

It will appear from these details and accompanying reports that our dismounted cavalry, infantry, and militia nobly performed their duty, watching, marching, and fighting whenever and wherever opportunity offered; that by their aid in holding our depots and supporting our mounted force, we have saved all our important posts, and most of the country from pillage, except a belt of some twenty miles wide along the route of the invasion, and with less than seven thousand effective cavalry have pursued, overtaken, beaten in several engagements, and finally routed an invading cavalry variously estimated at

from 15,000 to 26,000 men, re-enforced by six thousand armed recruits from Missouri, taking from them *ten pieces* of artillery, two stands of colors, 1,958 prisoners of war, a large number of horses, mules, wagons, and small-arms; compelled them to destroy most of their remaining wagons, train and plunder, blasted all of the political schemes of the rebels and traitors who concerted with Price to revolutionize Missouri, destroy Kansas, and turn the State and presidential election against the Union cause, and by our triumph in the late elections have given to gallant and suffering Missouri the fairest prospect she has ever yet seen of future freedom, peace, and prosperity—all the fruit of a campaign of forty-eight days, in which most of our victorious troops had never before seen a great cavalry battle. Rarely during this or any other war has cavalry displayed more persevering energy in pursuit, more impetuous courage and gallantry in attacking, regardless of superior numbers, or had its efforts crowned with greater fruits of success.

While paying a just tribute of thanks to all the officers and soldiers of the cavalry, artillery, infantry, militia and citizen guards, who served during the raid, for their prompt and cheerful obedience of all orders, whether to labor, march, or fight, I must refer to the accompanying reports of their commanders for special mentions of individual gallantry. Major General Pleasonton deserves the thanks of the country for the able manner in which he handled and fought the cavalry, and for the brilliant and fruitful victories he won over triple his own force. I hope he may receive promotion in the regular army. Major General A. J. Smith deserves thanks for promptitude, energy, and perseverance in all his movements, and for the good judgment displayed in his campaign. Nor must I omit a tribute of admiration to those brave and true soldiers, who, under Mower, followed Price from Arkansas, marching 300 miles in eighteen days, and after going by boat from Cape Girardeau to Jefferson City, resumed the pursuit, making another march of 462 miles before they embarked for Nashville, to take part in the not doubtful contest before that city for the mastery of Middle Tennessee. The district commanders all deserve my thanks for prompt and cordial co-operation in all measures, precautionary and preparatory, for the raid.

General Ewing deserves special mention for military judgment, courage and gallantry in holding Pilot Knob till he had certainty of the enemy's force, as well as for the manner in which he withdrew his troops to Rolla. General McNeil, for promptitude and energy in putting Rolla in a state of defence, and for moving with all force to Jefferson City in time to succor it; General Fisk, for the prompt and cheerful discharge of very trying administrative duties, and for his energy and good sense in preparing the defence of Jefferson City, as in the subsequent repair of Lamine bridge. General Brown displayed energy and good sense in preparing the city for a good defence, and General Sanborn for vigilance, energy and soldierly judgment, while commanding the cavalry advance between Jefferson City and Dunksburg, as well as throughout the campaign. Colonel J. V. Dubois, aide-de-camp, chief of staff; Captain Henry, assistant quartermaster, of General Steele's staff, volunteer staff quartermaster in the field; Captain G. Schull, chief commissary; Surgeon P. V. Schenck, medical director in the field; Captain Hoelcke, acting aide-de-camp, engineer; Major Fisher, 5th Missouri State Militia, on engineer duty; Captain J. F. Bennett, assistant adjutant general, and my personal aids, Major F. S. Bond, aide-de-camp, and Captain R. S. Thomas, aide-de-camp; Captain Hills, 12th Kansas militia, provost marshal, accompanied me during the campaign, and were zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of their respective duties; Major McDermott, 1st Iowa cavalry, who, with his battalion of 1st Iowa cavalry, did such good service in North Missouri, and behaved very gallantly in the pursuit of the rebels from Jefferson City to Boonville, commanded the escort from Sedalia, and deserves honorable mention. Brigadier General J. B. Gray,

adjutant general of Missouri, and Brigadier General Pike, of the enrolled, are entitled to public thanks for their valuable and indefatigable services in connexion with the enrolled militia. Colonel F. J. Haines, commissary of subsistence, to whom all the armies, as well as the country, owe a debt of gratitude for invaluable services, not likely to be overpaid, displayed his usual promptitude and foresight in providing for the wants of our troops and depots. Colonel William Myers, chief quartermaster, in supplying animals, fitting up trains, and providing for the wants of our troops, exhibited his characteristic care and skill.

I must also mention the voluntary services of those tried veterans, Colonel Wangelin, of the 12th Missouri Volunteer Infantry, and Colonel Laibold, who did all in their power to aid in the defence of St. Louis.

Senator B. Gratz Brown and Mayor Thomas, seconded by the efforts of many patriotic citizens of all classes, did much to prepare for the defence of the city, and deserve my thanks. I should be glad to call the general's attention to many militia officers, such as General Craig, whose able management in the northwest, in the absence of General Fisk; Colonel Gale, who so promptly organized his militia regiment, 54th E. M. M., at Franklin, and many others scattered over the State, who rendered great service to the country.

But as the chief motive of these officers and the men of their commands was their country's good, the consciousness of duty manfully performed must be their chief reward, until the day comes when our children, pointing to them as to others who have borne arms in this great national struggle, shall say, "there go some of the men who helped to save our nation."

The accompanying reports show our total losses in this campaign were: 174 killed, of whom 116 were murdered at Centralia; 336 wounded; 171 prisoners, of whom many, if not all, are illegally paroled; 681 *hors du combat*. Besides which, there were several small squads of prisoners illegally captured and paroled in southeast Missouri, and the troops at Glasgow, whose surrender was, I think, justifiable, and possibly lawful.

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major General*.

Lieut. Col. CHRISTISON, *Assistant Adjutant General*,  
*Military Division West Mississippi, New Orleans, La.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *November 18, 1865.*

Official copy :

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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*General Banks's Report of the Red River Campaign.*

SIR: While engaged in earnest efforts to effect the capture of Galveston, with a view to those general operations contemplated for the winter campaign, I was informed by a despatch received January 23, and dated January 4, that "it was proposed that General Steele should advance to Red river if he could rely upon your (my) co-operation, and be certain of receiving supplies on that line," and that "the best military opinions of the generals of the west seemed to favor operations on Red river, provided the stage of the water would enable the gunboats to co-operate;" that "this would open a better theatre of operations than any other for such troops as General Grant could spare during the winter." I was also informed that Major General Grant and Major General Steele had been written to, and I was *instructed to communicate with them upon this subject.*

Having made known my plan of operations on the coast, and fully stated at different times the difficulties to be encountered in movements by land in the direction of Alexandria and Shreveport, I did not feel at liberty to decline par-

ticipation in the campaign which had been pressed upon my attention from the time I was assigned to the command of this department, and which was now supported by the concurrent opinions of the general officers in the west, on account of difficulties which might be obviated by personal conference with commanders, or by orders from the general-in-chief. It was not, however, without well-founded apprehensions of the result of the campaign and a clear view of the measures (which I suggested) indispensable to success, that I entered upon this new campaign.

The necessity of a perfect unity of command and of purpose, as well as of constant communication between the forces assigned to this duty and then separated by hundreds of miles, was too apparent to admit of question.

I replied to this despatch on the 23d of January, stating that "*with the forces proposed,*" to wit, General Sherman's and General Steele's and my own disposable force, I concurred in the opinion that the Red river was the shortest and best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas, and that with my own forces and those of General Steele and the assistance of General Sherman, the success of the movements on that line might be made certain and important, and that I should cordially co-operate with them in executing the orders of the government.

In order that the inherent difficulties attending the proposed combined movement, which had been thoroughly tested in the campaign of 1863 and 1864, and which I had represented with as much earnestness as seemed to be proper, might be presented in a manner most likely to gain attention, I directed Major D. C. Houston, chief engineer of the department, who possessed the highest claims to favorable consideration from professional qualifications and experience and his acquaintance with the route, to prepare a memorial upon operations on Red river, which had been long under consideration.

This was transmitted to the headquarters of the army, and appeared to have received the attention and approval of the general-in-chief. It stated with precision the obstacles to be encountered and the measures necessary to accomplish the object in view. No change would be required in this statement if it had been written in review, rather than in anticipation, of the campaign. It recommended, as a condition indispensable to success, 1st, such complete preliminary organization as would avoid the least delay in our movements after the campaign had opened; 2d, that a line of supply be established from the Mississippi, independent of water-courses; 3d, the concentration of the forces west of the Mississippi, and such other force as should be assigned to this duty from General Sherman's command, in such a manner as to expel the enemy from northern Louisiana and Arkansas; 4th, such preparation and concert of action among the different corps employed as to prevent the enemy, by keeping him constantly employed, from operating against our positions or forces elsewhere; and, 5th, that the entire force should be placed under the command of a single general. Preparations for a long campaign were advised, and the month of May indicated as the point of time when the occupation of Shreveport might be anticipated. Not one of these suggestions, so necessary in conquering the inherent difficulties of the expedition, were carried into execution, nor was it in my power to establish them. The troops under the command of General Steele were acting independently of my command, under orders not communicated to me, and at such distance that it was impossible to ascertain his movements or to inform him of my own, so that we might co-operate with or support each other. The detachment of troops from the command of Major General Sherman, though operating upon the same line with my own, were under special orders, having ulterior objects in view, and afforded an earnest but only a partial co-operation in the expedition. The distance which separated the different commands, the impossibility of establishing necessary communications between them, the absence of a general authority to command

them, the time that was required for the transmission of orders from Washington, and the necessity of immediate action, on account of the condition of the rivers and operations contemplated for the armies elsewhere, gave rise to embarrassments in the organization of forces and in the execution of orders which could not be overcome.

In the instructions I received from the government it was left to my discretion whether or not I would join in this expedition; but I was directed to communicate with General Sherman and General Steele and Admiral Porter upon the subject. I expressed the satisfaction I should find in co-operating with them in a movement deemed of so much importance by the government, to which my own command was unequal, and my belief that, *with the forces designated*, it would be entirely successful. Having received from them similar assurances, both my discretion and my authority, so far as the organization of the expedition was concerned, were at an end. The disposition of the enemy's forces at that time, according to the best information that could be obtained, was as follows: Magruder had about 20,000 men, of all arms, of which 15,000 were serviceable. The main body covered Galveston and Houston from an anticipated movement from Matagorda peninsula, still held by our troops. Walker's division, numbering 7,000 men, were upon the Atchafalaya and Red rivers, from Opelousas to Fort De Russy; Mouton's division, between the Black and Washita rivers, from Red river to Monroe, numbering 6,000 men; while Price, with two heavy divisions of infantry, estimated at 5,000, and a large cavalry force, estimated at from 7,000 to 10,000, held the country from Monroe to Camden and Arkadelphia, confronting Steele. Magruder could spare 10,000 of his force to resist an attack from the east, leaving his fortifications well garrisoned on the coast, while Price could furnish, at least, an additional 5,000 from the north, making a formidable army of from 25,000 to 30,000 men, equal to any forces that could be brought against them, even with the most perfect unity and co-operation of commands. This estimate of the strength of the enemy was given in my despatch of February 2, but was thought, upon information received by the government, to be exaggerated. The defences of the enemy consisted of a series of works covering the approaches to Galveston and Houston from the south, the defences of Galveston bay, Sabine Pass, and Sabine river, Fort De Russy, a formidable work located three miles from Marksville for the defence of the Red river, and extensive and formidable works at Trinity, the junction of the Tensas and Washita at Camden, commanding approaches from the north.

To meet these forces of the enemy, it was proposed to concentrate, in some general plan of operations, 15,000 of the troops, under command of General Steele, a detachment of 10,000 from the command of General Sherman, and a force from 15,000 to 17,000 men from the army of the Gulf, making an army of 35,000 to 37,000 men of all arms, with such gunboats as the Navy Department should order. Orders were given to my command at once to suspend operations at Galveston, and vigorous preparations were made for the new campaign. Having been charged by the President with duties not immediately connected with military operations, but which were deemed important, and required my personal attention at New Orleans, the organization of the troops of my command assigned to the expedition was intrusted to Major General W. B. Franklin. The main body of his command, consisting of the 19th corps, (except Grover's division, at Madisonville, which was to join him,) and one division of the 13th corps, under General Ransom, were at this time on Berwick's bay, between Berwick City and Franklin, on the Bayou Teche, directly on the line of march for Alexandria and Shreveport. Small garrisons were left at Brownsville and Matagorda bay, in Texas, (positions which, under instructions from the President, and subsequently from Lieutenant General Grant, were not to be abandoned,) at New Orleans and at Port Hudson, which was threatened by a

vigorous and active enemy. Smaller garrisons at Baton Rouge and Donaldsonville, on the river, and at Pensacola and Key West, on the coast, constituted the balance of forces under my command.

It had been arranged that the troops concentrated at Franklin should move for the Red river on the 7th of March to meet the forces of General Sherman at Alexandria on the 17th, but, for causes stated by General Franklin, the march was delayed until the 13th, at which time the advance, under General A. L. Lee, left Franklin, the whole column following soon after and arriving at Alexandria, the cavalry on the 19th and the infantry on the 25th. On the 13th of March, 1864, one division of the 16th corps, under Brigadier General Mower, and one division of the 17th corps, under Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith—the whole under command of Brigadier General A. J. Smith—landed at Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya, and proceeded at once towards Fort De Russy, carrying it by assault at 4.30 p. m., on the afternoon of the 14th. Two hundred and sixty prisoners and ten heavy guns were captured. Our loss was slight. The troops and transports under General A. J. Smith, and the marine brigade under General Ellet, with the gunboats, moved to Alexandria, which was occupied without opposition on the 16th of the same month. General Lee, of my command, arrived at Alexandria on the morning of the 19th. The enemy, in the mean time, continued his retreat through Cheneyville, in the direction of Shreveport. Officers of my staff were at Alexandria on the 19th, and I made my headquarters there on the 24th, the forces under General Franklin arriving on the 25th and 26th of March; but as the stage of the water in Red river was too low to admit the passage of the gunboats or transports over the falls, the troops encamped near Alexandria, General Smith and his command moving forward twenty-one miles to Bayou Rapides, above Alexandria. There was but six feet of water in the channel, while seven and a half was necessary for the second-class, and ten feet for the first-class gunboats. The river is narrow, the channel tortuous, changing with every rise, making its navigation more difficult and dangerous, probably, than any of the western rivers, while pilots for the transports were reluctant to enter government service for this campaign. The first gunboat was unable to cross the rapids until the 26th; others crossed on the 28th with some transports, and others still on the 2d and 3d of April, the passage having been made with difficulty and danger, occupying several days. Several gunboats and transports, being unable then to ascend the river, remained at Alexandria or returned to the Mississippi.

While at Alexandria Major General McPherson, commanding at Vicksburg, called for the immediate return of the marine brigade—a part of General Smith's command—to protect the Mississippi, for which service it had been especially organized. The transports of this brigade were unable to pass above Alexandria. The hospital boat, Woodford, had been wrecked on the rapids in attempting the passage up. The troops were suffering from smallpox, which pervaded all the transports, and they were reported in condition of partial mutiny. It was not supposed at that time that a depot or garrison at Alexandria would be required, and this command being without available land or water transportation, was permitted to return to the Mississippi in compliance with the demands of General McPherson. This reduced the strength of the advancing column about 3,000 men.

The condition of the river and the inability of the transports to pass the falls made it necessary to establish a depot of supplies at Alexandria, and a line of wagon transportation from the steamers below to those above the falls. This was a departure from the plan of the campaign, which did not contemplate a post or depot at any point on Red river, and involved the necessity of leaving a division at Alexandria for the purpose of protecting the depot, transports, and supplies. Brigadier General C. Grover was placed in command of the post, and

his division left for its defence. This reduced the force of the advancing column about 3,000 men.

While at Alexandria, on the 21st instant, a movement was organized against the enemy posted at Henderson's Hill, twenty-five miles in advance. The expedition consisted of three brigades of General A. J. Smith's command and a brigade of cavalry of the 19th corps, under command of Colonel Lucas, of the 16th Indiana volunteers—the whole under command of Brigadier General Mower, of the 16th corps. The enemy were surprised, losing two hundred and fifty prisoners, two hundred horses, and four guns with their caissons. Colonel H. B. Sargent, of my staff, was severely wounded in this action, and disabled from service during the campaign. This affair reflected the highest credit upon the officers and men engaged. Anticipating by a few days the passage of the gunboats, the army marched from Alexandria for Natchitoches, eighty miles distant by land, reaching that point on the 2d and 3d of April. The enemy continued his retreat, skirmishing sharply with the advance guard, but offering no serious resistance to our advance.

The shortest and only practicable road from Natchitoches to Shreveport was the stage road through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield, distance 100 miles, through a barren, sandy country, with little water and less forage, the greater portion an unbroken pine forest.

A reconnoissance from Natchitoches on the 2d April, under command of General Lee, discovered the enemy in force at Pleasant Hill, thirty-six miles distant, and established the fact that a portion of Greene's command had arrived from Texas and were then confronting us. Prisoners captured from Price's command indicated what had been feared from the loss of time at Alexandria, a concentration of the entire available force of the enemy, numbering, according to the statements of prisoners and intercepted letters, about 25,000 men, with 76 guns.

The river was perceptibly falling, and the larger gunboats were unable to pass Grand Ecure. The troops under command of General A. J. Smith, which had hitherto moved in transports by the river, now marched by land from Natchitoches, with the exception of one division of the 17th corps, 2,500 men, under Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith, which, by order of General A. J. Smith, continued its movements by the river in company with the fleet, for the protection of the transports. The arrangement of land transportation for this portion of the column, the replenishing of supply trains from the transports, and the distribution of rations to the troops, were made at this point, but the fleet was unable to ascend the river until the 7th of April. The condition of the river would have justified the suspension of the movement altogether at either point, except for the anticipation of such change as to render it navigable. Upon this subject the counsel of the naval officers was implicitly followed. On the 4th of April, Colonel O. P. Gooding commanding a brigade of cavalry, engaged upon a reconnoissance north of Red river, encountered Harrison's command, 1,500 strong, in which the enemy was defeated with considerable loss. Our loss was about forty in killed, wounded, and missing. The enemy's repulse was decisive. The army was put in motion for Shreveport *via* Pleasant Hill and Mansfield, April 6. General Lee with the cavalry division led the advance, followed by a detachment of two divisions of the 13th corps, under General Ransom, first division 19th corps, under General Emory, and a brigade of colored troops under command of Colonel Dickie, the whole under the immediate command of Major General Franklin. The detachments of the 16th army corps under command of Brigadier General A. J. Smith followed on the 7th, and a division of the 17th army corps, under Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith, accompanied Admiral Porter on the river as a guard for the transports.

The fleet was directed to Loggy bayou, opposite Springfield, where it was expected communications would be established with the land forces at Sabine

Crossroads, a distance of fifty-four miles by land from Grand Ecore and one hundred miles by water. I remained with a portion of my staff to superintend the departure of the river and land forces from Grand Ecore until the morning of the 7th, and then rode rapidly forward, reaching the head of the column at Pleasant Hill the same evening, where the main body encamped. General Smith's command was at the rear of the column on the march, but passed the negro brigade on the route to Pleasant Hill. A very heavy rain fell all day on the 7th, which greatly impeded the movement of the rear of the column, making the road almost impassable for troops, trains, or artillery. The storm did not reach the head of the column. In passing the troops from Natchitoches to Pleasant Hill I endeavored, as much as possible, to accelerate their movements.

The enemy offered no opposition to their march on the 6th. On the 7th the advance drove a small force to Pleasant Hill, and from there to Wilson's farm, three miles beyond, where a sharp fight occurred with the enemy posted in a very strong position, from which they were driven with serious loss and pursued to St. Patrick's bayou near Carroll's mill, about nine miles from Pleasant Hill, where our forces bivouacked for the night. We sustained in this action a loss of fourteen men killed, thirty-nine wounded, and nine missing. We captured many prisoners, and the enemy sustained severe losses in killed and wounded. During the action General Lee sent to General Franklin for reinforcements, and a brigade of infantry was sent forward, but the firing having ceased it was withdrawn. The officers and men fought with great spirit in this affair. At daybreak on the 8th General Lee, to whose support a brigade of the 13th corps, under Colonel Landrum, had been sent by my order, advanced upon the enemy, drove him from his position on the opposite side of St. Patrick's bayou and pursued him to Sabine Crossroads, about three miles from Mansfield. The advance was steady, but slow, and the resistance of the enemy stubborn. He was only driven from his defensive positions on the road by artillery. At noon, on the 8th, another brigade of the 13th corps arrived at the Crossroads, under Brigadier General Ransom, to relieve the first brigade. The infantry moved from Pleasant Hill at daybreak on the 8th, the head of the column halting at St. Patrick's bayou, in order that the rear might come up. I passed General Franklin's headquarters at 10 a. m., giving directions to close up the columns as speedily as possible, and rode forward to ascertain the condition of affairs at the front, where I arrived between one and two o'clock. General Ransom arrived nearly at the same time with the second brigade, 13th corps, which was under his command in the action at the Crossroads.

I found the troops in line of battle, the skirmishers sharply engaged, the main body of the enemy posted on the crest of a hill in thick woods on both sides of a road leading over the hill to Mansfield on our line of march. It was apparent that the enemy was in much stronger force than at any previous point on the march, and being confirmed in this opinion by General Lee, I sent to General Franklin, immediately upon my arrival, a statement of the facts, and orders to hurry forward the infantry with all possible despatch, directing General Lee, at the same time, to hold his ground steadily, but not advance until reinforcements should arrive. Our forces were for a long time stationary, with some skirmishing on the flanks. It soon became apparent that the entire force of the enemy was in our front. Several officers were sent to General Franklin to hurry forward the column. Skirmishing was incessant during the afternoon. At 4.30 p. m. the enemy made a general attack all along the lines, but with great vigor upon our right flank. It was resisted with resolute determination by our troops, but overpowering numbers compelled them, after resisting the successive charges of the enemy in front and on the flank, to fall back from their position to the woods in rear of the open field, which they occupied, retreating in good order. The enemy pressed with great vigor upon the flanks, as well as in front, for the purpose of getting to the rear, but were repulsed in this attempt by our cavalry.

At the line of woods a new position was assumed, supported by the third division of the 13th army corps, under General Cameron, which reached this point about 5 p. m., and formed in line of battle under the direction of Major General Franklin, who accompanied its advance. The enemy attacked this second line with great impetuosity and overpowering numbers, turning both flanks and advancing heavily upon the centre. The assault was resisted with gallantry, but the troops finding the enemy in the rear, were compelled to yield the ground and fall steadily back. The road was badly obstructed by the supply train of the cavalry division, which prevented the retreat of both men and artillery. We lost ten of the guns of Ransom's division in consequence of the position of the train, which prevented their withdrawal. Repeated efforts were made to reform the troops and resist the advance of the enemy; but though their progress was checked, it was without permanent success.

Brigadier General W. H. Emory, commanding first division 19th corps, had been early notified of the condition of affairs and directed to advance as rapidly as possible and form a line of battle in the strongest position he could select, to support the troops in retreat and check the advance of the enemy. The order to advance found him seven miles to the rear of the first battle-ground. He assumed a position at Pleasant Grove, about three miles from the crossroads, on the edge of the woods commanding an open field sloping to the front. The 161st New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Kinsey commanding, were deployed as skirmishers and ordered to the foot of the hill, upon the crest of which the line was formed to cover the rear of the retreating forces, to check the pursuit of the enemy and give time for the formation of the troops.

General Dwight, commanding first brigade, formed his troops across the road upon which the enemy was moving, commanding the open field in front, the third brigade, Colonel Benedict commanding, formed to the left, and the second brigade, General McMillan, in reserve. The line was scarcely formed when the 161st New York volunteers were attacked and driven in. The right being threatened, a portion of McMillan's brigade formed on the right of General Dwight. The fire of our troops was reserved until the enemy was at close quarters, when the whole line opened upon them with most destructive volleys of musketry. The action lasted an hour and a half. The enemy was repulsed with very great slaughter. During the fight a determined effort was made to turn our left flank, which was defeated. Prisoners reported the loss of the enemy in officers and men to be very great. General Mouton was killed in the first onset. Their attack was made with great desperation, apparently with the idea that the dispersion of our forces at this point would end the campaign, and with the aid of the steadily falling river leave the fleet of transports and gun-boats in their hands or compel their destruction. Nothing could surpass in impetuosity the assault of the enemy but the inflexible steadiness and valor of our troops. The first division of the 19th corps, by its great bravery in this action, saved the army and navy. But for this successful resistance to the attack of the enemy at Pleasant Grove, the renewed attack of the enemy with increased force could not have been successfully resisted at Pleasant Hill on the 9th of April. We occupied both battle-grounds at night.

From Pleasant Grove, where this action occurred, to Pleasant Hill, was fifteen miles. It was certain that the enemy, who was within the reach of re-enforcements, would renew the attack in the morning, and it was wholly uncertain whether the command of General Smith could reach the position we held in season for a second engagement. For this reason the army, towards morning, fell back to Pleasant Hill, General Emory covering the rear, burying the dead, bringing off the wounded, and all the material of the army. It arrived there at 8.30 on the morning of the 9th, effecting a junction with the forces of General Smith, and the colored brigade, under Colonel Dickey, which had reached that point the evening previous. Early on the 9th the troops were prepared for

action, the movements of the enemy indicating that he was on our rear. A line of battle was formed in the following order: first brigade, 19th corps, from the right resting on a ravine; second brigade in the centre, and third brigade on the left. The centre was strengthened by a brigade of General Smith's forces, whose main force was held in reserve. The enemy moved towards our right flank. The second brigade withdrew from the centre to the support of the first brigade. The brigade in support of the centre moved up into position, and another of General Smith's brigades was posted to the extreme left position on the hill, in *echelon*, to the rear of the left main line. Light skirmishing occurred during the afternoon. Between 4 and 5 o'clock it increased in vigor, and about 5 p. m., when it appeared to have nearly ceased, the enemy drove in our skirmishers and attacked in force, his first onset being against the left. He advanced in two oblique lines, extending well over towards the right of the third brigade, 19th corps. After a determined resistance this part of the line gave way and went slowly back to the reserves. The first and second brigades were soon enveloped front, right, and rear. By skilful movements of General Emory the flanks of the two brigades now bearing the brunt of the battle were covered. The enemy pursued the brigades, passing the left and centre, until he approached the reserves under General Smith, when he was met by a charge led by General Mower, and checked. The whole of the reserves were now ordered up, and in turn we drove the enemy, continuing the pursuit until night compelled us to halt.

The battle of the 9th was desperate and sanguinary. The defeat of the enemy was complete, and his loss in officers and men more than double that sustained by our forces. There was nothing in the immediate position or condition of the two armies to prevent a forward movement the next morning, and orders were given to prepare for an advance. The train which had been turned to the rear on the day of the battle was ordered to re-form and advance at day-break. I communicated this purpose at the close of the day to General A. J. Smith, who expressed his concurrence therein; but representations, subsequently received from General Franklin and all the general officers of the 19th corps, as to the condition of their respective commands for immediate active operations against the enemy, caused a suspension of this order, and a conference of the general officers was held in the evening, in which it was determined, upon the urgent recommendation of all the general officers above named, and with the acquiescence of General Smith, to retire upon Grand Ecore the following day. The reasons urged for this course by the officers commanding the 19th and 13th corps were—

First, that the absence of water made it absolutely necessary to advance or retire without delay. General Emory's command had been without rations for two days, and the train which had been turned to the rear during the battle could not be put in condition to move forward upon the single road through dense woods, in which it stood, without difficulty and loss of time. It was for the purpose of communicating with the fleet at Springfield landing from the Sabine Crossroads to the river, as well as to prevent the concentration of the Texan troops with the enemy at Mansfield, that we had pushed for the early occupation of that point. Considering the difficulty with which the gunboats passed Alexandria and Grand Ecore, there was every reason to believe that the navigation of the river would be found impracticable.

A squadron of cavalry, under direction of Mr. Young, who had formerly been employed in the surveys of this country and was now connected with the engineer department, which had been sent upon a reconnoissance to the river, returned to Pleasant Hill, on the day of the battle, with the report that they had not been able to discover the fleet, nor learn from the people its passage up the

river.\* This led to the belief that the low water had prevented the advance of the fleet. The condition of the river, which had been steadily falling since our march from Alexandria, rendered it very doubtful, if the fleet ascended the river, whether it could return from any intermediate point; and probably, if not certain, that if it reached Shreveport it would never escape without a rise of the river, of which all hopes began to fail. The forces designated for this campaign numbered 42,000 men; less than half that number was actually available for service against the enemy during its progress. The distance which separated General Steele's command from the line of our operations (nearly two hundred miles) rendered his movements of little moment to us, or to the enemy, and reduced the strength of the fighting column to the extent of his force, which was expected to be from 10,000 to 15,000 men. The depot at Alexandria, made necessary by the impracticable navigation, withdrew from our forces 3,000 men, under General Grover. The return of the marine brigade to the defence of the Mississippi, upon the demand of Major General McPherson, and which could not pass Alexandria without its steamers, nor move by land for want of land transportation, made a further reduction of 3,000 men.

The protection of the fleet of transports, against the enemy on both sides of the river, made it necessary for General A. J. Smith to detach General T. Kilby Smith's division of 2,500 men from the main body, for that duty. The army train required a guard of 500 men. These several detachments, which it was impossible to avoid, and the distance of General Steele's command, which it was not in my power to correct, reduced the number of troops that we were able at any point to bring into action, from 42,000 men to about 20,000. The losses sustained in the very severe battles of the 7th, 8th, and 9th of April amounted to about 3,969 men, and necessarily reduced our active forces to that extent. The enemy, superior to us in numbers in the outset, by falling back, was able to recover from his great losses by means of re-enforcements, which were within his reach as he approached his base of operations, while we were growing weaker as we departed from ours. We had fought the battle at Pleasant Hill with about 15,000 against 22,000 men and won a victory, which, for these reasons, we were unable to follow up. Other considerations connected with the actual military condition of affairs afforded additional reasons for the course recommended.

Between the commencement of the expedition and the battle of Pleasant Hill, a change had occurred in the general command of the army, which caused a modification of my instructions in regard to this expedition.

Lieutenant General Grant in a despatch, dated the 15th March, which I received on the 27th March, at Alexandria, eight days before we reached Grand Ecore, by special messenger, gave me the following instructions: "Should you find that the taking of Shreveport will occupy ten or fifteen days more time than General Sherman gave his troops to be absent from their command, you will send them back at the time specified in his note of (blank date) March, *even if it should lead to the abandonment of the main object of the expedition.* Should it prove successful, hold Shreveport and Red river with such force as you deem necessary, and return the balance of your troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans." These instructions, I was informed, were given for the purpose of having "all parts of the army, or rather all armies, act as much in concert as possible," and with a view to a movement in the spring campaign against Mobile, which was certainly to be made "if troops enough could be obtained without embarrassing other movements, in which event New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition."

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\*The report of General T. Kilby Smith, commanding the river forces, states that the fleet did not arrive at Loggy bayou until 2 o'clock p. m., on the 10th of April, two days after the battle at Sabine Crossroads.

A subsequent despatch, though it did not control, fully justified my action, repeated these general views, and stated that the commanding general "would much rather the Red river expedition had never been begun than that you should be detained one day beyond the 1st of May in commencing the movement east of the Mississippi."

The limitation of time referred to in these despatches was based upon an opinion which I had verbally expressed to General Sherman, at New Orleans, that General Smith could be spared in thirty days after we reached Alexandria; but it was predicated upon the expectation that the navigation of the river would be unobstructed, that we should advance, without delay, at Alexandria, Grand Ecore, or elsewhere, on account of low water, and that the forces of General Steele were to co-operate with us effectively at some point on Red river, near Natchitoches or Monroe. It was never understood that an expedition that involved on the part of my command a land march of nearly four hundred miles into the enemy's country, and which terminated at a point which we might not be able to hold, either on account of the strength of the enemy or the difficulties of obtaining supplies, was to be limited to thirty days. The condition of our forces, and the distance and difficulties attending the further advance into the enemy's country, after the battles of the 8th and 9th, against an enemy superior in numbers to our own, rendered it probable that we could not occupy Shreveport within the time specified; and certain that, without a rise in the river, the troops necessary to hold it against the enemy would be compelled to evacuate it for the want of supplies, and impossible that the expedition should return, in any event, to New Orleans in time to co-operate in the general movements of the army, contemplated for the spring campaign. It was known at this time that the fleet could not re-pass the rapids at Alexandria, and it was doubtful, if the fleet reached any point above Grand Ecore, whether it would be able to return. By falling back to Grand Ecore, we should be able to ascertain the condition of the fleet, the practicability of continuing the movement by the river; reorganize a part of the forces that had been shattered in the battles of the 7th, 8th, and 9th, possibly ascertain the position of General Steele, and obtain from him the assistance expected for a new advance north of the river or upon its southern bank, and, perhaps, obtain definite instructions from the government as to the course to be pursued. Upon these general considerations, and without reference to the actual condition of the respective armies, at 12 o'clock, midnight, on the 9th, I countermanded the order for the return of the train, and directed preparations to be made for the return of the army to Grand Ecore. The dead were buried, and the wounded brought in from the field of battle and placed in the most comfortable hospitals that could be provided, and surgeons and supplies furnished for them. A second squadron of cavalry was sent, under direction of Mr. Young, of the engineer department, to inform the fleet of our retrograde movement, and to direct its return, if it had ascended the river, and on the morning of the 10th the army leisurely returned to Grand Ecore. The wounded were immediately visited by Dr. Sanger, who took with him clothing, rations, medicines, and other supplies, and reported them in comfortable condition.

The fleet sailed from Grand Ecore on the 7th, and reached its destination, at Loggy bayou, on the morning of the 10th, one day after the battle at Pleasant Hill, and two days after the engagement at Sabine Crossroads. General T. Kilby Smith received a verbal message the evening of the 10th, and on the morning of the 11th written orders to return. The transports were in a crippled condition, rudders unshipped, and wheels broken. The enemy attacked the fleet, on its return, near Pleasant Hill landing, on the 12th, with a force of 2,500 cavalry, a strong reserve infantry, and a battery of six guns, under General Greene; but the troops, protected by cotton bales and bales of hay, with the gunboats, kept up a deadly fire and drove the enemy from the river.

For two miles the bank was strewn with the wounded and dead. Among other rebel officers killed was General Greene, who was left dead upon the field. The troops of the transports saw him fall, and claim that his death was the work of their artillery—the gunboats and transports all firing at the same time. The enemy, under Liddell, who had occupied the north bank of the river with 2,500 men, attacked the fleet on the 13th, but was driven back with loss. The navigation up and down the river was intricate and difficult, and the steamers were frequently aground.

Several of the boats were laden with ammunition and ordnance stores, but the energy of the officers and men brought off every boat. The only loss in stores was a hundred sacks of oats, thrown overboard for the relief of a steamer aground. They reached Compte on the 14th, with the loss of one man killed and eighteen wounded, where they met a force from the army, sent to their assistance, and reached Grand Ecore on the 15th without further obstruction.

General T. Kirby Smith, to whose courtesy I am indebted for all the official information I have received of this part of the expedition, mentions with commendation Major D. C. Houston, of the engineers, who had in charge the ordnance stores, and Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Abert, officers of my staff, who accompanied him, and also officers and men of his own command and the masters of transport steamers.

General Smith, who commanded the land forces and transports, is entitled to the highest commendation for the energy, skill, and success with which he managed this most difficult affair. Lines of defence were established at Grand Ecore the 12th of April, and orders given to attack the enemy if he approached. A pontoon bridge was thrown across the river during the night. Our pickets were driven in on the 13th, but the enemy appeared, upon a reconnoissance made in force, to have gone below for the purpose either of attacking our troops at Alexandria, or occupying Mowet's bluff, on Cane river. On the same day General Smith crossed the river with two brigades, two batteries, and a strong cavalry force, to aid the fleet still above Grand Ecore. Despatches were sent to General Steele, informing him of the condition of affairs and requesting him to join us at some point on the river. Orders were sent to New Orleans for re-enforcements, and the Lieutenant General commanding the army was informed of the condition of affairs by telegraph, and of my intention to advance upon Shreveport, if General Steele could come to our assistance, and my determination not to withdraw without orders. The fleet returned on the 15th in safety, without loss of vessels or materiel of war. Admiral Porter, with whom I had a conference on his arrival at Grand Ecore, advised against any further attempt to advance without a rise of the river, and his counsel was followed. The river had been steadily falling. Supplies were brought up to Grand Ecore with very great difficulty. It was found that two of the gunboats could not go below Grand Ecore, and it was now certain that the fleet could not pass the falls at Alexandria. Lieutenant Commander Selfredge, left in command of the fleet by the admiral, who had gone to Alexandria, addressed to me a despatch, dated 17th of April, stating that he had been informed the army was to withdraw immediately, and that it would be impossible in that case to get the gunboats down the river. I informed him at once that the army had no intention of withdrawing from that position; that I had sent to New Orleans for troops, and by special messenger to General Steele urging his direct co-operation, and that until it was definitely ascertained that his assistance would fail us, and that my force would be insufficient to advance further upon this line against the enemy, who appeared to be in full force, I should entertain no thought of a retrograde movement, and never if it left the navy in any danger. No such purpose was then entertained, and until I received information in reply to my despatches it was my purpose to maintain my position. A copy of this letter is appended to this report.

The next day I received instructions from Lieutenant General Grant (to which I have referred) that if my return to New Orleans was delayed one day beyond the 1st of May, when it would be necessary for my command to co-operate with other armies in the spring campaign, it would have been better that the expedition had never been attempted. These instructions, with the fact that the river was not likely to rise; the report received by Captain R. T. Dunham, that General Steele could not co-operate with us, and that the difficulty of passing the falls at Alexandria was hourly increasing, if the passage was not even then impossible, led me to change my determination. It was not, however, until the entire fleet was free, transports and gunboats, and that Admiral Porter, in charge of the Eastport, which had been aground several miles below Grand Ecore for several days, sent me word by Colonel W. S. Abert (whose statement is hereto appended) that she was clear and further protection unnecessary, that orders were given the 21st of April to return the supply teams in the direction of Alexandria. The army moved on the morning of the 22d of April, every vessel having preceded both the marching orders and the movements of the army. Any statement, from whatever source, that the army contemplated moving from Grand Ecore towards Alexandria against the advice or without the approval of the naval officers in command, or until after the departure of every vessel on the river, is without the slightest color of truth. In my interview with Admiral Porter, on the 15th of April, he expressed the utmost confidence that the river would rise, and gave me no intimation of his leaving Grand Ecore, nor of the purpose of the withdrawal of his vessels, or of his apprehensions of the retreat of the army. I gave him at that time distinct information of my plans, which were to advance. This fact was communicated to Lieutenant Commander Selfredge in my letter of the 17th of April. The admiral expressed the same confidence in the rise of the river to officers of the army, who, from long experience in the Red river country, were equally confident that it would not rise.

The difficulties attending the voyage of the Eastport were incident to the condition of the river, for which the army was in nowise responsible. I had offered every assistance possible, and did not leave this position while any aid was suggested or required.

Colonel Bailey, after consultation with the general officers of the army, offered to float the Eastport over the bars by the construction of wing-dams, similar to those afterwards built at Alexandria, but the assistance was declined. No counsel from any officers was regarded in nautical affairs.

The army marched from Grand Ecore on the morning of the 22d of April, having been detained there by the condition of the navy ten days. To prevent the occupation of Mowet's bluff, on Cane river, a strong position, commanding the only road leading across the river to Alexandria, or to prevent the concentration of the enemy's forces at that point, if it was in his possession, it became necessary to accomplish the evacuation without his knowledge, and to prevent his strengthening the natural defences of the position by the rapidity of our march. The conflagration of a portion of the town at the hour appointed for marching partially frustrated the first object, but the second was fully accomplished. The army marched from Grand Ecore to Cane river on the 20th of April, a distance of forty miles, and moved upon the position held by the enemy the 23d of April, before daybreak. About 8,000 men and 16 guns, under command of General Bee, were found in possession of the bluff, on the opposite side of the river, who were evidently surprised at the unexpected presence of our army, but ready to dispute our only passage towards Alexandria. At daybreak, one division of the 19th and 13th corps each, the cavalry commanded by General Arnold, and the artillery commanded by Captain Classon, the whole under command of General W. H. Emory, were ordered forward to the river for the purpose of forcing this position. The pickets of the enemy were encountered on the west side of the

river and quickly driven across, but the main position was found to be too strong to be carried by direct attack. A reconnoitring party under Colonel Bailey, 4th Wisconsin volunteers, sent to ascertain the practicability of crossing the river below the ferry towards Red river on the morning of the 23d, reported that the river was not fordable below the ferry, and that, owing to the impassable swamps on one side and the high bluffs on the other, it would not be possible to cross Cane river at any point below the ferry. If we failed to dislodge the enemy at the ferry, the only alternative open to us was to attempt a crossing to the north side of Red river, an exceedingly difficult and dangerous movement. At the same time a force under command of General H. W. Birge, consisting of his own command, the third brigade of the first division, 19th army corps, Colonel Fessenden commanding, and General Cameron's division, 13th corps, were ordered to cross the river three miles above the ferry, and turning the left flank of the enemy, carry the heights in reverse, if possible. Upon the success of this movement depended the passage of the river by the army. The route traversed by General Birge's command was intersected by bayous, swamps, and almost impenetrable woods. This force reached its position late in the afternoon. To accomplish the purpose in view, it became necessary to carry two strong positions held by pickets and skirmishers before the enemy was encountered in force on the crest of a hill, commanding an open field, over which our troops were compelled to cross in making the attack. The third brigade, 19th corps, Colonel Fessenden commanding, carried this position, which was defended with vigor, by assault. Its occupation compelled the retreat of the enemy from the bluffs commanding the ferry and ford. Our loss in this most brilliant and successful affair was about two hundred killed and wounded. Colonel Fessenden, who led his command with great gallantry, was severely wounded. General Birge, as in all actions in which he has been engaged, deserved and received the highest commendation. Lieutenant William Beebe, of the ordnance department, and Mr. Young, of the engineer department, both volunteers, were conspicuous in the fight. Mr. Young was twice wounded, and died in New Orleans, in July, of the injuries received in this battle. The attack on the rear of the enemy's position, covering the line of the enemy's retreat, failed in consequence of the difficulties encountered on the march and the late hour at which our troops gained their position. The enemy was thus enabled to escape with his artillery by the Fort Jesup road to Texas.

The main body of the army had moved from Cloutreville at 4.30 a. m. on the 23d to the river. They drove in the enemy's pickets three miles in advance of the river, and formed a line of battle in front of the enemy's position, while General Birge was moving upon the enemy's left flank. The enemy opened with a heavy cannonade from his batteries, which was returned by our artillery with spirit and effect. The fire was continued at intervals during the morning, but the troops were held in reserve for the purpose of forcing the passage of the river at the moment that General Birge commenced his attack on the right. The action lasted till dark, when the enemy retreated, and the heights were occupied by our forces. General A. J. Smith's command had sharp skirmishing with the advance of the enemy in our rear on the 23d.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th six guns were fired from the camp of the enemy in the rear. It was interpreted as a signal that they were ready for a combined attack; but the enemy in front had then been driven from the river, and the contemplated movement upon our front and rear failed. During the morning of the 23d an effort had been made by a portion of the cavalry under Colonel E. J. Davis to turn the right flank of the enemy's position, by crossing the river below the ferry in the direction of Red river, which proved impracticable on account of impassable swamps. A sharp engagement occurred on the morning of the 24th between the troops of General T. Kilby Smith and the enemy in the rear, which resulted in the repulse of the latter. Our loss was about fifty in this affair. Had the enemy concentrated his forces and forti-

fied his position at Monet's bluff, we could not have forced him from it, and should have been compelled to accept the chances of crossing Red river above Cane river in the presence of the enemy on both sides of the river. Orders had been sent to General Grover to move with all his force upon Monet's bluff in the event of its being occupied by the enemy or our march seriously obstructed, and his troops were in readiness for this movement.

The army marched from Monet's bluff on the afternoon of the 24th of April, and established lines of defence at Alexandria on the 25th and 26th of April. In the twenty-four days intervening between the departure of the army from Alexandria and its return the battles of Wilson's farm, Sabine Crossroads, Pleasant Grove, Pleasant Hill, Compte, Monet's bluff, and several combats in the neighborhood of Grand Ecore while we were in occupation of that point, had been fought. In every one of these engagements, except that of Sabine Crossroads, we had been successful. The failure to accomplish the main object of the expedition was due to other considerations than the actual superiority of the enemy in the field. In these operations, in which my own command had marched by land nearly four hundred miles, the total loss sustained was 3,980 men, of whom 289 were killed, 1,541 wounded, and 2,150 missing. A large portion of the latter were captured and have been since exchanged, but a considerable portion returned to the army during its operations on Red river. No loss of artillery or of trains or any army material whatever was sustained, except that which occurred at Sabine Crossroads. We lost there Nim's battery and a section of the Missouri howitzer battery, 150 wagons and 800 mules, captured by the enemy on account of the position of the train near the field of battle. All the ammunition wagons were saved. The army had captured up to this time from the enemy 23 guns and 1,500 prisoners. His losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners—officers and men—were much greater than ours. Among the former were some of the most efficient rebel commanders, whose loss can never be made good. Up to this time no other loss of men or material had been sustained by our army.

As soon as the lines of defence were completed, preparations were made for the release of the fleet, which was then unable to pass below the falls. From the difficulty which the supply transports had encountered in passing the falls, it was known at Grand Ecore as early as the 15th of April that the navy could not go below, and the means for its release were freely discussed among officers of the army. During the campaign at Port Hudson the steamers Starlight and Red Chief were captured by Grierson's Illinois cavalry, under command of Colonel Prince, in Thompson's creek. The bed of the creek was nearly dry, and the steamers were sunk several feet in the sand. After the capture of Port Hudson, Colonel Bailey constructed wing-dams, which, by raising the water, lifted the steamers from the sand, and floated them out of the creek into the Mississippi. This incident naturally suggested the same works at Alexandria for the relief of the fleet. A survey was ordered for the purpose of determining what measures could be best undertaken. The engineers of the army had complete surveys of the falls, captured from the enemy during our occupation of Alexandria in 1863, at the commencement of the Port Hudson campaign. It was found, upon examining these charts and upon a survey of the river, that the channel was narrow and crooked, formed in solid rock, and that it would be wholly impracticable to deepen its bed. It was therefore determined to commence the construction of a dam to raise the river to such a height as to enable the vessels to float over the falls. This project was freely discussed by the engineers and officers of the army, and was generally believed to be practicable. Captain J. C. Palfrey, who had made the survey, reported that in his judgment it was entirely feasible, and the only question made related to the time that might be required for so great a work.

The management of this enterprise was naturally intrusted to Lieutenant

Colonel Joseph Bailey, 4th Wisconsin volunteers, who was by profession a civil engineer, familiar with works of that kind, common to slack-water navigation upon all the western rivers, and had successfully released the steamers from Thompson's creek, on the Mississippi. Colonel Bailey had suggested the practicability of the dam while we were at Grand Ecore, and had offered to release the Eastport, when aground below Grand Ecore, by the same means, which offer was declined. Material was collected during these preparations, and work commenced upon the dam on Sunday, May 1. Nearly the whole army was engaged at different times upon this work. The dam was completed on Sunday, May 8, and the gunboats Osage, Hindman, and two others came over the rapids about four o'clock in the afternoon.

The water had been raised upon the dam for a mile and a quarter about seven feet, with a fall below the dam of about six feet, making in all a fall of about thirteen feet, above and below the falls. The pressure of the water at its completion was terrific. I went over the work at eleven o'clock on the evening of the 8th, with one of my staff officers, and felt that the pressure of the water was so great that it could not stand. I rode immediately to the point above where the fleet was anchored, to ascertain if they were ready to follow the four boats that had already passed the rapids. I reached the fleet about twelve o'clock midnight. Scarcely a man or a light was to be seen. It was perfectly apparent that the boats were not in condition to take advantage of the completion of the dam, and feeling that it could not stand another day, I wrote a note to Admiral Porter at one o'clock on the morning of the 9th, which was delivered in person at two o'clock a. m. by Colonel J. G. Wilson, stating my belief as to the condition of the dam and fleet, and asking that measures should be taken to put the boats in condition to move over the rapids at the earliest possible moment in the morning. A little after five o'clock on the morning of the 9th I saw a part of the dam swept away. The four boats that had passed the rapids the afternoon before were able to pass below through the opening which the waters had made. Only one of the vessels above the falls, the Lexington, was ready to move when the dam gave way, and that came down after the break and passed the dam safely with all the vessels that were below the rapids. Had the others been ready to move, all would have passed the rapids and the dam safely on Monday.

Until after the dam had been carried away no effort had been made to lessen the draught of the imprisoned vessels by lightening them of cargo, armament, or plating. Before the second series of dams was completed, a portion of the armament and the plating, materially lessening their draught and the depth of water required to float them, was removed. Lieutenant William S. Beebe, of the ordnance department, United States army, superintended the removal of the heavy naval guns from above the rapids to a point below the dam by land, assisted by officers and soldiers of the army.

The army immediately commenced the reconstruction of the dam. Finding it impossible to resist the current of the river entirely, the opening made by the flood was only partially closed, and eight or ten wing-dams were constructed on the right and left banks of the river in accordance with the original plan, turning the current of water directly upon the channel, and raising it at the different points sufficiently to allow the vessels to pass. This new work was completed on the 12th of May, and on the afternoon of that day all the boats passed below the rapids to the dam. At six o'clock in the evening the Mound City and Carondelet passed the dam. The other boats remained above until the morning of the 13th. The water upon the dam was steadily falling, but at nine o'clock on the 13th all the boats had safely passed.

Preparations had been made for the movement of the army the evening after the passage of the boats below the dam on the 12th, and after all were below, on the 13th orders were given for the march.

The construction of the dam was exclusively the work of the army. But little aid or encouragement was rendered by officers of the navy, except by Lieutenant A. R. Langhorne, commanding the *Mound City*, who assisted in setting the cribs, and was always ready to answer the call of the officers charged with the construction of the work. The soldiers labored sedulously and zealously night and day, in and out of water, from the 1st to the 13th of May, inclusive, when the passage of the boats was completed.

Upon my arrival at Alexandria, on the 25th of April, I found Major General Hunter, with despatches from the Lieutenant General commanding the armies, reaffirming instructions which I had received at Grand Ecore relating to the operations of the army elsewhere, and to the necessity of bringing the Shreveport campaign to an end without delay. The only possible means of executing these peremptory orders had already been taken. General Hunter left on the 30th of April with despatches to the Lieutenant General, giving a report of the condition of affairs—that the fleet could not pass the rapids, that there was no course for the army but to remain for its protection, that the enemy would concentrate all his forces at that point for the destruction of the army and the fleet, and that it was necessary to concentrate our troops west of the Mississippi at the same point by which the army and navy could be relieved and the forces of the enemy destroyed.

Major General McClermand, with the larger part of the forces recently at Matagorda bay—which had been evacuated by order of Lieutenant General Grant, dated March 31—arrived at Alexandria on the evening of the 29th of April. Brigadier General Fitz Henry Warren, left in command at Matagorda bay, followed with the rest of the forces in Texas, except those on the Rio Grande, when the batteries of the enemy on the river near Marksville obstructed his passage. Not having sufficient force to dislodge the enemy, he seized Fort De Russy, below the batteries, which he held until the passage of the fleet and army.

While engaged in the construction of the dam a despatch was received from Major General Halleck, dated April 30, as follows :

“Lieutenant General Grant directs that orders heretofore given be so modified that no troops be withdrawn from operations against Shreveport and on Red river, and that operations there be continued, under the officer in command, until further orders.”

This despatch was not received until it was impossible to move either up or down the river from Alexandria. It was, of course, impracticable to execute these instructions.

Until the 4th of May communication with the Mississippi by the river was unobstructed. Lieutenant William Simpson, of my staff, left by the gunboat *Signal*, with despatches for Lieutenant General Grant, Admiral Farragut, General Sherman, and General Rosecrans. The gunboat *Covington*, having in convoy the transport *Warner*, accompanied the *Signal*. We received news on the morning of the 6th of the destruction of the gunboats and the transport. The enemy had established a battery near Marksville, supported by a large infantry force. Communication with the Mississippi was closed from this date. About four hundred men of the 56th Ohio volunteers were on board the *Warner*. A part of them joined our troops below, and a portion of them pierced the lines of the enemy and returned to Alexandria. About one hundred and fifty were captured. Lieutenant Simpson was captured, but destroyed his despatches. The *City Belle*, on her way to Alexandria with four hundred and twenty-five men of the 120th Ohio volunteers, was captured by the enemy. Two hundred of the troops escaped.

The fleet passed below Alexandria on the 13th of May. The army, on its march from Alexandria, did not encounter the enemy in force until near the town of Mansura. He was driven through the town on the evening of the 14th

of May, and at daybreak next morning our advance encountered his cavalry on the prairie east of the town. He fell back, with steady and sharp skirmishing across the prairie, to a belt of woods, which he occupied. The evening's position covered three roads diverging from Mansura to the edge of Atchafalaya. He manifested a determination here to obstinately resist our passage. The engagement, which lasted several hours, was confined chiefly to the artillery until our troops got possession of the edge of the woods—first upon our left, by General Emory; subsequently on our right, by General Smith, when he was driven from the field, after a sharp and decisive fight, with considerable loss.

The 16th of May we reached Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya. Being entirely destitute of any ordinary bridge material for the passage of this river—about six hundred yards wide—a bridge was constructed of the steamers, under direction of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey. This work was not of the same magnitude, but was as important to the army as the dam at Alexandria was to the navy. It had the merit of being an entirely novel construction, no bridge of such magnitude having been constructed of similar materials. The bridge was completed at one o'clock on the 19th of May. The wagon train passed in the afternoon, and the troops the next morning, in better spirit and condition, as able and eager to meet the enemy as at any period of the campaign. The command of General A. J. Smith, which covered the rear of the army during the construction of the bridge and the passage of the army, had a severe engagement with the enemy, under Polignac, on the afternoon of the 19th, at Yellow Bayou, which lasted several hours. Our loss was about one hundred and fifty in killed and wounded; that of the enemy much greater, besides many prisoners who were taken by our troops. Major General E. R. S. Canby arrived at Simmsport on the 19th of May, and the next day assumed command of the troops, as a portion of the forces of the military division of the West Mississippi, to the command of which he had been assigned.

Rumors were circulated freely throughout the camp at Alexandria that upon the evacuation of the town it would be burned. To prevent this destruction of property—part of which belonged to loyal citizens—General Grover, commanding the post, was instructed to organize a thorough police and to provide for its occupation by an armed force until the army had marched for Simmsport. The measures taken were sufficient to prevent a conflagration in the manner in which it had been anticipated. But on the morning of the evacuation, while the army was in full possession of the town, a fire broke out in a building on the levee, which had been occupied by refugees or soldiers, in such a manner as to make it impossible to prevent a general conflagration. I saw the fire when it was first discovered. The ammunition and ordnance transports and the depot of ammunition on the levee were within a few yards of the fire. The boats were floated into the river and the ammunition moved from the levee with all possible despatch. The troops labored with alacrity and vigor to suppress the conflagration, but owing to a high wind and the combustible materials of the buildings it was found impossible to limit its progress, and a considerable portion of the town was destroyed.

On the 1st of April, two or three days before the army moved from Alexandria to Natchitoches, an election of delegates to the constitutional convention was held at Alexandria by request of citizens of the parish of Rapides. No officer or soldier interfered with or had any part whatever in this matter; it was left exclusively to the loyal citizens of the place. Three hundred votes were given in this election, which was a large majority of all the voting population in that parish. Fifteen hundred votes were a full representation of the people before the war. Nearly five hundred men from this and neighboring parishes enlisted in the army as mounted scouts, and rendered efficient and valuable services during the campaign.

Under the general prize law the naval authorities upon their arrival at Alex-

andria commenced the capture of cotton on both sides of the river, extending their operations from six to ten miles into the interior. Wagon trains were organized, cotton-gins put in operation, and the business followed up with great vigor while the fleet lay at Alexandria. Some difficulty occurred with the marines, who insisted upon their right to pass the lines of the army, which was terminated by the advance of the army and navy to Grand Ecore. I was informed by parties claiming property which had been taken by the naval authorities to whom I referred them, that upon application for relief their property had been released to them by the commander of the fleet. The army did not enter into competition with the navy in the capture of this property.

In order to remove all the products of the country which might, under any circumstances, be used to aid the rebellion against the government, General Grover, in command of the post of Alexandria, and the quartermaster of that post, upon the departure of the army from Alexandria, were directed to collect such property as should remain there after its departure and transmit it to the quartermaster at New Orleans, who was instructed to turn it over to the officers of the treasury, to be disposed of according to the orders of the government and the laws of Congress. Notice was also given to the supervising agent of the treasury at New Orleans that no trade would be allowed with that portion of the State until it should be completely and permanently occupied by the army. No person was allowed to accompany the army upon this expedition as reporter, or for any other purpose, without a distinct and written declaration that no trade by private parties or for personal purposes would be permitted under any circumstances, and that no property or private account would be transported by public or private vessels to New Orleans; but that all property sent to New Orleans would be consigned to the chief quartermaster, and by him turned over to the treasury agent and held subject to such claims and orders as should be approved by the government at Washington.

Previous to my departure from New Orleans the chief quartermaster, Colonel S. B. Holabird, had been instructed that no privileges would be given to any party whatever, under any circumstances, to trade in, to dispose of, or to transport private property; that all the property that came down from that country, so far as the army was concerned, would be turned over to him, and by him to the proper treasury officers. The same information was given to the treasury agent. No permission was given to any person to accompany the army, except upon these express conditions, and then only to such persons whose public positions seemed to be a full guarantee against abuse of the privilege, and whose requests could not be properly refused. They were given to reporters of the public press and to prominent officers of States whose troops were in the field.

Upon representations made by officers of the Treasury Department at Alexandria that there would be difficulty in receiving such property except under the treasury regulations of the 26th of January, 1864, those regulations were officially promulgated for that purpose at Alexandria and at New Orleans. These orders were strictly enforced by all officers connected with or representing the army. There was no permission whatever given to any person to trade, to dispose of, or transport private property; no privilege of this kind was recognized under any circumstances. Every dollar's worth of property that came into the hands of the army during this campaign was either appropriated to its use in kind by the proper officers of the commissary and quartermaster's departments, receipts being given therefor, or transmitted to the chief quartermaster at New Orleans, and by him turned over to the treasury agents to be disposed of according to the laws of Congress and the orders of the government.

When cotton or other property interfered with the transportation of any material of the army, or of refugees, negroes, or troops, upon the evacuation of the country, it was thrown from the boats and abandoned upon the river levee to

the enemy. I intend this statement to be as comprehensive upon the subject as language can make it, and to cover all possible methods, direct or indirect, by which officers or citizens, public or private parties, or any persons whatever, could evade or violate these orders on the river or at New Orleans, or appropriate by any means public or private property to private uses or personal advantage, or deprive the government or individuals of any property which, by any interpretation of military orders or public laws, could be considered as belonging justly and properly to them. General Grover, commanding the post, Colonel S. B. Holabird, chief quartermaster at New Orleans, and Honorable B. F. Flanders, supervising special agent 'Treasury Department, will be able to account to the government for public or private property coming into their hands during this campaign.

I was engaged upon the Gulf coast, hoping, by the capture of Galveston and Mobile, to put my command in readiness for an effective co-operation, by Mobile and the Alabama river, with General Sherman, precisely in accordance with the campaign suggested by the Lieutenant General commanding the armies in his despatches of the 15th and 31st of March, when I received instructions to communicate with the admiral and the general officers commanding the fleet and forces of the upper Mississippi upon the subject of the campaign against Shreveport. I immediately complied with these orders. They had received similar instructions, and, in answer to my communications, expressed their readiness and desire to enter upon the campaign. With the forces proposed, and the co-operation of the fleet, its success was reasonably certain. Under such circumstances, I could not decline co-operation with them.

I at once abandoned all other enterprises and gave my whole attention to this service

The first difficulty encountered was in the navigation of the river. Sixteen days' delay, caused by the inability of the fleet to pass the rapids at Alexandria, and three days' delay at Grand Ecore in waiting the rise of the river, enabled the enemy to concentrate his forces, and rendered impossible that celerity of movement by the army which the success of the expedition demanded. Eight days of the delay at Alexandria would have been attributable to the tardy organization and movements of Franklin's command, but the fleet was unable to pass the falls until eight days after his arrival at Alexandria. This delay was doubtless owing to the impracticable navigation of the river; but it is not improper to say that the forecast and diligence which are enforced upon all men in the daily affairs of life would have forbidden an attempt to force a fleet of so much importance to the free navigation of the Mississippi to a point from which it could never hope to escape, except upon the theory that the river ought to or might rise. The movement of the navy, in a despatch of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter, to which the Secretary of the Navy has given official publication and sanction, is attributed to the request of General Banks, who "deemed the co-operation of the gunboats so essential to success that he (Porter) had to run some risks and make unusual exertions to get them over the falls."

This implies that the responsibility of his action rests upon the army; but it is not consistent with the facts. The co-operation of the navy was an indispensable condition and basis of the expedition. Major General Halleck informed me, January 11, that he had been assured by the Navy Department that Admiral Porter would be prepared to co-operate with the army in its movements; and the admiral himself informed me, February 26, that he was "prepared to ascend Red river with a large fleet of gunboats," and to co-operate with the army, at any time when the water was high enough. The fleet was as necessary to the campaign as the army. Had it been left to my discretion I should have reluctantly undertaken, in a campaign requiring but eight or ten light-draught gun-boats, to force twenty heavy iron-clads four hundred and ninety miles upon a river proverbially as treacherous as the rebels who defended it, and which had

given notice of its character by steadily falling when, as the admiral reports, "all other rivers were booming."

There is a better reason for the disregard of the palpable difficulties of navigation than the overzealous counsel of army officers in nautical affairs. In a subsequent despatch Admiral Porter says that "all my vessels navigated the river to Grand Ecore with ease, and with some of them I reached Springfield landing, the place designated for the gunboats to meet the army. My part was successfully accomplished; the failure of the army to proceed, and the retreat to Grand Ecore, left me almost at the mercy of the enemy." The records of the campaign do not at all support the reckless and fiery ardor of this statement. The fleet did not reach the "place appointed" until two full days after the first decisive battle with the enemy. The admiral occupied four days in moving 104 miles on what he calls "a rising river" with "good water" to the place appointed. General T. Kilby Smith states that the fleet made twenty miles on the 7th, fifty-seven miles on the 8th, eighteen miles on the 9th, and nine miles on the 10th of April—total, 104 miles. The failure of the fleet to move up the river with ordinary expedition, together with the fact that the gunboats were unable to pass Grand Ecore until the 7th, justified the belief that its advance had been prevented by the low stage of water, and governed the army exclusively in its retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, as it did in every important operation of the campaign. The admiral's despatch does not mention the fact that, in addition to the "mercy" of the enemy, he had the support of General T. Kilby Smith's division of 2,500 men, whose most gallant and honorable part in the preservation of the fleet of gunboats and transports is not referred to in what the admiral calls "this curious affair between (the enemy's) infantry and gunboats." In view of the published despatches of Admiral Porter, it is proper for me to say that every position of difficulty in which the army was placed in this campaign was the immediate and direct consequence of delay in the operations of the navy. This may have been inevitable and entirely justifiable from the condition of the river. It is not my province to pass judgment upon its operations; but the fact remains nevertheless. During my term of service it has been an invariable rule of conduct, from which I have never departed, to forbear the expression of opinion or complaint upon the official action of others; but I feel it to be a solemn duty to say, in this official and formal manner, that Admiral Porter's published official statements, relating to the Red river campaign, are at variance with the truth, of which there are many thousand living witnesses, and do foul injustice to the officers and soldiers of the army, living and dead, to whom the Navy Department owes exclusively the preservation and honor of its fleet.

The partial disintegration of the several commands assigned to this expedition was a cause of embarrassment, though not entirely of failure. The command of Major General Steele, which I was informed by Major General Sherman would be about 15,000 men, was in fact but 7,000, and operating upon a line several hundred miles distant, with purposes and results entirely unknown to me. February 5 I was informed by General Steele that if any advance was to be made it must be by the Washita and Red rivers, and that he might be able to move his command by the way of Pine Bluff to Monroe for this purpose. This would have united our forces on Red river, and insured the success of the campaign. The 28th of February he informed me that he could not move by the way of Monroe, and on the 4th of March, the day before my command was ordered to move, I was informed by General Sherman that he had written to General Steele to "push straight to Shreveport." March 5 I was informed by General Halleck that he had no information of General Steele's plans, further than that he would be directed to facilitate my operations towards Shreveport. The 10th of March General Steele informed me that the objections to the route I wished him to take (by the way of Red river) were stronger

than ever, and that he "would move with all his available force, (about 7,000,) to Washington, and thence to Shreveport." I received information the 26th of March, dated the 5th of March, from Major General Halleck, that he had "directed General Steele to make a real move, as suggested by you, (Banks,) instead of a demonstration, as he (Steele) thought advisable." In April General Halleck informed me that he had telegraphed General Steele "to co-operate with you (Banks) on Red river, with all his available forces." April 16th I was informed, under date of the 10th, by General Sherman, that General Steele's entire force would co-operate with me and the navy. In May I received information from General Steele, under date of the 28th of April, that he could not leave Camden unless supplies were sent to him, as those of the country were exhausted; that we "could not help each other operating our lines so wide apart;" that he could not say definitely that he could join me "at any point on Red river at any given time;" and, from the distance that separated us, that I could render no assistance to him, an opinion in which I entirely concurred. I never received authority to give orders to General Steele; my instructions limited me to communication with him upon the subject of the expedition. His orders he received from other sources. I have no doubt that General Steele did all in his power to insure success, but as communication with him was necessarily by special messenger, and occupied from fifteen to twenty days at each communication, it was impossible for either of us fully to comprehend the relative positions of the two armies, or to assist or to support each other.

The column of General A. J. Smith was a partially independent command. General Sherman, in his despatch of the 10th of April, received the 16th, informed me that "the thirty days for which he had loaned me General Smith's command would expire on the 10th of April," the day after the battle of Pleasant Hill. General Smith's instructions, which he showed me, required him to confer constantly with Admiral Porter, the approved friend of the army of the Tennessee. His orders were dated "*Headquarters Red River Expedition, steamer Clara Bell.*" He never declined co-operation with me, nor did he receive orders from me. He made no official reports of his forces or their operations. He was in no wise responsible for the result of the expedition, and may, perhaps, be said to have gained as much by its failure as he would from its success. When his thirty days were up he claimed the right, at Grand Ecore, to return to Vicksburg, irrespective of the condition of the army, or the fleet, and did not consider himself at all responsible for the inevitable consequences of his withdrawal to the army or navy, nor for that detention which their preservation demanded. That responsibility I was called upon to assume in written orders. I entertain no doubt that his official course was entirely consistent with his orders, and I cheerfully acknowledge the generous and earnest efforts of General Mower, of the 16th, and General T. Kilby Smith, of the 17th corps, to infuse into the different corps that unity of spirit which is as essential to victory as the valor of the soldiers in actual battle. I gladly accord to the men of their commands the honor of having fought a desperate enemy, superior in numbers, with as much gallantry and success as that which distinguished the troops of my immediate command. No higher praise than this can be given to any soldier. Alexander's troops never fought better.

The results of the position of the cavalry train, and the loose order of march by the leading column of troops, under Major General Franklin, on the 8th of April, before the battle of Sabine Crossroads, have been stated. A commanding officer is, of course, responsible for all that occurs to his command, whatever may have been the cause. I do not shrink from that responsibility. But, while it was both proper and necessary for me to give personal attention to the prompt advance of all the troops, and fleet, from Grand Ecore, on the morning of the 7th, it was supposed that the movement of a single column of 13,000 men,

moving in advance on one road, for a distance of less than fifty miles, in such manner as to be able to encounter the enemy if he offered resistance, might safely be intrusted to an officer of the reputation and experience of Major General Franklin, whose rank, except in one instance, was superior to that of any officer of the expedition or of the department of the Gulf.

I make no complaint of the navy; but, in view of its prolific despatches long since published on this campaign, I may properly repeat a few facts already stated. The success of the expedition depended solely upon celerity of movement. The navy delayed the advance of the army at Alexandria sixteen days, and at Grand Ecore three days. It occupied four days in moving from Grand Ecore to Springfield Landing, a distance of 104 miles, upon what the despatches call "a rising river with good water," where it arrived two days after the first battle and one day after the decisive battle of the campaign at Pleasant Hill. It detained the army ten days at Grand Ecore and eighteen days at Alexandria on its return. These are not opinions; they are events. To the army they were pregnant and bloody events.

The difficulties of navigation, the imperfect concentration of forces, the incautious march of the 8th of April, and the limited time allotted to the expedition, were the causes of its failure. We owe nothing to the enemy, not even our defeat. Could any one of these difficulties have been avoided, the object of the campaign would have been accomplished.

But the occupation of Shreveport could not have been maintained. The presence of the enemy would have required such a force for its defence as could not have been supplied by the river, and for which no other arrangement had been made, as suggested in my despatch of the 30th of March. The only possible method of maintaining this position would have been to concentrate at this point a force superior in numbers to the enemy, with sufficient time to pursue him wherever he should move, even if it took us to Galveston, on the Gulf coast. This was suggested as a possible result of the campaign, but it was not embraced within the original plan, and was specially precluded by orders received from the Lieutenant General commanding the armies.

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,


N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General Volunteers.*


The SECRETARY OF WAR.


Official copy :


E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *December 1, 1865.*











Sketch of  
 Military Map of NE Virginia  
 Showing Ports and Roads  
 Engineer Bureau  
 War Dept  
 1865.


Scale, one inch to the mile.

Notes:  
 The Coast Survey Maps were used in  
 the compilation. North of the Potomac  
 west of the Dist of Columbia









# Map illustrating the Siege of ATLANTA, GA.


By the Chief Engineer, Commanded by MAJ GEN W T SHERRMAN


From the journals of E. C. De Kay, J. S. Foster, and other sources, and from the reports of the Chief Engineer, Commanded by MAJ GEN W T SHERRMAN, from the 19<sup>th</sup> of July to the 22<sup>nd</sup> of September, 1864.


Scale: 10000 Feet = 1 Mile


Legend:  
Black line: Railroad  
Red line: Trenches  
Blue line: River  
Green line: Road  
Grey shading: Fortifications  
Black dots: Camps  
Black squares: Buildings  
Black circles: Mills  
Black triangles: Churches  
Black diamonds: Cemeteries  
Black stars: Public Buildings  
Black crosses: Schools  
Black pluses: Hospitals  
Black asterisks: Barracks  
Black squares with dots: Churches  
Black circles with dots: Cemeteries  
Black triangles with dots: Churches  
Black diamonds with dots: Cemeteries  
Black stars with dots: Public Buildings  
Black crosses with dots: Schools  
Black pluses with dots: Hospitals  
Black asterisks with dots: Barracks

Notes:  
1. The map is drawn from the journals of E. C. De Kay, J. S. Foster, and other sources, and from the reports of the Chief Engineer, Commanded by MAJ GEN W T SHERRMAN, from the 19<sup>th</sup> of July to the 22<sup>nd</sup> of September, 1864.  
2. The map is drawn to a scale of 10000 Feet = 1 Mile.  
3. The map is drawn from the journals of E. C. De Kay, J. S. Foster, and other sources, and from the reports of the Chief Engineer, Commanded by MAJ GEN W T SHERRMAN, from the 19<sup>th</sup> of July to the 22<sup>nd</sup> of September, 1864.

















































# REBEL LINE OF WORKS AT BLAKELY


CAPTURED BY THE ARMY OF WEST MISS.

April 9, 1865.

POSITION & APPROACHES BY THE UNION FORCES.





39th Cong. 1st Sess. Report of the Chief Engineer U.S.A.





Engraved in the Engineer Dep't

Bowen & Co. Lith. Philada.









PLAN NO 8  
 SIEGE OPERATIONS  
 AT  
 SPANISH FORT

MOBILE BAY.  
 by the U.S. Forces under  
 MAJ GEN CANBY.


*Captured by the Army of West. Miss on the night of April 8 & 9, 1865.*


Major M. M. Foster - Senior Engr. Major J. P. Drew - Asst. Engr.  
 Capt. A. J. Allen - Asst. Engr. Capt. Patton - Inspector - Genl. & Dept. Ad. Asst. Engr.





Engraved in the Engineer Department.

Scale of Yards.











REBEL DEFENCES  
 MOBILE ALABAMA  
 OCCUPIED BY  
 UNION FORCES  
 UNDER  
 MAJ. GEN. E. R. S. CANBY COMDG.



Engraved in the Engineer Department.






# CENTRAL VIRGINIA

(Shaded)

Lieut Genl F. S. GRANT'S Campaign  
and Marches of The Armies under his Command  
in 1861-5


Engineer Bureau War Dept


Scale 1:250,000












Chlorofield C.H.


Region  
embraced in the Operations  
of the Armies against  
**RICHMOND and PETERSBURG.**


Engraved at the Engineer Bureau War Dep

Scale 1:50,000  
1865.


AUTHORITIES. North of James & Appomattox from Photograph Map  
Captured from the Enemy  
South of D<sup>o</sup> from Surveys of Col N Michler  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS.


















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