



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THE STRUGGLE
FOR THE WORLD

*The sea of Fortune doth not ever flow,
She draws her favours to the lowest ebb;
Her time hath equal times to come and go,
Her loom doth weave the fine and coarsest web . . .*

ROBERT SOUTHWELL

Books by James Burnham

THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION

THE MACHIAVELLIANS

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD

JAMES BURNHAM

NEW YORK

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CONTENTS

Part I.—THE PROBLEM

1. <i>The Immaturity of the United States</i>	I
2. <i>Is It Really One World?</i>	14
3. <i>The Political Consequences of the Atomic Bomb</i>	26
4. <i>World Government or World Empire?</i>	42
5. <i>The Nature of Communism</i>	<u>56</u>
6. <i>From Internationalism to Multi-national Bolshevism</i>	<u>75</u>
7. <i>The Goal of Soviet Policy</i>	<u>90</u>
8. <i>The Weakness and Strength of the Soviet Union</i>	114
9. <i>Is a Communist World Empire Desirable?</i>	122
10. <i>The Main Line of World Politics</i>	130

Part II.—WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE

11. <i>The Renunciation of Power</i>	136
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Part III.—WHAT COULD BE DONE

12. <i>Political Aims and Social Facts</i>	144
13. <i>The Break with the Past</i>	150
14. <i>The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Defensive</i>	161

15. <i>The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Offensive</i>	181
16. <i>The Internal Implementation of Foreign Policy</i>	200
17. <i>World Empire and the Balance of Power</i>	211
18. <i>Is War Inevitable?</i>	222

Part IV.—WHAT WILL BE DONE

19. <i>The Policy of Vacillation</i>	231
20. <i>The Outcome</i>	242

THE STRUGGLE
FOR THE WORLD

Part I

THE PROBLEM

1. The Immaturity of the United States

THE THIRD WORLD WAR began in April, 1944. The details of an incident that then took place have not been disclosed. The incident itself, even less dramatic than the dropping of a small bomb on a Manchurian bridge, was hardly noticed behind the smoke of clashing armies and the rubble of cities falling.

The few ships of the remnant of the Greek Navy, operating as a unit under the British Mediterranean Command, were in harbor at Alexandria. The Greek sailors, joined by some Greek soldiers stationed near by, mutinied. It was not a serious revolt, in either numbers or spirit. A few shots were fired, a few lives lost. The British rounded up the mutineers and placed them, for a while, in concentration camps. A few leaders were punished; but soon the trouble was patched up and forgotten. It was recalled briefly by some when, later, a short, bitter civil war broke out in Greece proper.

We do not know the details of what happened in the mutiny; but the details, important as they may be for future scholars, are unnecessary. We know enough to discover the political meaning of what happened, and for this details are sometimes an obstacle. The mutiny was led by members of an organization called ELAS. ELAS was the military arm of a Greek political grouping called EAM. EAM was a seemingly heterogeneous alliance of various Greeks with various political and social views. But EAM was directed by the Greek Communist Party. The Greek Communist Party, like all communist parties, is a section of the international communist movement. International communism is led, in all of its activities, from its supreme headquarters within the Soviet Union.

Politically understood, therefore, the Greek mutiny of April, 1944, and the subsequent Greek Civil War, were armed skirmishes between the Soviet Union, representing international communism, and the British Empire. In the Second World War, however, which had still at that time more than a year to run, Britain and the Soviet Union were allies against a common enemy. We have been recording, we thus see, another war.

In the late summer of 1945, Japan fell. The Red Army, though somewhat tardy in arrival, took quick control over Manchuria and parts of North China. During the time that followed, the communist armies of what had been called the Yen-an Government, sheltered, equipped and in part officered by the Red Army, attempted to establish independent sovereignty in Manchuria, northern and some of central China. These armies met in battle with the armies of the Chungking Government, trained and equipped with the help of the United States Army, and transported toward the scene of action by ships of the United States Navy. But in the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union were allies.

In the Spring of 1946, a little late by the diplomatic clock, the Red Army withdrew from northern Iran. As is the custom of occupying armies, it left behind among the population a reminder of its stay. The young offspring was, however, more formidable than usual: a new little red army, trained, equipped and led by the aid of its political father, with a new autonomous state and a new political party for its playthings. This new little army faced south and southwest and southeast, toward India, toward the Persian Gulf, toward the great oil fields of the United States and the British Empire, flanking the land bridge to Africa.

We are inured to the fact that a great war stirs so deeply the social cauldron that the fumes and bubbling cannot be expected to subside at the mere official declaration of the end of hostilities. Subsidiary wars, mass strikes, civil wars, colonial revolts are the accompaniment of the last stages of great wars, and the usual aftermath. This was true of the First World War, in the period from 1917 to approximately 1924, and it is true now of the postlude to the Second World War. The civil wars and strikes and revolts are a phase of the war. More accurately, both they and the war are phases of a

wider historical process which comes to an acute head in the outbreak of large-scale fighting.

The Russian Revolution, the civil wars in Germany in the years 1918-24, the uprisings in India, the Allied intervention in revolutionary Russia, the Balkan revolts, the Turco-Greek war, the strike waves in nearly every country, were all part of what may properly be called the First World War. Not until their conclusion was the war itself brought to an end. World political conditions quieted—relatively—down. The interim period of recuperation set in, and lasted until the preparatory stage of the new war began. We now realize that the first battles of the Second World War were fought in Spain, and in China from 1937 on. The new war reached its overt military climax from 1940 to 1945 (the battles of 1939 were still preliminary), and is now fading out, with the expected aftermath. The strike waves in the United States, the end of the Third Republic in France, the ousting of the Italian monarchy, the Labour Party victory in England, the colonial disturbances in the Far East, all these may be included as part of the Second World War.

But the events that I have begun by citing—the Greek mutiny and civil war, the Chinese civil war, the Iranian conflict—are of a different character. They are not part of the Second World War, nor of its accompaniment nor aftermath. The forces basically opposed in them—opposed and clashing by arms, as well as by economic and diplomatic competition—are not aligned as were the opposing forces of the Second World War. One of the main power groupings of the war has, indeed, been eliminated altogether. Moreover, the new conflict pushes through those other disturbances which might, from one point of view, be judged as part of the war's aftermath.

The comforting opinion that the world troubles since August, 1945, are in a way normal, the natural features of a time of settling-down and readjustment, like the headache and queasiness following a heavy drunk, is a delusion. These troubles are not a hangover, but the first sips in a new bout. The armed skirmishes of a new war have started before the old war is finished. A general peace agreement is impossible not because leftovers from the old war are still unswept, but because the debris of a new war is already piling up.

After these years of so much death and suffering and exile and destruction, there is a great weariness in the world, and a hope for rest. It is hard to say, and still harder to believe, that this hope is empty, that there will be no rest, that a new war has already begun. Nevertheless, this is the truth, and the penalty for denying this truth will be heavy.

Preliminary skirmishes, of course, even bloody skirmishes, are not identical with the grand battle. Sometimes, even after the skirmishes have been fought, with dead on both sides, the battle itself is delayed, or, for the time being, avoided. Sometimes, perhaps, the battle never does take place, though only if the issues at stake are resolved by some other means. We can, then, consider it at least possible that the Third World War may never expand much beyond these preliminary stages, might end its life in its beginning, like a new bud late-frosted. But what chance to avoid or to win the battle would a commander have who refused to believe the reports of his scouts, who would not listen when told that shots had already been exchanged, and who lolled carelessly in his tent, playing cribbage with his aide, and arguing the tactical merits of yesterday's engagement?

2

The United States has made the irreversible jump into world affairs. It is committed everywhere, on every continent, in every major field of social action, and it can never again withdraw. In the Third World War, the United States, whatever the wishes of its citizens, is one of the two dominating contestants. But socially, politically and culturally, the United States is not prepared for the world role which it is nevertheless compelled to play.

Faced with the tasks of full social maturity, the United States is itself mature in one field alone: in the development of the technique of production. In this, Americans themselves often do not understand their unparalleled supremacy. There is not, and has never been, anything approaching American methods of production. The last war showed that it is almost impossible to set goals too high for American factories to reach. Whether hairpins or battleships, airplanes or carpet slippers, cement or the most delicate precision in-

struments, machine tools or penicillin, the United States can, so far as technique goes, flood the earth with them.

It is not so much in the machines themselves, where England and Germany and perhaps Sweden and Switzerland have done better, that the specific United States superiority lies. It is rather in a talent, by now almost a national characteristic, for the large scale organization of production. England and Germany could build finer ships and airplanes and cameras, but they could not organize the hundreds of thousands of men and machines and secondary supplies and plants and freight cars and trucks into functioning organisms out of which could issue the immense quantities of very good, if not the finest, ships and airplanes and cameras.

This ability to organize production is so well established that it seems capable of being applied at will, or under pressure, to new and unprecedented problems. There is an instructive contrast between the petty Nazi attempts to manufacture atomic bombs, and the colossal, integrated Manhattan Project. Almost none of the fundamental research was done by Americans. The true creative energy of the United States was expressed in the organization and its mass functioning. The achievement was the same with blood plasma, radar, new drugs, or K rations.

The same talent was notable even in the military conduct of the war. The War and Navy Departments, the generals and admirals, inferior in the niceties of military tradition and science to those of other nations, were heroic as mass organizers. They hurled at the enemy overwhelming quantities of supplies, men, shells, food, ships, trucks, tanks, planes, so that the mistakes and crudities of details were buried in the mass. The military methods were in accord with the American genius. To send thousands of planes and two million tons of shipping against a small Pacific atoll would have been absurd for any other nation, but it was exactly American.

From this supremacy in the technique of production, a supremacy that is like one of the wild artistic talents, irrational, only half-conscious, uncontrolled, out of balance with intelligence and other impulses, there derives, for the United States, a powerful urge toward a crude, narrowly conceived economic imperialism. Driven by

the potential of their mass production factories, the directors of the American economy would like to imagine the world as an open field, waiting for the rain of American goods and machines and money. They can provide all, they dream, for all the world, and they do not need any help from other bungling, ineffective nations, a Germany or England or Japan. The world, all the world, should be the vast market for American goods and machines and the source of certain desirable supplies. What a blessing it would be to the world! If only it were not for the narrowness of foreign business competitors, and the blindness of generals and politicians at home as well as elsewhere, whose careers seem to be a wilful plot against rational and efficient production.

But the politicians and generals remain, and the ability to organize mass production is not a sufficient qualification for the proper conduct of the affairs of a great world power. Human society is more than factories, weighty as is the influence of the factories on society as a whole. And when we leave the premises of the factories, the American, there so seemingly mature and triumphant, appears as a gawky adolescent.

For this social immaturity, the circumstances of the nation's history provide an explanation. The United States began only three centuries ago, as a colonial offshoot of Western Civilization. During more than two of these centuries, its energies were concentrated on the comparatively primitive task of conquering a natural wilderness. It was removed, in those generations, from the culture and learning of the civilization of which it was nevertheless a part, and from which its historical life was drawn. Its good fortune, moreover, hindered its normal cultural growth, like a gross boy too pampered and sheltered by a foolish mother. Its rich material resources, its continental self-sufficiency, its geographical isolation until the present age, were curtains hiding from it the way of the world. The natural wilderness was subdued, a nation was formed, a matchless economic machine constructed, but there was no art of its own, no music, no literature, no great philosophy or religion, none of those signs of an inner and deeper wisdom.

The foolish, sheltering mother is now dead, killed by the consequences of scientific technology. The walls of the continental home

are down. The untrained adolescent must act on the world arena, not with an obscure apprenticeship but as a spotlight, featured star. The result is a kind of schizoid split; the accomplished, confident technician of production is fused with a crude and hesitant semi-barbarian.

Let us consider, as a symptom of this schizoid adolescence, the attitude of our soldiers at the end of the recent war. Most accounts agree that it was summed up in a single objective: to go home, to Mother, the Best Girl, a local job, and the corner drugstore or saloon. Emotionally the wish is understandable and sympathetic. But rationally it should be plain that such an attitude on the part of its young men is incompatible with the objective requirements of a world power. This was not the attitude of the young men of the Athens of the 5th century B.C., or of the Rome of the late Republic and the Empire, or of the Moslems of the 8th century, or of modern Holland and England and France. The young men of a world power must be ready to act in the world, to seek their career and its fruition in far places. Power is not abstract, nor is it adequately embodied in bills of exchange, or mere material commodities. As United States power stretches out to Brazil or Africa or China or Europe or the Near East, it must be concretized in men and their institutions, in soldiers and engineers and administrators and intelligence agents, in factories and airfields and plantations and railroads.

It is contemptible to blame the young soldiers for their provincial attitude, to condemn them, as has been not infrequently done, for cowardice or shirking. It is the nation, not the soldiers alone, that is unprepared. It was the members of Congress, not the soldiers, who showed real cowardice and blindness when they responded to the complaints of the soldiers not by pointing out to them the responsibilities of world power but by yielding to the homesickness, and seeking demagogically to gain a few cheap votes by joining in the clamor to bring the boys home at whatever cost to the interest of the nation—and of the world.

The same provincialism, flatly counter to the needs of world power, is reflected in the educational system. There are few Americans who can speak even tolerably well a foreign language, and fewer still who bother to learn intimately another nation's culture.

Until very recently, there were only one or two schools that trained students for international careers in diplomacy or business. Even the *New York Times*, the most internationalist of the country's journals, advocates as the educational reform most to be desired a new concentration on United States history—at the very moment when what is required is an understanding of world history.

Equally revealing is the nation's attitude toward its armed services. Responsible world power must be based finally upon military strength. The nation, daily and unavoidably intervening all over the world—from Argentina to Spain to Iran to Manchuria—suffers an extended internal crisis over the perfectly obvious question of a renewed Draft Law, a necessity which is so much accepted by all other nations as to be not even subject for debate. This failure to take the armed services seriously has, of course, a long historical background. The seriousness was, in fact, not required in the past, because, on the one hand, possible wars developed slowly, with geography an adequate first line of defense; and, on the other, the nation did not have extensive permanent commitments throughout the world. The carry-over of this attitude into the new period, when all has changed, when the United States is one of the two decisive world powers, is another sign of the nation's adolescent schizophrenia. Psychically, the United States does not want to admit to itself that it is not a child any longer, but a grown-up man.

We may note similar characteristics in the nation's economic conceptions (as distinguished from its practical abilities at economic production). The owner or manager of a factory is delighted to sell his goods abroad at a profit, and from his standpoint there the whole matter ends. He doesn't want to reflect that if he and others like him sell abroad, then someone inside the country must also buy from abroad. He hasn't learned that for a mature world power it is even more necessary to receive than to give. Congressmen and businessmen alike argue about loans to Britain or France or China as if they were niggling credits arranged by a store at a local bank, instead of conceiving them in their actual meaning as instruments of world policy. Shipowners and airways companies haggle over a foreign contract to make it net a few more dollars, without any

concern for the fact that they might be driving a potential ally into the network of the world opponent.

3

I have been mentioning a few symptomatic illustrations of what I have called the immaturity of the United States. This "immaturity" may be described more abstractly as a form of what sociologists call "cultural lag"; specifically, the persistence of habits, attitudes, ideas, customs, and to some extent institutional structures, appropriate enough to the United States of the 19th century, into a new period where the actual position of the United States has completely changed, and where these persisting habits, attitudes and ideas are incongruous and stultifying. The United States, become in fact a world power, potentially the greatest world power, cannot function properly as a world power because it still conceives itself and the world through the medium of ideas suited to what was, in reality, a province, out of the main stream.

The illustrations could readily be multiplied. I propose, however, to restrict myself to one further instance, the most important of all, and the one most directly relevant to the subject matter of this book: the immaturity of the United States in political understanding.

Three features of United States foreign policy during the past five years (though they are not confined to that interval) must have struck nearly every reflective observer. First, the policy abruptly shifts, without any adequate motivation. The United States forces Argentina into the United Nations, then takes the lead against Argentina by publishing the Blue Book on Perón; the public is compelled to accept Tito, then the effort is made to help Mikhailovitch at his trial, and thereby to injure Tito; in China there is a flip-flop every few months; Soviet-dominated Poland is recognized at the same time that anti-communist exile Polish troops are aided; and so on. Second, the United States has not been securing political results commensurate with its material strength. After all the conferences, Teheran or Yalta or Potsdam or London or Paris, it always turns out that the United States has made the significant concessions. This feature is the more striking in comparison to the habit

of Soviet diplomacy, during these same years, to get results far greater than would seem to follow from its material strength. Even when the Soviet Union was on the edge of military defeat, it could still win political victories. Third, there is a peculiar ineptness about United States political actions. The political representatives are always making mistakes, getting mixed up, getting lost in procedure, having to retract and start over.

These features are all related to the fact that the United States does not have at its disposal among its citizens, governing or governed, a trained understanding of the field of politics in its more general sense, or, in particular, of contemporary world politics. Many of the political representatives of the United States do not know either what they are doing or what they are up against; they do not even know, usually, what the problems are.

The prevailing conceptions of politics in the United States have two chief sources, both extending back to the early years of the unified nation. One is the abstract, empty, sentimental rhetoric of democratic idealism, as established for us first by Thomas Jefferson. This is for speeches, conscience-soothing, and full-dress occasions. The other is the ward-heeling, hotel-and-saloon, spoils-system, machine practices, put on a working basis first by Jefferson's party colleague and first vice-president, Aaron Burr. This is the traditional American combination, holding as much for the Republican as for the Democratic Party. The amalgam, under Franklin Roosevelt, of the "idealistic" New Dealers with the "vicious city machines," so puzzling to many liberal commentators, is in the standard American style, and is to be found just as plainly functioning in Jefferson's election, through Burr, in 1800.

Jeffersonian rhetoric has no connection with reality, and I shall not, therefore, be further concerned with it. When it is taken seriously, as it is not by many of those who most frequently employ it, it prohibits the understanding of political events.

American machine politics, and the ideas corresponding to machine politics, are remarkably effective within a limited range of political action, especially under more or less stable social conditions. They can take over and keep control of a city administration or a State government, or swing the outcome of the national nominating

convention of one of the political parties. They can, within their restricted sphere, suitably reward political friends and punish enemies.

When, however, either the scale of political action sufficiently expands or the social conditions underlying politics enter a period of crisis, the machine conceptions are no longer adapted. Great nations, with a tradition and a culture, do not operate in terms of quashed parking tickets, building contracts, and soft jobs in the local courthouse. To deal successfully with them on a world scale, it is necessary to know something about world geography and economics—and even religions and morals, and about the history and behavior of civilizations. Moreover, in times of crisis, the control of the movements of the masses cannot be won by cigars and handshakes and postmasterships. The masses become subject to the influence of ideas, of world-shaking myths, of vast, non-rational impulses.

Here, also, the usage of the educational system is instructive. In United States educational institutions, from primary school to university, politics is taught under such headings as "Civics" or "Government." The courses bolster the usual rhetoric with sterile charts of outward governmental forms—constitutions and bureaus and uni- or bi-cameral parliaments and departments and councils. For practical training, students are taught case-work technique in social service, and how to become a Grade 8 civil servant. We seldom find courses offered in world political history and its correlated fields, in geopolitics, world economics, military history. In the United States, the practical politician despises the men of learning in the political sciences—for there are a few; and the men of learning, blocked from contact with the springs of power, become academic and sterile.

We live in what Lenin correctly described as an "era of wars and revolutions," in the midst, indeed, of a great world revolution.* A distinguishing and all-important development of this era has been the rise of the totalitarian political movements, of the essentially similar though variously named Nazi, fascist, and communist varieties. Nowhere is the political illiteracy of Americans more fully

* I have described the general nature of the world revolution of our time in *The Managerial Revolution*, The John Day Company, New York, 1941.

and disastrously shown than in their lack of understanding of these totalitarian movements. Many of our political leaders believe that the totalitarian parties, though somewhat strange and "foreign," are fundamentally similar to our own Democratic and Republican parties, those loose, shifting aggregations of millions of diverse-minded men and women, held together by vague sentiments, vaguer traditions, and the business of office-seeking. When General Patton slowed up in his de-Nazification of the Third Army's zone in Germany, he explained that after all the difference between Nazis and anti-Nazis was pretty much like that between Democrats and Republicans at home. He was relieved of his command; but his error was no greater than that of Roosevelt or Hull or Stettinius or Byrnes or Acheson or Wallace when, all over the world, they accepted without protest the inclusion of the communists among the "democratic parties" that should be permitted to function with full freedom in liberated or conquered nations, and when they welcomed communists into reconstituted governments. In China, indeed, the United States government compelled Chiang Kai-shek to propose, in the autumn of 1945, the inclusion of the Chinese communists in the Chinese government.

These totalitarian movements, with their steel discipline, their monolithic structure, their cement of terror, their rigid and total ideology, their pervasion of every aspect of the lives of their members, are of a species totally different from what we are accustomed to think of as "political parties." No wonder the United States political representatives are constantly surprised by the behavior of the Soviet representatives at every conference, just as they were always surprised by the Nazis. Our diplomats believe that they are bargaining with other men who, though tough and shrewd, are of a similar kind to themselves, and who operate according to the same underlying rules. For the Soviet men, the bargaining is the lesser detail. They are there to use the conference as a forum from which to speak to the masses, and as a device not for gaining agreement with, but for promoting the destruction of, their fellow-conferees. Gromyko's rude behavior at the Security Council is unintelligible to Byrnes; but Byrnes' vacillating behavior, unfortunately, is not unintelligible to Gromyko.

The low level of political knowledge in the United States is shown also by the books, articles, speeches, editorials and columns on political affairs. Here direct comparison can be made, and it is safe to say, I think, that our level is lower than that of any other nation. To an informed Russian or Englishman or Chinese or Brazilian, it must seem incredible that tens of millions of the citizens of the United States guide their political sense by columnists and radio speakers educated by years of scandal-mongering, sports writing, or cigar salesmanship; and try to find out what is happening in the world by reading the careless notes of journalists who consider themselves qualified as political analysts because they call famous men by their first names and know the fashionable bar in each capital.

It would be absurd to believe that a mere increase in political understanding could solve the catastrophic political problems that lie ahead. In spite of Bacon, knowledge is not of itself power. But ignorance is weakness, because ignorance is not able to direct whatever resources may be available toward the goals that may be selected. Nonsense is a safe luxury only in times more tranquil than ours.

The purpose of this book may be simply stated. I propose to analyze, in its primary and most fundamental lines, the world political situation as it exists in this period following the conclusion of the Second World War; as it exists in reality, not as it is distorted in wishful dreams or in the lies of propagandists. I propose, further, in terms of the actual situation, to examine the alternatives of political action which are at the disposal of the United States.

2. *Is It Really One World?*

WENDELL WILLKIE, with an enthusiasm touched off by the wonders of modern air transport, popularized the phrase, "one world." The complex of feelings and ideas associated with the phrase were not, however, Willkie's discovery. They have a longer history.

It is worth while to be clear about this question of the unity of the world, since more is at stake than a fruitful subject for after-dinner conversation or election campaigns. To many, there seem to follow, from the belief that the world is one, certain political conclusions of great import. If the world is one, they argue, then it can and ought properly to be politically united; then there can, and should be, just one world government. In order to unite the world in a single world government, all that is necessary is to make known to the peoples of the world this fact that their world is one.

Is it true that the world is one? Or rather, since this first question is ambiguous, is a way of confusing several different and independent questions, let us put it: in what sense or senses is the world one? in what sense or senses is it many? In both cases, the answer must be in terms that are relevant to the problems of world politics. The fact that the world is one in an astronomical sense, as a single planet located in the gravitational field of a definite star, is not of political importance.

The first expression, in the West, of the notion of the unity of the world was, according to tradition, by Alexander the Great, who therein went beyond the philosophic ideas of his tutor Aristotle. It was developed further by the Stoics of the Roman Empire, by Dante, partly under Stoic influence, and by the medieval philosophers, with their doctrine of a universal "natural law." Kant, in his moral philosophy, gave it a new variation; and it reappears today among the beliefs of many internationalists.

The oneness of the world, as interpreted by the core of meaning shared in this lineage, extended over 2300 years, and to be found

also in Confucius and in the earliest, non-supernatural form of Buddhism, is a secular philosophic conception that all men are one because they share in a "common humanity." Whatever the diversities in their talents or circumstances, all men are subject to the laws of the universal cosmos, all men have reason, all men are moral beings, equally able to exercise moral will and equally bound by moral duty. "World humanity," "the world community," therefore, are not empty abstractions, but are phrases which sum up the objective metaphysical reality of a single universal human nature.

In recent years, this philosophic conception has been given a more naturalistic, empirical slant. Emphasis is sometimes put not so much on reason, moral will, and natural law that men are, in some complicated metaphysical manner, presumed to share, as on the basic biological and psychological needs, desires and impulses that they undoubtedly do share: needs for food, sex and shelter, the desire for some sort of security, the impulse toward sociality.

A content similar to that of these secular conceptions is to be found, transferred into religious language, in the ideas of the great world religions, particularly in Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. In Christianity this is summed up in the New Testament doctrine of "the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man." Since God is the Creator and Father of all men equally, since our being is alike derived from Divinity, we are therefore all brothers.

This, then, is the first specifiable meaning, or rather set of meanings, that can be given to the phrase, "one world." The world is one because all men share a common humanity, whether that humanity is interpreted in naturalistic, metaphysical or religious terms. What bearing, then, does the oneness of the world, so understood, have upon the cold historical problems of world politics in our time?

The answer, unfortunately, is that it has almost no bearing at all. Whatever common humanity men may have, they must have had it from the beginning. Men have existed on the earth for at least several hundred thousand years, and probably for several million. Their common humanity has never prevented them from always being divided, from always fighting, killing, torturing and oppressing each other. The very philosophers who proclaimed the metaphysical doctrine have been conspicuous in the fighting and the

torturing; the religions which profess the Fatherhood of God have inspired among the fiercest of the wars and persecutions; the fashionable naturalists of common humanity in our own time have not been backward in defending the saturation bombing of helpless cities, where common humanity was thoroughly disintegrated in common.

Experience does not, then, suggest that common humanity has had much effect in contributing to the historical goal of one world community. The trouble with the doctrine is, first, that in its selection of certain common factors from the totality of human nature it neglects many less desirable but equally universal factors, such as man's impulse to destruction and pain as well as to fraternity, his need for hate, his desire for domination, in short his irrationality, which is at least no less plain than his reason. Second, the doctrine, having decided on its common factors, fails to note that, in concrete reality, these are inextricably bound up with many other factors, both common and special, both universal and particular: with the other, neglected common factors, and with all the particulars of tribe, family, city, nation, property relations, language, wealth and poverty, customs and taboos, material resources, science and religion and technology and art. What men actually do in history, and notably the conflicts they get into with each other, are determined not so much by the abstracted factors which they have in common as by the specific circumstances of place and social structure and time, wherein their interests diverge and their objectives clash. The humanity common to a Soviet commissar, a Trobriand native, a Midwestern small farmer, and a Spanish Jesuit is a rather pale residue, a not very substantial foundation for the construction of one world.

Moreover, the common needs and impulses that men have—for food, shelter, women, pre-eminence, wealth, pleasure—far from invariably bringing them together in brotherhood, are more usually sources of their mutual struggle. When there is not enough food to go around, reason and the moral will have never proved adequate to the task of deciding who gets what. The nomads of steppes become arid through climatic change descend on the plain, with as much and as little attention to the claims of moral duty as the house-

wives who throw themselves into the frenzy of the black market.

It would, nevertheless, be wrong to dismiss altogether the doctrine of common humanity and the brotherhood of man. Taken as a description of what men have been and are, of how they behave, it is distorted and even dangerously false. Projected as a guiding ideal, as a goal and purpose, the doctrine has not only a splendid nobility, so wonderfully expressed in those passages of St. Matthew where Christ corrects the jealous separatism of the Scribes and Pharisees; but it has also, through the loyalty of those who believe in the ideal, a chance of influencing, toward the goal of brotherhood which it states, the course of history.

It is not sentimental, but simply human, to have ideals. What is sentimental, and what so often leads to disaster, is to confuse ideals with present facts. Men are in fact not one but divided, not rational in their actions but predominantly irrational, not filled with love only but also with selfishness, not good but a strange mixture of evil and good. The facts remain, whatever words we use. But men can become less divided; and even if the hate and irrationality and evil cannot be eliminated, their consequences can, perhaps, be made less terrible. We rightly honor the ideal of common humanity. However far it is from solving, or even helping us much in solving, the problems of today, it remains a hope, and the best hope, for tomorrow.

2

From the time of Karl Marx, the notion of one world has been given another, very different interpretation, an interpretation accepted by many who are not at all Marxists. The world has not in the past been one, the Marxists say, but it has become potentially one—will, they would say, inevitably soon become one—through the results of modern technology. Machines and mass production, rapid transportation and communication, world-wide economic interdependence through the world-wide division of labor and resources, the spread of science and its applications, all these have so linked all parts of the world together, so reduced the time and space dimensions applicable to human society, that the world is today as intimate a community as a county was a thousand years ago. When

these facts are recognized, or merely through their effect even if unrecognized, the world as a whole will necessarily be organized, socially and politically, into a single world state or society, so that its political form will come into balance with its technological base.

This Marxian conclusion rests upon an assumption drawn from the Marxian theory of history. According to the theory, the nature of human society and the process of historical change depend "in the final analysis" (to use Engels' ambiguous words) upon the development of technology ("the means of production," in Marxian language). In the long run, everything else, property relations, class divisions, political organization, philosophy, art, morality and religion, follow causally from the state of technology as applied in the means of production. Therefore, Marxists reason today, since a single basic technology, a single means and method of production, are now world-wide in extent and influence, it follows that government (along with everything else) is, or is ready to be, world-wide. Mankind has become one because mankind as a whole now depends upon a single means and method of production.

This Marxian doctrine is in part true, and I shall separate out its truths before proceeding to state its errors.

Through scientific technology, factories and machines and assembly lines, and an extreme division of labor, Western Civilization* has constructed the extraordinary mechanical appliances and the remarkable method of production with which we are all familiar. These appliances, especially during the past century, have been spread into all parts of the earth. For the use of the Western productive plant, raw materials of many kinds, agricultural and mineral, have likewise been drawn from all parts of the earth. Some regions—notably Japan, Russia, and sections of such countries as China, India and Turkey—not themselves part of Western Civilization have even borrowed the method of production itself, and are turning out on their own account the mechanical appliances.

We must further note that historical geography depends upon

* By "Western Civilization" I refer in this book to that civilization whose original home was in the European peninsula, whose traditional religion has been Christianity, and whose historical career began at the end of the Dark Ages that followed the collapse of Hellenic Civilization.

an Einsteinian rather than a Newtonian function; that is, upon a combined space-time function. The devices for rapid communication and transportation, and for long-distance warfare, have historically speaking greatly reduced the size of the earth. The historical, political distance between two places depends primarily upon how long it takes to get from one to the other, either in person, or in influence, as by the proxy of a message or a bomb. Today it takes much less time for a man to go from New York to Moscow than it took him 150 years back to go from New York to Boston; and it takes incomparably less time for a radio message or a rocket to travel either distance.* Therefore it is correct to say that, in certain respects at least, the world today is a community as geographically intimate as a county a thousand years ago.

A conclusion of great importance does follow from these truths. They do not prove that the world and its civilization are one, or that a world community is inevitable; but they show that the administration of the world, or most of the world, as a single state is now technically possible. There is no longer any insuperable technical obstacle to a degree of integration in armed power, police, courts, finances and economy sufficient to constitute a unified world state.

3

From this positive conclusion, which I shall later use in positive analysis, we may turn to the errors in the Marxian doctrine. Of these, there are principally two. First, the existing facts are overstated. Though it is true that the mechanical appliances of Western Civilization are found all over the earth, they are in many regions far from abundant, in not a few so rare as to make hardly a ripple in the sea of the local culture. Airplanes have by now been seen, probably, by most human beings; but there are comparatively few places where airplanes have become part of ordinary daily life. A

* This fact alone shows the absurdity of those who argue that there can be two great nations today—the United States and the Soviet Union, for example—with no potential basis of conflict because they have no “points of contact”: that is, their borders do not meet on a conventional map. Today the real borders of all nations—the limits of their interests—all overlap.

radio or an electric iron or a light bulb is still a magical sensation among well over half the peoples of the earth. If we study economic maps of the distribution of railroads or electric power plants or automobiles or telephones, what impresses us is not that they diffuse the earth, but quite the contrary, that most of the world is almost entirely without them.

If we consider the advanced Western means of production, we find that their distribution is even more narrowly limited. The maps show only a few major concentrations: in the United States, in England, in certain areas of the Soviet Union, in Japan and the adjacent Chinese coast, and in part of Continental Europe; and the Second World War has considerably reduced the last two. Elsewhere, it is only in a few seacoast city areas in India, Brazil, Argentina, Australia and perhaps one or two other nations that we find significant quantities of the typical Western means of production—the factories, mills, power plants.

The mechanical appliances of the West are not, therefore, literally present everywhere in the world. The most that we can correctly say is that their power and influence are felt, directly or indirectly, everywhere in the world.

The second Marxian error is deeper. It is the error in the assumption drawn from the general theory of history, the error in the belief that technology is the sole determinant of the nature and process of history and civilization. Technology is unquestionably one of the decisive causal forces in history, and in the history of Western Civilization, especially since the Renaissance, it has been perhaps more influential than any other causal force; but in the history of civilizations in general it must be reduced to merely one among several determining influences. Climate, custom, institutional forms, religion, morality, even intelligence and individual genius, all have at least a relative autonomy as historical forces. The nature and fate of civilizations is the resultant of the interaction of all of these, and still others, with each other, and with, of course, technology as well.

We who belong to Western Civilization have our vision distorted by a parochial blindness. We assume the identity of mankind as a whole with ourselves. All that we can see of the peoples of the earth is ourselves—the “civilized”—and a dim outer fringe of “natives.”

And since we are peculiarly distinguished by our technological prowess, we further confound civilization with technology. Through this narrow slit, this egocentrism, the world can appear as one, or almost one. If, however, we try for a moment to lift and expand our vision, if we get rid of the filters of Westernization and technology, the map of the world falls into more profoundly varied contours.

The nations of Western Civilization are themselves, for that matter, bitterly and obviously divided, so bitterly that they have been engaged during the present century in the effort, not without success, to annihilate each other. They are divided in language, in economic interest, in governmental forms, in the axioms of jurisprudence. The fiercely divisive influence of nationalism is itself a phenomenon of our age. Our kind of nationalism arose in conjunction with the French Revolution, and today it shows few signs of abating. It is a remarkable fact that during the Second World War the effective resistance in Europe to both Nazism and communism turned out to be nationalist in motive. Neither freedom in the abstract nor "class war" nor "United Europe" nor "World Government" proved to be the rallying ideas of the undergrounds and the resistance movements. It was the idea of "France," of "Poland," of "Greece."

If there are these divisions within Western Civilization, how much more profoundly divided, then, is the world as a whole, where there simultaneously exist, along with Western Civilization, at least four other distinct civilizations—the Far Eastern, the Islamic, the Hindu, and the Orthodox Christian—together with the remains of several earlier civilizations, and even a number of surviving primitive cultures?

The misleading feature in the social environment has been the fact that, in modern times, our own Western Civilization has cast the net of its economic system round the World and has caught in its meshes the whole living generation of Mankind and all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face of the Planet. . . .

[Western observers who believe in "the unity of civilization," in "one world"] have exaggerated the range of the facts in two directions. First, they have assumed that the present more or less complete unification of the World on a Western basis on the economic

plane and the large measure of unification on the same basis which has been accomplished on the political plane are together tantamount to a perfect unification on all planes. Secondly, they have equated unification with unity. . . .

[Their] vision of the contemporary world must be confined to the economic and political planes of social life and must be inhibited from penetrating to the cultural plane, which is not only deeper but is fundamental. While the economic and political maps of the World have now been "Westernized" almost out of recognition, the cultural map remains today substantially what it was before our Western Society ever started on its career of economic and political conquest. On this cultural plane, for those who have eyes to see, the lineaments of the four living non-Western civilizations are still clear. Even the fainter outlines of the frail primitive societies that are being ground to powder by the passage of the ponderous Western steam-roller have not quite ceased to be visible. How have our historians managed to close their eyes lest they should see? They have simply put on the spectacles—or the blinkers—of their generation; and we may best apprehend what the outlook of this generation has been by examining the connotation of the English word "Natives" and the equivalent words in the other vernacular languages of the contemporary Western World.

When we Westerners call people "Natives" we implicitly take all the cultural colour out of our perceptions of them. We see them as trees walking, or as wild animals infesting the country in which we happen to come across them . . . Their tenure is as provisional and precarious as that of the forest trees which the Western pioneer fells or that of the big game which he shoots down. And how shall the "civilized" Lords of Creation treat the human game, when in their own good time they come to take possession of the land which, by right of eminent domain, is indefeasibly their own? Shall they treat these "Natives" as vermin to be exterminated, or as domesticable animals to be turned into hewers of wood and drawers of water? . . . Evidently the word ("Native") is not a scientific term but an instrument of action . . . It belongs to the realm of Western practice and not of Western theory; and this explains the paradox that a classificatory-minded society has not hesitated to apply the name indiscriminately to the countrymen of a Gandhi and a Bose and a Rabindranath Tagore, as well as to "primitives" of the lowest degree of culture, such as the Andaman Islanders and the Australian

Blackfellows. For the theoretical purpose of objective description, this sweeping use of the word makes sheer nonsense. For the practical purpose of asserting the claim that our Western Civilization is the only civilization in the World, the usage is a militant gesture.*

Wendell Willkie, in his hurried trip, visited large cities, factories, airports and government offices. He talked to factory managers, generals, bureaucrats and high administrators, who were besides anxious for favors, through a good report, from the United States. Not unnaturally Willkie saw that world as one. But it does not take a very long trip in from the seacoast of India or New Zealand or China or Arabia or Africa or Burma or Ceylon to remind those who are willing to see that culturally the world is not one but many. It does not, indeed, take a trip longer than that to our local museum or library, where songs and pictures and statues and symbols and religious books will offer the same evidence. The diversity, moreover, is not just a surface paint. There are even, hard as it is for a Western mind to understand it, "natives"—of China and India and Morocco and Turkey—who not only have no automobiles and bathtubs and radios but who do not want them.†

We may summarize the analysis, up to this point, of "one world":

The world is potentially one in the light of a possible ideal of brotherhood, of common humanity. The world is actually one, at least at a certain level, through the direct or indirect influence of a particular technology and method of economic production. Politically, and, most deeply of all, culturally, the world is many.

* Quoted by permission from *A Study of History*, by Arnold J. Toynbee, Vol. I, I, C, III, (b), pp. 150-153, published by the Oxford University Press (London) on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In this chapter, and in Chapter 4, I have drawn considerably from this great work.

† Toynbee, *op cit.*, recalls "the story of the Sharif of Morocco who, returning home after a visit to Europe . . . , was yet heard to exclaim, as he sighted the Moroccan coast: 'What a comfort to be getting back to Civilization!' When our great-grandchildren make the same remark as their ship enters the Solent or the Mersey, will the joke be published in the comic papers of China and—Morocco?"

I have dealt so far in this chapter with long-term phenomena: of more than a century in the economic and political instances; of a great many centuries in the case of the cultural plurality. I have left unmentioned one growingly familiar and outstanding fact, of direct bearing upon the question of "one world," which is a phenomenon of decades rather than of centuries. This fact more than any of the others has direct relevance to the question of political policy. Political action, however wise, cannot be meaningfully conceived in terms of centuries, but at most, of decades or a generation. Rational political action does not disregard the slow, vast, centuries-old phenomena, but it is compelled to accept them as an element of the situation which is merely "given," like the slowly changing sea for marine life, or the atmosphere. Deliberate political policy must concentrate on the main issue of today and a few years from today.

The additional fact is that, independently of the unities and diversities which we have been considering, the world today is split sharply and decisively into two incommensurate regions, the communist and the non-communist. The very metaphors of contemporary rhetoric give witness to this split, and to its sharpness. We all know about the "iron curtain" at the dividing line. This metaphor, however, is misleading. The division is not correctly to be thought of as crystallized along a particular geographical line. The communist region infiltrates into every geographical area of the earth; and the split, though plainest along the boundaries of the Soviet Empire, is to be found also within each nation outside of those formal boundaries, dividing within that nation the communists from the non-communists as formidably as, at a given moment, the Elbe divides Germany.

Since much of this book will deal with the split of the world into communist and non-communist fragments, I shall here do no more than note the fact. It is a fact toward which every communist is long adjusted. From the time of Lenin, and implicitly before Lenin, every communist has been drilled to believe that in the world there are only two divisions of mankind: the communists, and all the rest. From the point of view of communist theory, all the thousand dif-

ferences, among non-communists, of nation or wealth or learning or class or color or religion or policy are as nothing when weighed against that difference which separates the communist from all others. When the communist sings, "The international Party shall be the human race," he means what he says, and he expresses his view of the process by which alone he thinks that ultimate difference can be overcome.

3. *The Political Consequences of the Atomic Bomb*

MOST OPINIONS about the historical meaning of the discovery and use of atomic weapons* can be divided into two general types. One, the less conspicuous, though adhered to by a number of military leaders, maintains that no essential change in warfare or in history is brought about by the introduction of atomic weapons. Atomic weapons are just one more item in a long list: clubs and stones, swords, spears, ships, bows and arrows, gunpowder, rifles, cannon, machine guns, airplanes, gas, rockets, atomic bombs. . . . New weapons have altered the range at which killing and destruction can take place, and have increased the amount of killing that can be accomplished at one moment. The differences, however, are only of degree. Tactics, defensive and offensive, must accommodate themselves to the quantitative changes. The great principles of military strategy stand unaltered. An atomic war will look quite different from older fashioned wars, and will require different tactical preparations and dispositions; but it will be decided by the same combination of resources, morale, and strategic superiority that has always been in question.

The other set of opinions, in extreme contrast, holds that the discovery of the use of nuclear energy, and its adaptation to warfare, have thrown us into an altogether new stage of world history. War, and in time human life, are at the beginning of a total change, un-

* Atomic bombs are not, of course, the only new weapons of mass destruction. It has been claimed that some others, not yet disclosed, are still more devastating in effect than atomic bombs. For the sake of simplicity, I shall speak of "atomic weapons" or merely of "atomic bombs"; but I wish to be understood to refer in each case to the entire group of new weapons of comparable, or greater, destructive power. I may add, as my own opinion, that I should expect the nuclear weapons, based as they are on the unlocking of a new level of physical reality, to prove of much the greatest importance.

recognizable and unpredictable from the point of view of the past. Experience can no longer be a guide. To be in accord with the revolutionary "nuclear age," we must also revolutionize our ideas.

When confronted with two extreme and seemingly opposed views, the liberal mind customarily feels that the truth must lie in a compromise halfway between them. In this way, liberalism avoids the often rather grim duty of facing the flat truth, and recognizing that on most matters all views except one are simply false.

In this instance, the truth is more complex than usual. Both extreme views happen to be true. There is no paradox, because those who maintain the two views are talking about different things.

The first view is correct in recalling that atomic bombs were not created *ex nihilo*, and do not begin their career in a social vacuum. They do not make themselves, but are made and used by groups of human beings. These human beings do not change their biological and psychological traits at the moment of constructing atomic bombs. As human beings, they are parts of organized, institutionalized societies; psychologically, individually and institutionally, they conduct themselves in behavior patterns largely determined by a long and continuing past. As a physical fact, the atomic bomb is for human knowledge something new, unique, startling. As a social fact, it is linked into the great chain of social facts. Its appearance, as a physical fact, is without human significance. The human problem is: what is to be done with it, how is it to be used? and this is a problem not of nuclear physics but of human behavior, a moral and social problem. Such problems did not begin with the cyclotron.

The atomic bomb does not make men more intelligent or more unselfish; it does not abolish their impulses toward love or hate, power or kindness; it does not eliminate the struggle of classes for wealth and privilege, or of nations against other nations, or of freedom against tyranny; it does not make a great country small, or a small one great, or a backward land advanced. What happens to atomic bombs, what is done with them, in short, is decided not by atomic bombs but by men; and men, in turn, make their decisions under the social conditions accumulated through the centuries.

Looked at in such a context, therefore, it is correct to say that the introduction of atomic weapons involves no essential change. And

it would be fatal to believe that the lessons from past experience have no application: there are no other lessons. It is, more narrowly, correct also to insist that the great principles of military strategy still apply. These principles, after all, are merely a statement of the general methods whereby any deliberate action in any field can be successfully carried out.

Nevertheless, the second view has also its truth. Though as a social fact atomic weapons are like other social facts, and will be dealt with as other social facts have been, there is in the case of atomic weapons much more at stake than in that of almost any other social fact, far more than in any previous discovery of a new weapon; so much more that we may reasonably consider the problem they present as in decisive respects unique.

Warfare has always been, with only a few minor primitive exceptions, endemic to mankind as a whole. Up to the present, men have been able to assimilate warfare to the general conditions of human life sufficiently well to permit not merely life itself to continue, but civilizations, with all their varied achievements, to develop and flourish. From a Malthusian standpoint, warfare can be understood as one of the checks which have kept population from exceeding too greatly the available means of subsistence; but war, together with the other checks, has never for long kept the world population from gradually increasing. In that sense mankind might be said to have been winning in the struggle for existence. It is remarkable that even during the very years of the first two world wars, in which the greatest mass slaughters of all time took place, the world population was apparently increasing not only as a whole but in almost all of the belligerent countries themselves.

The uniqueness of atomic weapons is to be found first of all in this: that they create a definite material possibility of the total annihilation of human life.* This possibility could be realized in at least two obvious ways. By-products of atomic explosions, rays, gases, and so on, might so diffuse the global atmosphere that it would no longer support human life; or they might poison the soil in such a way that it would not bear the means of subsistence. Second, a

* The possibility is also present in the methods of mass biological warfare.

chain reaction involving some common, widespread element might eliminate life at one stroke.*

I am aware that the nuclear scientists are anxious to deprecate both of these possibilities. They have, they assure us, everything under control. They calculate in advance just how much of what will be diffused, to make sure that only the proper air and soil and persons will be disintegrated. And their explosive chain reactions occur in the cases only of a few odd unstable elements at the top of, or beyond, the natural periodic table. I do not, however, have full confidence in the public statements of the scientists.

The basic ideas of nuclear physics are not too difficult for a layman. It is already evident—from, for example, the questions unsolved in advance about smoke dispersal at the Clinton plant, or water radioactivity at Hanford, or from the curious data on the smudging of photographic film hundreds of miles from Los Alamos some time following the test explosion—that the scientists do not understand thoroughly the question of the diffusion of the by-products of atomic explosions. If they do not when the explosions are of single, extremely inefficient bombs, how much less are they aware of the total effects from the simultaneous explosion of thousands of efficient bombs.

Moreover, though their own controlled results have been achieved only with critical concentrations of unstable elements high on the periodic table, they are not fully aware of the general conditions for chain reactions. By their own account, the energy cycle of the sun involves such common elements as hydrogen, carbon and helium. There can be no *a priori* reason for ruling out comparable reactions on the earth, started, perhaps, quite accidentally from the point of view of the intentions of the scientists.

If we wish to know the historical meaning of nuclear technology, as it might be called, we must begin, then, by recognizing its most distinctive consequence: that it makes possible, not at all probable

* There are other, more remote, but still conceivable, possibilities: climatic changes induced by alterations in ocean currents or the melting of polar ice; land displacements through earthquakes and volcanic eruptions set off by atomic explosions; and so on.

but quite definitely possible, the early total annihilation of human life.

This, however, is perhaps not to be considered a "political consequence" of atomic weapons. Annihilation would, after all, end political problems. It is also possible, though still less probable, that life might be annihilated by an overlarge meteor or an unexpected comet or a hitch in the orderly processes of the sun; but we do not bring such possibilities into our political calculations. Let us turn, therefore, to consequences of atomic weapons, short of annihilation, which have a more direct relevance to political policy.

2.

First, we may note that, if the annihilation of life is improbable though possible, the early destruction of civilized society by atomic weapons is on the whole rather probable. One or two large scale wars in which both sides had and made use of atomic weapons would quite probably destroy what we call civilization.

Modern civilization is dependent upon a very complex interlocking network of physical and institutional arrangements. The keys to this network and its maintenance are concentrated in large cities. Atomic weapons are peculiarly fitted to the destruction of cities. With an accumulation of such weapons on hand on both sides of a new war, and with the devices for launching them at long distance available, the rapid joint destruction of a great many cities and other industrial areas is feasible, and to be expected. This might cause a breakdown in the social processes beyond the possibility of recuperation, because the material means for recuperation would have been eliminated. Human life, reduced in numbers, would still continue, but at a much more primitive social and cultural level. "Our world" would have disappeared, as fully as the Minoan civilization disappeared after the sudden and mysterious calamity which visited its centers on its controlling island of Crete.

It is our own Western Civilization that is in particular vulnerable to atomic weapons. The greatest world cities of the present are ours, and we are most dependent on cities. Our intricate, industrialized, mechanized social machine, which can be brought almost to a stop

by no more than a strike of a few thousand persons, is the most exposed. A tractor can plow more land than a horse, but a horse needs only a little food and water and a peasant to keep going; and the peasant alone can still make the land yield.

The more heavily industrialized a nation, the more concentrated its industrial areas, the more intertwined its communication and transport, the more vulnerable it is: England most of all, the United States, Germany as it functioned before the war, Belgium, northern Italy, parts of France. Where non-Western nations have taken over Western methods of production, they too have made themselves vulnerable: Japan—though in this last war it was not atomic weapons that brought about Japan's defeat; and Russia, though with her great spaces in the remote Heartland and her lower level of industrial development, she is less vulnerable than the technologically advanced nations of the West.

China, India, most of the Middle East, and, still more evidently, the African interior are in an incomparably better condition to sustain atomic warfare. Atomic weapons could, no doubt, wipe out Bombay, Calcutta, New Delhi, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Peiping, Canton. . . . Unless, however, the weapons were developed to a point that imminently promised the annihilation of all life, the Far Eastern and Hindu civilizations would still remain: a few tens of millions of humans killed, perhaps, but their cultures hardly dented. The explosions would not disturb the African tribes in the jungles, on the veldt and along the river banks. The Chinese and Indian peasant and the African primitive, who do not know the blessings of the mechanical appliances of the West, are at the same time free from dependence upon them.

It may very well turn out, then, that Western Civilization, by releasing nuclear energies, has committed suicide.

3

An already observable consequence of atomic weapons is a still greater speedup in the rate of historical change, which had already, during the past fifty years, reached the highest level in history. The political, social and institutional changes of previous decades, or

centuries, are becoming crowded into a year or two. Crisis succeeds crisis; there is no lengthened, restful interlude. We have already examined a major example of this speedup: the prelude to the Third World War has opened before the close of the Second. It is plain in every field: laws, regimes, boundaries, monarchs, property relations, constitutions, the value of money, change overnight. The nationalization of whole industries, in France or Czechoslovakia or England, is carried through with less fuss than used to accompany a minor parliamentary investigation. Diplomatic showdowns, on Argentina, Iran, Manchuria, Germany, Spain, Palestine . . . trip each other's heels. A world bank starts one week, a civil war the next; evening headlines of a mass strike replace the morning's news of the revolt of great colonies. The United States seizes billions of dollars' worth of property more quickly than it once condemned a few acres for a new bridge or highway. Governments are rearranged like players in a progressive bridge tournament.

Atomic weapons are not, of course, the sole cause of this speedup; they are, in some respects, rather a symptom than a cause. A more rapid rate of historical change is characteristic of revolutions—is, for that matter, the meaning of "social revolution"—and a generation ago, there began, on a world scale, a great social revolution, which has not yet run its course. The discovery of atomic weapons, however, exacerbates the whole process, like oxygen under pressure added to an already flaming fire.

The reason for this is that the existence of atomic weapons prohibits any long postponement of a showdown. The threat of atomic weapons presents the perspective of social annihilation, at the very least for the losers, not in centuries or generations, but on the immediate horizon. The Second World War itself, with its unprecedented slogan of "unconditional surrender" and its pulverization of the defeated, shows that the nations are morally prepared for wars of extermination. The nuclear discoveries place the physical means at their disposal.

Everyone really knows, or senses, the change; and this general awareness accounts for the feverishness of the social atmosphere. Many respond with a crude hedonism, aiming to get what they can—money, pleasure, women, liquor—in what time is left. Some turn

to religion, often of a mystical type. The generals respond by trying to hold their armies together, and by herding the scientists and technicians into the martial laboratories. The statesmen frantically test one political combination after another.

The atomic weapons, poised in their secret United States nests, just hatching from the laboratories of other powers, will not permit the world to wait. It therefore follows that no political program today has any concrete meaning unless it can provide, within a very few years, some sort of at least temporarily workable answer to the problem of atomic weapons. There is no time for ideal societies to be reached by education or other slow processes in a century or two. The goal for a significant political policy must be capable of being reached, at least sufficiently, within at most a decade.

The logic of this conclusion is, I think, inescapable. With it a host of well-intentioned and abstractly worthy political programs fall at once in pieces. They do not, perhaps, have to be abandoned entirely; but any long-term program must be supplemented by a short-term policy, or it cannot meet the issue. It can only be utopian, trivial, politically irresponsible. If a house is burning down, a program of reform for its inhabitants counts for nothing unless some action is meanwhile taken to put out the fire.

Further, if we now relate the fact of the historical speedup to the considerations of the preceding section, an additional conclusion may be drawn:

If a workable solution for the problem of atomic weapons is not found within a relatively few years, Western Civilization will cease to be the dominant civilization of the world (if it does not disappear altogether), and will be replaced probably by one of the other existing civilizations; or, if none of these retains enough creative power for the task, then Western Civilization will be replaced at a much later date by some new civilization not yet in evidence. It is difficult in these questions to specify with any assurance what should be meant by "a relatively few years." The evidence—primarily consisting of the fact of the existence of atomic weapons and the probability, on the basis of present indications, of their early use—seems to show that the decision will certainly come within a few decades, a calculation which allows for the possibility of Western Civilization's

surviving the Third World (and First Atomic) War, and collapsing only, as it surely would, in the Fourth.

This conclusion is so drastic that it will doubtless be thought by many to be mere rhetoric. Such a dismissal would rest on the illusion that our civilization is identical with civilization in general, our history with the history of mankind. Though we can realize that each of us individually must die, it is inconceivable that our entire mode of life should cease to be. "Doubtless," Toynbee observes, "the last [Egyptian] scribe who knew how to write the hieroglyphic script and the last sculptor who knew how to carve a bas-relief in the Egyptian style cherished the same illusion, when the Egyptian Society was *in articulo mortis*, that had been cherished by their predecessors at the time when the Egyptian Society was still holding its own among its kind, and at the still earlier time when, for all that its members knew, it was the only society of the kind that ever had existed or was destined ever to exist in the World."*

Toynbee tells also the story of a conversation between a British statesman and a Persian visitor, in which the statesman sought to justify the cynical British policy toward Persia on the grounds that only through it was Russia brought into the First World War on the side of the Allies. "If," concluded the statesman, 'seven years later, Germany had started the Great War with Russia as an ally or indeed as a neutral, she would certainly have won the war; and that would not only have been the end of the British Empire. It would have been the end of Civilization. When Civilization was at stake, how could we act otherwise than we did? Put yourself in our place, and answer me with your hand on your heart.'

"At this the Persian, who had at first been mildly puzzled and aggrieved, completely lost his temper. His heart burnt within him and a torrent of denunciation issued from his lips: 'Your policy was infinitely more wicked than I had suspected! The cynicism of it is beyond imagination! You had the effrontery to look me in the face and tell me complacently that you have deliberately sacrificed the unique treasure which Persia preserves for Humanity—the priceless jewel of Civilization—on the off-chance of saving your worthless Western Society from the catastrophe which its own greed and pug-

* Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, I, C, III, (b), p. 158.

nacity were inevitably bringing upon its head! Put myself in your place, indeed! What should I have cared, and what do I care now, if Europe perish so long as Persia lives!" *

4

If, however, we are not yet ready to accept passively the final collapse of Western Civilization, we may state the following as a necessary first condition of any workable solution of the problem of atomic weapons: there must be an absolute monopoly of the production, possession and use of all atomic weapons.

It might be argued that a much simpler and surer solution would be to get rid of all atomic weapons, and all the apparatus that might be used to produce them. This would be an example of the usual kind of argument in a historical vacuum. Atomic weapons and the apparatus which produces them did not jump fully primed out of the forehead of a 20th-century Zeus. They are a climactic end product of the whole long development of Western science and technology. To get rid of them, it would not be enough to bury them, denatured, in the sea, and to wreck the atomic plants and laboratories. We should have also to get rid of what had once brought them about, and would promptly do so again: that is, modern science and modern technology, as well as the scientists and technicians who are the carriers of science and technology. This would be the equivalent of wiping out Western Civilization, the same result that the atomic weapons themselves threaten, and would thus solve nothing.

The only way in which atomic weapons could actually be eliminated is the way in which a monopoly often eliminates products which it controls: by withholding, at its own discretion, their manufacture and use.

That monopoly control is a necessary (though by no means sufficient) condition for solving the problem of atomic weapons seems to me so evident, after reflection, as to be hardly open to doubt.

Let us assume that more than one (two is enough for the assumption) power possesses, and is producing, atomic weapons. Each will

* Toynbee, *loc. cit.*, pp. 162-3.

be improving the efficiency and destructive potential of the weapons as it goes along. Now let us try to reason as the leaders of these powers would be compelled to reason.

Each leader of Power A could not but think as follows: Power B has at its disposal instruments which could, in the shortest time, destroy us. He has possibly made, or is about to make, new discoveries which will threaten even more complete and rapid destruction. At the moment, perhaps, he shows no open disposition to use these instruments. Nevertheless, I cannot possibly rely on his continued political benevolence—above all since he knows that I also have at my disposal instruments that can destroy him. Some hothead—or some wise statesman—of his may even now be giving the order to push the necessary buttons.

Therefore? Therefore, in order to defend ourselves, we, since we have on hand a sufficient atomic armament for the purpose, must strike, striving by all means, political, diplomatic, psychological and economic, as well as military, to catch him off guard. Even thus, we must expect severe retaliation. But, if we are lucky, we shall be able to sustain it; and we shall have crushed, at one massive blow, the permanent foundation of his defenses, so that he can never recover for more than a futile death grapple.

So also, each leader of Power B.

How else would it be possible for them to reason? Thoughts such as those should not be piously dismissed as the ravings of perverted and Satanic madmen. Serious leaders cannot, in their practical plans, accept the sentimental versions of political life given in primary school or liberal weeklies or their own holiday speeches. Nor would they, as the world goes, be in such reasonings irresponsible or even immoral. Their primary duty is understood to be to themselves and their own group. They know that no social group in history has ever been saved by reliance on the innate goodness of man.

Even if there were no atomic weapons, many of the leaders would undoubtedly be reasoning today along these lines. Atomic weapons are, after all, not responsible for warfare, not even for the Third World War, which has begun. The fact that the political and social causes of a war are abundantly present stares at us from every edition of every newspaper. The existence of atomic weapons merely

raises the stakes immeasurably higher, and demands a quicker decision.

It is true that few men and few leaders reason with unrelieved consistency. The force of the above assumed deduction might not be at once apparent to them, or they might not for a while be willing to accept it. But to assume, as do some foolish commentators, that fear of retaliation will be the best deterrent to an atomic war is to deny the lessons of the entire history of war and of society. Fear, as Ferrero so eloquently shows, is what provokes the exercise of force. Most modern wars have been, in the minds of every belligerent, preventive: an effort to stamp out the fear of what the other side might be about to do.

Some delay in acting upon the deduction might also result from the intervention of other forces not completely under the control of the leaders of Powers A and B. In particular, public opinion might be operating against such a preventive atomic attack. Public opinion can, however, be directed. In the case of a totalitarian nation, the leaders are, on the one hand, accustomed to strict logic in their political deductions, and, on the other, relatively immune from the influence of an independent public opinion.

The existence of two or more centers of control of atomic weapons would be equal to a grenade with the pin already pulled.

An absolute monopoly of control, by whomever exercised, would not, it is true, make certain that atomic weapons would never be used. But it would automatically remove, from those in charge of the monopoly, by far the greatest motive for their use: the fear that someone else will use them. Responsibility, moreover, will be open and unavoidable before the whole world; and the opinion of all humanity would be brought to bear upon the actions of the monopolist. If I possess the only gun, there can be no question who is the murderer when a man is found shot through the head. The atomic monopolist can never plead that he unleashed his atomic weapons because some other side was ready with its own. And—though this is perhaps cause for only minor satisfaction—monopoly control would at any rate guarantee that not all the earth would be turned into an atomic waste. It would at most be only the other side's section. Responsible statesmanship could, and would, decide

on atomic warfare if control of atomic weapons is divided. But it would in truth need an insane leadership to launch general atomic destruction if it alone held the means of that destruction.

5

If there is to be monopoly control of atomic weapons, who is to be the monopolist?

Though there are various approaches to the argument, there is a fairly wide recognition of the necessity for monopoly control of atomic weapons. The usual answer to the question, "Who shall be the monopolist?" that must then follow, is: a "world government" or some kind of "international body." I shall return in the next chapter to the problem of "world government." Here I shall remark only that a world government does not exist, and cannot therefore be a present candidate for the monopoly position. If a world government should come to exist in the future, there would no longer be any problem in the control of atomic weapons. The world government would exercise the sole control, or it would not be a world government.

As for "international bodies" or "international commissions," such as those that are, as I write, being proposed through the United Nations, they cannot possibly answer; they will come to nothing, no matter what nominal agreements are made. All such bodies are, like the United Nations itself, not in any sense genuine "world institutions," since they have no independent sovereignty. They are merely talking, paper committees, or at most alliances, of individually sovereign states. Their political possibilities reduce in functioning terms entirely to the separate functioning of the individual states. To place atomic weapons in the hands of any commission composed through and out of the United Nations, or any comparable commission, does not in the least establish a monopoly. In practice, it would merely symbolize the fragmentation of the control, its division among the member-states. This would necessarily be, and remain, the case unless the "Atomic Commission" itself became the World Government.

Any hope, therefore, that some kind of United Nations sleight of

hand is going to provide an easy, short-cut solution to the problem of atomic weapons will in due course—perhaps even before this book appears in print—end in disillusion.

Among those observers who believe that atomic weapons have upset all those principles heretofore applicable to warfare and to social action in general, there are some who hold that a small nation or even a group of private individuals (scientists and technicians, for example) could now, by means of atomic weapons, conquer great nations, or even the world. This opinion is mistaken.

In the first place, the production of atomic weapons* requires the possession of comparatively large amounts of raw materials which are found in sufficient concentration in only a few places. This rules out at once most nations. Second, it requires, directly and indirectly, an enormous, advanced industrial plant, which hardly any small nation has at its disposal. Third, it requires large numbers of trained workers, scientists and technicians, which, again, are not available to small nations. As for groups of private individuals, obviously no state will permit them to function.

If it remains still conceivable that one or two small nations (Switzerland or Sweden, for example, which have precision industry and scientists) might produce atomic weapons, even this would not pose, on a world scale, a total threat. It would be like a single maniac, loose in a city with a machine gun. Terror and death, on a certain scale, could result. But nothing permanent would follow. The small nation would not have the men to follow up and consolidate a quick orgy of destruction.

The truth is that the role of a small nation in the production of atomic weapons could only be that of a front for a great and populous nation. The apparent source of the atomic weapons might be a small nation (say, Czechoslovakia or Ecuador), but the controlling hand would be that of a great nation which could have some hope of administering the world of its defeated rivals.

Most of the great and populous nations can likewise be quickly ruled out as candidates for monopoly control of atomic weapons.

* It is possible, of course, that new methods of making atomic weapons more simply, from easily available materials, will be found. This does not seem probable for the future in which the issues will be decided.

Since production depends upon an advanced industrial plant and a large group of scientists, only nations with those resources are in the field. Therefore India and China or Java or Brazil, for example, are not, for the present, in the running. Japan and Germany are crushed, as a result of the war, and could have, if any role at all, only that of "front," like one of the small nations. (The German nuclear scientists have, for that matter, been appropriated by the victorious great powers.)

France, in any case not sufficiently populous, has been too weakened by the war and its own continuing internal crises to be admitted. France, in international policy, can at best only go on as she has been doing, trying to preserve a partial independence by jockeying between the active powers.

What remains?

Abstractly reasoned, it might be thought that England, with the British Empire, remains on the list. England and Canada did, we know, have a prominent part in the first development of atomic production. In the concrete, however, we must recognize that England is on the historical defensive. England retains the potential for great achievement, but she can no longer take the initiative. Her empire is weakening, her independent expansive force has ended. It is only in association with a dynamic power that England can henceforth operate: as a subsidiary or associate or partner, but without an individual freedom of action. This has already been proved, in its own way, by the first stage of atomic development. Though England and Canada contributed greatly, the plants were built, the final secrets held, and the weapons themselves exclusively retained, in the United States.

There remain, then, among existing social institutions, two, and just two, serious candidates for the monopoly control of atomic weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union alone possess all the necessary qualifications.

The issue of atomic weapons, of atomic warfare, is an issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is the reality that lies beneath the complex appearance through which the issue expresses itself in the press, in speeches, in the United Nations and at the conferences. It is a reality, moreover, which, in spite of all the

irrelevancies of discourse, is well enough known by the leading parties to the disputes. Wherever and whenever the problem of atomic weapons comes up for discussion or debate, no one is really worried about Norway or Poland or Peru or China or New Zealand or Italy or Afghanistan or Greece or England or Spain. The sole "question of substance" (as the United Nations parliamentarians like to phrase it) is: What are the United States and the Soviet Union going to do?

4. *World Government or World Empire?*

A RECOGNITION of the fact that the survival of Western Civilization, and perhaps of mankind, depends upon the early establishment of a monopoly control over atomic weapons usually leads, we have noted, to the conclusion that a "World Government" must be formed. The World Government would exercise supreme world sovereignty. In it the atomic monopoly would be vested. Since there would no longer be independent, sovereign nations, international war would "by definition" become impossible, and mankind would thus be saved from the general atomic destruction which another war or two would make probable.

Abstractly considered, the project for a supreme World Government seems to be much the best solution. Long before the birth of atomic weapons, and on more positive grounds than the defense against destruction, the ideal of World Government had been repeatedly put forward. It has to recommend it the humanitarian, moral, and technological arguments which we discussed in Chapter 2. True enough, a World Government would not of itself accomplish quite all that is claimed for it by its advocates. It would not guarantee the end of wars. Wars as physical facts cannot be stopped "by definition." If, under a World Government, international wars could not take place for the semantic reason that there would no longer be nations, nevertheless mass warfare could still go on under the title of "civil war" or "rebellion." Death and suffering are not much changed by a switch of labels. However, if there were, or came to be, a World Government, it would in fact provide the most rational structure within which to meet the problems of modern world polity, economy and technology. And it would give the complete answer to the greatest of all immediate issues: the issue of control of atomic weapons.

For the eloquence, wisdom, and goodness of heart with which the ideal of World Government has been in our time so well defended

I have only admiration. I add nothing here to that defense only because I feel I have nothing new to say. I share the ideal; and what I am writing, however paradoxical this may often seem, is in its service.

Unfortunately, however, the present advocates of a World Government, now organizing in dozens of new Committees and Councils, do not seem to understand either what a "government" is, or how, historically, a government comes to be. They think of a government as a title, a name, a letterhead, or an imposing Committee. They seem to believe that if there were some body—the United Nations, for example—that we would agree to *call* a World Government, then that body would *be* a World Government. They conceive of the means whereby a World Government might be brought into existence after the manner of a kind of international trick: a well-worded treaty to be signed, a pledge to be taken by individual persons all over the world, or a clever amendment to the United Nations Charter. It is not so easy.

A genuine government is not an abstraction. It is composed of actual human beings, organized into institutions, and cemented by a common body of shared ideas. A considerable percentage of the subjects, or citizens, of a genuine government must be ready to recognize, freely or through coercion, that there is no political power superior to the government. That is what is meant by calling a government "sovereign"; and without sovereignty it is not a government. That is why the League of Nations was not and the United Nations is not a world government or even a step toward world government. No one has ever recognized either of those organizations as the supreme political power. The charters of both of them, as well as their rules and practices, were so designed as to make impossible their possession or assumption of sovereignty.

The functioning institutions which are an essential part of any possible government must include at the very least those capable of executive, legislative, and judicial action. The same body can act in all three spheres; but all three functions must be performed, or sovereignty remains non-existent. The government must be able to make laws that are binding on all the citizens and subjects. It must be able to administer those laws. It must have courts, police, jails

and armies to enforce them. If it does not have all these things, if it cannot do all these things, then it is not a government. If individual citizens or subjects, or groups of citizens and subjects, are at liberty to accept or reject the government's laws as they themselves see fit, if they can execute them after their own manner, if they can refuse to grant the jurisdiction of the courts and can resist the power of the police, if they can veto by their will an act of the government, then it is not a genuine government, then it is only a name or a form, and the real power rests elsewhere.

All of this is not yet enough. In order that a government should be established and maintained, its citizens or subjects, or a considerable percentage of them, must share at least a minimum set of ideas or formulas or myths. For the government to be in truth sovereign, the citizens or subjects must *believe* that it is sovereign. The sources of the belief may be various; but the question of source is secondary to the question of content. They might believe that the sovereignty is divinely ordained, or biologically inherited, or expressive of the will of the people, or rationally desirable; or they might simply believe that the government's power is unassailable. No matter, so long as the practical content of the belief—namely, the acceptance in action of the government's authority—is the same. But if they do not believe at all in the government's sovereignty, then that sovereignty itself is an illusion.

This is the meaning of "government," any government, including a hypothetical World Government. A short reflection on the meaning is enough to show us how far from reality are the plans of the World Government's advocates.

2

Our analysis has taken its departure from the fact of the existence of atomic weapons, understood as the principal material ingredient of the extreme crisis of world politics. We have observed that the destruction of Western Civilization is an immediate, not a distant, perspective. Granted the desirability of the attempt to preserve Western Civilization, we have therefore recognized as a first requirement

for any solution to the crisis, a chance that it can be realized within a comparatively few years.

The achievement of a World Government is not impossible. We cannot correctly argue that because there has never been a World Government, one therefore can never be. Because, for tens of thousands of years, no human society exceeded a few thousand souls, it did not follow that no future society could comprise many scores of millions. Inferences from the past can be drawn only when they also take into account new material and social factors that were not present in the past. On the other hand, it is even more grossly fallacious to argue that because a certain solution is desirable or "needed," therefore it will come about. There is nothing whatsoever in either individual or social experience to suggest that men will get out of their difficulties in the way which, rationally considered, is best for them. Pointing out to an alcoholic that alcohol is bad for him does not stop him from drinking, any more than a lesson on the general evils of inflation will lead a farmer to sell his grain below the market price. A World Government would be the best solution to the present crisis. But this truth, even if it were far more generally accepted, is not enough to bring a World Government into being.

If we judge by facts and not by wishes, we cannot escape the following conclusion: within the given time limits, the free and voluntary establishment of a World Government is historically impossible. It is impossible because the necessary historical pre-conditions do not exist.

A World Government means world political unity. Historical experience shows that political unity is achieved by cultural diffusion plus military conquest, or simply by conquest. The Roman legions plus the Roman educators and architects and language could unify Gaul and Italy; the soldiers and priests of Ancient Egypt could unite, politically, the valley of the Nile; Kultur plus diplomacy plus the best trained soldiers of Europe could bring together the small German states; by direct conquest, without cultural penetration, the Ottoman Turks could unite the various Byzantine states of Asia Minor and the Balkans. But we find in history almost no examples of the political unification of hitherto separate autonomous communities brought about by deliberate, voluntary decision.

The seemingly voluntary unification of separate communities shows, on more careful examination, two conditions always present: a pre-existing cultural unity shared by the communities; and the actuality or strong threat of an external force directed against the communities which unite. Even these conditions are seldom enough to bring about unity. From the 4th to the 2nd centuries B.C., the Greek city-states shared a common traditional culture, a culture so deep that from the point of view of its language all non-Greeks were *barbaroi*—"barbarians." The Greeks faced both the threat and the actuality of an external force—from Macedonia and then from Rome—so mighty that every adult Greek understood that the separated city-states had no chance against it. Nevertheless, the city-states did not succeed in uniting politically. Their various leagues and coalitions fell periodically to pieces, and Greece ended as a subject province. The history of the great Italian city-states of the pre-Renaissance was the same. In their case, too, there was a profound and splendid cultural unity. They, too, were battered by external force, by the armies of Spain and France and the Empire. They were, moreover, made fully conscious both of their situation and of the only possible solution for it, by the superb analysis and the moving rhetoric of Machiavelli. Still they did not unite.

If the uniting of England and Scotland seems peaceful and voluntary, this is only because we confine attention to the unimportant final act, and forget the many centuries of war and bitter conflict which preceded it. And in that case, too, there was the Christian civilization of the West shared in common. Before the Swiss Federation became a united nation, centuries of changing leagues and coalitions, of foreign intervention and temporary conquest, had to be buttressed by the impact of Napoleon, the pressure of the Holy Alliance, and a sharp if brief and relatively bloodless civil war.

It is above all in the founding of the United States that the believers in World Government seek their precedents. There, they hold, is a positive example, by following which we could, today, voluntarily and peacefully, set up and maintain a unified government of the world. Analysis can easily show, however, that this analogy, so persuasive at first hearing, breaks down at every relevant point.

The thirteen colonies, to begin with, shared not only the common Western culture, but, for the most part, the specifically English form of that culture, including the English language. As all dependencies of a single great power, they were accustomed to think of themselves together politically, as united in a common political fate; and they had no tradition of separate sovereign existence. Spatial continuity with each other and isolation from the rest of the world, with the vast sea to one side and the vast wilderness to the other, imposed on them a geographical unity. They had fought together the long, difficult revolutionary war, and had together conquered. In the war, though their unity had been far from complete, though in many respects it was fought as a coalition of independent powers, they had come to possess in common many symbols and traditions of unity: a single Congress, no matter how limited in power; united and often thrilling Declarations; joint victories and defeats and treaties; national heroes. Influential classes of the population stood to gain by unity, and to lose much by separatism. Moreover, the very real threat of external force was by no means removed through victory in the War of Independence. Almost all of the leading statesmen of the colonies understood that the failure to become a strongly united nation would surely open the road to constant intrigue by the great European powers, playing off one set of States against others, with the long-term aim of re-establishing European domination.

Even all of this was not enough to bring about a free, deliberate decision to unite. What was in reality a minority *coup* was in addition required. The Philadelphia Convention had to violate its specific instructions which limited it to the mere amendment of the Articles of Confederation. The new Constitution itself contained a blatant threat of coercion through the provision that the new government would come into being after the adherence of only nine of the States. In the doubtful States, the bold campaign for adoption joined open intimidation to rational argument and demagoguery. New York City's declared intention to secede from the State doubtless weighed as much at Poughkeepsie as Hamilton's speeches. And, finally, the unity was sealed only with the blood of one of the most terrible of Civil Wars.

Even, then, if we were to grant the American precedent, it hardly

suggests a soft slide into World Government. The precedent itself, however, is plainly inapplicable. In the world as a whole there is not cultural unity, but cultural plurality, and, in addition, the superimposed fracture into totalitarian and non-totalitarian segments. Western Civilization is itself harshly divided into separate communities, with the inertial weight of centuries reinforcing the divisions. By the nature of the case, at any rate until the era of inter-planetary wars begins, there can be no external force prompting a move toward world unity. The evidence of experience is unambiguous. We can have no reason to believe that the people of the world will, in the predictable future, establish, through any form of free, deliberate decision, a World Government.

3

We have been considering the prospects of a World Government achieved by free and deliberate decision. If, however, we shift the locus of the problem, and consider, not such a World Government, but rather a World Empire, established at least partly through force and the threat of force, the evidence from historical experience no longer dictates the same negative conclusion.

There has, of course, never been a World Empire in the sense of an Empire the dominion of which comprised literally the entire earth. What Toynbee* calls "Universal Empires" have, however, come into being many times; and are, indeed, a usual stage—the next to final stage—in the history of civilizations. In the instances of those civilizations of which we have knowledge, what seems usually to happen is more or less this: Each civilization expands gradually from its original, comparatively limited home, by diffusion, colonization and conquest. It becomes articulated into a number of independent (sovereign) political communities. At some point in the development there occurs a long series of catastrophes and crises—named by Toynbee the "Time of Troubles." At the culmination of the Time of Troubles, some one state succeeds in eliminating all rivals and founding a Universal Empire, the extent of which coincides roughly with the sphere of cultural influence attained previ-

* In this section I have made considerable use of Toynbee's *A Study of History*.

ously by the civilization. The Universal Empire, in its turn, has so far always been followed by the breakup and destruction of the civilization in question.

In some such order, there came into being the Universal Empire of the Han dynasties (for the earlier Chinese, or "Sinic" civilization); the Empire of the Guptas for the earlier Indian civilization; the Abbasid Caliphate (resuming the interrupted Achaemenian Empire) for Syriac civilization; the Ottoman Empire for the Orthodox Christian (Byzantine) civilization; the Empire centered on Crete for the Minoan civilization; the "Empire of the Four Quarters of the World," restored, after an interruption, by Hammurabi for Sumeric civilization; the Roman Empire for Hellenic civilization; the Empire of the Incas for Andean civilization; the Empire of the Mongols and later the British Raj for more recent Indian civilization; and so on.

It should be noted that the state which succeeds in founding the Universal Empire of a given civilization sometimes (as in the case of the Hellenic, Egyptian, Sinic, Andean civilizations) belongs to that civilization. In other examples (such as those of the Indian or Orthodox Christian civilizations) it is a nation or tribe that comes raiding in from outside, and is culturally unrelated to the original civilization. In these latter instances, it is as if the original civilization, following a sequence of disasters, confronts an impasse for which a Universal Empire provides the only way out; but it fails, on its own initiative, to take that way, and must therefore be led through it by an alien hand.

We who belong to Western Civilization are, with a natural provincialism, best acquainted with the Roman Empire, since it was in the breakup of that Empire that the seeds of our own civilization were fertilized. For the sake of a possible analogy to our own present situation, we may recall the general form of the development of the Roman Empire.

Following the breakup of the Minoan Society, Hellenic Civilization had its origin along the littoral, and on the islands, of the Aegean. From this source, for a number of centuries it gradually expanded. Politically, it was for the most part articulated into independent small city-states, many of them with various sorts of col-

onies. After the victory over Persia during the first part of the 5th century B.C., two great coalitions arose, under the leadership of Athens and Sparta. One or the other of these might have succeeded in unifying the Hellenic world; but, as it turned out, the long clash between them, in the Peloponnesian Wars at the end of the 5th century, ended with a mutual exhaustion from which the original homeland of the civilization never recovered. The mother cities lost the creative initiative.

The problem of unification remained, however. Its challenge was taken up by the "semi-barbarian super-states of the periphery," as Toynbee calls them. For nearly three centuries, with intervals of relative quiet, Macedonia, Carthage, and Rome struggled to deliver "the knock-out blow." War took on a new meaning, vastly enlarged in scope and fierceness, with limited specific aims transformed into the objective of annihilation—*Carthago delenda est*. These wars merged into gigantic class and social struggles, revolutions and civil wars. Spartacus, the Gracchi, Sulla, Marius, Pompey, Julius, Antony, Octavius fought in cross-tides over the entire area of the civilization, purged their own followers, overthrew the old social forms, proscribed and slaughtered the ranks of the defeated, until the definitive victory of Octavius established the Empire as a functioning and universal fact.

How close is the parallel? The source of Western Civilization is in the western half of the European peninsula. Political separatism, becoming ever more intense since the Renaissance, poses more and more inescapably the problem of political unification. From within the homeland, first France, under Napoleon, attempts to meet the challenge, and fails. Then Germany tries twice, with an intervening collapse of all proposals for peaceful union. In the recently concluded second attempt, for the first time in Western history, annihilation of the defeated becomes the objective of war. The lists of the proscribed are drawn up in advance. The social and revolutionary wars cut across the lines of the international battles. The homeland has failed. There remain the two mighty, semi-barbarian super-states of the periphery, the American and the communist. If either of these succeeds, the resultant Universal Empire of Western Civilization, unlike the Universal Empires of other civilizations,

will also be a World Empire. This will follow because, though Western Civilization is not culturally world-wide, its political influence and material power dominate the world.

Toynbee nowhere commits himself to acceptance of a positive analogy between Hellenic and Western history, although he outlines it in details that go much beyond the political scheme into parallels of philosophy, literature, moral attitudes and emotional moods. It is not, however, necessary to derive our forecast of world political developments from analogies based on past civilizations, the laws of which are, it may be admitted, very doubtfully known. The over-all nature of the present world political situation, the tendencies therein observably at work, can make sufficiently plain what, in general, is happening, and what is going to happen.

4

It is now apparent to everyone that the pre-1939 world political division into a comparatively large number of independent, sovereign nations is finished. Two of the great independent powers have been destroyed by the war. Smaller nations are no longer serious independent factors in world politics. The United Nations Charter drops even the fiction of the equality of small nations, which would be incompatible with the veto rules and the assignment of permanent seats on the Security Council.

In *The Managerial Revolution*, written in 1940, some years before the advent of atomic weapons, I considered what might be expected to replace the dissolving world political structure. It seemed to me, then as now, that a single world state was the solution both rationally and morally best, and most in accord with economic and social needs. I believed then, however, that cultural diversities combined with administrative and military difficulties were so imposing as to make a single world state unlikely. It seemed to me more probable to expect a division of the world among a small number of super-states, possibly three chief such states centering around the main world industrial areas in Europe, Asia and the United States. At the same time, I predicted wars fought among these super-states with

the aim of securing undisputed world control, an aim which I thought would probably not be achieved.

This earlier prediction may still, in the end, be confirmed. It contains in any case, I still think, important elements of the truth, to some of which I shall return in a later chapter. For the historical period which we now immediately face, however, two decisive new elements have been introduced: first, the existence of atomic weapons; second, the fact that the Second World War has left in the world only two dynamic super-states, with the consequence that the kind of power-balancing that might have occurred if there were three or four has become impossible.

The transcendent power concentrated in atomic weapons makes politically possible—as I did not believe it to be when there were no atomic weapons—the domination of the world by a single sufficiently large state, provided that state holds the monopoly of atomic weapons. The threat of mutual destruction by atomic weapons of all the states that might possess them, assuming that there are more than one, makes certain that each such state will strive to acquire the monopoly. But a monopoly of atomic weapons can be secured only by gaining world domination.

The problem of the control of atomic weapons is identical with the problem of world political control. This identity is being expressed in an illuminating way through the complex procedures of the United Nations. Politically, the highest body of the United Nations is the Security Council (or, formally, the Assembly, which is merely the Security Council with decorations). In the Spring of 1946, an Atomic Commission, presumably a subordinate body, was set up by the United Nations to handle the question of atomic weapons. But it became rapidly apparent that whatever body, however named, actually made the basic decisions about atomic weapons would be the supreme body. Therefore, two proposals had logically to follow, and were made: either basic decisions about atomic weapons had to be passed back to the Security Council itself, thus reducing the Atomic Commission to a purely technical bureau; or a new organization, outside the United Nations, had to be created for handling atomic problems. But in the latter case, it was at once clear to reflective observers, this new

organization would supplant the Security Council, which would become a political subordinate. The naive belief that the insuperable political difficulties which stultified, and will continue to stultify, the Security Council, might be overcome in the case of atomic weapons by the mechanical device of setting up a separately named special commission exploded at the first touch of political reality. Who controls the atom will control the world.

Whether we approach the problem from the point of view of the general pattern of history, or from that of a more or less Marxian analysis of socio-economic needs and possibilities, or from that of the potentialities of the new military weapons, or from that of the existing division of the world into the two major power spheres, we are led to a single conclusion. A World Empire has become possible, and the attempt will be made to establish a World Empire. A World Empire would, moreover, solve the problem of atomic weapons, within the terms set in Chapter 3. That is, it would institute a monopoly control over such weapons.

5

I wish to clarify the distinction which I have made between the terms "World Government" and "World Empire." The former I have been using in the sense which I believe is given to it by those who regard themselves as advocates of World Government. It means a world state set up by peaceful means, through some sort of constitutional or democratic processes, and in which the various peoples of the world would have, more or less, political equality. It is such a state that I regard as impossible for the next historical period.

By a World Empire I mean a state, not necessarily world-wide in literal extent but world-dominating in political power, set up at least in part through coercion (quite probably including war, but certainly the threat of war), and in which one group of peoples (its nucleus being one of the existing nations) would hold more than its equal share of power.

Let us suppose that the United States had been founded not through acceptance by all the States of the Philadelphia Constitution, but in some such way as follows. New York and Pennsylvania,

convinced that the unity of the colonies was necessary, and despairing of getting it in time through peaceful agreement, determined to force it. Through a combination of negotiation, threats, concessions, bribes, and perhaps some actual fighting, they succeeded; and brought all the colonies under the jurisdiction of a government so constituted that a predominant (though not necessarily exclusive) power over certain key questions, such as foreign affairs and the army, was guaranteed to New York-Pennsylvania. Then, in the sense I am giving, the result would have been an "Empire."

The word "Empire" has, for Americans, connotations of extreme tyranny and despotism which are historically unjustified. There have been many kinds and degrees of Empire, and I shall discuss later (in Chapter 17) some of these variations. An Empire is not incompatible with democracy in the imperial power—indeed, Athens and England, two of the greatest imperial powers in history, are the two most democratic governments so far known. The British Empire, as well as other lesser Empires, prove also that democracy can exist and develop within the subordinate realms of the Empire. The relations between the imperial power and the subordinate realms need not in all cases be the same, but may vary all the way from the harshest exploitation to nearly equal partnership.

The imperial power need not be totalitarian—that is, intervening in all phases of social activity. It can be restricted to what is necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the empire. There is, in fact, only one absolutely essential world task of the possible World Empire of tomorrow: the preservation of the monopoly of atomic (and comparable) weapons. The fulfillment of the central task is compatible with much looseness of the imperial structure in other fields.

It goes without saying that the attempt at World Empire will not be carried out under the open slogan of "World Empire." More acceptable phrases, such as "World Federation," "World Republic," "United States of the World," "World Government," or even "United Nations" will be used. But in this book, I am concerned with realities, not with words. The truth is that the growing belief in, and propaganda for, various sorts of World Government are in historical actuality both a symptom of the need for a World Empire,

a support for the attempt to achieve such an Empire, and a psychological preparation for its acceptance, if it comes. A similar longing, similarly expressed, was widespread throughout the Hellenic world during the century preceding the foundation of the Roman Empire. It is like a bachelor who begins to prepare himself for the restrictions of matrimony by discoursing on the beauties of "true love."

Finally, it should be noted that there is not, historically speaking, an absolute opposition between World Empire and World Government. Rather is it the case that World Empire is the only means through which genuine World Government might be achieved. World Empire might, it is true, be at the outset, or evolve into, a word totalitarian tyranny. But such a development is not inevitable. The believers in a free world government, if they are politically serious, if their beliefs are more than dreams whereby they compensate for the grimness of actual experience and their own weakness, are in practice committed to an acceptance of the perspective of World Empire, because through that alone is there a chance for the realization of their more ultimate ideal.

6

We may now summarize the result, up to this point, of our analysis:

The discovery of atomic weapons has brought about a situation in which Western Civilization, and perhaps human society in general, can continue to exist only if an absolute monopoly in the control of atomic weapons is created. This monopoly can be gained and exercised only through a World Empire, for which the historical stage had already been set prior to and independently of the discovery of atomic weapons. The attempt at World Empire will be made, and is, in fact, the objective of the Third World War, which, in its preliminary stages, has already begun.

It should not require argument to state that the present candidates for leadership in the World Empire are only two: the Soviet Union and the United States.

5. *The Nature of Communism*

THE MOST COMMON source of errors about the nature of social and political movements is the idea that the words used by adherents of the movements, in alleged explanation of their aims and activities, can be taken at face value. The words are not unimportant, and sometimes they tell the truth. More frequently, however, their function has nothing to do with the truth, but is to express, as a kind of poetry, hidden sentiments, hopes and confusions. The words used publicly by communists about themselves and what they do are particularly misleading, because deliberate deception of others, as well as the normal unconscious self-deception, are an integral part of communism.

Most books on communism or the Soviet Union offer, as presumptive evidence for their conclusions, citations from speeches, manifestoes, articles and books by communists, and from the Soviet Constitution, laws and decrees. Because a Constitution or set of laws says that there is racial, cultural, and national equality within the Soviet Union, it is taken as proved that such equality in fact exists. Because communists outside the Soviet Union declare that they believe in democracy or free trade unions or civil rights or national prosperity and defense or wider educational opportunities, it is assumed not only that they do so believe but that they are practically striving toward such ends. Because a report on a Five Year Plan states that workers' housing, food and clothing have improved such and such a percentage, it is believed that this has indeed happened. Because a Soviet diplomat speaks for disarmament or the outlawing of atomic weapons, it is granted that he is really in favor of disarmament and the outlawing of atomic weapons. Even those who have become rather skeptical about the current practices of communists are inclined to say that "Their goal—of a free classless human society—is a great and noble ideal," thus assuming that the

goal which the communists profess in words is the real goal (that is, the probable outcome in action) of what they are doing.

To understand political and social movements, we must approach reality by a route very different from this verbal boulevard. We must begin not with words but with social behavior. We must examine the deeds of the movement, its history in action, its record in practice, its dynamic tendencies, the direction of its evolution. The words it uses must always be checked in terms of behavior, and may be taken at face value only when they sustain the check. We will find, in the case of communism, that some of its words, especially those written not for a general audience but by communists for communists, are unusually revelatory of its inner meaning. But toward all words we must take the attitude: false, unless proved true.

We are sometimes told that communism is young, new, untried, so that we do not yet have enough evidence for judgment. This argument is a device to try to stop us from rendering the judgment that the facts warrant. As a specific, differentiated socio-political movement, communism (or Bolshevism) was founded in 1903, forty-four years ago. It developed out of one emphasis in Marxism, which took fairly clear form in 1848 (that is, a century ago), with certain added elements from nihilism and Blanquism, which also had a considerable prior history. Since 1903, communism has developed consistently, with no discernible historical breach in its tradition or its pattern of behavior. For thirty years it has been in control of a great nation, and it has lately extended its full control to more peoples and areas. Throughout the world, it has for decades functioned in parties, unions, governments, industries, publications, and in thousands of committees and organizations. Communism can be studied in action in every type of social, political, cultural and moral environment, in relation to every type of problem occurring in our society, in war and in peace, in power and out, on a large scale and on the most minute, in a bridge club or a Boy Scout troop as well as in a mighty army. The evidence by now at hand is not merely ample but overwhelming. The only excuse for not coming to a decision in our judgment of the nature of communism is ignorance or an unwillingness to face the truth.

For Americans, Englishmen, and in general those whose concep-

tions of politics are based upon acquaintance with the customary political parties of democratic countries, there is a further obstacle to the understanding of communism. Though communism is recognized as having a "different program," it is assumed to be a political party in the same sense that applies to the Democratic or Republican or British Conservative or French Radical-Socialist parties. A member of the Communist Party is thought to be the same type of being as a Democrat or a Conservative. He has merely joined a different, but comparable, organization.

Reasoning and acting on this assumption, it seems natural to deal with communists in much the same way that one deals with the members of any other rival political party. One negotiates with the communist-controlled Soviet Union as one negotiates with any other nation. Communist parties are permitted to function legally, like any other party, and are welcomed or at least accepted into coalition governments. Electoral deals are made with communists, not only in Hungary or France, but in New York. Good citizens do not hesitate to join with communists in all sorts of committees for worthy purposes, or to form with communists editorial boards for magazines and newspapers. Liberals respond with indignation whenever communists complain that their civil liberties are being infringed.

This assumption is grotesquely false. Apart from those generic traits which characterize all organizations, in this case of secondary practical significance, the Communist Party has nothing in common with democratic, parliamentary parties. It exists on a totally different plane of political reality. The parliamentary parties with which we are familiar are sprawling aggregations of diverse individuals, limited in their objectives, loosely united as electoral machines. They have no systematic program, at most a few traditional ideas, and periodic, not very seriously meant, "platforms" covering a few items of current political interest. For most persons, "to be a Republican" means little more than to contribute a few dollars now and then, and to vote the party ticket on election day. Even for the professional parliamentary politician, "politics" is comparable to any other "business," one and not necessarily the chief among the varied interests of life.

The true communist, in complete contrast, is a "dedicated man." He has no life apart from his organization and his rigidly systematic set of ideas. Everything that he does, everything that he has, family, job, money, belief, friends, talents, life, everything is subordinated to his communism. He is not a communist just on election day or at Party headquarters. He is a communist always. He eats, reads, makes love, thinks, goes to parties, changes residence, laughs, insults, always as a communist. For him, the world is divided into just two classes of human beings: the communists, and all the rest. In his eyes, there are simply his own Communist Party on the one side, and all the rest of the world on the other. All non-communist parties are, as he would put it, "agents of the class enemy"; "openly" or "unconsciously," they are all "objectively counter-revolutionary."

In order, therefore, to understand the nature of communism, we must rid our minds of all preconceptions drawn from our experiences of the traditional parliamentary parties. If we do not, it will be like trying to infer the nature of chess from an acquaintance exclusively with checkers, merely because they happen to use a similarly constructed board. Our success in dealing with communists will be comparable to that of a checkers player, so instructed, in a chess tournament.

2

On the basis, then, of the full evidence, communism may be summarily defined as a world-wide, conspiratorial movement for the conquest of a monopoly of power in the era of capitalist decline. Politically it is based upon terror and mass deception; economically it is, or at least tends to be, collectivist; socially it is totalitarian.*

*I am well aware that this definition may be applied almost without change to fascism also. This is not surprising because the two, fascism and communism, are variants of the same fundamental kind of socio-political movement. Their differences are primarily in the always secondary factor of the ideology or myth through which their activities are rationalized, and in the special circumstances of their origins. In their historical evolution, they have demonstrably approached a common norm. They are rivals only in the sense that, say, two candidates for the heavyweight boxing championship are rivals; their aim and methods are identical. The communist claim to be "the world leader in the struggle against fascism" is, from the point of view of those who are neither fascists nor communists, one of the most ironic jokes in history.

Every word in this definition is meant in the strictest sense, and I shall therefore proceed to elaborate its content.

* * *

Official communism is, and has always, from the time of Marx, been conceived to be, a world-wide movement, recognizing no political, geographic or cultural boundaries. Since the founding of the Third International, this internationalism has been concretized in a rigid organizational form, so that all major policies of all official communists everywhere are controlled from a common center. It is a major effort of the propaganda of communists, and their dupes, to make us believe that Russian communists and American communists and Chinese communists and Yugoslavian communists are not the same thing. Such a belief is a naive illusion. The programmatic differences among the communist parties of various nations are themselves decided by the common center. These are never more than tactical variations, suited to the particular national conditions at the particular time. The central strategy is always one and the same.

For communists, the formal dissolution of the Third International, in May, 1943, which created such a stir of speculation in the general press, had not the slightest significance. Communists never worry about "organizational forms." They knew that nothing had really changed, that the International had long before become a "bureaucratic excrescence," not operationally necessary, and besides awkward in Soviet diplomatic negotiations. Already, in 1937, the Chinese Communist Party had withdrawn formally from the International, in order to further its local policy. In 1940 the United States Party took the same formal action, so that it might conform nominally to the provisions of the Smith-Connally Act. After May, 1943, nothing changed in communist world strategy, or in the subordination of the world movement to the central direction. Agents, funds, directives came and went as before—Tito, Thorez, Anton, Berger, Ibarri, Mao, Togliatti continued to be as much at home in Moscow as in Yugoslavia, France, Mexico, the United States, Spain, China, or Italy.

* * *

To many, it may seem odd to call the communist movement "conspiratorial" when we all know that communist parties and multitudes of communist-controlled organizations flourish openly in all countries. The paradox here is within the non-communist world, not in communism. A conspiracy means a plan which, though it may also have legal phases, is in its basic aims and methods illegal, outside the law. From the communist point of view, legal work is always secondary, is no more than a cover for illegal activity. It could hardly be otherwise when, as Marx and Engels put it in the original *Manifesto*, the communist "ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions." "Legal work," Lenin declared,* "must be combined with *illegal* work. The Bolsheviks always taught this. . . . The party which . . . does not carry on systematic, all-sided, *illegal* work in spite of the laws of the bourgeoisie and of the bourgeois parliaments, is a party of traitors and scoundrels."

It is this attitude that dictates the communist conception of reforms. To wish and work for reforms is, of course, "legal work," and Stalin sums up as follows, in his *Foundations of Leninism*: "The revolutionist will accept a reform in order to use it as a means wherewith to link legal work with illegal work, in order to use it as a screen behind which his illegal activities for the revolutionary preparation of the masses may be intensified." The communist evaluation of the "legal work" of elections, the climactic political activity of parliamentary parties, is identical: "Comical pedants. They have failed to understand that voting in the limits of bourgeois parliamentarism is *part* of the bourgeois state apparatus which must be broken and smashed from top to bottom *in order* to realize the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . They fail to understand that, generally speaking, it is not voting, but civil war that decides *all* serious questions of politics when history has placed the dictatorship of the proletariat on the order of the day." †

Conspiracy is so much a part of the essence of communism that it persists unchanged and in fact intensified even in a country where,

* In an attack on Ramsay MacDonald, written in 1919.

† Lenin, *loc. cit.* "Dictatorship of the proletariat" is the circumlocution whereby communists refer to the "monopoly dictatorship of the communists."

as in the Soviet Union, the communists are legally in control. Kravchenko notes, in *I Chose Freedom*: "The G.P.U. had its eyes and ears carefully deployed so that they would see and hear everything. Behind the backs of the formal authorities and the economic managers, I realized, there was a network of spies—spies of the secret police system and others of the Party, unknown to one another. Behind the ostensible government was a real government."

* * *

All of communist policy is dependent upon the belief that traditional, individualist capitalist society is in inescapable decline. This belief is probably true; but unless it is true, the communists are aware they would have no chance of reaching their final goal. It is the disintegration of capitalism that provides the opportunity for a compact, disciplined army of revolutionists to acquire a monopoly of power. This belief, moreover, is one of the two sources of the communist economic policy of collectivization. Convinced that competitive private ownership cannot handle the problems of modern mass industry, that it must result in chronic economic dislocation, mass unemployment and periodic crisis, the communists reason that collectivization of industry will in the long run operate more effectively, will eliminate the worst of the economic troubles, and will thereby provide the strongest possible foundation for their regime.

There is, however, another quite different and more decisive communist motive for collectivization. Property rights in the instruments of production are a form of social power. If these rights are exercised by individuals, at their own discretion, this means a decentralization, a plurality of power. The supreme objective of communism, to which everything else is subordinate, is a monopoly of power. They therefore look upon private property, correctly, as a threat to their monopoly. Their tendency is to minimize or wipe out important property rights as soon as this is technically possible. A certain flexibility would, however, seem to be possible on this point. Communism, consistent with its own nature, can permit, at least temporarily, some retention of property rights, or even their mild revival, if this is an expedient maneuver (as under the Soviet New Economic Policy of 1921-28, or in some of the newly dominated puppet States

of Eastern Europe), provided only that this does not seriously endanger communist power.

Economic collectivization, thus, which was originally advertised as the guarantor of the economic emancipation of all mankind, turns out in practice to permit the most concentrated of all forms of mass exploitation.

By calling communism "socially totalitarian" I mean that its power monopoly extends to all phases of human life: not merely to the limited ranges of experience that have been traditionally regarded as within the sphere of politics, but to art, industry, agriculture, science, literature, morality, recreation, family life. A novel or a divorce or a painting or a religion or a symphony or a biological theory or a vacation or a movie are as much a "weapon of the class struggle" as a strike or a revolution.

* * *

Every political regime is based upon force and myth, upon police, armies and jails, and upon an ideology which is at least partly at variance with reality. What distinguishes communism is that terror constitutes the force upon which it is founded, and deliberate deception the content of its myth. Law, like everything else from the point of view of communism, is exclusively an instrument of power, to be used or by-passed as the expediency of the moment decides. Under communism, open, legal force is always subordinate to the secret, conspiratorial terror. The leading agent of this terror is the secret police, the N.K.V.D.,* numbering about 2,000,000 operatives active in every part of the world. These, however, are supplemented and at times counter-checked by many other agencies: the secret operatives of the official party and its Control Commissions, the military intelligence, the private spies of great bureaus or bureaucrats, and millions of voluntary or dragooned informers and provocateurs.

The terror is everywhere, never ceasing, the all-encompassing atmosphere of communism. Every act of life, and of the lives of parents, relatives and friends, from the trivial incidents of child-

* This organization, formerly referred to as the "G.P.U.," and still earlier as the "Cheka," has recently changed its label to "M.V.D." I retain what I take to be the most familiar title.

hood to major political decisions, finds its way into the secret and complete files of the N.K.V.D. A chance meeting with a stranger, a casual remark to a fellow-worker, a nostalgic reminiscence with a lover, a letter to a child or mother, all may be recorded, to rise to condemn a victim during his examination in one of the great purges. The forms of the terror cover the full range: from the subtlest psychological temptings, to economic pressure, to months-long third degrees, to threats against wives and children, to exile and forced labor, to the most extreme physical torture, to a shot in the back of the neck in the corridors of the Lubianka, to the trained assassinations, in a city street or a railway train, of the special Terror Section of the N.K.V.D.

The scale of the terror is beyond computation. Its direct victims are numbered not in occasional dozens or scores, but in many millions. During 1932-33, as a stimulus to the agricultural collectivization program, 3,000,000 Ukrainian peasants were deliberately starved. In the purges, tens of thousands are shot, hundreds of thousands jailed, and millions sent to the N.K.V.D.'s concentration camps and slave-labor gangs.

The terror, though it can operate to the full only where the communists are in absolute control, as in the Soviet Union, is by no means confined within the Soviet boundaries. The N.K.V.D. operates throughout the world. It advances with the Red Army into Eastern Europe, and there supervises the liquidation of the opposition. In Spain, during the Civil War, it had its own prisons and torture chambers. Hundreds of anti-communist Loyalists were kidnaped or assassinated by its agents. It reaches into France to kill the secretary of the anti-Stalinist Fourth International, and, since the war, to arrest or kidnap Russians who have renounced Stalin; into Switzerland to assassinate Ignace Reiss, one of its own agents who thought he could resign; into Cuba, to murder Paul Maslow; into Mexico, to stab Trotsky; into China, to help settle with the Kuomintang; into Washington, to stage the faked suicide of Krivitsky; into New York, to shanghai Meyer London or Juliet Poyntz.

It should not be supposed that the terror with which communism is linked is a transient phenomenon, a temporary device used and perhaps abused for some special "emergency of the revolution."

Terror has always been an essential part of communism, from the pre-revolutionary days when Stalin, as "Koba," was directing the bombings whereby Bolshevik funds were assembled, through the years before 1917 when Lenin was approving the private tortures administered to political dissidents, into every stage of the development of the communist regime in power. Terror is proved by historical experience to be integral to communism, to be, in fact, the main instrument by which its power is increased and sustained. From the beginning of the communist regime in Russia, every major political and economic turn has been carried through by terror. The liquidation of the opposition parties, the reintegration of the independent state of Georgia (both these under Lenin), the institution of the first Five Year Plan, the collectivization of agriculture, the liquidation of the old "specialists" inherited from the Tsarist regime and the later liquidation of the "Red Specialists," the turn to the popular front policy after the victory of Hitler in Germany, the introduction of "single responsibility" in the factories, the ending of the independence of the trade unions, the liquidation of factions within the Communist Party itself, the turn to the Hitler Pact, the early turn toward exaggerated nationalism in the constituent republics as well as the subsequent reverse of that turn, the mobilization for the war, and now, as I write, the attempt to re-consolidate politically after the partial demoralization left by the war: in every case, the basic reliance for the achievement of the objective has been put, not upon a law or a decree or education or appeals to loyalty or even self-interest, but upon terror. Each step has been driven through by its correlated purges, imprisonments, exilings, tortures and assassinations.*

* Apart from direct experience in the revolutionary movement, which is the only source for adequate knowledge of some aspects of communist operations, there is extensive first-hand documentation for these generalizations about communist terror, in the writings of the following: Boris Souvarine, Anton Ciliga, Vladimir and Tatiana Tchernavin, Victor Serge, W. G. Krivitsky, Markoosha Fischer, Alexander Barmine, Victor Kravchenko, Jan Valtin, and the Poles who were Soviet prisoners during 1939-41, as well as many journalists, including pro-Stalinist journalists. Much can also be directly learned and easily inferred from official Soviet publications on the various purges and trials, the records of Party meetings and Congresses dealing with these problems, and the theoretical justifications of terror which have been written by nearly all leading communist writers. What has been understood by only a very

The tens of thousands of fellow-travelers of the communists in this country, the hundreds of thousands of innocents who serve the communists by working on the magazines and committees and fronts and appeals which the communists daily construct, the workers who follow their trade-union leadership, even the outer fringe of the Communist Party members, do not, most of them, understand in the least the meaning of the terror, though by their actions they support and defend it. They have no idea that it operates, though as yet on a small, guarded scale, within their own country. Much less have they any imagining of what it would mean if transferred intact, a possibility by no means too remote for imagining. During the years 1940-41 the United States made the political "turn" to the war. The method of terror would have meant: the arrest—in the middle of the night, without court warrant—of every person who had expressed "anti-war sentiments," and, under the convenient pretext, of every actual or potential "opponent of the regime" as well as those against whom any high official or low informer happened to have a grudge; months of sleepless grillings, tortures, beatings of the "accused," along with more informal miscellaneous beatings and grillings throughout the country; confessions, prison sentences, slave-labor camps, starvation, death for hundreds of thousands. So, also, not only for so crucial an issue as war, but for the beginning (and end) of N.R.A., the start or stop of rationing, the arrival of an economic depression or a change in foreign alignments. The "enemies of the people"—that is, all who oppose, or once opposed, or might possibly sometime oppose, the party in power—are "scum," "offal," "mad dogs," and are rightly thrust into the outer darkness.

* * *

The positive supplement to terror, as the second pillar of communism, is the deliberate deception of the masses. Truth, too, is "a

few, however, is that terror is an integral part of communism as a functioning movement. Official communists defend terror as a legitimate and necessary temporary defense of the revolution against its class enemies. Opposition communists accept terror in principle, but say that Stalin has gone to excess. Non-communists who have become acquainted with the facts are too horrified to be able to grasp its general significance.

weapon in the class struggle." This deception takes two forms. One is the direct lie: to deny that millions are starving when millions are dying of starvation; to affirm that a political opponent has met with Hitler or Trotsky or Churchill or the Mikado in Stockholm or Paris or Berlin or Denmark or Tokyo, when he had never been within a hundred miles of the place or the person; to destroy the records of a census (as in 1937) and kill the statisticians who made them, when the results are "not according to plan"; to confess to crimes not committed and often not even possible; to falsify, month by month, the records of industry, agriculture, wages, finance; to corrupt quotations and fake up photographs; to re-write every three years the history of Russia and the world, so that history itself will always be a confirmation of the immediate line of the Party. In London, a communist trade-unionist frames a non-communist official of his union; in New York a communist teacher * at City College, for years the Party leader of a large communist fraction of fellow-teachers, denies in court that there is any other communist on the faculty. They exhibit the same communist consistency with which an editor of *Pravda* denies Soviet interference in Iran, or Stalin at Yalta promises freedom for Poland or Rumania, or Molotov signs a non-aggression pact with Finland or Esthonia.

The second form of deception is the manufacture of abstract formulas which distort the comprehension of reality. According to this method, the terrorist dictatorship of the Communist Party becomes "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat"; the expropriation of the lands, livestock and tools of the peasantry by terror and mass starvation becomes "voluntary collectivization"; the extreme inequality of income and living conditions within the Soviet Union becomes "a triumph for socialist realism"; the killing of potential opponents becomes "the liquidation of fascist agents of world imperialism"; lies, sabotage, and terror directed, anywhere, against non-communists become "self-defense of the proletariat against its enemies"; the immeasurable suffering and misery of the Russian people become "the self-reliant happiness of the people of the land of socialism."

* Morris U. Schappes, convicted and sent to prison for this perjury.

3

All political parties seek power. That is the object for which political parties exist. The peculiar characteristic of communism is that, wherever it operates, it seeks an absolute monopoly of all power.

When, say, the Republican Party in the United States wins a national election, it temporarily gains thereby more power within a certain limited field of the national life than any other party or organization. It distributes to its own members a large number of official posts in the Administration and the bureaucracy. It passes certain laws, assigns revenues and readjusts taxes at least partly in accordance with what it takes to be its own special interests. It takes advantage of the control of the governmental agencies to present itself favorably to the public, and to pick up, for its members and friends, some of the informal fruits of office—juicy contracts and expense accounts, privileges in housing or transportation that can be charged to the government, an occasional bit of graft.

At the same time, however, it does not seek literally to destroy all rival political organizations. Doubtless it tries to weaken them, and to provide the best chance for its own continuance in office; but it accepts as a practical axiom the right of its rivals to continuing social existence, and it takes for granted that some day one of the rivals may have its turn at the government, while Republicans retire to the oppositional sidelines. Moreover, the Republican Party in office, or any such parliamentary party, recognizes in practice limits to the range of its power extension. Political parties are not the only power organizations in non-totalitarian society. Churches, trade unions, armies, farms, industries, banks, fraternal and other associations, all are, in at least one aspect of their functioning, concentrations of social power. The Republican Party will consider it legitimate that this should be so, and that these organizations should continue to hold their independent share of the total power, even if, as will often be the case, their power is directed counter to the power interests of the Republican Party itself.

What is in question here is a fundamental premise or rule not only of parliamentary parties, but of democratic society. In a free society, there must be a multiplicity of relatively independent inter-

ests, there must be a fragmentation of power. According to the rules of a democratic society, it is proper for a political party or other organization to try to gain for itself more power than it already has, or even more power than any other single organization. But the rules provide that it must always grant the right of other organizations to make the same try, that it accept the principle of the plurality of power.

Historical experience has shown that the relation of communism to power is of a totally different kind, that communism operates according to a different set of rules, a different principle. The communist party aims not merely at securing for itself more power than that possessed by any other political party or movement; its object is the possession of all power, not only all direct political power but all social power whatsoever. Therefore, negatively, it aims to destroy all rival, independent foci of power in society as a whole.

That this is the aim (indeed, the supreme aim) of communism is proved by the fact that communists act in accordance with it wherever, and to the extent that, it becomes technically possible. It is exemplified just as plainly in the conduct of a communist fraction on a magazine's editorial board or in an American trade union as it is by communist behavior when they take charge of a nation.

The necessity for the communist monopoly of power receives the customary distorted expression in the abstract formulas of communist theory. The nominal ultimate goal of communism is "the free, classless communist society." Communist society can be reached, however, only by the interim stage of the "proletarian dictatorship." Lenin is careful to remind us* that "the transition from capitalism to communism represents an entire historical epoch," in which is carried on "a long, stubborn and desperate war of life and death, a war which requires perseverance, discipline, firmness, inflexibility, and unity of will."† But the proletariat is ignorant, corrupted by centuries of capitalist rule, and therefore cannot itself exercise "its own" dictatorship. This can be done only by the "conscious vanguard" of "professional revolutionists"—namely, the Communist Party—whose integrity is guaranteed by its adherence to the correct

* In *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*.

† *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*.

"ideology." The communists, and only the communists, have this ideology; and therefore they and only they can be the dictators. Everyone else, every other movement, is and must be an open or disguised agent of the counter-revolution, and must therefore be deprived of all power, if the revolution is to succeed. "*The only choice is: Either bourgeois, or Socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for humanity has not created a 'third' ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle Socialist ideology in any way, to deviate from it in the slightest degree means strengthening bourgeois ideology.*"*

While communists remain a small and weak sect, operating within a society controlled by others, this principle has to remain submerged. But as soon as, and to the degree that, they get material power, it is put literally into operation. Thus, after the Revolution in Russia, we note: first, the destruction of all Tsarist, "bourgeois" and liberal parties (1918-19); then the destruction of all non-communist peasant or working-class parties (1918-21); then the smashing of the independent power of the Orthodox Church (1918 on); then the reduction to impotence of the Soviets, co-operatives, trade unions, etc. (1925-29); then the suppression of opposition factions within the Communist Party itself (1927-29); then the liquidation of all individual actual, former, or potential dissidents (in the Purges, especially those during the years following the assassination of Kirov in 1934); and along with all these steps, the reduction of all social agencies whatsoever, from the most trivial to the greatest, to the single control.

However, it is not necessary to look inside the Soviet borders to observe the principle operating. It operates, wherever there are communists, to the limit that is materially possible. It is operating today, on national scales, in Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, eastern Germany and Austria, northern Korea and Iran. It operates in the Chinese territories controlled

* *Ibid.* Lenin writes "Socialist" in this passage because, at the time, the Bolsheviks were operating as a faction in the Social-Democratic Party. He means, of course, "Bolshevik" or "communist," not "socialist" in today's sense. The italics, which are decisive for the meaning, are Lenin's.

by the communists, as it operated in the Spanish Loyalist armies. It operates within every trade union where communists are active or in control—in the American Communications Association; the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technicians; Harry Bridges' Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union or Michael Quill's Transport Workers' Union; the United Public Workers of America; the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers; the Fur and Leather Workers' Union; and so on. It operated, very effectively, and to success, in New York's American Labor Party. It operates, though here still for the time being restrained by "unripe conditions," on the Political Action Committee; or the Independent Citizens' Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, behind its changing façade of a Harold Ickes, Claude Pepper or James Roosevelt; in the Democratic State Committees of California and Washington; in the New York City Council; and at a still earlier level in Congress or the State Department. Always and everywhere, the principle is the same: the conquest, for the communists, of an absolute monopoly of all power.

From this principle, which is the central fact of communism, the essential and sufficient key to the basic understanding of the nature of communism, a conclusion follows: After communism has grown beyond the limits of a narrow sect, it is impossible for any other power grouping to coexist for any length of time with communism. A plurality of power is incompatible with communism. Communism must conquer, or perish.

4

There is one communist tactic, so important at every level of communist activity, and so fundamentally misunderstood by most non-communists, that it is advisable to explain it briefly from the point of view of the analysis of the nature of communism. This tactic is what communists call "the united front."

Whenever communists support or engage in an activity, or set up an organization, jointly with non-communist individuals, groups or organizations, this constitutes what can be called in general a "united front." Thus, a magazine like *Science and Society* is a united front; or a Committee to Save the OPA; or a League for Constitutional

Liberties; or a Council for Soviet-American Friendship; or a League for a Free Africa; or a Political Action Committee; or a Federation of Atomic Scientists; or a Hollywood Screen Writers' Guild; or the lists of signers to some petition or open letter; or, at much higher stages, a popular front such as that formed before the war in France; or coalition governments which include communists, like those at present in France, Italy, and the East European nations; or the Allied coalition in the Second World War; or the United Nations; or even, in the Soviet Union itself, the electoral front of the "union of the Party and the non-Party masses."

If we examine the individuals and organizations that belong to these various fronts—of which there have been tens of thousands during the past generation—we discover that some of the fronts are altogether counterfeit. They are limited to communists and close sympathizers, and are created for the sake of a nominal masquerade through which the communists can hide their hand, manipulate finances, or gain legal immunities. Of this sort are, for example, the International Labor Defense, or the magazine *New Masses*. Other united fronts, however—such as the Political Action Committee or the Independent Citizens' Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions—include a maximum ideological range, from anti-communists to non-communists to innocents to fellow-travelers to communist party members to, in many cases, the N.K.V.D. itself.

Entry into a united front presents itself to a communist in a way altogether incommensurate with the motives of a non-communist. The non-communist sees a certain task to be done—an arrested Negro to be defended, Chinese children to feed, trade unions to organize, colonial independence to further, a nation with no clear majority to be got somehow through a difficult period, a war to be won. He is willing, even eager, to join with everyone, including communists, who will promise to work jointly with him to accomplish the task in which he is interested. Or, on some occasions, he sees no way to carry through the task alone, and feels compelled to join with others of different views and organizations, including communists. Nothing could, apparently, be more natural.

But this is not the way the communist reasons. He may or may not be interested in the specific task for which the united front is

ostensibly organized—very often he is indifferent to it, or even anxious that it fail. As always, he is interested centrally in advancing the monopoly of communist power. The primary purpose for which he enters into the united front is to get a chance to weaken the non-communist individuals and organizations that belong, with him, to the united front, and to destroy their political influence. The innocent or morally worthy ostensible purpose of the front is the bait to a trap. The communist, able to work from the inside through the device of the united front, can undermine the non-communist organizations, win over their members, and either capture or “expose” and crush politically the leading individual non-communists.

It is a law of modern politics without exception that non-communists always lose by entering into a united front, for any purpose whatsoever, with communists. They lose no matter what happens to the supposed specific purpose of the united front. As a rule, that purpose gradually evaporates after a few rounds of activity, when the communist line takes a new turn, or the communists feel that they have exploited the situation as far as is profitable. Very often the supposed purpose is quietly perverted, as when funds raised to provide medical relief to Spanish loyalists or Yugoslavian children go to provide jobs for deserving communists and finances for the Spanish and Yugoslavian sections of the Party and the N.K.V.D. But in every case, whatever else happens, the primary purpose of the communists is to use the united front as a vantage ground; to acquire a useful and respectable disguise for themselves; to recruit new members and fellow-travelers; to gain a platform through which they can speak to an audience not otherwise accessible or so favorably accessible to them; and, finally, to destroy the independent power of the other constituent organizations (or individuals) either by capturing them, or, if this proves impossible, by crushing them.

When Byrnes and Cadogan and the others sit with Gromyko at the sessions of the Security Council, they are constantly puzzled by Gromyko's behavior; they find it “incomprehensible.” It is, however, far more rational than their own. They are not aware that Gromyko sits there not because he has the slightest interest in solving fruitfully any problems of peace or prosperity, but precisely to

aggravate those problems; not because he has any wish to make genuine agreements with his fellow Council members, but because he is instructed to use the United Nations as a helpful wedge for weakening and destroying the other members and the nations they represent. When the Communist Party enters into a French coalition government, it is not because it proposes to aid in the reconstruction of France as a strong and prosperous power, but just the opposite: because it wants an inside post from which to make certain that independent French power will never be revived, that France will live again only as a communist-controlled state. Claude Pepper and Joseph Davies and Elliott Roosevelt and Henry Wallace and all the ministers and actors and writers and busy journalists are, I suppose, quite unconscious of the contempt with which they are regarded by the communists for the light-hearted way in which they make their speeches before united front meetings in Madison Square Garden, and permit their names to grace the imposing letterheads of united front committees.

During 1946, as I write, there is being carried through a classic example of the united front tactic in Eastern Germany. First there are the separate socialist and communist parties. Then, stimulated by the Red Army and the N.K.V.D., there is a united front of the two parties. Then, in the late Spring of 1946, there is the culmination of the united front tactic—which is, of course, “unity.” The Socialist Unity Party comes into being. Now, the completion of the process will take place. The socialists in the Socialist Unity Party will either cease being socialists, or will cease to be. And the Socialist Unity Party will become, “not accidentally,” as communists would say, the German Communist Party at a “higher stage of development.”

For communists, the only admissible form of unity is, in all things, total communist domination.

6. *From Internationalism to Multi-national Bolshevism*

DURING RECENT YEARS there has been much dispute about the question: has communism taken over Russia, or Russia taken over communism? Are we to understand communism as primarily an international movement, acknowledging no fatherland, that happens to have had its chief local success to date in Russia; or are we to believe, as many analysts contend, that communism is, or has become, no more than a new outward form for the older nationalism and imperialism of Russia?

These two views seem incompatible; and there seems at hand much evidence, especially from the last decade, for the second. It is a fact that the Russian communists control the world communist movement. It is a fact that during the past ten years there has been within the Soviet Union a revival of Russian nationalist tradition. The cult of the traditional heroes of Russian history, tsars and soldiers and even legendary figures, has reappeared with official approval. Literature and the arts express pride in Russian themes. Tsarist military decorations, uniforms and even modes of address have been reinstated. The Orthodox Church has been permitted to resume a less hampered activity. During the war, internal propaganda stressed the patriotic defense of the holy motherland. In addition, many of the aims of Soviet foreign policy, both those achieved and those still in process, are seen to be continuations of the foreign policies of imperial Russia.

Nevertheless, these facts are deceptive. The truth is that the two views are not contrary to each other. Communism is both an international movement and Russian imperialism.

The communist world movement first came to complete power in the great and populous Russian Empire. There is nothing surprising in the subsequent result that the Russian communists became

dominant in the world movement. This would have been true of the German communists, if Germany had been the first nation conquered; or of the British communists if it had been England. And the succeeding stage of communist development would then have had a German or an English bias. Since 1917 the Russian communists have had at their immediate disposal the greater percentage of the material substance of power—human beings, funds, lands, factories, armies. Naturally, so backed, their voices have been louder in international communist councils than those of any others. Naturally, also, when it came to choices on international policy—in connection with Germany or China or Austria or Argentina—they would tend to support a decision which would be favorable to their own special interests, even if that decision meant difficulties for communists in Germany or China or Austria or Argentina. The Russian communists discovered, moreover, that to control the masses of the Russian people, to get them to endure uninterrupted sufferings and to die in wars, the symbols of Russian nationalism and even Russian religion were useful instruments.

But to conclude from this that international communism is only "the Russian state party," an extension throughout the world of the Russian foreign office, and that communism is "nothing but Russian imperialism," would be a disorienting mistake.

From the point of view of communists themselves, communist Russia is not a "national fatherland" in the ordinary sense, but a "fortress of the world revolution," just as a conquered trade union in a non-communist country might be considered a pillbox, or a communist cell in the State Department, a sentry post. The dispute between Trotsky and Stalin, so far as it was more than a struggle for personal power, was not over "world revolution" versus nationalism. Both Trotsky and Stalin, like all communists, believed in both world revolution and the defense of a communist Russia. The principal issue between them was a purely tactical problem. What percentage of communist resources and energies should be assigned directly to the Russian fortress, and what to operations in the still unconquered sections of the earth? Trotsky argued for a faster pace, and for a bigger allotment to the non-communist hinterland. Stalin wanted more time, and a relatively greater share given to increasing

the armaments and strengthening the walls of the fortress already won.

The internal consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., the success achieved in the work of Socialist construction, the growth of the influence and authority of the U.S.S.R. among the masses of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the colonies signify the continuation, intensification and expansion of the *International Social Revolution*. . . . The U.S.S.R. inevitably becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the center of international revolution, the greatest factor in world history. In the U.S.S.R., the world proletariat for the first time acquires a country that is really its own. . . . The U.S.S.R. is the only fatherland of the international proletariat, the principal bulwark of its achievements and the most important factor for its international emancipation. . . .

These words are not from Trotsky, but from the 1928 Program of the Communist International, written under the direct supervision of Stalin.*

Soviet patriotism, with its Russian component, is therefore not merely consistent with communist internationalism, but obligatory upon genuine communists. When the communists conquered power in one nation, the strategy of the world communist struggle for a monopoly of world power was thereby necessarily altered. Before that, communists were against the governments of all nations, and for their overthrow. Thereafter the communists had an existing state of their own; and every extension of the power or boundaries of that state became automatically an extension of world communism.

Now Soviet Russia assumed, in the Communist creed, the role of an instigator, of a pioneer. To liberate the "oppressed peoples" became the function of a *state*, not of the *revolutionary party* [as formerly distinct from any state].

Thus, in 1939-40 [in the seized Baltic countries] socialization was carried out along new lines which were different from the classical concept of revolution. In the newly occupied countries industrial

*This Program and the Constitution and Rules of the International are of very great significance, and should be read in their entirety.

plants were not seized by the workers; on the contrary, the new regime ruthlessly suppressed all attempts of this kind. A complete scheme of "socialization of society" had been prepared beforehand and was systematically put into effect by the new authorities. Ties were established between industrial centers in Moscow and the corresponding factories in the newly acquired territories. Special instructions were issued concerning political reprisals against anyone guilty of offering opposition.*

Soviet "neo-Russian" imperialism is thus identical with "revolutionary emancipation." Nor is it surprising that there is a continuity between Soviet imperialism and Tsarist imperialism, since the general lines of both are in considerable part dictated by evident geopolitical considerations. Soviet state policy is identical with world communist policy. That is why we can get light on Soviet policy by reading the New York *Daily Worker* and observing the activities of American communists, just as we get light on American communists by noting what the Soviet government is doing.

I propose, then, in the next two sections, to review certain developments of Soviet policy not as "Russian incidents," but in their true sense, as the Soviet expression of developments in world communist policy which have in each case their complete international correlation.

2

Since the time of the Revolution, Soviet (that is, international communist) policy has been featured by periodic abrupt "turns," in which what was formerly good becomes, seemingly, suddenly bad, what was true becomes false, and what was white becomes in one stroke black. These turns are the source of the feeling so many persons have that there is something mysterious and unknowable about Soviet policy and intentions. They are also the source of many hundreds of misleading books. With each new turn, several dozen authors believe that a pet theory of their own has been finally

* David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-42*, p. 247. Quoted with the permission of the publishers, the Yale University Press. These remarks would, of course, apply equally well to Poland, eastern Germany and Austria, and the Balkan countries a few years later.

proved; they assume that the turn is permanent; and they write a book interpreting Soviet history and perspectives in terms of it. What with the time required for writing and publishing, each set of books usually appears at just about the time the next turn in the series gets started. The books are thus out of date before they are read. Among the authors so caught are often prominent communists themselves, whose books are hastily withdrawn from circulation and whose persons are not infrequently purged.

Soviet, and world communist policy, since the 1917 Revolution, divides into seven clearly demarcated major periods, with a sharp turn occurring between each of them. The list is as follows:

LEFT

1. War Communism (1918-21)
3. The Third Period (1928-35/36)
5. The Hitler Pact (1939-41)
7. The Seventh Period (1945-)

RIGHT

2. The NEP (1921-28)
4. The Popular Front (1935/6-39)
6. The Teheran Period (1943-45)

(From June, 1941, until the end of 1943, that is, from the beginning of the Russo-German war until Stalingrad, there was an interregnum. The Soviet Union was fighting for existence, and the issue of the war was in doubt. The military struggle absorbed all energies, and "policy" was restricted for the most part to the immediate, desperate reflex of the battlefield. Not until the victory at Stalingrad did the prospect of a successful outcome to the war become serious enough to permit a major new positive development in policy. It was only, therefore, at the end of 1943 that the Teheran Period took definite form. However, even in the course of the preceding year and a half, the groundwork for that period had been shaped.

(The names for the first six periods are established in communist terminology. Since no special title has yet emerged, I call the last noncommittally "the seventh period.")

The first period covers the years of overt revolution and Civil War within Russia. The second corresponds with the partial revival of small scale private enterprise. The third extends over the beginnings of the Five Year Plans, and the agricultural collectivization. The fourth is the somewhat tardy reaction to Hitler's victory in Germany. The fifth is the deal with Hitler. The sixth is the political correlate of the joint fight, with the Allies, against Germany, and the effort to end the war on the basis most favorable to the Soviet Union. The seventh is the first stage in the specific preparation for the Third World War.

I have already remarked that the turn or transition from one period to another is accompanied by a terrorist purge. The turn from the first to the second periods was linked with the liquidation of the "leftist" opposition parties and groups, which had outlasted the already liquidated right opposition parties; the turn from the second to the third, by the "Shakhty" trial and the other so-called "trials of the engineers," and by the liquidation of factions in the Party; the turn from the third to the fourth, by the great wave of purges and trials that followed the Kirov assassination (1934); the turn from the fourth to the fifth, by a smaller scale elimination of those opposing a united front with Nazism; the turn to the sixth, by the exiling of the Volga peasants of German stock, and by measures against miscellaneous persons who might have used the war for opposition. The new purge for the seventh period, a little delayed by the confusion following the war, is getting under way on a big scale as I write (in 1946).* It should be remembered that the Show Trials, usually staged with twenty or thirty rehearsed de-

* The first public announcements of the post-war purge were published in the Moscow press during June, 1946. During the following summer and autumn, several American newspapers, especially the *New York Times*, gave in their Moscow dispatches frequent (though as a rule not featured) reports of its progress. The first wave of the purge evidently struck against administrative and technical personnel in industry, the trade unions, and to a lesser extent the collective farms, under various charges of "non-fulfillment of quotas," "holding back of wages," "falsification of statistics," etc. Then there was a concentration in the Ukraine, where much of the Party apparatus was ousted. The American news stories paid particular attention to a third wave of the purge which fell on many well-known personalities in literature, the theater, and the movies, who were convicted of "bourgeois deviations." The tragic, broken Sergei Eisenstein, once the greatest movie director in the world, was among those compelled, not for the first time, to make public confession of political

pendants in Moscow, are only the star acts of a drama that numbers its cast in millions, and takes place in every town and most villages of Russia, as well as in all communist parties throughout the world.

It will be noticed, from the list of periods, that communist policy has shifted in a Left-Right alternation. The 1st, 3rd, 5th and present 7th periods have all been "leftist." They have featured extremist, openly revolutionary, "class struggle" slogans. They have been contemptuous of "bourgeois democracy," have denounced "social-fascists," made revolutionary attacks on "imperialist war," called for "colonial revolts," and insisted on "proletarian" orthodoxy in science, philosophy and the arts. The 2nd, 4th and 6th periods have in contrast been much milder in slogan, have stressed the call for united and popular fronts, have preached the "peaceful co-existence" of socialism and capitalism, and advocated moderate "reformist" measures.

Nevertheless, it would be an error to conclude that the development of communist policy is a simple pendulum motion from Left to Right, and back. The four Left periods are not identical with each other, nor are the three Right. The direction of motion is rather that of a spiral, in which, along with the swing from one side to the other, there goes a cumulative progression from the starting point.

Indeed, the alternations from Left to Right are the secondary, less important elements of the motion. They are confined to "tactics," which periodically change in response to real or imagined changes in internal Soviet conditions or world affairs. The fundamental "strategy"—with its univocal aim of the conquest of a monopoly of power—does not zig-zag, but develops through a continuous process. This difference, incidentally, explains a fact that is puzzling to outsiders: namely, the ease with which trained communists accept a sudden change in "line." The communists, unlike the outsiders, understand that the change is only tactical, and that the basic strategy remains unaltered.

We may illustrate the cumulative strategic development by ana-

sins. Even Dmitri Shostakovitch, the international communist musical hero during the war years, was not exempted from a denunciation for the "anti-Soviet triviality" of his latest work.

lyzing an important contrast in the application of the united front device in the various periods. The first use of the united front was during the second (NEP) period. It was limited, then, to other non-communist "working-class" organizations, and is best shown by the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee of that time, a bloc between the Soviet and English trade unions. In the fourth (the second Right) period, the "united front" evolved into the "popular front": that is, a bloc which includes not only non-communist working-class organizations but also liberal-democratic bourgeois groups. This may be illustrated by the French *Front Populaire* (from which the period takes its name), which was a bloc between the French communists, socialists, and bourgeois-democratic Radical Socialists.

In the sixth (Teheran) period, the popular front in its turn evolved into the "national front." In a national front, the communists are now prepared to extend their bloc to include any group or individual whatever, not merely proletarian and democratic-bourgeois, but conservative, reactionary, monarchist, and fascist. In the Moscow Free Germany Committee, set up in 1943, there were (are, for that matter, since the Committee still exists) communists, socialists, liberals, anti-Hitler Nazis, and extreme Junker reactionaries such as Generals von Seydlitz and von Paulus. In the second Badoglio government in Italy, the communists sat with the fascist Badoglio in the King's Cabinet. The Spanish "Supreme Council of National Union," formed by the communists in April, 1944, included communists, monarchists, conservative Catholics, and reactionary industrialists. The communists had no difficulty in dealing with King Boris of Bulgaria or ex-King Carol of Rumania. They have supported Perón in Argentina, and are today utilizing in eastern Germany millions of Nazis, while recruiting tens of thousands of them into their own ranks. For the United States, Earl Browder,* in 1944, summed up the new meaning

* It is important not to be deceived by Browder's expulsion from the Party for alleged "deviations from Marxism-Leninism." Browder, as leader of the Party, did not "deviate" during the Teheran period, but, as always, exactly followed orders. His nominal expulsion was part of the turn to the seventh period. He is, however, being kept by the communists in reserve, as a "second string to Stalin's bow," holding out to the United States the prospect of a new "collaborationist" line to replace this leftist seventh period, and hoping for "vindication" in the by no means impossible next turn to a rightist eighth period.

of the united front as follows: "If J. P. Morgan supports this coalition and goes down the line for it, I as a Communist am prepared to clasp his hand on that and join with him to realize it." And he added in an interview with the newspaper *PM* (March 15, 1944): "I am not sorry when you say that leading members of the N.A.M. talk like me."

* * *

There is another significant general difference between the early and the late periods. The first four periods were, on a world scale, mechanical and uniform in their "leftism" or "rightism." In a left period, every communist everywhere spoke and behaved as if he expected to be on the barricades tomorrow, and scorned even a haircut or a clean blouse as degraded symbols of bourgeois decadence. The united front itself was suspended, as suspect of "collaborationism." In a right period, every communist everywhere became respectable, shined his shoes, and kept begging non-communists for friendship and co-operation.

From the fifth period on we may observe a much greater flexibility. Collaboration with Hitler can coexist with "leadership of the anti-fascist forces" in democratic nations. Friendship with J. P. Morgan can accompany open revolutionary struggle in the Balkans. In 1946, New York City communists can vote for candidates of the Democratic Party while their comrades in the United States and elsewhere denounce the government run by the Democratic Party as the world leader of imperialist counter-revolution.

Both this change in the meaning of the united front and the increase of flexibility in the application of the "general line" are reflections of the inner development, since the 1917 Revolution, of the world communist movement. This development is, simply, the mighty expansion, both quantitative and qualitative, of the power and independence of world communism.

The temporary circumstances of the origin of communism gave it a special relation to two classes of the general population, the working class and the poorer peasantry. The communists themselves have always been an elite of professional revolutionists; but these two classes were, in the early days, the primary "mass social base"

upon which communism relied (much as the unemployed and certain sections of the middle classes were the primary initial social base of Nazism), and with the help of which the communists carried through the 1917 Revolution. Following the revolution, the communists were still "tied," to one or another extent, to this original social base, and thereby limited in their freedom of action. That is why the original united fronts had to be restricted to proletarian and peasant organizations; and why the earlier propaganda and tactics had to have a relatively narrow class appeal.

With sufficient power and resources, the communists were in a position to cut their original ties (except where they may wish to manipulate them again in taking over new peoples), and to gain almost complete freedom for themselves. This cutting of the original social cord was accomplished in particular by the terror, and was achieved at the time of, and largely through the culminating mechanism of, the great trials and purges of 1936-38.*

This emancipation from the original social base might be called the sociological pre-condition of the new style of communist tactics. It is this that, sociologically, now permits communists to form a bloc with any social group, with any individual from any class, to adopt as easily a "no strike" as an "always strike" policy, to support or conduct an imperialist war in one month and a league of pacifists the next.

The organizational pre-condition for the new style is the maturing of the "cadres" of the world communist movement, in particular including the N.K.V.D. World communism now disposes, within and outside of the Soviet Union, an absolutely reliable and steered core of men and women, hardened both ideologically and practically. It is this core which is able to make any political turn instantaneously (Hitler Pact, war with Germany, attack on Perón or support of Perón, support of Badoglio or of monopolies, collaboration with the United States or the attempt to smash the United States, strikes everywhere or strikes nowhere). It then swings behind itself the various layers of less conscious, less politically skilled party members, fellow-travelers, sympathizers and dupes. "Above all," the

*The best estimates are that in this series of purges from eight to ten million persons were shot, jailed, exiled, or sent to concentration and forced-labor camps.

French communist leader, André Marty, remarked in 1944, "the Party has shown absolute firmness, changing its tactics three times in succession since September, 1943, without the least sign of a fissure."

This organizational pre-condition was also largely fulfilled during 1936-38. The purges sought to eliminate all real, potential or imagined opposition. Those who remain in the inner communist core are firm, flexible, true "Stalinists"—that is "men of steel." Only with such an organizational preparation could so drastic a turn as the Hitler Pact have been carried through with scarcely an organizational loss.

It is this organizational preparation which permits the communist leaders to dispense with organizational formalities. They can dissolve the Communist International, dissolve and re-constitute national communist sections, merge into other parties and split from them, enter governments and leave them, confident that the cement which binds their own ranks is firmer than any organizational formula. Moreover, because they are subject to a minimum of external social restraint, they can move politically with that startling rapidity which dazzles their world rivals, and keeps the initiative in communist hands.

They are, in short, ready.

3

Independently of the separate tactical shifts from period to period, there has taken place in world communism since the 1917 Revolution a slower general development of major import. This is a transformation of the form of communist "internationalism," into what Molotov has defined as "multi-nationalism." "This transformation," Molotov explained in a speech delivered to the Supreme Soviet on Feb. 1, 1944, "is in direct accord with the principles of our Lenin-Stalin national policy." In it there is one of those personal correlations so frequently found in history. Stalin, from his early days in the Party, made himself a specialist on "the national question." As Molotov put it, Stalin is "the best authority on the national question, not only in our party and not only in our country." Multi-national-

ism is, in fact, the most distinctive creative advance in communist theory and practice under Stalin's leadership.

The internationalism of earlier communism—of communism while it was still comparatively weak, still a relatively isolated sect—was doctrinaire, abstract. It was based upon a presumed identity of international "class forces," independent of all national divisions. The communists proclaimed that the masses had no true fatherland, that nationalism was just a trick whereby the class enemy forged heavier chains, that the main enemy was always one's own government, that sentiments of patriotism were shameful treachery to the revolution. These ideas were at variance both with reality and more especially with the deep traditional feelings of the masses. Consequently, this earlier internationalism, or rather anti-nationalism, often found itself crashing head on against the powerful sweep of national sentiment, which, far from subsiding, has reached a new intensity in our times. Potential recruits or followers of the communists were offended and repelled by the anti-nationalism; it was a difficult barrier between communism and "the mind of the masses."

Social democracy, in accordance with Marx's own precepts, was also originally internationalist in this same doctrinaire sense, and met the same troubles. In 1914, at the outbreak of the First World War, social democracy ended the dilemma by succumbing to nationalism. Within each of the warring nations, the socialists abandoned their previous abstract formulas about the unity of the workers of the world, the duty of opposing "their own" governments and fighting against "imperialist wars," and so on. They decided to be patriotic citizens and soldiers, fighting for their respective governments against the national enemies. The end result of this solution has been the disintegration of social democracy as an independent historical force. Social democracy (called simply "socialism" in the United States), in any crisis such as war or revolution, henceforth became subordinated to one or another national state. Thus the socialist parties in many of the Allied powers in the Second World War became the governmental leaders in the fight for national survival. After the war the British (socialist) Labour

Party or the French Socialist Party is first of all English or French, and only secondarily socialist.

Communism has taken a different path, of far greater historical weight. It is not succumbing to nationalism, but absorbing nationalism, and thereby integrating into one movement two of the greatest—perhaps the two greatest—historical forces of the present age. There is here a typical “triumph of Stalinist realism.” The Stalinist method has always been to try, as far as possible, to swim with the tide, never directly counter to it, but always to keep on top of the water, not to be dragged under.* Since nationalist sentiments do exist, let us not weaken and isolate ourselves by bucking them, but rather let us exploit them, let us make them an avenue of approach to the masses instead of a wall of separation.

A decade ago the national flag, in each country, began to appear on party platforms along with the Red Banner; comrades sang “The Star-Spangled Banner” or “God Save the King” as well as “The Internationale”; the portraits of the traditional patriotic heroes were hung beside those of Marx, Lenin and Stalin; the communist school in New York was re-named “The Jefferson School,” and the N.K.V.D. recruited a contingent for the Spanish Civil War as “The Abraham Lincoln Brigade.” The Red Army, during the war, organized Czech divisions and Polish divisions and Hungarian and Spanish, and for that matter German divisions. Communism becomes a kind of world political chameleon, more American than Washington or Lincoln (“Communism is 20th Century Americanism”), more French than Joan of Arc, more Chinese than Sun Yat-sen, more German than Frederick—and, needless to say, more Russian than Peter the Great.

As an instrument of world political policy, the starting premise of “multi-national Bolshevism” gives it a considerable superiority over “national socialism,” which it otherwise so closely resembles. National socialism, beginning with an intensification of Germanic

* A revolutionist I knew, who later became a prominent communist, once expressed the method through a personal anecdote. “In the First World War,” he said, “I was an aggressive pacifist. One night a crowd of several thousand persons came to my house to lynch me, and I just managed to escape with my life. I resolved then and there that in the next mobs I had anything to do with, I was going to be leading them, not chased by them.”

nationalism, was brought into direct conflict with rival nationalisms when it went beyond the Germanic *Volk*. Communism, beginning with a non-nationalist ideology, now adapts itself to existing nationalisms as it finds them, and thus can under many circumstances absorb their dynamic in order to utilize it for communism's own ends.

Stalin has written several tens of thousands of words about the national question; and on these there have been many million words of commentary. His "solution" of the national question, however, boils down to a very simple formula: grant nationalities everything expedient except power. Let them keep native costumes, songs, language, food, dances (it is all these that make big conferences in Moscow so colorful *); anything so long as they do not have power. Power, under the communist system, is a monopoly; that is the constant. The method was gradually worked out for the nationalities within the borders of the twelve original Soviet republics; it was extended to the four new republics formed during the war; and it is being used, with suitable adaptations and at various stages, for the nationalities that are brought under the expanding communist influence. Many puzzling and seemingly irreconcilable features of present-day communist policy make ready sense when they are understood in terms of multi-nationalism. It would, moreover, be a grave mistake to underestimate the power of this remarkable hybrid. Its career is not ended, but only beginning.

The official recognition of multi-nationalism, and its formal incorporation as part of the practicing doctrine of communism, took place when the Supreme Soviet, early in 1944, adopted—unanimously, of course—the so-called federalist amendments to the Soviet Constitution. In the general press at that time, there was the usual idiotic comment on the meaning of the amendments. Most interpreters discovered, as they periodically discover, symptoms of "decentralization" and "democratization." ("Federation," Lenin wrote

* And so impressive to those, like Corliss Lamont, who write books singing the praises of the freedom of races and nations granted by the Soviet system. A sufficient comment on the freedom is the fact that, during the purges of 1936-38, all the leading personnel of all the "governments" of all the professedly autonomous constituent Soviet republics and "autonomous regions" were liquidated by the N.K.V.D.

in 1920, "is a transitional form to the complete unity * of the toilers of all countries.") Soon thereafter the incident was forgotten.

Such forgetfulness about these communist rituals is not advisable. There were two immediate purposes to be served by these amendments. The lesser was to prepare for the demand that the Ukraine and White Russia should be granted independent status in the United Nations. The second was to provide an easy juridical structure for the incorporation into the Soviet Union of the four new republics, then on the agenda: the Latvian, Esthonian, Lithuanian, and Moldavian Republics. Their admission was voted by the Supreme Soviet in the sessions following that which adopted the amendments.

These four, however, are not at all the only candidates eagerly awaiting their chance to join the growing list of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. A fifth, Mongolia, has already been signed up. A dozen others, in Eastern Europe and in Asia, are, we shall probably discover before long, impatient. The Soviet club is not exclusive. Why should we suppose that the nations of the rest of the world, when properly educated by the N.K.V.D., will prove reluctant candidates?

The truth is that these amendments, or more exactly the policy of multi-nationalism which they express, are an integral and major part of the preparation for that ultimate goal which now, in the plans of the communist leaders, looms much closer on the historical horizon: the communist World Empire, entitled in communist terminology the World Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

* In communist language, the word "unity" means "complete subjection to unified communist control."

7. *The Goal of Soviet Policy*

WE HAVE ALREADY discovered, from several convergent directions, that the ultimate goal of communist, and therefore of Soviet, policy is the conquest of the world. This is not a surprising or a fresh discovery. It is a secret only to the ignorant or the deceived.

There has never been any mystery about this goal, except for those who have wanted it to be a mystery. From the very beginnings of communism, not only from the formation of the Bolshevik faction in 1903 but from the time of Marx' and Engels' *Manifesto*, this goal has been reiterated in theory and furthered in practice. Marx told his followers, "You have a world to win," just as Stalin proclaims in his chief textbook: "Here is the greatest difficulty of the Russian Revolution, its supreme historical problem—the need to solve international problems, the need to promote the world revolution." The Program of the International boasts in its introduction that it "is the only international force that has for its program the dictatorship of the proletariat and Communism, and that openly comes out as the *organizer of the international proletarian revolution.*" It announces with confidence and satisfaction "the inevitable doom of capitalism." Part III of the Program of the International has as its title: "The Ultimate Aim of the Communist International—World Communism." The official *History of the Communist Party*, required reading for all communists everywhere, declares: "Study of the history of the Communist Party strengthens the certainty of the final victory of the great task of the Lenin-Stalin Party: the victory of Communism in the whole world."

The fact that this is the communists' belief, that world conquest is, in their own minds, their goal, is not, by itself, particularly important. There have been, and still are, other groups and even individuals who have believed in this same goal of world conquest. Several such individuals can be found in almost any insane asylum. There the belief is not taken seriously in objective terms. It is

regarded as a delusion which, far from being coherently related to the total behavior of the maniac, is symptomatic of the breach between his diseased mind and its social environment.

The situation is analogous when this goal is professed, as it has often been, by small and weak sects. Then, too, it can be treated as a more or less troublesome delusion. It is not materially possible for the sect to do anything about the goal, and the rest of the world does not have to be concerned. Often the actions of the sect, in spite of the professed goal, do not have any positive relation to it: the grandiose goal is no more than an inverted answer to some obscure psychotic need. Implicit in at least one interpretation of the doctrines of Mohammedanism, Judaism, and even Calvinism is a goal of world conquest; but none of these groups is acting in practice to realize the goal; and none of them is in a material position to have a chance in this historical period to achieve it, even if they should attempt to do so. Therefore, in these cases also, the goal may be disregarded.

When, however, we find that a belief in the goal of world conquest is combined with both sufficient means to give a chance of achieving it, and actions which in fact work toward it, then the purpose must be taken quite literally, at face value. This was the case with Nazism; and it seems also to have been true of at least one section of the Shintoist-militarist Japanese leadership. It is much more obviously true of communism. In communist doctrine, there is not the slightest ambiguity about the goal of world conquest. In action, communists work always and everywhere toward that goal. And at the present time the means at their disposal, in numbers, material resources, and psychological influence, are enough to give them a very substantial probability of reaching it.

However often this plain truth is repeated, very few of the leaders and citizens of the democratic nations really believe it. They do not believe it, I suppose, because they do not want to believe it. It is, we may grant, an uncomfortable belief, putting a pistol to the will, and demanding just Yes or No as an answer. Nevertheless, and in spite of however many exorcisms by Henry Wallace or the Dean of Canterbury, it is true, and will continue to be true, until the issue is decided.

The communist doctrine, hardened as it is into a fixed mental pattern by a century's tradition, is not the only force impelling communism toward the goal of World Empire, though it alone is sufficient to establish and maintain World Empire as the goal of communist activity. At least three other major pressures are operative:

1. We have already noticed, in some detail, the senses in which contemporary society is ripe for World Empire. This is evident to all observers, but seems particularly clear when analyzed from the Marxian point of view, in terms of which communists understand the world. The international division of labor, the development of rapid transport and communication, the complex inter-relationship of world industries, the unavoidable impact of each region of the world upon every other, the patent archaism of the present political divisions, the class stratifications ignoring national boundaries, all constitute what Marxists call the "material conditions" for a world state. A world state, Marxian reasoning concludes, must therefore necessarily come into being, since "political super-structure" is necessarily determined by "material conditions." There is no doubt, it may be added, that these conditions do act, not only upon the communists but upon other powerful groups and states also, as an objective pressure directed toward world political integration. The communists themselves, independently of their ideas, are acted upon by these pressures. In addition, they reason consciously from them to the inference that if they do not themselves organize a World Empire for their own benefit, then others will at their expense.

We have already seen how the advent of atomic weapons makes the question of World Empire incomparably sharper and more immediate.

2. Another force driving the communists toward world expansion, of a type very familiar in historical experience, is the effect of economic and social failure within the Soviet Union, the primary base of communist power.

The stories about the mighty successes of socialist industry within the socialist fatherland, about the communist "solution of the economic problem," are, of course, mythical. The fact is that the great

mass of the Russian people has lived, under the communists, at a material level well below that which it had under Tsarism, and that this level has declined during the Five Year Plans. Hunger, cold, and squalor, as well as terror and slavery, are the products of a quarter century of communist victories. Soviet industry is for the most part incompetent, inefficient, and qualitatively at a low level. The mass of the terrorized population, moreover, bitterly hates, as well as fears, the communist masters.*

Under these circumstances, the expansion of communist rule holds out several substantial promises.

First, according to the time-tested formula, it serves to divert attention from the internal difficulties. Victories elsewhere make up for defeats at home. A ready-made excuse is provided for the wretched living conditions. The discontent and anger of the people is deflected from the heads of the communist rulers.

Second, the looting of conquered territories means a temporary addition of desperately needed consumers' goods. From the start of the present stage of expansion in the Baltic nations, the communists have systematically stripped the stores, warehouses, barns and homes of the conquered territories. It should not be imagined that the individual soldiers who have done the initial looting have been permitted to keep commodities other than what they have put into their stomachs. After the first outbursts die down, the soldiers are in turn looted by the state, and the goods distributed according to the plans of the rulers.

Third, the new territories yield the communists vast new reserves of manpower, upon which they rely to make up for industrial inferiority.

Fourth, the communists gain new capital goods—factories, mines, railroads, machines.

3. Finally, even if World Empire were not the positive goal of communism, it would, from the communist standpoint, be a necessary aim as a defensive measure. The communists believe, and have always believed, that there are only two alternatives for modern society: communism or capitalism. In spite of what people may "subjectively" think, they are all "objectively" lined up on one side

* See the Note at the end of this chapter.

or the other: there is no in-between. When, therefore, communism became a serious world force by conquering a large section of the earth and its inhabitants, an inescapable historical dilemma was presented. Either capitalism would destroy the new communist world, or communism would conquer the remainder of capitalism. (Somewhat paradoxically, the communists hold the latter result to be in the long run "inevitable.") The showdown might be drawn out or for a while postponed, but it cannot be avoided.

World capitalism (in which they include everything except themselves) is at present, they believe, in its death agony. It is driven by its internal contradictions to an ever more ruthless policy of world exploitation. Above all, it hopes to get renewed strength by opening up to exploitation the areas and peoples of the Soviet Union, now shielded by the proletarian dictatorship. This objective, the communists believe, has nothing to do with the personal opinions and wishes of the capitalists themselves, or their political leaders. It follows necessarily from the nature of capitalism in decline. It is inevitable, just as war under capitalism is inevitable; and just as it is inevitable that the "real meaning" of every war of the present time is an onslaught against the communist fortress of the Soviet Union.

Stalin, in his principal theoretical work, *Problems of Leninism*, has summed up the issue as follows:

The basic fact . . . is that there no longer exists a worldwide capitalist system. Now that a Soviet country has come into existence . . . worldwide capitalism has ceased to exist. The world has been severed into two camps, the imperialist camp and the anti-imperialist camp. [Vol. I., p. 369.]

We are living, not merely in one State, but in a system of States; and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist interminably side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately, one or another must conquer. Pending this development, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States must inevitably occur. [Vol. I., p. 56, quoting from Lenin, *Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XVI, p. 102.]

As if to make certain that the entire world should know that nothing of this doctrine had been abandoned as a result of the re-

formist demagoguery of the Teheran Period, Stalin declared in his election speech of Feb. 10, 1946:

It would be incorrect to think that the war arose accidentally or as a result of the fault of some statesman. Although these faults did exist, the war arose in reality as the inevitable result of the development of the world economic and political forces on the basis of monopoly capitalism.

In terms of these beliefs, world conquest is for the communists the only means of self-defense. Any war which they conduct, no matter who fires the first shot or first invades—as, for example, the Finnish War of 1939—is by definition a defensive war.

The naive appeasers of the communists imagine that these beliefs of theirs can be altered if we show the communists that we are really their friends, if we talk softly to them, and grant everything they want. They overlook, to begin with, that what the communists want is the world. And they do not understand that, in the eyes of the communists, this friendliness from the class enemy must be either a hypocritical deception or a symptom of stupidity and weakness. Nothing is going to change these beliefs. Certainly no rational argument or evidence is going to change them, because, in the fundamental point that communism must either conquer the world or be itself destroyed, the communist belief happens to be true.

3

Within the framework of the ultimate goal of World Empire, the specific present communist objective is the preparation for the open phase of the Third World War. Preparation for the war is the basic communist "line." As always, this means that every communist activity, no matter how seemingly remote, is directly or indirectly subordinate to the "line." The Fourth Five Year Plan, the policy in the C.I.O., the new purges, Gromyko's behavior at the Security Council or the Atomic Commission, the seizure of Austrian industries, the coup in Iran, the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions or the recognition of Perón, the fighting by the Chinese communists or the anti-United States agitation throughout

Latin America, the application by the British Communists to join the Labour Party or the campaign on the Franco question, the reorganization of the Red Army and Navy or the attempt to unify the United States seafaring and waterfront unions, the call for a monopolistic American Authors' Authority or the intransigence on Germany, the step-up in activities among the U.S. Negroes and the nursing of Moslem friendship: all these and all the rest are simply part of the preparation for the war. Soviet policies are mysterious only to those who persist in looking at them from the outside, separately and piecemeal, who refuse to use the key which the communists themselves supply to all who wish to use it. If we have a general understanding of the nature and goal of communism, all that we further need is a grasp of the main current line. Then everything fits into place, from slogans to assassinations, and the policy as a whole is revealed to be not in the least mysterious, but more direct and simple than any other in the world.

For convenience, the task of the preparation for the Third World War may be subdivided into the following:

1. The attempt to consolidate effective domination of the Eurasian continent.
2. The simultaneous attempt to weaken and undermine all governments and nations not under communist control.

In the present section, I shall confine myself to the first of these.

* * *

In August, 1939, the communists, in this respect heirs of the Russian Empire, held control of what geopoliticians call the "inner Heartland" of the "World Island." * For the first time in world history, the inner Heartland (Central Eurasia) possessed a mass population, a high level of political organization, and a considerable industrialization.

In August, 1945, communist domination, though not yet fully consolidated, extended in the West to a line from Stettin south to the Dalmatian coast, and East to include all of the Balkans except

* I am using, in particular, Sir Halford Mackinder's terminology. Cf. his *Democratic Ideals and Reality*.

Macedonia, Thrace, and the geopolitically unimportant Greek Peninsula. This line on the West, except for the omission of Macedonia and the Turkish territory north of the Dardanelles, corresponds exactly with what Mackinder defined a generation ago as the outer border of the Heartland.

In the East communist domination reached via the Kuriles to outflank the Americas on the North, and moved into northern Korea, Manchuria, and North China. Its two lines of egress from the Heartland into China (into Manchuria, and further south into Sinkiang) are also those previously defined by Mackinder.


In the West, the communist pressure pushes against the northern flank (Scandinavia), with the main force exerted against Germany, the key to the rest of Europe. This thrust is combined with an attempted envelopment from the rear (Spain) and what might be described as a temporary holding operation in France and the lesser European states.

In the Middle East, the pressure is felt throughout, in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, down into Palestine and the lesser Arab states, and for that matter on into Egypt and North Africa generally. From the point of view of the thinking of traditionally naval powers, like Britain and the United States, this constitutes a "threat to the Empire lifeline," and is linked with the drive on Trieste and toward Italy. However, as understood from the point of view of land power and of fundamental geopolitical relationships, it is perhaps more fundamentally a drive across the land bridge to the southern adjunct of the Heartland, in Africa.

In the Far East, the pressure is directed toward all of China. In India, which is outside the Heartland and of secondary importance from a geopolitical point of view, the direct force from the Heartland is not yet being exerted. The pressure is felt from within, through the influence of the Indian Communists, the N.K.V.D. and military agents, and as an effect of the general pro-Moslem orientation.

We may picture the perspective through the geometrical analogy of a set of concentric rings around an inner circle (see the following page).

THE FIELD STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNIST POWER



(This figure is not meant to be either complete or in every respect exact. Its purpose is to represent not a static state of affairs, but the general character of a dynamic historical process.)

The inner, magnetic core of the system is the established Soviet Union itself, within the boundaries temporarily crystallized, after the Civil War and until August, 1939. In preparation for the Second World War, this was the communist fortress. It now becomes, in preparation for the Third, the inner defensive ring of the greater Eurasian fortress.

The consolidation of the Eurasian fortress as a whole requires, for the inner core, a series of measures which are already well started. Economically, the new Five Year Plans are designed to expand at all costs the basic war industries, and to make a supreme effort to overtake the United States in the production of atomic weapons. New contingents of millions of slave laborers, drawn from the Russian people and from the conquered regions, provide a flexible mass labor force that can be concentrated at the will of the leadership on the economic tasks. The army, navy and air forces are being tightened and qualitatively developed, with the educational system revised to produce a maximum of disciplined, trained soldiers and officers. Politically, the new purges, the familiar N.K.V.D. terror methods, and suitable propaganda are re-establishing firm control over the people, which was somewhat loosened by the aftermath of the War, and are steeling them for the coming struggle.

* * *

The first ring, surrounding the inner circle, represents those territories already absorbed, or scheduled soon to be absorbed, directly within the structure of the Soviet Union proper. This step was prepared for, as we have seen, by the federalist revision of the Soviet Constitution.

* * *

Circle II represents those nations which the communists, in the first instance, aim to dominate (rather than absorb directly into the Soviet Union) through one or another type of puppet government. Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Northern Iran, Northern Korea, Eastern Germany, Eastern Austria, are already well inside this circle. To suppose that they will ever, voluntarily or by merely diplomatic maneuvers, be per-

mitted to escape, is political idiocy. The communist design is, of course, exactly the opposite: to draw them further inward, toward and finally into Circle I of Absorption; and to bring within Circle II of Domination other nations now balancing uneasily on its edge. Finland, the rest of Iran and Austria, Manchuria and North China (if the United States graciously ditches Chiang Kai-shek), Iraq, Turkey, and all of Scandinavia have even today one foot over the brink.

Germany, however, is the top prize of this circle. The leaders of the democratic nations, who do not have an over-all political line, and who are always distracted by side issues, have yet to understand the meaning of the kind of concentrated Bolshevik *campaign* which is being directed toward the domination of Germany. Domination of Germany will in turn guarantee effective domination of the entire European continent, and will complete in the West the structure of Fortress Eurasia.

The importance assigned to Germany dates back to Lenin, and before him to Napoleonic days, when Prussian officers and divisions helped in the defeat of Napoleon. Lenin many times declared that German technology plus Russian manpower and resources would clinch the victory of the world revolution. From 1918 to 1924 the communists tried repeatedly to carry through a German communist revolution. Thereafter they continued intimate relations with Germany. They brought in German machines and technicians, and permitted German officers of the army outlawed by the Versailles Treaty to gain experience training the Red Army. The Stalin-Hitler Pact was by no means so unprecedented a reversal as the world found it.

Hitler's decision to launch the war against Russia did not end this more ancient perspective. As early as October, 1941, the communist veteran Walter Ulbricht was directing the formation of a communist-controlled league among the German war prisoners. In a speech delivered to the Moscow Soviet on November 6, 1942, Stalin assured all Germans: "It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany . . . It is not our aim to destroy all military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that this is not only impossible in regard to Germany . . .

but it is also inadvisable from the point of view of the future." On July 12-13, 1943, the Free Germany National Committee was formed in Moscow, under the nominal chairmanship of Junker General Walther von Seydlitz, captured at Stalingrad, and the real direction of Wilhelm Pieck, leading German communist and former Secretary of the Communist International.*

The Free Germany Committee opened up offices under communist direction all over the world. It drew into its membership abroad the bulk of the German-speaking residents and refugees: fellow-travelers, socialists, liberals, and ordinary patriotic but anti-Hitler Germans. Within the Soviet Union, the Committee and its affiliates undertook the job of indoctrinating the German war prisoners, the transformation of German Nazis into German communists, and the training of special agents and of the battalions of a future "Free Germany" army. By August, 1944, when Friedrich von Paulus, the German commander at Stalingrad, announced his adherence, nearly a hundred captured German general officers had joined the Committee.

So alarming to England and the United States did the prospect of the Free Germany Committee become, that at Yalta they obtained Stalin's signature to a paragraph renouncing any plan to install the Committee as a new German government. As always, for the communists, such a renunciation was purely of form, not of substance.

The Free Germany Committee is the expression of the communist plan for Germany. Its program is a trap, baited for Germans with what seems to be the offer of a kind of junior partnership in the Soviet Eurasian, and future World, Empire. In reality, it aims at the incorporation of Germany under the monolithic communist control. This program stands unchanged by the Yalta Declaration, just as the Free Germany activities, under a variety of names, continue unabated.

The terms of the German capitulation gave eastern Germany to the communists. From eastern Germany as a base, they eye Germany as a whole. Already, by mid-1946, the progress in eastern Germany

*I do not have space here to discuss in detail this extremely important committee. Cf. my article, *Stalin and the Junkers*, in the Sept. 15, 1944 issue of *The Commonwealth*.

was sufficient to permit the preliminary moves toward the rest of Germany. The communists had swallowed the socialists by forcing them into the "Socialist Unity Party." The Free Germany Committee members, communist-trained abroad, were brought back from Mexico, New York, Latin America, London, Stockholm, Moscow. For the first time since the War, in Paris during June, 1946, Molotov came out against federalism and dismemberment, and for a "united Germany." By then he believed that the outcome was assured, that a united Germany would be a communist Germany.

The policy followed in the preliminary organization of eastern Germany is, in its fundamentals, the same as that throughout the area of "domination." There need not be any set formula under which the domination is to be achieved. Great flexibility, and many diverse forms of political movement, of social structure and of government, are possible. The one constant, as always, is the elimination of all power except communist power. Temporary concessions, favoritism, conversion, economic pressures, shuffling and re-shuffling of parties and governments, deception, and—essential and continuous prop to all the rest—the terror, threats, torture, killing, exile, forced labor, all of these, in mixed and varying dosages, gradually weed out all opposition, past, present, future, or imaginable. Coalitions, elections, treaties, mergers, these are shadows. The substance is the communist drive toward all power.

* * *

The boundary in the system of concentric rings between Circle II (Domination) and Circle III (Orienting Influence) is not always precise. Circle III represents those nations which the Soviet Union does not at the given moment feel in a position to absorb or reduce to outright puppet status, but within which it seeks enough influence to guarantee a pro-Soviet foreign policy, or at least to neutralize any tendency toward an anti-Soviet foreign policy. In Europe this includes the effort to hinder the formation of the so-called Western Bloc. In Latin America it means pressure to cut the nations loose from subordination to the United States.

The modes of influence in Circle III vary from direct pressure exerted by the Soviet state or the internal communist parties, to vari-

ous forms of concession and conciliation. As examples of the latter, it may be noted that the Soviet government was the first to grant partial recognition to the De Gaulle Committee, and the first to grant full recognition to the Badoglio government in Italy and to Perón in Argentina. During 1946 it shipped grain to France. It offered, and in some cases put through, generous economic deals with various Latin American nations. Within all the nations of Circle III, the communist parties call for unity and collaboration in national fronts. They combine this call for unity with threats and strikes or other hostile actions to enforce abandonment of anti-communist or anti-Soviet tendencies. Within France and Italy and throughout most of Latin America, the communists have secured control of the greater part of the organized labor movement. There, and in China, they are ready to enter into coalition governments, where their veto power can be exercised in the cabinets.

In the nations of Circle III (including those, like the Scandinavian nations, which, though still in Circle III, are already drawn toward Circle II), the communists' policy is to strive for socio-political conditions that permit the communist movement to function effectively. That is why they advocate, for the present, a measure of democracy within them: communists abandon the forms of democracy when, but not until, communist domination is assured. That explains, also, their readiness to dissolve or merge national Communist Party organizations, and their acceptance of posts in multi-party cabinets. At the same time, they work to absorb or destroy any non- or anti-communist revolutionary elements that tend to arise from the Left.

It is to be observed that the relations within this whole system of concentric rings are dynamic. As long as the Soviet Union retains the political initiative, the center acts as an attractive force, pulling the outer rings toward itself. As the first ring is absorbed into the body of the central circle, the second ring (Domination) tends to fuse, in part at least, with the first. Additional territories or nations tend to become candidates for outright absorption rather than for mere domination. We may rightly expect that, before so very long, applications for admission to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics will be filed by some nations now within Circle II. Similarly, the third ring (Orienting Influence) tends, as the process develops, to

fuse into the second; and the nations of the third ring thus tend toward the Domination group. The whole set of relations within the system of rings is summarily epitomized by the 1939-40 history of the Baltic states.

* * *

We have dealt, in this section, with the nature of Circles I, II, and III. The discussion, except for its inclusion of Latin America, has concerned the first part of the task of preparation for the Third World War: the attempt to consolidate effective domination of the Eurasian continent. Circle IV carries us altogether outside of Eurasia, and relates only to the second part of the general task: the simultaneous attempt to weaken and undermine all governments and nations not under communist control.

4

The principal occupants of Circle IV are the United States, England, and the British Commonwealth. Though the ultimate communist goal with respect to these is identical with that for every other part of the earth, the specific policy for the present period of preparation for the Third World War is, in many respects, radically different from the Eurasian policies analyzed in the preceding section. Within this period, the communists do not expect to be able either to absorb or to dominate the nations of Circle IV. They do not believe that in the United States they can even attain a decisive orienting influence, though they may have a small reserve hope of swinging England into line.

Their policy toward the United States is, on the contrary, based upon the conviction that the United States is the only serious rival center of power to their own, and that the United States is their determining opponent in the developing Third World War. They believe that, in all probability, England and what is left of the Commonwealth and Empire will continue the *de facto* alliance with the United States on into the open stage of the War. The policy toward England is therefore subsidiary to the policy toward the United States, and I shall confine the following analysis to the United States.

* * *

The communist objectives in relation to the United States may be summed up as follows:

First, to try to prevent interference by the United States with the communist plans for the consolidation of Fortress Eurasia, and even to gain United States assistance in fulfilling those plans.

Second, to weaken, undermine and demoralize the United States to the maximum extent possible prior to the open war struggle.

Third, to become imbedded within the social fabric of United States life in order to be ready for direct action—espionage, sabotage, stimulation of riots and revolts, etc.—when the open war begins.

These objectives are furthered, of course, by communist activities and propaganda throughout the world. Within the United States and its dependencies they are promoted by a powerful and complex network. Many Americans, understanding nothing of totalitarian politics, dismiss the communists as “a negligible force in American life,” because the Communist Party gets few votes in elections. For communists, elections—particularly the vote one gets in elections—are among the most minor of political exertions. It might be recalled that in 1917, at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, the Russian Bolshevik faction, which became the Communist Party, numbered only about 25,000 members. In general it is a law of politics that a small minority, tightly organized and disciplined, knowing in advance what it wants and planning consciously how to get it, has far greater weight than loose, amorphous majorities.

The communist apparatus in the United States, even quantitatively considered, is, as a matter of fact, very extensive. It is built out of a series of layers, which surround the inner steel, and merge at the outer edges into the general population. At the center, checking and supervising every activity, are thousands of N.K.V.D. agents. There are then thousands of other agents, of the military intelligence, and of the various special commissions, committees and bureaus of the Soviet State and the international party. All Soviet employees in this country, in whatever apparent capacity, are of course part of the machine. All foreign communist parties have their organized sections within all refugee and foreign-language groups in this country. Then there is the United States Party itself, with its own many layers; and the many communists who are instructed not

to join any party. Then, in widening circles, there are the fellow-travelers, the sympathizers, the dupes, the simpletons; and the millions of honest citizens who, without knowing its source or its direction, drink up the propaganda because it seems to correspond with some sentiment of their own.

In order to carry out its triple objective, the communist network tries to infiltrate every level of American life. ("We must," Lenin commands in *What Is to Be Done?*, "go among all classes of the people as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators, and as organizers.") From the smallest sports clubs to the highest departments of government, from great trade unions to neighborhood debating societies, from the established political parties to minute farm co-operatives, from the army to organizations of pacifists, from *The Atlantic Monthly* to *The Protestant*, from Hollywood parties to strike riots, everywhere communist influence is actively penetrating. Where an organization is already established, they wedge from the outside; where there is none, they create it. As their grease for infiltration, they use everywhere the formula of the united front, which we have already studied.

The infiltration is in part opportunistic: that is, the communists seize any chance that may appear to entrench themselves in any kind of organization whatsoever. However, in accordance with their specific objectives, they have in the United States certain concentration areas to which they devote the greater part of their deliberate and planned efforts. The chief of these are the following:

1. *The public opinion industry.* Enormous energies and funds are spent on winning over or influencing writers, publishers, journalists, editors, lecturers, radio speakers, government propagandists, theater and movie producers, directors and actors, teachers, ministers, and so on. Dozens of special united fronts have been created for them; hundreds of communist-controlled magazines, newspapers, confidential newsletters are put out. The Party plugs the sale of sympathetic books, and tries by every sort of pressure to suppress or hinder anti-communist books, plays, movies, or radio programs. Movie sequences are adroitly slanted by its Hollywood sympathizers. Lucrative Soviet contracts are carefully manipulated. Communists

and fellow-travelers pour hundreds of books and articles into the American market, when necessary through their own organizations (such as International Publishers), but more frequently and desirably with the help of sympathetic or deceived sponsors among the established publishers. Hundreds of innocent radio speakers, magazine writers and newspaper journalists are happily unaware that the "inside information" with which they jazz up their programs and articles, and sometimes raise their own salaries, have been fed to them through a very long tube that traces back to the Agit-Prop section in Moscow.

In accord with the public opinion concentration, it is not surprising that during the war communists and fellow-travelers were so conspicuous and so successful in the Office of War Information, in "psychological warfare" work generally, and on the staffs of the army newspapers.

2. *Maritime and Communications.* Already a large percentage of United States seamen and waterfront employees are in unions under communist control. The Party has also been notably successful among certain of the communication workers, including the ship-board radio operators and the employees of the crucial New York (Western Union) headquarters of international communications. Communist efforts among railroad workers and truck drivers have been stepped up, and, after earlier years of failure, are now making progress. The importance of this concentration from the point of view of war preparation is obvious enough.

3. *Intelligence Services.* The communists are trying by every means to infiltrate the various intelligence services, military and governmental. The measure of their success is indicated by the war-time penetration of their ideas into some branches of the Office of Strategic Services, as well as into Military Intelligence and the State Department. Their work in this field is facilitated by their active interest in the United Public Workers of America, the union which is making considerable headway in the organization of government employees. Of course all communists, wherever they are located, are in effect intelligence agents for the world communist movement.

4. *Science, especially nuclear science and technology.* Several years ago the communists began large-scale work in the sciences. From the time of its formation, they have vigorously supported the International Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technicians. With the approach and arrival of atomic weapons, this concentration has been intensified. Communists and fellow-travelers are active in most of the committees, unions and other organizations of nuclear scientists and technologists that are now being formed. The names of several of the leading nuclear scientists have, in fact, figured in united fronts. We may take it as certain that nearly all supposed secrets of atomic energy come into communist hands very shortly after discovery.

* * *

From these and their other organizational vantage points the communists in the first place manipulate American public opinion in such a way as to permit the development of the communist Eurasian policy. Communism has by far the greatest propaganda machine that has ever existed, and its achievements in this country during recent years are notable. United States opinion was led, for example, to accept the turning over of Yugoslavia to the communist Tito; and of Poland to the communist-controlled Bierut government. Communists, with detailed advance preparation, acted as a catalyst for the "Bring the Boys Home" movement following V-J Day, which demoralized the armed forces, and weakened the world diplomatic position of the United States. Many Americans now believe, or half-believe, that totalitarianism is a new kind of higher democracy. They are persuaded that there should be "non-interference" in China: that is, that China should be turned over to the Soviet-supported and -supplied Chinese communists. They will soon be led to think that all American troops should be brought home from Eurasia. They believe, or many of them believe, that Americans abroad nurse fascists and counter-revolutionists. They are told horrifying stories about Greek monarchists and Turkish tyrants and Iranians and Iraqians subsidized by British and American big business. Whatever the immediate issue, the propaganda always finds a reason, a whole set of reasons, why the United States should do

nothing to interfere with the communist organization of the concentric ring system, should, on the contrary, help in that organization with political friendship, food, supplies and industrial equipment.

And tirelessly the propaganda hammers in the Soviet myth, the fairy story of the happy, prosperous land of socialism, where forward-moving humanity marches ahead with one mind and one voice to new and braver worlds.

On another, related front, the communist propaganda and activities stimulate and provoke all latent conflicts between the United States and other non-communist states. In the Philippines, the Huk-balahaps, the guerilla force exploiting the discontent of poor peasants, directs its arms and agitation against the American-sponsored new government. In Puerto Rico, the communists join the separatist movement. Throughout Latin America, the communists and their allies denounce Yankee imperialism. Especially is every occasion seized upon to stir dislike and distrust of Great Britain.

Within the United States, the communists arouse and exploit every divisive possibility. Labor against capital, big business against little business, C.I.O. against A.F. of L., farmers against businessmen, Negroes against Whites, Christians against Jews, Protestants against Catholics, landlords against tenants, foreign born against native born, South against North, unemployed against employed: wherever there is a potential rift in the national life, the communist tactic is to deepen and tear that rift.

To refuse . . . to maneuver, to utilize the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies; to refuse to temporize and compromise with possible (even though transient, unstable, vacillating, and conditional) allies—is this not ridiculous in the extreme? . . . The old forms have burst. . . . We now have from the standpoint of the development of international communism such a lasting, strong and powerful content of work . . . that it can *and must* manifest itself in any form, both new and old; that it can *and must* regenerate, conquer, and subjugate all forms, not only the new but the old—not for the purpose of reconciling itself with the old, but to be able to convert all and sundry forms, new and old, into a weapon for the complete, final, decisive and

inevitable victory of communism. [Lenin, quoted by Stalin in *Problems of Leninism*.]

It is of course true that many of these rifts, or potential rifts, exist, independently of communism, within the fabric of our society. There would be a Negro problem, a labor problem, a religious problem, a Jewish problem, if there were no communist movement. It is further true that many good citizens, non-communists and anti-communists, concern themselves with these problems. Their concern, however, is to try to solve them. What they do not grasp is that the concern of the communists—with whom they so often join their activities, frequently without themselves knowing of the united front into which they enter—is not to solve them but to make them insoluble. They do not understand that the communists do not want to mend the nation, but to smash it beyond repair. The good citizen is glad to find communist allies when he seeks, say, a fair trial for a Negro; he does not know that the communist will use him for the precise purpose, not of helping the Negro, but of embittering and poisoning race relationships. The good citizen joins a committee to support, perhaps, the families of strikers; he does not know that the communists in the committee have as their objective not the well-being of labor but the hopeless exaggeration of class conflicts, and the undermining of the American economy. Or the good citizen, as a humanitarian, joins some committee “for Soviet-American friendship,” equally unaware that the function of the committee is to protect and defend not the peoples of Russia and the United States, but the communist dictatorship today crushing the Russian people and tomorrow aiming for the people of America.

So, if all goes according to plan, the full war will open with the United States so isolated, and so internally weakened, divided, demoralized, that it will be unable even to make a good showing in the struggle. Meanwhile, in the war itself, with public communist activities limited or abolished, the infiltrated divisions will be in a position to take direct action to break down the industrial and military machine, and the morale of the nation.

The downfall of the United States will remove the last great obstacle. The Communist World Empire will begin.

It is not excluded that the present leftist Seventh Period will be followed by a temporary Eighth Period, rightist in outward form. If this happened, the Communist Party of the United States would drop some of the more extreme class struggle slogans and tactics, and would, as in the Teheran Period, profess to be more friendly toward the United States government. Earl Browder might resume his interrupted post as party leader.

There are two possible occasions for such a shift. The United States might adopt such a strong policy toward the Soviet Union and communism that the communist leaders might feel that they had to run to temporary cover under a veil of friendliness. Or the mild approach might be thought a suitable bribe for the United States in return for United States economic assistance, and complete acquiescence by the United States in the communist Eurasian plans. There is some reason to believe that a faction within the Soviet Union favors such a right turn, and that Stalin himself belongs to that faction.

If such a turn occurs, it will, like the previous right turns, be hailed by public opinion in this country as proof that the Soviet Union has given up world revolution, and that permanent friendly co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States has been established.

It must be insisted once more that these political turns of the communists are purely tactical in significance. The fundamental strategy of the communists is irrevocably set. Nothing whatever of the analysis of this chapter would be altered by a shift to a rightist Eighth Period. The basic line would still be: preparation for the Third World War, by consolidation of the Eurasian base, and the weakening of the rest of the world. The specific objectives within the United States would still be to prevent political interference in Eurasia, to demoralize the country, and to infiltrate every stratum of its social structure. The surface would alter: the slogans would seek to lull rather than to knock sharply on the head. But the knife would still be ready for the heart.

Note. The evidence demonstrating the deterioration of the standard of living under the communist regime has been assembled and analyzed by a number of scholars. Among the relevant books that may be consulted in this connection, the following are representative: *Workers Before and After Lenin*, by Manya Gordon; *Soviet Labour and Industry*, by Leonard E. Hubbard; *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace*, by A. Yugow; *The Real Soviet Russia*, by David J. Dallin. All of these books contain extensive bibliographies of first-hand sources.

Under the conditions of Soviet life, with no legal, public mechanism through which opposition can be expressed, it is naturally impossible to get extensive direct evidence about the attitude of the people toward the regime. The ritualistic statements of loyalty to Stalin and communism made by Soviet citizens to foreign journalists show only what the citizens feel they must say in order not to risk trouble from the N.K.V.D. These statements are in direct contradiction to the reports of the former subjects who have renounced Soviet citizenship and have been able to speak or write in countries where freedom of expression is permitted (*cf.* Victor Serge, Walter Krivitsky, Victor Kravchenko, Alexander Barmine, etc.).

The lack of adequate direct evidence, however, is more than compensated by what can be indirectly inferred from characteristic features of the Soviet system. Let us consider only three of the most striking that have a bearing on this problem: (1) the internal secret police; (2) the periodic mass purges; (3) the prohibition of any travel beyond the Soviet border, except on official missions, by any Soviet citizen (a prohibition enforced by severe statutory penalties which apply not only to an individual who tries to leave the country but to the members of his immediate family and to anyone who has knowledge of his intended act).

Let us ask: why are the secret police, the purges, and the prohibition of foreign travel considered necessary by the regime, and not merely admitted publicly in the controlled press, but constantly and spectacularly emphasized, especially in internal propaganda? The only possible explanation is that the regime recognizes the existence of profound mass discontent, however inarticulate and unorganized. If everyone, or nearly everyone, liked the regime, why would it be necessary to have the enormous secret police apparatus operating in every social, cultural, economic and political institution? Why would it be necessary to institute the periodic purges which, by the official accounts, involve hundreds of thousands, even millions, of persons, and often sweep away the entire staffs of magazines, theaters, movie trusts, factories, farms, party committees,

commissariats, and so on, which in many cases have been praised a few months before as the best defenders of the Revolution? If the masses of the people believe Stalin to be the Messiah that is described by our own fellow-travelers (exercising their decadent right of free speech from their vantage point on another continent), why, we may wonder, does Stalin need to make the attempt to get away from him a criminal offense?

The regime confronts here an insoluble dilemma. In order to propagate the communist myth in the non-communist world, it must swamp the ether, the newsstands and the bookstalls of all countries with the story of the happy, contented land of socialism. In order to terrorize its own unhappy subjects into submission, it must fill the columns of *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and *Red Star* with denunciations of wrecking, sabotage, graft, "diversions," plots and deviations, on a scale so huge that it would seem to indicate a belief by the regime that nine-tenths of the population must be criminals and traitors. Both versions are lies, but the second, in its own indirect way, informs us very plainly about the true relation between the regime and the people.

8. *The Weakness and Strength of the Soviet Union*

I PROPOSE NOW to judge the equipment with which the communists are making their bid for World Empire. It is not my intention to cite quantitative statistics. Much of the statistical material is inexact, often deliberately falsified. Besides, because of the peculiarities of communist social organization, it is usually misleading, even when accurate. I shall attempt, rather, what might be called a qualitative estimate; and I shall have in mind, as the background of comparison, the imperial rival: the United States.

1. *Geographical position.* The communists, in control of the extended Soviet Union and its puppet territories, enjoy an incomparable geographical position. This adjective is meant literally: there is no geographical position on earth which can in any way be compared with that of their main base. For the first time in human history, as we have already remarked, the Eurasian Heartland, the central area of the earth's great land mass, has both a considerable population and a high degree of political organization. In this respect the communists are the heirs of the Russian Empire and of the predecessor Duchy of Muscovy which, in the 16th century, began the organization of the forests and steppes that for millennia had been the home of hunters and fishermen, isolated river-cities, and the scattered nomads who periodically descended upon the civilizations of the periphery.

Geographically, the Heartland, with its vast distances and its huge land barriers, is the most defensible of all regions of the earth. Sea power cannot touch it. Conquerors are swallowed up within its enormous confines. On the other hand, from the base within the Heartland raids in force can issue East, West, Southwest, and South.

Potentially, the Heartland controls the Eurasian land mass as a

whole, and, for that matter, the secondary African Continent, with the southern section of the Heartland in its interior. From the point of view of Eurasia, with its African appendage, there remain on the earth only lesser islands. Geographically, strategically, Eurasia encircles America, overwhelms it.

Before the coming of airborne and atomic weapons, it was an axiom of geopolitics, and of common sense, that if any one power succeeded in organizing the Heartland and its outer barriers, that power would be certain to control the world. Sea power depends in the last analysis upon the control of its bases. But sea power cannot touch the Heartland. Land power, resting on its ultimate base in the Heartland, would, therefore, in the end, be sure to overcome sea power on its island bases.

Air power and atomic weapons have upset the certainty of this former axiom. The Heartland is no longer inviolable. Nevertheless, they have not altogether done away with the facts of geography. Geographically, the Soviet position is still the strongest possible position on earth; and that remains a very great strength. If the communists succeed in extending their full direct control to the Atlantic, and in maintaining or extending their position on the Pacific, the odds on their victory would advance close to certainty.

2. Manpower. The communists are very strong in manpower. Already within the official Soviet borders there are about two hundred million human beings; within the already dominated territories there are over two hundred million more. Several tens of millions are in the communist-controlled movements of the rest of the world. The communists rightly consider that many of the colonial peoples constitute "strategic reserves of the revolution." Most of this communist-controlled population, moreover, are great breeders, with birth rates far higher than that of the advanced nations of Western Civilization.

The communists use their manpower to make up for other deficiencies. This is especially striking in the two crucial fields of industry and warfare. In both, lack of training, machines, efficiency and quality is made up for by millions of human beings. Millions of Russian lives stopped the qualitatively superior Nazi war ma-

chine; tens of millions overcome industrial defects. The most expressive symptom of this method in the economy is the increasing reliance on slave labor, which is hurled by the millions upon millions into the gigantic tasks of "socialist reconstruction."

3. *Natural resources.* The Soviet Union has, as is well known, an abundance of almost all natural resources needed for modern industrial society.

From one point of view, however, the amplitude of Soviet resources is perhaps over-stated. A "natural resource," like a mineral or lumber or water-power, is of economic and social significance only when it can actually be put to social use. If it is inaccessible, or accessible only at prohibitive cost, then the "natural resource" is a merely physical fact and not, we might say, a "social resource." A considerable part of the Soviet resources seem to be in this situation. For example, much of the great timberlands of Siberia are in territory where the rivers flow into the frozen Arctic: but great forests without rivers on which the logs can be floated to processing and shipping points are much reduced in social value. For a great deal of the mineral resources of Siberia, there are also extreme transportation difficulties. Some of these difficulties can no doubt be overcome by increased railroad facilities, and by the use of airplanes. Some are met by the lavish use of manpower already mentioned. A technologically adequate solution, however, lies in a future beyond the time during which the world struggle will be decided.*

4. *Economic plant.* The growth of the Soviet economy under communist control, though considerable, has been greatly exaggerated in communist propaganda. From a quantitative standpoint, the rate of growth has been no more rapid—in many important lines less rapid—than that of United States economy in the period following the Civil War. The quantitative output of most Soviet industries was, prior to the war, far below that of the corresponding United States industries, and has been heavily set back by the war's damage.

The weaknesses of the Soviet economy in factors other than the

* I am indebted to Professor Willard E. Atkins, of New York University, for an illuminating personal discussion of the point made in this paragraph.

purely quantitative are even more striking. The economy as a whole is qualitatively on a very low level, inefficient, and out of balance. The inadequacies of the transportation system, for example, both railroad and highway, constitute a persistent bottleneck. (Lend-lease trucks were probably as decisive as any other single element in the defeat of the Nazis.) The qualitative inferiority is not merely a hardship on consumers—a question of little concern to the communist rulers—but results in a maximum of spoilage and breakdown throughout the productive process. Combined with inadequate provisions for repair and upkeep, it leads to the quick physical deterioration of buildings, machines, and factories. The administrative overhead in both industry and agriculture, which must include the cost of the multitude of N.K.V.D. agents, and the elaborate checking, cross-checking and constant interventions of dozens of special Party and governmental bureaus, is fantastically high. A Soviet mine or factory always has two or three times the number of persons in its administrative personnel as a mine or factory with comparable output in the United States. Stakhanovite stunts staged for propaganda purposes, attempts by individual plants to make a spectacular showing on the Kremlin score sheets, and the inroads of purges interfere chronically with the smooth integration of production. The politically motivated passion for quick production figures leads to the operation of new factories before their buildings are finished, and before there are at hand proper storage facilities, supplies, tools, spare parts, and so on. Decent housing, transportation and food for the workers are never provided, deficiencies which contribute their share to the low man-hour output.

There are, however, certain compensating factors in the economy. In general, it is incorrect to judge production costs in a totalitarian economy by exactly the same standards that apply within capitalist economy. A production cost that would mean bankruptcy for a capitalist enterprise might be justified from a political or strategic standpoint. I have already mentioned the use of the vast reserves of manpower as a substitute for economic quality. The communists, moreover, are making up for some of their own earlier lacks by exploiting the industries and labor force of the newly absorbed or dominated territories in Eastern Europe and Manchuria.

More important, for strategic purposes, is the economic concentration which absolute political control makes possible. This is of great significance in connection with the production of atomic weapons. Deficient as they are in almost all branches of economy, the communists can concentrate the most and the best of what they have both of human and physical equipment on a task which they decide to be dominant. It would, therefore, be a mistake to judge their atomic performance by their general industrial level.

5. *Cultural level.* Though the communist regime has made considerable advances toward a general primitive literacy,* the cultural level within the Soviet Union remains low. The percentage of skilled workers is small. The number of technicians, engineers, scientists, doctors, teachers, and other professionals is inadequate. Their training, for which skill in communist ideology and practice is considered more fundamental than calculus or biology, is defective or distorted. Schools, hospitals, libraries, and so on, except for the show-places designed for the ruling class and visiting journalists, are inferior in numbers and quality. The rigid censorship and propaganda block genuine historical and sociological knowledge, though at the same time they make easier the problem of political manipulation.

6. *Armed forces.* Technologically, the weaknesses in the Soviet economy and culture are reflected in the armed forces. With some exceptions, the quality of weapons and equipment is relatively low, and in many lines there are major shortages. Soviet strategical ideas, however, take this difficulty into account. Manpower and concentration substitute for quality. The entire economy, the entire society, is concentrated on the preparation for the war. There is no argument, in the Soviet Union, over conscription. The quotas for the mass production of soldiers are fulfilled. Strenuous efforts are being made to improve discipline, and to turn out a more thoroughly trained officer corps.

*The "colossal" Soviet achievements in education are a favorite item in the communist myth, achieved by a juggling of statistics. The rate of progress toward literacy has been no higher than that under the last decades of Tsarism. Cf. *Manya Gordon, Workers Before and After Lenin*, Part XI.

The theory and practice of multi-nationalism also aids in the expansion of the communist divisions. The armies of the dominated nations are fitted readily into the over-all structure of the communist military machine. It should also be kept in mind that the communists within the non-communist nations are a direct military supplement.

√7. *Ideology.* The communist myth, or complex of myths, is a special source of great strength for the communist movement. The general myth has traditional roots that push backward more than twenty-five hundred years. It expresses, in secular form, the great dream of a Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. As a compensation for those who are weary and careworn, or an ideal for those who are aspiring, it permits that seductive leap from a reality which is not, and can never be, to our taste, into the vision of a utopian society where all men are free and equal and good, where exploitation and war and hunger and wretchedness have vanished, and all mankind is linked together in a universal brotherhood. According to the manner of all hallucinations, this dream is mistaken for objective reality: the dream is taken to be the guiding law of the very process of history, necessary, inevitable, destiny. The dreamer thereby gains that feeling of moral security which springs from the sense that we are at one with the Universe. Even the catastrophic, apocalyptic elements of the myth—the conviction that the goal will be reached only after great suffering and gnashing of teeth, in travail and blood and torment, amid the thunder and crash of the institutions of the world—adds, as the experience of all religious faith testifies, to the hold which the myth acquires over the emotions of the believers.

To the general myth, there has been deliberately added, during the past generation, the Soviet variation. Tens of millions of persons throughout the world quiet their doubts and fears with that extraordinary fantasy of a purposeful, co-operative community where there are no landlords and absentee owners, where the workers and farmers own and rule, where there is security for all and no unemployment, where the masses, despite all obstacles, are surging ever forward toward a new and happy life: this vision substituting for

the reality of a police-state founded on terror and slave labor, of incomparable wretchedness and tyranny.

From the myth, as from a magic elixir, a strength flows into the veins of the communist movement that enables it to soar beyond more grossly material limits. It is a comfort in adversity, as it is a crowning glory of happy days.

Nevertheless, the present power of the communist myth would seem to be in most part negative. Social man cannot live without great myths. It is the deterioration of our religious myths as well as of the liberal and democratic myths of post-Renaissance civilization that gives, by default, such a special enchantment to the communist myth. Bewildered by the awful problems of this prolonged crisis of a civilization, uncertain and afraid, disillusioned with the ideals of liberal democracy in action, skeptical or half-hearted in genuine religious belief, men grasp at the communist myth so that their spirits may not altogether drown.

There is, moreover, a seeming paradox that may prove of some practical importance. The communist myth is believed more ardently outside of communist-controlled territories than within them. Within the Soviet domain, there are, it is true, especially among the youth, some millions of total believers, whose minds and souls are shaped absolutely by the communist myth. But there is every reason to think that this is not true of the majority of the people. The outside world may be led to believe that workers rule in Russia; but the Russian workers know by life that they are serfs and slaves. Comfortable American journalists can believe that Stalin liquidated counter-revolutionary Kulaks as a class; but Russian peasants know that he tortured and killed and robbed their families and starved neighbors. English and American preachers and diplomats can accept the confessions at the Moscow Trials and complacently explain them as expressions of the peculiarities of the Russian soul; but Russians who knew and worked with the defendants understand that the confessions are fables of the N.K.V.D. French poets can rejoice at the unanimity of will shown by a Soviet election; but Russians know how that unanimity is obtained.

In 1939 the people of Eastern Poland hailed the Red Army as the liberator. But we know from much evidence that within a few

months or weeks the welcome had faded. So in the other dominated territories of eastern Europe. After the first flush, it was not the myth, but the terror and fears, and hopes for a berth in the very unmythical apparatus, that kept the people, or most of them, under the communist whip. The communist reality blights the communist myth. The myth is powerful, but with the power of a compelling mirage, not that of the substantial mountains.

8. *The International.* Unique, and very high among the power-assets of communism, is the international organization. No nation has at its disposal any force remotely comparable. The international sections are an incomparable intelligence bureau; they are the greatest propaganda body ever known or conceived; they are a permanent pressure group; and, when necessary, they can act, from within, as a military auxiliary. They function, in addition, to forestall, either by diverting or capturing or crushing them, independent, non-communist mass movements.

9. *Political leadership.* Perhaps the greatest single element of the strength of communism is the quality of its political leadership. World communism is headed by a large stratum of men whose entire lives are trained and dedicated to the pursuit of power. They study the problems of power with a concentration in which the objectivity of a research scientist is combined with the passion of a fanatic. Never before has an entire group of men been so conscious and deliberate about power. With the exception of a comparatively few individuals, the political leaders of the past, and the non-communist leaders of the present, have watered their political interests with other human concerns. The cross currents of family affection, or aesthetic sense, or friendship, of moral conscience or religious belief, of an idea moving freely under its own impulse, divert at least occasionally the tide of their political motivation.

But the communist leader is all political, all of the time. Neither wife nor child nor friend, neither beauty nor love nor pleasure nor knowledge cherished for its own sake, is allowed to deflect by even the smallest fraction of a degree the fixed direction of the communist will to power.

9. *Is a Communist World Empire Desirable?*

IT IS HARD for ordinary citizens to realize that there are in the United States, as in every other nation, thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of persons who believe that a communist World Empire is not merely possible but good. Some of them work actively for that Empire; others would welcome it; many more are prepared to accept it, if it comes. They believe that it would be what they would call "the solution."

On one point they are undoubtedly wiser than the rest. They see that the question of communist world rule is an issue which must be faced, about which a moral being ought to make a deliberate and plain decision. The communist World Empire is a part, the culminating part, not of the myth of communism, but of its blunt reality. It is not the vague possibility of a remotely future century, but a quite probable outcome for the present generation. What, then, is our moral ballot: For or Against? Is a communist World Empire desirable?

Such a question is always more complex than it appears. When we ask whether something is desirable, we must always presuppose certain assumptions in order that the question should be meaningful: desirable for whom, in relation to what standards, and in comparison to what possible alternatives? Even the Anopheles mosquito is desirable, if our standard is the ability to spread malaria.

Naturally, a communist victory is thought to be desirable by the communist leadership which would share in and benefit by that victory. Our reference must be to the majority of men, which is not communist.

This book has made its point of departure the problem of atomic weapons, taken in the historical context of the present stage in the development of civilizations. A basic conclusion was reached that only a monopoly of atomic weapons, which could be exercised only by what would be in effect a World Empire, could save Western

Civilization, and perhaps all organized human society, from destruction. Only a World Empire could, in that sense, "solve" the problem of atomic weapons.

It must, therefore, be recognized that the victory of a communist World Empire would solve this special problem from which we began. Though the communist Empire would not eliminate social violence, it would, by ending independent nations, end international wars. The communist rulers would hold the monopoly of atomic weapons. They would therefore no longer have as a motive for the general use of these weapons the fear that similar weapons would be used against them. Under those circumstances, there is reason to believe that the communist rulers would not consider it expedient to use the atomic weapons, or would at most use them on a limited scale.

These gains, even if rather negative, are mighty enough to be taken very seriously. If death is the immediate alternative we do not usually dispute with the surgeon when he tells us that an arm and a leg must go, to save life. We do not dispute even if we know that we will have to live on a plain, dull diet forever after, and that his fee will be our entire fortune.

What else, then, would a communist victory mean? And what are the costs that must be balanced against the gain? These we can estimate only by an appeal to experience: the historical experience of the communist movement, where it has been in full power, where it is now in the process of establishing full power, and where it has operated, on a narrower scale, within nations themselves not communist dominated.

The evidence does not seem to inform us conclusively about what material economic values would be realized through a communist world victory. Within Russia, a generation of communist rule has meant a definite lowering in the average real standard of living, at the same time that heavy industry has been considerably expanded. At the beginning of that generation, however, Russia was relatively backward industrially. The communists have, besides, had to operate within a hostile world political environment. We are not yet, I think, entitled to judge finally the economic possibilities of collectivized industry.

There seem, nevertheless, to be two special features of the specifically communist form of collectivization, both necessarily following from the nature of communism, that would always prevent a communist economy from raising the average standard of living: which would, that is to say, make it probable that a world communist economy would not increase the material well-being of the majority of mankind.

The central objective of communism is the conquest and maintenance of a monopoly of all power. From this there follows a complete subordination of economics to politics. The "natural" requirements of the economy—in terms of division of labor, organization of the productive process, balancing and integration of the various sections of industry and agriculture, some reference to *de facto* relations of supply and demand, and so on—are always handled with primary reference to strictly political ends. Building a new factory, locating a railroad, setting a production record in one department of a particular plant, installing or firing an engineer, planning new housing, allocating supplies, giving purges and decorations to economic villains or heroes, adjusting levels of wages and salaries and bonuses: these are all decided by their probable effect on the political monopoly. No doubt the classical economists have much overstated the naturalness of the natural economic laws. But it is a fact that technological and economic processes impose certain objective limiting conditions that must be accepted if the economy is to have any chance of functioning reasonably well. In a large enterprise, for example, you cannot attain maximum long-term output by staging, in one section of one department, a Stakhanovite stunt, which for a few days achieves a record output for that section at the expense of the equilibrium of the enterprise as a whole. When planning factories, you cannot disregard the location of coal mines or rivers or transport or housing or utilities or replacement facilities without raising real costs and thereby reducing potential output.

From the primary communist objective there follows, second, the necessity of complete economic centralization. Complete centralization is not inherent in modified forms of collectivization: many sections of the United States economy (such as, for example, the

T.V.A.) are collectivized without being integrated into a totally centralized economy. But centralization must be a feature of a communist collectivism, because decentralization would create potential economic bases of decentralized political power. Complete economic centralization means the attempt to direct the entire economy from a single authority (through Five Year Plans and similar devices). But it is humanly impossible that this should be done efficiently, not only for the world as a whole, but even within a single large nation. The attempt to do so results continually in economic distortions.

The probability that a world communist economy would not mean an increase in the average world standard of living—would mean quite possibly a decrease—is not, however, a fact of identical significance to all human beings. For the inhabitants of the more prosperous nations, such as, above all, the United States, it would almost certainly involve a radical decrease in living standards. On the other hand, more than half of the world's inhabitants, in India, China, Indonesia, Africa, central Brazil, are already at or below the minimum possible standard of life. Their material condition could hardly be further lowered, might even be somewhat improved.

For the greater part of the presently privileged classes in the non-communist world, a world communist economy would, of course, mean a drastically lowered standard where it did not bring, as it would in most cases, slavery or death. The new communized privileged classes—the managerial class of officials, bureaucrats, factory managers, functionaries of mass organizations, police and army leaders—would, in contrast, improve their relative material standards.

It is, thus, difficult to generalize about the desirability of a communist World Empire from the point of view of standard of living. Material standard of living is not, however, the only economic value. There are also the values of economic security and of various economic freedoms.

Communist propaganda claims that communist economy, by abolishing unemployment, gives everyone economic security. To the extent that this is true (and it is not strictly true), it has been correctly pointed out that the security is analogous to that existing within a prison. Much of the employment is in forced-labor camps

and slave gangs. All labor is tied serf-like to its assigned job. But the fact that everyone not only may but must work to live does not at all by itself mean "job-security." Not only all workers under communism, but all subjects of a communist state—even the members of the privileged strata—have in reality a maximum of insecurity in their jobs, because of the fact that political intervention may at any moment snatch them away to another job, or to purging, exile, or death.

At the same time, directly contrary to the propaganda myths, the communist economy eliminates every significant economic freedom. Deficient and often empty as economic freedoms have been under capitalism, they have at least included some measure of the rights to select or reject a given job, to quit, to start on one's own initiative a new line of work or new enterprise, the not inconsiderable right to fail without its being a penal offense, to criticize, organize, demonstrate and strike, to show numerous kinds of economic initiative. Besides these and other similar rights, there is the large and little recognized element of economic democracy which springs from the exercise of selective consumer preference: that is, by deciding, in the mass, what they wish to buy and not to buy, the general population, functioning as consumers, can direct, within limits but not inconsiderably, the course of economic enterprise.

Under communist economy, all of these rights and freedoms are done away with, and must be, for the same reason that compels total centralization. These freedoms interfere with deliberate centralized control. In the organizational forms which embody them, they provide foundations for potential political opposition. Under communism, there can be no independent organization of labor or of technical and administrative personnel. Each man in industry must be assigned to his job, and must change only with political permission. No one can, of his own volition, initiate any enterprise. Ostensible unions and technical associations must be agencies of the communist control, not of their members. No strikes or other independent labor demonstrations can be tolerated. The central direction, not consumer preference, must decide what will be produced. The relation of labor as a whole to the communist state becomes analogous to that of serfs to their feudal lord, without the mitigating

effect of feudal social and religious custom or the reciprocal obligations assumed by the lord toward his serfs.

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If material standards are not the whole of economic values, still less are economic values the whole of human values. The evidence from experience is that the world victory of communism would mean the destruction of all those values which have been most distinctively cherished in the tradition of Western Civilization, as well as of a number of still more general values which Western Civilization shares, in aspiration, with such other civilizations as the Chinese and Indian. I want to be sure that I am here understood to be making an objective prediction, not in any degree a flourish of rhetoric. I am stating a fact, not expressing an attitude.

I do not at all mean that Western Civilization, or any civilization, has ever adequately realized these values. I recognize, even, that their moral worth might be challenged, and that they might be judged better destroyed. Nevertheless, it is true that certain clusters of values have throughout the history of our culture functioned as at least partially operative ideals, and have thereby conditioned at least to some degree the forms of our social and individual life, and have defined our conceptions of the meaning and goal of humanity.

Chief among these ideals are those which assert the absolute value of the single human person, of the individual. In the tradition of Christianity, this is expressed through the doctrines of individual moral responsibility, guilt, conscience, and personal immortality, with the consequent conviction that personal salvation is the supreme goal of each human being. In the secular mode, similar attitudes are expressed in the doctrines of traditional democracy and liberalism. Applying these ideals, we derive, as guides and tests for the good life and the good society, the further values of personal freedoms and personal dignity.

Communist ideology and communist practice alike entail the destruction of these ideals of the supreme worth of the human person, of personal freedom and dignity. The subordination of the person to the collectivity, the state, the Party, the Revolution, the historic

process becomes not merely an occasional necessity but a highest duty and a permanent norm; and not merely the subordination but the degradation of the individual. It is not carelessness but settled policy and integral ideal that toss away millions of lives to achieve quick agricultural collectivization, or rapid industrialization, that in a purge sweep ten million individuals into slave labor, that fight a war with oceans of blood substituted for machines and strategy, that uproot millions—from the Baltic States or Poland or the Volga or the Sudetenland or the Ukraine—from their homes and families, that pass laws holding families responsible for individual crimes, that in the interests of immediate political tactic turn the workers of Germany or Austria over to Nazism without struggle, that sacrifice the people of Spain or China or of a thousand trade unions to the insistence on a communist monopoly of all power. The Moscow Show Trials revealed what has always been true of the communist morality: that it is not merely the material possessions or the life of the individual which must be subordinated, but his reputation, his conscience, his honor, his dignity. He must lie and grovel, cheat and inform and betray, for communism, as well as die. There is no restraint, no limit. The slave must not merely obey but praise his master; and the master is himself crushed in his own chains.

Our culture has, again, always held in one or another mode the ideal of an objective truth as the guide and goal, beyond the limits of our passions and interests, of our inquiries. In Christian theology this standard of truth appears as the archetypical ideas in the Divine Mind, the eternal laws of the universe decreed by the Omnipotent God. Throughout the secular tradition of post-Renaissance science, an analogous standard of truth is implicit in the humility before independent factual evidence that pervades scientific method. For communist doctrine and communist practice, truth, as merely another weapon in the class struggle, becomes a political tool. The Party can (as it has) declare the theory of relativity or the Mendelian laws of heredity false, because “counter-revolutionary,” as readily as it doctors statistics or re-writes history or invents a new childhood for Stalin. What communists call “mechanical logic”—that is, the rules of objective inference and proof, the rules that permit us to test for truth and falsity—is replaced by “dialectical logic.”

The law of dialectical logic is simply that whatever serves the interests of communist power is true.

Though, in our history and in all histories, might has no doubt in practice ordinarily determined what the laws decree to be right, we have always rebelled against the belief that might is in truth right, and have asserted in action as well as in thought the claims of a superior right against existing might. Antigone, appealing to the laws written in the stars against the might of Creon, is a heroine for us as well as for the Hellenes. But for communist ideology, as well as its action, the distinction itself is obliterated. The final proof offered that communist power is right, and all the means used to advance that power, is the proclaimed inevitability of communist triumph.

These, then, are among the costs that must be assessed against those gains which would result from the victory of a communist World Empire. If to some, and I think there are some, it will appear better that mankind should altogether perish than that communism should thus conquer, there will, I believe, be many, increasingly many persons in the United States and everywhere who will feel that these costs are not too high.

10 *The Main Line of World Politics*

THE GREAT CAPTAINS of military history, varied as they have been in every other respect, have all been noted for their grasp of what military writers call "the key to the situation." At each level of military struggle, from a brief skirmish to the grand strategy of a war or series of wars, they have understood that there is one crucial element which is this key to the situation. The key may be almost anything: a ford across a river, or a hill like Cemetery Ridge at Gettysburg; a swift blow at the enemy reserve, or the smashing of the enemy fleet as at Trafalgar or Salamis; stiff discipline on the flanks as at Cannæ, or a slow strangling blockade for an entire war; a long defensive delay to train an army or win an ally, or a surprise attack on a capital; control of the seas, the destruction of supplies, or the capture of a hero.

The great captain concentrates on the key to the situation. He simplifies, even over-simplifies, knowing that, though the key alone is not enough, without it he will never open the door. He may, if that is his temperament, concern himself also with a thousand details. He never allows details to distract his attention, to divert him from the key. Often he turns the details, which in quantitative bulk total much larger than the key, over to his subordinates. That is why the genius of the great captain is often not apparent to others. He may seem a mere figurehead, indolent, lethargic, letting the real work be done by those around him. They fail to comprehend that the secret of his genius is to know the key, to have it always in mind, and to reserve his supreme exertion for the key, for what decides the issue.

The principles of political struggle are identical with those of military struggle. Success in both political knowledge and political practice depends finally, as in military affairs, upon the grasp of the key to the situation. The exact moment for the insurrection, the one issue upon which the election will in reality revolve, the most vul-

nerable figure in the opposition's leadership, the deeply felt complaint that will rouse the masses, the particular concession that will clinch a coalition, the guarded silence that will permit an exposure to be forgotten, the exact bribe that will open up a new Middle Eastern sphere of influence, the precise hour for a great speech: at each stage and level of the political process there is just one element, or at most a very small number of elements, which determines, which decides.

The great political leader (who is often also a great captain)—Pericles or the elder Cato or Mohammed or Cæsar or Henry of Navarre or Bismarck or Hamilton or Lenin or Innocent III or the younger Pitt—focuses on the key. He feels whether it is a time for expansion or recovery, whether the opposition will be dismayed or stimulated by a vigorous attack, whether internal problems or external affairs are taking political precedence. He knows, in each political phase, what is the central challenge.

During the late 12th and for most of the 13th centuries, the Papacy struggled with the Hohenstaufen Empire, and concluded by destroying the Hohenstaufen. For all of Italy that struggle was in those times the key to the general political situation, no matter how it appeared to those whose political sense was distracted by temporary and episodic details. For the first generation of the 5th century B.C., the political key in the Aegean was the attempt of Persia to conquer the Hellenic world. All of the contests among the Greek states, and all their internal city squabbles, were in reality subordinate to the relation with Persia. For a generation in America, until it was decided by the Civil War, the key was the struggle for a united nation. Everything else in politics, foreign or domestic, was secondary. For Western Civilization as a whole at the turn of the 19th century, the key was the contest between England and France. England won, perhaps, because her governing class concentrated on the key, whereas Napoleon, only vaguely glimpsing the key with its shaft of sea power, dissipated his energies.

For a given nation, the political key is located sometimes among internal, sometimes among foreign affairs. For the United States, the key during most of its independent history has been internal: union or slavery or the opening of the West or industrialization or monopoly. For England, quite naturally, it has been more ordinarily,

though by no means always, an external relation. It may be the church or the army or the peasant problem, or, for a brief period, a spectacular scandal like the Dreyfus affair or the South Sea Bubble or Teapot Dome.

We have entered a period of history in which world politics take precedence over national and internal politics, and in which world politics literally involve the entire world. During this period, now and until this period ends with the settlement, one way or another, of the problems which determine the nature of the period, all of world politics, and all of what is most important in the internal politics of each nation, are oriented around the struggle for world power between Soviet-based communism and the United States. This is now the key to the political situation. Everything else is secondary, subordinate.

The key is, much of the time, hidden. The determining struggle is not apparent in the form of individual political issues, as they arise week by week. The deceptive surface is the cause of the political disorientation and futility of so many of the observers and actors, which so particularly infect the citizens and leaders of the United States. They base their ideas and actions on the temporary form of political events, not on the controlling reality.

Yugoslavia disputes with Italy over Trieste. Chiang Kai-shek fights with Chou En-lai over North China. Armenians begin to clamor for an independent Armenia. The new Philippine government confronts a revolt of the Hukbalahaps. Poland argues with Mexico in the Security Council. The French Cabinet calls for an immediate break with Franco. Harry Lundberg and the communists fight for control of the United States waterfront. The American Labor Party and the Liberal Party jockey for position in New York State. The British Communists apply for admission to the Labour Party. The World Federation of Trade Unions demands an official voice in the United Nations. The International Harvester Company objects to sending tractors to the Balkans. Japanese printers' unions refuse to set up editorials they don't like. Sweden signs a commercial agreement with Moscow. The United States asks for bases in Iceland or the Azores. Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania arm and succor Macedonian partisans. Joseph Clark Baldwin, ousted by the New

York Republicans, is endorsed by Vito Marcantonio. Australia objects to the veto power.

The eyes of the public become entangled in the many-colored surface. The exact ethnic complexion of Venezia Giulia is debated with ponderous statistics. Owen Lattimore proves at length that Chiang is not quite democratic and that many peasants support Yen-an. Arthur Upham Pope explains that there are reactionary landlords in Iran. Henry Wallace describes the geography of Siberia. *The Nation* catalogues the villainies of Franco. *PM* sturdily denounces the crimes of Greek Royalists. *The New Republic* gives the history of agricultural oppression in the Philippines. The innocent bystanders send in their dollars, join committees, and sign open letters.

The statistics and records and swarms of historical facts are admirable enough to have at hand. But by themselves they are shadows, ashes. If we do not look through them to the living body, the focal fire, we know nothing. If we do not grasp that Trieste and Thrace, and Armenia and Iran and North China and Sweden and Greece are the border marches between the communist power and the American power, and that all the statistics and records are filigree work on the historical structure, then we know nothing. We know less than nothing, and we fall into the trap which those who do know deliberately bait with all the statistics and records. It is their purpose to deceive us with the shadows and to prevent us from seeing the body. If we do not know that the American Labor Party has nothing to do with America or with Labor or with any of the issues stated in its program and speeches, but is simply a disguised colony of the communist power planted within the enemy territory, then, politically, we know nothing. If we do not understand that the World Federation of Trade Unions is merely a device manipulated by the N.K.V.D. to further the communist objective of infiltrating and demoralizing the opponents in the Third World War, then we have not begun to realize what is at issue in the world. The central point is not whether Chiang is a democrat—though that too is an important point—but that he is, in his own fashion, a shield of the United States against the thrust of communist power out of the Heartland. The debates in the Security Council are not really over the absurd procedural ritual that appears

on the surface of the minutes. The ritual is like a stylized formal dance reflecting in art the battle of the Titans.

Walter Lippmann, after a tour of Europe in the Spring of 1946, told us in a widely publicized series of articles that the main issue of world politics was the contest between England and the Soviet Union, which was coming to a head in the struggle over Germany. The United States he found to be in the comfortable position of an impartial umpire who could generously intervene to mediate and settle the dispute. Mr. Lippmann was right in insisting on the crucial present role of the fight for Germany. But one look at the political map of Europe, with a side-glance at the state of India and the British colonies, should be enough to demonstrate that England could not possibly stand up as principal in a challenge to the communist power. England in Germany, whatever her intentions, functions as a detachment of the greater power which is the only existing rival in the championship class. If it were really England, and if the pressure of the United States were withdrawn from the European arena, the decision over Germany would long since have been announced.

↳ The determining facts are merely these: Western Civilization has reached the stage in its development that calls for the creation of its Universal Empire. The technological and institutional character of Western Civilization is such that a Universal Empire of Western Civilization would necessarily at the same time be a World Empire. In the world there are only two power centers adequate to make a serious attempt to meet this challenge. The simultaneous existence of these two centers, and only these two, introduces into world political relationships an intolerable disequilibrium. The whole problem is made incomparably sharper and more immediate by the discovery of atomic weapons, and by the race between the two power centers for atomic supremacy, which, independently of all other historical considerations, could likewise be secured only through World Empire.

One of the two power centers is itself a child, a border area, of Western Civilization. For this reason, the United States, crude, awkward, semi-barbarian, nevertheless enters this irreconcilable conflict as the representative of Western culture. The other center, though it

has already subdued great areas and populations of the West, and though it has adapted for its own use many technological and organizational devices of the West, is alien to the West in origin and fundamental nature. Its victory would, therefore, signify the reduction of all Western society to the status of a subject colony. Once again, the settled peoples of the Plains would bow to the yoke of the erupting Nomads of the Steppes. This time the Nomads have taken care to equip themselves from the arsenal of the intended slaves. The horses and dogs have been transformed into tanks and bombs. And this time the Plains are the entire Earth.

Between the two great antagonists there is this other difference, that may decide. The communist power moves toward the climax self-consciously, deliberately. Its leaders understand what is at stake. They have made their choice. All their energies, their resources, their determination, are fixed on the goal. But the Western power gropes and lurches. Few of its leaders even want to understand. Like an adolescent plunged into his first great moral problem, it wishes, above all, to avoid the responsibility for choice. Genuine moral problems are, however, inescapable, and the refusal to make a choice is also a moral decision. If a child is drowning at our feet, to turn away is to decide, as fully as to save him or to push him under. It is not our individual minds or desires, but the condition of world society, that today poses for the Soviet Union, as representative of communism, and for the United States, as representative of Western Civilization, the issue of world leadership. No wish or thought of ours can charm this issue away.

This issue will be decided, and in our day. In the course of the decision, both of the present antagonists may, it is true, be destroyed. But one of them must be.

Part II

WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE

II. The Renunciation of Power

IF OUR SUPREME AIM were in truth to solve finally the problems of atomic weapons, of war and politics, to bring into the world a universal and permanent peace, then the way through which that aim might be fulfilled would not be obscure. The way, the only way, has been known for a long time. It has been repeatedly told to us in all the thousands of variations on the winged words that we link to the names of Christ and Buddha and Confucius and St. Francis and Lao-tse.

We may have peace, permanent peace, when, and only when, we are ready to renounce power, to renounce it totally, absolutely. This is the way, and there is no other way.

With the renunciation of power, the problems of politics, politics itself and war which is part of politics, cease even to exist, since politics is nothing but the struggle for power. But this can be only when the renunciation is total. So long as there is any impurity in our aim, so long as there is anything other than peace itself that we will not sacrifice, then the time will come when our wants will clash with the wants of others. We will be step by step driven to a judgment by force.

If I seek for nothing, I cannot lose in my search. If in my own soul there is no sense of material possession, then who can rob me? If liberty and family and life itself are as nothing to me beside the absolute sin of power, then who can enslave or oppress me? Through the renunciation of power, I become immune to power. Through absolute renunciation, I become absolutely free, because my freedom is of another kingdom, not of this world.

The renunciation of power has this peculiar distinction: that it is a revolution within the individual soul. It is thus a revolution that each individual human being can carry through for himself, to the end. I do not have to compromise and delay, to calculate probabilities, study social forces, educate and organize, wait for the world and thereby surrender to the world. I can act alone, because the source and end of the action, because the Kingdom of God, is within us.

There is, I think, a remarkable symptomatic significance in the revival of interest in mystical forms of religion which has become apparent in Western society during recent years. Religion which is organized into churches descends through the fact of social organization from the City of God into the City of the World. It is thereby enmeshed, necessarily, in the struggle for power. Mysticism, derived through the individual's inmost experience, alone with the Alone, joins naturally and invariably with the renunciation of power.

We find this movement toward mysticism expressed, to begin with, in those most sensitive of all historical barometers, the advanced intellectuals. Gerald Heard, Aldous Huxley, Ignazio Silone, Evelyn Waugh, are only better known names that represent a much wider stratum among the younger intellectuals of most of the Western nations. Within the ranks of the organized churches, both Catholic and Protestant, the same phenomenon is found, often rather disturbing to the established hierarchies. Part of the impulse in the rise of movements like the French Existentialism and Dolorism, the neo-Protestant turn toward Kierkegaard, the swing among some Catholic theologians away from Thomism toward (as a first step) Augustine and Platonism, is not unrelated. The impulse filters down and is commercialized by middlebrow writers who turn out books with a "mystical angle" that are chosen by the book societies and reach the top of the best seller lists.

Like everything else among us, mysticism becomes a racket. Few even of the best of the individuals who turn toward it win through to the end of the way; there is usually a Hollywood contract or a profitable anthology that pushes up in the mystic desert. These dregs of the City of the World should not, however, obscure for us the reality of this fresh flow of mysticism out of that spiritual well

which repeatedly, in periods analogous to ours, has sent its waters to the surface. Confronted with a social crisis which seems overwhelming in its proportions, which seems insurmountable by any means drawn from empirical analysis and practical calculation, men, or some men, seek to vault beyond the crisis through the way of mysticism and its total renunciation of power.

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The mystic revolution, for the individual who makes it, does solve, and solve permanently, the problems of politics and war and atomic weapons, as it solves every material problem. The world of matter, the social world, become *Maya*—illusion. The soul, drawn into the timeless reality of the mystic *Nirvana*, need no longer be troubled by the grotesque fantasies of *Maya*. Against this solution of him who has taken the mystic way, there can be no relevant argument.

Nevertheless, *Maya*, even if illusion, remains, for others, after its own fashion. The mystic is exempt from argument only while he stays within the mystic world of his own soul. When he speaks, or we still ask, about that other world of mountains and valleys and cities, of machines and nations and classes, we must still apply the severe and relentlessly non-mystical criteria of natural reason, if we want reliable answers to our questions.

These will readily enough indicate to us that the program of the renunciation of power, unassailable for the self-isolated individual, would solve the social and historical problems of politics and war only if everyone everywhere made the renunciation. For me, my own renunciation of power may be enough. But if my still worldly neighbor has not joined me in my renunciation, then robbery, cheating, exploitation, murder will still exist in the historical world if not in mine: his acts, namely against me. If all the people of the Argentine renounced power there would still, after all, be the Uruguayans, who would then think their neighbors only the easier picking.

The universal, total renunciation of power by human beings is not, perhaps, logically inconceivable. I do not think, however, that I need give detailed proof that it is so wildly improbable that its realization would be a miracle beyond all bounds even of imagina-

tive speculation. It would mean, as Arnold Toynbee notes, the transformation of human society to an entirely new level, at least as far removed from our type of civilization as this is removed from primitive culture. Perhaps, as Toynbee thinks, this transformation, foreshadowed by the teachings of the great religions and the lives of some of their saints, is the goal of human history. If so, it is a goal with which we have at present no contact, not even by the most delicate spiritual radar. We cannot, therefore, rely on its aid for our navigation.

Let us suppose that the persons not of the whole world but of a single nation renounced power absolutely. They would no longer, of course, be a nation, because a nation is itself a form of organized coercion and power. For them, we know in advance, it would mean a total enslavement. We should not, with historical experience before us, fool ourselves with the illusion that, because of the passivity of the slaves, this slavery would be less than the most harsh. Perhaps it would be better, morally better, to be thus enslaved, beaten, tortured, starved, than to take for defense to the sword—in particular to this horrible new sword which the nuclear physicists have fashioned for us. Perhaps we may even grant that if the people of a single great nation should freely make that sacrifice they would through their example, in time, in a very long time, draw behind them the other peoples of the world.

Nevertheless, the probable fact, so highly probable that it is a historical certainty, remains that this people does not exist. For the citizens of a single great nation to make the ultimate renunciation would be a miracle as much beyond any rational speculation as the miracle of universal renunciation. We can pray for miracles, but the wish for their occurrence cannot guide rational social thought or rational social practice. Miracles are what even theologians call Acts of Gratuitous Grace, which we neither deserve nor have the right to expect.

If, therefore, we wish to base our reasoning upon experience and the facts of the real world, we must give up the hope for a "permanent solution" of the problems of war and politics, in general and in the newly acute form these now take through the advent of atomic weapons. We know what the only possible permanent solution is.

We know that men are not going to accept that solution. When we nevertheless continue to adhere to the idea of a permanent solution, and when we construct a program in the light of that idea, we not only delude ourselves, but we fail to advance in the humbler task which is possible: the discovery of temporary and partial solutions. A man with a small business would be evidently foolish if he held out for non-existent million dollar propositions, and meanwhile went bankrupt through rejecting thousand dollar customers.

Nothing we can do will guarantee permanent peace. Nothing will make it certain that atomic weapons will not some day wipe out civilization and mankind. We can, however, take steps that will either postpone war, or make it less totally destructive, or give the best chance for a favorable outcome. If we cannot make certain that atomic weapons will not destroy us, we can at least take steps to make it less certain that they will. Moreover, in spite of widespread romantic notions to the contrary, it has always seemed to me that smaller, shorter and easier wars are, as a rule, better than bigger, longer and more difficult wars. And, if by "winning a war" we mean the outcome most favorable to what we believe in, it seems better to win a war than to lose it.

3

What is called "public opinion" is a set of changing ideas and feelings that are incompatible with each other. The ideas include truths, half-truths, and errors; the feelings mix good with vicious impulses. There are few individuals capable of the mystic way, with its renunciation of power, which is reserved, after all, for saints. Watered versions of the attitude which has led to the mystic search are, however, reflected today in the complex of "public opinion."

We constantly hear and read condemnation of "power politics." We are constantly told that the goal of national and international policy is, or ought to be, "peace." These two beliefs are at present accepted almost as axioms. They are always good for an editorial, a column, a speech, or a book on world affairs. They represent, however, a profound confusion, an insurmountable barrier to clarity in political analysis or adequacy in political proposals.

"Power politics" is the only kind of politics there is. The idea of

some sort of "politics" that would not be "power politics" is empty, self-contradictory. When someone condemns "power politics," it is a sign either that he doesn't know what politics is about, or that he is objecting to someone else's power politics while simultaneously camouflaging his own.

Equally mistaken is the idea that "peace" can be the controlling objective of political policy. Peace can be, as we have seen, the supreme objective of an individual person's moral life. It cannot be the dominant goal of an organized social group, such as a nation, because that would be the equivalent of a decision by the group to dissolve, to commit suicide. The group (a nation, for example) exists as an organized structure of institutionalized interests which bind together and define the members of the group. These interests are under continuous attack from corrosive influences within the group itself and from the external pressure of other groups. Some of these interests are secondary, and can be thwarted without major damage to the group as a distinct social entity. But if the major interests, and the institutions which embody them, are negated, then the group simply does not exist any longer. The nation, if a nation is in question, is absorbed into another nation, or its people are dispersed into the social wilderness. The individual human beings who previously constituted the nation may still exist; but the nation has disappeared.

To make peace the supreme objective of national policy would mean in effect to decide that the major interests and institutions—that is, the elements which make the nation a nation, which give it historical existence—will not be defended. Since the circumstances of social life make it certain that the pressures, both internal and external, against these interests and institutions will continue to operate, this decision would mark the cessation of the nation's "will to exist." At the first crisis, which would not be long delayed, such a nation would be obliterated. There have been a number of examples of nations which reached this point, and from there went on to oblivion. Modern France was perilously close to it in 1939-40, as was indicated by the half-cynical but widely mentioned French slogan of those days: "It is better to lose a war than to fight one."

Because peace cannot be the supreme objective of policy, it does

not follow, as some fascist theoreticians have argued, that war must be. Peace cannot be. War may be, and in the case of some nations, has been. What more strictly follows is merely that a nation (or any comparable social group) must be willing to fight. It must be willing to fight whenever those major interests and institutions, which define it as a distinct group and without which it would not exist as a nation, are seriously threatened. It may consider peace, among other things, as on the whole preferable, and therefore seek to prevent the occurrence of such a situation. But such situations will nevertheless occur. The nation must then be willing to fight, if necessary must in fact fight. Peace can never be more than the by-product of a policy which has, for the time being, succeeded in defending the major interests by means other than war.

It is a popular view that those persons who exhaust their rhetoric in denunciations of power politics and war, in pledges of allegiance to "understanding" and peace, are "moral," "idealistic," and "good"; whereas the unregenerate few who insist on analyzing politics in terms precisely of the struggle for power, who are less concerned with praising permanent peace than with securing a temporary truce or charting the course of an approaching war, are "cynical" and "bad." If we judge only in terms of subjective motivation, there may be something to be said for this view. It is perhaps a tribute to man's moral nature that he so often allows his conscience to blind him to reality. However, if our concern is with consequences rather than with motives, there is a case for the cynics. Unfortunately, we do not get rid of cancer by calling it indigestion.

It is advisable to observe, so far as consequences go, that the rhetoricians of peace are not the best servants of their own avowed cause. You do not eliminate the conflicts between nations and classes by denying their existence. You merely make it that much harder to discover actions that might eliminate or lessen, if they can be eliminated or lessened, those conflicts. You do not stop an approaching war by closing your eyes to it. You merely make it more likely that you will miss any chance there may be of averting it; and, if it does still come, that you will lose it. In practice, the transcendental ideals of the mystic renunciation of power, mixed into the vague impure medley of public opinion, result in self-deception

and irresponsibility. An impossible program is always irresponsible, because it cannot function in practice as a guide to real action. It ends up as an excuse for doing nothing, or as a cloak for doing something quite different from what the program advertises.

We have entered a period of history during which the attempt is to be made to organize world dominion, a World Empire. There are, however, only two power-groupings capable of making the attempt seriously: one led by communism with its Soviet base, and the other potentially under United States leadership. In these circumstances, there are only three general alternatives from which the choice of each person must be made. Even if he does not choose consciously and deliberately at all, or thinks in his own mind that he is choosing some fourth alternative, his actions in their practical consequences will favor one or another of just these three.

1. He may renounce power, and thus political life. If he does this genuinely and all the way, then the catastrophes of politics and war will be for him like the merely material catastrophes of avalanche or earthquake or tidal wave, without moral significance. They may, quite probably will, overwhelm his physical being, but he will be morally outside of them.

2. He may believe that a communist World Empire is the best solution. If he does and is morally consistent, then he should act to make the triumph of the communist Empire as quick and as painless as may be.

3. If he rejects the communist Empire, and is not prepared for ultimate renunciation, then there is nothing left for him—and this will happen, whether or not he wills it—but to join the attempt to block the communist Empire by the only means which historical circumstance has placed at our disposal.

Part III

WHAT COULD BE DONE

12. Political Aims and Social Facts

IT MAY BE that the course of history, of social and political life, is determined. It may be, in other words, that the laws of historical development are independent of any influence from human reason or voluntary human choice. The growth and decline of peoples, the rise and fall of civilizations, the spread and dissolution of churches, all may occur in some sequence that has no causal reference to our own rational nature. Many philosophers have thought so, and have traced the causal root of history to the Will of an Absolute God or to rainfall, to Destiny or Race or the accidental meetings of atoms.

If so, then all political debate and all discussion of social reform, all our arguments and supposed decisions about elections and wars and statutes and revolutions, are neurotic illusions, meaningless scrawls on a blank façade. All, then, that we could intelligibly do about history would be to contemplate it with a detached aesthetic interest.

This may be so, but we must, and we do, assume that it is not so. We believe, and we cannot help believing, that what we think and decide makes some difference to the course of history.

The question then arises: how much difference? We must beware of this assumption of ours. If we assume, and are perhaps justified in assuming, that our thoughts and decisions make some difference to history, it does not follow that they make very much difference. It is, indeed, fairly easy to demonstrate that they make, at most, very little difference. If we have any freedom in relation to the course of history, to political and social affairs, it is a narrowly restricted freedom.

Each of us, and each generation of us, comes into a world that is not our handiwork. From one point of view it is merely *there*, given as the scene and condition of our existence. We are not responsible for the stars or the oceans or the atoms, or for the density of the elements, the energy of nuclei, or the modes of operation of our own organism. Nor are we responsible for the houses that we find already built, the cities and factories and temples, the veins of ore that others have opened, the land that others have cleared, the tools and the machines that are the products of their ingenuity. No more are we responsible for the courts and armies and jails already functioning, the boundaries our fathers have drawn, the whole vast frame of thought and feeling, of science and myth and philosophy that reaches us out of the long past where we were not. The ponderous but moving weight of the world, the social as well as the material world, is, for us, a brute and alien fact. It is a snowball, not rolled by us, grown already monstrous when we come upon it, moving now under the compulsion of its own inertia. The most, surely, that we can propose to ourselves is to alter by a degree or two, with the lever of the mind, the direction or rate of its advance.

I think it was Machiavelli who first compared history to a river the main course of which we cannot hope to divert, which, when it is in violent flood, we cannot in the least resist. Our aim must be more humble, using a time when our river is more calm, so that "by banks, and fences, and other provisions [we may perhaps] correct it in such manner that when it swells again, it may be carried off by some canal, or the violence thereof rendered less licentious and destructive."

These general considerations have a relevance, which is often forgotten, to the problem of formulating a deliberate political program. They explain the sense in which most political programs are "utopian." They are utopian because they try to reverse the course of the river. Instead of accepting the inherited set of social facts, and studying how these may be given a new impetus, a partial redirection, the programs counter-charge head-on into the social facts. In that direct assault the programs are sure to be crushed, and the brute facts to conquer. Noble political longings for a past Golden

Age turn into the soured disillusion of the reactionary; abstract revolutionary idealism is transformed into tyranny.

Today in this country we are told by a growing number of persons who are identified by such names as "democratic agrarians" or "personalists," that industrial civilization has been a mistake, that we ought to do away with large cities, and return to a rural culture based upon unmechanized family-size farms. This program has, in the imagination of the distracted city-dweller, a nostalgic emotional appeal. It is similar, it may be noted, to the program of the Epicurean movement which flourished in a troubled period of Hellenic history analogous to the period in which we live. The sufficient comment on any such program is that it is impossible. Our cities and machines are not isolated accidents. They are integral phases of our entire social scheme and process. There is no magic in a noble moral impulse that enables us to wish away our past. The good agrarians do not, for instance, stop to reflect that their plan would mean the destruction of four-fifths of the population, in the (impossible) event that it should be put into effect. What happens in practice is what happened also with Epicureanism. The agrarian primitivism for the common man becomes the transfer of a few thousand sophisticated New Yorkers into the old farms of Pennsylvania and Connecticut, where they raise a few vegetables perhaps, and are supported by interest or dividends and by writings paid for by the city publishers.

Able and persuasive economists have of late been proving for us the dangers of economic collectivism. Their positive proposals are left vague; but the essential meaning is always a return to a genuine market economy and free enterprise. Again we must observe that their program is impossible. The free enterprise which they have in mind never did, as a matter of fact, exist anywhere. The actual economic relations of a century ago have vanished forever, together with the general social conditions which supported them. Collectivism need not, as I have argued, be identified with totalitarianism; but a large dose of some form of economic collectivism there is from now on certain to be.

The specific subject-matter of this book is the present situation in world politics. In Part I the character and tendencies of the present historical period have been analyzed. The general problem has been stated. The communist program—that is, the communist solution to the general problem—has been given.

The communist program is neither empty nor utopian. It is a genuine program because its political aims are in sufficient conformity with the social facts. The communists are wrong in believing that the victory of their aims is “inevitable,” but nothing in the social facts makes it impossible. Their program, moreover, does provide a solution to the general problem in the only sense that political problems are ever solved: a temporary and partial but still workable solution.

Any counter-program to the communists, if it is to be a genuine program, a guide to action, must meet the test of these same criteria. It must be in sufficient conformity to the social facts. It must actually solve, in a measure that would at least be workable, the general problem. We have seen, it should be remembered, that any solution of the present world political problem, which includes the problem of atomic weapons, must be such that it can be realized comparatively quickly.

We have been compelled, because it did not fulfill these criteria, to rule out voluntary World Government as a solution. We have had also to rule out any program the realization of which would have to wait for a future several generations or more distant. These last would include all programs which place their reliance upon the gradual spread of proper education, enlightenment, and moral improvement, since, from present indications, that spread is going to be very gradual; and all programs whose hopes rest on social forces that are now inconsiderable, since the development of these to a point where they can decisively influence history takes a long time.

To rule these programs out as solutions for the present world political problem does not, of course, mean to abandon them entirely. They may be adhered to for the long term. Meanwhile there is a short-term crisis that must be met if there is to be any long

term. You can't re-educate a wicked crew if it is going down, tonight, on the sinking ship.

The international programs of Americans usually have a good deal to say about the freedom and equality of all nations, large and small, the sanctity of treaties and international law, the rights of self-determination, and so on. All programs based on such conceptions are also hopeless in the present situation. They are hopeless because they, too, are completely at variance with social facts. History shows that treaties have never lasted, and have never done much more than symbolize temporarily existing power relationships. During this century they have all become nondescript scraps of paper. In serious matters, there cannot be international law when there is no world state to enforce it. For us, international law can only be what it was at Nuremberg (and what it would have been at Moscow and Washington if the other side had conquered): a cover for the will of the more powerful. We cannot make all nations equal by calling them equal, or writing their equality into the provisions of a Charter. They simply are not equal, and that settles the question. The so-called "revolts of small nations" at various international gatherings during the past few years are deceptions. The net effect is never anything but an expression of the alignments of small nations in relation to the great powers. All the fuss over the veto power in the United Nations is energy wasted. Whatever the Charter said, the Soviet Union and the United States would always have a *de facto* veto power, because either of them is alone immeasurably stronger than the United Nations. What an absurdity to think for a moment that Ecuador is equal to the United States, or Sweden equal to the Soviet Union! And what a preposterous absurdity to imagine that the crisis of world politics could ever be solved with the help of such juridical nonsense!

For whom can a counter-program to the communist program be intended? A program must be addressed to some audience. The policies it proposes would have to be implemented by some social agency. There is, however, only one suitable agency in the world, and no time for the creation of a new agency. A world policy for Ethiopia or Belgium or Siam, abstractly unassailable in all respects, would be meaningless, because nothing that Ethiopia and Belgium

and Siam can do will materially influence the world political crisis. The only possible policy will have to be implemented primarily through the United States government, because that government is the only agency which might in the next period of history channel a counter-power adequate to meet the challenge of the communist power.

This does not mean that the program need be directed toward the United States government alone. A world program presumably seeks to recommend itself as widely as possible to the peoples of the world—including in this instance, very prominently, the Russian people, who must on all occasions be so carefully distinguished from the Soviet regime: they are the primary victims of that regime, as they may prove to be the chief immediate instrument of its downfall. Such a program will profit also by the acceptance of governments other than the government of the United States. But its fate will be decided by the action of the United States. This is so because the fate of the world in this epoch will be decided by the United States. The United States alone is capable of drawing together and leading the forces that could prohibit the victory of world communism.

The aim of the present section of this book is, then, to answer the problem stated in Part I. Without reference to the question whether it ought to be done, or will be done, I shall describe *what could be done*. That is, I shall formulate, within the limits of the general criteria for any genuine political program, a specific program that is both possible to carry out, and adequate to answer—not by any means for all time, but for this historical period—the threat of atomic weapons and the need for world political organization. This program is thus in direct opposition to the communist program, which is also both possible and adequate. It will therefore presuppose a rejection of the communist program.

Because of the world political position of the United States, such a program can only be, first and primarily, a proposal of policy, in particular though not exclusively foreign policy, for the United States. It is therefore in terms of United States foreign policy that the program will be, for the most part, presented.

13. *The Break with the Past*

UNITED STATES foreign policy, from the points of view both of national interest and of the world crisis, has for a number of years been mistaken in conception, in method, and in content. The first requisite for a viable policy is, therefore, a sharp break with the past.

I

In the first place, the United States, most of the time, has not really had a foreign policy. What it means to have a policy is not clearly understood by many of the governmental leaders, or by the general public.

I observed, recently, a typical example of this confusion. I was asked to speak professionally, one night, at a meeting of a Republican committee. During my remarks, I mentioned that the Republican Party did not have a policy, and that it was mistaken in supposing that, without a policy, it could count on winning sustained mass support by organizational measures and the errors of its opponents. In the discussion that followed, several members of the audience not only agreed heartily that it was a fine thing to have a policy, but told me that the whole matter of policy would soon be taken care of. A dozen or two committees had been appointed, they said, and were busily gathering statistics on agriculture, foreign trade, labor, industry, banking, consumers, and what not. Before long they would have their reports in; these would be summarized and put together; and there would be the program and policy of the Republican Party.

It is admirable, granted, for political leaders to be acquainted with a maximum of factual information about all relevant subjects. These earnest committees, however, could dig away for the facts from now until eternity, and they would still not come to the surface with a policy. A policy is not a set of facts. It is a proposal to do

something about facts. If the proposal is intelligent, it will naturally take the facts—enough of them, which is much less than all—into account; but if it is limited to the facts, then it is not a policy.

A national policy on agriculture does not mean all the detailed mass of data about farms and farming and farmers in this country and in the world. It means a general directive, or small group of inter-related directives, which points to a goal, and which can serve as a guide to political action. The objective might be, for instance: to improve (or worsen) the economic position of farmers relative to the rest of the population; to increase (or decrease) total agricultural production; to shift from small-scale to large-scale farming, or from private to collective farming; to make some major change in the kind of crops grown, and so on; or it might be a combination of several such general objectives, so long as they are consistent with each other. Presumably a policy of this kind ought not to be adopted without a sufficient knowledge of agricultural conditions, and without relating agricultural policy to the national interests as a whole. Nevertheless, the facts by themselves cannot decide the policy. Indeed, we do not know what facts are relevant, what facts to look for, unless we are thinking in terms of policy.

On the other hand, policy should not be confused with the specific means that are used to carry out the policy. If our agricultural policy were to improve the relative economic position of the farmers, we might try to do so by manipulating prices, changing tariffs, giving subsidies and bounties, promoting more efficient methods of production, lightening farm taxes and increasing city taxes, opening new export markets, squeezing processors and middle men, and so on, or by some combination of these. Any one of these particular means, however, is "policy" only in a secondary sense. To make sense, it has to be related to an over-all policy, consistent and fairly simple in conception. Otherwise, the various means will very likely have opposite effects, cancel each other out, and lead nowhere but to confusion. This, it may be added, is a result by no means infrequent in this country's conduct of its affairs.

What I have been saying applies directly to the problem of foreign policy. It is imagined that the nation can have a "sound foreign policy" by setting up, in the State Department, a "Yugoslavian desk"

and an "Argentine desk" and a "Siamese" and forty other "desks"; and then grouping these desks together according to elegant and complicated charts until, at the top of the page, you have presumably The World, presided over by the Secretary of State, as deputy for the President.

Linked to each desk, at home and in the field, will be specialists, experts and research assistants, who will have at their fingertips all the facts about their respective provinces. Then, by consulting the appropriate file or the appropriate specialist, you will automatically have the answer to any political question that arises anywhere.

Under the guidance of no-policy, you will treat each separate problem "on its own merits." Canada wants too high a price for copper, so you will switch to South Africa. The communist Polish government promises democratic elections, so you will throw the London Poles out of the window. Perón is rude to Braden, so you denounce Argentina in an official Blue Book. England must export to live, so you make them haggle over interest rates on a government loan. Jewish votes may decide the next election in the key States, so you indulge your demagogic talents on Zionism. The Russians threaten to get cross, so you reject your own man and take Lie as Secretary General of the United Nations. Chiang Kai-shek is not as democratic as he might be, so you tell him he must take communists into his government. The communists want to kill all their political opponents, so you obligingly turn over to them all who they claim are "Soviet citizens" and all whom they accuse—accuse only—of "anti-Soviet acts." Franco is a bad man, so one day you condemn him in terms that ought to mean immediate war, and the next you prevent any serious action being taken against him. One day you think Japan should be rebuilt as a buffer against Soviet expansion, and the next that Japan should never again have a soldier or a sailor or an acre of heavy industry. You won't recognize a friendly French government because it was never officially elected; but you will recognize a government installed by Red Army bayonets because it is a "democratic coalition"—that is, it contains, besides avowed communists, disguised communists or communist-captives using the labels of three or four parties. You won't ask the Spanish govern-

ment to join the United Nations because it is undemocratic; and you hand over half the world to the most undemocratic government that has ever existed.

It all adds up to approximately nothing at all. Without a policy, the most perfectly designed and functioning apparatus in the world is as useless as tubes, canvas, easel and brushes without an artist. To have a foreign policy would mean for the nation to know what it wants in the world, where it intends to go. Without a policy, the desks and bureaus and divisions and specialists and consuls and diplomats are like the limbs and joints of a puppet, pulled and twisted by a thousand unrelated and conflicting strings. A policy is a central nervous system, and living blood, pumped from a living heart through every artery and vein, integrating into a vital whole a purposive organism.

From the point of view of a genuine foreign policy, you cannot isolate each separate problem, and treat it on its own merits, because you understand that the merits of each problem can be judged only in their relation to the whole. Without policy, separate decisions are at cross purposes and get nowhere, or perhaps lead insensibly in a direction opposite to our desires. Informed and organized by a coherent policy, each decision counts, and moves a step forward in a general advance.

In former times there was no world polity. That is, active political relationships for most or even all nations did not entangle them with all the world, but only with their neighbors or special regions where they had special interests. Today every considerable nation is in continuous political relationship with every other nation and region; every political event of any significance has its effects spread everywhere. Foreign policy today, therefore, cannot be divided into "policy toward Portugal," "policy toward Peru," "policy toward Italy." There must be as a directing conception a world policy. What is the aim and the objective, not in relation to this or that problem or this or that individual nation, but in and for the world as whole? This is the first and last question that foreign policy today must answer.

We should further note that a foreign policy does not mean some special jewel locked in a top-secret box of the State Department. The

State Department, plainly, has the principal direct concern with foreign policy. But an adequate foreign policy must be the policy of the entire government, of all its agencies, and for that matter of the entire nation. There must be one and the same policy directing all relevant activities of the Departments of War and the Navy and Agriculture and Commerce, of the Treasury and the Export-Import Bank and the Civil Aeronautics Board and the other great agencies and bureaus. In addition, the people, especially the organized groups of citizens, must be won to an understanding and acceptance of the policy. If not, then there is only the mixed discord of dozens of sub-policies whose sum is no-policy.

Moreover, since today foreign policy takes precedence over internal policy, since the world political problem is the key to the situation, is what decides, it follows that it is impossible to have a coherent and effective internal policy without having a coherent and effective foreign policy. All major domestic questions—synthetic rubber or labor or inflation or anti-Semitism or civil liberties or food production—are today dependent upon world political questions.

To have a domestic policy we must have a foreign policy. To have any policy, we must begin by knowing what a policy is.

2

A foreign policy, and an altogether correct policy, would still be of no use if it were not properly implemented. To put policy into practice, there must be men, with sufficient means.

It is not my intention to discuss the deficiencies, in personnel, training and facilities, of what might be called—since it includes more than the State Department—the “political department” of the government. These are due in part to historical and social characteristics of the country as a whole. We have not developed a large class of persons trained in the required fields of knowledge and skills, from which class the government might draw. Nor does Congress, public opinion, or the State Department itself yet realize that the world political tasks, in intelligence, information, propaganda, negotiation, scientific research, and the rest, make ridiculously small the resources in men, money and physical facilities now devoted to

them. It is true that better could be done with what is at hand. It is not necessary to accept the abundant self-confidence of a Wisconsin lawyer or even the experience of a reasonably successful military administrator as perfect qualifications for dealing with the shrewdest politicians in history.

I wish, again, merely to note the fact that the carrying out of any given foreign policy demands certain correlated measures in connection with the armed forces and industry. Granted the policy, the determination of just what these measures should be is a technical problem. Difficult as it is in this country to get such measures put into effect, no special political question is involved.

I should, however, like to direct particular attention to one factor in the implementation of policy which itself has a reciprocal influence on the nature of the policy.

A policy has to be administered and put into effect by human beings. In order that the policy should be in practice the operating principle of the government, the human beings who administer it must act in accordance with it. They must be, that is, loyal to the policy.

To guarantee such loyalty, reliance cannot be put upon mere verbal pledges, or even upon honest intentions. Human beings too easily deceive themselves. If the whole pattern of a man's life and thinking runs counter to the policy, he cannot, objectively, be relied on to implement it effectively.

Let me illustrate. If United States foreign policy included the perspective of achieving union with Great Britain, it would not be well advised to appoint Colonel Robert McCormick as Ambassador to the Court of St. James's; nor would Senator Bilbo be the best choice as Minister to Liberia. If these examples seem absurd, they are no more so than the frequent practice of recent years. There was no reason to expect objective information on the situation in Yugoslavia when Communist Party members were planted along the chain of intelligence, and sat in an office which funneled secret news. Henry Wallace does not seem the most adequate of reporters on Soviet Siberia. Can Owen Lattimore, whose writings have in recent years proved his adherence to views on China that are often hardly distinguishable from those of the communists, be a suitable instru-

ment for a policy of supporting Chiang? Is there any point in setting up a Russian desk in an intelligence unit, or a magazine to present the American point of view in Moscow, and then running them under the influence of communist fellow-travelers? What kind of propaganda will an O.W.I. put out, what kind of information on European undergrounds will an O.S.S. receive, when key spots throughout their organization are accessible to Communist Party members, fellow-travelers, sympathizers, and dupes? Why should Negrín, leader of a Spanish faction controlled by the communists, be received at the State Department, but the leaders of the Spanish anti-communist refugee parties and organizations be refused admittance? Lombardo Toledano, spearheading communist penetration of Latin America, has for years been courted and aided by officials of the United States government, as part, presumably, of the policy of Continental solidarity. In Germany, the selection of men for both civilian and military jobs of the occupation has often disregarded prior and deep-seated ideological commitments, so that the policies, confused enough to begin with, have repeatedly been reversed in practice.

The point here is so obvious, that the question cannot help arising: why does this happen? We accept the principle that our very postmasters—whose technically important function is after all not very crucial for the political destiny of the nation—should be not merely undividedly American in outlook but members of the Party in power. Yet we so often entrust the implementation of our foreign policy, upon which our fate and that of the world directly depend, to those who, if they do not deliberately sabotage, are hindered by ingrained mental habit from properly carrying out the policy.

The explanation is, I think, threefold. This happens, in the first place, as a result of ignorance. The appointing officials do not know, and do not take pains to discover, the habitual commitments of their subordinates. This can, of course, occur in connection with any policy at any time. There is a more profound ignorance, however, that affects operations in the present period. The appointing officials do not understand what it means for a person to have, or to be strongly influenced by, a totalitarian ideology. Their own political

ideas occupy a special compartment of their minds. They are convinced, patriotic Americans, and are ready to change their ideas if they feel the national interest requires change. They assume that other citizens, in spite of differences in detail, think and believe and feel pretty much as they do. They know that they themselves will loyally carry out the policy decided upon, even if they do not altogether agree with it. And they suppose that other citizens will behave as they do. They cannot comprehend that a totalitarian ideology is a *Weltanschauung*—a world view and a life view, affecting the inner core of one's intellectual and moral being. It cannot be tossed in the basket, as one discards a soiled shirt. It is the fixed lens through which the believer sees the world, the lever by which he hopes to change it. As long as he remains even partially under the ideological spell, the believer will necessarily, even in spite of his own subjective wish, act in accordance with the dictates of the ideology, and will press into its frame any policy whatsoever.

Second, the communists and their friends are wonderfully skillful. Under the cover of their myriad disguises, they can edge through even the best guarded gates. They can hide quietly, like a dormant germ in the unnoticed marrow, and the organic repercussions of their activities can spread so far before discovery that a cure is neither quick nor easy.

A third cause of this tendency to defeat policy by putting its execution into the hands of men who cannot be counted on is, perhaps, a confusion about the application of democratic procedures. Many Americans, including many of our political leaders, feel that a clear, firm policy is anti-democratic because, if it is clear and firm, there will always be persons who sharply disagree with it. They feel that it is dictatorial to dismiss a man from a post because of a disagreement over policy—though they will not hesitate to appoint or dismiss if the result can be counted in votes. It is true, of course, that a democratic nation must permit, in the nation as a whole, the expression of opposition policy, and must, periodically, ascertain the will of the people with respect to leadership and policy. It does not in the least follow that there is any democratic rule against the vigorous execution of what is, for the time being, the national policy. If an opposition doesn't like it, and has a different policy, that is

just the bad luck of being an opposition. It will have to wait its turn to take over.

An ordinary business corporation would certainly not permit officers, salesmen and supervisory employees to decide, each man for himself, whether he will carry out the general plan of operations that the corporation has adopted. Anyone who failed to do so would be fired. If there were reason to think, on the basis of past experience, that someone was incapable of going along with a new plan, he would be fired in advance. No one, not even the victims, would find that surprising.

It is not a question of being democratic, but of being effective. If democracy cannot be made reasonably effective, it might as well quit now.

3

Of course, however, it is the content of the policy that most of all matters. In content also, the first condition for a United States foreign policy that could work is a sharp break with the past.

During the middle of the '30's, first publicly indicated by Roosevelt's Chicago speech in October, 1937, the policy of the government, so far as it had any policy at all, came to be based upon the following central ideas: Nazi Germany was the main danger to the national interest and to the kind of world political organization that the United States wanted. Japan, though secondary in the world as a whole, was the main threat to the preferred organization of the Pacific. Therefore Germany and Japan had to be stopped.

I do not propose to examine these ideas of a decade ago. I believe that, though they were not altogether false, they were understood in so vague and confused a manner that they became disorienting. In any case, the United States acted in accordance with them. The result should apparently have been the occasion for one hundred percent rejoicing. Not only was the immediate danger removed. Germany and Japan have been so crushed that neither can ever again, in all probability, play a major *independent* role in world politics. The foreign policy adopted in the '30's has, thus, triumphantly succeeded.

It is unnecessary to stress how bitter is the flavor of this success.

World communism is today in an immensely stronger position than Germany or Japan ever was, and is a far more direct and powerful threat to the interests of the United States. The world political situation as a whole is immeasurably worse than that of a decade ago. Something plainly went wrong.

Insofar as deliberate policy had anything to do with this unhappy consequence, it is obvious enough what went wrong. The mistake lay primarily in a completely false estimate of communism and therefore also of the communist dominated Soviet Union.

It was thought that communism's revolutionary ideology had degenerated into a pious verbal racket used to help Russia's new rulers stay in power. It was believed that the Soviet Union could be not merely a helpful but a loyal ally in the war, that it would be grateful for assistance received, and that it would honor its pledges. Viewed through the spectacles of this false estimate, Russia was found to be growing more democratic and more normal. She was going "to resume her rightful place in the family of nations." With Germany and Japan out of the way, the world could be reorganized for lasting peace and prosperity under the harmonious joint leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union, with Great Britain a junior stockholder, France and China granted prestige posts on the Board of Directors, and the little nations given a forum where they could harmlessly blow off steam.

As the blots on this pretty blueprint began to spread, the policy did not alter. The Russians were "suspicious," sometimes a bit rude, and not always duly appreciative of the favors with which they were showered. It became fashionable to say that the main problem of postwar world politics was "how to get along with Russia." As soon as the United States and the Soviet Union learned how to get along together, and they certainly would do so soon, one way or another, then everything would be solved. If we gave enough proofs of our own good intentions, the Soviet leaders' suspicions would evaporate, and the troubles would be over.

In the Spring of 1946, United States policy seemed to many to have somewhat shifted. Undiluted appeasement was mixed with a dash of what many believed to be, and called, "getting tough with Russia." This shift, however, is of trivial importance. Primarily it is

a shift in political rhetoric, not in political reality. No law of foreign policy is better founded than this: that there is no use talking tough unless you are ready to act tough. Nobody is fooled. For that matter, there is no use talking tough in any case. So far, the tough talk does not seem to have proved much of a hindrance to the communist plans. Even if a little real toughness were added, this would still not mark any change in the fundamental estimate and perspective. It would be merely a minor change in tactics, after discouragement with the results of the tactic of total appeasement.

What is wrong is not this or that tactic, but the basic idea. This idea is that, by some means or combination of means, you must and will solve the problems of world politics by "getting along with Russia," and this is interpreted to mean getting along not with the Russian people—who could be friendly enough—but with the communist regime which now dominates Russia. But the truth, which we have analyzed with some care in Part I, is that you can get along with communism in only one way: by capitulating to it.

14. *The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Defensive*

WE SEEK, THEN, to formulate a policy which the United States could follow, and which would be adequate to the demands of the present world political crisis. Though it might be phrased in a variety of ways, there is only one such policy. I shall restrict the present chapter to a statement of the negative or defensive phase of the policy, and reserve the positive or offensive phase for the next chapter. This separation is somewhat arbitrary. Defensive and offensive measures are, after all, only differing tactical applications of a single general strategy. However, the distinction is useful for analysis and exposition.

The nature of a defensive policy is not an independent problem. A proper defense is derivative from the policy of the opponent, and is designed to block the fulfillment of that policy. If, therefore, we have discovered the opponent's policy, we have thereby indirectly learned also the objective of defense. Carrying out the defense may be difficult in practice, or even impossible, but we will at least have the great advantage of knowing what we are trying to do. If our vegetables are under attack from woodchucks, a fence around the garden will be a suitable protection. If the attack is from insects or birds, however, the fence will be irrelevant.

For the United States, we know that the opponent is world communism. We know that the ultimate communist aim is a communist World Empire. Therefore, the general defensive goal of United States policy must be to prevent the fulfillment of that aim. In Chapter 7, we saw that this communist policy, in this present period which they interpret as the period of preparation for the open stage of the Third World War, reduces to two specific tasks: consolidation of effective domination of Eurasia, and the infiltration and

weakening of all countries which cannot be brought under communist control.

The specific defensive goals of United States foreign policy in the same period can, therefore, only be: to block communist domination of Eurasia, and to combat the infiltration.

The communist drive out of the Heartland toward Eurasian dominance proceeds, by way of the natural exits, in three general directions. It plunges Westward into the European peninsula, across the plains of Poland and Eastern Germany, with flanking movements on the North via Scandinavia, and to the Southwest through the Hungarian gap and up the Danube valley. It presses South, down by way of the Iranian plateau, Southwest toward the Dardanelles, the Aegean and the Adriatic, Southeast into Afghanistan—waiting for disintegration of the Indian political situation for bigger moves toward India. Eastward, it marches on the Northern flanks of the Eastern Coastland of Eurasia, through the exits into Manchuria, Sinkiang and Mongolia, with all of China below.

The Coastlands of the Eurasian World Island (to continue with Mackinder's phraseology), though gravely threatened through the breaches already opened, are not yet in communist hands. The first part of the Eurasian defensive task is then to secure and hold these Coastlands. United States policy must aim to prevent the European peninsula, Greece, the Middle East, China, India from being incorporated within the communist Eurasian fortress, and must recognize Japan as an American outpost off the shores of the World Island.

Communist control, though powerful, is not yet totally established in most areas outside of the 1940 Soviet boundaries. Defensive policy, here merging with offensive, must therefore strive to undermine communist power in East Europe, northern Iran, Afghanistan, Manchuria, northern Korea and China. The further, and implicitly offensive object of the defensive policy would thus be to reverse the direction of the thrust from the Heartland, turning the expansive advance into a demoralizing retreat.

I shall, in this chapter, make only occasional reference to the second defensive task of combating communist infiltration in those parts of the world neither dominated nor immediately threatened at the present time by outright communist control. What this second

task means, and the ways in which it could be accomplished if it were taken seriously, are for that matter fairly obvious. It may be added that one of the most fruitful of these ways of lessening communist influence everywhere in the world—including very prominently Russia itself—would be by a notable success in the first (Eurasian) defensive task. Communism in disorderly retreat in Eurasia would prove much less appealing than communism in bold advance.

* * *

Two comments might be made on the defensive policy which has just been summarized.

In the first place, the policy might seem so obvious that it should be taken for granted without even the bother of stating it. Now I confess that, judged in terms of the interests of the United States and of a workable solution for the world political crisis, it does seem to me almost too obvious to need discussion. Nevertheless, the evidence proves that during recent years and at present it has not been and is not United States policy.

During many of these years United States policy has been exactly the opposite: it has not hindered but furthered communist expansion on Eurasia; it has not combated but aided communist infiltration all over the world, beginning with the United States itself.

Furthermore, though this defensive task has occasionally or in the minds of some leaders been *part* of United States policy, it has never been accepted as the defensive phase of the *supreme* policy objective. This latter qualification is essential. Where the policy has been accepted at all, it has always been as only one job among others of approximately equal rank. Along with it there goes the need, it is figured, of beating out England in the race for markets, of preventing a third resurgence of Germany or a second of Japan, of capturing the bulk of the world merchant marine and air business, of overthrowing Franco, of indulging one's emotions about India or the East Indies, and so on. Success in the great defensive task, however, would require that all such other matters be considered secondary, that what is done about them be subordinated to the interests of the chief aim. The main present danger is not England or Franco or German resurgence; these are not even remote dangers.

The main goal is not a few extra millions of profit in oil or transport. These today are trivialities, and should be so treated.

Moreover, we must keep in mind that the whole isolationist tradition, still very influential, denies that the United States should have any Eurasian policy at all. The isolationists have branched out a bit, and are willing to include all of the Americas and much of the Pacific in the home garden. But, they tell us, not a step outside. For honest American farmers, there is nothing but trouble ahead in those barbarian Eurasian jungles. What does it matter, anyway, who runs things over there? Let them go to the devil their own way.

So, apparently, the policy is not obvious.

A second and more gloomy comment would be made by many who would grant the desirability of such a defensive policy, but who would argue that it is already too late. There is nothing that the United States can do about the communist strategy. If it fails, it will be by a miracle, a stroke of luck.

I shall amplify the meaning of the defensive policy and evaluate these comments by examining a few selected but typical errors of the recent past, and certain possibilities of the near future.

2

In Yugoslavia, the United States, along with England, had a choice between Mikhailovitch and Tito. As political choices go, this one was unusually free. They chose Tito.

It is hard to imagine a more utter political mistake than this choice of Tito. Mikhailovitch was a well-known Yugoslavian patriot, supported by the overwhelming majority of the population. Tito was a communist agent from the outside, who had collaborated with the Nazis during the period of the German-Soviet Pact, and who had, when the Soviet war began, only a handful of followers, most of them Communist Party members. Mikhailovitch, with support and direction, could be relied on to fight the Nazis (as he did even without support and direction), and, equally, to resist communist domination of his country and the rest of the Balkans. Naturally the Soviet Union pressed hard for Tito. But at the time the choice was made, there was not the slightest need for a concession. The Red

Army was fighting for its life thousands of miles away. Russia could not have quit the war then, over the issue of Tito.

But Tito was chosen and Mikhailovitch was abandoned, betrayed and permitted to be degraded and shot through the mechanism of a standard communist show trial.

The choice of Tito was equivalent to handing over the Balkans to the communists. The Balkans might have been lost anyway—and they may still some day be regained—but if support had gone to Mikhailovitch, the odds would have been far more favorable.

The political consequences of such an act, however, are much wider than the direct losses or gains in territory. Men everywhere, caught in the storm of the world struggle, note, and draw conclusions. The communists back their friends and allies, to the limit. The United States has trouble telling friend from enemy, and cannot be relied upon.

There is evidence that part of the cause of the choice of Tito was direct sabotage by communists and fellow-travelers in the American and British Balkans intelligence services. Misinformation about the Yugoslavian situation and the nature of Tito's government was successfully palmed off on the Anglo-American military and political leadership. This sabotage is even being offered by some supporters of Churchill and Roosevelt as an excuse for the error. It is a poor excuse, since it is an additional error of the leadership that there were communists in the intelligence services, and a glaring error whenever reports that have filtered through communists or their sympathizers are believed without independent confirmation. However, the misinformation was not the chief cause. This is to be traced to false policy, the false estimate of communism and its aims, the false analysis of world political realities.

* * *

The Paris Conference, in the summer of 1946, proved unable to settle the Trieste issue. It will not be settled, even if the attempt is made to carry out a nominal compromise agreement, signed by the representatives of the Big Four.

What is at stake in Trieste? Trieste is the great outlet to the Mediterranean and the South from the Danube valley. Supported

by the Dalmatian and the Albanian coasts, it controls the Adriatic, outflanks Italy from the East, Greece from the North and West, and potentially opens into the central Mediterranean. The communist power seeks this key point, either outright as demanded through Tito, or more gradually and indirectly through a phony internationalization.

Could anything have been done—could anything still be done—about Trieste? The answer is so plain and simple that it must make many an honest general weep. The Anglo-American armies control Italy; their fleets control the Mediterranean; their air forces control, or could control, the skies of Europe. All that would have been needed would have been an Anglo-American decision that Trieste and its surrounding zone were to remain Italian, together with an open readiness to enforce that decision. Who would have challenged it? Who would challenge it? In the remote chance that it would be challenged, what challenge could be easier and cheaper to meet?

The Trieste issue is related, of course, to the Italian problem as a whole. The major troubles over the Italian Treaty (in which a Trieste ruling is supposed to be included) are all of them absurd. It is not a lack of ability that has made impossible a settlement of the Italian question that would be in accord with American (and also English) interests. It is a lack of policy, adherence to the false policy of "getting along with Russia." All the months of negotiations, always ending with concession to the communists of the substance of issues in return for their concession of a few empty words, could have been avoided by a brief United States declaration that it was ready to write and sign its own treaty with Italy regardless of whether anyone else signed. If the Soviet Union had chosen to keep its pen sheathed, all the better. The United States could then have proceeded unhampered to promote the integration of a non-communist Italy into the still non-communist half of Europe.

* * *

Roosevelt and other United States negotiators, through secret agreements not yet fully disclosed, ceded to the communists in the Far East the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, control over the very important warm water ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, the occupa-

tion of Manchuria and the fuller occupation of northern Korea. What gave them the right to make these cessions is not entirely clear. Perhaps they reasoned it was the Atlantic Charter. That, however, is, from the point of view of politics, a lesser question than: why did they make the cessions? and what results from them?

We are told that they were made as part of the price for getting the Soviet Union to promise to come into the Japanese War after the end of fighting in Europe. The promise, as we know, was kept. The additional question arises: why did they want the Soviet Union to come into the Japanese war?

By the time these agreements were entered into, it must have been clear to the United States General Staff that the war with Japan could be won without any help from the Soviet Union, which, after the Soviet losses in the West, was not going to amount to much in any case. It was clear by then to most of the Japanese leadership. The objective of United States policy should have been to keep the communists out of that war, not to ask them in. Once again, the United States was actively furthering the advance of the communist power out of the Heartland toward Eurasian domination. With these new Eastern positions, added to what it already had and what it is strengthening with their help, communism flanks China, the American outpost of Japan, and for that matter America itself. This was indeed a remarkable piece of political bargaining, to pay someone a stiff price to hit you a stiff blow.

In reality, Roosevelt was led to this deal not by objective military considerations, but by his policy. It was part of the process of collaborating with Russia—politically, not merely militarily, which latter was dictated by the immediate facts of war—and of easing her re-entry into the family of nations. Having all been through the same wars together, it will be that much easier to have peace together. China is a country with a great future, so we want our friend Russia to co-operate with us and the Chinese themselves in developing it.

* * *

It is known that the United States and Great Britain considered at length and with care the advisability of directing the major in-

vasion of Europe through the Balkans. It would be rash for a layman to pass judgment on the strictly military merits of that plan compared with those plans that were actually adopted. Nevertheless, it is reported, and nowhere denied, that many leading officers both of the British and American commands favored, or were ready to accept, the strategy of a Balkan invasion. If we take into account the preparation for European invasion by the grinding of the German army in the East, the bombing of the Continent, and the overwhelming weight of the invasion forces that were assembled, there seems good reason to believe that the Balkan invasion would have been successful, though it is impossible to be sure whether it would have been more or less expensive.

It is understood that the final decision against the Balkan plan was made by Roosevelt, as the United States political leader. All the evidence thus indicates that the primary motivation for the decision was once again not military but political. The pattern is the same that appears so often. The Soviet Union did not want Anglo-American armies in the Balkans, because she had her own plans for the Balkans. She brought her pressure to bear, not only in the secret meetings, but through the world-wide propaganda drive for a "second front," by which, she made clear, she meant only a new front in France. Acting in consistent accord with the policy of getting along with Russia, of building a new world through Soviet-American friendship, the United States made the same political choice that she had made when she abandoned Mikhailovitch for Tito. The communist expansion into Europe was not merely permitted, not resisted, but it was actively promoted by United States policy.

Even without a major Balkan invasion, there is reason to believe that the Red Army could have been kept out. The German Balkan armies were, apparently, ready to surrender before they did, on the condition that the surrender would be to the Anglo-American, not the communist forces. Eighty million human beings, and the interests of the world, were—with perfect consistency—tossed into the hungry mouth of the false policy.

Let it be reflected that, if Anglo-American armies had taken over the Balkans, the iron curtain would now be drawn along the East,

not along the West, of the Danube valley. The difference to the map is not unimpressive.

3

If it is argued that the errors so far cited belong to the past and that what's done cannot be undone—an incorrect argument, since none of these four situations can yet be marked as finished business—let us turn to a brief examination of two crucial problems which are still far from crystallized.

The recognized government of China is the Kuomintang regime, headed by Chiang Kai-shek. China is not, however, a unified nation. In particular, the authority of the Kuomintang regime is challenged by a communist regime (the so-called Yen-an government), which asserts authority over considerable territory and population in northern, northwest, and parts of central China. This communist regime functions as an independent government, with its own armies, police, concentration camps, taxes, and officials. It has for many years waged civil war against the recognized government. It is, of course, the Chinese branch of the world communist power.

The policy of the United States has been to try to force a unification of China by getting a "democratic coalition government" which would include both the Kuomintang and the Communists, as well as certain lesser groups. Applying this policy, the United States has compelled Chiang to sign various treaties, agreements, and promises envisaging such a governmental coalition.

The motivation for this policy is threefold. In part it follows from certain abstract ideas about "democracy." Chiang Kai-shek's government is not, as communists and their spokesmen declare, totalitarian: China is insufficiently organized to have totalitarianism. But it is also not democratic, and is, besides, ridden with even more graft and corruption than is customary in governments. Equality of political opportunities for all parties, instead of a virtual Kuomintang monopoly (or, as is often forgotten, a communist *totalitarian* monopoly where the communists are in control), and an all-party government, which means in practice a Kuomintang-Communist government, therefore seem to doctrinaires the road to democracy in China.

A few Americans, fancying themselves shrewd manipulators, approach the question differently. They imagine that the United States can play the Kuomintang and the communists off against each other, and can thereby harvest richer Chinese pickings.

The primary motivation, however, is as usual the more fundamental general policy of getting along with Russia, which, also as usual, means in the minds of the American leaders, getting along with communism. A Kuomintang-Communist coalition is the kind of Chinese regime that most exactly corresponds with the whole picture of a world running happily along through the friendly combination of the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the case of China, life is proving quickly and openly enough the absurdity of the United States policy. There can never be a genuine coalition between the Kuomintang and the communists. The objective of the communists is not to make China a unified democratic nation, but to turn it into a communist totalitarian province. They would, under circumstances to their liking, be glad to enter a nominally coalition government, as they enter into any united front: in order the better to destroy, from within, their political opponents. Meanwhile, they will never relinquish voluntarily the positions of real power—of control over people and money and territory and arms—that they have already won. They feel a good deal of confidence, with their rear in the West and North firmly under communist rule, and their world propaganda so brilliantly successful.

United States representatives and commentators lament over civil war in China, and scold both Chinese houses. They do not realize that it is their policy which has not merely promoted Chinese civil war, but prolongs and deepens it. It does so because United States policy prevents the basic issue from being settled. So long as it is not settled there can never be, in China, better than a short, uneasy truce.

It is quite false to believe that, in politics, all issues can be compromised. Many can; and, if they can, as a rule they no doubt should be. But basic issues, above all the basic issue of sovereignty—of who shall be master in the house—cannot be compromised. They must be *settled*. That means that on basic issues one side must win and the other must lose. Compromise in such cases can do no more than

postpone the showdown, with the usual result of an increase in the cost of final settlement. The issue in China is of this kind.

From an adequate world policy, it would have been easy for the United States to deduce a workable application in China. With the end of the Japanese war, the problem was to block communist domination of China, which is the Eastern Coastland of Eurasia. The communists had taken advantage of the long Sino-Japanese war to set up an insurgent government, and to gain substantial power. It was necessary, therefore, to aid Chiang in extending the sovereignty of the Central Government over all of China, which could be done only by destroying the sovereignty of the rebel government and liquidating its attributes of independent power—armies, police, political administration, finance system. This meant, for the United States, all material aid necessary to Chiang, and nothing whatsoever for the communists. With the tremendous weight of United States power in the Far East, a firm, open policy of this sort would, it seems probable, have settled the basic issue within a very short time and at a minimum cost.

At the same time, this was, and is, the only road toward what democracy is possible in China. China will never become democratic by giving the communists a part in her life. They want a little democracy now only to be in a position, when their time comes, to destroy all Chinese democracy forever. Support of Chiang, as against the communists, does not involve support of Chiang in all things and against everybody. Quite the contrary. Such measures as are here outlined would put the United States in the best possible position to force reforms on the Kuomintang, to get freedom for non-totalitarian political parties and movements, and at the same time to guarantee an orientation of Chinese foreign policy favorable to United States world policy.

The original United States policy was one more example where the United States, far from hindering the communist drive out of the Heartland base, used its influence, against its own potential friends, to help that drive penetrate into new territories. Months of weary failure have gradually brought half-hearted, confused revisions in the original policy, but clarity is still not in sight.

In the early Spring of 1945, the United States army on the continent of Europe, with English, Canadian and French armies as in effect auxiliaries, was the most powerful functioning armed force that had ever operated in history. Its forward sweep was irresistible. From a military point of view, it was then in a position to occupy all of Austria, some of Yugoslavia, much of Czechoslovakia and of Eastern Germany, and in particular Berlin, in advance of the Red Army. It did not do so. The army was held back. In several sections it was withdrawn from the forward positions it had reached.

Everyone knows that this reticence was "required" by the agreement that had been entered into with Moscow. It is a poor excuse, showing how drastically wrong that agreement was. But the agreement in any case should not have been honored. It was part of more general agreements which had already been violated a dozen times by the communist party to them. Therefore, even if it is considered proper to treat these agreements juridically, they should have been judged null and void.

The communists were given Eastern Germany, the main German agricultural areas, the largest share of Berlin, and the very important symbolic triumph of the first entry into Berlin. From their German base, with Berlin as its apex, they now proceed with their plan for establishing control over all of Germany. How much more difficult their present task would be if an American army had taken over Berlin, later admitting at most a token communist force, and if the American divisions had established and held their lines at the eastern limit of feasible advance!

Having thus freely donated to the communists the most advantageous position they could have hoped for, the United States has ever since continued to make smooth the communist path in Germany. Western Germany is stripped of factories, machines, and tools for the benefit of the communist zone, but no food comes from there westward. Democratic parties in the East are suppressed or absorbed by the communists, but communists are permitted to function freely in the West. Communist literature circulates in the West, but no democratic literature in the East. Anyone in the West of any nationality—Russian or Baltic or German or Pole—whom the communists do not like is obligingly shipped off East for death or

concentration camp, while in the East the "Free German" divisions and the communist led Poles and Balts are trained for their place in the war against the West. Under the lingering, politically insane influence of the ideas of the Morgenthau Plan, no future hope or perspective is given by the United States to the German people, while from the East the Germans are offered the illusory but enticing prospect of a unified *Volks* admitted as a partner in the Soviet Empire.

In Germany as elsewhere, experience is gradually forcing a partial revision of the earlier policy, but a revision so slow and confused and half-hearted that it has small chance of success. Even France, under the pressure of her huge communist Fifth Column, is permitted to sabotage a reorientation. France, freed from internal communists, could be a great friend and bulwark of the United States and Western Civilization in the struggle for the world. But a friend, too, must be corrected. The United States, supported by England, is easily able to compel France to fall into line, on the German question. The United States, by bold and firm action, would not weaken but solidify relations with France.

Ideas of vengeance have no place in intelligent politics. Intelligent politics must learn from the past, but point always toward the future. The German people must be given a chance to live again, as honored members of a European order that is part of a workable world political system. This chance must be made to appear better to them if they accept United States rather than communist leadership. American liberals are attacked by paralysis of the conscience when they are told that there is now a race between the Soviet Union and the United States for the enlistment of the Germans as auxiliaries in the Third World War. There is much truth in this view of the German problem, though it is not the whole truth. Even if it were, where is the occasion for feelings of guilt? Will it make liberal consciences easier if the Germans turn up in the communist camp?

As I write, the communist pressure on Turkey, with intervals of deceptive relaxation; gradually mounts. From Russia and from the

Balkans it points at the Dardanelles. The call has gone out long since for Kars and Ardahan and other Turkish land to the east. A faked-up campaign for a new Armenian republic, carved mostly out of Turkey, is growing on a world scale. Agents, trained within the Soviet Union, are swarming into Turkey. Soviet professors and journalists are working overtime to prove that Turks are the root of all evil.

Could anything be done? A correct policy would have little difficulty providing answers more compelling than legalistic notes about the Montreux Convention. It might discover an appropriate moment, for example, for Turkey to purchase from the United States, on easy credit, five hundred or a thousand first-class airplanes, completely equipped. Several thousand young United States officers might well go with the planes, to give instruction in their use to Turkish soldiers. The Turkish government might be induced to invite lengthy maneuvers of United States warships in the vicinity of the Straits. Perhaps a volunteer squadron of American aviators might wish training experience in the Near East; and might arrive with planes and equipment; perhaps, even, with planes fitted for atomic bombs and with a range at least as far as the Caucasus oil fields. The bargaining for prices on Turkish export products might be very generously conducted.

But if Turkey feels from one side, and from within, the hot reality of communist power, and from the other only the faint moralistic breath of diplomatic speeches, who can doubt what will happen? With her resistance sapped, she will be sucked into the communist system of concentric circles. She will begin the fatal journey from orienting influence through domination to absorption.

Iran, defended by the West only in irrelevant speeches on points of procedure at the Security Council, is already within the outer circle of orienting influence, its northern province indeed already a puppet state. The Tudeh, front for the Iranian communists, has penetrated the government. Only a still stronger counter-pole will negate the attraction of the magnetic core of the concentric circles.

Greece is in the same position as Turkey, under the same communist pressures and the same lack of sufficient counter-pressure. Meanwhile United States public opinion is more disturbed over the

minor problem of the Greek monarchy than over the communist drive for Macedonia, which is the immediate Greek expression of the main world problem.

For Spain, perplexed by marvelously co-ordinated communist propaganda, the United States now does its share in the move to replace the trivial, powerless clerical-fascist, Franco, with a totalitarian communist regime planted well out in the Atlantic, and threatening non-communist Europe from the rear.

Toward India, with the communists poised for full descent into the chaos that would result from an abrupt move for full and immediate independence, the United States washes its hands, and sits back listening piously to denunciations of British imperialism.

The communists have begun major operations to subordinate the economies of the non-communist small nations of Europe to the Soviet economy. This is designed as a first stage in the process of dragging these nations within the concentric rings. A Soviet-Swiss company is formed, for example, to distribute Rumanian oil, with a potential monopoly of the Swiss market. The oil itself is the legal property of British and American corporations, but under communist control, and used for communist ends. Could anything be done? Switzerland, too, is a potential friend; but in politics the small man must try to be the friend of the stronger. The strong must make plain in action their claim to strength. Perhaps, for the moment, the Rumanian oil fields and refineries are inaccessible. Switzerland, and the route to Switzerland, are not. The Anglo-American armies lie across that route, in Austria and Bavaria. Why should Switzerland be allowed to succumb to this maneuver engineered by the communists and certain of her own profiteers? Juridically, the United States and England can void the contracts, since the oil is British and American. Physically, they can simply block delivery.

Sweden finds it necessary to yield to the communists, and to make contracts with the Soviet Union that will tend to throw Swedish economy into dependence on Soviet economy. She yields because she feels the communist pressure to be too great. Why should there not be a more than counter-balancing pressure from the West, a pressure which would make clear to Sweden both the positive advantages she would gain from choosing the West, the

concessions that would be granted, but equally the danger, the very great danger, she runs if in the end she turns up on the wrong side. So too with Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and, very notably, with France. We may sympathize deeply with France at the same time that we believe she should not be permitted much longer the coy balancing of her present tight-rope course. A firm pull from the West must be hastened, or she will before long topple to the East.

We are told by the anxious liberals in their sermons on relief that "you must not play politics with human lives," and by profit-blinded conservatives that "politics should not interfere with business." Unfortunately for the liberals, human lives are just what politics always plays with; and to the confusion of the conservatives, politics and business are now part of an identical enterprise. Listening to them, the United States turns over millions of tons of food for distribution by communists, not to those who most need it, but as bribes and rewards for those who accept the communist domination. The staunchest friends of the West are the ones who do not get the food; the food of the United States is turned into a communist weapon. American industry makes American political friends suffer for the sake of a minor foreign market, or hurries the construction of turbines and machines that will supply the atomic bomb plants of the Soviet Union. Is there any reason, in the nature of things, if American food is to be distributed, why Americans should not do the distributing, in accordance with American interests and values instead of communist interests and values? or why, if American machinery is to be sent to other lands, there should not be sufficient real guarantee that it will not be used for the destruction of America?

5

This sketch of various situations from the recent past, the present, and the near future, has been introduced in order to develop the meaning of the supreme defensive policy formulated in the first section of this chapter. I do not wish to insist on the specific interpretation of any single incident or problem. Complete agreement on policy does not prevent occasional disagreement on how the policy is to be applied. Agreement assures in each application, however, a

common standard of judgment. Because we know the goal, we have a chance to measure, and even to predict ahead of time, whether a given step puts us closer or pushes us further away. Enough examples have been assembled, I think, to show what it would mean to adopt as the primary defensive policy the aim of blocking communist domination of Eurasia. These same examples serve also to prove that this has not been the functioning policy of the United States.

We have also been examining the question whether, granted the political desirability of the policy, there is anything that can be done about it, whether the policy is practically possible as well as desirable. We have found, in every instance, that there is something, usually several things, that could be done. The policy is not, therefore, uselessly abstract, but designed for action. It is true that for the United States to put such a policy into practice would mean the abandonment of many ideas and habits of the past. I shall conclude this chapter by summarizing certain rules of political outlook and behavior which would have to be accepted if the defensive policy were to be adopted and put into practice.

1. It would have to be recognized that peace is not and cannot be the objective of foreign policy.

2. What tag ends still remain of the doctrine of "the equality of nations" would have to be discarded. The United States would have to be prepared to make an open bid for world political leadership.

3. Similarly, the doctrine of "non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations"—already little more than a verbal shell—would have to be discarded altogether. So far as concerns matters affecting world political relations, the procedure would have to be quick, firm, sufficient intervention, not non-intervention. The more clearly this is everywhere understood, the more effective will the intervention be.

4. The United States would have to accept the need for worldwide propaganda as an arm of policy that cannot be dispensed with in the modern world. In our time the peoples of the world have become the active political audience. Policy today must break through whatever barriers are erected, and find the ear of the

masses. The meaning and goal of policy must become publicly intelligible and convincing.

The United States, as against the communists, has a peculiar potential advantage in mass propaganda. It would be an experiment of unusual fascination if this advantage were utilized. The communist propaganda, as we have seen, is and must be false on all important points. United States propaganda could be, and would benefit by being, for the most part true, or close to the truth. What is chiefly needed is merely to call things by their right names. It is time to stop calling the Soviet Union one of the "peace-loving democracies," to stop the pretense that a communist ruled Poland or Yugoslavia or Mongolia is "an independent state," or a communist led union an ordinary workers' organization, or a communist journalist, "a noted liberal." It could be useful to end nonsensical arguments over "eastern and western definitions of 'democracy' and 'freedom of the press'" and to explain that the real dispute is not over words but over totalitarian slavery. The secret intelligence reports on communist activities in Poland, East Germany, China, the Balkans, the United States, would do much better published than hidden in the archives. The past practices of the United States leaders have not a little to do with the fact that the peoples of the world have absorbed so much of the communist myth: the spokesmen of the United States, from a mistaken notion of expediency and from ignorance, have done their part in spreading the myth.

The propaganda should aim very deliberately to penetrate the Soviet borders, to let the subjects of the communist dictatorship know that the United States is aware of their misery and is their ally against their tyrants. The present automatic identification of "Russia" with the communist regime permits the regime to solidify its hold on the Russian people and to persuade them that they must stand together against the "bourgeois world." The people must be allowed to know that it is not they but their oppressors whom the world condemns, and that the world is ready to rejoice with them when they break their chains.

5. Friends would have to be distinguished from enemies. The rule would have to become: all aid and comfort—economic, political, food, machines, money, arms—for friends; no support, nothing and

less than nothing, for enemies. The idea that because a loan or a tariff reduction or food or locomotives or scholarships or airplanes have been granted to one nation they must then be allotted to all, may be appropriate in a society of angels but will prove disastrous in the struggle for the world. The United States should let it be unequivocally known that there is something to gain by being its friend, and much for enemies to lose.

6. In particular application of Rule 5, it follows that no favors would be granted to communists or to the friends of communists, and that the grounds for the refusal would be openly stated: nothing for that person or organization or country *because* he, or it, is communist. It should be made clear to workers that a union led by communists will not be treated like a union led by non-communists; that anyone joining a communist front in the supposed interest of some political or social aim of his own is thereby injuring, not furthering that aim; that a nation admitting communists to its government is by that act, in the eyes of the United States, moving not toward democracy and friendship but toward totalitarianism and war. For the generous welcome given by the United States to every communist agent in the guise of journalist, engineer or diplomatic clerk, there would be substituted the same kind of welcome that a citizen of a democracy gets in communist territory.

7. There would have to be a practical recognition of non-collaboration with the Soviet Union. The real meaning of the much debated "Soviet veto" is not to be discovered by parliamentary study of the provisions of the United Nations Charter or the regulations of the Council of Foreign Ministers. What the Soviet veto means, for the United States, is that the United States has been unwilling to make any political move which might risk the serious disapproval of the Soviet Union. As long as this attitude persists, the Soviet Union has a *de facto* veto over United States policy. In consequence, United States policy is subordinated to Soviet policy. Soviet policy retains the all-important political initiative. This we have observed in the examples cited in this chapter. The only way for the United States to avoid the Soviet veto and to seize the initiative is to make decisions independently, in the light only of the perspective of United States policy, without reference to the possible Soviet attitude; and

then to carry these decisions through, whatever the Soviet Union may say or do.

8. Finally, this policy could be put into practice only if the United States is, and is known to be, able and ready to use force. The force may not have to be used, or may have to be used only sparingly. But it must be there, as the final premise, or the political syllogism is incomplete.

15. *The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Offensive*

DEFENSIVE STRATEGY, because it is negative, is never enough. The defensive policy stated in the preceding chapter would be able to halt and even reverse, for a time, the communist Eurasian advance. It would make more difficult the communists' path toward their final goal, and would delay their arrival. Communist victory would, however, still be the end result.

The trouble with a merely defensive policy is that, however successfully pursued, it leaves unsolved the problems which generate the crisis in world politics. The intolerable unbalance of world political forces would remain. There would be no framework within which the world polity could function without continuous irritation. The irrepressible issue between world communism, with its unalterable aim of world conquest, and the non-communist world would not be settled. Civilization would continue to be under the ceaseless threat of destruction by atomic warfare.

Under these circumstances, any retreat of the communists would prove temporary. Since they have a plan which, no matter how costly to human values, would at any rate sufficiently work, men would in desperation turn toward that plan as the only answer offered to an unendurable challenge. If there is no alternative, there can be no doubt about the choice.

The communist plan for the solution of the world crisis is the World Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics: that is, the communist World Empire. If the communists are not to win, there must be presented to the governments and the peoples of the world a positive alternative to the communist plan, which will meet, at least as well as the communist plan, the demands of the crisis. Mankind will not accept, as a substitute for the communist Empire, nothing.

This alternative can only be another, a non-communist World

Federation—a federation at least of enough of the world to dominate effectively the major questions of world politics. No world federation will, we have seen, be attained voluntarily in our time. Besides the communists, only the United States holds power enough to force a federation into being. It can be brought about only if the United States, retaining for itself monopoly control of atomic weapons, assumes responsibility for world leadership.

A federation, however, in which the federated units are not equal, in which one of them leads all others, to however slight a degree, and holds the decisive instrument of material power, is in reality an empire. The word is unacceptable, as distasteful perhaps to citizens of the United States as to those of most of the rest of the world; and therefore the word would in practice doubtless never be employed. Whatever the words, it is well also to know the reality. The reality is that the only alternative to the communist World Empire is an American Empire which will be, if not literally world-wide in formal boundaries, capable of exercising decisive world control. Nothing less than this can be the positive, or offensive, phase of a rational United States policy.

In the creation of this Empire there would be necessarily involved the reduction of communism to impotence. The threat of a communist World Empire would therefore be eliminated. Once functioning, the primary political business of the American Empire would be the restriction of warfare within limits that would permit civilization to continue. To accomplish this, the crucial step would be to safeguard the monopoly of atomic weapons. There would have to be the continuous assurance against possession of atomic weapons* or their means of manufacture by two or more rival centers; there would have always to be one and only one control.

This bare minimum is enough to solve the immediate world political crisis. It is enough, that is, to permit civilization to continue at least through the next historical period. It is very far from enough to solve society's more enduring problems, or to guarantee a world at all in accord with our wishes. These larger problems are not part of the subject-matter of this book, which is confined to the political

* As I have explained, I use the term "atomic weapons" to refer not only to these in the proper sense but to any other weapons comparable in destructive power.

analysis of the present crisis. Beyond the minimum, the questions are left entirely open, and they are in fact open. To solve the problem of the present crisis is no more than the pre-condition for the solution of the larger problems. But without the pre-condition, there will be no further problems, much less their solution.

2

What does it mean to say that there must be an "American Empire," and by what possible means could it be brought about? I wish to make sure that I am not interpreted to be saying much more than I intend.

There is already an American Empire, greatly expanded during these past five years. From the point of view of political reality, the territories of this Empire, as of any empire, cannot be thought of as limited to those areas which are, like Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, legally and formally listed as some sort of colony or dependency. The Empire extends to wherever the imperial power is decisive, not for everything or nearly everything, but for the crucial issues upon which political survival depends.

From this point of view, the American Empire reaches out to the West to include, at the present time and for the foreseeable future, Japan. The Philippines did not leave the Empire through a grant of juridical independence. Their status within the Empire has changed to one more honorable, but the fate of the new Philippine Republic is still altogether dependent upon United States power, which could snuff it out in a moment, and alone protect it from attack.

The many islands of the Atlantic and the Pacific, implicitly dominated by United States military and naval installations, are also part of the already existing American Empire. For that matter, those parts of Africa and Europe where United States armed force is supreme are also, for now at least, in the Empire.

The present Empire includes still more. All of the Americas already lie within it. Is it conceivable that any one or any combination of the American nations could make a war against the United States that would be more than an insane gesture? Is it conceivable that the United States would permit the resources of any of these

nations to fall into the hands of a major world enemy? The imperial federation of the Americas is loose, and its members enjoy a great—perhaps, occasionally, a too great—autonomy. United States policy is vague and irresolute. It does not lead the Americas as well as it easily could—and if it led better, the rest of the Americas would be not more but much less given to complaints about “Yankee imperialism.” Nevertheless, for the issues that decide, the Empire is real. If the leadership of the United States were less hypocritical, more responsible, the nations would have no legitimate grounds for objection. Without the imperial relation, they could not survive a decade in the present world. Some time ago, several of the Latin American countries on the West Coast would have been colonies of Japan. Not a few would be near today to the far from agreeable role of satellites of the communist world power.

Canada, juridically, is a Dominion in the British Commonwealth. But Canada, too, in terms of political reality, must be included within the American Empire. To prove this, it is only necessary to reflect on the following hypothetical test. Suppose that United States policy, continuing its present confusion and vacillation, ends by indirectly forcing England into the Communist Empire, and that war begins. On which side will Canada be? There would no doubt be an Anglo-communist faction that would have to be suppressed. It is certain, however, that the resources, and much of the manpower, of Canada—whether or not the Canadians freely chose so—would be with the United States. For that matter, maps of United States war resources have for many years included those of Canada.

An imperial policy is not, therefore, something new for the United States. It has been, rather, and continues to be forced upon the United States by the dynamic effects of power relationships. The relative strength of the United States is too great to permit passivity. The United States cannot help building an Empire. But United States opinion has never been willing to face consciously the significance of the United States political position and its political behavior. The realities of the struggle for power are overlaid with a crust of pseudo-moral platitudes, by which United States citizens and leaders try to convince themselves that they always act from the most altruistic of ideal motives. This habit may be a tribute to United

States conscience, but it has a lamentable effect outside the borders.

The citizens of other nations, after their experiences in the late war and the demonstrations of the atomic bombs, are fully conscious of the power of the United States. They regard this power with mingled fear and hope, fear from what it has already done when turned toward destruction, and hope that it may be redirected toward the positive solution of those problems which unaided they do not feel able to meet. Along with this fear and hope there is also a growing contempt. To others the moral platitudes appear only as a combination of hypocrisy and stupidity. Is a European, starving in a city crushed by American bombs, going to take seriously American condemnations of "power politics"? Is a foreign observer at Bikini going to pay much attention to American piety about "peace"? Is the citizen of a small nation, noting American signatures on charters that guarantee control by great powers, going to listen to American speeches on the "equality of all nations"? Is a father, whose daughter has been raped and house looted by American soldiers, going to believe that the United States is moral preceptor to mankind? Is an Englishman going to relish American rhetoric against British imperialism in Palestine and India, while the United States takes no concrete step to help England meet the grave problems of those unhappy lands?

The United States has power, greater relative power in the world total than has ever been possessed by any single nation. The United States is complacent in the enjoyment of many of the immediate fruits of that power, in particular the highest living standard there has even been. The United States is, however, irresponsible in the exercise of its power. A positive and adequate policy for the United States would presuppose first of all that the United States should face the fact and the responsibility of power. That done, there would follow at once the realization that the United States must itself, openly and boldly, bid for political leadership of the world.

It will not be imagined by anyone that such a bid by the United States would meet with unanimous enthusiasm in the rest of the world. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that, made in the proper form, it would meet universal rejection. A not inconsiderable portion of mankind is aware of the catastrophic depth of the world

crisis. It is ready to accept a way out, even at much loss to lesser needs. This readiness, after all, is the principal source of communism's attractive power. How much more persuasive would be a perspective, as effective as the communists' in offering a solution of the crisis, yet without the price of totalitarian degradation.

There is much to learn, in this connection, from Hitler's failure. In the end the Nazi military machine was smashed, but it is probable that the first cause of Hitler's defeat was political rather than military. I wish to cite one major item from the political record.

Victory in the First World War made France the leading power in Europe. The Versailles Treaty, tailored in all of its European measurements to France's order, was designed to perpetuate her position. Nevertheless, in 1940, France collapsed at the first hard blow. Every evidence from that period—no matter how this may now be covered up—proves that a large part of the French population had no stomach for the new war. It was not that they were cowards. They just didn't think they had anything worth fighting about. More than this. They did not feel that Europe could go on in the old way, divided into a score of jealous nations, economically strangling each other, and breaking out in general wars every few decades. The French were ready for what the situation so pre-eminently demanded: European federation. They would not have proposed it—certainly not to Hitler; but they were ready to be pushed into it, and to accept it. If there was no other way, they were ready to accept what was for them the worst way: federation under German leadership.

In 1940 Hitler had his great political chance to win. Instead of occupying France and handling her as a conquered nation, he could have made at once a generous treaty with France, and proposed that she join as a partner—a junior partner, to be sure, but more than puppet—in the administration of a united Europe. It is hard to believe that France, already prepared psychologically, could have refused such an offer, from which she had so much to gain. Agreement between Germany and France would have been enough, by itself, to make European union an almost immediate reality. England would then have faced not a conquered Europe seething internally with England's friends, but an awakened Europe eager to go for-

ward. Hitler could have demanded, with the voice of all Europe, an end to the war in the West. England's case for continuing the war would have collapsed. There were probably elements within Nazism that made it impossible for Hitler to grasp his political chance, but, looking back, we can see what kind of chance it was, and what it would have meant if it had been taken.

* * *

It must be granted, of course, that the United States cannot, within the allotted time, win the leadership of a viable world political order merely by appeals to rational conviction. To carry out its responsibility, the United States would have to proceed primarily through a combination of pressures and concessions. Both are indispensable. The United States does not have sufficient independent power to rely solely on pressures. The resistances are too strong for concessions alone to soften.

The relevant concessions are of three kinds: economic, political, and what might be called sentimental or moral. The United States, with its colossal and indeed overbuilt productive machine, is in a position, if it is prepared for unorthodox methods, to grant enormous economic concessions in the interests of a supreme political objective. In some cases, these might require temporary economic self-sacrifice, but their effect would often be beneficial through the stimulus they would give to production. Loans, relief, mutually profitable trading agreements, machines, floods of wanted consumers' goods, easy financial terms, these all speak a language that is everywhere understood. They could all be made to repeat the lesson that it is a materially profitable and pleasant thing to be associated with the United States.

In politics, as in a marriage, it is always wise to concede everything except what is essential. In the relations between a more powerful and a less powerful nation, constant political interference on small points is usually much more irritating to the lesser nation than a sharp, firm intervention confined to those very infrequent points that really decide. It would be fatally wrong for the United States to adopt officially the feeling of many of its citizens that all nations ought to model their political and social institutions after the United

States pattern. Others may not like the pattern and may still be neither barbarians nor menaces to world security.

The United States, in the conduct of its foreign affairs, is often guilty of playing what is sometimes called "prestige politics." This term refers to political actions which are motivated by the forms rather than by the substance of politics, which are overly concerned with political appearances. It is prestige politics when you always want to be first in the procession, chairman of conferences and committees, addressed in a respectful tone, listed at the top of the page; when you hate someone else for making a suggestion first, even though you agree with it, when you want to sit Number 1 at a Peace Conference even though that violates the alphabetical order. Wise politics is occupied with the realities of power, and is content to give freely to others the prestige of appearances. Octavius, when he became emperor and Rome an empire, was careful to be ranked still just one senator among the others; he did not mind that he should not be called "king"; he wanted to be king. If the United States wants to be first among nations, it will not succeed most easily by insisting that all other nations humble themselves before the Bald Eagle. On the contrary, it will do best if it demonstrates that other nations, through friendship with the United States, increase and guard their political dignity and honor.

The cheapest of all concessions in the relations between nations, and far from the least important, are those to moral sentiment, religious belief, and social custom. Here too the provincialism and smugness of the United States do grave injury to its foreign policy. The American tourist, making crude jokes about "foreigners," is the counterpart of the American diplomat who doesn't know the language of the country to which he is accredited, the exported American film which ridicules an unfamiliar religious sensibility, or American advertising which boasts at the world's expense. A policy concentrated on the supreme objective, on the key to the situation, will dictate the utmost tact in the approach to the customs, feelings and beliefs of other peoples.

Concessions alone would not, however, be enough. Concessions alone, in fact, give others the impression not of generosity but of weakness. Concessions must be understood as one side of a coin

whose reverse is pressure, force. The realization that it is good to be a friend of the United States must be inseparably tied to the further realization that it is fearful to be its enemy. At all points bracing the concessions used for the construction of the world order, there must be the buttresses of power. Power must be there, with the known readiness to use it, whether in the indirect form of paralyzing economic sanctions, or in the direct explosion of bombs. As the ultimate reserve in the power series, there would be the monopoly control of atomic weapons.

A non-communist world federation is the only rational objective for United States foreign policy. This federation can be built, at least to the necessary extent and level, by the bold use of generous concessions and superior power. These two necessary and sufficient means are today—though not for long—at the disposal of the United States. That is why the responsibility for the future of civilization falls unavoidably, today, upon the United States.

3

Because I am concerned with the general statement of a supreme policy, and wish to prevent the diversion of attention from guiding objectives to side issues, I am anxious not to become too much occupied with details of the application of policy. In order to allow for unexpected changes in the historical situation, the correct application cannot in any case be exactly mapped in advance. However, the meaning of the policy will perhaps remain vague unless there is some indication of how it might be put into practice.

No fundamental change would be required in United States relations toward the Americas. What is needed is a more conscious clarification of the implicit objectives, and both more firmness and more tact in pursuing them. United States supreme policy, in its application to the Americas, would be successful if it guaranteed the following: first, that the major resources of the Americas will be utilized, during peace, to the mutual benefit of the Americas, the United States, and the world friends of the United States, and therefore counter to the interests of world communism; second, that in war the use of these resources will be under the direction of the

United States; third, that world communism will not secure any base in the Americas, but will on the contrary be progressively weakened.

This minimum, if accepted as primary, is without question attainable.

4

The supreme policy formulated in this chapter would, I believe, dictate an immediate proposal by the United States to Great Britain and the British Dominions: common citizenship and full political union.

This conclusion may seem surprising against the memory of an adverse popular response, both in the United States and in England, to Churchill's advocacy of no more than a firm Anglo-American alliance. The adverse response, however, was more clamorous than widespread. In the United States, its surface was exaggerated by the professional England-haters of the *Chicago Tribune* and the Hearst press. Both here and in England, it was stoked by the communist front organizations, not a little of whose energies are now being allocated to the promotion of Anglo-American hate. The whole agitation has a somewhat absurd side, since a *de facto* Anglo-American alliance does in any case exist.

Political experience, moreover, would seem to indicate that there would be more support for, and less opposition to, a proposal for outright union than for a mere alliance. A larger goal, especially if it is felt that this could really accomplish something great, has frequently a better chance of popular acceptance than a lesser, partial goal that would not be a real advance even if attained. The lesser goal excites the same resentments as the larger but is not capable of enlisting the same enthusiasm. A formal alliance between Great Britain and the United States would accomplish nothing. Merely signing a document would not make more stable the present incomplete *de facto* alliance. Documents can only record, not create, real political relations. Actual union between the United States and Great Britain and her Dominions would on the other hand be a catalyst which would instantaneously transform the whole of world politics.

We may grant that the union could not take place through an altogether spontaneous birth. The forceps would perhaps have to be used, or at least kept at hand. However, enough of the historical premises hold to make union possible. Historical origin, language, literature, legal principles, form of government are a single heritage. The circumstances of the world crisis bring the issue to a present head. The United States, Britain, and her Dominions confront a common fate. They will, whether they admit it in advance or not, survive together or be destroyed together. If the communist Empire captures England, the turn of the United States will not be long delayed. If England thinks she can go her own way, playing communism off against America, she will be soon and most grievously undeceived.

Union is possible, and is rationally demanded by the crisis. Suppose that, after a brief period of preparation at official and unofficial levels on both sides, union were openly offered, not by private individuals or well-motivated but rather snobbishly organized private groups, but by the President of the United States? Proposed not for a dim and abstract future, but for right now. Why should we believe that the offer would be, could be, rejected? If the offer were generous, open—and if there were also in the background some hint of the black meaning of refusal—an imaginative fire could be kindled in which the jealous fears of special interests would be consumed.

Today the only escape which men can see from the ever-tightening net of isolating nationalism, with all its cords of passports, boundaries, tariffs, coinage, police, bureaucracy, is into the suffocating totalitarian unity of the communist Empire. The union of Britain and the United States would present men with the fact and the prospect of another road on which the barriers could be pulled down without the necessity for paying the totalitarian forfeit.

Such a union would mean that Britain, her Dominions and the United States would become partners in the imperial federation. In the first stages, Britain would be necessarily the junior partner. This fact, which follows not merely from popular prejudices, but from the realities of power relations, is the greatest obstacle to the union. It is harsh to ask so great a nation, which for three hundred years

led the world, to accept a lower place than the first, especially when the claim comes from an upstart whose only superior qualification—unfortunately, the deciding qualification—is the weight of material might. It would need a superb statesmanship to overcome this obstacle, and a realization among both peoples of the depth of the crisis.

5

Foreshortened Europe is today pressed back against the Atlantic wall. The advanced units of the communist power are flung in every direction on the Continent, far beyond the iron curtain, piercing right through to the seas. Behind the curtain, the communist consolidation of all power proceeds under the whip of the N.K.V.D. In front of the curtain, in the still non-communist sections of the Continent, the remaining nations, starved and weakened, squander their last reserves of energy in snarling at each other's heels, pouncing at meatless bones, and refighting the lost battles of yesterday. It is a dreary, self-defeating spectacle. There is so plainly only one possible solution.

Under the protection and guidance of Anglo-America, there must be swiftly built a European Federation, joining all those Continental countries not now under communist domination, and, as its attractive power grows, drawing to itself the victims now behind the curtain. That few today dare even to talk of a plan so obvious and so imperative must be a source of many chuckles for the communist leaders. How scornfully they must hear the cowardly denials that answer their shout of "Western bloc"! How pleased they must be as they watch the nations of the West squabble among themselves for the sake of prestige and vengeance!

Can anyone believe that Europe will endure even a decade longer under these conditions? What answer other than European Federation can there possibly be?

For England and the United States not merely to accept, but to compel the federation of Europe would mean a complete reverse of policies which have been followed by England for more than three centuries, and by the United States for two generations. Both nations have fought their greatest wars with the objective political aim of

preventing the unification of Europe. No such reversal could be expected unless the situation had so changed that the traditional policies had become inadmissible.

The situation has, however, so changed. The traditional policies were based upon the historical fact that until a generation ago the bulk of world power was located on the European Continent. If, therefore, that power were unified, it would dominate the entire world, including of course England and the United States. English policy, supplemented in this century by United States policy, had thus to aim to keep the European power divided, "balanced," in order to ensure their own independence and survival.

Today the bulk of world power is divided between the United States and the communist controlled areas of Eurasia. The total power of what remains of Europe is not capable, during the next few decades, of entering the lists as an independent challenger to the two main contenders. It does not follow that what happens to Europe is unimportant for the outcome of the struggle. What follows is that Europe's potential energy can now be harnessed only as auxiliary to the West, or to communism. The European supplement may well control the equilibrium.

The traditional Anglo-American policy, which in the past protected Anglo-American security, has today under the new conditions exactly the opposite effect. Permitting Western Europe to remain divided and quarreling means permitting communism to conquer Western Europe. Through every rift, the communist power pours in. Anglo-America can close the entrances only by superintending the consolidation of Europe. The combined tactics of concession and compulsion must bring unity through a process that simultaneously rids Europe of internal communism.

France, since 1870, has feared European federation because she has felt that in a united Europe the Germans would be ascendant. Today there is no longer any reason for that fear. England and the United States, along with France, are in a position to control the conditions of federation. They can, if they wish, arrange these so that the Germans may live honorably and work again within a united Europe, and still be deprived of any chance to become a political or military threat. If France argues that in time any initial

restriction would be loosened, that the Germans might in some future once more make a drive for dominance, the reply must be: yes, that might happen. But that chance belongs to the next volume of world history. Meanwhile there is no *independent* "German problem." The question today is not whether the Germans will make another try for European and world leadership, but whether there is any way of preventing the Germans from being drawn into the communist Empire. Let France, if she is worried over the remote menace, two generations hence, of a resurgent Germanism, reflect more carefully on the very real prospect of a united communist Germany, two years hence, at her borders.

6

The problem of American relations to China, India, Malaysia, the East Indies, the Arab and other Moslem territories, and the primitive regions of Africa, grave as it is, has this mitigating distinction in the present crisis: the societies within these areas are not a direct part of Western Civilization and do not have large-scale advanced industry or technology. For this reason, they are not capable during the next historical period of undertaking on their own the manufacture of atomic weapons. Since the existence of atomic weapons is the precipitating factor of the crisis, it follows that policy toward these parts of the world, though it should doubtless aspire to much more, can be content with a merely negative, or defensive success. That is, if policy is able to block communist domination of these areas and their addition thereby to the communist strategic base, it will have achieved, if not much, the necessary minimum.

The application of the supreme policy to China has been made in the preceding chapter. Japan raises no special political problem, since it is obvious that rational American policy would retain Japan as an advanced American base off the Eurasian coast, would eliminate communism from Japanese life, and would try to guide Japanese development in such a way as to integrate the Japanese people into the non-communist world political system. In general, the combined method of concessions and force would be the means for implementing the policy.

Among the concessions, those of a political order have now become most acute, especially in connection with India and the East Indies. Let me restrict a brief comment to India.

The majority of articulate Indians (who comprise a very small proportion of the Indian population) want an independent India. India does not, however, have the social conditions which would enable her to operate as a fully independent, sovereign nation. If Western power (at present primarily British power) were at once or in the near future totally withdrawn from India, the general result may be predicted with assurance. India would immediately plunge into internal chaos. Within this chaos, the only consistent, positive force would be that of communism, continuously augmented from its base in the Heartland. As the other mixed forces wore themselves out by fighting each other and by internal disintegration, the relative power of communism would increase cumulatively. India would be drawn into the communist Empire.

No one today can advance a convincing argument against this palpable conclusion, or even tries to. Debate is always diverted into purely moral channels of "right" and "freedom." But the rights and freedom of the peoples of India would not be furthered by turning them over to communism. Freedom and all rights would be wholly snuffed out. Subjection to the British Raj would seem a golden past compared to the slave gangs of the N.K.V.D.

If there were no other variant, it would be politically just to conclude: better that the Indians should be denied their wish a generation longer, after so many hundreds, than that communism should conquer the world. There is, however, another variant which, if not altogether satisfactory to anyone, is at any rate the least of the available evils.

"Independence" and "freedom" are after all abstractions. In the world today, no nation, certainly no nation which is either small or industrially undeveloped, can be altogether independent and free. The cause of the most bitter humiliation to a people or a nation (or even an individual) is not so much the lack of an abstract freedom which no one, or few, possess, as the feeling that it is singled out for some special and peculiar discrimination, that it must wear a badge of unique dishonor. India has been not only ruled and oppressed,

which is the fate of almost all of us. Conscious of the greatness of her historical past, India has suffered from the moral degradation of her status as a mere possession of an alien people which has coupled to its power an intolerable racial arrogance. In material terms, in spite of exploitation, India has gained from British rule. Morally her loss has been unrelieved.

The articulate Indians can reasonably demand a position in the world more nearly that of other men, granted the overriding imperatives of the world order as a whole. Toward this, the first step is the recognition that India is no longer the special problem of Britain, but of Britain and her friends within the non-communist world political system: that is, in particular, the United States. Such a recognition at once would change the entire issue for India. What she regards as an uncompromisable struggle against a foreign tyrant could be transformed into a mutual effort to create a world system within which India would find a just and respected place.

India must not be laid open to the communist advance. India cannot, for many decades, defend her own independence. Therefore, whatever the extremists of independence may say or do, the Western powers must have adequate guarantees for the defense of India, and for the orientation of her foreign policy. Within those limits, which should hold today for every nation, it would seem possible, though far from easy, to work out a status for India not unlike that which is presumably envisaged for the Philippines. It is not without relevance to point to the enormous objective advantages that would follow for all peoples from the expansion of a political federation such as is here under discussion. The collapse of political barriers would so stimulate free social intercourse, trade and industry, as to make possible a general economic advance. India's share could be large enough to reconcile her people, perhaps, to some adjustment of their ideal hopes.

It may be added that it will be expedient for the United States to contribute her maximum to the material improvement of the less developed sections of the world. For this she has motives more politically compelling than disinterested generosity. Her own productive plant has swelled much beyond the potentialities of the internal market, and can be kept from deflationary collapse only by

increasing the percentage of output sent to the rest of the world. At the same time, it will be difficult for force alone to keep the Chinese, the Indians, the Moslems, the East Indians, the Malaysians and the others in line with United States world policy, unless experience demonstrates to these peoples the relative material benefits which accompany acceptance of United States political leadership.

It is sometimes argued that by building up, say, China, industrially and politically, the United States would be creating a rival which in the future, with its vast resources of manpower, would crush its American sponsor. Here, too, we must reply: yes, this is quite possible. But this, too, belongs to another historical period, the problems of which must be met by another generation. Meanwhile the question is of survival through this present period. For my own part, I am inclined to doubt these prophecies about China (or India), in the form they are usually given. It is forgotten that China and India belong to entirely different civilizations from that of the West. Though they may accept, or have forced on them, the mechanical surface of the West, with its appliances and some of its material conveniences, the current of their independent cultural life is too deep, I think, to be absorbed by the Western tide. If China or India, in some future, conquers the world, it will not be because they, having become Western, turn to destroy the West. It will more probably be because Western Civilization has collapsed from within. China or India or Islam might then be called to act as receiver for the Western bankrupt.

7

Success in all these policy applications which I have so far listed would not have solved the world crisis, though even a start at such applications would revolutionize world power relationships. The United States would gain the political initiative; world communism would be put on the defensive. The communist fortress would, however, remain, and the ultimate division between the communists, with their fixed aim of an absolute monopoly of power, and the rest of mankind. The statement of positive policy is not, therefore, complete, unless it is understood to include the task of penetrating the

communist fortress, and of winning back from communist control those areas and peoples—including pre-eminently the Russian people—now subject to the communist monopoly. To this problem, which I have already touched on, I shall return in another context.

8

Even those who will not be frightened when the policy outlined in these two chapters is called “imperialist”—and no doubt “fascist”—may prefer to dismiss it as “unrealistic.” I should like to examine, for a moment, this adjective.

There are two quite different reasons for which a policy may correctly be judged “unrealistic.” A policy is unrealistic if, in order that it should be carried out, we must expect men to act in ways utterly unlike those in which experience teaches us they do act. It is in this sense that the policy of peace through the renunciation of power, analyzed in Chapter II, is unrealistic. So too is any policy, such as utopian socialist policies, which assumes that groups of men in power will voluntarily relinquish their power, or use it only for the benefit of others. Unrealistic in this sense also, as we have seen, are the plans for the immediate voluntary establishment of a democratic World State.

It is less often noticed that a policy is, in another sense, equally unrealistic if, even granted its full success, it totally fails to solve the problem with which it is concerned. A policy, in the cure of cancer, of having all those with the disease take large doses of sulfa-drugs does not exceed human capacity. But a successful application of this policy would not in the least cure cancer. A policy, with the aim of avoiding economic depression, of legalizing free coinage of silver could readily be put into practice. It would not, however, stop depressions.

It is hardly possible to exaggerate the profundity of the present world political crisis. The trouble with many of the policies which are proposed, or even followed, in the attempt to meet the crisis is that even their most triumphant achievement would not at all lessen the crisis. Can anyone seriously believe that signing a few treaties will remove the threat of the atom bomb? Does anyone continue to

think that debates in the Security Council are going to eliminate the "misunderstandings" between communism and the West? Who, after what has happened in Eastern Europe, is going to expect communism to keep any pledges except those which it is compelled to keep? Are American diplomats going to open up the Danube valley to freedom of trade by convincing the communist leaders that free trade is a "better" economic principle than totalitarian monopoly? How many more treaties on China must be broken before it is understood that the Chinese communists want not treaties but all power? United States foreign policy, during the past several years, has been fighting for victories which are not worth winning.

The policy which I have sketched is certainly grandiose. It is not unrealistic in either of these two senses. It presupposes that men, groups of men, and nations, will continue to act politically as they have always acted: primarily (though not quite exclusively) from self-interest, with good will and intelligence affecting their conduct to a very slight, though nonetheless potentially important, degree. This policy, moreover, takes into account the realities of the existing distribution of world power, and calls for nothing that is not materially possible in terms of this power distribution. Finally, this policy, if carried out with success or even a fair percentage of success, would really solve—in, let me repeat, the temporary and partial measure that is the most that is ever possible in social life—the chief present problems which account for the profundity of the present crisis. Nothing less than this can be "realistic."

16. *The Internal Implementation of Foreign Policy*

BECAUSE I WISH to limit my primary discussion in this book to a descriptive analysis of the world political crisis and the alternatives for its solution, I do not intend to take up questions of what Americans call "practical politics": candidates, nominations, elections, party organization, platforms, and so on. I do not want to give the impression that I minimize the importance of these questions. A policy cannot make its own way in the world. The best policy conceivable for the United States would mean nothing unless it were activized in the will of political leaders and a political party. I have no criticism of the American stress on "practical politics"; I criticize only the usual American belief that this is all there is to politics; and I wish, therefore, in counter-emphasis, to keep attention directed toward the problem of the integrating objective, the guiding program, toward what I have been calling "policy."

Any policy along such lines as we have been tracing would, however, have to face within the United States two special problems which would prove so fundamental as to be inseparable from the general question of the policy itself. In Chapter 13, as part of the discussion of the implementation of policy through the State Department and other government agencies, both of these special problems, in narrower form, have been provisionally dealt with. We shall find that both are linked to decisions about the nature of democratic government.

I

The first can be posed as follows. Under a democratic form of government, what ought policy to be, and how ought it to be related to the opinions of the body of citizens? Should it be a resultant, average, or compromise of all the various beliefs held, on the ques-

tion at issue, by the various citizens? Or should it try to reflect, as accurately as possible, the belief that at each given moment is held by the majority? Both of these views seem, at first glance, democratic. Or is there, perhaps, some third possibility that is consistent with democratic government?

Under the assumption that we wish, so far as this is possible, to retain a democratic form of government in the United States, the following considerations will show why this rather philosophic enquiry is relevant.

I tend to believe, though with admittedly inadequate evidence, that the policy which has been formulated in this part, if presented vigorously, in terms suitable for public debate, would be found to correspond to the sentiments of a majority of the adult citizens of the United States. I am certain, however, that at least a substantial minority would be, and would for a long time remain, most sharply opposed to every aspect of it. If, therefore, democratic policy must represent the average, or the least common denominator, of the beliefs of the citizens, this policy could not be United States policy so long as the United States remained a democracy.

Whether or not my belief about the present sentiment of the majority is factually correct, it is at any rate conceivable that either now or in the future the majority might believe in this policy. But to carry out the policy is a long, difficult, and perhaps most terrible process. During that process, occasions would arise when the policy would seem to threaten total disaster; on others, a temporary let-down in world political tension would seem to make the policy unnecessary. Though a majority might, at one time and another, believe in the policy, we know from experience that mass opinion is variable, and can shift with great rapidity. We can be fairly sure that belief in the policy would not be continuously maintained at a majority level during all of the time necessary for carrying it out. If, then, democratic policy must reflect at every given moment the opinion of the majority, it would be impossible for the United States to remain democratic and at the same time to carry out this policy with the consistency and firmness which would be plainly indispensable.

We seem, so far, to be led to the conclusion that the policy is ruled

out for the United States, unless the United States abandons democracy. The United States may abandon democracy in any case, for other reasons, but it is not forced to do so by these premises and this policy. The truth is that these two ways of defining the proper relationship between policy and citizens do not exhaust the democratic alternatives. Indeed, neither of these two is genuinely democratic. The first is merely a guarantee of having no policy at all, and reduces government to the sole task of office-seeking. The second defines not democracy, but demagoguery. It is the theory professed by the demagogue, who manipulates the crowd by giving it the impression that he is nothing more than the sensitive mouthpiece for the crowd's own changing thoughts and sentiments.

If democracy, as a form of government, is not compatible with responsibility and leadership, then it neither will, nor deserves to, endure. Alexander Hamilton, who was more concerned with real liberties than with democratic rhetoric, which he left to his opponents, has in the *Federalist* understood the dilemma, and resolved it for us:

There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current . . . as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which governments are instituted, as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests.

In a democracy, leaders, and through them the policies which they hold, must give a periodic accounting to the enfranchised citizenry. Their submission to "the will of the people" means, in practice, that they must be judged at regular intervals by a secret ballot, on which the voters are free to oppose them. There is, however, nothing in the nature of democracy which forbids them from leading the nation, while it is their turn to lead, in accordance with their own best wisdom, not in deference to every momentary prejudice and weakness

of the common man. Nor is there anything to forbid democratic leaders, if their own belief differs from that of many or even a great majority, from trying to convince even the great majority that it is wrong. This the demagogue never attempts. The demagogue is cynical, contemptuous of the masses—contemptuous above all because they follow him; and he flatters “their prejudices to betray their interests.” But a willingness to be opposed if necessary, openly opposed to the majority, and to try, openly, to convince the majority that it is wrong is a sign not of contempt but of deep respect for the masses. It is an essential part of democratic leadership.

The policy which we here consider could be implemented internally only with such a conception of democracy, only if a responsible leadership proved ready to pursue boldly and openly a single, unwavering course, and, through the education of public opinion, win for that course informed public consent.

2

The second problem is posed by the fact that the United States could not carry out this world policy, or any policy remotely like it, unless communism within the United States were reduced to impotence. To accomplish this, communism would have to be illegalized and suppressed. There is no hope that communism could be sufficiently reduced, within the allotted time, by mere education and enlightenment. The implementation of the policy is impossible—the survival of the United States, I would in fact add, is impossible—unless the internal communist movement is got rid of. Here, again, thus, we must ask: is this compatible with the principles of democratic government?

The usual reply—spoken most loudly of all, we may be sure, by the communists themselves and their sympathizers—is that illegalization and suppression of the internal communist movement would be an obvious violation of the fundamental democratic rights of free speech and assembly, and therefore not consistent with democratic government. Democracy must grant everyone not only the right to his beliefs, but the right to express them, to win others to them, and to organize politically to try to make them the prevailing beliefs of

the democratic community and the directing beliefs of its government. The logic of the argument seems complete. It is hard for most people to see at what point it could be even challenged. There are those in this country who are ready to suppress internal communism; but to most others, and even to themselves, it is felt that in doing so they would be abandoning democracy.

It is never possible, however, to understand political questions by the purely logical analysis of abstract principles. We must relate the principles to what they mean in terms of concrete historical experience. If we do so in this case, we will discover the emptiness of the usual argument. Let us, for simplicity, approach the evidence from the point of view of the right of free speech. Similar considerations would apply in the case of the various related democratic rights.

Democracy in practice has never, and could never, interpret the right of free speech in an absolute and unrestricted sense. No one, for example, is allowed to advocate, and organize for, mass murder, rape, and arson. No one feels that such prohibitions are anti-democratic. But why not? Why cannot some purist tell us that any restriction whatsoever is, logically, counter to the absolute democratic principle of free speech?

The explanation of the logical puzzle is this. The right of free speech, or any other single right, or all of them together, cannot be understood in isolation. It must be related to a context, not merely to the verbal context of a constitution or set of laws, but to a social and historical context. The right of free speech presupposes the existence of a democratic government, which is something much more complex than just free speech; and the existence of a democratic government presupposes the existence of a functioning social community. But mass murder, rape, and arson are incompatible not only with the existence of a democratic government but with the existence of any kind of functioning social community. Whatever the situation in pure logic, it is factually impossible for any organized society to enforce rules of conduct which are incompatible with its own existence. No right guaranteed by any government can, in social fact, be interpreted to permit citizens to advocate, and organize for, mass murder, rape and arson.

We may generalize as follows. The principles of an organized

society cannot be interpreted in practice in such a way as to make organized society impossible. The special principles of a special form of government, in this case democratic government, cannot be interpreted in practice in such a way as to make that form of government impossible.

Let us approach the question along somewhat different lines, through an analogy. Suppose that a football team claimed to be the best in the country, and announced that it was ready to prove it by playing against "any other team." Let us further suppose that another group, *calling* itself a football team, challenged; but that this second group did not in fact accept the rules which define the game of football to be what it is. The second group, let us say, scored differently, refused to accept penalties, shot runners with pistols instead of tackling them, and so on. If our first claimant to the championship refused to take up the challenge, would we then denounce it for not making good on its offer to play "any other team"? We would, of course, not. We would say, rather, that the second group was not really a football team at all. We would say that you can play football only with those who accept the fundamental rules which define football, without which there would be no such thing as football.

Similarly, a poker player willing to take on "any opponent" means in practice, and can only mean, a poker player ready to take on anyone who is going to abide by the rules of poker. Within the framework of those rules, there can be an infinite variety in players and their method of play; in a poker tournament all of this variety should properly be admitted; but without the rules there is simply no poker.

These analogies will, perhaps, suggest what is the only intelligible and workable interpretation of the rights and freedoms of democratic government. Any individual right or freedom is properly extended only to those who accept the fundamental rules of democracy, only to those whose political activities, however infinitely various, are conducted within the general framework of democratic government, the framework without which the government would not be democratic. If this is not the interpretation, then democratic

government is necessarily self-defeating. It cannot defend itself. It welcomes and fosters, in effect, its own murderer.

We may further note that no sovereign government, democratic or of any other kind, can, or does, voluntarily permit within the jurisdiction of its sovereignty the organized activities of the agency of another and contrary sovereignty. This too could not be otherwise in practice, because such activities are a negation of the government's sovereignty.

Communism, in democratic nations, makes use of free speech in order to abolish free speech. More generally, it is an essential part of the goal of communism to destroy democratic government, and to replace democratic government by totalitarianism.* Communism, in other words, does not accept the basic rules of democracy, the rules which define the very possibility of democracy. This fact is incontrovertible, demonstrated alike by consistently held communist doctrine and by communist practice. The rules of democracy cannot, therefore, be intelligibly interpreted as providing for the free operation and development of a force specifically designed for their own destruction. On the contrary, if democratic government is historically workable, its rules must not only permit but enjoin it to reject, combat, and eliminate any such force. How, once again, could any society survive which deliberately nursed its own avowed and irreconcilable assassin, and freely exposed its heart to his knife?

But communism within the United States is no less outside the limits of democratic rights on the equally demonstrable ground that it is the agency of an alien sovereign. It rejects, in theory and practice, United States sovereignty, and accepts that of world communism and its Soviet center.

There is, therefore, nothing in democratic principle which would forbid the suppression of communism. The act of suppression would be in no way incompatible with the democratic form of government. The question, however, does not end with this demonstration. A principle is, we might say, timeless. The application of a principle occurs necessarily in time. In connection with the application, we must always ask when? how? under what circumstances? If, on principle, I have the right to carry a rifle, it does not follow that it

* This analysis applies, of course, equally well to the fascist form of totalitarianism.

is always under all circumstances correct for me actually to carry a rifle. The application is also a matter of expediency.

Experience can show us that, though there is nothing anti-democratic in principle in suppressing such a movement as communism, there is always a practical danger to democracy from any and every act of suppression. The reason, as we know, is that those who have power, those who control the suppressive measures, often do not stop at what is justified in principle. They find it convenient to create an amalgam, to lump together with the group that ought legitimately to be suppressed other opponents of theirs whose activities are not outside the boundaries and rules of democracy. The communists today are very skillfully playing up this danger. They are saying over and over: if communists are suppressed, then where will the line be drawn? Will that not prove the first step in a series which will end with the suppression of all opposition?

This might happen. It would be foolish to deny the reality of the danger. But in political life, and in all life, there is always danger. Every choice we make may lead to disaster. Nothing we can do will make certain our safety. If our object is to preserve democracy, we must, then, weigh possible dangers against each other. Along which course—that of permitting communism to continue freely, or that of suppressing it—does the greater danger to democracy lie?

To the principle which permits the suppression, we need to add a rule of expediency which can help us know when to apply the principle. Negatively, the reasonable rule would seem to be that it is never expedient to proceed against a group which is so small and weak as to be a negligible influence in the life of the country. Even if its program and activities are altogether beyond the permissible boundaries of democracy, the mere fact of its weakness means that there is little to gain from suppressing it, and that this little is not enough to counterbalance the indirect dangers from the act of suppression. Positively, the rule would call for suppression in the case of groups which constitute a clear, present, and powerful threat. In such cases, though it is no doubt hard to be sure just when the equilibrium shifts, the danger to democracy from the existence of the group outweighs the possible dangers from the suppression.

The Hearst press does a great disservice through its mode of

treating the "Red Menace." There is a Red Menace within the country, and only those who are liars or ignorant deny it. It is the menace of the official communist movement and its legions of auxiliaries and dupes. But the Hearst press applies the terms "red" and "Bolshevik" and "communist" indiscriminately to official communists, opposition communists, socialists, populists, anarchists, and several kinds of liberals. Only the official communists, together with those whose ideas and activities they control, come under the rule that the threat must be "clear, present, and powerful." It might be argued that socialism, through the political effects of collectivization, might in the long run bring about the destruction of democracy. This argument, however, is not "clear": that is, it is not yet proved by the historical evidence. Besides, the non-communist socialist groups are too weak to be either a "present" or "powerful" threat. The rule cannot justify suppression for what might happen fifty or a hundred years from now. The influence of the anarchists is negligible. As for the populist movements, and the individualist liberals (as distinguished from the pseudo-liberals of the *New Republic*, *Nation*, *PM* type, who are professionally sympathetic to communist policies), their suppression naturally cannot be justified in principle or in practice: their program and activities are eminently within the boundaries of democracy, far more plainly than those of the Hearst press, which not infrequently steps beyond those boundaries.

The threat of the communist movement, of that movement specifically, comes in all respects under the rule of expediency, which calls for actual suppression. Its threat to democratic government is absolutely clear, demonstrated. Its threat, above all in the context of the world political crisis, is very present. And the total internal influence of its combined forces, supplemented by the pressures from without of its world apparatus, is already so powerful as to be a major challenge to the sovereignty of the government. The danger to democracy in the United States from the continued existence of the communist movement is so much greater than the possible danger from the act of suppression, that there are no grounds for democratic hesitation. The survival of democracy in this country requires the suppression of communism, now.

The suppression of communism cannot be accomplished in a day or two. To begin with, the reasons for the suppression must be explained clearly and frankly to the people. The communists and their allies, their activities and their program, must be named and exposed, stripped of all the disguises which they are so adept at wearing. From the point of view of the implementation of foreign policy, an immediate practical measure imperatively demanded is the ousting of all communists and all ingrained communist sympathizers from all departments and agencies of the government and the armed forces. How, possibly, can the world struggle against world communism be successfully conducted, when communists are planted in key spots throughout the primary instrumentalities of that struggle?

After having been motivated by the explanation and the exposure, the communist party, and all communist activities and propaganda conducted under whatever name or through whatever fronts, must then be flatly illegalized. And the prohibition must be rigorously and thoroughly enforced.

We not infrequently hear that "you cannot suppress communism." Communism, it is said, arises naturally in our day out of the discontent of the masses with bad social conditions. The only possibility of ending communism is by removing all the bad conditions, and creating a society with universal well-being and happiness.

Those who use this argument are not aware that it has been supplied to them by the communists themselves. They are still less aware that the communists themselves do not believe it. For communists, the classic refutation of this "theory of spontaneity" is to be found in Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?*, to which we have elsewhere referred. Lenin insists, correctly, that mere social "conditions" could not bring "Social-Democratic consciousness" to the masses (by "Social-Democratic" he means what is today called "communist"). "This consciousness," he writes, "could only be brought to them from without."

The partial truth in the usual argument, which gives it its plausibility, is that bad social conditions are one of the factors that may produce moods of discontent and even revolt among the masses, and may lead to actual mass movements against the prevailing order.

(They do not always do so; often they produce mass passivity.) They do not of themselves lead to communism. Communism is not just a loose wave of discontent. It is a specific movement of our time, highly and intricately organized both in its theories and in its activities. It does not "arise spontaneously." It is deliberately built, by trained and disciplined men, by what Lenin calls the professional revolutionists of the conscious vanguard. Bad social conditions are, it is true, a kind of manure which helps the professional communists to grow an easier and larger crop. It is thus worth while, as a defense against communism, if there were not so many better reasons, to work to improve social conditions. But the specific problem of communism in our time is independent of the more permanent problem of social conditions. Communism, as a specific movement, is not like an Antæus, who, crushed to his mother Earth, will rise again always stronger than before. Communism can be suppressed, to stay suppressed. If democracy is to be saved, it will have to be.

17. *World Empire and the Balance of Power*

A WORLD FEDERATION initiated and led by the United States would be, we have recognized, a World Empire. In this imperial federation, the United States, with a monopoly of atomic weapons, would hold a preponderance of decisive material power over all the rest of the world. In world politics, that is to say, there would not be a "balance of power."

To those commentators who feel that they are displaying a badge of political virtue when they denounce the "balance of power," the prospect of its elimination ought to seem a prime asset of the policy here under discussion. Those who are not impressed with the rhetorical surface of politics will be less pleased.

At whatever level of social life, from a small community to the world at large, a balance of power is the only sure protection of individual or group liberties. Since we cannot get rid of power, the real political choice is between a balance of diverse powers and a monopoly of power. Either one power outweighs all the rest, or separately located powers check and countercheck each other. If one power outweighs all the rest, there is no effective guarantee against the abuse of that power by the group which wields it. It will seem desirable and necessary to buttress still further the power dominance, to take measures against any future threat to the power relations, to cut off at the source any trickle of potential opposition. It will seem right that those with the over-weening power should also receive material privilege commensurate with their power ranking. Only power can be counted on to check power and to hinder its abuse. Liberty, always precarious, arises out of the unstable equilibrium that results from the conflict of competing powers.

As a solution for the present crisis, might it not therefore seem that there is little objective reason to prefer a world federation under United States leadership to a communist World Empire? Of course, we might, not altogether cynically, reflect that even if our choice is

only between jailers to preside over our common prison, that is still not an occasion for indifference. But is anything more at stake? Would not the United States also, if it became world leader, turn out in the end to be world tyrant?

We must begin by replying, as we have so often: it might be so. There can be no certainty against it. We must say even more than this. There is in American life a strain of callow brutality. This betrays itself no less in the lynching and gangsterism at home than in the arrogance and hooliganism of soldiers or tourists abroad. The provincialism of the American mind expresses itself in a lack of sensitivity toward other peoples and other cultures. There is in many Americans an ignorant contempt for ideas and tradition and history, a complacency with the trifles of merely material triumph. Who, listening a few hours to the American radio, could repress a shudder if he thought that the price of survival would be the Americanization of the world?

2

We have already observed that the idea of "empire" carries with it a confused set of associations that is only remotely related to historical experience. There have been many empires, of many kinds, differing in almost every imaginable way in their social and political content. The only constant, the factor that leads us to call the given political aggregate an "empire," is the predominance—perhaps only to a very small degree—of a part over the whole.

It is by no means true that all empires are tyrannies. The Athenian Empire of the 5th century B.C. was for most of its history little more than a strengthened federation. Within the imperial state, Athens itself, there flourished the most vigorous political democracy of the ancient world, and in some respects of all time. Though Athens controlled the foreign policy of the federated cities and islands, in many instances she used her influence to promote democratic changes of their internal regimes.

The hand of England has been heavy on India, Malaysia, Ceylon, but she can hardly be accused of destroying there a liberty which never existed. And in what independent states has there been found more liberty than in her loosely dependent Dominions?

The imperial rule of Rome, especially if compared to the pre-existing regimes of the areas to which it was gradually extended, was far from an unmixed despotism. For hundreds of years it was centered in an imperial state which was itself a Republic. Many of the cities and states which were added by force or maneuver were, upon affiliation, cemented by the grant not of slavery but of Roman citizenship. It would be hard to prove that Roman power meant less liberty for the inhabitants of Egypt or Thrace or Parthia.

Even the Ottoman Empire, which, entering from outside, took over the rule of the enfeebled Byzantine states in Asia Minor, the Balkans, and parts of Africa, is hardly responsible for the end of liberties which had never grown on Byzantine soil. Under the Ottoman Turks, the Christians, permitted the free practice of their religion, and eligible through the peculiar device of the slave household of the capital to the highest military and administrative positions, were more free than had been heathens or heterodox Christian sects under the Byzantine power.

I am not, certainly, trying to suggest that building an empire is the best way to protect freedom. The empires of the Mongols, of the Egyptians, the Incaic and Aztec and Babylonian and Hittite empires will scarcely be included among the friends of liberty. It does, however, seem to be the case that there is no very close causal relation between empire and liberty. The lack of liberty among the Andean or Mexican Indians, the Egyptians or Mongolians or Hittites, cannot be blamed on the imperial structures into which their societies were, at various periods, politically articulated. Within their cultures, social and political liberties, as we understand them, did not exist at any time, whether or not they were organized as empires. The degree of liberty which exists within an empire seems to be relatively independent of the mere fact of the imperial political superstructure.

The extension of an empire does, by its very nature, mean at least some reduction in the independence, or sovereignty, of whatever nations or peoples become part of the empire. This is sometimes felt as a grievous loss by these nations or peoples, almost always so felt by the governing class which has previously been their unrestricted rulers—perhaps their tyrants. But this partial loss of independence

need not at all mean a loss of concrete liberties for the population, may even mean their considerable development, and may bring also a great gain to civilization and world political order. Untrammled national independence is a dubious blessing, consistent with complete despotism inside the given nation, and premise of an international anarchy that derives precisely from separatist independence.

I did not attempt to deduce the totalitarian tyranny of a communist World Empire from the mere fact that it would be an empire. This conclusion was based upon the analysis of the nature of communism, as revealed in ideology, organization, and historical practice. Though it must be granted that an imperial world federation led by the United States might also develop into a tyranny, the fact of empire does not, in this case either, make the conclusion necessary.

3

The development of an industrial economy world-wide in scope, the breakdown of the international political order, and the existence of atomic weapons are, we observed at the beginning of our discussion, the elements of the world crisis as well as the occasion for the attempt to construct a world imperial federation. This world federation is made possible by the material and social conditions, is demanded by the catastrophic acuteness of the crisis, and at the same time is a means for solving the crisis. The nature of the federation cannot be deduced from definition, but must be understood in relation to the historical circumstances out of which it may arise.

From the point of view of the United States, and of the non-communist world generally, the world federation is required in order to perform two inter-related tasks, which cannot be performed without the federation: to control atomic weapons, and to prevent mass, total, world war. With United States leadership, and only with its leadership, a federation able to perform these tasks could be built, and built in time. With the performance of these tasks, the federation would be accomplishing what might be called its "historical purpose"; it would be fulfilling the requirements which prompted its creation. The minimum content of the "American world empire" would thus be no more than that of a protective

association of nations and peoples in which, for a restricted special purpose, a special power—the power of atomic weapons—would be guarded in the beginning by one member of the association.

At first there would be, perhaps, little more to the federation than this minimum content—which, after all, would not be such an unmitigated blow to the liberties of mankind. It is not, however, to be expected that the federation would remain long at this bare level. It would develop; the content would deepen. How it would develop is a question not decided in advance. If the direction might be toward a tyrannous despotism on the part of the initially favored nation, there is no reason to rule out a development in a quite opposite direction, toward the fuller freedoms and humanity of a genuine world state and world society.

The danger to liberties would be the power predominance of the United States in the beginning of the federation. Fortunately for liberty, there are objective factors of very great weight that would operate against any attempt by the United States to institute a totalitarian world tyranny.

Not unimportant among these factors is the historical tradition which is the past of the United States social present. I have mentioned the brutality, provincialism, and cultural insensitivity which are not infrequent in United States behavior. These are, however, characteristics to be expected in a young and “semi-barbarian super-state of the cultural periphery” (I use, again, Toynbee’s phrase). There is nothing totalitarian about them. Their rather anarchic, somewhat lawless, disruptive manifestations are on the whole anti-totalitarian in effect. Americans do, most of them, have a contempt for ideas; but that very contempt gives them a certain immunity to mental capture by an integral ideology of the totalitarian kind. It is less easy for a nation to escape from its past than many optimists, and pessimists, imagine. The past can be a millstone around the neck, but it can also be an anchor bringing safety. The United States may become totalitarian. It seems to me unlikely, however, that this will come about through a natural internal evolution. Totalitarianism would have to be brought from without, as it would have been by a world-victorious Nazi Germany, as it will be by the communists, if they are allowed to continue.

A second factor on the side of liberty is the inadequate power of the United States. The United States has today very great power, greater than its own spokesmen realize, great enough to build a world federation, to defeat communism, and to ensure control of atomic weapons. It does not have enough power to impose a totalitarian rule on the rest of the world. Even if the United States could concentrate enough in the form of purely military power, it lacks sufficient manpower and sufficient political experience.

What this means is that the United States can lead only by accepting others as partners, only by combining the methods of conciliation and concession with the methods of power, only by guarding the rights of others as jealously as its own privileges. If the United States refuses this mode of leadership, if it should try instead to be world despot, it might still, for a short while, subdue the world beneath an atomic terror. But the end would be swift and certain. Mankind would be avenged, and the United States destroyed. The only question would be whether all civilization would be brought down in the process.

Looked at somewhat differently, this indicates that in the projected world federation the principle of the balance of power would not in reality be suspended. At the one, narrowly military level, a balance would be replaced by United States preponderance. But military force, especially in the technical sense which is alone at stake in the control of atomic weapons, is by no means the only form of social power. In terms of population, material resources, cultural skills and experience, the United States would not at all outweigh the other members of the federation. Within the framework of the federation, divided powers would continue to interact. Through their mutual checks and balancings, they would operate to prevent any totalitarian crystallization of all power.

A third, ironic protection of liberty is the unwillingness of the United States to rule the world. No people, pushed by forces they cannot control, ever entered on the paths of world power with less taste for the journey, with more nostalgic backward glances. This distaste, indeed, is so profound that it is primarily significant not so much as a protection against the abuse of United States power,

but rather as a tragic handicap to the sufficient utilization of that power.

There is a fourth major factor which will challenge any despotic presumption on the part of the United States. In the world today there are many millions of men and women who know the meaning of totalitarian tyranny, often through the frightful lessons of direct experience, and who are resolved, if any chance is given them, to fight against it. They are within the United States itself, as within every other nation, not the least firm among them silent for the moment under the stranglehold of the communist power. The loss of liberty teaches best, perhaps, its meaning. Though they are now, after so many betrayals and vain hopes, close to despair, they are still ready to act again.

They are ready, since there is no other way, to accept and follow the leadership of the United States, but only if they are given reason to believe that United States leadership will bring both power and justice: power so that there will be a chance to win, and justice so that the victory will be worth winning. They will follow not as subjects of the United States, but, in their own minds, as citizens of the world. For them, all governments and all power are suspect. They will be—they are—stern judges of the United States; they are acquainted with the symptoms of tyranny; they will observe and resist every invasion of liberty. If experience should prove to them that their hope in the United States is also empty, then they will abandon the United States.

The United States cannot compete in tyranny with the communists. The communists have cornered that political market. The peoples of the world will reason that if it is to be totalitarianism anyway, then it had might as well be the tried and tested brand. The United States will not win the peoples to her side—and the struggle in the end is for them, is not merely military—unless her leadership is anti-totalitarian, unless she can make herself the instrument of the hope, not the fear, of mankind.

4

In Chapter 3 we reached the conclusion that a genuine world government was not a possible solution of the present world political crisis. At the same time we found no reason for abandoning the ideal of a genuine world government or even the far nobler ideal of a world society in which the coercion and violence which are always part of any government would be replaced by the free, co-operative union of all mankind.

Those men who are dedicated to these ideals, who have rid their hearts forever of the bitter nationalist shell that divides them from their brothers who are all men, cannot remain satisfied with any such perspective as we have been examining. With the best of chances, a world federation led, however generously and discreetly, by the United States would still retain its gross flaw of imperial inequality. Must they, then, these dedicated men, reject and condemn this perspective?

I think they need not, if their ideal is more than self-indulgence, if they know that their ideal must be realized within and through the harsh, real world of history. For them, this is the means; there is no other way. They cannot want for its own sake a federation of unequals, led by the United States. But they must want it as the necessary step toward their own goal of a world society of equals, in which they will continue to believe, and toward which their influence will try to direct the future of the federation.

5

Let us assume that I am correct in maintaining that world organization under communist leadership and world organization under United States leadership are the only two real alternatives in the present world political situation.

Communism, consistent in itself, is not troubled by any seeming disparities between the various propaganda masks through which it faces the world. From one mouth, it will tell us that all is well within the Soviet Union and among communists everywhere, and that any story of communist villainy is a fascist slander and a

counter-revolutionary lie. If we have learned too much to be in this way quite lulled, communism will change mouths, and say: of course communists are now and then guilty of excesses, and there has been some Soviet trouble, but is this not the way of the world? How can the United States, with its own eye so full of beams, object to those Soviet motes? If communists are rather bad, well, at any rate Americans are no better.

This adroit maneuver, playing as it does so skillfully on all the strings of our own guilt, has a paralyzing effect on the minds and wills of honest men. Is it not true that we oppress a subject race, that we grab military bases, that our soldiers rape and rob, that we have dismal slums, that our propaganda is often false and hypocritical, that much of our press serves rich and wicked men, that we have grafters and absentee landlords and exploiters? What right do we have, then, to criticize communism, to set up our own way against its way? What choice is there between us? And, above all, what right have we to ask the world to choose?

Because I have not tried to conceal either the present defects in our society or the threats of future danger, but rather to force these out into the open, I feel it necessary to comment on the subtle, pseudo-humility of this attitude.

The truth is this. Our way is not the communist way. There is a difference, and there is a choice, as profound as any that men have in history confronted. We do not ever have, in history, a choice between absolutes, between Good and Evil, God and Satan. Evil, along with good, pervades the fabric of the City of the World; Satan, if not enthroned, is always present at the world's assemblies. Our choice is always between gray mixtures of good and evil; our right choice can never gain more than the lesser evil. What is always relevant, therefore, is the exact composition of the mixture, the degree, the measure.

It is true that we discriminate against the Negro race; but the most oppressed Negro in the United States has ten times more freedom than nine-tenths of the persons subject to the communist power. It is true that there are some frauds in our elections; but the whole electoral system of the Soviet Union is nothing but a gigantic fraud and farce. It is true, and wrong, that our press sometimes distorts

news for the sake of selfish owners; but the entire communist press is simply the voice of a total lie. Some of our workers and farmers live in poverty and slums; but all Soviet workers live, under communist rule, in poverty and slums; all are hounded by a secret police and tied to the state by labor passports, and fifteen or twenty million of them are herded into the slave-gangs of the N.K.V.D. Our soldiers, occupying a country, are, some of them, brutal; but the communists, occupying a country, suck it dry, destroy its independent life, ship hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants back to the slave-gangs, and torture and kill every even potential opponent. Our police occasionally knock a striker over the head, or beat up a harmless drunk; but the communist police torture and frame and exile and murder millions of innocent men and women, and by means of spies and provocateurs reach into every factory and farm and home. Our employers and authorities sometimes try to break a strike; under a communist regime the very mention of a strike is punishable by death. We sometimes punish a poor man who in desperation steals, say, a jewel from a rich waster; in the Soviet Union a starving peasant who takes, to feed his children, a bushel of wheat from the farm he works, can legally be sentenced to exile or death for what, in the pious cant, is called "the theft of socialist property." In communist law and practice, it is a crime not to be a stoolpigeon, and a duty to betray friends and wife and family. Among us, the poor and weak do not have an equal chance against the rich and powerful; under the communists the poor and weak must not only obey, but praise and fawn on their masters.

It is far from my purpose to list these comparisons in order to suggest any complacency on our part. Our evils are still evil, even if there are worse. It is no less our duty to reject and overcome them. Every one of them, every added one, it may be noted, is a weapon contributed to communism. But it is necessary to guard against a false and in reality cynical indifference which escapes the responsibility for choice by the plea that all roads are alike, and alike lead to ruin. It is well to recall that there is something, after all, to *losè*.

It will be useful to give a name to the supreme policy which I have formulated. It is neither "imperial" nor "American" in any sense that would be ordinarily communicated by these words. The partial leadership which it allots to the United States follows not from any nationalist bias but from the nature and possibilities of existing world power relationships. Because this policy is the only answer to the communist plan for a universal totalitarianism, because it is the only chance for preserving the measure of liberty that is possible for us in our Time of Troubles, and because it proposes the sole route now open toward a free world society, I shall henceforth refer to it as *the policy of democratic world order*.

18. *Is War Inevitable?*

IT IS, IN A WAY, rather absurd to ask whether there is going to be another general war, a Third World War. The Third World War began, we saw, in the Spring of 1944, and has thus already been going on for several years. Already, thousands, even tens of thousands, of men have been killed in this war—in China and Iran and Yugoslavia and Trieste and Germany and elsewhere. Among those killed have been armed soldiers of the United States.

We know, however, that something different is usually meant by the question. When we speak of syphilis, we do not have in mind the passing annoyance of a small sore. When most people ask about the Third World War, they are thinking, of course, not of small skirmishes and incidents here and there, or even rather extensive battles in the less developed nations, but of fighting and destruction on a mass and general scale. We may note that there is a superficiality in this way of thinking. Between the small sore and the dread organic degeneration, though they may be widely separated in time and in idea, the lurking spirochetes provide a most intimate causal link. Nevertheless, let us re-state the problem, and ask whether there will be a new war in the more total sense.

No future event is inevitable, and we therefore cannot say that a new full-scale war is certain to come. It is conceivable, possible, that it should not. We are compelled to recognize, however, if we wish to face the evidence, that a new war in the full sense, and in a comparatively short time, is very probable. It is on the whole probable, though not in each case equally so, no matter what deliberate policies are followed by the United States or by the other nations. The living germs are present in the blood; and political science has not yet devised its miracle drugs.

The evidence, a good deal of it, may be found distributed through the pages of this book. We know in general that civilized men have always fought many and frequent wars. We know of nothing to

assure us that their habits of millennia can quickly change. In the past, the most that wise policy has ever achieved has been to lessen the frequency and devastation of wars, to decrease, by foresight and a steady navigation, the cost of either victory or defeat. We know that in today's world the division and unbalance, immeasurably aggravated by the mere existence of atomic weapons, are so profound that they cannot persist for long under the present tensions without some major resolution. We know that such a resolution is ordinarily brought about through war.

It is not really necessary to examine causes to their roots in order to recognize that a new war is probable. The fact is written in bold-face on the daily surface of events. Indeed, there is hardly a precedent in history for the failure of a war to begin from political clashes and incidents much less grave than those of the past few years.

We may say more than this. It is well understood that the immediate occasion which sets off a great war in our complex modern society is largely accidental. It need be nothing of any particular importance in itself: a mistranslated telegram, a personal assassination, a border incident among many border incidents. Difficulties much more serious in themselves will have preceded it, without starting the war. What happens is that the relations among the belligerents-to-be reach and maintain a state of explosive instability. In that state, even a small spark, which before could easily have been damped out, can begin the massive detonation. The spark is sometimes deliberately struck by one of the protagonists, hoping to gain an advantage from the choice of timing; sometimes it occurs, as it were, spontaneously, the chance result of a clash which no political leader consciously planned. Once the explosive state has been reached, war can begin at any moment. Conceivably it may be delayed, even for some years; but, unless by rare luck the explosive combination is denatured, it is a never-absent, immediate threat.

The world has now, in relation to the full and open stage of the Third World War, entered that explosive state. This means that the full war is not the possibility of a generation from now, to be debated on at leisure. It might be delayed four or five years, much more improbably ten; but it may begin at any moment, today, tomorrow; it may have begun before these sentences are published.

An airplane shot down, a port shelled by a warship, an army's march into a neighboring country, an atom bomb dropped on a great city or an oil field, an arrest and detention, any of hundreds of events no more intrinsically important than hundreds which have already occurred, might be the immediate occasion. Or it could begin from a larger, slower fuse, building up through stages in the expansion of a civil war or a revolt or a border infiltration.

Under these circumstances, the United States cannot carry out a serious foreign policy, certainly not the policy of democratic world order, unless it is at every moment ready for war. I do not refer so much to the details of military preparedness. Essential as these are, they are secondary, derivative from the more fundamental political readiness, from the realization that policy must, if necessary, be backed by force, and backed all the way.

Policy must come first, and I again repeat: peace cannot be the supreme practical objective of policy. In the present world political crisis, there is no chance of bluffing so shrewd and informed an opponent as the communists. Conflicts involving the concrete aims of American policy are bound to occur, are daily occurring. Where these are of any consequence, it will mean that their settlement will be a definite advance or a definite setback for American world objectives, and, conversely, a definite setback or advance for communist objectives: one cannot go forward without the other's retreating. No tough speeches, no rude notes, no shocked complaints to the Security Council will appreciably affect the results unless it is true, and known to be true, that directly back of the words is force, and that there is a complete readiness on the part of the American leaders to call on the force to implement the words.

The United States is not going to stop the war by wishing for peace. It is unlikely that this war can be stopped in any case. The only chance of stopping it is by carrying through a policy the fulfillment of which would remove the causes of this war. This can be done only by a constant readiness for war; and readiness for war, therefore, far from making war more probable, is the indispensable means for decreasing its probability to the lowest figure that is, under the circumstances, possible. If war nevertheless comes quickly, there is less reason for the United States to fear it in conjunction with a policy

that is certain to improve the relative position of the United States, than there is to fear a later war which would begin with atomic weapons on the other side, and the United States' position sapped perhaps beyond repair by the results of a false policy.

2

The communists are at the present time ready, but not anxious, for war.

There are in their ranks no signs of defeatism or of any unwillingness to fight at once if it seems advisable. Indeed, they have been fighting right along, sometimes on a considerable scale, in many parts of the world. There is, however, some reason to believe that they would, on the whole, prefer a delay of ten or fifteen years in the outbreak of general warfare.

This wish for delay, which is by no means an insurmountable preference, has an understandable motivation. The parts of the world which the communists now control are, relative to the United States and its potential associates, technically and economically backward. In spite of the communist concentration on war industry to the exclusion of almost everything else, the backwardness means deficiencies, both quantitative and qualitative, in the production of armaments. In particular, they still lack atomic weapons and the means of producing them.* By delay, these deficiencies might be at

*During 1946, rumors began to circulate that the Soviet Union did have atomic weapons. These rumors may be expected to recur from now on. In most cases they may be traced to communist sources. Though it is difficult to be sure, I am inclined to doubt them. Through the activities of their agents in the United States, England and Canada, combined with the work of their own and their captive German scientists, I take for granted that the communists possess all the important "secrets" of the manufacture of atomic weapons. Nevertheless, the history of Soviet industry suggests that it will have great difficulty in meeting, on the necessary large scale, the extremely high precision standards which are required. If there is no interruption, it will be done, by way of the method of concentration which the Soviet scheme permits. But not, I think, for a few years more. The planted rumors seem to be, for the present, an instrument of psychological warfare, designed to induce doubt, fear, and demoralization. If war started tomorrow, rumors would be used to spread mass panic in New York, London, Chicago, Detroit and other great cities, and thereby to get the socially disintegrating effect of atomic weapons without having the weapons themselves.

least in part overcome. With even five years, they would have atomic weapons ready for use.

The war with Germany caused great material destruction in the Soviet Union, much of it in just those regions which had been most highly developed during the first three Five Year Plans. The stories about the many factories saved by being moved intact to the Urals are much exaggerated. Besides, you cannot move coal mines, dams, coke ovens, oil fields. The need to repair this damage also counsels delay.

The war and its aftermath brought, besides the material destruction, a considerable socio-political disintegration. The war gave the first big chance for the expression of the fierce accumulated resentment against the communist regime. This took many forms. The Russian divisions, for example, which fought powerfully for the Germans under General A. A. Vlasov were the only large "traitor army" that any of the belligerents succeeded in organizing. The regime has, since the war ended, taken note of mass anti-communist behavior by wiping out a number of so-called "autonomous republics" (the Chechen-Ingush, Crimean, Kalmyk, Volga-German), whose existence was supposedly guaranteed by "the most democratic constitution in the world," and by liquidating the Karachev "autonomous region." As the Red Army spread beyond the Soviet borders, discipline among the ordinary soldiers often broke down, and desertions were frequent. Under the war conditions, moreover, it was hard to hold together the complexly woven threads of the centralized party apparatus.

The leadership, therefore, needs a little time to reconsolidate its absolute control of the party ranks, the army, and the masses. This job is being carried out in the usual way, through the primary mechanism of the gigantic new purge which began in 1946.

On the other hand, the communists believe, with no residue of doubt, that "capitalist-imperialism"—that is, the non-communist world—has entered the stage of its permanent decline, and that it is subject to irreversible internal disintegration. Within a few years, they believe, the non-communist world will descend into another economic depression more catastrophic than that of 1929-33. They believe also that the internal disintegration of capitalism can be

speeded by the activities of their own organizations functioning within the capitalist nations. Delay thus seems to promise a double relative improvement in the communist position, both by positive communist advance, and by capitalist deterioration.

A stress on these considerations is responsible for a current of opinion which exists among the communists, but which does not find official recognition in the slogans and conduct of the present, leftist "Seventh Period." * Those influenced by this current are in favor of a slower, more cautious policy, and a shift to a new Right period with the customary Right formulas of collaboration and united fronts. The public form of their views was given by Earl Browder, in the six articles which he wrote for *The New Republic* during the summer of 1946, after his journey for conference with his headquarters in Moscow.† These articles were a bait held out to the United States government. They said, in effect: just let us complete our present modest plans in Europe, China, and the Middle East, and we will promise to be good. The United States and the communists, in permanent "peaceful collaboration," will together run the world to their mutual happiness and prosperity.

The difference between this view and that expressed in the current Seventh Period is, needless to repeat, merely tactical. The only question is how, in details and in timing, to prepare best for the war which all communists regard as inevitable. I have already suggested that a new turn to the Right is not at all inconceivable. In many ways it would seem a more intelligent tactic, especially toward the United States. The United States is almost pathetically anxious to be lulled to political sleep.

* * *

However, a wish for a delay in the start of the war is not a symptom of any lack of communist confidence. This confidence, sustained by the belief in capitalist disintegration, is increased by the recent war's fresh demonstration of the strength of the geographical and

* See Chapter 6.

† The same position, stated by Browder from the communist side, was given its American expression by Henry Wallace. The difference between Browder and Wallace is that Browder knows what he is doing.

strategic position which the communists now control. Ideologically, it has unassailable support in the dogma of the inevitability of communist world triumph.

Of still more immediate bearing on present communist tactics is the communists' belief in their own political superiority. Negatively, they are convinced that "imperialism" is so degenerate and so torn with "internal contradictions" that the non-communist world, in its parts and as a whole, is incapable of projecting and following any serious policy at all. For this view they have, up to now, much evidence. Positively, they observe the fact that, during the war and following it, they have at all times, no matter what their material difficulties, kept the political initiative. Even when they have bluffed like a poker player raising the limit on a pair of threes, they have found that their bluff is never called. In Poland or Argentina or Iran or Italy or Germany, on Tito or Franco or Boris, they always move first. The non-communist nations either come trailing after, or shout feeble protests against the runner who jumps the gun.

Thoughts on matters like these help account for the dynamic, "fast," Left communist policy which now prevails. Like a gambler in a winning streak, they reason: let's keep going while the going is good. Let's snatch every opening, fill every vacuum, pry wider every crack. Let's, in other words, get as much as possible of the next war's job done before the war begins in earnest. If we irritate the imperialists, they are, politically, too broken down to do anything much about us. Even if they should try to, even if our tactics provoke an earlier war, we will have gained more than enough to make the chance worth taking.

3

The lock-bolt of the entire structure of communist plans is political. For them, everything depends on their continuing to have political superiority and to maintain the political initiative. If they do, they win either way, war or no war, war soon or war delayed. Whatever happens, their policy, with its fixed goal of world conquest, will be steadily advancing.

The structure collapses if the lock-bolt is loosened. If the non-communist world adopts a bold and adequate policy, and takes the

initiative in carrying it out, the communists will be thrown back on the political defensive. Then many even of their apparent advantages would be turned into obstacles. Their morale, dependent on the sense of political superiority, would be undermined. The political vacuums into which they now pour would be filled from the opposite direction. The walls of their strategic Eurasian fortress, so apparently firm now as much because of the absence of pressure without as from strength within, would begin to crumble. The internal Soviet difficulties, economic and social, would be fed a rich medium in which to multiply. The communist sections within the non-communist nations would wilt; in short order they could be stunted, and rooted out.

The policy of democratic world order promises rapid and maximum results. It is designed not as a remote future possibility, but for immediate action. Its dividend payments would begin on the day of subscription. Within a week it is capable of transforming the world political situation.

This policy, while providing firmly against attack, is positive and purposeful. It provides a solution, the only possible non-communist solution, for the world political crisis. There would be in it no element of bluff, because it would be based on material power sufficient for its aims; and it is thereby peculiarly suited to forcing the communists at once on to the defensive. For that very reason, its tendency would be not to provoke the communists to war, but to make them, with good reason, fear the beginning of war, and grant major concessions to forestall it. They would no longer call the turn.

If war nevertheless came soon, as it might, the communists, deprived of political superiority, would be in very poor shape to fight it. Delay, however, would only weaken them further. Confronted by the active working of the policy of democratic world order, they could no longer count on time to improve their condition. They would find themselves driven on the horns of a most unpleasant dilemma. Either, facing the ever rising odds against them, they would become afraid to fight—in which case we would doubtless be treated to the ironic spectacle of a totalitarian attempt at the appeasement of democracy; or, in desperation, they would try a fling

at a last ditch war which, perhaps without great cost in blood and destruction, they would be sure to lose.

If it stopped short of the end, however, even the successful implementation of the policy of democratic world order would not remove the threat of a new war capable of destroying civilization. So long as the explosive ingredients remained assembled, the total war would still continuously impend.

The danger of this war will not disappear until the present Soviet regime is overthrown, and world communism as a whole rendered impotent. It is the presence of a high relative concentration of communism alongside of a world society which is still itself non-communist that renders the world political mixture explosive. The mixture can be denatured by its becoming all-communist, or by reducing the communist percentage safely below the critical point. Besides these two, there is no other method.

In the Soviet Union, and in all other countries, it is preferable, and we ought to prefer, that the smashing of communism should be accomplished from within, rather than by a war from the outside. Communism, however, has grown beyond the powers of any single people acting alone and unsupported. The defeat of communism anywhere must be part of the mutual struggle of non-communists everywhere. It is, moreover, the peoples of the Soviet sphere who most need aid. When—and only when—they have rid themselves of their communist masters, we will find it easy enough to solve the now unanswerable riddle of “how to get along with Russia.”

Part IV

WHAT WILL BE DONE

19. The Policy of Vacillation

WE DID NOT, at any point in Part III, raise the question of what the United States will do, but only of what the United States could do, and would do, if it were to adopt and carry through a policy adequate to meet the demands of the present world political crisis. What the United States will actually do is a problem of a different kind. In order to predict what probably will happen, we must first determine what alternatives there are to the possible course which Part III has charted.

Part III dealt with a line of action for the United States particularly, and for the non-communist world more generally, which would be directed by a deliberately adopted, consciously held supreme policy. If our reference is merely to conscious policy, to ideas that men are capable of forming in mind and imagination, we may say at once that there is an infinite number of alternatives to the policy of democratic world order. There are no limits, or almost none, to what men can imagine. A lively fancy could, in a single afternoon, pull a hundred possible policies out of its mental hat.

The United States might adopt as its leading policy a plan for the colonization of Antarctica, or the conversion of the world's population to Rosicrucianism. It might decide that France was the main enemy, and direct all efforts toward the annihilation of France and Frenchmen. It might hold that the key problem of the world was the political unification of the United States and the Soviet Union, and that to accomplish this end the United States should make immediate application for membership in the Union of So-

cialist Soviet Republics. It might undertake the conquest of Tibet, or simply say that it would never again have anything to do with anything in the world beyond its own borders.

In a similar way, a man confronted with a heavy invasion of his rose garden by Japanese beetles might choose simply to ignore them. Or he might set out bowls of rum for them, so that they would become too drunk to be interested in the flowers; or sing lullabies to make them sleepy. He might believe in the principle of putting a fierce watchdog on guard at the garden's gate, or he might write a letter of protest to the Department of Agriculture. Any of these, and any of a thousand more, are possible policies for the gardener. Meanwhile the historical process, through which the beetles continued eating up his roses until there was not a whole petal left, would develop according to its own laws, not at all deterred by any of these policies. If he wishes to protect his garden, those policies are not so much wrong as they are irrelevant. They have no significant effect on what is happening.

We have seen that meaningful political choice is narrowly limited by the structure of social facts, by the concrete situation within which the choice must be made. A genuine political policy must be of such a kind that it has some real connection with the situation, and is capable of affecting, at least to some degree, what is to happen. Otherwise it is, like the various possible United States policies just listed, irrelevant, a fantasy of the imagination, not a plan for human action.

The facts in the case are that the world has entered a period of the severest possible political crisis, and that the only two great power groupings, one led by the communists, the other by the United States as deputy for Western Civilization, have begun a struggle for world leadership. The struggle grows out of the given situation. It is forced on the protagonists. They cannot avoid it, no matter what they consciously decide. The conditions of the struggle are such, moreover, that one or the other, or perhaps both, of the contestants must in the end be defeated.

These are the facts. Only those policies which are based upon an understanding of these facts, and which propose operation within the limits which these facts set, can be taken seriously. The choice of

policy, infinitely wide in imagination, is most strictly bounded in reality. To the basic perspective underlying the policy presented in Part III, there is in reality no alternative whatever. No matter what conscious policy is adopted by the United States, and even if it has no policy, the situation will be what it is, and the struggle will go on.

For the United States, as for the communists, there are significant alternatives. The alternatives, however, are not with respect to the basic issue. They are all tactical, about the choice of ways and means, about the degree of consciousness and firmness with which policy will be carried out. There are alternative ways of conducting the struggle. There is no alternative to the struggle itself. And there is the not unimportant alternative of: who will win?

The usual American conception of foreign policy is an uneasy combination of abstract moral sentiment with short-term selfish interests, both projected without any reference to world political facts. How, under the circumstances of the present, could any policy so conceived be expected to influence events, to succeed, or to gain anything worth while if it did succeed? Debate over such conceptions is an exercise in rhetoric, not in politics. They serve as a means for expressing feeling, not as an instrument for understanding history, or changing it.

For political clarity, it is essential to distinguish between the question, What is the situation? and the separate question, What shall we do about it?—with the understanding, of course, that what we do may in turn change the situation. If the world political situation is, not in every detail perhaps but in the main, more or less as it is described in this book, then what is to be done? All answers will be tactical variations of the three possible judgments. Either nothing should be done, and the struggle allowed to take its own course. Or the communist plan for world leadership should be actively furthered. Or the United States should accept the responsibility of the struggle, and should, consciously, try to win it. If the last judgment is accepted, there is still a wide enough scope for debate. There will still be the problems of means and methods, and there are better and worse ways of winning.

If the situation is not as here described, then what is wrong with

the description? What is the evidence that it is false? It will not be proved false by being found disagreeable.

2

Nearly everyone knows by now that the whole question of United States foreign policy, and of world politics, centers in the problem of the relation between the United States and the Soviet Union (though it is less widely understood that the Soviet Union is primarily significant not as an ordinary nation among nations, but as the chief base of world communism). The two most vehement and coherent positions taken on this problem by United States public opinion are those of Appeasement and of a new form of Isolationism.

The unremitting source of the appeasement point of view is the communist propaganda machine. Its most publicly conspicuous adherents, however, have been such conspicuous men as Henry Wallace, Claude Pepper, Elliott Roosevelt, and Joseph E. Davies. Its ostensible thesis is simple. The Russians (whom the appeasers systematically confuse with the communists) are friendly, co-operative, hard-working, unaggressive people, in fact just like Americans. Their leaders have a few absurd ideas, but these are a hangover from the past, and nothing to worry about. They believe in the common man, and in real economic and social democracy. If they have an approach to political democracy not quite like ours, well, everyone is entitled to his tastes, and, besides, our views and theirs are steadily getting closer together. They want only peace and prosperity, and a chance to improve their lot for the sake of themselves and the world. If they are still a bit touchy and suspicious of us, that is because we have treated them so badly in the past, and because war-mongers in our midst stir up distrust by spreading lies about them.

All that we have to do, then, is to prove that we are fair and square by giving them what they feel they need for their political security, shipping to them food and commodities and machines to build up their country, turning over to them the secrets of atomic weapons, assuring democracy everywhere by having communists in

all governments, stopping warlike gestures like building bases and sending warships on tours, and preventing fascist-minded Americans from provoking them by telling truths out of season.

Traditional isolationism has evaporated under the hot sun of two world wars. No one can even dream any longer of a virginal United States, pure, serene and satisfied behind its ocean ramparts and its continental boundaries, guarded from the filth of the diseased Old Worlds of Europe and Asia. But the heart of isolationism was never geographical. The geographical expression was a temporary mode, correlated with those stages in United States development when the primary historical tasks were the conquest of its own internal frontier and the welding of its own national unity, and when armament was restricted in effective range. Below the isolationist geography there has always been a historical, a moral idea. It is the notion, not without its grandeur for all its falsity, that the United States is not as other nations are. It is the vision of a New World of new hope and new promise, taken naively, literally. The United States, as seen in the images of this vision, grew from fresh seed in new soil, without roots in the past, unmixed with the weeds that so choked the crops of other lands. It must draw its strength from its own rich, untainted earth; it must be shielded from those osmotic contacts through which the ancient infections might flow. Hence, America First and Unique, its own star not part of any constellation, its destiny unentangled with common human fate.

The emotions out of which this vision grew remain, and express themselves through new forms, distorted and degraded by the inexorable pressure of a historical reality in which they can have no natural outlet. These new forms are grossly manifest in the *Chicago Tribune* or the *New York Daily News*; they show more honestly in the failing politics of the LaFollettes or Burton K. Wheeler; and they become dignified in the refined nostalgia of Charles A. Beard.

The new isolationism has expanded its provincial geography to include, within the boundaries of its idea of the United States, all of the Americas and much of the Pacific. But it retains intact the sense of the uniqueness of the United States, and the conviction that the United States must go its own unentangled way. All international organizations are to be mistrusted and preferably avoided.

There must be no alliances, certainly no unions, and no admission to "alien philosophies."

In political effect and practice, the new isolationism is belligerently nationalist. The United States, it declares, seeks only to go its own way and to safeguard its own interests. Let other nations choose their own particular route to damnation—communist, socialist, imperialist, fascist. It is no business of the United States', so long as they don't interfere with United States affairs. In the world as it exists, however, the affairs of the United States are everywhere, and there is always interference. The new isolationism is thus forced to be, not simply indifferent to the rest of the world, as it would like to be, but actively anti-foreign. It refuses to admit the interdependence of all the present world, and the impossibility of the United States' divorcing itself from the world's political destiny. It refuses to intervene responsibly and positively in the grave international problems which determine the political health of a world that includes the United States—the problems of India or the Balkans or communism or Iran or Western Europe or Palestine. . . . But what is done about the problems, in spite of the refusal, most intimately affects the United States. The result is that isolationism succeeds in disentangling the United States from the rest of the world only in the sense that it tends to turn all the rest of the world against the United States. Since it is unwilling to seek or accept more fruitful connections, it reduces international relations to their bare and sterile minimum, to force alone. Denouncing all other points of view as leading to war through entanglement, it makes war more probable than ever by refusing to admit any method, other than war, of mediating the critical issues which, in spite of isolationism, will continue to arise.

Appeasement and isolationism seem, to American public opinion and to each other, the ultimate opposites in the debates over United States foreign policy. Certainly appeasers and isolationists reserve for each other their fiercest invective. The Chicago *Tribune's* contemptuous cartoons of Wallace are equaled only by Wallace's bitter jibes at the *Tribune*. Certainly, if we stick to the verbal surface, no two positions could seem more irreconcilable. Nevertheless, if we relate words to facts, and examine these apparent opposites in their

historical frame, in terms of political consequences, we discover that the differences melt and blur.

Though each gives a very different account of the political world we live in, both accounts are equally false. The proposals of both, based on the false descriptions, are equally incapable of fulfillment. In their political consequences, in their effect upon the key problem of present world politics, they are identical. Both, in their different ways and from their different motivations, offer a free rein to the communists. Either, directing United States policy, would permit the communists—unhampered by the isolationists, positively aided by the appeasers—to carry forward their own communist world policy. The specific present communist policy is the strategic and political preparation for the open stage of the Third World War, the war in which communism will be fighting against the United States and for control of the world. The practical meaning of both appeasement and isolationism is, therefore, simply: no interference with the communists. A surer guarantee of war, and of war disastrous for the United States, is hard to imagine.

On the other hand, neither appeasement nor isolationism, even if entirely successful, offers any positive solution to the world political crisis, or to the problem of atomic weapons. For all their exchange of insults, they are identical in their sins of omission, as in their sins of commission. They fail to propose what is necessary. What they do propose is, and most fatally, wrong.

3

Early in 1946 there was an apparent shift in United States diplomatic behavior, which was taken by many observers to be a turn to a policy of "getting tough with Russia." I have remarked that this turn was chiefly rhetorical. By calling a policy "rhetorical," I mean that its words do not correspond with its actions. In politics, it is the actions, not the words, that count; or, rather, the words count only so far as they correctly express a line of action.

The rhetorical nature of at least the earlier stage of the 1946 toughness was plainly shown by the Iranian episode which first prompted it. The Soviet Union had directly violated its treaties and

agreements with Iran, the Teheran agreement, and the Charter of the United Nations. It had begun the process of drawing Iran into the concentric ring system, by transforming northern Iran into a puppet dependency, and gaining an orienting influence in Iran as a whole. The spokesmen for the United States, at the Security Council and in public declarations, grew very indignant about the Soviet behavior. They used tough words in place of the uniformly gracious phrasing that had made up the appeasement rhetoric of the preceding four and a half years. However, the communists knew that the United States was not taking, and had no intention of taking, any action, political, economic or military, in connection with the Iranian affair. This was well known, also, to the Iranian government.

There should have been no surprise, therefore, at the result. The tough rhetoric bounded off the resilient hide of Gromyko, and was disregarded. The communists went ahead according to plan—their plan. They withdrew the formal units of the Red Army only after they had sufficiently secured their position within Iran. At the same time the Iranians were given a lesson in how much help they could expect from the United States. The Iranian orbit began to be determined by the communist gravitational field. A much stronger counter-force than would have been enough in January, 1946, will now be required to break it away.

The mere rhetoric of toughness does not constitute a special policy. The policy continues to be defined by the substance of action. The rhetorical toughness is only, in fact, a kind of seasoning added to the mush of appeasement. A doting mother, along with her fond pleading, occasionally shakes her finger and says, "Naughty," when her spoiled child continues to be rude before company. But her attitude and her objectives do not change—nor, for that matter, does the child.

However, it is possible that the rhetorical toughness with Russia will develop into a real toughness. It is important to insist that a mere "tough with Russia" policy does not coincide with the policy of democratic world order. Indeed, just as the rhetorical toughness is a variant of the policy of appeasement, so might a real toughness amount to no more than a variant of isolationism.

The policy of democratic world order does, it is true, include real

toughness—though toughness with communism rather than with Russia. This toughness, however, is only part of a more complex orientation which is internationalist in the widest sense, not nationalist. A leading function is assigned to the United States, not because of any supposed moral virtues which the United States possesses, but because of the existing power relationships which permit the fulfillment of the internationalist purpose only through United States leadership. The policy aims not at the defeat of Russia, but at its liberation, at the victory of the Russian people over their totalitarian rulers. It proposes the defeat of world communism, but only as a negative and lesser phase of a task whose positive objective is the construction of a world political order within which civilization can breathe again. The policy of democratic world order aims not to reinforce the divisions in the world but to bring the world together, and to bind the United States to the rest of the world.

Mere toughness, in contrast, would be no more than the end-product of a national isolationism. It would be divisive, not integrating. It would mark off the United States from the rest of the world, and found the case of the United States on the sole plea of ungloved power. Its maximum success would prove negative and sterile. Conceivably the Red Army would be crushed in battle, but the conditions of the world political crisis would remain untouched, and therefore the crisis itself would be in no measure solved. The world would be no nearer a workable political order.

Policy unsupported by power is empty; but power divorced from correct policy is sterile. This is a law of politics which recent experience should be making well known to the United States. In Germany, Austria, Italy, France, there has been no lack of United States power. That power has led to nothing of benefit to the United States, to those nations themselves, or to the world. It has not because the power has not been controlled by a policy which could put the power to fruitful use.

If we are to judge by the evidence up to now at hand, we must believe it unlikely that the United States will adopt any sustained,

consistent, long-term world policy. It is not merely unlikely that it will adopt and carry through an adequate policy—the policy, namely, of democratic world order; it seems unlikely that it will even adopt and stick to any single version of incorrect policy.

The leaders of the government are under two sets of interacting pressures, one from the outside, from the international arena, the other from within. The habitual practice of American politicians is opportunistic in the most immediate sense: they try to worm their way through the maze of these pressures by yielding, responding, occasionally reacting to them as they arise and vary from day to day. They seldom lift their vision to a level from which they could get knowledge of the pressure system as a whole, in order, with the help of that knowledge, to try to create an independent force which might control and direct the resultant energy of the entire system. They are more likely to weigh a shift in foreign policy against a million votes in the next election than against the effect of the shift on the alignment of world political forces—though that effect, if adverse, may before long lose much more than an election.

We may, then, expect to find, at any given moment in the government's conduct of world affairs, an admixture of several mutually incompatible policies—three parts appeasement with one part toughness; two parts isolationism with two parts World Government; and so on. Over a period of time, we may expect the successive predominance of first one and then another of the various possible policies. Moods of toughness, appeasement, isolationism, internationalism, and chauvinism will (unless, of course, open war cuts the series) replace and overlap each other.

In short, the evidence suggests that the United States in world affairs will have a *policy of vacillation*.

A policy of vacillation is perhaps the worst of all policies. Even a poor policy, resolutely carried through, will usually produce much better results than a policy of vacillation, as in science a false hypothesis is often more useful than no hypothesis at all. Under a policy of vacillation, everything adds up to nothing, because one action in one direction merely cancels out another in a different direction. Your own followers are disoriented and demoralized. Your friends, who cannot count on you from one week to the next, are

disheartened. Because they know that, whatever your promises, a sudden change may leave them in the lurch, they drop away. Your enemies, if they keep their heads, can go merrily and scornfully forward.

A vacillating attitude toward the storm on the horizon—one moment running up all sails to try to fly before it, the next trimming down to head into its teeth, then dropping anchor to ride it out—does not, unfortunately, ensure any vacillation on the storm's part. It will come on at its own rate, and break at its own time. Your indecision will have meant only that, when the squall strikes, you will be least ready to meet it.

20. *The Outcome*

I HAVE ALREADY STATED my belief that the policy of democratic world order would prove successful. From the point of view of the United States, success for this policy, or for any policy, would, in the first place, mean the assurance of survival. Negatively, success would mean the defeat of the communist plan for world conquest and the reduction of communist power to insignificance. But, given the existing world political situation, success must mean much more. It must include a method for controlling atomic weapons, which, we have seen, can only be through an absolute monopoly in their production and possession. It must provide for the organization of a world political system which would be workable and through which a general, total war could be prevented. These two requirements, which are of no more special concern to the United States than to the world at large, can also be fulfilled by this policy. In addition, though here we look beyond the present historical period to which alone this policy is directly relevant, the achievement of its specific aims could be used as a bridge toward the goal of a genuine world government.

All this is not merely logically possible. With the available means, it could actually be done. With a determined leadership in, and by, the United States, it would be done. I do not wish to suggest that it could be done easily, or with small cost. The most optimistic account of the present state of the world will be very black. The most hopeful route out of the crisis will be hard and painful and, most probably, bloody.

The determined leadership may arise, in response to the world challenge. What if it does not, what then will be the outcome?

If it does not, the United States will follow what I have described as a policy of vacillation. This policy will in no way check the intensification of the crisis, or the progress of the world struggle. The struggle will go, and the flood of war will break at a moment for

which, because of the very nature of the policy, the United States cannot be prepared. The initiative, the timing will be under the control of the antagonist.

We do not need access to secret files in order to know that the military leadership of the United States is aware of the possibility, even probability, of the war, and is, in a military sense, preparing for it. Military preparation, however, is the instrument of policy; and political unpreparedness condemns even the most perfect military measures to futility. Under the assumption of a policy of vacillation, let us consider briefly the prospects of the war.

Since the enemy, under the assumption, will have at his disposal greater manpower and a better strategic position, the primary reliance of the military leadership must be on technical, and to a lesser extent on quantitative, superiority in armament. The strategic plan must be, it would seem, to strike an immediate, paralyzing blow with atomic weapons at the Caucasian oil fields, Moscow, and a dozen or more of the chief Soviet and Soviet-controlled cities and industrial concentrations. There is reason to believe that some among the military leaders think that with this blow the war would be virtually over, and that the Soviet Union, deprived of war potential, would have to quit within a few weeks.

In 1946, it is doubtful that there exist the technical means for delivering a simultaneous, mass blow into the depths of the Heartland. Let us assume, however, that this technical problem will have been solved, as it no doubt soon will be. In any case, even without its full solution, colossal material destruction could be brought about.

But if, by then, the Soviet Union also has atomic weapons, the United States will receive as well as launch a mass attack in the first stage. In fact, with a United States policy of vacillation, and with the totalitarian freedom from public responsibility, it is almost certain that the communist attack will have come first. Presumably, the United States will have prepared its atomic installations so that they at least will survive the attack, and retaliation will be possible (if not, the United States will have lost before beginning).

We have already noted that United States industry, more highly developed, more concentrated, more integrated, is also and because

of those very characteristics more vulnerable to atomic attack than Soviet industry. At the same time, the American social structure is more intimately dependent on industry than the Soviet structure. We should therefore expect that the relative damage done by the initial communist atomic attack on the United States will be greater than the damage done by the United States attack on the Soviet Union.

However, the attacks would tend, more or less, to cancel each other out. They would not end a short war, but begin a war of incomparable length and magnitude. The huge material damage on both sides, so great that during the course of the war it will never be made up, will have the effect of lessening the importance of the technical factor in the conduct of the war. Manpower, morale, appeals to the peoples of the world, in general the political factors, will become more and more decisive. With the continued assumption of a United States policy of vacillation, this change in the nature of the struggle will throw the advantage more and more heavily to the side of the communists. Their greater direct manpower reserves will be supplemented by the mass populations of the colonies and undeveloped nations, which the lack of positive United States policy will have left open to communist influence. Western Europe will probably have been brought under communist domination before the start of the war. If not, if it is still somehow standing, divided nationally and socially, riddled with communist organizations, it will fall to pieces at the first big communist push. Within the United States itself, and inside all of her allies, the communist parties and agents, permitted by the policy of vacillation to thrive imbedded in all the vital national organs, will erupt into material and psychological sabotage, before which loyal citizens, politically unprepared, will be comparatively helpless. The end, the defeat of the United States, will be delayed, but almost certain.

Let us suppose, on the other hand, that when the war begins the Soviet Union does not yet have atomic weapons. Then, of course, there will be no immediate retaliation to the initial mass atomic attack by the United States. This means that the first stage of the war will be a gigantic victory for the United States. If this victory were part of an adequate positive policy, it would, in all probability,

be the end of the war. In the eyes of all the peoples of the world, including those of the subjects of the Soviet regime, it would mean much more than a mere display of unprecedented material force. It would be seen in relation to a plan, already in operation, which promised a solution of the world crisis. Everyone, except the communist leadership itself, would know that he had something to gain by stopping the war. The pre-war functioning of the policy would have blocked the communists from completing their strategic and political preparations, would have reduced or rooted out the internal communists, and would have shown the people the meaning of the struggle. It would have acted to neutralize the communist penetration of China, India, Islam, the East Indies, Latin America. Instead of the slender human resources of the United States, joined with some others in a precarious *ad hoc* alliance for the war, the peoples of the non-communist world, and the non-communist peoples of the communist world, would be in the process of coming together not for a war but for the creative task of building a humane world political order. The communists could recover from the physical blow of the initial attack only if they had superior political reserves on which to draw. Deprived of these, they would have little chance, even for a delaying action.

The prospect at once darkens if we keep to the more likely assumption of a policy of vacillation. True enough, the communists could not avoid the terrible defeat in the initial stage. But, with their political arsenal immune to the atomic blast, they would not surrender. They would abandon their vulnerable great cities and factories, as the Athenians, knowing that they could neither defend nor use it, abandoned their city to the Persian hordes. They would give up the idea of a war fought with all modern conveniences. They would transform the struggle into a political war, a "people's war," fought in every district of the world by irregulars, partisans, guerillas, Fifth Columns, spies, stool pigeons, assassins, fought by sabotage and strikes and lies and terror and diversion and panic and revolt. They would play on every fear and prejudice of the United States population, every feeling of guilt or nobility; they would exploit every racial and social division; they would widen every

antagonism between tentative allies; and they would tirelessly wear down the United States will to endure.

Though the result would be not quite so certain, perhaps, as if the communists also had atomic weapons, they would in the end, I think, succeed. Because of the lack of a positive United States policy, because it would not have presented to the world even the possibility of a political solution, its dreadful material strength would appear to the peoples as the unrelieved brutality of a murderer. Its failure to distinguish between the communist regime and that regime's subject-victims would weld together the victims and their rulers. Americans themselves would be sickened and conscience-ridden by what would seem to them a senseless slaughter, never-ending, leading nowhere. The military leadership would be disoriented by the inability of their plans based on technical superiority to effect a decision. The failure to conceive the struggle politically would have given the communists the choice of weapons. From the standpoint of the United States, the entire world would have been turned into an ambush and a desert. In the long night, nerves would finally crack, the sentries would fire their last shots wildly into the darkness, and it would all be over.

There can be no illusion about the meaning of defeat in the next total war. We are long past those youthful wars of the springtime of a civilization, which are part of the exuberance of lusty growth. We have left behind the wars that are the professional business of a small social class that doesn't have much else to do, or the polite wars which, after much maneuvering and small fighting, adjust a dynasty or a kink in a border. We are fighting the Punic Wars and the civil wars of the climax of the Time of Troubles, the wars of annihilation. Roosevelt, in the Second World War, impelled by a fatality which he doubtless did not understand, revealed by his ominous slogan the nature of our age. For the first time in the history of the wars of Western Civilization, the objective had become Unconditional Surrender—final defeat, utter, crushing, absolute.

2

Under a continued policy of vacillation, the defeat and annihilation of the United States are probable. It is less certain, however, that the defeat of the United States will automatically mean the victory of the Soviet Union and world communism. In the prolonged struggle, especially if it is fought by both sides with atomic weapons, it may be that both contestants will be destroyed, that they will destroy each other. The exhaustion, the human and material destruction, might well go beyond the point where social recuperation is possible. This has happened before. In the Peloponnesian Wars, victorious Sparta was destroyed no less than defeated Athens, as the battle of Leuctra soon showed; and all Greece was opened to easy conquest, first by Macedon and then by Rome. It happened in the case of Byzantine Civilization, whose internal blood-letting permitted the entry of the Ottoman Turks; and it happened in other civilizations centered in the Near East, and in China.*

All of Western Civilization, all, that is, of those parts of the world whose social structure is now dependent upon an advanced level of industry and technology, would be enmeshed in this total defeat. But what then? The intolerable world political crisis, which is fundamentally the crisis of Western Civilization in its necessarily world-wide repercussions, would still exist, in a still more aggravated form. In the premature travail of Napoleon, and by three world wars, the West would have proved that it could not solve its own crisis. In the attempt it would have used up its resources for possible solution.

But Western Civilization, we have been careful to observe, is not all of human society. The exhaustion of the West would have affected only the imposed Western veneer of the other existing civilizations. Into the vacuum of the West there might well then flow a tide from China or India or Islam. The political order of a Universal Empire would be imposed from without, and the Western peoples would enter the last stage of their history as the imperial proletariat.

* Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*

The United States must choose. When the cry of the drowning man has once been heard, it does no good to stop our ears. There is no way of release from the awful responsibility of choice; Pilate's refusal to choose is also, we know, a choice.

Individual men, through the mystery of what our theologians call God's Grace, if they fail once, are always given another chance, a chance to repent and choose again. This does not seem to be the law of the history of societies. History offers each of its great challenges only once. After only one failure, or one refusal, the offer is withdrawn. Babylon, Athens, Thebes, Alexandria, Madrid, Vienna sink back, and do not rise again. Nor is there any prior bargaining over the terms and the time of the challenge.

It may be that the darkness of great tragedy will bring to a quick end the short, bright history of the United States—for there is enough truth in the dream of the New World to make the action tragic. The United States is called before the rehearsals are completed. Its strength and promise have not been matured by the wisdom of time and suffering. And the summons is for nothing less than the leadership of the world, for that or nothing. If it is reasonable to expect failure, that is only a measure of how great the triumph could be.



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